Petra Garberding

Gerd Schönfelder: Musicologist and Stasi Employee in Sweden

The musicologist Gerd Schönfelder, alias IM (*inoffizieller Mitarbeiter*) "Hans Mai", wrote in a report to the Stasi on 21 July 1984:

> I can say the following about my activity in Sweden:
>
> In October 1976, the Association [of Composers and Musicologists of the GDR] sent Comrade [Ursula] Ragwitz and me to the Swedish Association in Stockholm. The president at the time, Eskil Hemberg, openly criticized the way the GDR Association was organizing its foreign relations at the time. He explained, among other things, that visit by GDR representatives to Sweden were purely for tourist purposes and shopping. It had happened that GDR representatives had not even listened to Swedish music during their stay.
>
> Comrade Ragwitz and I drew our conclusions from this and really studied Swedish music every day in the information center [GDR Cultural Center in Stockholm]. We discovered that most Swedish composers have an attitude of active humanism and are potential allies in the struggle for peace.
>
> Eskil Hemberg informed me that there was no developed art analysis in Sweden. Therefore, they would invite the FRG as a guest country to participate in the Nordic Music Days in 1978. Because there were good analysts in the FRG, a conference would be held involving musicologists from the Scandinavian countries and Iceland and the Federal Republic.
>
> Eskil Hemberg, who knew my analytical work quite well, offered me a keynote lecture and urged me to participate in this conference. I agreed on the condition that they would not invite the FRG, but the GDR, since only here could they really learn something new in the aesthetic field. […]

Gerd Schönfelder, 1984. (Bundesarchiv Berlin, Photo 183-1984-1204-020 / Photographer: Matthias Hiekel).

He then informed me in March of the following year that he had succeeded in changing the opinion of the members of the Presidium of the Nordic Music Council and had succeeded in pushing through the decision to invite the GDR by a majority vote.[1]

1 BArch, MfS, BV Dresden (Dnd), AIM 3242-90, II, vol. I, p. 170. German original: "Über meine Tätigkeit in Schweden kann ich folgendes sagen: Im Oktober 1976 entsandte der Verband [der Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler der DDR] Genossen [Ursula] Ragwitz und mich zum schwedischen Verband nach Stockholm. Der damalige Präsident Eskil Hemberg übte offen Kritik an der damaligen Gestaltung der Auslandsbeziehungen des DDR-Verbandes. Er erklärte u.a., daß die Aufenthalte von DDR-Vertretern in Schweden rein auf touristische Zwecke und auf das Einkaufen eingestellt seien. Es wäre vorgekommen, daß sich DDR-Vertreter nicht einmal schwedische Musik während ihres Aufenthaltes angehört hätten.

Genosse Ragwitz und ich haben daraus unsere Schlußfolgerungen gezogen und täglich im Informationszentrum [DDR-Kulturzentrum in Stockholm] schwedische Musik regelrecht studiert. Dabei entdeckten wir, daß die meisten schwedischen Komponisten eine Einstellung des aktiven Humanismus hegen und in der Frage des Friedenskampfes potentielle Bündnispartner sind.

Eskil Hemberg unterrichtete mich davon, daß es in Schweden eine entwickelte Kunstanalytik nicht gibt. Deshalb würden sie 1978 im Rahmen der Nordischen Musiktage die BRD als Gastland zur Teilnahme einladen. Weil in der BRD gute

In this 1984 report, Schönfelder provides the Stasi with some background to his at that time well-developed relations with representatives of Swedish musical life. The excerpt also shows Schönfelder negotiating in favor of the GDR in the Cold War period and how he had successfully pitted the GDR against the FRG as a guest country at the Nordic Music Days in 1978. The report also stresses that there was a need in Sweden for new methods of analyzing musical works, with Schönfelder seen as an important source of inspiration.

In this chapter I use examples from texts by and about the musicologist Gerd Schönfelder to examine the discourses on musicology and politics that were constructed through music-related contacts between Sweden and the GDR from the 1970s to the 1990s. I will also look at how these discourses influenced the shaping of academic and political careers. Gerd Schönfelder, who first worked as GDR travel cadre and from 1983 as an IM of the Stasi, is an interesting example here, because he was one of the GDR regime's most important links with Swedish music life.[2] I aim to show how closely musicology and politics were connected in Schönfelder's activities and to give examples of the consequences for his Swedish colleagues and for the development of musical contact between Sweden and the GDR, of Schönfelder's activities for the Stasi.

The material for this article comes from Swedish and German archives, including the Stasi Record Archive and the archives of the Royal Swedish Academy of Music in Stockholm (*Kungliga Musikaliska Akademien*, KMA).[3]

Analytiker vorhanden seien, würde eine Konferenz unter Einbeziehung von Musikwissenschaftlern der Skandinavischen Länder und Islands und der Bundesrepublik durchgeführt.

Eskil Hemberg, der meine analytischen Arbeiten ziemlich gut kannte, bot mir ein Hauptreferat an und drang in mich, an dieser Konferenz mitzuwirken. Ich habe ihm zugesagt unter der Bedingung, daß sie nicht die BRD einladen, sondern die DDR, da nur hier auf ästhetischem Gebiet wirklich Neues zu erfahren sei. […]

Er unterrichtete mich dann im darauffolgenden Jahr im März, es sei ihm gelungen, die Mitglieder des Präsidiums des Nordischen Musikrates umzustimmen und mit Mehrheit den Beschluß zur Einladung der DDR durchzusetzen."

