Two distinct cases of kin-state relations are examined: that of Russians living in states neighboring Russia and that of Magyars living in states around Hungary. The role of kin-state relations in Europe is studied from a historical perspective and, with reference to Rogers Brubaker's concept of a triadic nexus between nationalizing states, a national minority, and an external homeland. It is argued that the fall of communism – and the fall of several multi-ethnic federations, in particular – revived old territorial conflicts and hostility among national groups both within and between states. The question of kin-state relations is put at the forefront of European minority issues.

Much of the political science literature suggests that a cohesive political community is advantageous, if not a precondition, for a stable democracy. Forging a cohesive community is obviously a more complex matter in a multi-ethnic setting. This article will consider the prospects of building political communities in the Baltic countries – three countries that, to various extents, struggle to balance ethnic pluralism, nation-building and democracy. The article examines the relationship between political community and democracy from a theoretical perspective, followed by an outline of the nation-building strategies taken by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after re-establishing independence in the early 90s. Drawing on survey data, we will use territorial attachment to tap the sense of political community in the three countries. Notably, our figures disclose that most of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia identify themselves as 'Russians', and not at all with the country they reside in. This suggests that the contested issue of citizenship rights in the two countries has not been particularly conducive for creating cohesive political communities. We then move to the political regime and set out to examine the character of regime support in the three countries. Can we envisage solid support for democracy and its institutions in the absence of a cohesive political community? As it appears, regime support is not contingent on territorial identity. Our data disclose that many Baltic inhabitants draw a clear distinction between their own experiences with different political systems and what they perceive as relevant regime options today.

The book is the first systematic and comparative effort to capture political culture in the Baltic countries, including political orientation and support for democracy. Revolving around public opinion data from the 1990s and onwards, including two recent surveys commissioned by the authors, the book takes stock of the political climate prevailing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a quarter of a century after reclaiming independence and fifteen years after becoming members of NATO and the EU. These three countries share the same geopolitical fate and many contemporary challenges, and yet each has been marked by their own transitions and struggles between nation building and European integration, Western and post-Soviet orientations, and past experience and future aspirations.

Drawing on a unique and recent cross-national public opinion survey, the article examines the determinants of regime support and retrospective evaluation of the Soviet era in the Baltic states. The analytical framework encompasses three dimensions: political-ideological nostalgia, performance-driven nostalgia and nationality-driven nostalgia. The analysis demonstrates that nationality is the strongest single predictor for communist rating, but that also support for democratic principles has a clear impact on attitudes towards the Soviet past. Estonia and Latvia are marked by strong ethno-political divisions and the overall trends suggest that these divisions have become more entrenched over the last couple of decades. Meanwhile, the Soviet legacy has become a prominent instrument to restore a sense of community across generations of Russians and a more ideological and political Soviet nostalgia may have taken roots. This is a question of collective identity: to mark distance to the majority population and to justify the presence in the region The findings add to our understanding of political culture and system support in the contemporary Baltic states, as well to our knowledge of the salience of identity and memory in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

The Baltic presidents have in common that they are supposed to embody the ‘nation’ and provide an image of their countries abroad. But can the president embody the people if ‘the people’ itself is divided? In this article, we will focus on public trust in the presidency between the majority and minority population in the Baltic states. Drawing on public opinion surveys, the aim is to examine the determinants of public trust in the presidential institution and support for the performance and principles of the political system as well identification with the political community itself. Among our findings, we conclude that ethnic or linguistic identity explains trust to a considerable degree, which suggests that trust is not only an expression of specific political support, but also part of a more deep-seated, diffuse support.

Drawing on public opinion surveys conducted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2014–2015, the chapter updates the empirical basis of contemporary studies of public opinion and ethnic divides in the Baltic states. By contrasting political orientations among the ethnic majority populations to corresponding attitudes among the Russian-speaking minorities, the chapter demonstrates clear, albeit unsystematic cross-national attitudinal differences when it comes to regime performance and support for democracy. Inter-ethnic differences are also evident when it comes to external threats: the Baltic majority and minority populations perceive Russia in very different ways.

Baltic Barometer 2014. Public opinion data: representative samples of the adult population in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, including the Russian-speaking and Polish minorities.

The dataset provides important information about the mood in the three Baltic countries almost 25 years after the restoration of their independence and 10 years after their accession as full members of the European Union. It covers attitudes towards the past, current events and to some extent hopes for the future.

Representative samples of populations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This is our follow-up survey (from 2014) in the three Baltic countries but without additional sampling of their respective Russian speaking minorities. Special focus is on the handling of the covid pandemic in the Baltic countries, but the survey also covers attitudes towards the EU, migration, democracy, and Russia against the backdrop of its aggression in Ukraine.

Public opinion data. Surveys were carried out in representative samples of inhabitants between 15 and 74 in the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Questions include trust in political institutions, support for democracy, attitudes to immigrants and refugees, attitudes to socioeconomic conditions.

Opinion data from Hungary, Bulgaria and Latvia (including the Russian-speaking minority).

This survey focuses on relations with and attitudes towards Russia in three East European countries with a record of close ties with Russia – Latvia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The survey was carried out against the backdrop of Russia´s annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. It may be the very first survey to tap East European reactions to Russia’s drastic attempt to redraw the map of post-war Eastern Europe. The 2015 Post-Crimea Survey asks many of the key questions in the Baltic Barometer questions about identity, democracy, and the European Union (Baltic Barometer 2014).