Media, Bullet, Media

Investigating the coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine by leading Farsi-language news media in connection to peace/war journalism

Author: Alireza Asgari

Supervisor: Dr. Walid Al-Saqaf
Södertörn University, Sweden | School of Social Sciences
Department of Journalism
Programme: International Master's Programme in Journalism

Subject: Journalism
Master's Thesis
Spring Semester 2023

SÖDERTÖRN UNIVERSITY | STOCKHOLM
sh.se

Abstract:
This empirical study examines the conflict coverage of two leading Farsi-language news media, Iran International and BBC Persian, regarding peace journalism (PJ) and war journalism (WJ) and the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. Drawing upon available scholarly work in the field of PJ and WJ (studies) and within a normative debate, this research argues that the existing model of PJ/WJ is dualistic and binary. Then, the study conceptualizes and suggests a new concept of semi-war journalism (SWJ), which transforms the existing dualistic model into a multi-dimensional one.
The study provides a background on the Farsi-language media ecosystem. It additionally presents an intensive account of the background of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine and demonstrates that this is not a two-party conflict but a multi-party conflict. Also, the conflict has its internal roots in the Ukraine.
Conducting a literature review of the existing scholarship, the study demonstrates that a small share of the journalistic works fulfills the criteria of PJ, and the 2022 conflict in Ukraine is understudied. Apart from PJ/WJ subjects, in many other aspects, Farsi-language media are understudied as well. Qualitative content analysis of twelve news articles from the website of the media under study from their coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine in six months, from February 2022 to July 2022, is conducted. The findings reveal that the dominant frame in all articles is elite-oriented reporting, in which elites are taken into consideration either as the source of information or as actors. Employing PJ/WJ and framing theory, it is concluded that Iran International's coverage sharply leans toward WJ, with five out of six articles with the WJ approach and only one SWJ article. BBC Persian is chiefly aligned with SWJ (three articles), while it has one PJ article and two WJ. The findings of this study are in line with previous research that underscored that only a small share of conflict reporting fulfills the criteria of PJ, while it seems that, in the case of BBC Persian, there is a shift away from WJ to the two other approaches (SWJ and PJ).

Keywords: Peace journalism, War journalism, Semi-war journalism, Ukraine, Conflict, Farsi, Media.

Acknowledgments:

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Walid Al-Saqaf, for his constant support and constructive, fruitful, and helpful reflections on my text while I was doing this dissertation. I learned a lot from him. No words can appreciate his support and guidance.

I'd also like to thank two of my dear colleagues, Vladimir Gospodinov and Zamokuhle Mthethwa, who assisted me in conducting the reliability test by performing the coding of two of the news articles under study.

This dissertation is dedicated to those millions of children around the globe whose childhood was scarred by wars and who have since grown up in a traumatized life. I have nurtured one of them in me to this day.

Table of Tables & Table of Figures

Table of Tables

Table of Figures

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction & Research Aims and Questions

1-1 Introduction

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the biggest wars in recent years, particularly on the soil of Europe. As of May 2023, only 23 606 civilian casualties were recorded in Ukraine, including 8,791 killed (OHCHR, 2023). It is estimated that the war has so far caused more than three hundred thousand military casualties from both sides, including sixty thousand killed (Smith, 2023). Damages to infrastructure, traumas, and socio-psychological problems are other severe issues generated by this war. More than five million Ukrainians have been internally displaced, and around eight million individuals are recorded as refugees from Ukraine across Europe (Relief Web, 2023).

Yet, like other wars, this war is not merely fought on the ground by soldiers and artillery and in the skies by military jets. The battle is also fought in and by the media. Like other international affairs, in this war, parties to the conflict attempt their story win (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). There is an ongoing narrative war in communication. In such a war, the media rarely cover conflict neutrally (Dente Ross, 2006). Mass media willingly became wartime propaganda (Carruthers, 2000). They have been weaponized (Rodgers & Lanoszka, 2021). After a few months after the invasion of Ukraine, the historian and media sociologist Isabelle Veyrat-Masson stated that this war "is a media war with human faces" (Dassonville, 2022).

Keeble (1998), who studied the British media coverage of the crisis in 1991 and 1998 in Iraq, suggested that the media acted as a propaganda actor. Moreover, the 2003 war on Iraq was also framed in favor of the US military (Pfau et al., 2004). A study on the conflict reporting of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) proved that BBC -a public service broadcasting- could hardly function independently from the government (Aalberg and Curran, 2012; Schlosberg, 2017). In Liu's (2023) study on the practice of BBC and RT (formerly Russia Today) in the coverage of the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict, it was found that, although there were differences in their journalistic practice, both media shared biased reporting and were similar in that their media soft power became a significant dimension of the state power (p.20-21).

Yet, this is not the full image of the practice of the media ecosystem regarding conflict reporting. There has been some development in recent decades. Peace journalism (PJ) was proposed in the 80s and ever since promoted and partially practiced. According to Galtung (2017), PJ is peace-conflict oriented, people-oriented, truth-oriented, and solution-oriented. On the contrary, war journalism (WJ), which is the dominant approach in news media practice, is war-violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented, and victory-oriented (ibid). Some suggest that PJ exists largely in alternative media (Perez de Fransius, 2014:85), but it has been suggested that it can help bridge the existing gap between alternative and mainstream media (Lynch et al., 2011). It is argued that there are signs of PJ within mainstream media. Particularly in the UK, these signs of PJ are identified by various studies (Perez de Fransius, 2014:85). Such studies argued that, for instance, BBC's conflict coverage had made a slight shift from WJ to PJ (ibid). Therefore, it would be interesting to study such media's practice in the coverage of the ongoing war in Ukraine to see whether they are acting in favor of the continuation of the

war or the opposite. The current study will focus on media coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine, focusing on PJ and WJ.

Many scholars have studied the conflict coverage of various news media outlets in different geographical and socio-political contexts, be it the media in the US, the EU, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, or elsewhere. Whereas there are many studies on various media regarding conflict coverage (including English-language), the Farsi-language media and their practice concerning conflict/war coverage are rarely analyzed. Thus, there seems to exist a literature gap in this sense. The literature review sheds light on this subject. For Iranians, there are two distinct and major camps of news media. The state runs one; the other is run abroad. Within the latter, the two leading news media are based in the UK, Iran International and BBC Persian. They have the highest share of daily viewership among Iranians (outside and inside of Iran), with a viewership share of 33% and 17% (Gamaan, 2021). This makes up 50% of the daily viewership share among Iranians.

Moreover, BBC Persian (n.d) and Iran International (n.d) state that their reporting is neutral and impartial. It would be a significant contribution to the available scholarship to shed light on the practice of these Farsi-language news media to see how they function with regard to conflict reporting. Do they take a side? Are they partisan in their conflict coverage? Do they fairly harvest the news from diverse sources? And generally, how does their work affect the war? Does it fuel the conflict, or does it help to de-escalate it? It will be additionally fruitful to do as such since it enhances the knowledge regarding the conflict reporting concerning the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. As mentioned, these news media are based in the UK, so it would be worthy of examining other scholars' studies (e.g., Perez de Fransius, 2014:85) in which they suggested that the media in the UK are showing signs of PJ.

1-2 Research Aims & Research Questions

The general purpose of the research is to contribute to the academic field of communication studies, particularly media and journalism studies. It particularly seeks to shed light on conflict reporting, focusing on the practice of leading Farsi-language media.

The specific objective of the research is to contribute to the available scholarship in the field of PJ/WJ with a focus on the 2022 conflict in Ukraine while exploring the coverage of the leading Farsi-language news media. A second-degree objective of the research is to explore the practice of these media in conflict coverage to see what type of main frame is used by these media's reporting.

Noteworthy is that if the research succeeds in achieving this objective, the findings can also be utilized for news workers in the field while covering conflicts. Such studies seem to be necessary to contribute to journalistic culture in the Farsi-language news media ecosystem. BBC reporter David Lyon, a well-known opponent of PJ, was once disturbed by the studies employing PJ (Ottosen, 2010). He was almost offended that his journalism work was categorized as WJ. Lyon argued that WJ and PJ journalism is "too dualistic" (ibid, p.264). In this study, apart from Iran International coverage, the work of Lyon's colleagues in BBC Persian is analyzed. Also, in the current research, a new approach toward PJ/WJ is employed regarding what Lyon calls a dualistic model. The study, among other things, can provide a response and suggestion to not only scholars in this field but also to journalists.

To achieve the objectives of the research, one main research question and one secondary research question are designed to be answered. The main research question (RQ1) will chiefly inform the selection of this research's main theoretical framework and method. The main research question to be answered is:

> RQ1: How did these Farsi-language news media cover the 2022 conflict in Ukraine in connection to PJ or WJ?

To better understand the conflict reporting of these news media, a complementary question would be:

> RQ2: How did these media cover the conflict in connection to consequence framing and solution framing, and is there any relationship between solution framing and PJ?

As can be seen from the objective and research questions, this research will be an empirical and exploratory study. However, as a side subject to be further studied in future research, it will be attempted to provide some rough explanations for the study's findings. The discussion chapter will address an extra question- though not as a main research question. This question is as to why these media covered the conflict in the way they did. This question will shift away the study from exploratory research to an explanatory one. However, it should be emphasized that this is only a question to be put forth in the current research to pave the way for further studies on this. The reader should bear in mind that the objective of the research is to explore in *what* way the conflict coverage of these media is and not *why* it is so.

1-3 Expectations & Contributions

From a methodology point of view, for answering the RQs, empirical data from conflict coverage of two leading news media under study (Iran International and BBC Persian) will be gathered and qualitatively content analyzed. PJ/WJ theories/concepts and framing theory will be employed to interpret the findings (to be elaborated on in later chapters).

The Farsi-language media ecosystem is understudied concerning PJ/WJ (studies). Farsi/Persian is my mother tongue, and this can assist me in understanding the conflict coverage that is produced within this ecosystem, and the study can provide an analytical account and shed light on the practice of two leading Farsi-language news media and contribute some knowledge to the broader strand of PJ/WJ (studies). Therefore, my research on this ecosystem can hopefully be read by and circulated among non-Farsi speakers in both academia and the journalistic world. Moreover, the study can additionally provide some knowledge to Farsi-speaking people, including scholars, news workers, and probably news consumers. It would be fruitful that, apart from non-Farsi speakers, people who deal with these Farsi-language media (either as scholars, news workers, or consumers) get to know more about PJ/WJ and particularly about the conflict coverage of the two most popular news media they deal with.

1-4 The research outline

In chapter two, the available literature is reviewed. The Background Chapter presents a background of the conflict and the background of the media under study. The Theory Chapter discusses the theoretical framework. In the methodology chapter, the overall methodology and method of the study are presented. The Finding chapter presents the results of the analysis. The Discussion Chapter answers the RQs and compares them with a broader context of scholarship. The text finishes by providing a summary of the study and some conclusions.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter reviews the existing scholarship in the PJ/WJ (studies) strand. Some relevant to this research's aim, problem, and scope will be presented in the available literature in English. At the end of the chapter, a review of available literature that studied Farsi-language media (of which many were written/published in Farsi) will be presented. The most apparent reason for reviewing the available literature is to know the works that already have been done in this specific field so as to avoid repetition (Bryman, 2012:98). Moreover, the literature review shall help better understand the theories/methods and findings that are employed and produced within this strand. The chapter will also help construct an account in which various contexts and results within PJ/WJ studies are elaborated. Additionally, the review should clarify the literature gap and confirm the rationale of this dissertation's assigned aim, problem, and research questions.

The first section of the chapter will present some studies that analyzed journalistic practice in the PJ/WJ (studies) strand. The studies that are selected to be reviewed have addressed distinct geographical and geopolitical contexts. Then the focus will be placed on the specific conflict in Ukraine. Owing to the novelty of the 2022 war in Ukraine and due to the lack of available research about this novel conflict in connection to journalism practice and particularly regarding PJ/WJ, some studies that addressed the 2014 conflict in Ukraine will be presented. These studies are relevant to the current research because they analyzed a conflict that has continued until now, a conflict that is one of the roots of the 2022 war in Ukraine. However, two studies that are relatively related to this novel crisis (the 2022 war in Ukraine) were identified and will be presented. These two escalation phases (in 2014 and 2022) have many similarities and stem from the same conflict. In the chapter's second part, studies conducted on Farsi-language media will be presented. At the end of the chapter, the implications of the literature review will be explained: What this chapter offers regarding research questions of this research, and what it suggests as research gaps.

2-1 A short account of the trajectory of PJ/WJ studies

First, Johan Galtung's model of peace journalism (explained in, e.g., Galtung, 2017), according to Lynch (2008:143), inspires and provokes. The contours of peace journalism were articulated by Galtung & Ruge (1965), and then the concept entered journalistic discourse in the 1970s (see Galtung, 1986) and developed over time (see the theory chapter for an in-depth presentation of this model).

This model has inspired journalists and affected them in writing critical articles from conflicts and war zones; it has additionally been used by teachers as a platform to influence and encourage students to think critically about mainstream media and the way they report in wars (Hackett & Schroeder, 2008:26). Additionally, media researchers have used this model as a research tool and employed it when they analyze journalistic practices within war/conflict areas (Mandelzis & Peleg, 2008:62). This literature review covers some of the studies that analyzed journalism/media practice in connection to PJ/WJ.

Second, in their 2005 work, Lynch & McGoldrick describe PJ as a conflict-sensitive and accurate way of framing stories. One question can be what share of the journalism practice meet this criterion? Lichtenstein et al. (2019:69) argued that empirical studies (e.g., Ersoy,

2016, and others which will be presented here) found that only a small share of journalistic reporting fulfills peace frame criteria. This chapter will examine this argument by reviewing studies on WJ/PJ.

The chapter starts with reviewing scholarly studies by different scholars concerning conflicts reporting from various journalistic cultures across the globe and will continue to review the Conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

2-2 PJ/WJ studies on conflicts across the globe

Ersoy (2016), in his article, analyzes the Turkish press and their coverage of two events/conflicts in 2012 and 2014. The former was when the Syrian army hit a Turkish jet plane, and the latter was when the Turkish army hit a Syrian jet plane. The researcher analyzed press reporting regarding the two conflicts while using the PJ model (p.247). The study performs quantitative framing analysis to see how Turkish newspapers covered these events and also identify what frames these newspapers tend to use (255). Considering the number of newspapers, the researcher analyzed only front pages and headlines. A total of 255 headlines from 148 newspapers are analyzed in the research. As for the reliability test, a second researcher coded 10% of the same data, and 92% reliability was shown. The research found that the dominant framing was "blame the other side," followed by two other frequently used frames, "us and them" and "war-oriented" (p.257). The author finds out that the general tendency of the Turkish press is toward blame, accusation, and the creation of suspicion of the "other" side (p.260). The article suggests that, within a win-lose frame, the Turkish press focuses on who will "win" the conflict and sees this win as a resolution to the conflict. Ersoy (2016) concludes that in the time of two events in 2012 and 2014, the Turkish press mostly "preferred to utilize a conflict/war orientation" (p. 259).

In a study on the same journalistic culture, a study was conducted on Turkish and Greek media. Çiftcioğlu & Shaw (2021) conducted a study to analyze the prominent Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers' coverage of the conflict in Cyprus. Their analysis of the front pages of six newspapers shows a strong preference for WJ. In September 2011, the Mediterranean island of Cyprus faced a serious risk of plunging into war. The main reason behind this risk was the confrontation over the excavation of hydrocarbon reserves found in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. This study further demonstrates that the newspapers from both sides failed to provide any peaceful solution to the conflict. The study additionally finds that newspapers on both sides failed to discuss the negative repercussions of a possible war that was about to start over the hydrocarbons conflict.

From a different political, social, and cultural context, Asian newspapers were analyzed, and like the articles on Turkish and Greek press, it shows that the dominant trend in these newspapers is toward WJ. This study is frequently referred to within the PJ/WJ field and was conducted by Lee & Maslog (2005). Like the previous study, Lee & Maslog (2005) conducted a quantitative analysis of 1,338 stories from 10 English-language Asian newspapers when reporting on four Asian regional conflicts (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines). In terms of intercoder reliability, they obtained a result of between .76 and .93 for various indicators after they performed the test on 100 articles (p.317). The finding of the analysis of 1,338 stories reveals that 56% of the stories were framed as war journalism, 35.7% as peace

journalism, and 8.3% were neutral (p.317). A nonpartisan approach, a multiparty orientation, and the avoidance of demonizing language were the most salient indicators of peace journalism. Also, the war journalism frames involved a "focus on the here and now, an elite orientation, and a dichotomy of good and bad" (ibid). The authors conclude that "the news coverage of these conflicts is dominated by a war journalism frame" (p.311). Their study produced two important findings. They found out that the type of the story (e.g., feature, news story, or opinion piece) had no effect on framing a story as PJ or WJ (p.321). Importantly the study proved a positive correlation between the size of a story and PJ framing and, conversely, a negative correlation between the size of a story and WJ framing (ibid).

In a quite different study in terms of the finding, in another study conducted by Prakash (2013), it was shown that the dominant approach in Pakistani newspapers under study was PJ. Prakash (2013) analyzed both the traditional and social media in Pakistan in 2012 after the US Congress passed a resolution in favor of the right of Pakistan's Balochistan to self-determination. The article focuses on the Balochistan/Pakistan conflict. Balochistan is a Pakistani province that makes up a large part of Pakistan, and there has been a conflict regarding the Pakistani government's exploitation of Balochistan province. The conflict has been ongoing since the partition of India. Like previous studies, Prakash (2013) utilized quantitative content analysis. Analysis performed on 100 articles extracted from Pakistani newspapers and 1,000 tweets from various relevant users on Twitter, the study finds that there is an apparent exercise of PJ in the practice of various sources.

In a different context, a study on a conflict in Africa shows the same result as the first, second, and third studies that were presented above. In relatively recent research, Ishaku (2022) examines how the Nation, Punch, Vanguard, and Daily Trust newspapers reported the conflict in Southern Kaduna conflict, Nigeria, in the period of September 2020 and March 2021. Two hundred and twenty-four articles from these newspapers were selected and analyzed, utilizing social responsibility and agenda-setting theories and mixed methods such as critical discourse analysis and content analysis. The research reveals that, among other issues, 92% of the reporting lacked sufficient context and background, and most of them were sensational and inflammatory. These are some of the main traits of WJ. The study then poses some suggestions as such: media organizations should train their journalists in conflict-sensitive reporting and provide analytical and in-depth with sufficient background and context for conflict-sensitive journalism. Although this study employed different theories and methods, it showed the same results as other studies.

In a different journalistic culture, in a Scandinavian country, Norway, similar to other regions of the world, a WJ approach toward conflict coverage is being practiced. Ottosen (2010) analyzed the mainstream newspapers in Norway, *Aftenposten* and *Verdens Gang (VG),* and their reporting regarding the first week of the 2001 war in Afghanistan. After conducting an analysis of 104 articles by Aftenposten and 100 articles published by VG, Ottosen concluded that the reporting by these two newspapers generally follows the traits of WJ in Galtung's model (p.269). While pointing to Norway's participation in the war, Ottosen adds that both newspapers' reporting about the war in Afghanistan is "dominated by US-friendly framing and the use of Western sources" (ibid). About the same conflict (in Afghanistan), but from Western journalistic culture (in the US) and also from a totally different journalistic culture (in China),

almost the same result was found regarding conflict coverage. Elham et al. (2021) analyzed the reporting of the New York Times and China Daily in their coverage from September 2018 to August 2019. They used a combined method (of both qualitative and quantitative) of content analysis on 144 stories. The findings of their study demonstrate that both New York Times and China Daily newspapers excessively used visible effects of elite-oriented war frames, which means the reporting only focused on casualties, dead/wounded, and damage to property while neglecting emotional trauma, damages to society and culture. The findings also show that the NYT uses demeaning language and puts the responsibility of the war on the Afghan people.

A study with similar results but on media in Colombia was conducted in 2022. García-Perdomo et al. (2022), in their bilingual and cross-national study, while using the Galtung peace journalism model, analyze social media stories about the Colombian peace process to examine peace and war framing in the texts and news reporting. Their study shows that even during peace talks, Colombian media use war frames and narratives more often than peace frames.

As demonstrated, regardless of the method of study, journalistic culture, or the conflict under study, most of the studies show a leaning toward the main traits of WJ.

2-3 Media coverage of the conflict in Ukraine

As of the time of the current research, in May 2023, the exploration within the available literature identified little (or perhaps) research on PJ/WJ concerning the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. However, here in the following section, two studies that share some aspects with the scope of this research and have been conducted to study the 2014 conflict in Ukraine are presented. Then two recent studies that are related to the current conflict will be presented.

Fengler et al. (2020) Analyzed the coverage of the 2014 conflict in Ukraine by newspapers in 13 European countries in the first half of 2014 (p.91). Although this study is not directly related to PJ/WJ, its related findings to the scope of the current research are presented. The study demonstrates that attention to conflict varies across countries (p.401). Geographical/cultural proximity, economic exchange, and lack of editorial resources might be the reason for such a variation, according to the authors (ibid). Regarding the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, with a constant stream of conflict news, Russia has dominated the news agenda in all newspapers under study. The authors found that the media attempted to contextualize the conflict, which contradicts prior literature, according to Fengler et al. (2020). The study shows a shift away from elite focus and a high share of information from non-elite actors, such as social actors and citizens are represented in the reporting on the 2014 conflict in Ukraine (p.415).

In another study, Liu (2023) analyzed RT and the BBC reporting on the 2014-15 conflict in Ukraine and demonstrated that RT applied humanitarianism to set the news agenda. BBC used the human rights frame to a lesser extent while depicting "Russia-backed separatists" and Russia as responsible for the conflict (p.1). The article argues that the studied reporting has reduced the conflict to the responsibility of only one actor. An approach that is not constructive if one seeks to reduce the tensions and provide a resolution (ibid, p.20). One of the findings of this study is that although the intentions and approaches of RT and BBC framing efforts might differ, the nature of the bias in their reporting is similar, and their "soft power and framing in propagating ideas have become a very central dimension of state power" (p.20-21).