2 BArch, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 190–191.

3 The article forms part of the research project "Between East and West: Ideology, Aesthetics and Politics in the Music Relations between Sweden and the GDR 1949–1989", which runs until 2020 and is carried out by the author together with the historian Henrik Rosengren and the musicologist Ursula Geisler; it is financed by the Baltic Sea Foundation at the Södertörn University in Sweden. Parts of this chapter have already been published in Swedish and English in *Swedish Journal of*

This study addresses discourse production within Swedish and East German musicology and politics during the 1970s and 1980s. While this chapter focuses on Schönfelder's work for the Stasi, the following chapter by Henrik Rosengren will analyze how Schönfelder's involvement with the Stasi while he was in Sweden was discussed by the Swedish public after 1989 and how relations between Schönfelder and his Swedish colleagues developed during the 1990s.

Gerd Schönfelder: A short biography

Gerd Schönfelder was born in 1936 in Köttewitz, near Dresden. In the 1950s he studied at the Music Conservatory in Dresden and then at the Dresden College of Music "Carl Maria von Weber" as well as at the Humboldt University in Berlin. He spent the years 1958 to 1962 studying at Beijing University in China. From 1966 to 1972 he was employed as a research assistant at the University of Leipzig. In 1969 he wrote his doctoral thesis on *Das yue mu ci zi und seine schlagrhythmische und formstrukturelle Gestalt* (The yue mu ci zi and its beat-rhythmic and form-structural shape), and in 1972 he submitted his doctoral thesis B, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff des Neuen in der zeitgenössischen Musik: Ein Beitrag zur Bestimmung spezifischer inhaltlicher Erscheinungsformen nichtwortgebundener Musik des sozialistischen Realismus* (Investigations into the Concept of the New in Contemporary Music: A Contribution to the Determination of Specific Contentual Appearances of Nonword-Bound Music of Socialist Realism). During the same year he also published studies on the Beijing opera. In 1975 he was appointed professor of musicology (music aesthetics and music history) at the Carl Maria von Weber College in Dresden. From 1972 on he was also active at the Academy of Music in Dresden as prorector and from 1980 to 1984 as rector. [4] In 1984, Schönfelder became head of the Dresden Semper Opera. In addition to his academic work, he

Musicology (2019) and *Ethnologia Scandinavica* (2020): Petra Garberding, Henrik Rosengren, Ursula Geisler, "'Jag ser till att bli uppfattad som en vanlig DDR-medborgare": Musikforskaren Gerd Schönfelder, Kungl. Musikaliska akademien och Stasi", Svensk tidskrift för musikforskning vol. 101 (2019)/Swedish Journal of Music Research, vol. 6 (2019), 103–135. Petra Garberding, "'We could smell that he's Stasi.' Power and justification strategies of the Stasi in Music Life in the GDR and in Swedish-German Music Contacts", Ethnologia Scandinavica vol. 50 (2020), 43–66.

4 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 93–94. Gerd Schönfelder, *Die Musik der Peking-Oper* (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik).

was also involved with several musicological and political organizations. In 1961 he became a member of the SED, in 1973 of the Cultural Association of the GDR (*Kulturbund der DDR*), and in 1969 of the VKM, where he also served as a member of the presidium.[5]

During the 1970s, Schönfelder became interested in Swedish contemporary music. At that time, he was one of a small number of German musicologists with an interest in this field of research. Schönfelder first came to Sweden in 1976 at the invitation of the Swedish Association of Composers (*Föreningen Svenska Tonsättare*, FST) and its then chairman, Eskil Hemberg (1938-2000). Together with the head of the cultural department of the Central Committee of the SED, Ursula Ragwitz (b. 1928), Schönfelder established contact with Hemberg and his Swedish colleagues.[6] Some of Hemberg's compositions were also performed in the GDR. In the years that followed, Schönfelder created a network of several leading figures in Swedish musical life, including the composer Jan Carlstedt (1926–2004), the music administrator and music journalist Hans

Gerd Schönfelder gives a lecture at a scholarly conference on Heinrich Schütz on the occasion of the 400th birthday of the composer in the town hall in Dresden on October 8, 1985 (Bundesarchiv Berlin, Photo 183-1985-1008-026 / Photographer: Matthias Hiekel.

5 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 56.

6 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, vol. 1, pp. 168ff. The book "Truth Principle, Beauty Principle…" also discussed one of Hemberg's works *Messa d'oggi* (op. 23) for mixed choir from 1972.

Åstrand (b. 1925, permanent secretary of the Royal Academy of Music in Stockholm 1973–1990), the composer and head of music education at Härnösand Folk High School, Johannes D. Degen (1910–1989), and Per Skans (1937–2007) of Swedish Radio.[7] While in Sweden, Schönfelder produced analyses of Swedish musical works, provided assistance with the preparation of musicological conferences and helped Radio Sweden produce programs on East Asian culture, especially musical theater.[8]

Schönfelder's collaboration with Åstrand during several years resulted in the book *Prinzip Wahrheit, Prinzip Schönheit: Beiträge zur Ästhetik der neueren schwedischen Musik* (Truth Principle, Beauty Principle: Contributions to the Aesthetics of Recent Swedish Music), published in German in 1984 by the KMA. The book approaches Swedish contemporary music from an analytical and aesthetic musical perspective, with the analyses of work by new Swedish composers provided by Schönfelder while Åstrand wrote the introduction. By this time, Schönfelder was already well known in Swedish music circles, especially as a musicologist and as the principal of the Dresden Academy of Music.[9]

Gerd Schönfelder as a travel cadre in Sweden

Today it is well known that the GDR authorities had a particular interest in keeping the cultural sector under control. According to the musicologist Daniel zur Weihen, the Stasi and the SED saw great danger in art and culture being "misused" and having a bad influence on "socialist consciousness".[10] Therefore, they particularly wished to keep those active in this area under supervision, and this included Schönfelder. During the 1970s, Schönfelder was therefore monitored by the Stasi, among other things because of his networks of colleagues in Western European countries and because they wanted to investigate his reliability as a so-called travel cadre (*Reisekader*).[11] In the early 1980s, he was investigated to

7 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, vol. 1, p. 170–171.

