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2026 (English)In: Journal of applied econometrics (Chichester, England), ISSN 0883-7252, E-ISSN 1099-1255Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]
In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 45 of the 57 investigated data sets (p value threshold 0.05).
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2026
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-58860 (URN)10.1002/jae.70038 (DOI)001655867300001 ()
Funder
The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, P22-0087The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, W18–0004
2026-01-092026-01-092026-01-16Bibliographically approved