sh.sePublications
Change search
Refine search result
345678 251 - 300 of 353
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • harvard-anglia-ruskin-university
  • apa-old-doi-prefix.csl
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 251.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Depression and the Self: Bodily Resonance and Attuned Being-in-the-World2013In: Journal of consciousness studies, ISSN 1355-8250, E-ISSN 2051-2201, Vol. 20, no 7-8, p. 15-32Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper will explore the relationship between selfhood and depression, by focusing upon the lived body’s capacity to “resonate” with the world and thus open up an “attuned” space of meaning. Persons will become differently tuned in different situations because they embody different patterns of resonance—what is most often referred to as different temperaments—but the self may also suffer from idiosyncrasies in mood profile that develop into deficiencies of resonance, making the person in question ill. In many cases of depression one might describe this as a being out of tune in the sense of being oversensitive to the sad, anxious and boring tune qualities of the world. This phenomenological model allows us to describe a spectrum of various normal sensitivities which might favor certain moods over others, but also to identify pathologies, like depression, in which the body is out of tune and makes the being-in-the-world overwhelmingly unhomelike.

  • 252.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Diagnosing mental disorders and saving the normal: American Psychiatric Association, 2013. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. American Psychiatric Publishing: Washington, DC. 991 pp., ISBN: 978-0890425558. Price: $122.702014In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 241-244Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 253.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Do antidepressants affect the self?: A phenomenological approach2007In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 153-66Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I explore the questions of how and to what extent new antidepressants (selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors, or SSRIs) could possibly affect the self. I do this by way of a phenomenological approach, using the works of Martin Heidegger and Thomas Fuchs to analyze the roles of attunement and embodiment in normal and abnormal ways of being-in-the-world. The nature of depression and anxiety disorders - the diagnoses for which treatment with antidepressants is most commonly indicated - is also explored by way of this phenomenological approach, as are the basic structures of self-being. Special attention is paid in the analysis to the moods of boredom, anxiety and grief, since they play fundamental roles in depression and anxiety disorders and since their intensity and frequency appear to be modulated by antidepressants. My conclusion is that the effect of these drugs on the self can be thought of in terms of changes in self-feeling, or, more precisely, self-vibration of embodiment. I present the idea of a spectrum of bodily resonance, which extends from the normal resonance of the lived body, in which the body is able to pick up a wide range of different moods; continuing over various kinds of sensitivities, preferences and idiosyncrasies, in which certain moods are favored over others; to cases that we unreservedly label pathologies, in which the body is severely out of tune, or even devoid of tune and thus useless as a tool of resonance. Different cultures and societies favor slightly differently attuned self-styles as paradigmatic of the normal and good life, and the popularity of the SSRIs can therefore be explained, not only by defects of embodiment, but also by the presence of certain cultural norms in our contemporary society.

  • 254.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Döden går att dela: viktig bok om den svåra vården. [Recension av: Mazzarella, Merete, Den goda beröringen : om kropp, hälsa, vård och litteratur]2006In: Axess, ISSN 1651-0941, Vol. Annex, vår, p. 43-44Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 255.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Empathy as a necessary condition of phronesis: a line of thought for medical ethics2014In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 293-299Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Empathy is a thing constantly asked for and stressed as a central skill and character trait of the good physician and nurse. To be a good doctor or a good nurse one needs to be empathic-one needs to be able to feel and understand the needs and wishes of patients in order to help them in the best possible way, in a medical, as well as in an ethical sense. The problem with most studies of empathy in medicine is that empathy is poorly defined and tends to overlap with other related things, such as emotional contagion, sympathy, or a caring personality in general. It is far from clear how empathy fits into the general picture of medical ethics and the framework of norms that are most often stressed there, such as respect for autonomy and beneficience. How are we to look upon the role and importance of empathy in medical ethics? Is empathy an affective and/or cognitive phenomenon only, or does it carry moral significance in itself as a skill and/or virtue? How does empathy attain moral importance for medicine? In this paper I will attempt to show that a comparison with the Aristotelian concept of phronesis makes it easier to see what empathy is and how it fits into the general picture of medical ethics. I will argue that empathy is a basic condition and source of moral knowledge by being the feeling component of phronesis, and, by the same power, it is also a motivation for acting in a good way.