8 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I. Vol. 1, p. 327–336.

9 Schönfelder, Gerd and Hans Åstrand, *Prinzip Wahrheit, Prinzip Schönheit: Beiträge zur Ästhetik der neueren schwedischen Musik* (Stockholm: Kungl. Musikaliska akademien, 1984).

10 Daniel zur Weihen, "'Ich versprach, mein Möglichstes zu tun' – Komponisten im Blick des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit", in *Musik in der DDR: Beiträge zu den Musikverhältnissen eines verschwundenen Staates*. Ed. Mattias Tischer (Berlin: Verlag Ernst Kuhn, 2005), 275.

11 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 370.

determine his suitability as an IM. It is likely, but difficult to determine from the sources available, that Schönfelder was aware of this surveillance.

In February 1979, Schönfelder was granted permanent status as a travel cadre to "non-socialist foreign countries".[12] His wife was also active as a travel cadre and the couple could therefore often travel abroad together.[13] This meant that it was now much easier for him to travel and it was also a sign that he was considered politically reliable by the GDR authorities.

In order to become a travel cadre, it was necessary to demonstrate "political utility" to the regime.[14] Only those GDR citizens who were classified as politically reliable could become travel cadres. Political loyalty was determined through a process of Stasi surveys of the person at home and at work, which also included examining family and kinship relations, the person's political attitude, and contacts in the West.[15] Within the travel cadre system, there were also various degrees, depending on the assessment of political loyalty and political influence. For example, there were travel cadres who were allowed to enter and leave the GDR at will, while others had to submit applications for permission to travel. Some travel cadres were allowed to take their spouses with them, while other couples were not allowed to travel together because they were, despite their status as travel cadres, regarded with a degree of mistrust by the GDR authorities.[16]

As a travel cadre, Schönfelder undertook to accept and obey directives from the Ministry of Culture. Within 14 days of returning home, he had to send in a report of how he had fulfilled the directives during the trip. Sources in the Stasi archives show that a "permanent contact" was established with Schönfelder at the beginning of the 1980s.[17] By this time he was known to the Stasi as a reliable travel cadre and his extensive and well-written reports were highly appreciated. In a report of a visit to Sweden from 21 September to 16 October 1981, for example, he provided

12 BArch, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 190–191.

13 BArch, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 187–189.

14 Astrid Hedin, "'Ingenstans den minsta motvilja'? Den östtyska resekaderns besök i Sverige", in *Kommunismens ansikten. Repression, övervakning och svenska reaktioner.* Ed. Anu-Mai Köll, (Eslöv: Symposion, 2005), 289.

15 Hedin 2005, 294–299.

16 An example is Erich Stockmann, professor in musicology, and his wife Doris Stockmann, asscociate professor in musicology. They were considered politically unreliable and were not allowed to travel together. BArch, MfS, HA VIII, Nr. 2656, p. 166, 168; BArch, MfS HA XVIII AP 51144/92. See also Garberding (2020).

17 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 374.

a categorization of his Swedish musical colleagues, dividing them into GDR sympathizers, critics, and enemies. This report was well received by the Stasi and convinced them that Schönfelder might also be used as an IM.[18] The directives for this trip had involved the further development and deepening of existing professional contacts in Sweden, with the aim of encouraging Swedish colleagues to engage with Marxist-Leninist ideology and to draw their attention to the "achievements of real socialism". The trip was also intended to support "the continuation of a research project begun by the Scandinavian countries and scholars of the GDR to redefine the role of Romantic music within the framework of 19th century Romanticism as a pan-European intellectual current". Schönfelder should also participate in discussions and give lectures on the art and cultural policy of the GDR, addressing socio-theoretical questions concerning the socialist social order. Finally, all projects were to be integrated "into the GDR's offensive policy of peace and détente".[19]

In his detailed report after returning from Sweden, Schönfelder states that Swedish cultural life had changed since his previous visit in 1978. During the Nordic Music Days (where the GDR was the guest country) he was generally aware of great interest still in the GDR and socialism, but there were now several different groupings and attitudes. He divides his Swedish colleagues into three groups: 1. those who are still very interested in contact with the GDR and see the contact as "intellectual enrichment" (*geistige Bereicherung*); 2. those who had hoped for greater advantages of their own in the GDR contacts but were disappointed; and 3. those who are more openly critical of the GDR than before.[20] In the first group he includes Hans Åstrand, Jan Carlstedt, Ingmar Milveden (1920–2007, a musicologist at Uppsala University), Erik Lundquist (b. 1940, music director and organist), Eskil Hemberg, Johannes Degen, Werner Wolf Glaser (1913–2006, composer and at that time the retired director of the municipal music school in Västerås), Per Skans (Swedish Radio), Sven-Erik Bäck (1919–1994, composer) and Nils L. Wallin (1924–2002, member of staff at the KMA and secretary general of the International Music Council). In the second group he includes Sten Andersen (Sweden's Television), Ingvar Lidholm (1921–2017, composer) and Per Olaf Lundahl (1923–2008, director of STIM:s Information Center). In the third group he includes Karl-Erik Welin (organist, 1934–1992) and the new director

