Carl Cederberg

Jan Patočka and the Task for Post-European Philosophers[1]

In this paper, I explore Jan Patoĉka's enigmatic thesis that the the Platonic ideal of care for the soul.constitutes the essence of Europe According to Patoĉka's reading, Plato's philosophy, in contrast to that of Democritus, is concerned first and foremost with care for the soul, and only secondarily with ontology. Referring to Phaedo *and* Philebus, *I show how Patoĉka's thesis fits well with Plato's own understanding of his doctrine of ideas. I then show how this formula can be used to understand both Patoĉka's critique of (Post-)European modernity, and his engagement in Charta 77, as a heretical philosophy of history.*

One recurrent thesis in the philosophy of Jan Patoĉka is characteristically enigmatic: *Europe is care for the soul*. Banished from the university in the late 1970s, Patoĉka elaborated this theme extensively in *Plato and Europe*, a collection of lectures conducted in the homes of friends[2].

These lectures begin with the claim that we find ourselves in a situation of deep alienation, a state of political and existential crisis. He further claims that, if philosophy is to live up to its essence, it must be challenged: it must «somehow help us in the distress that we are»[3]. His first lecture concludes by posing a question: «Can the care of the soul, which is the fundamental heritage of Europe, still speak to us today? Speak to us, who need to find something to lean on in this common agreement about decline, in this weakness, in this consent to the fall»[4].

This article attempts to provide a modest answer to what is an otherwise broadly open-ended question. This first requires circumscribing precisely what is meant by care of the soul. The second task is to re-situate this question in our current predicament, some fifty-years after Patočka's question. Since Patočka does not provide us with an answer, we will need to specify how philosophical

1 I wish to thank all the organizers and participants of the conference *Reasons in Europe* for helping me to formulate these thoughts, and my colleague Patrick Seniuk for revising the language in what finally became this article.

2 It was first published into French by E. Abrams: *Platon et Europe*, Verdier 1990. It has also been translated into English by Petr Lom: *Plato and Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002. The Czech text exists in *Sebrané spisy, volume II*, Oikuméné, Prag 1999.

3 J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, translated by P. Lom, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002, p. 14.

4 *Ibidem*.

care of the soul might render Patočka's philosophy a source of inspiration when meditating on the various political and existential challenges that confront contemporary Europe. What would a philosophical care of the soul amount to today?

Furthermore, let us consider how Patočka's reading of Plato can complement his critique of modern phenomenology, and how we can bring this to have political actuality. What would this this actuality look like, from the viewpoint of Patočka?. A more challengingyet more urgent question is, how shoud we conceive it today?

Given the context of the publication of the present text, a volume of texts on *the Reasons of Europe*, the readers will probably have passed the first obstacle to understanding this curious formula: Europe is not exclusively a geographical concept. To put it differently, it should not be taken for granted that a geographical conceptby necessity simply denotes a piece of land. For Patočka, Europe is first and foremost an idea. In construing Europe as an idea, his main point of reference is always Edmund Husserl's work. Patočka claims that, since Husserl's work on this topic, nothing worthy of merit has been put forth. Patočka's discussion of Europe, then, should be read as a reply to Husserl's conception of Europe which is broadly characterized as the community of the universal.

For Husserl, the essence of European culture lies in the idea of the universal, around which Europe has been united since the advent of Greek philosophy and mathematics. Europe is the philosophic-scientific community, upholding the idea of universality and of a universal humanity. In *Crisis*, Husserl outlines a history of science, from Greece to Galileo, and then up to the present. He provides a genealogy of universalism, showing how the notion of the universal, the idea of reason, and the emergence of the universal human being, are parts of an event, albeit one that spans two thousand years of history. For Husserl, the advent of universality, reason, and humanity, coincides with the history of Europe. The descriptions of other cultures are meant to show that they are limited to a certain worldview. With Europe, the beginning of a universal culture takes place. Europe is of course one culture among others and so can be viewed in the same way as any other, but, according to Husserl, it is also the one that has made the universal to its essence.