  • 256.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    En revolution för reproduktionen2014In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 18 juniArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 257.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Evidensbaseringsrörelsen och det goda omdömet: en kritisk betraktelse2010In: Ikaros : tidskrift om människan och vetenskapen, ISSN 1796-1998, no 2, p. 33-38Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 258.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Avdelning 1, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Fenomenologiska perspektiv på hälsa och sjukdom2002In: Läkartidningen, ISSN 0023-7205, E-ISSN 1652-7518, Vol. 99, no 6, p. 540-4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 259.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Institutionen för medier, konst och filosofi, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Gadamerian Hermeneutics of Medicine: A Phenomenology of Health and Illness2005In: Between Description and Interpretation: the hermeneutic turn in phenomenology / [ed] Andrzej Wierciński, Toronto: Hermeneutic Press , 2005, p. 169-187Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 260.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Institutionen för medier, konst och filosofi, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Heidegger och sjukdomens fenomenologi2005In: Sjukdomsvärldar: om människors erfarenhet av kroppslig ohälsa / [ed] Bengt Richt, Gunilla Tegern, Lund: Studentlitteratur , 2005, p. 51-68Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 261. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Hermeneutics of clinical practice: the question of textuality.2000In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 171-89Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I scrutinize the question whether clinical medicine, in order to be considered a hermeneutical enterprise, must be thought of as a reading of different "texts." Three different proposals for a definition of the concept of text in medicine, suggested by other hermeneuticians, are discussed. All three proposals are shown to be unsatisfying in various ways. Instead of attempting to find a fourth definition of the concept of text suitable to a hermeneutics of medicine, I then try to show that the assumption that one needs to operate with the concept of text in order to develop a hermeneutics of medicine is false. Clinical interpretation can be shown to essentially consist in a dialogical hermeneutics, the pattern of which can be found in the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. This kind of hermeneutics is not a methodology of text reading, but an ontological, phenomenological hermeneutics in which understanding is a necessary feature of the being-together of human beings in the world. This being-together in and through language takes on a peculiar form in the clinical encounter, since the medical meeting is typically characterized by an asymmetrical enstrangement and has a specific goal--health for the patient--absent in other forms of hermeneutics. Central issues of Gadamer's philosophy, e.g. "fusion of horizons," are shown to fit the structure of clinical practice.

  • 262.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Avdelning 1, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Hermeneutics of medicine in the wake of Gadamer: the issue of phronesis.2003In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 24, no 5, p. 407-31Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The relevance of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis--practical wisdom--for medicine and medical ethics has been much debated during the last two decades. This paper attempts to show how Aristotle's practical philosophy was of central importance to Hans-Georg Gadamer and to the development of his philosophical hermeneutics, and how, accordingly, the concept of phronesis will be central to a Gadamerian hermeneutics of medicine. If medical practice is conceived of as an interpretative meeting between doctor and patient with the aim of restoring the health of the latter, then phronesis is the mark of the good physician, who through interpretation comes to know the best thing to do for this particular patient at this particular time. The potential fruitfulness of this hermeneutical appropriation of phronesis for the field of medical ethics is also discussed. The concept can be (and has been) used in critiques of the conceptualization of bioethics as the application of principle-based theory to clinical situations, since Aristotle's point is exactly that problems of praxis cannot be approached in this way. It can also point the way for alternative forms of medical ethics, such as virtue ethics or a phenomenological and hermeneutical ethics. The latter alternative would have to address the phenomena of health and the good life as issues for medical practice. It would also have to map out in detail the terrain of the medical meeting and the acts of interpretation through which phronesis is exercised.

  • 263.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Livet, tänkandet och driften mot oordning2013In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 18 novemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 264.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Medical technologies and the life world: an introduction to the theme2009In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 121-123Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 265.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Medicine2006In: A companion to phenomenology and existentialism / [ed] Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. , 2006, p. 412-424Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 266.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Institutionen för medier, konst och filosofi, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Medicinens hermeneutik: att förstå den sjuka människan2004In: När människan möter medicinen: livsvärldens och berättelsens betydelse för förståelsen av sjukdom och medicinsk teknologi / [ed] Sonja Olin Lauritzen, Fredrik Svenaeus & Ann-Christine Jonsson, Stockholm: Carlsson , 2004, Vol. S. 31-48, p. 31-48Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 267.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Medicinens humaniora: vad skulle det kunna vara? = The Humanities of Medicine: What Could This Be?2010In: En annan humaniora - en annan tid = Another humanities - another time / [ed] Carl Cederberg & Hans Ruin, Huddinge: Södertörns högskola , 2010, p. 53-64Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 268. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Narrativ medicin: berättelsen om patienten och hennes sjukdom2000In: Läkartidningen, ISSN 0023-7205, E-ISSN 1652-7518, Vol. 97, no 34, p. 3629-32Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 269.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Naturalisticand Phenomenological Theories of Health: Distinctions and Connections2013In: Human Experience and Nature: Examining the Relationship between Phenomenology and Naturalism / [ed] Havi Carel and Darian Meacham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I present and compare the philosophies and ideas behind naturalistic theories of health on the one hand and phenomenological theories of health on the other. The basic difference between the two sets of theories is no doubt that whereas naturalistic theories claim to rest on value neutral concepts, such as normal biological function, the phenomenological suggestions for theories of health take their starting point in what is often named intentionality: meaningful stances taken by the embodied person in experiencing and understanding her situation and taking action in the world.

