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  • 1.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Auditing and compliance in public procurement – an empirical assessment2023In: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, Vol. 23, no 2, p. 125-144Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose: This study aims to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of government auditing of local authorities’ compliance with the procurement rules.

    Design/methodology/approach: A diff-in-diff approach is used where the measure of compliance is (changes in) the incidence of private litigation under the Public Procurement Act, in audited vs non-audited municipalities. Further, semi-structured interviews were conducted with chief procurement officials.

    Findings: No statistically significant effect is found. While strong effects of audits can be ruled out, the statistical results and the interviews do not, however, contradict a modest but long-lasting effect.

    Originality/value: Few studies have addressed the effect of public procurement auditing on compliance. This study develops an empirical framework and presents empirical results.

  • 2.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Dimensionering av högre utbildning – vem är det egentligen som styr?2023Report (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Fredén, Annika
    Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
    Collegiality and efficiency in bureaucracy2022In: Public Policy and Administration, ISSN 0952-0767, E-ISSN 1749-4192, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 492-511Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the relation between the design of regulatory agencies and efficiency, arguing that authority concentrated to a single individual outperforms more collegial decision-making when the regulated firms' interests are aligned. The tentative explanation is that concentrated leadership reduces the risk for capture. This argument is developed from an empirical case on the markets for mobile and fixed broadband. In the mobile market, the regulated firms are similarly positioned, whereas in the fixed broadband market, the firms typically have adversarial positions, with an incumbent being challenged by entrants. A statistical analysis of regulatory agencies in 33 European countries lends support to the argument that regulation of mobile broadband benefits from having a single decision-maker whereas a bureaucratic regulation with more collegiality functions as well for the fixed broadband.

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  • 4.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    E-handeln förändrar staden2021In: Att göra stad i Stockholms urbana periferi / [ed] Malin Gawell; Apostolis Papakostas, Stockholm: Stockholmia förlag, 2021, p. 385-394Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholms universitet, Sverige.
    Housing prices, construction costs and competition in the construction sector – a Swedish perspective2021In: Nordic Housing Markets and Policies: Nordic Economic Policy Review 2021 / [ed] Peter Englund; Harry Flam, Copenhagen: Nordisk ministerråd, 2021, p. 81-113Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, J.
    Umeå University.
    Lundberg, S.
    Umeå University.
    Stake, Johan Y.
    The Swedish Post and Telecom AuthorityStockholm.
    Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging2020In: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0889-938X, E-ISSN 1573-7160, Vol. 56, no 1, p. 107-130Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literatures can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.

  • 7.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Coate, Malcom B.
    Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington D.C., USA.
    Mai Thi Van, Anh
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Ulrick, Shawn W.
    Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington D.C., USA.
    Does Merger Policy Converge After the 2004 European Union Reform?2019In: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, ISSN 1744-6414, E-ISSN 1744-6422, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 664-689Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.

  • 8.
    Granlund, David
    et al.
    Umeå University.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Price competition in pharmaceuticals - Evidence from 1303 Swedish markets.2018In: Journal of Health Economics, ISSN 0167-6296, E-ISSN 1879-1646, Vol. 61, p. 1-12Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the short- and long-term price effects of the number of competing firms, using panel-data on 1303 distinct pharmaceutical markets for 78 months within a reference-price system. We use actual transaction prices in an institutional setting with little scope for non-price competition and where simultaneity problems can be addressed effectively. In the long term, the price of generics is found to decrease by 81% when the number of firms selling generics with the same strength, form and similar package size is increased from 1 to 10. Nearly only competition at this fine-grained level matters; the effect of firms selling other products with the same active substance, but with different package size, form, or strength, is only a tenths as large. Half of the price reductions take place immediately and 70% within three months. Also, prices of originals are found to react to competition, but far less and much slower.

  • 9.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Felländer, Anna
    KTH.
    Åsbrink, Erik
    Handelns betydelse: då, nu och i framtiden2017Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
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  • 10.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Granlund, D.
    Umeå University, Sweden.
    Rudholm, N.
    HUI Research, Sweden ; Dalarna University, Sweden.
    Squeezing the Last Drop Out of Your Suppliers: An Empirical Study of Market-Based Purchasing Policies for Generic Pharmaceuticals2017In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, ISSN 0305-9049, E-ISSN 1468-0084, Vol. 79, no 6, p. 969-996Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the effect of the degree of exclusivity for the lowest bidder on the average price of generic pharmaceuticals in the short and long terms. Our results indicate that a 1-percentage-point gain in market share of the lowest bidder reduces average costs by 0.2% in the short term and 0.8% in the long term, but also reduces the number of firms by 1%. We find that reducing the number of firms has a strong positive (and hence counteracting) effect on average prices, a 1% reduction raising prices by approximately 1%.

