Based on data from a survey conducted in Saint Petersburg in 2013, this article sheds new light on attitudes towards fatherhood in contemporary Russia. We explore what norms are held concerning fatherhood, how these attitudes are related to age, sex, education and income as well as to ideal?typical models established in previous research on fatherhood from Western Europe and the US. Thus, the article also discusses what explanatory value established theoretical models have for the Russian context. Norms of the role of the father in the family are related to general norms of masculinity and, hence, are an important part of the study of politics and the political climate in a society. The results show that there are several fatherhood ideals present in contemporary Northwestern Russia: a traditional breadwinner model, an active fatherhood model as well as what we refer to as a marginalized fatherhood model. The latter has not been substantially identified in previous research, and may tentatively be identified as a legacy of the Soviet era.

Between 1985 and 1995, fertility in Eastern Europe declined from 2.2 children per woman to merely 1.5 on region-average. Previous research has emphasized mainly the economic turmoil during transition or the influx of new ideas regarding fertility and family relations. This article suggests that applying a risk management perspective on fertility patterns may put additional light on the reasons behind the fertility decline in post-communist Europe. The complexity of modern social systems has made people increasingly dependent on the state for risk evaluation and risk management. The article formulates the hypothesis that transition itself disrupted the mental models that helped people to navigate among the risks associated to having and raising children. Left to their own devices, women in Eastern Europe became more inclined to postpone childbirth or discard this option altogether.