    Although naturalism and phenomenology are fundamentally different in their approach to understand and define health, they are not necessarily opposed when it comes to understanding the predicament of ill persons. Naturalism can afford phenomenology an important strategic importance in finding clues for medical investigations, just as phenomenology can envelop a naturalistic understanding of diseases. Furthermore, the two theories display similarities in their emphasis of embodiment as the central element of health theory and in their stress on the alien nature of the body displayed in illness. Theories of biology and phenomenology are, indeed, companionable and in many cases also mutually supportive in the realms of health and illness.

  • 270.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Phenomenological bioethics: medical technologies, human suffering, and the meaning of being alive2017Book (Other academic)
  • 271.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, Institutionen för medier, konst och filosofi, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Phenomenology and Psychiatry: A Contemporary Diagnosis Introducing the Work of Thomas Fuchs2005In: Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1600-1974, E-ISSN 1869-7577, Vol. 6, no 2, p. 202-211Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 272.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Phenomenology listens to Prozac: analyzing the SSRI revolution2007In: Medical technologies and the life world: the social construction of normality / [ed] Sonja Olin Lauritzen, Lars-Christer Hydén, Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007, p. 164-183Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Focuses on the ways new health technologies intervene into our lives. This book explores: how new health technologies are understood by lay people and patients; how the outcomes of these technologies are communicated in various clinical settings; and, how these technologies can alter our notions of health and illness and create 'new illness'.

  • 273.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Phenomenology of pregnancy and the ethics of abortion2018In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 21, no 1, p. 77-87Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I investigate the ways in which phenomenology could guide our views on the rights and/or wrongs of abortion. To my knowledge very few phenomenologists have directed their attention toward this issue, although quite a few have strived to better understand and articulate the strongly related themes of pregnancy and birth, most often in the context of feminist philosophy. After introducing the ethical and political contemporary debate concerning abortion, I introduce phenomenology in the context of medicine and the way phenomenologists have understood the human body to be lived and experienced by its owner. I then turn to the issue of pregnancy and discuss how the embryo or foetus could appear for us, particularly from the perspective of the pregnant woman, and what such showing up may mean from an ethical perspective. The way medical technology has changed the experience of pregnancy-for the pregnant woman as well as for the father and/or other close ones-is discussed, particularly the implementation of early obstetric ultra-sound screening and blood tests (NIPT) for Down's syndrome and other medical defects. I conclude the article by suggesting that phenomenology can help us to negotiate an upper time limit for legal abortion and, also, provide ways to determine what embryo-foetus defects to look for and in which cases these should be looked upon as good reasons for performing an abortion.

