Non-majoritarian institutions are designed to depoliticize policymaking and enhance the credibility of regulatory decisions. Yetmany such bodies have become sites of contestation, exposing the limits of technocratic insulation. While research highlightsexternal and behavioral drivers of politicization, the role of institutional design features in shaping this process remains under-explored. This article develops the concept of design-based politicization to explain how structural features intended to depolit-icize decision-making can instead generate conflict. Drawing on interview and document material, it examines the EuropeanCommission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board as a critical case of technocratic oversight in regulatory governance. The analysis iden-tifies three design-related mechanisms for politicization: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughputlegitimacy. Politicization may thus stem not only from external pressures or poor performance but from specific institutional de-sign features, thereby revealing the contradictions of depoliticization and clarifying when and why technocratic oversight bodiesbecome contested within and beyond Europe. 

While European integration has transformed national parliaments, its long-term impact on conflicts between governments and opposition parties remains insufficiently understood. This study addresses that gap by analysing how Sweden’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 1995 altered the patterns of parliamentary opposition. Using longitudinal data on government proposals in the Swedish parliament, 1970–2022, we apply a difference-in-differences design to compare opposition intensity before and after accession. Our findings reveal two major transformations. First, we identify a sustained decline in opposition in internationally embedded economic and tax policies, supporting the view that the EU political system structurally depoliticises economic governance. Second, we observe a gradual but pronounced politicisation in policy areas tied to national identity and social welfare, where EU competences are limited and domestic discretion remains. We thus find that European integration reshapes parliamentary conflict by dampening opposition in economic policymaking while intensifying contestation in policy areas related to national identity and social protection. Rather than reducing opposition overall, EU membership redirects it across issue areas. Taken together, the results show that the distribution of national and supranational competences conditions parliamentary opposition. As Sweden is a most likely case of EU-induced cleavage transformation, similar dynamics are likely across other member states as well. The study advances parliamentary research by shifting attention from formal powers and debates to observable opposition behaviour over time. It also adds to theories of modern-day cleavage formation by providing evidence that European integration reduces conflict in economic policy while intensifying identity-based divides.

This report presents the findings of Work Package 2 (WP2) of the Horizon Europe project Sustaining Public Administration in Modern Democracies (SUPA). It examines regulatory offsetting schemes, commonly known as “One-in-One-out” (OIOO) or “One-in-X-out” (OIXO), which require new regulatory burdens to be compensated through reductions in existing burdens. As regulation and its associated burdens have continued to grow, modern democracies have increasingly adopted these schemes within broader Better Regulation programmes. Nevertheless, systematic comparative evidence of their design and implementation remains limited. Therefore, this report examines the design, politics, implementation and effectiveness of regulatory offsetting and the conditions under which it constrains regulatory growth and provides meaningful burden relief.

The report combines documentary analysis, longitudinal quantitative analysis and qualitative case studies drawing on 63 elite and expert interviews. Part I maps regulatory offsetting and selected burden reduction initiatives across 28 countries and the European Union (EU), including more detailed examinations of the Netherlands and the EU. Part II analyses legislative activity in Denmark, France, Germany and Spain between 2000 and 2025, using the Netherlands and Norway as comparison cases. It examines whether offsetting is associated with changes in the number and volume of legal acts and in the prevalence of restrictive and termination clauses. Part III investigates the practical operation of offsetting through in-depth case studies of Denmark, France, Germany and Spain.

Overall, the findings reveal that offsetting has its clearest and most consistent effects on regulatory procedures and institutional behaviour, particularly on how regulation is assessed and designed. It raises awareness of regulatory burdens, institutionalises cost measurement, strengthens the assessment, justification and scrutiny of regulatory costs, and encourages officials to consider less burdensome approaches to regulatory design and implementation. Yet we find no clear evidence that offsetting consistently constrains rule growth or provides substantial relief to regulated actors. Four main findings support this conclusion.

This policy brief summarises the principal findings and policy recommendations of SUPA Deliverable D2.1, Regulatory Offsetting in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Design, Politics, Implementation, and Effectiveness. It finds that regulatory offsetting increases awareness and scrutiny of regulatory costs but does not consistently constrain regulatory growth or deliver tangible burden relief. The brief recommends using offsetting as a supporting component of a broader Better Regulation framework rather than as an autonomous burden reduction instrument.

The expansion of European Union (EU) regulations often hampers effective policy implementation in the member states. However, little is known about how these diverse states navigate and apply the complex rules in practice, and with what consequences. This study addresses this gap by examining how the 2014 EU public procurement directives impacted procurement practices across the Union. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that the EU's goals of harmonisation and competition were undermined in practice. First, we observe a rise in single-bid contracts across EU countries compared to non-EU countries, undermining competition. Second, we demonstrate a growing divergence in policy implementation, where member states with varying administrative capacities and corruption risks display different rates of single bids. Third, we show that while a few Eastern European countries with poor procurement records embraced the flexibility to award contracts based on the most economically advantageous tender, Nordic countries largely avoided this flexibility. This divergence raises concerns that the new EU rules have brought about new corruption risks. These findings have important implications, underscoring the unintended consequences of expanding complex and flexible regulations, revealing that efforts to harmonise the internal market can backfire, leading to increased differentiated policy implementation across the member states.

For nearly three decades, the European Commission has been pursuing the so-called Better Regulation agenda. At present, however, we are entering an era in which simplification is being given priority over essential protections, with a growing risk that key labour and environmental standards — which help ensure protection for workers and the environment worldwide — will be weakened or dismantled. While originally intended to simplify complex legislation, the agenda has been increasingly shifted towards serving business interests. Under President Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission, this shift has accelerated: regulations are now routinely portrayed as burdensome, especially when they entail costs for companies. In early 2025, the Commission introduced the “Omnibus” package to simplify EU rules and boost competitiveness. This includes an at least 25% reduction of administrative burdens and reporting obligations for companies and 35% for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as the suspension of several legislative initiatives such as due diligence, corporate sustainability reporting, and EU taxonomy. After analysing these policies, this policy brief issues an urgent call for a rebalancing of the Better Regulation agenda to safeguard core social and environmental protections against an increasingly one-sided push for deregulation.

The European Union (EU) launched the European Pillar of Social Rights to improve social rights for EU citizens. However, little is known about the domestic dynamics of implementing these new rights. This article examines the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive in three member states with different policy traditions (Denmark, Germany, and Poland). Based on an actor-centred approach, the article demonstrates that two main factors were crucial in motivating national actors to shape the implementation of these rights. First, the economic costs, including new permanent costs emerging from the provisions and the administrative costs of implementing an EU directive, shaped actors’ positions in all three countries. Second, the values of gender equality – whether promoting gender-equal leave or traditional family values – constituted an underlying reason for actors to customise the EU rules differently. Both factors, used as a defence or driver for change, increase differentiated policy implementation.  

Seit fast 30 Jahren verfolgt die EU-Kommission die sogenannte Agenda der Besseren Rechtsetzung. Zu Beginn als Instrument, um komplexe gesetzliche Regelwerke zu vereinfachen, änderte sich die Zielsetzung allmählich zugunsten von Unternehmenswünschen. Unter der Führung von EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen werden EU-Gesetze nun zunehmend als administrative Last beschrieben, sobald sie für Unternehmen als zu kostspielig betrachtet werden.