As mentioned, the 2022 conflict in Ukraine concerning PJ/WJ is understudied. However, two studies on this subject were found that share some features with PJ/WJ studies. In one of them, the author claims that the study is relevant to PJ studies, and the other studied the narratives of Russian media in the war. Here these two articles are intensively presented.

In his article that was published in August 2022 (six months after the invasion), Joan Pedro-Carañana from the *Department of Journalism and New Media of the Complutense University of Madrid* addressed this conflict and suggested that Western media's practice is akin to war journalism (Pedro-Carañana, 2022). However, in this article which is titled Russia-Ukraine-USA/NATO: From War Propaganda to Peace Journalism, the author does not provide any evidence for his claim. He starts with definitions of peace and conflict analysis and the necessity of peace journalism and concludes that mainstream media are embedded in and affected by the structures of a warmongering culture and power. And this leads to the status in which they become subordinate to NATO propaganda (ibid). The author then emphasizes the role of peace journalism, which according to him, is absent in connection to the war in Ukraine (ibid). However, he does not support his claim with data/reasoning. This article lacks (empirical) reasoning and is mentioned here only to highlight the literature gap and the fact that this conflict is understudied.

Contrary to the article presented above, in another study by Brusylovska & Maksymenko (two scholars from Ukraine) published in September 2022, the authors only analyze the discourse of Russian in the media and its influence on the media in both Russia and Ukraine. Brusylovska & Maksymenko's (2022) 's article "starts by arguing whether there is a place for critical thinking in Russian mass media" (p.222). The article identifies and describes Russia's key narratives as they are represented in Russian media in connection to the "special operation" in Ukraine in 2022 (ibid). According to the findings of this article, the foremost narratives by the Kremlin focus on "special operation" (p.222-223). By analyzing four Russian newspapers and online portals, the article concludes that Russian media widely spread Russian officials' rhetoric, and this should be seen as a tool to reformat the regional identity of both Ukrainians and Russians. The authors suggest that the media mirror the Russian officials' rhetoric, shifting from "Ukraine loses the war to Russia is at war with the West to save Ukrainians and to protect Russia, its identity, and even its civilization" (ibid).

2-4 A literature review of the studies on the Farsi-language media ecosystem

This section will provide an intensive review of the available literature about Farsi-language media. Because in many of its important aspects and dimensions, this media ecosystem is understudied, here some available samples of the general pool of studies about this media ecosystem will be presented.

To begin with, since BBC Persian is one of the media whose coverage will be investigated in this research, here some of the studies on BBC Persian are presented and discussed.

BBC launched its multifaceted Farsi-language TV in January 2009 in order to address the 100 million Farsi-speaking population spread across Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and around the globe (M. Shahrani, 2014:335). Some studies have been conducted on BBC Persian and previous services such as BBC Persian Service. The latter refers chiefly to BBC Persian Radio, while the former is mostly used for the period of 2009 onward when BBC TV launched in

Farsi. In the following sections, a few studies that are conducted on the subject of (coverage of) BBC Persian (Service) is provided.

In their study on BBC Persian Service, Sreberny & Torfeh (2014) focused on five key historical periods in Iran from 1948 to 2012 and the way BBC Persian Service (BBCPS) (i.e., BBC Radio and later Radio and TV) covered these historical periods. They undertook an analysis of content, archival research, and interview research. The authors argue that BBC Persian Service appeared to embed British values in their content framing to some extent. However, they argue that this is far from claiming that BBC Persian Service has acted as a mouthpiece of the British government.

In a relatively similar study (in the sense of the aims of the research), Ganjian & Zanuddin (2019) investigated the role that BBCPS played in Iran's internal politics, both before and after the revolution. The study does not analyze the content and programs that BBCPS produced and relies on other secondary data and chiefly political and historical accounts on BBC. In other words, it is more about what others (including scholars) stated about BBC's policies regarding Iran's internal affairs and politics. Based on such a methodology which lacks primary and empirical evidence on the actual practice and coverage of BBCPS, the authors argue that BBCPS assisted "Ayatollah Khomeini while in exile" and broadcasted "his speeches against Shah's regime" (p.63). BBCPS, they argue, assisted "Iranian people during the presidential election protests in 2009". Ganjian & Zanuddin (2019) conclude that their study "confirms the significant role that this media plays in Iran's politics and, more particularly, the role that it has been playing in Britain's diplomacy (p.78). They add that "BBCPS acts as a tool of British interest and integral part of British policy-making in Iran" (ibid).

One study (Ahmadi et al., 2021), written and published in Farsi, focused on a relatively recent issue. It has investigated the Coverage of the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN) and BBC Persian concerning the Covid-19 outbreak. The authors aimed to "address the strategies of news media in the face of this global crisis" (p.135). While employing the theoretical framework of agenda-setting and framing and utilizing the method of quantitative content analysis, the findings of their study IRINN has utilized four strategies: demanding a better public health service regarding the pandemic, attempting to cool down psychological stress in the society, launching information campaign concerning the pandemic, and paying attention to health communication during the initial confrontation with the pandemic (p.158). On the other hand, BBC Persian covered the Coronavirus outbreak in Iran while adopting different frames. According to the authors, BBC took an "ambiguous "and "public distrust "approach to the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (ibid). The authors sometimes place un-documented claims about BBC. For instance, in their conclusion, they state that BBC Persian network, in the news coverage of the spread of the coronavirus in Iran, has had a “political orientation” aiming to build public "distrust" toward the government (Islamic Republic system) (ibid, p.158). Although the authors have only analyzed BBC news and reporting, they go further and judge the intentions and aims behind such reporting without providing any contextual discussion. Such a conclusion by authors is neither in the scope of their research nor is it proven scientifically in their study.

In a relatively similar study that is written/published in Farsi, Houshyar & Mehdizadeh (2020) investigated and compared the news coverage of BBC Persian and the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA) with a focus on their coverage of the uprisings in Arab countries

from December 2010 to May 2011. This quantitative study employs theories such as framing, media imperialism of news, discourse, image making, and ideology (p.125) while utilizing the discourse exploration method. Their study findings show that these two agencies "have tangible differences in their texts via lexical items, polarization, citations, persons, and institutions" (ibid). They argue that BBC Persian has employed a framework for peace-making while using "Islamophobia" frames. They also argue that BBC Persian has combated "Islamic awakening" (ibid. p.161). The authors assert that, as the second dominant frame in its coverage, BBC Persian has used "Iranphobia" and "Shiaphobia" (ibid). On the other hand, regarding the coverage of IRNA, the authors put forth other points. They state that IRNA is a news agency that is the official media voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) (ibid, p.162). And IRI is a state, according to them, that is constructed based on pivotal principles such as "Islamism, belief in the freedom and equality of human beings, and promoting and exporting the Islamic revolution" (ibid). Therefore, they argue that IRNA has attempted to cover the uprisings in Arab countries with an emphasis on "consolidating" the uprisings, "anti-West" frames, and "Islamic awakening" (ibid).

Another study on BBC Persian (Nosrati Kharazmi & Mohammadi, 2020) suggests that BBC Persian has been "more" successful in "projecting a fair image of itself" (ibid, p.24). The authors argue that Western media, including Farsi-language ones, among them BBC Persian - by employing news techniques, take Iranian domestic and internal issues as "an opportunity to advance the Western political agenda against Iran" (ibid, p.23).

To summarize, while exploring available literature relevant to the scope of the current research, it appeared that no study had been conducted on Farsi-language (news) media concerning war/conflict coverage generally, particularly regarding PJ/WJ. No study on Iran International about whatsoever subject was identified. Therefore, it was attempted to provide an intensive account of the literature review of those available studies that pertain to Farsi-language media (whether inside or outside, whether state or non-state ones, whether TV or website news outlet).

2-5 The implications of the literature review

In this chapter, an intensive review of the available literature in connection to PJ/WJ was conducted. Various studies on conflict reporting by media workers from different journalistic cultures across the globe were presented. Furthermore, some studies were mentioned regarding the 2014 and 2022 conflict in Ukraine and their connection to PJ/WJ studies. This review, among other results, proves the claim that only a small share of journalistic practice fulfills peace frame criteria (as was raised by, e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 2019:69 as well).

This literature review has several implications for current research. As it was seen for instance, Lee & Maslog's (2005) findings show a positive correlation between the size of the story and PJ. Thus, while conducting the sampling for the current study, it will be attempted to select longer stories if there is more than one article per day by each media under study. Doing so would give a greater chance to trace the high number of indicators in an individual story. Lee & Maslog's (2005) study can inform other aspects of this study, among them utilizing their coding schema that involves 26 indicators which, among all studies reviewed, has the most comprehensive set of indicators. Also, this study shows that the type of story (feature, opinion piece, or news story) does not affect PJ. Therefore, among various stories that are published in

one certain day, only the criterion of the size should be considered and not the type of the story. Another implication of the review is that, although I will qualitatively analyze the content of conflict coverage of two news media, it is still reasonable and fruitful for the study to perform quantification on the qualitative research. As mentioned, many studies used quantitative analysis. Yet, my qualitative approach is still proper, as many researchers employ it in the field of PJ/WJ. But, still, adding quantification to the process produces more precise results. A bigger number of concrete indicators significantly decrease the researcher's interpretation during the coding. This will be elaborated on in the Methodology chapter. One more implication of the review is that instead of the research question of how these media covered the conflict regarding PJ/WJ, it could be modified to a more precise one: "to what extent" they do so. This will fit better with the quantification of the method and provides an avenue for more accurate coverage measurement.

Yet, the most important implication of this review pertains to the scope of this research. As demonstrated, it seems that the subject of PJ/WJ in the case of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine is understudied. Also, the exploration of this subject from previous literature and across a broad period shows that while there is a plethora of studies on non-Farsi media (from all over the globe), a small number of studies focused on Farsi-language media, particularly in connection to PJ/WJ. Also, it was found that one of the media under study, Iran International is totally understudied. The current study attempts to fill this literature gap and remedy this deficiency.

Chapter 3: Background

This chapter attempts to depict the context in which the 2022 conflict in Ukraine is formed. First, the chapter discusses some constituting elements of a bigger conflict over decades, its parties, its problems/roots, and its development (from 2014 to 2024). In doing so, it will be attempted to make the 2022 conflict more understandable. Notably, this chapter does not aim to provide a list of all actors but tries to understand whether this is a two-party or multi-party conflict and also puts forth some of the main roots of the conflict. In the second part of the chapter, an intensive account of the Farsi-language media, particularly the two media under study (Iran International and BBC Persian), is provided.

The 2022 war in Ukraine, which broke out after Russia's military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is one of the bloodiest wars after the second world war in Europe (Masters, 2023). Putin called this invasion a "special military operation" (Armed Conflict Survey, 2022:107). He justified this act by claiming that Russia had no choice but to undertake this "special operation" for the security of Russia because of the NATO threat (Aljazeera, 2022). Putin, in his speech on this issue on February 24, 2022, while addressing Russians, Ukrainians, and the armies of the two countries, stated that "I am referring to the expansion of NATO to the east, moving its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders" (ibid). Claiming that

Ukraine has developed into a "neo-Nazi" state by which the people of the East are endangered, Putin justified the operation as a defense of the people of the two Eastern republics in Ukraine, Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic (collectively known as Donbas region) (ibid). Putin claimed that the operation accords with Article 51 of Part 7 of the UN Charter (ibid). However, a resolution issued by the UN general assembly on March 2, 2022, demanded an end to the Russian "offensive in Ukraine" (UN News, 2022).

This account avoids taking any side in how to call this military action. Therefore, it will be attempted to *chiefly* stick to the broader term of the 2022 *conflict* in Ukraine. The 2022 conflict, which turned into an armed conflict (or war), has its roots in a bigger conflict across a period long before 2022. By selecting the term "2022 conflict," this account additionally acknowledges the underlying roots of the outbreak of the war in 2022 and the dynamics of the conflict instead of only recognizing the escalated phase and the tangible side of the conflict (i.e., the war/invasion).

As others mentioned, this invasion on February 24, 2022, was neither a result of a recent change in Putin's personality or thinking (Shigeki, 2022:19) nor is it rooted in Putin's individual and psychological traits (Hanappi, 2022:116). It is rather a result of diverse causes rooted in the early 2000s (Shigeki, 2022:19) and particularly from 2014 onward. Some accounts argue that "getting rid" of Putin will not change the way things are in Russia, given the "Russian ecosystem" (Surin, 2022), a complex ecosystem encompassing the bureaucracy, security forces, oligarchy, cultural organizations, media, the orthodox church and so forth (ibid).

Snider (2023) argues that in the 2022 war in Ukraine, there are four international wars, though they are being fought in the shadow of a single war. He argues that the first war is fought within Ukraine and between the East and Kyiv. The second war is between Ukraine and Russia; the third is the proxy war between NATO and Russia, and the fourth is a direct war between the US and Russia (ibid). Issues such as Ukraine's ties with NATO and its relationship with the US, the EU, and the West have been frequently debated in connection to the conflict in Ukraine. The following sections will mention some key aspects of such relationships to see to what extent these actors have been involved in the conflict.

3-2 The conflict in the period between 2014 and 2022

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the interim government of Ukraine embraced reforms to facilitate more integration of Ukraine into the West (Welt, 2019:156). These reforms increased tensions between Ukraine and Russia and eventually resulted in the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014 (ibid).

When the former president of Ukraine, Yanukovych, was in power, some disputes between Ukraine and Russia were partially resolved by a shift from the West to Russia (BBC, 2014). He postponed closer economic and political ties with the EU (ibid) and instead agreed to receive substantial financial assistance from Russia (Welt, 2019). This was when the Euromaidan protests started resulting in the removal of Yanukovych from power (ibid). "Under EU pressure," Yanukovych "signed a deal to transfer the power to parliament" (BBC, 2014).

While Western, Ukrainian, and US sources call the 2014 events a revolution of dignity (e.g., Welt:2019:156), Russian government officials call this a coup that could, among other issues, threaten the security of the ethnic Russian minority in Crimea and also result in

Ukraine's NATO membership (ibid, p.169). Yanukovych fled to Russia, and Russian forces were deployed to the Crimea region. Consequently, a referendum was held in March 2014, and Crimea was declared to be annexed to the Russian Federation (Warsaw Institute, 2018). While some accounts (e.g., Safranchuk, 2022) call this annexation a result of a pro-Russia popular movement, others, including the Ukraine government and Western governments, including the US and the UK, call this an illegal act conducted by Russia (see, e.g., UK Government, 2021).

3-2-1 The Conflict between East and Kyiv

According to Sanders & Tuck (2020), Putin has used the secessionist movement in the East of Ukraine "as leverage to force" Kyiv to abandon more ties to the West (p.27). This support has continued ever since. As a consequence of the 2014 conflict, other regions in the Eastern part of Ukraine, such as Odesa and Kharkiv, faced disputes, mostly due to the population's leaning toward Russia. The movements in these areas were reportedly suppressed by Ukrainian forces (Safranchuk, 2022:1), which resulted in regenerating the conflict, including war with Kyiv. In order to stop the war, two Minsk accords were concluded, one in September 2014 and one in February 2015 (Sanders & Tuck, 2020), which provided a de facto status to this region, and the local forces declared two People's Republics. Kyiv did not recognize these republics. However, in line with these agreements, Kyiv granted a special status within Ukraine in certain areas of Donbas. Various Ukrainian presidents had different stances regarding these agreements. Volodymyr Zelensky denied these agreements when he took office (Norton, 2023). In 2022, Russian officials claimed that Zelensky's government was preparing to attack these regions to re-integrate them into Ukraine while they were, under Minsk agreements, enjoying a de facto self-determination (Safranchuk, 2022:1).

There are other roots to this internal conflict. Most of the population in Ukraine can speak Russian (as a primary or secondary language) (Ivanova, 2022). It is estimated that 15%-20% of the Ukraine population is identified as ethnic Russians, chiefly living in the East and South (Crimea), where there is a stronger tie to Russia than in the rest of Ukraine (Seiffert, 2014). There were, however, periodic political tensions around these cultural/societal aspects, e.g., tensions around the coexistence of the Russian and Ukrainian languages (Armed Conflict Survey, 2022:110). Moreover, economic conflicts affect the regeneration of the conflicts as well. In Soviet times, eastern Ukraine gradually became an important site of heavy industrial sectors (including defense-related manufacturing). This region and its industries continued to retain strong economic ties with Russia even after Ukraine gained its independence (Seiffert, 2014). However, there have always been economic tensions and contradictions around the distribution of wealth by the Kyiv government and the industrial Donbas region (Armed Conflict Survey, 2022:110). For instance, in 2017, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko banned the movement of goods to and from the Donbas region, and for instance, Ukraine has not bought coal from the East since then (UNIAN, 2018).

The tensions, as mentioned, escalated, for instance, in 2014, though not all accounts agree on how to interpret it. As shown, the Euromaidan events in 2014 were called by some a revolution and by others, including pro-Russian sources (see Sanders & Tuck, 2020), a coup. The tensions between Kyiv and Eastern Ukraine were never resolved. The war lasted until 2022 (Sanders & Tuck, 2020), though it was not always of the same magnitude.

The next question would be why Putin mentioned the issue of NATO as one of the reasons for Russia's military action in 2022. What do we know about NATO, Ukraine, and Russia? In the following section, some points will be provided to see whether NATO has a role as an actor in the 2022 conflict.

3-2-2 The role of NATO in this conflict

Regardless of one's stance regarding NATO, be it pro or anti-NATO, one can still examine the impact of NATO on the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. According to a "Congressional Research Service publication … prepared for Members and Committees of Congress [of the US]", the NATO-Ukraine relationship has always been a close one (Welt, 2019:215). In 1994, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the first country to establish a partnership with NATO was Ukraine (ibid). This excludes the Baltic states. In 1997 a NATO-Ukraine commission was established to foster their cooperation. Under the (so-called pro-Russian) government of Yanukovych, even though he rejected the aspiration of NATO membership, he invited NATO to launch a program for Defense Education Enhancement (ibid). NATO enlargement continued fast. Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia joined NATO in 2004 (Hanappi, 2022:119-120). In 2008 Russia opposed granting membership to Ukraine and Georgia, claiming that this would pose a "direct threat to its security and endanger the fragile balance of forces in Europe" (Reuters, 2008). In 2009, Albania and Croatia, and in 2017, Montenegro joined NATO (Hanappi, 2022:119-120). In 2017, Ukraine voted to prioritize cooperating with NATO as a pivotal orientation in its foreign policy (Welt, 2019). From the perspective of the West, this could serve the security of Europe, while from Russia's perspective, this was a threat to its security.

Some accounts (e.g., Safranchuk, 2022) argue that the crisis between Russia and Ukraine is very much rooted in the enlargement of NATO. All Russian governments, even those pro-West ones in the 1990s, opposed the expansion of NATO. Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to the reunification of West and East Germany only once he received signs of assurance about the non-enlargement of NATO and the security of the Soviet Union (Safranchuk, 2022). Nonetheless, NATO started to expand its territory in the 1990s and 2000s (Hanappi, 2022) and moved its military facilities and infrastructures close to Russian borders. According to Safranchuk (2022), Russia looked for a positive relationship with the West and thus did not reject NATO's expansion. This seemed to be Russia's policy until the 2000s when Western politicians targeted Georgia and Ukraine as new members of NATO, which was warned by Russia since it was way beyond Russia's red lines, but the West instead claimed "the freedom of any state to choose allies" (ibid).

On December 15, 2021, Russia undertook a diplomatic step and issued a draft document called "legal security guarantees from the United States and NATO," which addressed NATO, demanding a clause to prevent further NATO expansion (Reevell, 2021). According to Moscow, this agreement could guarantee European security (ibid). The West denied the request; some called it "radical demands" (ibid). This, for Russia, meant that NATO was testing its red line (Safranchuk, 2022). The issue of NATO has been a source of tension between Russia and the West. Among both anti and pro-NATO camps, there are major differences in the perspective from which they see NATO’s role in the conflict in Ukraine. But almost all agree on one thing. And that is the fact that NATO has supported Ukraine in many ways, including military training, logistic support, security, and (cyber) defense (see, e.g., Sanders & Tuck,

2020:26). Some see this as a good act for the security of Ukraine, and some a threat. Finally, many accounts call the 2022 war in Ukraine a NATO-Russia war. However, their stances differ. Susan Watkins (2022), in her debate essay, claims that this is "not a NATO war" but "a Russian war against NATO," while some, e.g., Noam Chomsky, call it a NATO/US war against Russia (see his interview on the website of Archyde, 2022). Regardless of the way one may call the war in Ukraine (either the NATO war against Russia or the Russia war against NATO), it seems that even opposite camps of positions agree that there is a war between NATO and Russia. This should be taken into account while looking into the 2022 conflict in Ukraine.

Yet, some accounts argue that NATO cannot be considered a defensive organization but an extension of the US power (c.f. Surin, 2022). Surin (2022), in his essay published in the journal of *China Media Research*, while analyzing the 2022 war in Ukraine, asserts that Ukraine is "a pawn caught between the US/NATO and Russia in the US's attempt to uphold a monopolar global system." Putin also, in his speech on February 22, 2022, on the justification of Russia's "special military operation," referred to NATO expansion but added that the problem "is not NATO itself." He claimed that NATO is "an instrument of US foreign policy" (Al-Jazeera, 2022). Whether to accept or reject this claim, one reasonable question would be to ask to what extent the US has played a role in the dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine. This is a subject to be intensively explained in the following section.

3-2-3 The role of the US and the UK in the conflict

For many years, Ukraine and the US have hosted joint military exercises in which NATO partners and allies participated (U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, 2019). According to the US Department of Defense (2016), this military aimed to "build combined capability and capacity to ensure maritime regional security and foster stronger friendships among partnering nations." US relations with Ukraine, according to the "Congressional Research Service publication," has been a deep and multifaceted one (Welt, 2019:195).