  • 274.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Psychopharmacology and the Self2013In: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry / [ed] K. W. M Fulford et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1171-1184Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 275.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Psychopharmacology and the Self: An Introduction to the Theme2007In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 115-117Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 276.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Psykiatrins etik2016In: Psykiatri / [ed] Jörgen Herlofson et al., Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, 2 omarb., p. 69-75Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 277.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    På spaning efter det goda dödandet2015In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 5 novemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 278.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Sjukdomsbegreppet i psykiatrin2016In: Psykiatri / [ed] Jörgen Herlofson et al., Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, 2 omarb., p. 37-43Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 279.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Smärtans mening: en Medicinfilosofisk betraktelse2009In: Att tänka smärtan / [ed] Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2009, 1, p. 31-47Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 280.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Tabletter för känsliga själar: den antidepressiva revolutionen2008Book (Other academic)
  • 281.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The Body as Alien, Unhomelike and Uncanny: Some Further Clarifications2013In: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, ISSN 1071-6076, E-ISSN 1086-3303, Vol. 20, no 1, p. 99-101Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 282.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The Body as Gift, Resource or Commodity?: Heidegger and the Ethics of Organ Transplantation2010In: Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, ISSN 1176-7529, E-ISSN 1872-4353, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 163-172Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Three metaphors appear to guide contemporary thinking about organ transplantation. Although the gift is the sanctioned metaphor for donating organs, the underlying perspective from the side of the state, authorities and the medical establishment often seems to be that the body shall rather be understood as a resource. The acute scarcity of organs, which generates a desperate demand in relation to a group of potential suppliers who are desperate to an equal extent, leads easily to the gift’s becoming, in reality, not only a resource, but also a commodity. In this paper, the claim is made that a successful explication of the gift metaphor in the case of organ transplantation and a complementary defence of the ethical primacy of the giving of organs need to be grounded in a philosophical anthropology which considers the implications of embodiment in a different and more substantial way than is generally the case in contemporary bioethics. I show that Heidegger’s phenomenology offers such an alternative, with the help of which we can understand why body parts could and, indeed, under certain circumstances, should be given to others in need, but yet are neither resources nor properties to be sold. The phenomenological exploration in question is tied to fundamental questions about what kind of relationship we have to our own bodies, as well as about what kind of relationship we have to each other as human beings sharing the same being-in-the-world as embodied creatures.

  • 283. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    The body uncanny: further steps towards a phenomenology of illness.2000In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, no 2, p. 125-37Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is an attempt to analyse the experience of embodiment in illness. Drawing upon Heidegger's phenomenology and the suggestion that illness can be understood as unhomelike being-in-the-world, I try to show how the way we live our own bodies in illness is experienced precisely as unhomelike. The body is alien, yet, at the same time, myself. It involves biological processes beyond my control, but these processes still belong to me as lived by me. This a priori otherness of the body presents itself in illness in an uncanny and merciless way. The unhomelike breakdown of our everyday being-in-the-world suffered in illness is explored through Heidegger's notion of the world being a "totality of relevance", a pattern of meaning played out between different "tools". The lived body is compared to a broken tool that alters and obstructs our way of being "thrown" and "projecting" ourselves in the meaning patterns of the world through feelings, thoughts and actions. The similarities and differences between this unhomelikeness of illness and the specific unhomelikeness of authentic understanding, reached according to Heidegger in existential anxiety, are discussed. In order to illustrate how the lived body can present itself as "broken" and "other" to its owner, and in what way this unhomelike experience calls for help from health-care professionals, I make use of a clinical example of a severe and common disease: stroke.

  • 284.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The ethics of self-change: becoming oneself by way of antidepressants or psychotherapy?2009In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 169-178Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the differences between bringing about self-change by way of antidepressants versus psychotherapy from an ethical point of view, taking its starting point in the concept of authenticity. Given that the new antidepressants (SSRIs) are able not only to cure psychiatric disorders but also to bring about changes in the basic temperament structure of the person—changes in self-feeling—does it matter if one brings about such changes of the self by way of antidepressants or by way of psychotherapy? Are antidepressants a less good alternative than psychotherapy because antidepressants are in some way less authentic than psychotherapy? And, if so, what does this mean exactly? In this paper I try to show that the self-change brought about by way of antidepressants challenges basic assumptions of authentic self-change that are deeply ingrained in our Western culture: that changes in self should be brought about by laborious ‘self-work’ in which one explores the deep layers of the self (the unconscious) and comes to realise who one really is and should become. To become oneself has been held to presuppose such a journey. While the assumed importance of self-work appears to be badly founded on closer inspection, the notions of exploring and knowing oneself appear to be more promising in fleshing out an ethical distinction between psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic practice with the help of the concept of authenticity. Psychotherapy, to a much greater extent than psychopharmacological interventions, involves the whole profile of the self in its attempts to effect a change, not only in the temperament but also in the character of the person in question, and this is important from an ethical point of view. In the article, the concepts of self-change, authenticity, temperament and character are presented and used in order to understand and flesh out the relevant ethical differences between the practice of psychotherapy and the use of antidepressants. Looping, collective effects of psychopharmacological self-change in a cultural context are also considered in this context.

