In this note we study how the share of workers in a corporation located in a high gender wage gap country impacts the wage gap in their home country operations. Our findings support the hypothesis that firms with strong intra-firm linkages to a high gender wage gap country also display a relatively large gender wage gap at home. 

In this paper, we study the link between globalization of firms and gender inequality. Specifically, we examine how the need for interpersonal contacts in trade and gender-specific differences in negotiations are related to the gender wage gap. Our key finding is that export of goods that are intensive in interpersonal contacts widens the gender wage gap. The effect is robust across various specifications and is most pronounced for domestic exporting firms, which do not trade within multinational corporations but with external foreign partners, where the contracting problem is most distinct. We ascribe this result to a male comparative advantage in bargaining.

In this paper, we study foreign ownership as a vehicle for transferring gender norms across international borders. Specifically, we analyze how the wage differential between men and women in Swedish firms is affected by the degree of gender inequality in the home country of foreign investors. The results suggest that gender norms of the home country matter—the gender wage gap in foreign-owned subsidiaries appears to increase with the degree of gender inequality prevailing in the investors’ home market. This f inding is identified from within job-spell variation in wages and proves robust across a series of specifications.

Educational mismatch in the form of over- and under-educated workers has long been studied in relation to labor market outcomes for individual workers. While its consequences for individual workers and society are dire, we have only anecdotal evidence of its consequences for rms competitiveness. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the impact of mismatch on rm productivity, wages and pro t. The results suggest an asymmetric e ect from employing over- and under-educated workers. We nd that while employing over-educated workers add to wage cost, there are no matching productivity gains, By contrast, the performance of under-educated workers more than compensates for their wage costs, leading to increased pro ts at the rm level. The net e ect, therefore, in the form of gross operating surplus is signi cantly negative (positive) when rms employ over- (under-)educated workers. The results suggest that the positive e ects primarily stem from under-educated young workers, whereas the losses can be traced to over-educated older workers.