Patočka takes Husserl's work as his point of departure, but rethinks and deepens his notion of Europe by re-situating it, grounding it in a more robust historical context, and meditating on how the idea of the universal was originally conceived. Like many, Husserl locates the birth of Europe in Greece. However, he does not rigourously engage with the ancient Greek thinkers.Rather, his interest lies in forwarding the thesis that rationality, and our understanding of rationality, has a history. When presenting this history, Husserl's attention is directed toward the later scientific revolution, and, save for a few remarks, he says little about the birth of philosophy. In response, Patočka takes up this history, neglected by Husserl, and providesa systematic reading of Plato that introduces a richer perspective on the origins of both of philosophy and Europe.

In a non-published addendum to the non-published "Europe and Post-Europe", in addition to deepening and extending of Husserl's work, Patočka views

his own approach as a "reorientation"[5]. Despite Patočka's admiration of Husserl, he makes it clear that the latter's project risks being part of the problem rather the solution. He asks rhetorically, «is not the real cause of the [European] crisis the pretentions of a subjectivity that wants to contain everything in itself, be the foundation of everything, be the "absolute" subjectivity wanting to present itself as a "free" foundation of all being, detached of everything». In this way, he hints at the very problems that he sees in Husserl's phenomenology[6].

This aspiration to escape this Husserlian thought structure is what makes Plato's philosophy attractive for Patočka. The turn from Husserl to Plato is also a turn from a philosophy of the subject to the philosophy of the soul. Following Plato, Patočka understands the soul not as the ultimate foundation of everything, but "as part of a bigger structure", the world of phenomenality manifesting itself for the soul. The soul is "what is capable of truth within man", with truth understood phenomenologically as the manifestation of beings as they are[7]. This is the springboard into the rest of this article. Drawing from Patočka's reading of Plato and his reorientation of phenomenology, I shall argue that "care for the soul" is care for the very manifestation of being and its manifestation for the soul: care for that which appears, *so that it can appear*. In *Plato and Europe*, Patočka characterizes care for the soul in the following manner: «The care of the soul consists in that we constantly examine our speech. […] [It] transforms us internally, […] from instinctive and traditional beings, beings that look to what is normal in society, and spiritually nourish themselves with this, into beings who entirely reverse this course, who are constantly examining […] In this the soul becomes something determined, in this it elevates its degrees of being. Of course the soul always is… but the soul that is cared for *is* more, it has a higher, elevated being. This being is, so to speak, thickened, concentrated, it is always the same, it does not dissolve, does not blur»[8].

This corresponds with the philosophical ideal of a life in amplitude, that Patočka expresses in an earlier text, while at the same time further expanding upon it[9]. Care for the soul is care for a life in amplitude.

But this does not mean that it is an a-political turn inwards. On the contrary, it is that which makes a true state possible: the possibility of living together in a manner that transcends the mere traditions of a community; a society where we strive to achieve a better life together. Ideally, care of the soul strives for «the community that is necessary so that a person like Socrates does not need to die»[10].

5 J. Patočka, "L'époque posteuropéenne et ses problêmes spirituels", translated by Erika Abrams in *L'Europe apres l'Europe*, Verdier, Paris 2007, p. 214.

6 J. Patočka, "L'époque posteuropéenne et ses problêmes spirituels", pp. 214-215.

7 J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, p. 27.

8 J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, pp. 120-121.

9 Cf. J. Patočka, "Equilibre et amplitude dans la vie", transl. by Erika Abrams in *Liberté et sacrifice*, Millon, Grenoble 1938/1990.

10 J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, p. 121.

Thus far, we can establish that if, for Husserl, Europe was the culture devoted to the universal idea, for Patočka it is understood as a culture devoted to the care of the soul. The discovery of the universal idea shall be understood as a part of this care. When Patočka introduces the idea of care of the soul, he often distinguishes between the philosophies of Democritus and Plato, two figures that he believed to be decisive for the European spirit. Democritean care of the soul is distinct from the Platonic variety insofar as its goal is not the soul itself, but the soul's insight into ontological truths. For Democritus, «the soul exists in order to explain the World»[11]. Democritus relies on an atomistic ontology, meaning that there exist entities that are indivisible, fundamental, and constitute both the most basic object of knowledge of the world and its foundation. Inspired by Hegel's thoughts on atomism, Patočka reads Democritean philosophy as having an importance that extends far beyond the ontological hypothesis of the atom. Atomism, understood more broadly, comprises not only ontology (in which case it would be falsified by modern physics), but an entire world-view: linguistic theory, theories of perception, political theory[12]. In the these theories we find theatomist schema, which reduce the field of study to its elements. «The general understanding of being as precise, entirely determined is atomist»[13]. This understanding is not only theoretic, but also entails praxis, a certain care for the soul.

