This open access short reader provides an introductory yet critically analytical exploration of migration and the politics of integration. Drawing inspiration from Nira Yuval-Davis' concept of the 'politics of belonging,' we define the 'politics of integration' as various political projects aimed at constructing integration, belonging, and cohesion within different collectivities. The book explores theoretical debates, such as the cultural, civic, and local turns, governmentality, subsidiarity, nationalism, nativism, securitization of migration, ultra-politics, sub-politics, populism, nativism, multiculturalism, and interculturalism. Based on the authors' empirical research findings, the book analyzes the directions the politics of integration have taken in Europe during the neoliberal era. This era is characterized by a bipolar, Manichean view of the world, which exacerbates the divide between "us" and "them". Written in an assessable way, the book offers valuable insights for social science students at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels as well as for policymakers and practitioners grappling with the challenges posed by migration and its political dimensions.

Family migration constitutes by far the largest form of entry into countries with established democracies. Yet, it remains widely neglected in the literature on public attitudes. One of the key challenges in researching this topic is its inherent complexity. Family migration involves not only the claims of outsiders seeking entry, but also those of insiders wishing to reunite with family members. To address both dimensions simultaneously, we designed a conjoint survey experiment using an innovative dyadic approach. Respondents were presented with hypothetical cases of aspiring family migrants, alongside their respective family members already residing in the destination country. Key attributes, such as financial resources and types of family relationships, were randomized for each pair. We conducted the survey with 5,000 respondents across France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Our results suggest that respondents pay close attention to the characteristics of the incoming family migrant, such as language skills, while also being concerned with the economic resources of the family member already residing in the destination country. These findings indicate that research on public attitudes cannot treat family reunification as just one among many immigration motives. Study designs must also systematically account for the status of the family member already living in the destination country.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and other crises have reactivated national membership issues in the Baltic Sea region. This article analyses recent policy shifts in Sweden and Finland, highlighting a move toward increased conditionality and deportability. In both countries, migration is increasingly framed through security—linked to domestic crime, geopolitical tensions, and the threat from Russia. Sweden’s reforms include abolishing permanent residency for certain groups and introducing “good conduct” requirements, while Finland has enacted emergency border laws and proposed a number of restrictions that will make access to secure residency harder. The study underscores how securitization enables restrictive membership policies. 

Since 2007, Scandinavia has emerged as a new destination for Romanian Roma engaging in circular migration for begging and street work. Using policy documents from parliamentary debates in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, survey data on Romanian migrants in Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen, and qualitative fieldwork in Scandinavia and Romania, this article explores the dynamic relationship between Scandinavian policy responses and migrant selection and adaptations. First, we demonstrate how the Scandinavian countries differ in their approach to migration for begging as a policy problem, resulting in different contexts of reception. Second, we show that these different contexts of reception have given rise to differences in the selection and adaptations of migrant beggars and street workers in each of the three capital cities. Third, we hypothesize that the relationship between policy responses and migrant adaptations should be conceptualized as a process of cumulative causation, where pre-existing policy differences are reinforced through positive feedback.

With the case of Sweden as its focus, this article contributes to the research on state–Islam relations in Europe. From a comparative European perspective, it demonstrates that Sweden departs from what is generally presented as the common pattern when it comes to when, how and why state-Islam relations were first established. Previous theorising on this topic, primarily connected with Jonathan Laurence’s seminal work on state–Islam relations in Europe, argues that such relations follow two phases, namely (1) Embassy Islam (1960–1990) and (2) the institutionalisation of domestic relations with (national) Muslim Councils (1990-onwards). Our conclusion, however, is that Sweden skipped the first phase and went directly to the second in the mid-1970s. This, we argue, can be explained as the (unplanned) result of a general change in church–state relations in Sweden.