From presidential regimes, in particular the US, scholars have shown that in times of crisis or war, the president’s power rises by a rally-round-the-flag effect and by centralization of power as extraordinary procedures, and emergency powers come into effect. Very few studies, however, have examined how the condition of war impacts on executive dynamics in semi-presidential regimes. This study addresses this gap by examining how executive coordination in Ukraine has been (re-)organized during the war and how this has influenced the balance of executive power between the president, prime minister, and parliament. Our analysis is based on a systematic collection of analytical materials and media reports, updates, expert comments, and official data covering the period Feb 2022 to March 2023. Among the study’s main findings and consistent with our hypotheses, we conclude that the war has accelerated centralization of executive powers around the president, thereby further strengthening the president’s dominance over the cabinet, but also that the overwhelming demands on the presidency during the war have necessitated the delegation of significant levels of executive governance from the president to the cabinet, particularly evident in areas of domestic policy.