According to Patočka, Plato did not reject Democritean philosophy outright, but, on the contrary, incorporated it into his own philosophical work[14]. Though Patočka, to my knowledge, does not explain precisely how this is done, we can make a cursory sketch and describe it in the following way. Atomism is incorporated into the care of the soul via the doctrine of the ideas and its relation to Platonist dialectics. I will justify this claim through my reading of *Phaedo* and *Philebus*.

Nothing is as characteristic of Platonic philosophy as the doctrine of the ideas. That which exists in itself are the ideas. These are, so to speak, the atoms of the Platonic universe. How does this doctrine relate to the care for the soul? Patočka does not give a clear answer to this question. However, if Platonism is about care for the soul, the discourse on the ideas must be understood as part of a structured attempt of take care of our lives. This becomes clear when Socrates introduces what he calls the hypothesis of the ideas in the *Phaedo*. Its aim is to lay bare the realms of concepts with which we understand our lives. For instance, why do we live as we do? How *should* we live?

11 J. Patočka, "Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme", in *Ketzerische Essais zur Philosophie der Geschichte und ergänzende Schriften*, Klett Cotta, Stuttgart 1984, p. 255.

12 J. Patočka, "Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme", p. 249.

13 A large strand of analytic philosophy is atomist in this respect, well represented by W.V.O. Quine's famous slogan: "Not entity without identity", W.V. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia University Press, New York 1969, p. 23). (J. Patočka, "Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme", 1984, p. 251).

14 J. Patočka, "Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme", p. 245.

The *Phaedo* recounts how Socrates, in the company of his friends, awaits his impending execution, during which he will be forced to consume a goblet of hemlock. While waiting, he and his friends discuss the mortality or immortality of the soul. The dialogue leads them to the composition of the soul and to the topic of causation: What are real causes in life? As an answer to this question, he introduces the doctrine of the ideas, and tells his friends of the origin of this hypothesis. He digresses with a lengthy biographical excursus, In his youth, he was interested in what we would today call a naturalist explication of life and rationality. However, he came to reject this position when he found that thinkers such as Anaxagoras tried to explain causal relationships through natural explications. His dissatisfaction with this "naturalism" is illustrated by a simple example, suggesting that a naturalistic account would find the causes for his sitting there with Simmias and Cebes in the constitution of his muscle tissue and bones, and the causal basis of their conversation in a physiological explanation of sound and hearing. Quite the opposite, Socrates claims. They are there, having this conversation, because the Athenians have sentenced him to death, and he has chosen not to escape[15]. Socrates does not mention Democritus here, but it is clear that he could have just as well stated that, the essence of what I am talking about will not change, regardless of whether these muscles and bones are ultimately made of atoms.

This is why Socrates turns to the ideas. They afford a better understanding, not only of his life, but of human life in general. Unlike naturalist explanations, these concepts provide a language of causality that penetrates the reality of human affairs. Socratic dialogues strive towards drawing conclusions about how life ought to be lived, if it is to be considered the best life, but in addition they are always (by way of a meta-discussion) concerned with the question of how best to *talk* about these issues. As a result, the ideas are a necessary foundation for this (or any) conversation. Here, this turn towards the ideas is labelled an escape in the logoi, "the second sailing"[16], as opposed to the first that searched for natural explanations. Now the ideas are atoms, in the sense that they are indivisible and distinct entities that exist by themselves, but they are always understood in relation to one another and ever in relation to a life trying to understand itself. They are the conditions for the conversation in which the examination of life proceeds, and in general for a human self-understanding that transcends myth.

Socrates' remarkable speech in the *Phaedo* should be read as a critique of naturalism, and, more broadly, as a foundation for what we now call the humanities. It is a plea for understanding humans according to concepts that are suitable for humans and that allow us understanding ourselves in terms of how we really live, as opposed to reductionist approaches that, by using mechanistic explanations, attempt to efface human freedom. Socrates insists that he has *chosen* not to escape, and this decision is made possible by virtue of conceptual discourse. To put it differently, he casts care for the soul as an escape to the *logoi* (the concepts) rather

15 Plato, *Phaedo*, 96a-99a.
16 Ivi, 99d.

than escaping prison and his death sentence. Care for the soul is at the same time care for the concepts by which we make ourselves understood, and is, for this reason, political: it concerns the discursive nature of the *polis*.

In *Philebus,* the central discussion focuses on whether it is reason or pleasure that is most important when answering the question of how to lead a happy life. As is the common fate in the dialogues, the interlocutors become preoccupied with what might seem like tangential concerns, which in this instance, is the dialectics of unity and diversity. On the one hand, any approach to the good life must be unified. On the other hand, what we encounter in life is endlessly manifold. Faced with this opposition, some inexperienced dialecticians are, according to Socrates, tempted to insist on either unity or diversity, whereas others excel in making complicated arguments that shift from the one to the many in misleading and deceitful ways. Socrates shows how understanding a given phenomenon cannot be restricted to either its unity or its diversity. Instead, understanding must proceed from “the right number”. To illustrate, Socrates uses examples from music and language. Even if tone and linguistic signs are unities, they may be infinitely varied. When approaching these fields, however, we need to proceed from a distinct number (a musical scale, an alphabet) in order to grasp the matter at hand (music, language). Claims of unity (these things are in some sense alike) and diversity (these things are in some sense different) always can be made without any risk. Claims concerning “the right number”, on the other hand, require knowledge. Much like the butcher who must know where the joints are in order to carve up the animal’s corpse in the best way (Phdr 265e1-3), we must know where to draw the most important distinctions, and how articulate our field of interest most appropriately and divide it into distinct entities.

This does not diminish the importance of the unity and diversity of life, but only stresses that there are better and worse ways of dividing any given field of interest in life. The entities in this field correspond to the basic elements of a Democritean framework. The lesson to be learnt here is that, while a Democritean approach for any investigation would characterize a set of entities as ends in themselves, the Socratic investigation considers their respective value for the soul and for life. Accordingly, in *Phaedus*, after having explained the notion of the right number, Socrates leads the dialogue back to the question of which qualities are most important for a good life. In my reading, the examples of language and music provide models for understanding life and for seeing how a field of interest can be divided into a set of distinct entities without being reduced to these entities (as they would in Democritus’s atomistic approach).

Remember, our excursus on Plato was guided by Patočka’s concern that the ancient Athenian’s philosophy should still “speak to us today”. It is clear that our contemporary situation is far more complex than that of the ancient *polis*, and, accordingly, we will demand more complicated models to govern and organise ourselves. The political and organizational systems in which we live and breathe are inexhaustibly multi-layered. In these systems, the atomistic approach, reducing the field that we aspire to understand to the entities through which we understand it, is increasingly tempting and promises to bring stability. «The beginning and end

of the Democritean doctrine,» writes Patočka, «is founded knowledge»[17]. Patočka claims that the atomist model of care of the soul (and mechanism, its consequence) has dominated European modernity: «Only the metaphysics of mechanism made possible the typical social phenomena of modern times, specifically modern capitalism, growing out of an equally extreme objective stance towards human affairs, subjecting human conditions to an equally law-like calculus and working directly with a mechanical model of human relations»[18].

Ultimately, this leads to Europe (care for the soul) becoming Post-Europe, which consists in caring for the outer world. «Not the care for the soul, the care to be, but the care to have, care for the external world and its conquest, becomes the dominant concern»[19]. This changes all spheres of the world: politics, business, religion, and science.

At present, the influence of atomist ideals is recognizable in the rise of New Public Management, as well as the other measurement systems involved in quality control that, broadly speaking, seek identifiable entities with the intention of certifying their quality. Working with these systems we often feel that, in attempting to give well-founded measures of the quality of our work, we are no longer able to produce anything of quality for life. Caring for the truth of the measure of quality can stand in the way of care for the good life, at the personal, professional, and organizational level. A Platonic care for the soul that incorporates Democritean atomism implies that such systems are justified: that we need systems, with some better than others, for measuring cost efficiency, sickness, school results, but theseare only justified insofar as they really benefit people or what Patočka and Plato call their souls. They are only justified insofar as they can be understood as contributing to care for the soul; a caring for the possibility to perceive the manifold appearance of being.