Disagreement between Russia and the West, and particularly the US, mounted in 2014 and after the conflict in Ukraine. Since Ukraine's independence, and especially after the 2014 conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine has been a leading recipient of US foreign, military/humanitarian aid in Europe and Eurasia. For instance, The US has provided substantial military assistance to Ukraine (US Department of Defense, 2019) since 2018. The US provided Ukraine with $1.5 billion in total as security/military assistance only from 2014 until June 2019 (ibid). From 2016 to 2019, $850 million was appropriated for intelligence/security assistance to Ukraine, to be extended in 2020 by another $250 million (Oswald, 2019). According to US Defense Department (2022), only from February to June 2022, an amount of US$ 4.6 bn was paid by the US to Ukraine for defense assistance. Other NATO members, including the UK, have also provided extensive military assistance to Ukraine (Armed Conflict Survey, 2022:112). In an interview, Jake Sullivan, US national security advisor, said that the 2022 war in Ukraine is not just about defending Ukraine "but also an opportunity to deliver significant blows to the stability of the Russian state" (Scahill. 2022). Charles W. Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, even posed a much clearer statement and said that the US will continue to fight Russia "to the last Ukrainian" (Maté, 2022). Regardless of one's judgment on the intention of such a war, it is clear that both sides (Russia and the US) see themselves in a war against each other. Putin claims that the special military operation is a reaction to NATO

which is a US instrument, and US officials state that this is a US war against Russia (apart from being a war, according to them, for defending Ukraine).

Yet, as mentioned, it is not only NATO and the US that were involved in such huge-scale military support for Ukraine but also the UK. The following section will shortly present some key aspects of the involvement of the UK and the EU in this conflict.

As shortly mentioned, since 2014, the Ukrainian government made closer integration with NATO and the EU as one of its top priorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2019). On the other hand, the EU has always struggled to find common positions and consequently relied mostly on the policies, initiatives, and orientation of individual member states and external actors, such as NATO (Härtel, 2023:271). Therefore, the EU's policies toward Ukraine have been shaped mainly by that of NATO. Härtel (2023) suggests that the EU's conflict management regarding the conflict in Ukraine has remained partial (p.285) in favor of one side of the conflict (i.e., Ukraine). The EU has supported Ukraine extensively and placed sanctions against Russia (ibid). After February 2022, EU countries remained the second aid provider to Ukraine. Between January 24, 2022, and July 1, 2022, the US, the EU, Germany, the UK, Canada, and other countries have provided, respectively, 69%, 11%, 6%, 3%, 2%, and 9% (others) of the humanitarian assistance that Ukraine received. And in the sense of Military assistance, the US, the UK, Poland, Germany, and others provided respectively 65%, 10%, 5%, 4%, and 10% of the military aid to Ukraine (Antezza et al., 2022).

3-3 The role of China and Iran in the conflict

In this section, China and Iran's role is addressed. These two actors have been claimed to be on Moscow's side – to be investigated. This is important to address since, so far, those actors on Ukraine's side have been mentioned. Also, since this study is investigating Farsi-language media, it is crucial to know what role Iran is playing in this conflict.

Identifying China's role in the current conflict in Ukraine is not an easy task. This is yet another complicated subject in the heart of a complex conflict. One year after the invasion of Ukraine, in an opinion feature in The New York Times, Nicole Hong (2023) addresses the meeting between Russian and Chinese officials and says that Western officials will be watching to monitor the meeting and see "how far China may be willing to go to act as a mediator in the conflict" (ibid). Chinese officials made a trip to Russia to act as a mediator for a peace agreement (ibid). So far, China is presented as a party to mediate. On the other hand, China's economic ties with Russia have raised attention. Whereas many Western countries have cut many economic exchanges with Russia, China has increased its trade by 30%, and in 2022 its overall trade with Russia hit a level of $190bn (BBC, 2023). Although China and Russia are not committed to defending each other and therefore are not formal allies, they are close strategic partners (Hong, 2023). Additionally, in February 2023, China rejected G-7's price cap on oil (Webster, 2023), which according to West, is an important support for Moscow.
Nonetheless, the trade turnover between Russia and the EU did not decline but grew 2.3% in 2022 despite the sanctions from the EU on Russia (Huaxia, 2023). As a way of illustration, in 2022, France increased its import from and export to Russia by 25% (Russia Briefing, 2022). Then the question is whether this increase in trade with Russia should be seen as supporting it in the war with Ukraine (as it is argued for the China-Russia trade relationship). Whatever answer one might give to this question, the question per see shows the complexity of the

conflict. Both the EU and China have increased their trade exchange with Russia. If China is supporting Russia, then one can conclude that the EU has done the same.

One more example of this complex situation is China's business in the hi-tech industry. US officials claim that Chinese firms have provided "non-lethal" support to Russia (Webster, 2023). Maria Shagina, an expert in economic sanctions, explained to BBC (2023) that China has not overtly supplied Russia with arms, but it "may be secretly" selling technologies that "could" be used for military purposes (ibid). This moves the debate from pointing to China as a direct actor to the question of whether China should be considered an indirect actor. There are other points to be taken into account. If China is an indirect actor in the Conflict in Ukraine due to allegedly selling technology to Russia that *might* be used for military purposes, then any other country that does the same can be categorized as a supporter of Russia. For example, US-made parts were used in Iran-made drones sold to Russia (Bertrand, 2023). And these drones are used to kill Ukrainians. Should this be counted as a support of the US for Russia? Can this be considered as an indirect involvement of the US in killing Ukrainians? Answering these questions needs more effort and time and is not in the scope of the current study. But these questions might shed light on the fact that one should not reduce the current conflict into a two-party conflict between one guy and the other. Many actors are fueling this war. Surin (2022) suggests that China's "rivalry with the US is primarily economic," while "US-NATO/Russia rivalry is primarily military and political." However, there is an economic dimension to this military and political competition (ibid). As mentioned, it is not easy to identify a direct and explicit role for China as an actor who is directly and openly playing a role in this conflict in the military/security dimensions of the conflict. This is quite contrary to the role of other actors, such as the UK, the US, the EU, and Iran, on a short-term and smaller scale. The following section will be allocated to Iran's involvement in the 2022 conflict in Ukraine.

Iran (The Islamic Republic) is playing a role in the current conflict in Ukraine. It has been repeatedly claimed (for instance, by US security officials) that Iran is supplying arms to Russia for the war in Ukraine (Wintour, 2022), including a large number of "cheap but effective" drones and missiles (ibid). The EU foreign policy chief calls Iran to immediately halt its support for Russia (Reuters, 2022). Russia denies using Iranian-made drones (Corcoran & Bake, 2022). Ukrainian officials posted pictures of such drones that, according to them, were used by the Russian military (Reynolds, 2022). In their opinion feature in Politico, Ward et al. (2022) named why Iran supports Russia with arms. They argued that Russia and Iran are "isolated" and under heavy sanctions, which is why they need to support each other. Iran is supporting Russia, among other reasons, so Russia continues its support for Syria's Bashar Al-Asad. It also does so because Iran gets money in exchange for arms, which will be injected into its "sputtering" economy (ibid). Whereas the US, the UK, and EU countries are openly supporting one side of the conflict (i.e., Ukraine) and announce it and even encourage each other to increase the support, Iran's involvement (for instance, via selling drones to Russia) faced denial by Iran and Russia. Additionally, while US/NATO/UK have been engaged in the conflict in Ukraine, no strong case has been identified that shows Iran's engagement goes back to before the 2022 invasion. Nonetheless, the issue of selling drones to Russia can suggest that Iran has a hand in this conflict, regardless of its magnitude and age, in comparison to other major actors.

3-4 An intensive account of the two leading Farsi-language media

Iran has the most significant Farsi-speaker population in the world. A majority of the 80 million population of Iranians can understand and speak Farsi even though the mother tongue of many of them is otherwise (e.g., Azeri/Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Balouchi, etc.). Other countries with Farsi-language populations are Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Millions of Farsi speakers live outside of Iran, including in Europe. Iran scored 177 among all countries in terms of the press freedom index, and it "has reinforced its position as one of the world's most repressive countries in terms of press freedom" (Reporters Without Borders, n.d). In the Farsi-language media, there are some media owned or controlled by the Iranian government. There are others run outside Iran by the Iranian diaspora, among them BBC Persian and Iran International. Millions of Iranians are frustrated with state media that are hobbled by heavy censorship and instead watch satellite channels that are broadcasted from outside, including the UK (Kamali Dehghan, 2018).

London, in light of such condition, "has become a hub of such exiled Iranian channels" (ibid). Among such channels are BBC Persian and Iran International. According to surveys conducted among 27,000 Iranians (of which 90% lived in Inside Iran), Iran International and BBC Persian are two popular and most watched/viewed news media among Iranians. According to this survey which has a “95% credibility level and credibility intervals of 5%”, these two media hold a share of 50% of daily viewership among Iranians (Gamaan, 2021), which is a big share of the news media ecosystem. Neither state news media nor non-state ones outside of Iran can compete with these news media in terms of viewership share. There is one TV (Manoto TV) that holds a higher share of viewership than BBC Persian and holds the second place in viewership share (after Iran International, which holds the first place), but it is mainly an entertainment media that broadcasts some minutes of daily news as well. Therefore, Iran International and BBC Persian together hold a monopoly in news work among the Farsi-speaking population. One can suggest that Iran International and BBC Persian, both based in the UK, represent the ecosystem of non-state news media among the Farsi-speaking population, regardless of their orientation and practice and regardless of one's judgment about their outcome. Since the current study focuses on the practice of these news media, the following section provides a short presentation of these two media.

BBC Persian Service (BBCPS) had its Radio service for 83 years, and it was only in March 2023 that BBC stopped broadcasting its Radio in Persian (BBC, 2023). BBC launched its multifaceted Farsi-language TV in January 2009 in order to address the 100 million Farsi-speaking population spread across Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (BBC Persian, n.d). BBC Persian broadcasts sixteen hours of daily programs (ibid). BBC Persian states that it follows the principles of journalism: impartiality, neutrality, and objectivity (ibid). BBC supports the journalistic work of its Persian service and asserts that "we stand by all BBC Persian journalists and support their journalism" (BBC, 2022). BBC has repeatedly reported the harassment that the journalists in BBC Persian and their family members are facing from the Iranian government (BBC Persian, 2020). Two UN Special Rapporteurs wrote in a joint statement that "[i]t seems that the Iranian authorities consider any communication with the BBC a crime" (ibid). This was said when after the judicial action of the Iranian authorities against about 150 current and former employees of the Farsi department, the BBC filed a complaint with the United Nations on October 25, 2017 (ibid).

Iran International launched its programs in May 2017 and is based in London. It provides news and current affairs around the clock (24/7) (Iran International, n.d). Iranian official authorities repeatedly accused Iran International of a media that fuels political conflicts in Iran and asked the UK media regulator (Ofcom) to act and shut down Iran International (Iran International, 2022). The head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps warned Iran International journalists that "we are coming for you" (ibid). Although Iran International is quite young in the Farsi-language (news) media, and it was only in 2017 that it launched its programs, it is now on top of the list in the sense of popularity. It holds a share of the daily viewership of 33%, while BBC holds 17% of the daily viewership among Iranians (Gamaan, 2021). Nonetheless, these two hold the biggest share of daily viewership among all other non-state Farsi-language news media.

Iran International and BBC Persian (with respectively 24- and 16-hour daily news programs) have covered the 2022 conflict in Ukraine, among other issues. Due to their large audience share, it is vital to study the reporting of these leading news media if one intends to study PJ/WJ in the Farsi-language media ecosystem.

Chapter 4: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This chapter presents and discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework that will be employed in this research. Two main strands of theories that are employed are explained in this chapter. First, framing theory will be intensively presented. Then, the main theories/concepts in the field of PJ and WJ (studies) are presented and discussed. As for the latter and aiming to contribute to and modify the existing scholarship in the field of PJ/WJ studies, I suggest a new concept while drawing upon a normative debate. The chapter also introduces indicators for identifying traits/frames of PJ and WJ in any given news item.

4-1 Framing theory

In (mainstream) media discourse, framing determines which aspects of a news story are meaningful and salient and thus worthy of being promoted as a valid version of reality (Entman, 1993; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The frame is the way by which the media present the information, and this way will inform the way audiences process and perceive that information. Thus, frames organize the meaning of the received message (Asemah & Edegoh, 2012). Another typical characteristic of framing is that it attempts to make people think in the same way and from the same perspective the journalists think (Van Gorp, 2005:485). Thus, news workers play the role of the constructor of social reality for people/audiences by framing (Güran & Özarslan, 2022:447). News workers, while applying frames that emphasize some aspects of reality, by selecting these aspects, effectively suppress other aspects and therefore define the reality (ibid).

Entman (2007) defines framing as " the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation" (p.164). Audience members' preferences and interpretations are shaped and altered through priming, which is employed by framing (Entman, 2007:164). Frames raise and introduce the salience or apparent importance of particular ideas (Entman, 1993) And activate schemas that encourage audiences. By so doing, frames make the target audiences feel, think, and decide in a particular way (cf., Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Kim et al., 2002; Price et al., 1997).

In this study, two specific categories of diagnostic and prognostic frames (Snow & Benford, 1988) are used, among other reasons, to "identify problems" or "propose solutions to international situations" (Shayesteh & Seo, 2022:55). These two frame categories are relevant to the scope of this research. Seeing a conflict, such as the one in Ukraine, as a problem and pointing to its consequences can be identified in news stories using a diagnostic frame, and posing a solution to this conflict in the news can be identified using a prognostic frame. A diagnostic frame, according to Snow and Benford (1988), is related to "a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration" (p.199). In the case of the conflict in Ukraine, for example, a diagnostic frame might emphasize and highlight how the war caused casualties, victimized citizens, or escalated the older conflict between parties. This seems to be more in line with WJ or perhaps SWJ. This will be examined. The prognostic frame, on the other hand, highlights and emphasizes "a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done" (ibid) and "foregrounds strategies for addressing a problem" (Shayesteh & Seo, 2022:95). In this research such frames can include proposing or pointing to solutions to end the war or transform the conflict in Ukraine.

4-2 PJ & WJ

The media's reporting on conflicts has been substantially discussed in academic debates. One could begin with the general expectations from the media, their responsibilities, roles, and functions. To begin with, media are considered the Fourth Estate in a democracy, a force "to rein" the politicians' abuse of power, a venue to expose corruption, ensure the flow of information, and inform those in power about the opinion of the public (Devere & Wilson, 2013:133). However, some scholars argue that, in practice, the media themselves act as "political players" to influence the public's opinion (ibid). Other scholars also assert that in times of conflict, the media mirror their government's perspective (Roman et al., 2017) instead of reflecting the public's opinion. Particularly, in the case of covering conflicts, media are more and more giving special attention to conflict as a "news value," and war reporting is becoming "sexy" (Lee & Maslog, 2005:311) and a product to be sold and consumed better. As an example, in the case of the Kosovo war, CNN followed NATO's lead and acted as a "de facto public-information partner" to NATO (Rizanaj, 2018:79). In a BBC report, Jamie Shea, NATO spokesperson, compared the bombings with "the sound of angels" (Pilger, 2000:126).

The media has elsewhere been described as "weapons" targeting the mind of the audiences, and these minds are depicted as "battlefields" (Szostek, 2018:116-117) attacked by the media. Beyond this metaphoric referral to the media, it is claimed that media are subject to massive propaganda from actors that are involved in a conflict (Höijer et al., 2002:4). Other accounts consider media as "key weapons" in a conflict situation or any war (Goretti, 2007:3). Moreover,

some scholars argue the media themselves are an element of conflicts (Blagojević, 2005:166) and a "key player" in the conflict (Rizanaj, 2018).

As mentioned, on the one hand, the media's ideal role as a chief pillar in a democratic society is to stop and prevent the abuse of power, ensure the flow of information, and reflect the public's opinion. On the other hand, and as discussed, in practice and specifically concerning reporting conflicts, media mostly take part in conflicts and become a part of the war propaganda machine. These two, the ideal role and their actual practice, seem to be incompatible in some ways. NohrStedt (2009) argues that the media's power of influence can make journalists either a "fifth column" or a "fourth branch of service" (p.96). Yet, there might be journalistic practices that fall in between these two opposite poles. This will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

Moreover, it has been well-documented that the media's coverage of conflicts is disproportionately violent, portrays a win-lose binary, lacks a diversity of views and context (Shaw et al., 2011:81), and fails to address the roots of the conflict, let alone provides any solution. This type of coverage of conflicts is labeled as WJ (war journalism). WJ is, to a large extent, profit-driven and consumerist. It additionally raises serious questions on the "ethos of objectivity" in media and journalism (ibid). Perhaps, it could be fruitful to explain WJ by explaining its differences with other opposite approaches in conflict reporting.

Contrary to the WJ approach is PJ (peace journalism). It is considered an alternative and a response to WJ and a "counter-hegemonic paradigm" (Shaw et al. 2011:81). Shinar (2007:2) explains that PJ is conceived as a "fairer" approach to cover conflicts, compared to WJ. It suggests professional attitudes, strengthen moral, human, and ethical values in media practices, and, more importantly, provides better public service by the media (ibid). PJ is a new approach to the ordinary approach that the average media follows. It seeks diverse perspectives and accounts to challenge the existing elite-oriented conflict coverage. Furthermore, it seeks and promotes peace as a primary value (Shaw et al., 2011:81). By this alternative approach (i.e., PJ), journalists should play an active role in favor of the interests of society (Ersoy & Miller, 2020, cited in Ersoy & İşeri, 2023:7). According to Shinar (2007), PJ aims to contribute to peacemaking, peacekeeping and also a change in the attitudes of professionals, media owners, advertisers, and audiences as well, toward war and peace (p.2). Moreover, journalists who follow the PJ approach cover conflict as a problem that needs to be solved in their reporting (Ersoy & İşeri, 2023:7). Nonetheless, there are scholars who criticize the PJ/WJ model. For instance, Hanitzsch (2007) asserts that this model “tends to highlight the exceptional, spectacular and negative of war coverage” and “ignores the many structural constraints that shape and limit the work of journalists.” Among these constraints are time and material resources, few personnel, textual constraints, editorial procedures, hierarchies, and so on (ibid). Addressing other critiques of this model would be beyond the scope of this research.

Galtung (1986) compared the two approaches and argued that WJ is dominant in the media. In WJ, conflict is seen " as a battle and the battle as sports arena and gladiator circus" (Galtung, 2017). In WJ, the parties to the conflict are usually reduced to two sides who struggle to impose their interests and goals. The reporting model on conflicts is that of military command and seeks and reports who advances, which party capitulates short of its goals, losses are seen and counted in terms of the number of people killed/wounded, and material damages. Knightley (2000) argues that WJ " is characterized by identification with one side or with the home side

of the war" and uses triumphalist military language (cited in Lee & Maslog, 2005:311). WJ is action-oriented and employs a superficial narrative with a little background, context, or historical perspective (ibid, p.311). The zero-sum perspective in WJ echoes sports reporting, where winning is the only desired thing. Negotiations are seen as verbal battles too.

On the contrary, as an alternative to WJ, Galtung suggests that PJ would focus on conflict transformation (Galtung, 2017). Whereas in this perspective, conflicts are seen as a challenge to our world, there is a clear opportunity and capacity in them for human progress. In the PJ approach, conflicts are considered as venues to find new ways and attempt to creatively transform the conflict. By so doing, Galtung suggests, the opportunities within a conflict take the upper hand without sticking to or following violence-oriented approaches (ibid).

Within decades after PJ was introduced, it drew other scholars' attention. Various studies were conducted in this field. Tehranian asserted that journalists have to take into consideration "whether their work will be part of the problem or part of the solution" (cited in Çiftcioğlu, 2017:16), and McGoldrick & Lynch (2000:5) described PJ as an approach in reporting that "uses conflict analysis and transformation to update the concept of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting" (cited in Cozma, 2015:436). Journalists who employ the PJ approach understand the historical and cultural roots of the conflict, give voice to all parties to it, and try to create understanding and empathy (ibid). Whereas WJ is elite-oriented, PJ is people-oriented (Lynch, 2007:7). PJ attempts to depolarize by showing black and white of all actors/sides and trying to deescalate the conflict by highlighting peace and conflict resolution, as much as it depicts the violence (Ersoy & İşeri, 2023:7). Therefore, according to Galtung (1998, 2006), journalists who follow the PJ approach (peace journalists), do not report only on salient events/stages of conflicts (e.g., violence) but through all stages. This includes the actual violent incidents and also the structural and cultural aspects that produce and reproduce them (cited in Hussain & Lynch, 2019:706). PJ approach also focuses on media influence, rather than merely on the presence of professional news media outlets, and thus the media can become facilitators of positive change toward conflict resolution rather than being mere disinterested professionals and observers/reporters (Howard, 2002:4 cited in Goretti, 2007:3). The next subject to be addressed is to provide more concrete classifications of PJ/WJ traits.

4-2-1 Categorizing the traits of PJ/WJ

What was presented so far addressed the theoretical presentation of a diverse range of characteristics of WJ/PJ that were put forth by different accounts in this field. Here, in this section, a clear categorization of constituting traits/elements of PJ/WJ is presented.

One classification upon which there seems to exist a consensus among scholars in the field of PJ/WJ and is frequently referred to is that of Johan Galtung. Many accounts (e.g., Jehangir, 2023; Lee & Maslog, 2005) refer to the Galtung classification. This classification explains four sets of PJ's main traits: peace/people/truth/solution. And this type of journalism should be easy for a “broader population to comprehend" (Jehangir, 2023:4). In developing his first model of WJ/PJ, Galtung divided conflict reporting into four classifications of coverage, which was modified in his later works (c.f., Galtung, 1986, Galtung, 2017) as such: peace/conflict-oriented vs. war/violence-oriented, truth-oriented vs. propaganda-oriented, people-oriented vs. elite-oriented, and finally, solution-oriented vs. victory-oriented.

