The majority of biodiversity assessments use species as the base unit. Recently, a series of studies have suggested replacing numbers of species with higher ranked taxa (genera, families, etc.); a method known as taxonomic surrogacy that has an important potential to save time and resources in assesments of biological diversity. We examine the relationships between taxa and ranks, and suggest that species/higher taxon exchanges are founded on misconceptions about the properties of Linnaean classification. Rank allocations in current classifications constitute a heterogeneous mixture of various historical and contemporary views. Even if all taxa were monophyletic, those referred to the same rank would simply denote separate clades without further equivalence. We conclude that they are no more comparable than any other, non-nested taxa, such as, for example, the genus Rattus and the phylum Arthropoda, and that taxonomic surrogacy tacks justification. These problems are also illustrated with data of polychaetous annelid worms from a broad-scale study of benthic biodiversity and species distributions in the Irish Sea. A recent consensus phylogeny for polychaetes is used to provide three different family-level classifications of polychaetes. We use families as a surrogate for species, and present Shannon-Wiener diversity indices for the different sites and the three different classifications, showing how the diversity measures rely on subjective rank allocations.

Clade and monophyletic group on one hand and grade and paraphyletic group on the other hand are commonly used as pairs of interchangeable terms. I question this apparent synonymy and propose that "monophyly" and "paraphyly" should refer to a property of a set, whereas "clade" and "grade" should apply to individuals resulting from evolutionary process.

When scientists use a taxon name like Mammalia, it is important that they talk about the same thing. But, what does it mean to be the same thing in different phylogenetic hypotheses? And, how is taxonomic reference maintained across hypotheses? Here, we discuss the differences between real and hypothetical clades, and how such a distinction relates to the sameness problem. Since hypotheses influence how we perceive things and pursue science, we find it important to have a functioning nomenclatural system for clades as perceived in phylogenetic hypotheses. As a solution to the sameness problem for such clades, we argue that a taxon name does not primarily refer to a single clade that somehow mirror the reality of branches in the tree of life. Instead we suggest that a taxon name refers to a set, or natural kind, of counterfactual and reconstructed clades.