This paper aims to analyze the philosophical implications of the atomic bomb in the thinking of three German post-war philosophers: Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers. Although they differ greatly in interest and philosophical perspective, the atomic bomb can be discerned as a problem of humanity's technological, ethical, and political conditions in the intersection of their authorships. In the examination of their ideas, they are situated within a diachronic tradition of philosophy of technology. Their common entanglement with phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy is also considered, most notably in the form of the influence of Martin Heidegger.
For Anders, the atomic bomb is the defining feature of the ethical and political conditions of post-war humanity, yet humans are unable to grasp its reality. In the thinking of Jaspers, the bomb necessitates a supra-political principle grounded in the faculty of reason. For him, politics in the nuclear age must rest upon the responsibility of the many individuals, in an ethical re-birth of humanity. Arendt primarily understands the bomb as a product of the increasing power of the thoughtless instrumentality of science. The destructive potential of atomic weapons solidifies to her a crisis in the meaning of politics, in which brute force has undermined political power.
All three thinkers share the view that the atomic bomb must be understood in conjunction with a certain thought- and meaninglessness in the science and politics of their contemporary. The bomb also signifies to them a technological obscuring of human agency, the implications of which are exacerbated by the fact that it has also immensely improved the ability of one individual to commit heinous acts. In impairing the conditions for ethical action and meaningful politics for lasting peace, the bomb necessitates these very same principles. By threatening to make humanity as mortal as only individuals had been before, the bomb has made radical change in human thinking and activity urgent. However, to what extent sufficient adaptations are probable, or even possible, is a question in which the philosophers discussed in this paper diverge.