Table 1 provides Galtung's classification and its subcategories, elaborates on the differences between WJ and PJ approaches, and according to Galtung, is an "effort to fill both concepts with operational content" (Galtung, 2017).

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	**WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM**
I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues general "win,win" orientation -open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture --making conflicts transparent -giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding, see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity -humanization of all sides-more so the worse the weapons -proactive: prevention before any -violence/war occurs: focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)	**I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED** focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, general zero-sum orientation, -closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone --making wars opaque/secret -"us-them" journalism, propaganda, voice, for "us", see "them" as the problem- focus on who prevails in war -dehumanization of "them"-more so the worse the weapon -reactive: waiting for violence before reporting -focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
II. TRUTH-ORIENTED expose untruths on all sides- uncover all cover-ups	**II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED** expose "their" untruths-help "our" cover-ups/lies
III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children -giving voice to the voiceless, give name to all evil-doers-focus on people peace-makers	**III. ELITE-ORIENTED** focus on "our" suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece -give name of their evil-doer-focus on elite peacemakers
IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED peace = nonviolence + creativity -highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war -focus on structure, culture - the peaceful society -aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation	**IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED** peace = victory + cease-fire -conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand -focus on treaty, institution-the controlled society - leaving for another war, return if the old flares up

Table 1., Differences between PJ and WJ, generated by and retrieved from Galtung (2017).

The proposed classification suggested by Galtung is still one of the most-referred models that are used in this field. Nonetheless, there are still misinterpretations and misunderstandings while employing such model(s). One of the major issues that occur while reporting conflict, according to Galtung (2017), is that media more often confuse conflict with violence (Galtung, 2017). Based on the scholarship within peace and conflict studies, it should be underscored that violence (including armed conflict and war) is only a certain phase in the dynamics of some conflicts, a salient and tangible phase in which the conflict has turned to direct violence. Not all conflicts necessarily involve war or direct violence. As mentioned, Galtung asserts that this is a problematic understanding in journalistic works regarding conflict reporting. I would suggest that this issue is not only the case among journalists but also among scholars in media

and journalism studies. As an example, one can point to a study on WJ/PJ in Turkish Press (Ersoy, 2016), in which the author confused conflict with violence/war. That article provides two sets of classifications as indicators for WJ and PJ. However, for the former, instead of war/violence journalism, the author used the title of "conflict"-oriented frames once it points to the elements of war/violence (see ibid). It should be clarified and underscored that the two opposite approaches are peace/conflict on the one hand and war/violence journalism on the other hand (see, e.g., Galtung, 2017).

As one of the suggestions of this study, it should be emphasized that PJ does not mean neglecting the conflict, but understanding the conflict, taking it into account, making it understandable and transparent for the audience, and attempting to provide a resolution to it. Therefore, I would underscore and put emphasis on this significantly important point as PJ is conflict-sensitive. That is why it is categorized/labeled as peace/conflict journalism (and only summarized and coined as PJ). On the contrary, the opposite approach neglects the conflict, its roots, some parts of the parties, and dynamics and only focuses on the salient moments/events, including violence/war. Such a clarification on the differences between the two approaches should explain why the two main categories are labeled as the peace/conflict category and, on the opposite, the war/violence category.

4-2-2 How to practically measure these traits and identify PJ/WJ?

Most theoretical accounts on PJ fall short of providing concrete and practical measures to be applied in analyzing conflict reporting and identifying PJ/WJ. They, instead, focus mainly on mere normative debates. Even those accounts that provide more concrete categorizations propose categories subject to normative debates and personal interpretation. For instance, it is not easy to identify all subcategories provided in Table 1 in a given news item. "Making conflict transparent," "making war opaque," "humanizations of all sides," "proactive" or "reactive" (Galtung, 2017), and many other items can be easily interpreted differently by different people and need to be translated into more concrete indicators/codes. For example, how should a conflict be reported to make the conflict transparent? One's reporting can mention two parties in a conflict, one or two problems between them, and then claim that such a report has made the conflict transparent. This claim can be rejected by putting forth the demand that the report should also have addressed the multi-party nature of the conflict, other underlying roots to the conflict, and so forth. Another valid demand can be the presence of other important aspects of the conflict in the report, including some points of the dynamics of the conflict and its development before it escalated and possibly addressing its economic-political, social-cultural, and historical roots. Therefore, by only demanding that the conflict should be made "transparent," we leave the room for a never-ending debate and yet normative discussion. Therefore, we need to provide and stick to more concrete indicators and codes.

Most of the available literature is constituted of theoretical/normative discussions that outline the benefit of following PJ and how it should be applied in reporting (e.g., Galtung, 1986, 1998; Lynch, 1998, 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). For the purpose of this research, I need to employ concrete indicators. Such indicators will be applied to conflict coverage and to examine what elements of each two approaches of PJ/WJ exist in the story. Indicators should be as lucid, concrete, and objective as possible to leave (as much as possible) no room for interpretations. What indicators fulfill this criterion?

As others emphasize, there is no universal standard for analyzing journalistic works, which also applies to the PJ field (Aslam, 2011:119). Different scholars suggested and/or employed different sets of classifications of constituting elements of PJ/WJ and different sets of indicators, though many share parts of others' classifications and indicators.

One frequently referred classification is that of Lee & Maslog (2005), which has been employed in many accounts (c.f., Devere & Wilson, 2013; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014). They reconstructed Galtung's categories and provided thirteen indicators for each of war and peace journalism (a total of 26) to analyze the news framing to see whether it accords with PJ or WJ (ibid, p.139). They categorized their classification into two sets of themes: The approach and the language that is used in the reporting. Then each theme contains various indicators/frames. This set of indicators is elaborated on in the Methodology chapter, and a more detailed version with a description is provided in Appendix 2.

Yet, there seems to be a flaw in these classifications suggested by Galtung and given more concrete categorization of indicators by others (cf. Lee & Maslog, 2005). This flaw should be tackled. This is elaborated on in the following section.

4-2-3 Suggesting a new concept.

As a result of my exploration of the existing scholarship in the field of PJ (studies), I argue that it seems that there is a flaw in the understanding and assessment of conflict reporting in connection to identifying it as either PJ or WJ. I argue that news stories do not necessarily fit into either PJ or WJ categories. This is a dual model, while this subject is not binary. It is rather a continuum, and there is a middle approach between the PJ and WJ. Consequently, based on a normative discussion, I suggest a supplementary theoretical perspective to the subject and propose a new concept by which the dual model of PJ versus WJ is transformed into a multidimensional one. For so doing, methodologically speaking, I depart from the application of this field (classification/indicators) to reach the theoretical debate and suggest a new concept and, consequently, a new model. Then, I suggest a concrete method to translate this normative suggestion into an applicable and identifiable concept.

As mentioned above, Lee & Maslog (2005) analyzed stories, and in every stance, a WJ or PJ indicator was present, a score (of one) was given to the respective approach (either PJ or WJ), and if that indicator was absent a score of zero was given. Then, based on the total score given to the PJ approach (and separately to the WJ approach), the coder will classify the news story as either WJ (if total scores for WJ exceed that of PJ), PJ (if total scores of PJ exceeds that of WJ) or neutral (if total scores of WJ and PJ are equal) (p.313). I argue that neutrality in covering conflicts means the absence of a conflict-sensitive approach, and this is still in the strand of WJ, though not a salient, tangible, and active WJ. The whole idea and the logic of peace/conflict journalism (see Galtung 2017) is about providing conflict analysis elements in an understandable language for the audience – and among other things, not remaining neutral or silent about the roots of the conflict. Importantly peace/conflict journalism is about the journalists' attempt to suggest a solution to the conflict. Hence, being neutral toward these crucial subjects means neglecting the approach of conflict (-analysis-oriented) journalism (i.e., PJ), which is against the very logic of PJ. And this means the news item lies on the side of WJ, though not an active WJ that involves many more WJ indicators. Although this is not directly and explicitly in line with an immediate practice of promoting and fueling the war, it is not yet

in accordance with promoting peace and providing a solution. Peace (and conflict) journalism is about not remaining silent about the underlying roots of the conflict, not reducing actors to two persons or only two sides, addressing people as either source or actor and trying not to neglect conflict transformation. It is not only one single score of total indicators more than the total indicators of WJ. A journalistic work that neglects the dynamics of conflict and only avoids the sharp language/approach of war/violence is not neutral, as some scholars call it. It still is abandoning the significant tasks of the peace and conflict approach. Therefore, as a theoretical contribution of this study, aiming to modify Galtung's dual conceptualization of PJ/WJ and attempting to modify the categorization derived from this model (that categorizes journalistic works as either WJ, PJ or neutral), I suggest a new concept. I call this concept *semi-war journalism* (SWJ). I argue that this middle approach (SWJ) is neither PJ nor WJ. It is in between. It does not fall in the field of the language/approach of an explicit and sharp/active war but in that of a passive war (to be ignited sooner or later). My conceptualization of SWJ dismisses the duality/binary nature of the model suggested by Galtung.

A made-up example can shed light on the subject. Here is a fictitious article:
In his speech addressing the nation, Mr. Putinsky said, "Our troops know this fact very well. Our neighboring country, Beepland, overuses the mutual water resources. Therefore, it is in our best interest and vital for our lives and for the next generations that our army continues taking act until they stop this". At a press conference the day after, Ms. Zelokov reacted to Putinsky's speech and stated that "we are doing nothing but using the resources that historically have always been ours. I have ordered our army to take any necessary measure to defend our dear country, Beepland, and I ask Mr. Putinsky to stop these claims" (All names are made up).

As can be seen, this made-up story has no demonizing or dehumanizing language. The story has covered both sides and took no side. This will be categorized as a neutral story by the existing model and method. However, by the new three-dimensional model that includes SWJ as well, this story will be categorized as SWJ. The reason is that in this story, the actors have been reduced to persons. No solution is mentioned. It is zero-sum reporting, and both sides are demanding their own interest. And no common ground for agreement is provided. For instance, it could refer to "Mr. Naveed, the president of Keepland, has called for reconciliation between the two presidents and suggested the formation of a mutual commission consisting of experts from the two countries and Keepland to assess the issue and find a solution" (made-up names). Putinsky and Zelokov might not accept this solution, but the report has covered a type of solution and also does not fuel the conflict. This SWJ can become a PJ if other conflict-sensitive traits are embedded in it.

As mentioned, SWJ does not reflect the sharp/explicit war journalism framing, but still, it is not a sharp PJ. SWJ represents masked and passive war/violence journalism. Under the skin of the SWJ approach, WJ is embedded, though not an explicit one. I suggest that SWJ is a masked WJ. Incorporating some traits of conflict-sensitive reporting (PJ) in a journalistic work can undo the mask, take a meaningful distance from WJ and make that journalistic work a PJ.

4-2-4 How to measure and identify PJ/SWJ/WJ?

The following method can be applied to translate this theoretical debate (and the suggested concept of SWJ) into a practical language and to make the elements of SWJ measurable. I suggest that first, one should deduct the total scores for WJ from that of PJ. The result of this deduction can define whether that story is PJ, WJ, or SWJ. If the deducted score is three or

less, the story is aligned with SWJ. If the deducted score is four and more in favor of WJ, the story is aligned with WJ, and if four and more in favor of PJ, then it is aligned with PJ.

This criterium is because a difference of three or fewer scores between PJ and WJ does not make a meaningful and sharp distinction between the two approaches. It is instead in the strand of SWJ. I suggest that more than three scores in favor of PJ situate that reporting in the strand of PJ and more than three in favor of WJ shows that the reporting is a WJ one. More than three scores difference is the threshold. Others might modify this criterion, suggest either more difference or less, or put forth content-based criteria for identifying SWJ. I propose a three-point difference as the threshold based on a pilot study I conducted. It was seen that most of the stories that are not sharply lean toward PJ or WJ involve around a three-score difference between the total scores of WJ and PJ. This is a subject of further study, and I call for more in-depth debates around this for future research.

Noteworthy is that there are 196 different possibilities for combinations of total scores of WJ and PJ. There is no pure PJ or WJ, except one possibility of zero PJ indicator and one possibility of zero WJ score, which makes only two possibilities out of 196, and results in a 98.9% possibility of reporting that are not pure WJ or PJ. In an article that is categorized as PJ, there is at least one (and more) indicator(s) of WJ. And the same applies to WJ. In almost all reporting, there are some traits of WJ and some of PJ. Thus, The contrast is not absolute, but there is a continuum from the ideal PJ pole to the far extreme WJ pole. SWJ is placed in between, and to identify it, one should use the indicators of the two poles of WJ and PJ. That also applies to the other approach; for instance, for identifying PJ, one should identify both PJ and WJ indicators in the article. SWJ is situated in between and acknowledges the nuances in reporting in connection to a conflict-sensitive approach.

Figure 1. illustrates how scores in favor of each approach result in measuring and identifying that approach. It also demonstrates the grey-colored strand of the suggested concept of SWJ.



Figure 1. Visualization of a new concept, semi-war-journalism, and the method by which PJ/WJ/SWJ can be measured.

In this Figure, for example, number 4, in the horizontal axis, means that the total score (Σi) for PJ in an article is 4. Number 8, for example, in the vertical axis, means the total score (Σi) of 8 for WJ in the article. To explain the usage of the Figure, four spots are indicated in it as examples. Spot 1 is where the total score of PJ is 12 while that of WJ is 5, which makes a difference of 7 (more than 3), and this is a PJ article. Spot 2, 7 total points for PJ and 4 for WJ, a difference of three thus SWJ. Spot 3 shows equal total scores for both, not neutral, but SWJ. Spot 4, 6 total scores for PJ and 11 for WJ, a difference of 5 (more than 3); thus, this article is WJ.

To sum up, framing theory was explained in the first part of the chapter. It was discussed that the frame is how the media present the information, informing how audiences process and perceive it. In the second part of the chapter, the (ideal) role of media/journalism was addressed, and two opposite functions of journalism in reality/practice (i.e., PJ/WJ) were mentioned. To modify this dual mode, I conceptualized and proposed a new concept of SWJ. Based on this new concept and a three-dimensional model, it was then explained how one could identify PJ/SWJ/WJ in a given conflict reporting.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5-1 Methodology

This empirical research seeks to contribute to journalism and media studies with a focus on two leading Farsi-language news media. As an exploratory study, the research examines to what extent these news media used PJ or WJ frames in their journalistic practice in the coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. Hence the theories/concepts of PJ/WJ are the primary theoretical framework to be applied to interpret the gathered data and drive the discussion. As a theoretical suggestion of the current study, the new concept of SWJ (see the Theory chapter) is also considered. Informed by this theoretical contribution which occurred in the current research process, the main research question should be modified. Instead of analyzing the articles regarding PJ/WJ, they should be analyzed regarding PJ/SWJ/WJ.

This research is generally deductive as it employs pre-provided theories. Only in the final part of the Theory Chapter, an inductive approach is used, and based on the available theoretical debates, a new concept (SWJ) is suggested. However, the research promptly turns again to a deductive approach since it even deductively employs this new concept.

Moreover, as a supplementary theoretical framework, the framing theory will be employed as it helps to understand better how journalists have framed their conflict reporting. Lee & Maslog (2005) argue that framing theory theoretically supports PJ (p.313). Fahmy & Eakin (2014:90) suggest that framing theory is a relevant theory for examining PJ/WJ because it

"demonstrates how frames, and thus certain understandings, become embedded within media coverage" (p.90). Lee & Maslog (2005) suggest that news/story framing is equal to the salience of indicators of PJ/WJ. Such framings, according to them, illustrate "how the media tell us *how* to think about something" (emphasis by mentioned authors) (p.313). Many scholars (e.g., Lee & Maslog, 2005; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Lichtenstein et al., 2019) use framing theory as a theoretical framework to better examine PJ/WJ in news stories. However, along with frames/indicators of PJ/WJ, framing theory will be additionally used to identify two categories of framing in the news stories: diagnostic framing and prognostic framing (Snow & Benford, 1988).

Once the data is gathered, and during content analysis, along with indicators/frames that will be used to identify PJ/WJ for each news story, these two additional frames (diagnostic and prognostic) will be searched to see which frame co-exists with PJ/WJ frames. The following sections will explain the indicators/frames of PJ/WJ.

5-2-1 method

The research analysis focused on textual coverage of the conflict in Ukraine by two leading and non-state Farsi-language new media. *BBC Persian* and *Iran International* are selected to be studied for several reasons. These news media, along with *Manoto TV,* are the top three popular Farsi-language media among Iranian inside and outside Iran based on daily viewership, with a share of respectively 33%, 17%, and 30% (Gamaan, 2021). These three media based in London each have more viewers than the Iranian state media (IRIB), which only has a 16% share of daily viewership (ibid). Nonetheless, Manoto TV is excluded from the study for two main reasons. First, it is primarily an entertainment channel, and it produces mainly "shows," and the rest of its output includes "handpicked programs licensed from some of the biggest distributors and producers worldwide" while also broadcasting blockbuster dramas and natural history programs (Marjantvnetwork, n.d.). Second, Manoto TV does not publish full news articles on its website. After broadcasting their news show – which is only a small part of their daily programs- the broadcasted news will be posted on Twitter and in a small volume. Twitter blogging is not the subject of this study since it poses restrictions in the sense of the volume/size of the story that is posted. This will be elaborated on. Therefore, from the three top popular and non-state media in the Farsi-language media ecosystem, the two that are news/report TV and have online publications as well (Iran International and BBC Persian) oriented are selected as the news media to be studied.

After conducting a pilot search/analysis on their institutional Twitter accounts, I found that finding and scoring 28 indicators in such a small text with a maximum of 280 characters is almost impossible. These indicators are presented later in this Chapter. The point is that, only for PJ and WJ, there are 26 indicators (each, thirteen), and two diagnostic and prognostic frames should be added to the dataset, which makes 28 indicators. Previous studies found that there is a correlation between the size of the text and leaning toward PJ. Lee & Maslog (2005) showed that the longer text most likely resulted in a PJ story. On the contrary, the shorter the story, the more likely the story was a WJ story. The authors concluded that longer stories provide more space for journalists to investigate the issue thoroughly and more carefully. They asserted that "longer stories may permit journalists to move beyond reporting of facts into some analysis" (p.322). Hence, to avoid drawing imprecise conclusions regarding the practice of these media,

I decided to analyze the longer stories that are published on their website instead of studying their shorter version posts on their institutional social media platforms. Studying their shorter versions, for instance, on Twitter and comparing their findings to the current research results will also be an interesting subject for further research.

The data unit for the qualitative content analysis is the full page of each individual news story (article) in Farsi. Each article is retrieved from the website of Iran International and BBC Persian (respectively https://www.iranintl.com and https://www.bbc.com/persian). To find the relevant news stories, Farsi/Persian keywords equal to any of these English words, such as "Ukraine", "Ukrainian", "Russia", "Russian" were used. The equal Farsi words for these keywords are respectively, "اوکراین", "اوکراینی", "روسیه", "روسی". These Farsi words were searched via Google Search using its advanced search feature. This specific feature allows filtering the search by website URL and keywords and filtering the data by date/period. Importantly it provides all relevant data that was published on the websites of the news media under study. Due to the time and space constraints that stem from the scope of a master's thesis, I decided to analyze twelve articles, six from Iran International and six articles from BBC Persian. The contents of those articles were qualitatively analyzed.

Purposive sampling was employed to select twelve articles. According to Bryman (2012), "purposive sampling is a non-probability form of sampling" (p.418). It is a strategic way of sampling (ibid). Instead of random selection, or even instead of selecting these articles from one specific month (e.g., a month after the invasion), I selected one article per each month in a six-month (half-year) period after the invasion of Ukraine, one from February 22, 2022, one from March 22, and so forth. By so doing, the dynamics of PJ/WJ (over time) will be obtained. Otherwise, if, for instance, six articles were picked from one certain month, they could not correctly represent the overall tendency in media practice. Noteworthy is that on the 22nd of some months, there were no articles regarding this conflict. Thus, I had to pick an article from one day before or after the 22nd. Additionally, only those relevant to the conflict were selected from a handful of articles published on a certain day. Some articles contained one of the keywords but did not directly pertain to the conflict. Among those that pertained to the conflict, the longer articles were selected. The reason, as previously mentioned, is that the longer the story, the fewer constraints for identifying the 28 indicators. This is crucial since, among other reasons, 28 indicators had to be tested for each article. Additionally, informed by the literature review, the selection was not affected by the type of story (feature, opinion piece, or news story) since the type has no association with PJ/WJ. The gathered articles were then compiled into a single overall dataset. This data gathering was performed in May 2023.

The dataset involves 31 variables. The name of the media, the date of publication, and the URL to the individual article. These three items are presented in Appendix 1. Other dataset variables are thirteen indicators/frames for PJ, thirteen for WJ, and two for diagnostic/prognostic frames. If any frame/indicator was (or was not) identified in the news article, a score of one (or zero) was given to that variable. As explained in the Theory chapter, if the sum of PJ indicators exceeds a three-score difference with that of WJ, that article is considered as PJ. And the same applies to WJ. If the difference is three scores or less, that article is categorized as SWJ. The two diagnostic and prognostic frames were given a yes or no value to be used in further analysis

and to be compared with the PJ/WJ/SWJ approach embedded in the article. Textual samples of the usage of these frames are provided in the Finding Chapter. The original samples were in English, and I used Google Translator to translate them to prevent any personal interpretation while conducting the translation.

As mentioned, the coding schema (of indicators/frames) for WJ/PJ is derived from Lee & Maslog (2005). They categorized the indicators based on approach and language. Approach-based frames/indicators for WJ are W1-Reactive, W2-Reports only on visible effects of war, W3-Elit-oriented, W4-Focus only on differences, W5-Focus only on here & now, W6-Dichtomizing between good guys/bad guys, W7-Two-party orientation, W8-Partisan/biased, W9-Zero-sum orientation, W10-Stop reporting when the war de-escalate. And language-based frames for WJ are W11-Usage of Victimizing language, W12-Usage of demonizing language, and W13-Usage of emotive words.