18 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 327–337.
19 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 327.
20 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 327–328.

of the National Concerts (*Svenska Rikskonserter*, presumably this means Magnus Enhörning, 1921–1992). The composer Gunnar Bucht (b.1927) is described as a "recently [...] friendly" person. Schönfelder interprets the interest in the GDR shown by the musicologist Bo Wallner (1923–2004) primarily as a question of personal interest in Schönfelder's work and not as interest in intellectual exchange.[21] Schönfelder stated that one reason for the declining interest in the GDR was that people had been disappointed in their expectations that some of their works would be performed there.[22]

Schönfelder's account illustrates the different notions of music and politics that were attached to the exchange between the GDR and Sweden at this time. While several of his Swedish colleagues saw the exchange primarily as a practical matter of making it possible to perform their works in the partner country, Schönfelder and his principals in the GDR primarily expected the musical exchange to lead to increasing interest in the political ideology of the GDR – something that did not happen to the extent expected.

In the same report, however, Schönfelder underlines the importance of the KMA for his work in Sweden:

> The [Royal Music] Academy itself has shown me the highest degree of attention, accommodation, and downright collegiality. I was provided with a comfortable apartment with the best working facilities and a car for my own use, which, however, I used only little under the abundance of tasks.[23]

On 8 October 1981, Schönfelder gave a lecture at the KMA to mark the anniversary of the GDR. He described this occasion as one of the highlights of this trip, which gave him the opportunity to speak at length about the GDR's art and cultural policy in relation to domestic and foreign policy. His report describes how several Swedish colleagues began to understand how culture and politics in the GDR seemed to go together like a "law of nature":

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21 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 328–329.

22 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 329.

23 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 329, p. 330. German original: "Mir selbst gegenüber hat die Akademie ein Höchstmaß an Aufmerksamkeit, Entgegenkommen und geradezu Kollegialität entgegengebracht. Mir wurde eine komfortable Wohnung mit besten Arbeitsmöglichkeiten bereitgestellt und ein Selbstfahr-Dienstwagen, den ich allerdings unter der Fülle der Aufgaben nur wenig genutzt habe".

> Several of my Swedish colleagues told me in the course of conversations that, in addition to knowing a wealth of facts and characteristics of this development, they could above all understand that culture and art in our country seem to be lawfully connected with politics. To lead them to this realization was one of my self-imposed goals, because the manipulation of public opinion does nothing to discredit the idea that cultural and artistic policy is being regulated by "the party".[24]

Here again it becomes clear that Schönfelder's task was primarily to work in support of the GDR's cultural propaganda abroad, a goal that was clearly superior to that of musical exchange. Culture, scholarship and political ideology were to work together in such a way that they supported the political propaganda. Birgitta Almgren has aptly described such action; she thinks that in this way the GDR regime tried to gain trust abroad by "camouflaging" their real political intentions.[25] Sweden was known to the GDR authorities as a country where people did not like to discuss politics, and therefore GDR travel cadres had to learn how not to have overtly political conversations with Swedes, but rather to try to incorporate political topics into other conversations. Stasi employees and travel cadres were also trained in conversational strategies and techniques of argumentation to enable them to convey a positive image of the GDR while avoiding problematic questions.[26]

A Volvo as a thank you

In 1981 the KMA wanted to thank Schönfelder for his Swedish musicological work by presenting him with a Volvo car. Hans Åstrand, at the time the KMA's permanent secretary, wrote to the "responsible authorities" in Sweden and the GDR asking them to respect KMA's decision to donate

24 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. 1, p. 330. German original: "Mehrere meiner schwedischen Kollegen sagten mir im Verlaufe von Gesprächen, daß sie neben der Kenntnis einer Fülle von Fakten und Besonderheiten dieser Entwicklung vor allem begreifen würden, daß Kultur und Kunst bei uns offenbar gesetzmäßig mit Politik zusammenhängen. Sie zu dieser Erkenntnis zu führen, bildete eines meiner selbstgestellten Ziele, weil die öffentliche Meinungsmanipulation nichts unterläßt, um die Kultur- und Kunstpolitik als durch 'die Partei' reglementiert zu diskreditieren".

25 Birgitta Almgren, *Inte bara Stasi…: relationer Sverige – DDR 1949–1990* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2009), 206.

26 Almgren 2009, 200–201.

a car to Schönfelder.[27] The car was to be a thank you for Schönfelder's important work for the Academy, in the form of lectures, discussions, scientific support, and participation in conferences. It was difficult to put a monetary value on all this, according to Åstrand. But a letter from the regional administration in Dresden to the Stasi shows that Schönfelder himself stated that he received the car because his own car had been destroyed in an accident. When he told his Swedish hosts, they decided to give him a Volvo as thanks for his work.[28] In a letter to the customs authorities in the GDR in 1982, Schönfelder thanked them for having allowed him to import the car, which, he said, he had not been able to refuse "for political reasons." He had accepted the car on the advice of the GDR ambassador Kiesewetter, because a rejection would have been seen as an insult to the Swedish king.[29] One of my interviews with a Swedish contemporary witness shows that Schönfelder was extremely pleased with the Academy's gift and that the Volvo meant a lot to him. It is also well-known today that in the GDR the party elite drove Volvos: the Volvo was a symbol of status and power.