  • 285. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    The Hermeneutics of Medicine1996In: The Goals and Limits of Medicine / [ed] Lennart Nordenfelt and Per-Anders Tengland, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International , 1996, p. 117-141Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 286. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    The hermeneutics of medicine and the phenomenology of health: steps towards a philosophy of medical practice2001Book (Other academic)
  • 287.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Linköpings universitet.
    The Hermeneutics of Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health: Steps towards a Philosophy of Medical Practice1999Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 288.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The phenomenology of empathy in medicine: an introduction2014In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 245-248Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is an introduction to a thematic section on the phenomenology of empathy in medicine, attempting to provide an expose of the field. It also provides introductions to the individual articles of the thematic section.

  • 289.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The Phenomenology of Falling Ill: An Explication, Critique and Improvement of Sartre’s Theory of Embodiment and Alienation2009In: Human Studies, ISSN 0163-8548, E-ISSN 1572-851X, Vol. 32, no 1, p. 53-66Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I develop a phenomenology of falling ill by presenting, interpreting and developing the basic model we find in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1956). The three steps identified by Sartre in this process are analysed, developed further and brought to a five-step model: (1) pre-reflective experience of discomfort, (2) lived, bodily discomfort, (3) suffered illness, (4) disease pondering, and (5) disease state. To fall ill is to fall victim to a gradual process of alienation, and with each step this alienating process is taken to a new qualitative level. Consequently, the five steps of falling ill have not only a contingent chronological order but also a kind of logical order, in that they typically presuppose each other. I adopt Sartre’s focus on embodiment as the core ground of the alienation process, but point out that the alienation of the body in illness is not only the experience of a psychic object, but an experience of the independent life of one’s own body. This facticity of the body is the result neither of the gaze of the other person, nor of a reflection adopting the outer perspective of the other in an indirect way, but is a result of the very otherness of one’s own body, which addresses and plagues us when we fall ill. I use examples of falling ill and being a patient to show how a phenomenology of falling ill can be helpful in educating health-care personnel (and perhaps also patients) about the ways of the lived body.

  • 290. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    The Phenomenology of Health and Illness2001In: Handbook of phenomenology and medicine / [ed] Toombs, S. Kay, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic , 2001, p. 87-108Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Features essays that demonstrate that because phenomenology provides extraordinary insights into many of the issues that are directly addressed within the world of medicine. This title is suitable for those who are interested in the philosophy of medicine, but for all healthcare professionals who are actively engaged in the care of the sick.

  • 291.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The phenomenology of suffering in medicine and bioethics2014In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 35, no 6, p. 407-420Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article develops a phenomenology of suffering with an emphasis on matters relevant to medical practice and bioethics. An attempt is made to explain how suffering can involve many different things-bodily pains, inability to carry out everyday actions, and failure to realize core life values-and yet be a distinct phenomenon. Proceeding from and expanding upon analyses found in the works of Eric Cassell and Elaine Scarry, suffering is found to be a potentially alienating mood overcoming the person and engaging her in a struggle to remain at home in the face of loss of meaning and purpose in life. Suffering involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected through the suffering-mood but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about (1) my embodiment, (2) my engagements in the world together with others, and (3) my core life values. Suffering is in essence a feeling (a mood), but as such, it has implications for and involves the person's entire life: how she acts in the world, communicates with others, and understands and looks upon her priorities and goals in life. Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way. In such situations, we are not focused directly upon the suffering-mood-as in the cases of pain and other bodily ailments-but rather, upon the things that the mood presents to us: not only our bodies, but also other things in the world that prevent us from having a good life and being the persons we want to be. Such suffering may in many cases be transformed or at least mitigated by a person's identifying and changing her core life values and in such a manner reinterpreting her life story to become an easier and more rewarding one to live under the present circumstances.

  • 292.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    The relationship between empathy and sympathy in good health care2015In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 267-277Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Whereas empathy is most often looked upon as a virtue and essential skill in contemporary health care, the relationship to sympathy is more complicated. Empathic approaches that lead to emotional arousal on the part of the health care professional and strong feelings for the individual patient run the risk of becoming unprofessional in nature and having the effect of so-called compassion fatigue or burnout. In this paper I want to show that approaches to empathy in health care that attempt to solve these problems by cutting empathy loose from sympathy-from empathic concern-are mistaken. Instead, I argue, a certain kind of sympathy, which I call professional concern, is a necessary ingredient in good health care. Feeling oneself into the experiences and situation of the patient cannot be pursued without caring for the patient in question if the empathy is going to be successful. Sympathy is not only a thing that empathy makes possible and more or less spontaneously provides a way for but is something that we find at work in connection to empathy itself. In the paper I try to show how empathy is a particular form of emotion in which I feel with, about, and for the other person in developing an interpretation of his predicament. The with and for aspects of the empathy process are typically infused by a sympathy for the person one is empathizing with. Sympathy can be modulated into other ways of feeling with and for the person in the empathy process, but these sympathy-replacement feelings nevertheless always display some form of motivating concern for the target. Such an understanding of empathy is of particular importance for health care and other professions dealing with suffering clients.