On the other hand, the approach-based indicators/frames for PJ are: P1-Proactive, P2-Reports also on invisible effects of war, P3-People oriented, P4-Focus on areas of agreement, P5-Reports on causes and consequences, P6-Avoidance of labeling as good/bad guys, P7-Multiparty orientation, P8-Nonpatrisan/neutral, P9-Win-win oriented, P10-Stays on & reports aftermath. And the language-based indicators/frames for PJ are P11-Avoiding victimizing language, P12-Avoids demonizing language, and P13-Objective & moderate wording. Noteworthy is that I deliberately added the letters "W" (refers to WJ) and "P" (refers to PJ) that are attached to the number of each indicator. In the original text (Lee & Maslog, 2005), they are presented only with numbers. The reason for adding these letters is that later, many references are given to these indicators and their meaning, while each indicator might be discussed separately. And for the sake of clarity, it is better to know to which approach (of either PJ or WJ) a certain indicator pertains. These indicators are elaborated on in the actual codebook (code schema), which can be seen in Appendix 2. It should be noted that in this text, both terms "indicator" and "frame" are used, and many times they come together (indicator/frame). The reason is that some of the indicators are frames as well. For instance, W8 is a frame (and an indicator) and is related to depicting some actor in the conflict as a bad guy (or good guy). But it is only an indicator when the story only focuses on the visible consequences of war (W2). Using both terms in the text is for this reason.

Some points should be explained regarding the employment of content analysis as the method of analyzing news articles. As summarized and underscored by Oleinik (2023), content analysis is conceived as a method for measuring the level of "exposure to the same set of keywords" (cited in Lasswell et al., 1949:13). Lichtenstein et al. (2019) used qualitative content analysis to exploit its advantage as "applied to the complexity and nuances of frames" (p.71) that are used in news articles. Qualitatively analyzing the content could serve to identify themes in textual content (ibid). The content analysis method is employed in many scholarly works in the field of PJ/WJ studies to identify these two approaches in the journalistic practice (see, for example, Lee & Maslog, 2005; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2016; Lichtenstein et al., 2019; Honari & Alinejad, 2022; Oleinik, 2023).

As mentioned, a score of either one or zero was given to each indicator for each individual article. This method of coding is more of the fashion of a quantitative method, while a qualitative strategy is employed in this study. Bryman (2012) discusses new trends (that differ

from mixed methods) among social scientists that are "breaking down the quantitative/qualitative divide (p.614). Whereas there are many differences between the two research strategies, there are many studies that "transcend the distinction" (ibid), studies in which quantitative approach was applied to qualitative research (ibid, p.623). In such qualitative studies, researchers "undertake a limited amount of quantification" (ibid, p.621). By doing so the researcher "is injecting greater precision into such estimates of frequency" (ibid). Given that, the current research employs such a strategy. While employing a qualitative method, I performed quantification as well to deal with a high number of concrete indicators and thus decrease the personal interpretation and increase the objectivity in the analysis. The available studies in which conflict coverage is analyzed chiefly use indicators/themes that are subject to normative debates and subjective intervention of the researcher. I used 28 indicators, a comprehensive set of concrete indicators that rarely leaves room for any (mis)interpretation. The reliability test can prove this claim. This concrete set of indicators also affirms the rationale behind the employment of content analysis instead of, for example, critical discourse analysis. The latter might involve some degree of researcher's interpretation, while the former, especially when a concrete set of indicators is employed, provides a higher degree of reliable findings.

5-2-2 Reliability, Validity & Generalizability of the study

Reliability addresses whether the results of a study are repeatable (Bryman, 2012:46). Therefore, the question would be whether the same results will be obtained if various people perform the same method. After coding all twelve articles, I requested two colleagues to perform the coding, each one for one article. Since ten percent of twelve makes 1.2, two independent coders randomly selected two articles. One from BBC Persian and the other from Iran International. I translated the selected article using Google Translator, and the articles were translated from Farsi into English. This platform was utilized to avoid any interpretation of myself during the translation. The coders, individually and without anyone's intervention, performed the coding. Both of them generated almost the same result as I did, with a difference of two codes per article, which resulted in four differences out of 52 (or 2 out of 26) indicators (for each article, 26 for PJ/WJ). Hence, the reliability test shows a reliability score of 92,3%, which is an acceptable result.

Regarding the validity of the research, two main points should be explained. According to Bryman (2012), validity is an issue of concern with "the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research" (p.47). More specifically, internal validity refers to whether the specific set of indicators that gauge a concept/theme really measures that concept (ibid., p.171). For the current research, I have utilized 26 indicators used by Lee & Maslog (2005) apart from two diagnostic and prognostic frames. My exploration in the field of PJ/WJ studies shows that this coding schema is exhaustive, if not the most exhaustive. Others frequently used this schema (code book). Many (e.g., Fahmy & Eakin, 2014) have utilized it but only eight of its indicators (out of thirteen). This research uses all thirteen indicators (for PJ and the same number for WJ). This set of indicators may be the most valid in this discipline based on the available scholarship. Thus, the internal validity of the research is high in this sense. Another point is the sample size; twelve articles for qualitative content analysis seems quite the proper size. Therefore, it seems that, in this case, the conclusion of this study is relatively valid, at least regarding the media coverage in a six-month period. Regarding the generalizability of the

research, some points are worthy of note. Generalizability is concerned with regard to research beyond the specific research context. The question is whether the result of this specific research can be generalized to a broader context. For instance, can the result of analyzing BBC Persian and Iran International be generalized to a broader Farsi-language news media? These news media are the most popular news media and have 50% of daily viewership among all Farsi-language media (Gamaan, 2021). The remainder is either state media run by the political establishment in Iran (with 16% of daily viewership) or, if non-state, they have a small share of viewership (ibid). To some extent, the result derived from this study can be related only to non-state and Farsi-language news media. Additionally, the findings are limited to a six-month coverage of these media, and further studies should be conducted to make a more generalizable finding. For future studies, a bigger sample, consisting of more articles from twelve months of reporting of these two media (instead of six months), will provide more precise results, increasing the study's generalizability.

Finally, regarding the ethics of the research and the question of whether any harm to the participant, invasion of privacy, and so on (Bryman, 2012:154) happened, it should be noted that no individual was involved in the research (except the two colleagues that assisted with the reliability test and) no one was harmed. The articles and data used in this research are either open-source or found via the official website of the Library of Södertörn University; thus, no copyright is violated.

Chapter 6: Findings

In this chapter, the findings of the study are presented. This finding results from qualitative content analysis using quantification of data performed on twelve Iran International and BBC Persian articles regarding their coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine published on their respective websites in six months between 22 February 2022 and 22 July 2022.

In the following sections, the findings are first presented separately for each news media. Then some comparison is presented. At the end of the chapter, some examples of actual framings that were identified in the articles are mentioned. Due to the lack of space and time, only the textual examples for those salient frames/indicators are presented. The remainder is provided in Appendix 3.

On a different note, while presenting the frequency of indicators, each indicator is given a number and a letter to differentiate them from one another. For example, W1 means frame number one (of the indicator schema, presented in Appendix 2), which pertains to the WJ approach, and P4, for instance, is frame number four which pertains to the PJ approach. Also,

a combination of a letter and a number is used to refer to articles. For example, I-4 means article number from Iran International, or B-2, article number two from BBC Persian.

6-1 Iran International

The total score for WJ framing in different articles from Iran International ranged from 7 to 11 points. The average for total WJ scores per article under six months of covering the conflict in Ukraine was 8.6.

The dominant WJ frames in Iran International's coverage of the conflict that was present in six articles were W3, W4, and W8, i.e., articles were (respectively) elite-oriented, focused only on differences between the parties to the conflict, and biased and partisan toward one side of the conflict which in this case was EU/US/Ukraine/NATO.

The next dominant WJ frames, which appeared five times in articles, were W6, W9, and W13. This means that in these articles respectively, dichotomizing between good guys and bad guys, zero-sum orientation, and emotive language were used. W2 and W5, and W7 frames were present in four articles, focusing on the visible effects of the war only on here and now (instead of additionally reporting on roots, consequences, and solutions) and on two-party reporting (instead of multi-party). W11 was present in three articles which refers to the usage of victimizing language. W12 frame (usage of demonizing language) was present in two articles. Finally, W1 and W10 were each present in only one article, which respectively pertains to reactive reporting (instead of proactive reporting) and stops reporting when the war or the very event under coverage stops (which is not applicable for most of the articles under study, since here an individual article is analyzed).

On the other hand, frame number 3 (i.e., P3) appeared in three of Iran International's articles regarding the PJ indicator. This is related to being people-oriented (either as the source for reporting or as actors). This was followed by P5, which was present in two articles. This frame refers to reporting on the causes and consequences of the conflict instead of only reporting here and now. Other frames/indicators that were present only in one article were P1, P4, P7, P11, and P13. These frames represent proactive reporting that covers the area of agreement instead of only differences, is multi-party oriented, avoids victimizing and addresses what has been and could be done by people, and is objective and moderate. Other PJ frames/indicators (P2, P3, P6, P8, P9, and P10) were totally absent in Iran International's news articles. The total PJ frames in all six articles were ten, making an average of 1.66 PJ frame(s) per article.

All six articles from Iran International contained diagnostic framing, which means all focus on the current situation and consequences of a particular stance or event. Only in two articles in May and June 2022 was the prognostic framing present, which means the article -to some extent- points to a solution to the event/problem it raised.

Table 2 provides the result of the qualitative content analysis and the coding for each individual news article of Iran International from 24 February 2022 to July 2022 regarding the coverage of the conflict in Ukraine and in connection to PJ, WJ. Also, it includes the two diagnostic and prognostic framing in each article.

Article Code	Total WJ frames	Total PJ frames	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
I-1	7	1	1	0
I-2	11	1	1	0
I-3	7	2	1	0
I-4	8	5	1	1
I-5	11	0	1	1
I-6	8	2	1	0

Table 2. The result of content analysis of six articles of Iran International in coverage of the conflict in Ukraine in a six-month period from February 2022 to July 2022.

6-2 BBC Persian

The total score for WJ frames in BBC coverage in different articles ranged from 3 to 10 points. The average for total WJ scores per each article under six months of coverage of the conflict in Ukraine was 6.5.

The dominant WJ frame in BBC Persian conflict reporting that was present in six articles was W3, meaning all articles were elite-oriented in sourcing or referring to actors. In five articles out of six, W7 (two-party orientation) and W9 (zero-sum orientation) frames were used. In four articles, W2, W5, and W8 were present, which respectively means reporting only on visible effects of the conflict, reporting only on here and now (instead of addressing consequences and solutions as well), and partisan reporting (which in this case it was toward EU/US/Ukraine/NATO). In three articles, WJ frames such as W4 (focusing only on differences), W7 (two-party orientation instead of multi-party orientation), and W13 (using emotive words) were identified. In two articles, the W12 frame was used, which means reporting with demonizing the parties to the conflict. Finally, W1 (reactive reporting) was present in only one article, and W11 (victimizing language) in only one article.

Regarding PJ frames that were present in BBC Persian's coverage, the most frequently used ones were P5, P7, and P12, which were present in four articles. In reporting while using P5 frames, (some extent of) causes and consequences of the conflict are presented. P7 frame refers to multi-party reporting and avoids focusing on only two parties. P12 frame is when the report avoids using demonizing language. In three articles, P8 (non-partisan reporting) and P13 (objective and moderate) frames were present. In two articles, P1 and P6 frames were identified, referring to proactive reporting and reporting while avoiding labeling the parties as good guys or bad guys. Other frames which were present in only one article were P2, P4, P9, and P11. These frames refer to a reporting where, respectively, focuses on invisible effects of the war/conflict (e.g., emotional trauma, damages to society and culture), focuses on areas of agreement between the parties, addresses a win-win approach, and avoids victimizing language. P3 framing was totally absent in all BBC Persian coverage of the conflict in Ukraine, which means that none of the articles were people-oriented in using people as either source or

addressing them as actors in the conflict. Generally, PJ frames were used 26 times in all six articles, which makes an average of 4.33 PJ frames per article.

All six articles from BBC Persian contained diagnostic framing, which means all focus on the current situation and consequences of a particular stance or event. Only in the articles published in April and May 2022 was the prognostic framing present, which means the article -to some extent- points to a solution to the event/problem it raised.

Table 3 provides the result of the content analysis and the coding for each news article of BBC Persian from 24 February 2022 to July 2022 regarding the coverage of the conflict in Ukraine and in connection to PJ, WJ. Also, it presents the result for the two diagnostic and prognostic framing in each article.

Article Code	Total WJ Frames	Total PJ frames	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
B-1	10	5	1	0
B-2	5	4	1	0
B-3	6	6	1	1
B-4	3	8	1	1
B-5	8	1	1	0
B-6	7	5	1	0

Table 3. The result of qualitative content analysis of six articles of BBC Persian in coverage of the conflict in Ukraine in six months from February 2022 to July 2022.

This Table shows, for example, in article B-1 (the article published in February 2022), there is a total score of ten points for WJ framings, while five scores favor PJ framing.

6-3 Comparing the conflict coverage by BBC Persian and Iran International

The findings that were presented in previous sections are summarized and demonstrated in Figure 2. As mentioned, the average of WJ frames per article for Iran International was 8.6, while the average for PJ frames was 1.66. In BBC Persian coverage, the average of WJ frames per article was 6.5, while the average for PJ frames was 4.33.



Figure 2. Comparing BBC Persian and Iran International conflict coverage regarding the average of PJ and WJ frames per article.

As can be seen in Figure 2, Iran International used WJ frames five times more than PJ frames. BBC Persian used WJ frames 1.5 times more than PJ frames. Also, in comparison, Iran International used WJ frames 1.3 times more than BBC Persian, while BBC Persian used PJ frames 2.6 times more than Iran International. This shows that Iran International's coverage of the 2021 conflict in Ukraine is gravely leaned toward WJ, while BBC Persian's coverage distances from WJ and uses more PJ frames in comparison to Iran International.

Now that the findings of each news media are presented and summarized and their practice regarding using PJ/WJ frames/indicators compared, in the following section, the textual example of PJ/WJ frames that were present in the news article is given an example and elaborated on. These textual examples are extracted from the same articles that are analyzed and given scores regarding PJ/WJ frames.

6-4 Textual examples of PJ/WJ framings from the media under study

In this part of the chapter, a more detailed presentation of the content analyzed material is provided. It will demonstrate how these indicators/frames of PJ/WJ and the two diagnostic and prognostic framing are embedded in the reporting of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine by two Farsi-language news media (Iran International and BBC Persian). This elaboration will be thematically provided. Each of the two opposite frames/indicators will be given examples in parallel. These texts/examples are extracted from the published news articles on the website of the respective news media under study. In Appendix 2, in a Table, all indicators are listed and explained.

It should be noted that only the dominant frames are given examples here. Due to space constraints, the rest of the examples (on frames W1/P1, W2/P2, W10/P10, W12/P12, and W13/P13) that were not among the dominant frames are given examples and available in Appendix 3.

One of the salient indicators was W3. It refers to elite orientation reporting as either source or actor, while P3 refers to framing people as either source of information or actor. The title of B1 is *Why Putin ordered invading Ukraine?* This article refers to Putin and Zelensky as the

main actors when reporting the conflict (W1 frame). On the contrary, for the P3 indicator, B-3 refers to people's opinion in Germany when it informs that "[t]he Russian attack also changed the German public's attitude towards avoiding foreign military conflicts, and polls show that the majority of them support military aid to Ukraine."

Whereas W4 is present in a story when it only emphasizes the differences between parties, P4 underscores the common grounds for agreement. I-4 (article four from Iran International) points to differences (W4) when reports that "Volodymyr Zelensky, the President of Ukraine, also says that Ukraine will not only defeat Russia but also take the Crimean Peninsula and other parts of Ukraine that Russia has controlled since 2014". The same article contains P4 when it reflects a chance to an agreement; it reads: "Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, has counted on a negotiated agreement, preserving the prestige of both countries," and in the same article, it is continued that "Macron said a few days ago that the world should not forget that it should focus on building peace. He emphasized that the world should do this at the negotiating table with Ukraine and Russia, but Russia and Ukraine will determine the end of the dialogue and negotiation. Macron added that such a thing would not be achieved in denial, alienation, and humiliation". As can be seen here in the article, agreement, instead of differences, is emphasized.

W5 frame refers to reporting only "here and now" and what is happening now, while P5 indicates that reporting should also cover the causes and consequences of the conflict. In line with the W5 indicator, in I-2, it is said that "The United Nations Human Rights Office announced on Thursday that the number of civilian deaths in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian offensive has reached more than 1,000, but the actual number of dead is much higher". In contrast, per P5, the consequences are reflected when in I-4 it is reported that "Europe's widespread support for Ukraine, while the world continues to struggle with the burden of the Covid-19 pandemic and the effects of climate change, increases the economic burden on the world's shoulders". B-1 refers to one of the causes, though the reports place hesitation on it. The article informs that Russian state television has continued its narrative about Ukraine over the years, A narrative based on which it says that since 2014, after the removal of the pro-Russian president, Ukraine has "fallen into the hands of the fascists."

Another salient indicator/frame was W6 which refers to framing the actors as bad guys and good guys, while P6 avoids doing as such. B-6 referred to Zelensky's speech when he said, "Ukraine's president accused Russia of waging a "gas war" against Europe and creating "terror" by cutting off energy supplies" (Putin as the bad guy who is creating terror, W6). B-6 (same article) refers to Putin and reports, "But Russian President Vladimir Putin recently told reporters that the state-owned company Gazprom will adhere to all its commitments and contracts." In this part of the article, it is avoided to depict Putin as a bad guy. This does not mean that Putin is telling the truth, but the article neutrally quoted Putin.

W7 indicator is present when a reporting uses two-party framing of the conflict, and P7 when multi-party reporting is provided. An example of the W7 indicator is when, in I-4, for example, it is reported that "The war in Ukraine is slowly approaching its third month, and there is no sign of a definite military victory for either side, and there is no way to end the war." This article frequently refers to Zelensky and Putin as parties to the conflict and does not point to any other party. On the other hand, B-3 (BBC Persian's article in April 2022) covers more than two parties and covers the press conference of various officials from NATO, EU, France,

and the UK, and informs that they declared that they are committed to continuing their military and security aids to Ukraine.

W5 is present when the coverage is partisan, takes a side, and does not cover the other party's stance or counterclaims, while P8 is in line with non-partisan coverage. In article I-5, partisan coverage is embedded when the report only points to one side: "The US and German foreign ministers accused Russia of using hunger as a weapon of war by preventing the transfer of Ukrainian grain from the Black Sea and fueling the food crisis." On the contrary, in B-1, some examples of non-partisan coverage are present (P8) when it states, "For the families of the military forces of both sides, anxious days are ahead."

Whereas the W9 indicator refers to a zero-sum approach, P9 is present in an article when a win-win approach is present in reporting. I-4 refers to many of the zero-sum positions of Western officials; for instance, "Ian Kelly, a retired veteran diplomat and former US ambassador to Georgia, described" the situation "as very difficult to find a negotiated solution to the current state of the war in Ukraine. Kelly said that neither side of the war is willing to stop it". The article continues, "[a]ccording to Ian Kelly's prediction, Ukraine will not back down at all because it thinks that it will win the battlefield." In the same article, it is reported that "Ned Price, the spokesman of the White House, called the American strategy a companion for Ukraine's victory in this war" (W9). On the other hand, in BBC Persian's article on May 2022 (B-4), a win-win approach has been mentioned in one particular subject when the report says, "Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko told the Interfax news agency that Russia is ready to provide a humanitarian passage for ships carrying food so that they can leave Ukrainian ports *in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions*" (emphasis added). Whether Putin's position is correct or not, the report has covered a solution that might be a win-win for both sides.

As the last textual examples for WJ/PJ indicators, W11 and P11 are given an example here. W11 pertains to reporting while using victimizing framing for people, and P11 avoids doing so and instead addresses the area in which people are active (not passive victims) and trying to cope with the problem. The latter was not found in any article. As for W11, an example of victimizing language is in B-1 when it is said, "So far, hundreds of people on both sides - civilians and military - have been killed in the conflicts that Germany calls *Putin's War*" (emphasis from the article). Or in I-5, where it explains that "[h]e emphasized that 345 million people in the world are under threat due to lack of food". In these examples, people are merely passive victims. In B-4, it is reported that "[s]ome Western officials have accused the Russian government of declaring a food war and holding the world's poor nations hostage." Or in B-1, it is reported that "Mr. Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, says that the enemy has declared him and his family as targets *number one and two*" (emphasis from the article). Here Zelensky and his family are depicted as potential victims. Or from another side of the conflict, victimizing language is present in B3, when it reports that "Sergei Lavrov reiterated his government's view that residents of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine have asked Russia to free them from the rule of *Nazis ruling Ukraine*" (emphasis from the article). Here, the people of Donbas are portrayed as passive victims of Kyiv and need a savior.

Finally, some examples of two framings of diagnostic and prognostic are presented here. As mentioned previously, while diagnostic framing merely focuses on the consequences of an event/problem/conflict, prognostic framing provides some sort of solution to it.
As for diagnostic framing (consequences), in article I-6, it is reported that "American officials have clearly said that if the Iranian government provides military support to Russia against Ukraine, the United States will impose more severe sanctions against the Islamic Republic [of Iran]." In this part, the consequences of Iran's acts are mentioned. For prognostic framing, one example could be the I-4 article in which it is reported that "Macron said a few days ago that the world should not forget that it should focus on building peace. He emphasized that the world should do this at the negotiating table with Ukraine and Russia, but Russia and Ukraine will determine the end of the dialogue and negotiation. Macron added that such a thing would not be achieved in denial, alienation, and humiliation". Here, some degree of solution to the conflict is mentioned. This solution might not be acceptable to the audience or to parties to the conflict. But the point is that this article did not neglect the solutions.

As an ending note, as mentioned, the remainder of indicators and/or frames are given a textual example in Appendix 3.

Chapter 7: Discussion

In this chapter, the findings of the research are discussed and interpreted. The RQs will be answered, and both the (raw) findings and the final results of this study will be compared to the broader context within PJ/WJ studies. The chapter will shed light on the conflict coverage of these news media in connection to other media practices that other scholars have studied. The chapter will demonstrate how the research findings and results contribute to the broader area of scholarship in the field of PJ and WJ studies. Therefore, when pointing to other studies, the available scholarship in the field informs the discussion. This chapter will discuss how BBC Persian and Iran International (both based in the UK but Farsi-language news media) have covered the 2022 conflict in Ukraine regarding PJ, SWJ, and WJ approaches. Finally, and importantly and importantly, this account on the PJ, SWJ, and WJ will contribute to the scholarship in the strand of PJ, SWJ, and WJ (studies).

The sections in the chapter have been categorized thematically. First, the dominant PJ and WJ indicators/frames of the conflict coverage of these two media will be individually discussed through a comparison to the findings of other studies on other media. For instance, other scholars also identified indicator W3 (elite orientation) as a dominant indicator. Then the ultimate approach of the two media regarding PJ, SWJ, and WJ will be discussed (RQ1) and

compared to the results of other scholarly works. In the second part of the chapter, a discussion on the *why* question will be conducted - as to why these news media reported in the way they did. Finally, the limitations and implications of the research will be discussed.

7-1 Dominant frames/indicators in comparison to other studies

To pave the way to answer the main research question (RQ1), first, the traits of WJ and PJ that were present in these media's coverage are discussed through a comparison with other studies in the broader contexts.

The dominant WJ frame that was present in all twelve articles (six from BBC Persian and six from Iran International) was the elite-oriented framing of the conflict. Elites were addressed as either the source of information or the main parties to the conflict. This is one of the traits of WJ. On the contrary, PJ coverage should focus on people as both sources of information and the party to the conflict, an active party and not a passive subject in conflict. Other scholars have pointed to the elite culture that drives the practice of BBC (Liu, 2023:20). And elite-oriented reporting has been pointed out in many studies. Herman & Chomsky (2008 [1988]) have underscored that news coverage propagates some messages while blocking others by using various types of filters, among them relying on information from the government. They categorize this approach of reporting as propaganda (ibid). Fahmy & Eakin (2014), who studied the media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, found that elite-oriented sourcing is dominant in reporting (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014:99). Elham et al. (2021) in their study demonstrated that the reporting of the New York Times and China Daily on the conflict in Afghanistan excessively used elite-oriented war frames.

Yet, in Iran International's coverage of the Ukraine conflict, there are signs of people-oriented framing in three of its articles. In these articles, people are addressed as either source of information or actors. This is in line with Fengler et al. (2020) 's study on conflict coverage which shows a shift away from elite focus. According to Fengler et al. (2020), this shift away from a focus on elite to non-elite actors, such as citizens and social actors, is represented in the reporting of thirteen European newspapers in their coverage of the 2014 conflict in Ukraine (p.415).

In all six articles by Iran International, indicator W8 was present, which refers to partisan/biased reporting. This is yet another trait of WJ. All articles were biased for one side of the conflict, i.e., Ukraine and the West and specifically NATO, the EU, and the US. The conflict coverage by BBC Persians contained the same approach and followed partisanship toward the West. However, in BBC Persian's coverage, this was the case in four articles and not six compared to Iran International. In this sense, BBC Persian covered one-sided to a lesser extent. This finding of the current study accords with a plethora of previous literature.

Liu's (2023) study on news framing of RT and BBC about the 2014 conflict in Ukraine reveals that while RT and BBC's approaches and intentions may be different, both media have been biased in their reporting (p.21). Although BBC Persian and Iran International (both based in the UK) claim to be neutral and reporting independently, it seems that the finding of this research is similar to other studies that underscore the alignment of UK media with their government's policies. Oleinik (2023) asserts that the media in the US and the UK, in their war

coverage, appear "to align – in relative terms – with their leaders' stated priorities despite the formally absent government control" (p.16). Pfau et al. (2004) found that the coverage of the 2003 war on Iraq was framed favorably toward the US military (p.314). The same applies to all articles of Iran International and half of the articles of BBC Persian in their coverage of the conflict in Ukraine. Similarly, Ottosen (2010) found out that both Norwegian mainstream newspapers' reporting about the war in Afghanistan is "dominated by US-friendly framing and the use of Western sources" (p.269). According to Fengler et al. (2020), European newspapers featured international or EU politics while covering the 2014 conflict in Ukraine (p.414). This seems to be the case for the media under study in this research, BBC Persian and Iran International, which are partisan and biased to one side of the conflict, though this is the case in half of the BBC Persian articles. Roman et al. (2017) argue that media from different countries mirror their government's perspective when they are reporting from war zones and conflict.
On the contrary, for non-partisan reporting, as mentioned, three of BBC Persian's articles are not biased. This seems to align with Lee & Maslog's (2005) study on Asian newspapers that the non-partisan approach was one of the salient indicators in their reporting. This is one of the indicators of PJ. This explains why BBC Persian's coverage of the conflict is far from WJ frames compared to that of Iran International.

As presented in the Finding chapter, five (out of six) Iran International and BBC Persian articles contain zero-sum (win-lose) frames that accord with the WJ approach. On the contrary, PJ would focus on a win-win approach while emphasizing the possibilities of agreement instead of focusing on differences. This approach (zero-sum orientation of the reporting) appeared to be the case in many other media's coverage of conflicts. For instance, Ersoy (2016) demonstrated that the Turkish press report conflict with a win-lose framing, and they focus on who will win the conflict. The press sees the win as a resolution to the conflict. Similarly, Alankus (2006) underscored that Turkish mainstream media cover the conflict and the peace process within a win-lose frame.

Two-party framing, one of the pillars of WJ, appeared in five of the BBC Persian's articles and four of Iran International's articles. This is a flaw in addressing the 2022 conflict in Ukraine since, as demonstrated in the Background chapter, other parties exist, including the US, the UK, NATO, and Iran.

Depicting such a conflict (wrongly) with only two parties or as the guilt of only one party has been intensively studied by other scholars. Liu (2023) analyzed RT and BBC reporting on the 2014-15 conflict in Ukraine and argues that the analyzed reporting has reduced the conflict to the responsibility of only one actor. An approach that is not constructive if one seeks to reduce the tensions and provide a resolution (ibid, p.20). BBC has, in many cases, followed the same approach. For instance, while covering the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, BBC reduced the conflict to a conflict with only two parties. Even more, in some cases, it reduced one of the two parties to a person, Putin (Liu, 2023:19). This has been similarly mentioned by other studies that point to a "high visibility of Vladimir Putin as an actor" in the conflict coverage (Fengler et al., 2020:415). Similar to other findings by various scholars, as a finding of the current research, it was identified that one of the BBC Persian's articles is basically a translation of an opinion story in BBC (English); the original story's title has been changed in translation. The

title of the original story (by a senior EU correspondent of BBC) says *why Russia ordered the invasion of Ukraine?* However, the title of the Farsi version that is published on BBC Persian's website (article number one in the current study, B-1) says *why Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine?* In this case, BBC Persian has even shifted away from BBC's approach and reduced the actor to a person (Putin instead of Russia). However, the original one already reduced a multi-party conflict into a two-party one (Russia vs Ukraine). Contrary to this coverage orientation, Lee & Maslog (2005) argues that in the conflict reporting of Asian journalists, there is some "understanding of the conflict," among other aspects, by mapping out the conflict as multi-party (p.324).

Now that WJ and PJ elements of the coverage of Iran International and BBC Persian were discussed and the findings of this study in this regard were compared to that of other studies, the main research question (RQ1) should be answered.

7-2 PJ, WJ, or SWJ? RQ1

RQ1 asks how these leading Farsi-language news media covered the 2022 conflict in Ukraine in connection to PJ or WJ. However, as discussed earlier, as an implication of the current research's theoretical provision, the new SWJ concept was suggested and developed. Consequently, RQ1 should be modified to how these leading Farsi-language news media covered the 2022 conflict in Ukraine in connection to PJ, SWJ, or WJ.

As explained in the Theory chapter, based on Galtung's (1986; 2017) model, PJ is peace-conflict truth-oriented, people-oriented, and solution-oriented. On the contrary, WJ is war-violence oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented, and victory-oriented. Lee & Maslog (2005) extracted thirteen indicators (and/or frames) based on Galtung categorization. In this research, I proposed the new concept of SWJ and modified Galtung's model, which is a dualistic model constituted of two approaches. My suggestion transforms Galtung's model into a multi-dimensional model that is constituted of three approaches. From a dual model to a multi-dimensional one. As an implication of this new model, the assessment of the total scores for each approach was modified. In other words, for categorizing a news story as either WJ, SWJ, or PJ, I additionally modified the assessment method of Lee & Maslog (2005) as follows. If the total scores for WJ in an individual story exceed that of PJ *and* the difference is four scores or more, then the story is a WJ reporting. If that of PJ exceeds *and* the difference is four scores or more, then it is PJ reporting. If the deduction of the total scores (of WJ and PJ) results in three or fewer scores, then that story is SWJ.

Drawing upon the findings that are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in the Findings chapter, the final scores for PJ and WJ were taken into account. For every individual article, the total scores of WJ and PJ were deducted. Based on that, it was determined which article is aligned with PJ, SWJ, or WJ. Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the final results and show which articles of Iran International and BBC Persian are PJ, SWJ, and WJ.

In these Tables, "I" represents Iran International, and "B" represents BBC Persian. And the number attached to it is the code for that specific article. For instance, I-3 means article number three from Iran International, or B-4, article number 4 from BBC Persian.

Article Code	Total scores WJ frames	Total scores PJ frames	Deducting the scores (WJ-PJ)	WJ	PJ	SWJ	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
I-1	7	1	6	YES	-	-	1	0
I-2	11	1	10	YES	-	-	1	0
I-3	7	2	5	YES	-	-	1	0
I-4	8	5	3	-	-	YES	1	1
I-5	11	0	11	YES	-	-	1	1
I-6	8	2	6	YES	-	-	1	0

Table 4. WJ/SWJ/PJ: The result of the analysis of six articles of Iran International in coverage of the conflict in Ukraine in six months, from February 2022 to July 2022.

Article Code	Total scores WJ frames	Total scores PJ frames	Deducting the scores (WJ-PJ)	WJ	PJ	SWJ	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
B-1	10	5	5	YES	-	-	1	0
B-2	5	4	1	-	-	YES	1	0
B-3	6	6	0	-	-	YES	1	1
B-4	3	8	5	-	YES	-	1	1
B-5	8	1	7	YES	-	-	1	0
B-6	7	5	2	-	-	YES	1	0

Table 5. WJ/SWJ/PJ: The result of the analysis of six articles of BBC Persian in coverage of the conflict in Ukraine in six months, from February 2022 to July 2022.

To show the results of the investigation of the conflict coverage by these news media, Figure 1, which was proposed in the Theory chapter, could be used. It helps to place each article in the bigger spectrum (to be compared to other articles), and it shows each article's proximity/distance from the main approaches of PJ/SWJ/WJ. Such a Figure can also visualize these news media's overall/average practice regarding PJ/SWJ/WJ. However, there seems to be a need for some modification to the Figure. This is explained below.

The content analysis showed that article five, which was published in June 2022 by Iran International (I-5), contained no single PJ frame. This was not predicted in my theoretical assumptions and, thus, in my theoretical contribution. As provided in the theory chapter, Figure 1 shows the areas of PJ/SWJ/WJ based on the total scores identified for PJ and WJ frames and the total score(s) given to each individual news article. In that Figure, a zero score is not presented and is missing. However, as a result of this empirical study and after performing content analysis and coding, it was seen that there could be news articles that contain no PJ indicator (or perhaps no WJ indicator). Therefore, Figure 1, which was provided previously in the Theory Chapter, should be slightly modified to add a zero score (one more column and one more row) for each PJ and WJ approach. Figure 3 is the modified version by which the final result is demonstrated. This Figure demonstrates the result of the content analysis on six news articles from BBC Persian and six news articles from Iran International and how these articles are aligned with PJ, SWJ, and WJ framing.



Figure 3. BBC Persian and Iran International coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine and whether their coverage is aligned with WJ, SWJ, or PJ.

In this Figure, BBC Persian articles are put in a blue circle (with the letter B and the number of the article), and that of Iran International in a red circle (with the letter I and the number of the article).

As the answer to RQ1 (how these two media covered the 2022 conflict in Ukraine in connection to WJ, SWJ, or PJ) and to sum up, as presented in Table 4 and Table 5 and demonstrated in Figure 3, BBC Persian coverage on the 2022 conflict in Ukraine is aligned chiefly with SWJ (three out of six articles), while its coverage contained two WJ and one PJ. On the other hand, Iran International's coverage is sharply aligned with WJ (five articles out of six), while it has only one SWJ and no PJ.

7-3 Study's final result in a broader context

As demonstrated, Iran International and BBC Persian's coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine generally does not fit the PJ criteria. One PJ article by BBC Persian, three SWJ, and two WJ, and for Iran International, only one SWJ while five out of six WJ were the identified approaches in their conflict coverage. Here it will be discussed how the finding of this study can be situated in a broader context of the scholarship in this strand. Such an account will not be an exhaustive account of previous literature since this review has been partially performed in previous chapters. Noteworthy is that since the current research proposes the concept of SWJ, the following sections cannot provide any previous literature regarding SWJ. So, the task will be to see what other studies found in connection to PJ and WJ. Proposing and developing the

concept of SWJ provided a lens to see the coverage of the two media under study in more detail. I suggest that a third dimension is missing in the existing model. This will be elaborated on in the section in which the implication of the research is presented.
Some major points can be raised regarding the result of the current research and comparing it to previous studies. It has been suggested in previous scholarly works that in wartime, broadcasters and international media outlets have played a soft power role in favor of their respective states (Miazhevich, 2016). Keeble (1998) suggested that British coverage of the crisis in 1991 to 1998 in Iraq accords with propaganda function. In line with the findings of this study about the conflict coverage of BBC Persian and Iran International, Ersoy (2016) found that in the time of two events in 2012 and 2014, the Turkish press mostly preferred to utilize a war orientation (p. 259). Also, Ishaku (2022) 's study of a conflict in Nigeria showed that 92% of the reporting lacked sufficient context and background, and most of them were sensational and inflammatory. These are some of the main traits of WJ. Similarly, Ottosen's (2010) study showed that most of the coverage they analyzed follows the traits of WJ in Galtung's model. In the conflict coverage by Colombian media, the war narrative was dominant (García-Perdomo et al., 2022). BBC and RT's coverage of the 2014 conflict in Ukraine involved strong traits of propaganda (Liu, 2023). This is in line with the result of the current study, which shows that Iran International is shapely leaning toward WJ, and BBC Persian has only one PJ.

Yet, there seems to be an ongoing shift away from WJ, and journalists are gradually getting familiar with PJ frames. The study on Asian newspapers showed that 35.7 % of the reporting was PJ, and 8.3% was neutral (ibid). Although 56% were WJ, the share of PJ stories and the 8.3% neutral ones (44%) show a considerable shift away from WJ. Others found more share of PJ in the reporting. Prakash (2013) demonstrated that there is an apparent exercise of PJ in the media coverage of the conflict in Balochistan/Pakistan. Even though British media and particularly BBC, are described as majorly practicing WJ, some studies suggest that they are moving toward the usage of PJ frames (Perez de Fransius, 2014:85). This generally aligns with the findings of the current research where it was found that BBC Persian had two WJ article, while one PJ article and three SWJ ones. Although it has only one PJ, but still WJ-oriented articles are two out of six. This can be interpreted as a shift away from WJ.

7-4 Prognostic/Diagnostic frames: RQ2

RQ2 asks how these media covered the conflict in connection to consequence framing and also solution framing and whether there is any relationship between solution framing and PJ. Based on the framing theory (Entman, 1993; Entman, 2007), and particularly two specific framing of diagnostic and prognostic (Snow & Benford, 1988), the articles were qualitatively content analyzed to see whether these framings are present in each individual story (Shayesteh & Seo, 2022). The results can provide the answer to the first part of RQ2. In all twelve articles, diagnostic framing (explaining the consequences) was present, while only two articles published by BBC Persian (B-3 & B-4) and two articles by Iran International (I-4 & I-5) contained prognostic framing. Table 6 and Table 7 demonstrate the answer to the first part of the RQ2 for all twelve articles.

Article Code	WJ	PJ	SWJ	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
I-1	YES	-	-	1	0
I-2	YES	-	-	1	0
I-3	YES	-	-	1	0
I-4	-	-	YES	1	1
I-5	YES	-	-	1	1
I-6	YES	-	-	1	0

Table 6. The usage of diagnostic and prognostic frames in each article of Iran International.

Article Code	WJ	PJ	SWJ	Diagnostic framing	Prognostic framing
B-1	YES	-	-	1	0
B-2	-	-	YES	1	0
B-3	-	-	YES	1	1
B-4	-	YES	-	1	1
B-5	YES	-	-	1	0
B-6	-	-	YES	1	0

Table 7. The usage of diagnostic and prognostic frames in each article of BBC Persian.

How can this answer be related to other studies? This finding does not align with one previous study conducted on Farsi-language social media. In their study on the *competing frames on social media: analysis of English and Farsi tweets on Iran plane crash*, Shayesteh & Seo (2022) found that the prognostic frame was dominant in both English and Farsi" (p.62). In the media under study, only two out of six contain prognostic framing. The difference between their finding and the finding of this research, among other reasons, may stem from the fact that civilians posted those tweets while the two media under study (BBC Persian and Iran International) were following their pre-set agenda. Why do they not provide a solution? This is a question for further studies.

The second part of the RQ2 asks whether there is any relationship between solution framing and PJ. Some possible answers can be provided. The only PJ article by BBC Persian (B-4) contains a prognostic (solution-oriented) frame. Also, one of its SWJ articles (B-3), which is not PJ but still not WJ reporting, contains a prognostic frame. Moreover, the only SWJ article by Iran International contains a prognostic frame. These results show a positive relationship between the prognostic frame and the PJ approach. Due to the small size of the data, no correlation can be suggested. Correlation might not be applicable in this case since various variables are involved in PJ reporting. Apart from a solution, it is crucial to address other aspects as well (e.g., actors, background, and so on). Also, the suggested (positive) relationship should be examined in future research by conducting analysis on a bigger size of the data body.

7-5 The Why Question

As the introduction indicates, the study also attempts to provide rough ideas on the casualty question. Why did these news media cover the conflict in the way they did? Given the methodology of this study, contrary to RQ1 and RQ2, which the analysis of primary data could answer, this "why" question can only be addressed while using secondary data and mostly other scholarly debates. It can also be answered by utilizing primary data, for instance, by conducting

interviews. As mentioned in the introduction, this "why" question is not one of the main research questions, and the casualty debate is beyond the scope of this study. The research is more of an exploratory nature to find out to what extent the reporting aligns with PJ, WJ, and SWJ. Nonetheless, it is fruitful to attempt to provide some possible answers to this explanatory aspect of the debate so as to pave the way for more investigations in further studies and to find out why these media are leaned toward SWJ or WJ. Iran International reported the 2022 conflict in Ukraine with no PJ approach, five WJ, and one SWJ approach. BBC Persian had one PJ, three SWJ, and two WJ reporting. Why did they do so? Some arguments from the available scholarship can be put forth.

Fengler et al. (2020) suggested that attention to conflict varies in different countries, and it is informed by economic exchange, geographical and cultural proximity to the conflict, and the lack of editorial resources (p.401). Gamson (1989) noted that the motives behind a news framing selected by a journalist could be unconscious. But it also may be intentional. Why does the biggest share of the media reporting align with WJ? As was demonstrated in all twelve articles under study, the coverage was heavily informed by an elite-oriented approach. Liu (2023) asserts that BBC's coverage of the conflict in Ukraine is "akin to a paternalistic media outlet that shares an elite culture" (p.20). Oleinik (2023) argues that the propagandist approach of media "prioritizes particular sources of information, such as government officials" (p.8), and editorial gatekeeping plays an important role as well (ibid, p.18). BBC's journalistic practice "may be largely influenced by its corporate interests" and its "particular working and bureaucratic culture" (ibid, p.20). Fengler et al. (2020:402) argue that not only Russian and Ukrainian media but also Anglo-Saxon media are heavily influenced by the geopolitical interests of their national government.

Ojala and Pantti (2017) studied conflict coverage by newspapers from the UK, Germany, Sweden, and Finland and concluded that media promote particular news frames by which they contribute to the legitimation of EU policies. As previously mentioned, in the case of media in the UK, and the US, despite the absence of formal intervention by the government, media "appear to align – in relative terms – with their leaders' stated priorities" (Oleinik, 2023:16). "Political economy of mass media," as Herman & Chomsky (2008, 2008 [1988]) call it, informs the propagandist role of the media. BBC's reporting on the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, while using its soft power and "framing in propagating ideas, have become a central dimension of state power" (Liu, 2023:20-21).

These points might explain that perhaps BBC Persian journalists, like their colleagues in BBC (English), had to intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, report in line with the elite-oriented approach and line with the British government’s policies. A government that, according to the background given in previous chapters, is involved in the conflict in Ukraine. To some extent, various studies have discussed how and why BBC is affected by the UK government. Lee & Maslog (2005) point to a plethora of studies that documented governmental influence on conflict reporting by journalists (p.323). As mentioned above, as far as the British media ecosystem has been studied, it is suggested that these media (including BBC Persian) are subject to influence by the policies of the UK government. It was discussed in the Background chapter that the UK is one of the parties to the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. It suggests that those media under its influence follow the UK policies. This was supported by the findings of this study that BBC

Persian's coverage leaned toward Western powers' policies, including the UK government. To sum up, as a rough answer to the question of why BBC Persian reported in SWJ (and not PJ) and its coverage leaned toward one side of the conflict (US/NATO/UK), it can be suggested that BBC Persian in influenced by the UK government's policies. Nevertheless, this question needs more in-depth research. One of the many possible ways would be to conduct interviews with journalists to see what factors impacted more than others in their conflict coverage.

The same applies to Iran International to some extent. It is also a news media based in the UK and run under the same regulations and circumstances. However, other factors should be taken into consideration. Apart from news workers from Voice of America, Euro News, and Manoto TV, many former BBC Persian correspondents, presenters, and senior editors have joined Iran International (Delgram.com, n.d). Therefore, it seems that almost the same skills and journalistic culture adopted in BBC Persian are adopted in Iran International's work. However, the financial sources of Iran International are not as clear as that of BBC Persian. BBC's income comes from various sources, but all are transparent. BBC reported that its income comes from "license fees," "BBC Studios," and "other commercials" (BBC, 2020).
On the other hand, Iran International's financial source(s) is not transparent. Their website states, "Iran International is a privately-owned UK entity" (Iran International, n.d). They also stated that Iran International is owned by "a company based in London owned by a Saudi Arabian/British citizen" and that Iran International has "no state backing or affiliation" (Iran International, 2022). In October 2018 Guardian published a feature claiming that Iran International "is being funded through a secretive offshore entity and a company whose director is a Saudi Arabian businessman with close links to the Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman" (Kamali Dehghan, 2018). While being claimed that the government of Saudi Arabia supports Iran International, Iran International denies such a relationship and claims to be independent (Iran International, 2022). However, as a result of the March 2023 reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it was said that Saudi Arabia has agreed to "tone down critical coverage of the Islamic Republic [of Iran] by Iran International" (Ebrahim et al., 2023). This shows some relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran International and that Saudi Arabia, to some extent, has control over Iran International's policies.

If Iran International is affected by the UK government ('s policies), then it is biased toward the West in its coverage of the war in Ukraine, and that is why it covers in line with WJ, and its coverage is leaned toward Western powers. If not, then the question is whether Iran International is affected by Saudi's politics. This brings another question: Is Saudi Arabia benefiting from the war? Saudi Arabia continued its cooperation with Russia even after the invasion of Ukraine, though it has shown some support for Ukraine (Cafiero, 2022) and tries to position itself as a "useful mediator" (ibid). While none of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joined Western powers in implementing sanctions against Russia or other politics that put Russia under pressure, GCC states largely supported resolutions of the UN Assembly that condemned the invasion of Ukraine (ibid). In October 2022, Saudi Arabia announced it would give €400 million to Ukraine as humanitarian aid (Radio France International, 2022). Others argued that Saudi Arabia is "the biggest beneficiary of the war in Ukraine" (Nuttall, 2022). These are only some rough estimations on which one

cannot rely to draw valid conclusions. As mentioned in the Background chapter, Iranian authorities call Iran International an enemy and even threaten their journalists. An Iranian top military official threatened Iran International by saying that "[w]e're coming for you" (Iran International, 2022). Iran International openly criticizes the political establishment in Iran and even covers uprisings and opposition actors of the regime. It can be suggested that Iran International's editorial policies are leaned toward an orientation of opposition to Iran's government. It covers international (and internal) affairs in a way that opposes the Iranian government's position. And Iranian officials' position is to repeat Russian narratives, even using the same narrative of the "special military operation" for the invasion (Karimi & Gambrell, 2022). As discussed in the Background chapter, Iran also supports Russia by sending military equipment, including drones. Thus, it can be suggested that Iran International, in its coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine, is -to some extent not affected by Saudi Arabia's policies- but chiefly practiced in opposition to Iran's (pro-Russia) stance and therefore took the side of Ukraine/west. Why did Iran International practice WJ, and did its coverage lean toward the West? In short, I suggest that because it chiefly follows anti-Russian and anti-Iran rhetoric and other Anglo-Saxon mainstream media practice. This is a rough answer to the question. However, this question is a subject for further research. To better answer this why question, further investigation needed to be conducted to see what factors impact the coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine by Iran International.

7-6 Limitations and implications of the study

Given that this study's main research questions are answered, it should now be discussed what limitations and implications this study has.

Regarding the study's limitations, some major points are worthy of mentioning. Given the qualitative nature of the study, the findings can only be provisional suggestions in some respects. In future research with less time/space constraints, a qualitative content analysis could be performed on more articles. This will serve to draw a more valid generalization of the findings across the media under study. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, the findings of this study can, to some limited extent, only be generalized on the conflict coverage of these news media over six months.

As mentioned in previous chapters, these news media (Iran International and BBC Persian) make up 50% of the share of the daily viewership among Iranians (Gamaan, 2021). No other news media has such a big share (ibid). The absence of Farsi-language state media in the analysis of this study could not be considered a limitation or deficit. This research aimed to investigate leading non-state Farsi-language news media. Only BBC Persian and Iran International fulfill these criteria.

One considerable limitation of this study was that it does not (fully) serve to establish causality for the practice of these media. However, this was clearly mentioned from the beginning of the study and is reflected in the aims and RQs that this research does not investigate as to *why* these media report in the way they did. Nonetheless, a section was dedicated to this subject to pave the way for future research. Interviews and other methods of in-depth investigation can help in future studies to provide the cause of the media practice.

This study has some implications. The implications are interrelated. Yet, some might be more salient than others. This study serves the development of communication studies generally and

particularly media and journalism studies. It specifically helps to expand the span of and deepen the depth of PJ/WJ studies, particularly in the case of understanding various media practices in coverage of the conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, it contributed to the knowledge regarding two leading Farsi-language media. It also contributes to a specific field of focus, investigating the coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine (concerning PJ, SWJ, and WJ).

Yet, one salient implication of this study is its provision of the new concept of SWJ. Within the framework of a normative debate, the study pointed to a deficit in the field of PJ/WJ studies. I proposed the new concept of SWJ, and the Galtung model, which was a dualistic/binary one, is now modified to a multi-dimension one. The study additionally put this new concept under examination. Other scholars might use this concept, develop it, and re-examine it for other instances. That is left to the future and see how the concept is introduced, presented, and embraced.

This new concept of SWJ has some practical implications. As presented before, for instance, Lee & Maslog (2005) categorize a significant share of the analyzed stories as neutral, whereas this study categorizes them as SWJ. The theory chapter explains the reason, and no repetition might not be necessary here. As for the practice of BBC Persian, for instance, two articles (B-2 and B-6) in this study have been categorized as SWJ and would be categorized as WJ by others (e.g., Lee & Maslog, 2005). Article B-3 (with equal scores for PJ and WJ farmers) would have been categorized as neutral by others, while in this study, it is categorized as SWJ. For Iran International coverage, the difference in categorization would not be that significant. The only difference would be that one story that in this study is categorized as SWJ would be categorized as WJ by others.

BBC reporter David Lyon, who is a well-known opponent of PJ, was once disturbed by the studies that employ the concept of PJ (Ottosen, 2010). He was almost offended that his journalism work was categorized as WJ. Lyon argued that the WJ/PJ model is "too dualistic" (ibid, p.264). He might be happy if he comes across the newly proposed concept of SWJ since by proposing the SWJ concept, the model is no longer dualistic as it was in the Galtung model. Lyon might additionally be satisfied if he gets to know that in some studies, such as the current study, some of the BBC (Persian) articles are categorized as SWJ and not as WJ. He might, however, get disturbed again that other articles are categorized as SWJ instead of neutral. Yet, the subject of journalism studies cannot be constrained by one or some individual journalist's satisfaction with the judgment of their work. This is neither the task of social science nor is it possible to keep all people happy about the result of analyzing their job. Such studies' aims and results might differ gravely from what journalists like to hear about their work. The investigation in this field, generally, and for instance, proposing the new concept of SWJ, should contribute to this scholarly discipline and additionally help to construct an in-depth understanding of conflicts. Importantly it should inform the future journalistic practice in bringing peace and not fueling wars. According to the ideals and claims, journalism should serve the public and be the fourth pillar of democracy, not the fifth column on the battlefield, and not an auxiliary means to the war machine by which the public is bombarded.

Conclusion

This empirical study aimed to contribute to the field of communication studies, generally and particularly media and journalism studies, with a focus on peace journalism (PJ) and war journalism (WJ). The specific objective of the research was to shed light on the media coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine to see how news media covered this conflict. The media under study were Iran International and BBC Persian, which are the leading Farsi-language news media among Iranians, with a total of 50% share of daily viewership (Gamaan, 2021), both based in London and non-state media. Thus, the study also contributed to shed light on the practice of these understudied Farsi-language news media.

The study's main research question was to what extent these media covered the conflict in line with PJ and WJ. A second research question was as to what extent diagnostic (consequence-explaining) and prognostic (solution-oriented) frames were used in the conflict coverage. Qualitative content analysis was used to analyze twelve articles of the two media (each six-article extracted from their respective websites). The articles were published in the period of February 2022 to July 2022.

For a better understanding of the conflict, the background of the conflict was explored, and it was argued that the parties to the conflict were not only Russia and Ukraine. Drawing upon a diverse range of sources, it was demonstrated that, for instance, the US, the UK, and NATO are parties to this conflict. Other actors are involved as well, but the task was to show that the conflict is multi-party and not two-party. It was also argued that four types of wars were fought within the conflict: Russia-Ukraine, US-Russia, NATO-Russia, and a war within Ukraine between Kyiv and some forces in the east of Ukraine. The 2022 conflict in Ukraine roots in economic, cultural, social, and political issues across a wider span of time.

Johan Galtung's (1986) PJ/WJ model and framing theory were employed to interpret the findings. Lee & Maslog's (2005) indicator schema (coding schema) for identifying the traits of WJ and PJ were adopted to serve the coding process on the selected news articles and identify PJ and WJ frames in every individual story. The total scores given to each of the approaches determine which approach the story is aligned with.

Drawing upon available theories/debates around PJ and WJ, it was argued that this duality in the model (i.e., PJ vs. WJ) does not accord with the very logic of peace/conflict and war/violence approach. There are some articles categorized as PJ but lack many core traits of PJ, and many categorized as WJ but contain some traits of PJ. Also, there are articles that have equal scores for both approaches and are categorized as neutral, which abandoned the conflict-sensitive approach. This means these articles are not neutral but serve in a way to the continuation of the war. As a result of theoretical exploration in this study, this deficit/flaw was identified and addressed. In the context of a theoretical debate, I proposed the new concept of semi-war journalism (SWJ). Practically and to know how to identify approaches in this new model, a new assessment is suggested. In this new assessment and coding, an article is SWJ if the difference between the total scores is less than four points. Otherwise, the article is either PJ or WJ depending on which one exceeds the other. As an implication of this theoretical

contribution, the main research question was modified as to what extent these news media used PJ, SWJ, and WJ frames in their coverage of the conflict in Ukraine.

The findings of the analysis on the coverage of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine by Iran International and BBC Persian extracted from their websites reveal that the most salient WJ frame which appeared in all twelve articles was the elite-oriented frame (which means the elite were addressed in articles as either the source of information or actors in the conflict). Zero-sum and two-party frames were other dominant WJ frames in the articles, tough to different extents for each media. It was found that both news media (to more extents, Iran International) tend to report in a partisan and one-sided approach and lean toward one side of the conflict, i.e., Ukraine and the West (e.g., the US, the UK, the EU, and NATO). For BBC Persian consequence frame, among other PJ frames, was more salient. In Iran International, among PJ frames, there were some signs of a people-oriented approach in some parts of the three articles. All articles contained a diagnostic frame, while only two articles of each news media contained a prognostic frame.

As the answer to the main research question, it was found that five articles of Iran International (out of six) were in line with WJ and one with SWJ. Among BBC Persian's articles, one article aligns with the PJ approach, three with SWJ, and two with the WJ approach. This can shed light on the diaspora media studies since the news workers in these two media are Iranians in the diaspora.

Although the research is of an exploratory nature, a why question was additionally addressed as to why these news media covered the conflict the way they did. A general answer was that according to a plethora of studies, news media tend to follow their respective governments' policies and are affected by state power. Since their government, here the UK government is an actor in the conflict, the news media also take a side and practice partisan coverage of the conflict. Both media under study are UK-based media, and such an answer might apply to them. It is documented that BBC has followed this trend in many conflicts. A more (set of) precise answers can be answered through further studies, which could utilize, among other methods, interviews with news workers.

This study contributes to the field of PJ/WJ (studies) and additionally to further development in PJ instruction for journalists. Development in journalistic instruction concerning PJ/WJ can provide capabilities by which journalists are equipped with a deeper understanding of the traits and elements of conflicts. This can help them, at least, to map out various parties and problems to the conflict, which helps them avoid depicting a conflict in frames such as two-party, zero-sum, partisan, and elite oriented. Therefore, PJ could be drawn from alternative media to other types of ordinary journalistic practice to develop this deeper understanding of conflicts.

Media, generally, and journalistic practices, particularly, are meant to serve the interests of the public and help de-escalate conflicts, not to fuel wars and help (re) generate troubles for the public. Giving more attention to the conflict-sensitive approach that the peace and conflict model of journalism explains can serve a better understanding of conflicts and war, and thus a conflict coverage that attempts not to be inflammatory. More than always, journalism must embrace approaches that make journalism serve the public and help to alleviate the suffering of people. Media's function is not to serve as bullets but to assist in stopping warfare.

Bibliography

Aalberg, T. and Curran, J. (eds). (2012). How Media Inform Democracy: A Comparative Approach. New York, NY: Routledge.

Al-Jazeera. (2022). 'No other option': Excerpts of Putin's speech declaring war. Viewed at 2023-05-04, Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts.

Ahmadi, A., Asgarzadeh, S.M., Mofidi, R. (2021). Comparative study of news coverage of the Coronavirus crisis in the IRINN and BBC Farsi. Quarterly Scientific Journal of Audio-Visual Media. Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.22085/javm.2021.253964.1629

Alankus, S. (2006). Writing for peace without the words for peace. Unpublished paper presented at the conference: Peace Journalism Conference, Famagusta, p. 5.

Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Rebinskaya, E., & Christoph Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel working paper, no. 2218, 2022.

Archyde.com. (2022). CHOMSKY: AMERICA WILL CONTINUE THE WAR UNTIL THE LAST UKRAINIAN IS KILLED. Viewed at 2023-05-04, Retrieved from: https://www.archyde.com/chomsky-america-will-continue-the-war-until-the-last-ukrainian-is-killed/ .

Armed Conflict Survey. (2022). 2 Europe and Eurasia, Armed Conflict Survey, 8:1, 102-129, DOI: 10.1080/23740973.2022.2135787.

Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (2001). Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Asemah, E. S., & Edegoh, L. O. (2012). Mass media agenda and conflict resolution in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. *AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 1*(4), 112-129.

Aslam, R. (2011). Peace journalism: A paradigm shift in traditional media approach, PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 17 (1) 2011, 119-139.

BBC. (2020). BBC Group Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20. Viewed at 2023-05-23. Retrieved from: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualreport/2019-20.pdf#page=179.

BBC. (2023). Ukraine war: What support is China giving Russia? Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253.

BBC Persian. (2020). BBC on World Press Freedom Day: Thanking and supporting BBC Farsi journalists [Translated from Farsi]. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-52521236

BBC Persian. (2022). BBC reacts to publication of private conversations of one of its staff: We do not tolerate harassment, wherever it comes from [Translated from Farsi]. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-63609012

BBC Persian. (2023). BBC Persian radio is closed [Translated from Farsi]. Viewed at 2023-05-21, Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-65080005

BBC Persian. (n.d). How the BBC is working to promote public trust and transparency in online news [Translated from Farsi]. Viewed at 13-05-2023, Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/persian/institutional-49283091

Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual review of sociology, 26*(1), 611-639.

Bertrand, N. (2023). CNN Exclusive: A single Iranian attack drone found to contain parts from more than a dozen US companies. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/04/politics/iranian-drone-parts-13-us-companies-ukraine-russia/index.html.

Blagojević, M. (2005). War on Kosovo: A Victory for the Media. In F. Bieber & Ž. Daskalovski (Eds.), Understanding the War In Kosovo (pp. 163–181). London & Portland: Frank Cass Publishers.

Brusylovska, O., & Maksymenko, I. (2023). Analysis of the media discourse on the 2022 war in Ukraine: The case of Russia. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 15(1), 222–235. https://doi.org/10.1111/rsp3.12579.

Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods. 4th. edition. Oxford University Press Inc., New York.

Cafiero, G. (2022). Analysis: The Russia-Ukraine war and the view from Saudi Arabia. Viewed at: 05-15-2023. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/24/analysis-russia-ukraine-war-view-from-saudi-arabia

Carruthers, S. L. (2000). The media at war: Communication and conflict in the twentieth century. New York: St Martin's Press.

Çiftcioğlu, V. (2017). Peace Journalism: A Practical Handbook for Journalists in Cyprus, ISBN 978-9925-7378-1-9.

Çiftcioğlu, V., & Shaw, I. S. (2021). Peace journalism in times of 'war risks': Coverage of the hydrocarbons conflict in Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers. International Communication Gazette, 83(6), 541–566. https://doi-org.till.biblextern.sh.se/10.1177/1748048520915668.

Corcoran, K. & Bake, S. (2022). Russia denied using Iranian suicide drones to attack Ukraine, even though there are pictures of it. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-denies-using-iran-suicide-drones-in-ukraine-despite-photos-2022-10?r=US&IR=T.

Cozma, R. (2015). Were the Murrow Boys Warmongers?, Journalism Studies, 16:3, 433-448, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2014.882098.

Dassonville, A. (2022). The war in Ukraine is a media war with human faces. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/03/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-media-war-with-human-faces_5982364_4.html

Delgram.com. (n.d). All we should know about Iran International [Translated from Farsi]. Viewed at 2023-05-23. Retrieved from: https://www.delgarm.com/scientific/do-you-know/183554-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84.

Dente Ross, S. (2006). (De)Constructing Conflict: A Focused Review of War and Peace Journalism conflict & communication online, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006

Devere, H., & Wilson, C. (2013). Peace and war journalism in the New Zealand media: Reporting on 'the arc of instability' in the Pacific. *Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa*, *19*(1), 132-147. https://doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v19i1.242

Ebrahim, N, Al Lawati, A. & Gold, H. (2023). A Saudi-Iran reconciliation may ripple across the region. Here's why. Viewed at: 05-15-2023. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/13/middleeast/saudi-iran-regional-impact-mime-intl/index.html.

Elham, A., Sadiq, A. & Haand, R. (2021). War and Peace Journalism: Representation of Conflict on Afghan Soil through Global Media. 4. 67-83. Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: 10.5281/zenodo.5122850.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58.

Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x

Ersoy, M. (2016). War-peace journalism in the Turkish press: Countries come to the brink of war. International Communication Gazette 78(3): 247–266.

Ersoy, M., & İşeri, E. (2023). Mediated public diplomacy and peace journalism: International public news agencies on the Syrian crisis. International Communication Gazette, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/17480485231151580.

Fahmy, S. & Eakin, B. (2014). High drama on the high seas: Peace versus war journalism framing of an Israeli/Palestinian related incident. The International Communication Gazette 2014, Vol. 76(1) 86–105. Sage. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048513504046.

Fengler, S., Kreutler, M., Alku, M., Barlovac, B., Bastian, M., Bodrunova, SS., Brinkmann, J., Dingerkus, F., Hájek, R., Knopper, S., Kus, M., Láb, F., Lees, C., Litvinenko, A., Medeiros, D., Orlova, D., Ozolina, L., Paluch, A., Nicoleta Radu, R., Stefanikova, S., Veldhoen, H., & Zguri, R. (2020). The Ukraine conflict and the European media: A comparative study of newspapers in 13 European countries. Journalism 2020, Vol. 21(3) 399–422. Sage. DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918774311.

Galtung, J. & Ruge, MH. (1965). The structure of foreign news. The presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crisis in four Norwegian newspapers. Journal of Peace Research 2(1): 64–91.

Galtung, J. (1986). On the role of the media in worldwide security and peace. In T. Varis (Ed.), *Peace and communication* (pp. 249–66). San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad para La Paz.

Galtung, J. (1998). *Peace journalism: What, why, who, how, when, where*. Paper presented in the workshop, "What are journalists for?" TRANSCEND, Taplow Court, UK.

Galtung, J. (2017). "Peace Journalism: What, Why, Who, How, When, Where?". Viewed at 2023-03-15, Available at: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2017/01/peace-journalism-what-why-who-how-when-where/.

Gamaan. (2021). Iranians' Attitudes Toward Media: A 2021 Survey Report. Viewed at 2023-05-10, Retrieved from: https://gamaan.org/2021/04/05/iranians-attitudes-toward-media-a-2021-survey-report/.

Gamson, W. A. (1992). *Talking politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ganjian, M. & Zanuddin, H. (2019). The role of BBC in Iran's Politics: From the Shah to Khamenei. The Journal of Iranian Studies. Vol: 2, No: 2, pp. 63-82. Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: DOI: 10.33201/iranian.476828.

García-Perdomo, V., Harlow, S. & Brown, D. (2022). Framing the Colombian Peace Process: Between Peace and War Journalism. Journalism Practice. 1-24. 10.1080/17512786.2022.2062428.

Goretti, L.N. (2007). Peace journalism applied: An assessment of media coverage of the conflict in Northern Uganda, conflict & communication online, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007.

Gross, K., & D'Ambrosio, L. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology, 25(1), 1–29.

Hackett, R. A. & Schroeder, B. (2008). Does Anybody Practice Peace Journalism? A Cross-National Comparison of Press Coverage of the Afghanistan and Israeli–Hezbollah Wars. *Peace and Policy* 13(1): 26–47.

Hanappi, H. (2022). Russia. The Background of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. *Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Field*, (Volume XIII, Winter 2022), 2(26): 116-129. DOI: 10.14505/tpref.v13.2(26).02.

Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Situating peace journalism in journalism studies: A critical appraisal. Conflict & communication online, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007.

Härtel, A. (2023). EU Actorness in the Conflict in Ukraine: Between 'Comprehensive' Ambitions and the Contradictory Realities of an Enlarged 'Technical' Role. Ethnopolitics, 22:3, 271-289, DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2022.2028421.

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2008 [1988]). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. London: The Bodley Head.

Hussain, S., & Lynch, J. (2019). Identifying peace-oriented media strategies for deadly conflicts in Pakistan. Information Development, 35(5), 703–713. https://doi.org/10.1177/0266666918784122.

Höijer, B., Nohrstedt, S.A, & Ottosen, R. (2002), The Kosovo War in the Media - Analysis of a Global Discursive Order. Conflict & communication online, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002 www.cco.regener-online.de ISSN 1618-0747.

Honari, A., Alinejad, D. (2022). Online Performance of Civic Participation: What Bot-like Activity in the Persian Language Twittersphere Reveals About Political Manipulation Mechanisms. Television & New Media, 2022, Vol. 23(8) 917– 938.
DOI: 10.1177/15274764211055712.

Hong, N (2023). Why China and Russia Are Closer Than Ever. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/20/world/asia/china-russia-ties.html.

Houshyar, M., Mehdizadeh, S.M. (2020). Framing & Media Discourse through News Coverage (A News Discourse Analysis of Farsi BBC & IRNA on News Coverage of Middle East & North Africa. Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Communication and Media. Volume 3, Issue 7 , June 2020, , Pages 125-163. Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.22034/jiscm.2020.196879.1055

Huaxia. (2023). Russia-EU trade grows 2.3 pct in 2022. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://english.news.cn/europe/20230308/e9e7c6638fd144ae9b7b93494ad8ce23/c.html.

Iran International. (2022). Volant Media's Full Statement On CNN Arabia Article. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202210266792.

Iran International. (n.d). About us. Viewed at 13-05-2023, Retrieved from: https://www.iranintl.com/en/abouten.

Ishaku, J. (2022). Peace Journalism or War Journalism? An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria (2020-2021). Ethics and Information Technology. 2021.

Ivanova, I. (2022). Why many Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language? Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/why-many-ukrainians-speak-russian-as-their-first-language-190856.

Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News coverage of the Gulf Crisis and public opinion—A study of agenda-setting, priming, and framing. Communication Research, 20, 365–383.

Jehangir, A. (2023). Finding peace journalism: An analysis of Pakistani media discourse on Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. *Media, War & Conflict*, *0*(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352221149559.

Kamali Dehghan, S. (2018). Concern over UK-based Iranian TV channel's links to Saudi Arabia. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/31/concern-over-uk-based-iranian-tv-channels-links-to-saudi-arabia.

Karimi, N. & Gambrell, J. (2022). In Iran, Russia's war on Ukraine is a political flash point. Viewed at 2023-05-23. Retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-iran-moscow-tehran-5438506fba2505fbcd227f93c533e86d.

Keeble, Richard. (1998). Not the Gulf war: A study of the UK press coverage of the 1991 and 1998 Iraq crises. In P. Lee (Ed.), *The media and the Persian Gulf war* (pp. 5–15). London: World Association for Christian Communication.

Kim, S. H., Scheufele, D. A., & Shanahan, J. (2002). Think about it this way: Attribute agenda-setting function of the press and the public's evaluation of a local issue. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 79(1), 7–25.

Knightley, P. (2000). *War journalism under fire.* Committee for Peace in the Balkans. Retrieved on April 1, 2003, from http://www.peaceinbalkans.freeserve.co.uk.

Lasswell, H. D., Leites, N., & Associates. (1949). *Language of politics: Studies in quantitative semantics*. New York: George W. Stewart.

Lee, S.T & Maslog, C. (2005). War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts, *Journal of Communication, June 2005*, 311-329.

Lichtenstein, D., Esau, K., Pavlova, L., Osipov, D., & Argylov, N. (2019). Framing the Ukraine crisis: A comparison between talk show debates in Russian and German television. The International Communication Gazette, 2019, Vol. 81(1) 66–88 DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048518755209.

Liu, Z. (2023). News framing of the 2014–15 Ukraine conflict by the BBC and RT. The International Communication Gazette 1–30. DOI: 10.1177/17480485231158904.

Lynch, J. (1998). *The peace journalism option.* Conflict and Peace Forums. Retrieved May 20, 2003, from http://www.conflictandpeace.org/6pub/3pub.html.

Lynch, J. (2003). *Iraq: Broadening the agenda*. Retrieved October 16, 2003, from http://www.basicint.org/iraqconflict/Pubs/Discussion%20Papers/DS190203.htm.

Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2005). *Peace Journalism*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.

Lynch, J. (2007). Peace journalism and its discontents, conflict & communication online, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007.

Lynch, J. (2008). *Debates in Peace Journalism.* Sydney: Sydney University Press.
Lynch J, Seaga Shaw, I. & Hackett, RA. (eds) (2011). *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Lynch, J. (2015). Peace journalism: Theoretical and methodological developments, Global Media and Communication 2015, Vol. 11(3) 193–199.

Mandelzis, L. & Peleg, S. (2008). War Journalism as Media Manipulation: Seesawing between the Second Lebanon War and the Iranian Nuclear Threat. *Peace and Policy* 13(1): 62–73.

Marjantvnetwork, (n.d.). About MTN, Commissions & Acquisitions.https://www.marjantvnetwork.com/.

Masters, J. (2023). Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia.

Maté, A. (2022). US fighting Russia 'to the last Ukrainian': veteran US diplomat. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://thegrayzone.com/2022/03/24/us-fighting-russia-to-the-last-ukrainian-veteran-us-diplomat.

McGoldrick, A., & Lynch, J. (2000). Peace journalism—How to do it. Retrieved on June 2, 2003, from http://www.transcend.org/pjmanual.htm.

McGoldrick, A. & Lynch, J. (2016). Audience Responses to Peace Journalism, Journalism Studies, 17:5, 628-646, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2014.992621.

Miazhevich, G. (2018). National branding in the post-broadcast era: The case of RT. European Journal of Cultural Studies 21(5): 575–593.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. (2019). President Signed Amendments to the Constitution on the Strategic Course of Ukraine for Membership in the EU and NATO. February 19, 2019.

M. Shahrani, M. (2014). *BBC Persian*: Filling the Media Void in the Persian-Speaking World. *Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 6, Issue 2—2014. Pp.335-338.* Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12102

NohrStedt, S.A. (2009). New War Journalism Trends and Challenges. 95 Nordicom Review 30 (2009) 1, pp. 95-112.

Norton, B. (2023). Ukraine's Zelensky admits he sabotaged Minsk peace deal with Russia, West blocked negotiations. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2023/02/10/ukraine-zelensky-minsk-peace-russia/

Nosrati Kharazmi, Z., Mohammadi, S. (2020). Persian-Language Media Overseas as the Western Tools of Public Diplomacy: Framing COVID-19 Pandemics in Iran by VOA and BBC. Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies| Vol. 4| No. 1| Winter 2020| pp. 1-36.
Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: DOI: 10.22059/WSPS.2020.308749.1171.

Nuttall, P. (2022). Saudi Arabia is the biggest beneficiary of the war in Ukraine. Viewed at: 05-15-2023. Retrieved from: https://www.newstatesman.com/environment/climate/2022/05/saudi-arabia-is-the-biggest-beneficiary-of-the-war-in-ukraine

OHCHR. (2023). Ukraine: civilian casualty update 8 May 2023. Viewed at 13-05-2023, Retrieved from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/05/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-8-may-2023#:~:text=From%2024%20February%202022%2C%20which,8%2C791%20killed%20and%2014%2C815%20injured.

Ojala, M. & Pantti, M. (2017). Naturalising the new cold war: The geopolitics of framing the Ukrainian conflict in four European newspapers. *Global Media and Communication* 13(1): 41–56.

Oleinik, A. (2023). War propaganda effectiveness: a comparative content-analysis of media coverage of the two first months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Atlantic Journal of Communication, DOI: 10.1080/15456870.2023.2187801.

Oswald, R. (2019). Trump Released Hold on Ukraine Aid; Democrats Unsatisfied. *CQ*, September 13, 2019.

Ottosen, R. (2010). The war in Afghanistan and peace journalism in practice. Media, War & Conflict, 3(3) 261–278. DOI: 10.1177/1750635210378944.

Pedro-Carañana, J. (2022). Russia-Ukraine-USA/NATO: From War Propaganda to Peace Journalism. TRANSCEND MEDIA SERVICE: Solutions-Oriented Peace Journalism. Retrieved from: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2022/08/russia-ukraine-usa-nato-from-war-propaganda-to-peace-journalism/

Perez de Fransius, M. (2014). Peace journalism case study: US media coverage of the Iraq War. Journalism 2014, Vol 15(1) 72– 88. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884912470313

Pfau, M., Haigh, M., Gettle, M., Donelly, M., Scott, G., & Warr, D. (2004). Embedding journalists in military combat units: Impact on newspaper story frames and tone. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 81*, 74–88.

Pilger, J. (2000). Censorship by Omission. In P. Hammond & E. S. Herman (Eds.), Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (pp. 132–140). London & Sterling: Pluto Press.

Price, V., Tewksbury, D., & Powers, E. (1997). Switching trains of thought: The impact of news frames on readers' cognitive responses. Communication Research, 24, 481–506.

Prakash, A. (2013). Peace or War Journalism: Case Study of the Balochistan Conflict in Pakistan, Strategic Analysis, 37:5, 621-636, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2013.821284.

Radio France International. (2022). Saudi Arabia to give Ukraine over €400million in humanitarian aid. Viewed at: 05-15-2023. Retrieved from: https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20221015-saudi-arabia-to-give-ukraine-over-%E2%82%AC400million-in-humanitarian-aid.

Reevell, P. (2021). Russia makes sweeping demands for security guarantees from US amid Ukraine tensions. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-makes-sweeping-demands-security-guarantees-us-amid/story?id=81821816.

Relief Web. (2023). Ukrainian Crisis - Situational Analysis 05 May 2023. Viewed at 13-05-2023, Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukrainian-crisis-situational-analysis-05-may-2023#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20Ukrainian%20refugees,returns%20(both%20IDPs%20and%20refugees

Reporters Without Borders. (n.d). Press Freedom Index. Iran. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://rsf.org/en/index

Reuters. (2022). EU tells Iran to halt repression, support for Russia. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-eu-nuclear-negotiators-meet-jordan-iranian-media-2022-12-20/

Reynolds, N. (2022). Ukraine Posts Photo of Iranian Drone That Official Denies Giving to Putin. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-posts-iranian-drone-official-denies-giving-vladimir-putin-russia-1748518.

Rizanaj, F. (2018). THE KOSOVO WAR IN MEDIA: BETWEEN WAR JOURNALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY OF NATO MEMBERS, PRIZREN SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL / Volume 2, Issue 1; January-April, 2018.

Rodgers, J., Lanoszka, A. (2021). Russia's rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea. Media, War & Conflict. 1–18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211027084

Roman, N, Wanta, W. & Buniak, I. (2017). Information wars: Eastern Ukraine military conflict coverage in the Russian, Ukrainian and US newscasts. *International Communication Gazette* 79(4): 357–378.

Russia Briefing. (2022). 2022 European Union Trade With Russia: Increases & Decreases YTD. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/2022-european-union-trade-with-russia-increases-decreases-ytd.html/.

Safranchuk, I. (2022). The Conflict in Ukraine**:** Regional and Global Contexts – A Perspective from Russia. Policy Perspectives 19:1 (2022): 1-5 https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.19.1.ca1.

Scahill, J. (2022). Noam Chomsky and Jeremy Scahill on the Russia-Ukraine War, the Media, Propaganda, and Accountability. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2022/04/noam-chomsky-and-jeremy-scahill-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-the-media-propaganda-and-accountability/.

Schlosberg, J. (2017). In search of credibility: RT and the BBC in a 'post-truth' world. The Foreign Policy Centre. Available at: https://fpc.org.uk/search-credibility-rt-bbc-post-truth-world/ (accessed 15 March 2021).

Seiffert, J. (2014). Donbas struggle. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/the-significance-of-the-donbas/a-17567049.

Shaw, I.S, Lynch, J. & Hackett, R.A. (2011), *Expanding Peace Journalism*: *Comparative and Critical Approaches Edited by* Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011. 389 pp. ISBN: 9781920899707.

Shayesteh, F & Seo, H. (2022). Competing frames on social media: analysis of English and Farsi tweets on Iran plane crash, The Journal of International Communication. Viewed at 2023-05-15, Retrieved from: 28:1, 47-69, DOI: 10.1080/13216597.2021.1948439

Shigeki, H. (2022). Historical Background of Putin's Invasion of Ukraine, Asia-Pacific Review, 29:2, 19-34, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2022.2105516.

Shinar, D. (2007). Peace Journalism: The State of the Art. In Peace Journalism: The State of the Art, edited by Dov Shinar and Wilhelm Kempf, 199–210. Berlin: Regener.

Smith, A. (2023). The 'stunning' scale of Russian deaths in Ukraine signals trouble ahead for Putin. Viewed at 13-05-2023, Retrieved from: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-casualties-soldiers-killed-ukraine-counteroffensive-putin-war-rcna82380

Snider, T. (2023). Who really started the Ukraine wars? War-racket—catastrophe capitalism. The four international wars in Ukraine. The libertarian institute, Transcend media service. Viewed at 2023-05-04, Retrieved from: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2023/02/who-really-started-the-ukraine-wars/ .

Snow, D., & R. D. Benford. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. International Social Movement Research 1: 197–217.

Sreberny, A. & Torfeh, M. (2014). Persian Service: The BBC and British Interests in Iran. (2014). *European Journal of Communication*, *29*(6), 760–760. Viewed at 2023-05-17, Retrieved from: 10.1177/0267323114545851

Szostek, J. (2018). Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during "Information War" in Ukraine. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(1), 116–135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217743258.

UK Government. (2021). Seventh anniversary of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea: UK statement. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/seven-years-of-illegal-occupation-of-crimea-by-the-russian-federation-uk-statement.

UN News. (2022). General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine. Viewed at 2023-05-20, Retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152.

US Department of Defense. (2016). Readout of Secretary Carter's Meeting with Ukrainian Minister of Defense General Stepan Poltorak. September 8, 2016.

US Department of Defense. (2019). DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine. Press release, June 18, 2019.

US, Department of Defense. (2022). Fact Sheet on US Security Assistance to Ukraine. June 1 2022.

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. (2019). Sixth Fleet Announces Sea Breeze 2019 Participation. Press release, June 25, 2019; Ed Adamczyk, "US Navy Prepares for 'Sea Breeze 2019'. Naval Exercises in Ukraine," UPI, June 28, 2019.

Van Gorp, B. (2005). Where is the Frame? Victims and Intruders in the Belgian Press Coverage of the Asylum Issue. *European Journal of Communication* Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi). www.sagepublications.com. Vol 20(4): 484–507. [10.1177/0267323105058253]

Vliegenthart, R., & van Zoonen, L. (2011). Power to the frame: bringing sociology back to frame analysis. Eur. J. Commun. 26 (2), 101–115. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0267323111404838.

Ward, A, Berg, M. & Ukenye, L. (2022). Why Iran is helping Russia against Ukraine. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/10/21/why-iran-is-helping-russia-against-ukraine-00062898.

Warsaw Institute. (2018). How Yanukovych facilitated the annexation of Crimea. Viewed at 2023-05-18, Retrieved from: https://warsawinstitute.org/yanukovych-facilitated-annexation-crimea/

Watanabe, K. (2017). Measuring news bias: Russia's official news agency ITAR-TASS' coverage of the Ukraine crisis. *European Journal of Communication*, *32*(3), 224–241. Viewed at 2023-05-15, Retrieved from: doi:10.1177/0267323117695735.

Watkins, S. (2022). An avoidable war? Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii133/articles/susan-watkins-an-avoidable-war

Webster, J. (2023). China's Growing Economic Support for Russia. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/chinas-growing-economic-support-for-russia/

Welt, C. (2019). Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, And US Policy. Current Politics and Economics of Russia. ISSN: 1057-2295. Volume 35, Issue 2-3. © Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Wintour, P. (2022). Iran agrees to supply missiles as well as drones to Russia. Viewed at 2023-05-16, Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/18/iran-agrees-to-supply-missiles-as-well-as-drones-to-russia.

Appendices

Appendix 1. The link and other information of the articles under study.

A-BBC Persian's articles.

Article Code	Media	Date	URL	Story Type	Word Count
B1	BBC Persian	Feb 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-features-60538533	Opinion	1715
B2	BBC Persian	March 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/tv-and-radio-60884714	Hard News	120
B3	BBC Persian	April 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-61227079	Feature	1615
B4	BBC Persian	May 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-61589164	Feature	714
B5	BBC Persian	June 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-61941671	Feature	903
B6	BBC Persian	July 26 2022	https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c72dd8d915eo	Feature	570

B-Iran International's articles.

Article Code	Media	Date	URL	Story Type	Word Count
I1	Iran International	Feb 26 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220226 3277	Hard News	136
I2	Iran International	March 25 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220325 4151	Feature	541
I3	Iran International	April 22 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220422 0279	Hard News	164
I4	Iran International	May 19 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220513 7262	Feature	1000
I5	Iran International	June 26 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220624 6013	Hard News	280
I6	Iran International	July 25 2022	https://www.iranintl.com/20220725 8689	Feature	565

Appendix 2- Code Schema

War Journalism frames/indicators	Peace Journalism Frames/indicators
Approach-based frames	Approach-based frames
W1. Reactive (waits for war to break out, or about to break out, before reporting)	P1. Proactive (anticipates, starts reporting long before war breaks out)
W2. Reports mainly on visible effects of war (casualties, dead and wounded, damage to property)	P2. Reports also on invisible effects of war (emotional trauma, damage to society and culture)
W3. Elite-oriented (focuses on leaders & elites as actors and sources of information)	P3. People-oriented (focuses on common people as actors and sources of information)
W4. Focuses mainly on differences that led to the conflict	P4. Reports the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflict
W5. Focuses mainly on the here and Now	P5. Reports causes and consequences of the conflict
W6. Dichotomizes between the good guys and bad guys, victims and villains	P6. Avoid labeling of good guys and bad guys
W7. Two-party orientation (one party wins, one party loses)	P7. Multiparty orientation (gives voice to many parties involved in conflict)
W8. Partisan (biased for one side in the conflict)	P8. Nonpartisan (neutral, not taking sides)
W9. Zero-sum orientation (one goal: to win)	P9. Win-win orientation (many goals and issues, solution-oriented)
W10. Stops reporting with the peace treaty signing and ceasefire and heads for another war elsewhere	P10. Stays on and reports aftermath: the reconstruction, rehabilitation, & implementation of peace treaty
Language-based framings	Language-based framings
W11. Uses victimizing language (e.g., destitute, devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, demoralized) that tells only what has been done to people	P11. Avoids victimizing language, reports what has been done and could be done by people, and how they are coping
W12. Uses demonizing language (e.g., vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist)	P12. Avoids demonizing language, uses more precise descriptions, titles, or names
W13. Uses emotive words, like genocide, assassination, massacre, systematic (as in systematic raping or forcing people from their homes)	P13. Objective and moderate. Avoids emotive words. Reserves the strongest language only for the gravest situation. Does not exaggerate.

Appendix 2. Coding Schema for indicators/frames of PJ/WJ. Retrieved from Lee & Maslog (2005). The letter attached to the number of the indicators (i.e., W and P) added by the author of the current study. W represents a WJ indicator and P represents a PJ indicator.

Appendix 3 -Textual Example of WJ/PJ indicators/frames

Some textual examples of indicators/frames of WJ and PJ extracted from analyzed articles that were not the dominant frames and not given as examples in the Finding chapter are mentioned here. The rest of the indicators are given textual examples in the body of the Finding chapter.

W1 frame/indicator is when reporting is reactive, while P1 is present when reporting is proactive. The former refers to reporting when it "waits for the war to break out, before reporting" (Lee & Maslog, 2005), while the latter anticipates and starts reporting before the war breaks out. This criterion could not be traced in an individual article since it is more the case when considering long-term reporting and the average journalistic practice.

W2 frame refers to reporting on the visible effects of war, while P2 refers to invisible ones (culture, society, etc.). One of the BBC Persian's articles (B-4) involves a visible reporting, explaining that "more than a third of Yemen's grain needs come from Ukraine - the war has put especially poor countries at risk of famine." This is a visible effect of the war (W2). Another BBC Persian's article (B-5) includes the invisible effect when it reports that "British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has admitted that there is pressure and anxiety due to the consequences of the war."

W10 refers to stopping the reporting when a treaty or agreement is achieved, while P10 continues on other subjects, such as reconstruction and rehabilitation in the aftermath. These two were not found since none of the articles covered a long time before the 2020 conflict.

While W12 refers to demonizing language in the coverage, P12 refers to the avoidance of that. As for W12, in B-6, it is reported that "Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says about Russia's gas issue that it's just a "gas blackmail" against Europe." In I-5, it is said that "[p]reviously, Ukraine has accused Russia of stealing and selling its grain." This demonizes language when it points to one actor's act as if stealing something. For P12, in BBC Persian's article on April 2022, it is said that "[s]imultaneously with the meeting between Mr. Guterres and Mr. Lavrov, a meeting of the Ukrainian defense advisory group was held at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, chaired by Lloyd Austin, the US Secretary of Defense." Here, all are named in official and precise names and positions, and no demonizing language is used.

While W13 pertains to emotive language usage in the reporting, P13 avoids doing as such and instead provides objective and moderate wording. As for emotive language (W13), in B-1, it is reported that "[r]ecent events have marked the *darkest moments* for European leaders since 1940" (emphasis added), and "Mark Milley, one of the US military officials, says that the size of the Russian military forces indicates a "terrible" scenario that extends to the conflict in densely populated urban areas" (emphasis from the article). As can be seen here, even an emphasis is added to the emotive language. On the other hand, for P13, and usage of non-emotive language, in I-4, it is reported that "[t]he war in Ukraine is slowly approaching its third month, and there is no sign of a definite military victory for either side, and there is no way to end the war." Although this is a sad story to be told, it is explained in a non-emotive way (P13).