In the GDR, most citizens could acquire a car only on application for permission and after a long wait period, and then it would mostly be a Wartburg or Trabant. "Western cars" were mainly driven by politicians or people of high social status. Makes of car were clear markers of class in a state that liked to present itself as classless. For example, the Stasi always investigated the kind of car a citizen drove.[30] Schönfelder therefore had to justify his gift from the KMA to the GDR authorities to prevent them from becoming suspicious. There was a risk that his freedom of travel might be jeopardized or even that he would be deprived of his car and see it collected as state property. Although Schönfelder had apparently been very happy to receive the gift, he did not allow himself to show the GDR authorities his pleasure in it. Instead, he presented the car as an imposed gift that he had to accept for "political reasons". But a gift always imposes an obligation to give something in return, as the French sociologist Marcel Mauss has stated.[31] A gift always establishes a relation-

27 KMA archives, The Swedish Musik- and Theatre Library (*Statens Musik- och teaterbibliotek,* SMB). Secreterary's correspondence, E 5 a, vol. 9; BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 198–201.

28 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 198–201.

29 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 198–199 and p. 356.

30 Daniela Münkel, *Staatssicherheit: Ein Lesebuch zur DDR-Geheimpolizei* (Berlin: BStU, 2015).

31 Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies* (Lon-

ship between the donor and the recipient, and the recipient is expected to give a counter-gift in the future. From this point of view, the gift from the KMA can also be interpreted as an obligation on Schönfelder: the KMA hoped that he would continue to make his services available to them in the future – which he did.

Schönfelder as "Hans Mai" in Sweden

On 4 February 1983 Schönfelder's Stasi contact, Uwe Greif, told the Stasi that Schönfelder had now been recruited as an unofficial employee with a specific area of responsibility (i*noffizieller Mitarbeiter zur Sicherung und Durchdringung eines Verantwortungsbereiches*, IMS) at the Stasi; the recruitment had taken place in Schönfelder's apartment and his alias was to be "Hans Mai". No written statement of obligations (*Verpflichtungserklärung*) by Schönfelder has yet been found in the Stasi files, but according to Greif, Schönfelder volunteered to cooperate of political conviction.[32] In 1984 he was upgraded to IMB status, which designated an unofficial employee, who was to work more specifically with the defense against enemies or potential enemies (*inoffizieller Mitarbeiter der Abwehr mit Feindverbindung bzw. zur unmittelbaren Bearbeitung im Verdacht der Feindtätigkeit stehenden Personen*).[33] Schönfelder was designated IMS and later IMB in order to "utilize" his extensive contacts with musical figures in West Germany, Austria and Sweden to "gain information about the aims and intentions of the leading personalities of musical life in Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria for the MfS".[34]

Although Schönfelder's Stasi files show that he was regarded as politically reliable, he was not easy for the Stasi to recruit. He himself cited his high workload as a reason. According to his files the Stasi visited him several times to recruit him and finally succeeded in February 1983. In this process, Lieutenant Greif of the Stasi had used a method called the "recruiting legend," which was quite common among Stasi recruiters. The recruiting legend was a narrative portraying the potential recruit as extremely important for the development or preservation of the state and, whenever possible referring to some previous instance of successful activity by the person to be recruited in order to convince them of their

don/New York: Routledge, 2002).

32 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, vol. I, p. 374.

33 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 383–395; BStU 2015, p. 43.

34 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 370.

great importance for the state.[35] In Schönfelder's case, Greif mentioned his reports on Sweden's work for a nuclear-free zone in Europe, something that was of particular interest to the Stasi. But Schönfelder's Swedish cultural network and his contacts with the KMA were also considered valuable and important.[36]

As already mentioned, Uwe Greif asserted that Gerd Schönfelder became an IM out of "political conviction":

> It can be said that the IM himself has an interest in a close and trusting cooperation with the MfS. He has recognized that socialism in the GDR and internationally can only be reliably protected from internal and external enemies through the use of conspiratorial tools and methods in connection with the other prerequisites. The IM represents consistent political-ideological positions. He is a convinced communist and internationalist, which he does not reveal in every case.[37]

According to Greif's account, Schönfelder accepted the then common narrative of the threatened state, which had to be protected through "conspiratorial tools and methods". He is also clearly presented as a "convinced communist and internationalist" and therefore as a suitable IM. Schönfelderwas supposed to gather information

> about the aims and intentions of leading personalities in the musical life in these countries [West Germany, Austria and Sweden][…] because this opens up opportunities to obtain information from other areas of the economic and social life of these countries, as through the candidate's circle of acquaintances there are extensive connections with leading representatives of monopoly capital.[38]

35 BArch, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 26648, p. 47–49.

36 BArch, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 374.

37 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 393. German original: "Es ist einzuschätzen, daß der IM selbst Interesse an einer engen und vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit mit dem MfS hat. Er hat erkannt, daß der Sozialismus in der DDR und auch international nur durch die Anwendung konspirativer Mittel und Methoden im Zusammenhang mit den anderen Voraussetzungen zuverlässig vor inneren und äußeren Feinden zu schützen ist. Der IM vertritt konsequente politisch-ideologische Positionen. Er ist überzeugter Kommunist und Internationalist, was er nicht in jedem Fall offenbart".

38 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, I, Vol. 1, p. 370. German original: "[...] Dabei ist es von besonderer Bedeutung, daß der Kandidat über umfangreiche Verbindungen ins Operationsgebiet verfügt, deren Nutzbarmachung zur Informationsgewinnung über die Ziele und Absichten der führenden Persönlichkeiten

Here it becomes clear that Schönfelder's connections with "leading personalities in musical life" were to be used for political purposes: Music was to be used as a way of spying on social, political, and economic activities in the countries mentioned above.

What was included in Schönfelder's reports on Sweden? For reasons of space, only some examples can be given here. The Stasi was particularly interested in the KMA in Stockholm. In December 1984, the same year that Schönfelder was promoted to IMB, he was elected as the first East German member of the Academy. For the Stasi his election was an opportunity to include questions about the KMA in a directive before he went to Sweden:

- What is the current attitude of Academy members toward the GDR?
- What are the expectations regarding further cooperation with the GDR in the cultural field?
- What role is Prof. Schönfelder to play in this?
- What is the attitude of the Academy members toward Prof. Schönfelder as a communist?
- What material remuneration will result from the election to the Royal Swedish Academy?
- What rights and duties does an academician have?
- What are the Academy's national and international objectives?
- What funds are allocated to the Academy?
- How are the interests of right-wing bourgeois forces perceived?
- How and through which persons are the interests of the USA and other reactionary systems being enforced?
- Where can starting points for penetration of the conspiracy of Western secret services be identified?

In particular, all findings in connection with the awarding of Nobel Prizes are significant.[39]

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des Musiklebens in Schweden, in der BRD und in Österreich für das MfS von Bedeutung ist weil dadurch Möglichkeiten eröffnet werden auch Informationen aus anderen Bereichen des wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Lebens dieser Staaten zu erarbeiten da durch den Bekanntenkreis des Kandidaten umfangreiche Kontakte zu führenden Vertretern des Monopolkapitals bestehen".

39 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 242. German original: "Wie ist die aktuelle Haltung der Akademiemitglieder zur DDR? Welche Erwartungen werden an die weitere Zusammenarbeit mit der DDR auf kulturellem Gebiet gestellt? Welche Rolle ist Prof. Schönfelder dabei zugedacht? Wie ist die Haltung der Akademiemitglieder zu Prof. Schönfelder als Kommunisten? Welche materiellen Vergütungen ergeben sich aus der Einwahl in die Königliche Schwedische

In addition, the Stasi wanted information about the political and economic situation in Sweden: they wanted to know to what extent one might discern a right-wing orientation in Swedish politics and how long the "opportunistic tendencies" in Swedish politics were likely to be maintained. They also wanted more information about Hans Åstrand, Per Skans and Eskil Hemberg in order to "further clarify the personality profile".[40] The questions show that the Stasi officials did not have a particularly good knowledge of the KMA and apparently assessed its influence on Swedish cultural life as more extensive than it actually was. They also seem to have confused the KMA with the Swedish Academy.

Before considering Schönfelder's answers to these questions, I would like to briefly report on his election to the KMA. He had been nominated for election to the KMA as early as 1978, presumably by the Academy member Jan Carlstedt, who described Schönfelder as "one of the best musicologists in Europe" and as an "outstanding analyst of contemporary music who was also already familiar with Swedish musical traditions".[41] In 1979, Schönfelder was again proposed for election by Carlstedt and Hemberg, but again nothing came of it.[42] It was not until 1984 that he was elected as a foreign member of the KMA, proposed by the composers Jan Carlstedt, Eskil Hemberg and Ingvar Lidholm, and the musicologists Bo Wallner and Gunnar Larsson. This time the proposal was based on Schönfelder's commitment to the promotion of Swedish music in the GDR and his important contribution to musicology through his *Prinzip Schönheit Prinzip Wahrheit*. They also described him as an important musicologist, humanist, and Swedish bibliographer.[43] However, he received only 24 out of 44 votes cast in the election,[44] which allows us to assume that Schönfelder's election

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Akademie? Welche Rechte und Pflichten hat ein Akademiemitglied? Welche Zielstellungen verfolgt die Akademie im nationalen und internationalen Rahmen? Welche Gelder fließen der Akademie zu? Wie werden die Interessen rechtsorientierter bürgerlicher Kräfte wahrgenommen? Wie und durch welche Personen wird versucht die Interessen der USA und anderer reaktionärer Systeme durchzusetzen? Wo sind die Ansatzpunkte für das Eindringen in die Konspiration westlicher Geheimdienste erkennbar? Insbesondere sind alle Erkenntnisse im Zusammenhang mit der Vergabe von Nobelpreisen bedeutsam".

40 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 242.

41 KMA archives, SMB, KMA minutes dossier, A 3 a, vol. 10, 1978–1979.

42 KMA archives, SMB, KMA minutes dossier, A 3 a, vol. 10, 1978–1979.

43 KMA archives, SMB, KMA minutes dossier, A 3 a, Vol. 21, 1984–1985.

44 KMA archives, SMB, A 1 a, KMA minutes, 1984–1985.

was not entirely obvious and that not all of the members of the KMA supported him.

But even at the point when Schönfelder was elected to the KMA, there was apparently some suspicion that he came to Sweden not only for scholarly reasons. Schönfelder's Stasi contact Uwe Greif reported to the Stasi that Schönfelder had told him that before his election to the KMA he had "been questioned by the deputy president [Claude Génetay]":

> He [Schönfelder] was confronted with the fact that the Swedish Academy had information that he was on a "secret service mission of the Ministry of State Security". This allegation was vigorously rejected by the IM. The Swede's question whether he [Schönfelder] could also take an oath on this was of course answered in the affirmative by the IM.[45]

According to Greif, Schönfelder had been held back in Sweden because of this mistrust and had not fulfilled "his tasks". His Swedish colleague Hans Åstrand was of the opinion that this suspicion might be connected with the fact that someone in Dresden, where Schönfelder had just become head of the Semper Opera, was resentful about his appointment and now tried to slander him.[46] The KMA seem to have believed Schönfelder's statement and apparently did not pursue the issue any further at that time and Schönfelder was duly elected as a new foreign member.

But what answers did the Stasi receive to its questions about the KMA? Because Schönfelder had not answered these questions in his conversation with Greif, he wrote a report for the Stasi in January 1985. Among other things, he reported that the Academy pursued a strict policy of neutrality at national and international level. He also mentioned that the "material remuneration" by the KMA had "only" been agreed to the extent that the KMA paid him for a trip to Stockholm twice a year, provided him with a free guest apartment during his stay in Sweden and paid for his daily expenses.[47] According to Schönfelder. the aim of the KMA was:

> ... to uphold cultural values and, above all, to develop a broad work to increase the cultural demands and the cultural level of the population and, by raising this level, to paralyze the Americanization of Europe. He [no name mentioned here] told me very clearly that these are clear alliances that point them to us. Various things that we have done here,

45 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 249.
46 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 242
47 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 290.

for example, are adopted by them, such as music for children, child class work, in order to direct people from the outset toward a culturally high level of education.[48]

In this report, the cooperation between the KMA and the GDR is justified by a narrative of the "locus terribilis": the image of a threat is constructed, against which joint action must be taken.[49] It was important to create "alliances" with like-minded partners, which also fits with a kind of unification strategy in critical discourse analysis. Two individuals or groups must work together to fight a common enemy.[50] The "alliance" with important partners such as the GDR is legitimized as an effective strategy against the threat directed at Sweden by Americanization. According to Schönfelder and his informant it is necessary to raise the cultural level of the population in order to counteract this Americanization, which is not explained in detail and remains vague. One interpretation might be that the KMA informant assumed that he/she and Schönfelder had similar ideas about Americanization as a problem, for example, the threat posed by new musical styles to the position of classical music in society.

According to Schönfelder's informant at the KMA, it is important to start cultural work with the population as early as possible. The term "child class work" (*Kinderklassenarbeit*) can have two different meanings here: musical education at school, or creating class consciousness in children. The description remains vague, and it is possible that both are meant. The GDR becomes an important role model for this child class work and the narrative also points to Sweden's great interest in the East German education system and the state's cultural work. As shown in previous research on contacts between Sweden and the GDR, many Swedish politicians regarded the school system in the GDR, with its "one

48 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 290–291. German original: "Ziel der Akademie ist, die kulturellen Werte hoch zu halten und vor allen Dingen eine ungeheure Breitenarbeit zu entwickeln, um die kulturellen Bedürfnisse und das kulturelle Niveau der Bevölkerung zu heben und mit der Hebung dieses Niveaus im Grunde genommen die Amerikanisierung Europas zu paralysieren. Es sind klare Bündnisbeziehungen, die sie zu uns hinweisen, das hat er mir ganz klar gesagt. Verschiedene Dinge, die wir hier gemacht haben, werden z.B. von ihnen übernommen wie Musik für Kinder, Kinderklassenarbeit, um den Menschen gleich von vornherein in der Erziehung auf ein kulturell hohes Niveau hinzulenken".

49 Ruth Wodak et.al., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität (Frankfurt/Main:* Suhrkamp, 1998), 85.

50 Ruth Wodak et.al. 1998, 84.

school for all", as well as its state-financed cultural policy, as a model.[51]

However, it was difficult for Schönfelder to identify the "right-wing bourgeois forces":

> It is always very difficult to ascertain the interests of the right-wing forces, because they never expose themselves in such a way. When you are in their apartment they speak ill of each other and when they sit opposite each other at the banquet, they say the most beautiful and kind things to each other. So the party principle is not the same there as in West Germany. It is very difficult to recognize right-wing forces, but there are some. They expose themselves like this W e l l i n, Karl-Erik [sic!] did, who has publicly opposed the GDR with all these insinuations such as freedom, humanity, etc., which are idiotic. He is also a member of the Academy and stayed away on the day of my election. He was also one of those who spoke against it for two years. But he was also one of those to whom the GDR gave an international career.
>
> He was one of the organ players who came to the GDR and played at big music festivals here like *Händelfestspiele, Musiktage, Biennale*, etc. Now he is no longer coming, I have already clarified that with the GDR Artist Agency. It was this person of all people who used this opportunity to carry out subliminal propaganda over the years.[52]

51 Birgitta Almgren, *Dröm och verklighet. Stellan Arvidsson – kärleken, dikten och politiken* (Stockholm: Carlssons, 2016), 110ff.; Nils Abraham, *Die politische Auslandsarbeit der DDR in Schweden: zur Public Diplomacy der DDR gegenüber Schweden nach der politischen Anerkennung 1972–1989* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007); Almgren 2009.