  • 293. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    The Truthfulness of Psychoanalysis2000In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 355-360Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 294.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    To die well: the phenomenology of suffering and end of life ethics2019In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper presents an account of suffering as a multi-level phenomenon based on concepts such as mood, being-in-the-world and core life value. This phenomenological account will better allow us to evaluate the hardships associated with dying and thereby assist health care professionals in helping persons to die in the best possible manner. Suffering consists not only in physical pain but in being unable to do basic things that are considered to bestow meaning on one's life. The suffering can also be related to no longer being able to be the person one wants to be in the eyes of others, to losing one's dignity and identity. These three types of suffering become articulated by a narrative that holds together and bestows meaning on the whole life and identity of the dying person. In the encounter with the patient, the health-care professional attempts to understand the suffering-experience of the patient in an empathic and dialogic manner, in addition to exploring what has gone wrong in the patient's body. Matters of physician assisted suicide and/or euthanasia-if it should be legalized and if so under which conditions-need to be addressed by understanding the different levels of human suffering and its positive counterpart, human flourishing, rather than stressing the respect for patient autonomy and no-harm principles, only. In this phenomenological analysis the notions of vulnerability and togetherness, ultimately connecting to the political-philosophical issues of how we live together and take care of each other in a community, need to be scrutinized.

  • 295.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Vi har förlorat känslan för lidandet2015In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 20 oktoberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 296.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Vi ser inte människan för alla kroppsdelar2013In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 12 marsArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 297.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    What is an organ?: Heidegger and the phenomenology of organ transplantation2010In: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 179-196Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates the question of what an organ is from a phenomenological perspective. Proceeding from the phenomenology of being-in-the-world developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and subsequent works, it compares the being of the organ with the being of the tool. It attempts to display similarities and differences between the embodied nature of the organs and the way tools of the world are handled. It explicates the way tools belong to the totalities of things of the world that are ready to use and the way organs belong to the totality of a bodily being able to be in this very world. In so doing, the paper argues that while the organ is in some respects similar to a bodily tool, this tool is nonetheless different from the tools of the world in being tied to the organism as a whole, which offers the founding ground of the being of the person. However, from a phenomenological point of view, the line between organs and tools cannot simply be drawn by determining what is inside and outside the physiological borders of the organism. We have, from the beginning of history, integrated technological devices (tools) in our being-in-the-world in ways that make them parts of ourselves rather than parts of the world (more organ- than tool-like), and also, more recently, have started to make our organs more tool-like by visualising, moving, manipulating, and controlling them through medical technology. In this paper, Heidegger’s analysis of organ, tool, and world-making is confronted with this development brought about by contemporary medical technology. It is argued that this development has, to a large extent, changed the phenomenology of the organ in making our bodies more similar to machines with parts that have certain functions and that can be exchanged. This development harbours the threat of instrumentalising our bodily being but also the possibility of curing or alleviating suffering brought about by diseases which disturb and destroy the normal functioning of our organs.

  • 298.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Education, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    What is phenomenology of medicine?: Embodiment, illness and being-in-the-world2013In: Health, Illness and Disease: Philosophical Essays / [ed] Havi Carel, Rachel Cooper, Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 299. Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Wittgensteinian perspectives on bioethics2001In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 4, no 1, p. 97-99Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 300.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Södertörn University, School of Culture and Communication, Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge.
    Å bli syk: en studie i tilsykningens fenomenologi2007In: Humanistisk sykdomslære: tanker om diagnoser og sykdom, helse og velvære / [ed] Gunn Engelsrud, Kristin Heggen, Oslo: Universitetsforl. , 2007, p. 42-58Chapter in book (Other academic)
345678 251 - 300 of 353
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • harvard-anglia-ruskin-university
  • apa-old-doi-prefix.csl
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf