Artikeln fokuserar på de mer personliga dimensionerna i brevväxlingen mellan Schiller och Körner och fäster särskild uppmärksamhet vid Schillers återkommande rapporter om sitt bräckliga hälsotillstånd. Artikeln analyserar det ”tvång” som enligt Schiller präglar den estetiska erfarenheten, dels genom att sätta det i relation till det motstånd som Schillers sjuka kropp uppreste mot hans eget skrivande, och dels genom att analysera tvångets betydelse för de estetiska och politiska ideal som Schiller framför i sina texter. För att kunna komma till rätta med dessa frågor kontrasteras Schillers estetiska tänkande mot Kants, i vilket den estetiska erfarenheten präglas av lust snarare än av tvång.

Whether we consider the nature of positive or negative aesthetic experiences, situating Kantian aesthetics within the framework of the critical system entails addressing the inherent negativity of the aesthetic itself. This article revisits the critical potential of aesthetic negativity to incite crisis in the discourses of science and morality (Menke 1991). By examining Kant’s notes on the displeasure of hypochondria as a principle of inversion (Verkehrtheit) in representation, it identifies a reciprocity between the aesthetic and hypochondriac mood (Gemütstimmung) (section three, «The Conflict of the Faculties»). Both moods denote intense, transgressive states between receptivity and spontaneity pertaining to the (self-)reflective sensibility of thought; the tautegorical sensation of thinking itself (Lyotard 1994). I argue that the aesthetic problematics of hypochondria’s psychosomatic self-reflexivity resonate in the negativity of the unregulated maximizing of the faculties characterizing their free play in aesthetic judgment. By highlighting the hypochondriac (hyper) sensibility, the critical impact of aesthetic experience’s infinite negativity regarding conceptual determinations, which «strengthens and reproduces itself» in the face of the object (CPJ, § 12), is emphasized. Aligning with readings that stress the importance of mind disorders in understanding Kantian philosophy (Comay 2016, David-Ménard 2000, Feloj 2022, Nancy 2008, Rauer 2007), Kant’s reflection on his hypochondriac sensibility is used as an analytical lens to explore a key aspect of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. I argue that the formal correspondence between these distinct moods underscore the crucial role of sensibility in Kant’s aesthetics, which is often overshadowed by understanding or reason in canonical (Guyer 1979, Allison 2001) as well as recent critical (Lloyd 2019) interpretations. The basis for the commonality between pathological and aesthetic self-reflexivity lies in Kant’s discovery in the third Critique regarding the relationships between sensibility, understanding, and reason. Deleuze notes that while the first and second Critiques feature strict regulation by one dominant faculty, the third Critique introduces the potential for free, unregulated relations among the faculties. This shift has significant implications for sensibility, which moves from being logically confined in the Critique of Pure Reason to, in the third Critique, concern an aesthetic, «a pathos beyond all logic» (Deleuze 1984, p. xii). If the first Critique focuses on the separation and orderly reunion of concepts and sensibility, the force of sensibility in the aesthetic «discordant accord» establishes a relation to phenomena without relying on conceptual powers (CPJ, § 1). Unlike the positivity of determinant (bestimmt) judgment, the purposelessness of the aesthetic Gemütsstimmung allows the given to emerge as new or radically other, evoking a sense of modesty and mystery toward the world’s diversity, with potential radical effects on its social organization (Rancière 2004).

This essay explores the metaphorical and conceptual significance of the globus sphere in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Physical Geography. Through its integration of sensibility and corporeal spatiality into the heart of Kantian philosophy, the essay argues that the spherical shape accommodates a situated notion of the subject. A conception that further nuances the “hard-edged” dominance of reason and rationality over sensibility, which often is associated with Kant’s thought. While recognizing the viable critiques of Kant’s Eurocentrism and racism in Physical Geography, the essay concludes by demonstrating how Kant’s concept of the sphere – emphasizing that neither Earth nor reason has a fixed center – implies that Kantian critique could likewise serve as a potential alternative to colonial and hierarchical modes of thought, thereby indicating a path toward the notion of a universal reason of a truly global character.

This thesis considers Immanuel Kant’s notion of sensibility in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). It directs attention to sensibility’s function in Kant’s conceptualisation of aesthetic experience and thereby shows how the central role of sensibility in the third Critique contributes to a deeper understanding of aesthetic experience. This is done through a close reading of two philosophical key terms – Gemüt and Stimmung – and two specific phenomena – laughter (Witz) and hypochondria – carried out in conversation with three works of art: Max Neuhaus’ public sound piece Times Square (1977), Sarah Lucas’ installation Au Naturel (1994) and Nazlı Dinçel’s film work Leafless (2011). Taking departure from the framework offered by Kant’s critical philosophy and his anthropological writings, I argue that the analyzed concepts and phenomena on the one hand call on the importance of sensibility in Kant’s aesthetics, and on the other show that we still need Kant to grasp present questions and central motives in contemporary art.