Nowadays, when we talk about philosophy as the care of the self, we generally treat it as complementary to medical care (Plato not Prozac!) on a very individual level and as a way of achieving equilibrium, often referring, not surprisingly, to the ideals of Stoic philosophers. This is not the Patočkian "medicine", though. His philosophy does not harbour the ideal of a life in harmony and is not restricted to a care of an individual soul. Can a Patočkian cure be found in his work? What legacy does the idea of Europe as care of the soul bequeath us?

I have already hinted at the way in which Patočka obviously practiced a philosophical care of the self. In his political participation in Charter 77, he demanded that Czechoslovakia abide by the Human Rights conventions they had subscribed to. Such political engagement also exists today. We philosophers and intellectuals speak out in similar ways,. For instance, some protest against the

17 J. Patočka, "Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme", p. 256.

18 J. Patočka, *Philosophy and Selected Writings*, ed. and transl. by Erazim Kohák, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1989, p. 245.

19 J. Patočka, *Heretical essays in the philosophy of history,* translated by Erazim Kohák, La Salle, Chicago1996, p. 83.

discrepancy reflected by the European Union's insistence on associate it's essence to that of human rights, and the questionable treatment of those whose lives are precarious and whose only possession *are* their human rights.

Since Patočka insists that the care of the soul must be interpreted politically, and against the backdrop of his own involvement for Human Rights in the Charta 77, it might be assumed that fighting for human rights constitutes a modern way of caring for the soul. If this is the case, it needs some qualification. Recall the interpretative claim made at the outset of this article: if the soul is that for which something appears, we can interpret caring for the soul as a care for that which appears, *so that it appears*:a care for its very manifestation.

The notion of human rights is a certain conceptual cluster that can be applied in many different ways and in recent years has often been used as a justification for military interventions. Human rights discourse can be used in ways that cover over that which they are supposed to reveal and care for. As Patočka wrote in a credo for Charta 77, «The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even om them, sacred, inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law they seek to express recognition»[20].

It is the purpose of Charta 77, writes Patočka, to remind us that there exists a higher authority than the state: each person's moral conscience. Do Human Rights really provide u with a solid foundation for a politically engaged philosophy? Reading the previous quote, we might assume so.

And when, more than twenty years later, Václav Havel (co-founder of Charta 77) defended the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999, he drew on a similar argument. Havel, then ex-president of the Czech Republic, claimed that human consciousness is "the ambassador of eternity." Like Patočka, Havel repeatedly refers to human rights as transcending the rights of the state. However, unlike Patočka, he provides these with a metaphysical foundation. The final justification, says Havel, is that «while the state is a human creation, human beings are the creation of God»[21].

Our concern here is not with whether the bombings were justified or not, nor is Christianity the issue. What is important is the way in which Havel's discourse employs that which transcends philosophy for the sake of politics. It is the question of how philosophy is to deal with that which transcends philosophy. In *Plato and Europe*, Patočka writes that, at its heart, philosophy, as care of the soul, "tries to negotiate with that which rejects every philosophy", discussing it in the name of something, such as the absolute, which philosophy helps to formulate conceptually[22]. Even if philosophy acknowledges the existence of transcendent

20 J. Patočka, *Philosophy and Selected Writings*, p. 341.

21 V. Havel, "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State", "The New York Review of Books", 46, no. 10, 1999, p. 6.

22 J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, p. 108.

ideals, these ideals were formulated, at least partly, *in the tradition of philosophy*. This gives philosophy a key role in interpreting them. This is not only a historical obligation. If philosophy is care for the soul, it is a care that negotiates a tension between allowing the transcendent to be transcendent, and realizing that the transcendent needs, first and foremost, to be formulated and interpreted.

