Concepts are fundamental collective constructs of individual items that are capable of abstracting meaningfully homogeneous groupings of phenomena. This capability is a prerequisite for communication and action and gives structure to learning and memory. Our study is aligned with the vast paradigm that assumes embodied cognition, rooted in Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of perception (trans: C. Smith). Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962), seminally articulated by Varela et al. (Embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991) and existing today in a number of variants that have been reviewed by Wilson (Six views of embodied cognition. Springer. Psychon Bull Rev 9(4):625–636, 2002). We argue that the faculty to conceptualise may spring from the ability of homo habilis to manage concrete actions in space and time, and we propose that at the root level, ‘grasping concepts’ in a cognitive perspective may have a lot to do with the process of ‘grasping objects’ from an operational position.