52 BArch, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242/90, II, Vol. 1, p. 290–291. German original: "Die Interessen der rechtsorientierten Kräfte wahrzunehmen, ist immer sehr schwierig, weil die sich nie so exponieren. Wenn man in deren Wohnung ist, dann machen sie sich gegenseitig schlecht und wenn man sich dann am Bankett gegenübersitzt, dann sagen sie sich die schönsten und liebenswürdigsten Sachen. Dort ist also das Parteienprinzip nicht so wie in der BRD. Rechtskräfte zu erkennen, ist sehr schwierig, aber es gibt welche. Sie exponieren sich wie dieser W e l l i n, Karl-Erik [sic!], der sich öffentlich gegen die DDR gestellt hat mit diesen ganzen schwachsinnigen Unterstellungen wie Freiheit, Menschlichkeit usw. Er ist auch Mitglied der Akademie und am Tag meiner Einwahl ferngeblieben. Er war auch einer derjenigen, die zwei Jahre lang dagegen gesprochen hat [sic!]. Er war aber auch einer derjenigen, denen die DDR die internationale Karriere verschafft hat. Er war einer der Orgelspieler, die in die DDR kamen und zu großen Musikfestspielen hier spielten wie Händelfestspiele, Musiktage, Biennale usw. Jetzt kommt er nicht mehr, das habe ich schon bei der Künstleragentur geklärt. Ausgerechnet dieser Mensch hat diese Möglichkeit dort genutzt, um eine unterschwellige Propaganda zu betreiben, über Jahre hinweg".

Here Schönfelder tried to fulfill his task, to identify his opponents and the potential enemies of the GDR and to make them "harmless". One can also speak here of the "art of distribution", as Michel Foucault calls it.[53] The aim is to place different individuals in closed environments, to monitor and control them, to classify them according to a certain system and to grant them various freedoms – or not. Schönfelder's aim was to classify individuals according to their sympathies and antipathies toward the GDR. He describes how the members of the KMA take on different personas in the privacy of their homes and in the more public environment of the KMA. However, it would also be possible to interpret these difference as showing that Schönfelder was trusted by those members who invited him to their homes and there complained to him about colleagues in the KMA.

The Swedish composer and organist Karl-Erik Welin is singled out as an enemy on several occasions in Schönfelder's Stasi files. After Welin had publicly expressed opposition to the GDR, Schönfelder arranged for the GDR Artist Agency not to allow him to travel to the GDR. Here, Schönfelder used his position with the Stasi to limit Welin's mobility – as a kind of revenge for Welin's criticism of the GDR.

Today one might ask why the suspicion that Schönfelder was working for the Stasi was not pursued further in Sweden after 1984? It is still a difficult question to answer. But the suspicion arose again at the end of 1989, when Schönfelder was visiting Sweden and suddenly had to return to the GDR. In December 1989, the musicologist and journalist Carl-Gunnar Åhlén wrote articles in which he asserted that Schönfelder had worked for the secret police of the GDR.[54]

Gerd Schönfelder and the musicology and politics of the Cold War

The texts by and about Gerd Schönfelder that have been analyzed here show that discourses on musicology and politics were linked and that various power relations emerged as a result. In official GDR policy, all art forms were supposed to express a certain political ideology, and music, musicology, and politics were always supposed to belong together.

53 Michel Foucault, *Övervakning och straff. Fängelsets födelse* (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 2003), 143.

54 See here the next article by Henrik Rosengren in this volume.

However, the official travel cadres who visited Sweden were instructed not always to make these connections that clear and not always to speak openly about politics. How much politics a GDR travel cadre could bring into a conversation would always depend on the conversation partner. A contemporary witness describes Schönfelder as an intelligent and socially very competent person.[55] Presumably this was one of the reasons why the suspicion of his work for the Stasi was not pursued further; it was not possible to imagine that the highly regarded musicologist Schönfelder was also a Stasi employee.

It is also clear from the source materials that Swedish musicology at the time was in need of new analytical methods and that Schönfelder filled an important gap here. In these circles he was seen as an important inspiration, and collaboration with him was regarded as valuable and essential. For his part, Schönfelder was able to exploit this need to try to spread political propaganda in Sweden.

In the Sweden of the 1970s and 1980s, various discourses on music and politics were in circulation. The ethnomusicologist Alf Arvidsson has been explicit that in Sweden, too, various circles, especially left-wing ones, held the view that music could or even should express political positions. But there were also counter-movements that rejected these ideas and instead emphasized that music was not to be used for political purposes.[56]

The case of Gerd Schönfelder makes it clear that it was possible for the political propaganda of the GDR to penetrate Swedish musical life quite deeply. While for reasons of space only a few texts have been analyzed here, Schönfelder's numerous and detailed reports in the Stasi archives on Sweden and Swedish musical life show that he abused the trust of his Swedish colleagues and secretly reported on them, both as a travel cadre and as an IM. What did people think about this after 1990, when the materials in the Stasi archives gradually became accessible? Henrik Rosengren will report on this in the next chapter.

Schönfelder's entrenchment in both musicology and politics both in his home country and in Sweden, the FRG, and Austria can also be interpreted as an exemplary career during the Cold War in a communist

55 Petra Garberding, "'We could smell that he's Stasi.' Power and justification strategies of the Stasi in Music Life in the GDR and in Swedish-German Music Contacts", 60.

56 Alf Arvidsson, *Musik och politik hör ihop. Diskussioner, ställningstaganden och musikskapande 1965–1980* (Umeå universitet: Etnologiska skrifter, nr 46: Gidlunds, 2008).

dictatorship. By skillfully combining his academic and social skills with his political messages on both sides of the political divide, he fit well into the political system of the Soviet Union and also managed to gain a position high up in the musical life of the GDR.

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