Today, if there is a general contemporary expression of a transcendent, it is perhaps that of human rights. Is there a philosopher who speaks out against the right to life, the right to freedom, the right to education, etc.? Indeed, in his Charter 77 text, Patočka held that human rights is an expression of the unconditional. The formulation of human rights pertains to the category of negotiation "with that which rejects every philosophy". Yet, they are formulated with the aid of philosophy, and, more precisely, by the philosophy of Enlightenment. However, human rights harbour what can be seen as a paradox. This paradox can be expressed with the dictum of Emmanuel Levinas: the universalisation of our unique responsibility for the neighbour. If we think that this universalisation occurs unproblematically, we will fall into a bad form of Platonism, the kind that Patočka calls "Platonic Rationalism" in the heretic essays. It consists of «the effort to subject even responsibility itself to the objectivity of knowledge»[23]. Conducting human rights discours along these lines would mean that the soul blinds itself for the appearance of the unique, that which the soul is.

However, Patočka is inconsistent in calling this approach Platonism. It is not a Platonic care for the soul. Of course, Platonism *is* an escape to the *logoi*, a turn towards the ideas. However,t as we see in *Phaedo*, this turn towards the ideas is *for the sake* of the soul. Subordinating life to concepts would be what this paper has called Democritean rather than Platonic.

So how are we to make sense of Patočka's notion of Europe as care for the soul, apart from the inspiration we can find in his philosophically inspired activism? Even if both he and Havel appear to share the same philosophical position, the latter is arguing in a dogmatic fashion, trying to defend human rights by grounding them in pure faith in God, whereas Patočka argues as a heretic, refusing any attempt to let a political philosophical philosophy be grounded in submission to authority. His involvement in Charta 77 is the practical consequence of his "heretical attempts atthe philosophy of history."

What is the relevance of a philosophy of history for a care of the soul? If the soul is care for the possibility of openness to appearance, this can be expressed as an openness to events. In order to perceive events, there must be an understanding of history. In our everyday life, or in our work as scientists or philosophers, we approach the world mostly unaware of the historicity of concepts and phenomena and of how we engage with them. Does this not illustrate the blindness at the heart of Havel's defence of the NATO bombings? Applying the same thought structure as the president of a country, justifying the attack on another country, as he did in struggling for freedom of expression under a dictatorship, is ahistoric. On the

23 J. Patočka, *Heretical essays in the philosophy of history*, p. 110.

other hand, accepting the historicity of our core concepts and values might not seem far from affirming historicism or moral relativism, an attitude even blinder to what actually happens, since it lacks real belief in the existence of any ideas or concepts with which to measure moral reality. We would find ourselves in the position of Nietzsche's "last human beings", shrugging our shoulders, asking, "What is the soul?", "What is justice?".

Consider briefly Hegel's philosophy of history, the background againt which Patočka claimsto be writing heretical essays in a philosophy of history. Hegel speaks of Europe as the continent of spirit thatfulfilling history's "divine plan". Africa, by contrast, plays but a minor role by merely providing Europe with slaves to fulfil its manifest destiny. Slavery, for Hegel, is in itself an injustice, but nonetheless a historical necessity for the rational cultivation of Africans. The event of slavery becomes insignificant because we are blinded by the event of Enlightenment, the light of spirit coming to self-understanding. For Patočka, no such self-understanding at the end of history can be assumed.

However, despite Hegel's questionable legacy, Patočka insists on treading the shaky ground of the philosophy of history. He embodies a philosophy of history as "heretical attempts" to perceive the philosophical events that provide the background for the languages which we use today, the speech that philosophy examines today. It is in this context we can understand his interest in Plato.

If a heretic can have a legacy, it would lie in continuing this historical care for the soul, attempting to make us more aware of the philosophical events that shape, and are shaping, our post-European lives. According to Patočka, the Platonic notion of the care for the soul lies at the core of these events.

Carl Cederberg
Södertörn University; Stockholm, Sweden.
carl.cederberg@sh.se

Carl Cederberg has published in political philosophy, ethics and professional studies, with an orientation towards contemporary continental philosophy and ancient philosophy (e.g. Plato, Levinas, Patočka). Current research interests include Refugees and Human Rights; Professional Judgment in Face of Vulnerability and the Fetishization of Dialogue.