  • 11.
    Lundberg, S.
    et al.
    Umeå universitet.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain2017In: International Journal of Public Sector Management, ISSN 0951-3558, E-ISSN 1758-6666, Vol. 30, no 4, p. 310-327Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyze how local and central authorities choose between lowest price and more complex scoring rules when they design supplier-selection mechanisms for public procurements. Five hypotheses are tested: a high level of cost uncertainty and highly non-verifiable quality makes the use of the lowest-price supplier-selection method less likely. Organizational habits and transaction-cost considerations influence the choice of mechanism. Strong quality concerns make complex rules more likely. Design/methodology/approach: The analysis departures from normative theory (rational choice) and is based on the regression analysis and survey data comprising a gross sample of 40 contracting authorities and detailed information about 651 procurements. Findings: More complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality. Authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partly driven by local habits and institutional inertia. Practical implications: The authors argue that, from a normative point of view, lowest price is an adequate method when the degree of uncertainty is low, for example, because the procured products are standardized and since quality can be verified. When there is significant cost uncertainty, it is better to use the so-called economically most advantageous tender (EMAT) method. (Preferably this should be done by assigning monetary values to different quality levels.) If there is significant uncertainty concerning delivered quality, the contracting authority should retain a degree of discretion, so as to be able to reward good-quality performance in observable but non-verifiable quality dimensions; options to extend the contract and subjective assessments of quality are two possibilities. The main findings are that EMAT and more complex scoring rules are used more often when the contracting authorities report that they experience substantial uncertainty concerning delivered quality and actual costs and that these factors tend to decrease the weight given to price, in line with the predictions. However, the authors also find that this result is mainly driven by variations between authorities, rather than by between-products variation for the same authority. This is from a training of professionals and regulation perspective of policy relevance. Social implications: Contract allocation based on habits rather than rational ground could implicate the waste of resources (tax payers money) as it adventures the matching of the preferences of the public sector (the objective, subject matter, of the procurement) and what the potential supplier offers in its tender. Originality/value: Although the principles for supplier selection are regulated by law they give the contracting authority substantial freedom in designing the scoring rule and in choosing what quality criteria to use. The tension between different objectives and the more general question whether the choices made by authorities reflect rational decision making or institutional inertia together motivate the current study. While the design of the supplier-selection mechanism is an important consideration in procurement practice, it has attracted relatively little attention from the academic community.

  • 12.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Johansson, P.
    Uppsala University.
    Lundberg, S.
    Umeå University.
    Spagnolo, G.
    Stockholm School of Economics / University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, Italy.
    Privatization and quality: Evidence from elderly care in Sweden2016In: Journal of Health Economics, ISSN 0167-6296, E-ISSN 1879-1646, Vol. 49, p. 109-119Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates. © 2016

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  • 13.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics. HUI Research.
    Granlund, D.
    Umeå University.
    Rudholm, N.
    HUI Research / Dalarna University.
    Reforming the Swedish pharmaceuticals market: consequences for costs per defined daily dose2016In: International Journal of Health Economics and Management, ISSN 2199-9023, E-ISSN 2199-9031, Vol. 16, no 3, p. 201-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2009 and 2010, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. One of the stated policy goals was to achieve low costs for pharmaceutical products dispensed in Sweden. We use price and sales data for off-patent brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals to estimate a log-linear regression model, allowing us to assess how the policy changes affected the cost per defined daily dose. The estimated effect is an 18 % cost reduction per defined daily dose at the retail level and a 34 % reduction in the prices at the wholesale level (pharmacies’ purchase prices). The empirical results suggest that the cost reductions were caused by the introduction of a price cap, an obligation to dispense the lowest-cost generic substitute available in the whole Swedish market, and the introduction of well-defined exchange groups. The reforms thus reduced the cost per defined daily dose for consumers while being advantageous also for the pharmacies, who saw their retail margins increase. However, pharmaceutical firms supplying off-patent pharmaceuticals experienced a clear reduction in the price received for their products.

  • 14. Carlsson, Kenny
    et al.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Konkurrenslagen: en kommentar2015 (ed. 2)Book (Other academic)
  • 15.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Jordahl, Henrik
    Institutet för näringslivsforskning.
    Goda år på ålderns höst?: En ESO-rapport om konkurrens i äldreomsorgen2014Report (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    Högskolan Dalarna.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå universitet.
    Reforming the Swedish pharmaceuticals market: Consequences for costs per defineddaily dose2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2009, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. One of the stated policygoals was to achieve low costs for pharmaceutical products dispensed in Sweden.

    Prices and sales data for off-patent brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals have beencollected, and a log-linear regression model was used to estimate how the policy changes affected thecost per defined daily dose.

    The estimated effect is a 19 percent cost reduction per defined daily dose at the retail leveland a 35 percent reduction in the prices at the wholesale level (pharmacies' purchase prices). Theempirical results suggest that half of the retail-level price reduction is due to the introduction of a pricecap for products going off patent and half is due to other components of the reform. Measured at thewholesale level the latter effect is larger than the former.

    The reforms reduced the cost per defined daily dose for consumers while beingadvantageous also for the pharmacies, who saw their retail margins increase due to the reform.However, pharmaceutical firms supplying off-patent pharmaceuticals experienced a clear reduction inthe price received for their products.

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  • 17.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Svensk marknads- och konkurrenspolitik2014In: Marknad och politik / [ed] Lars Hultkrantz och Hans Tson Söderström, Lund: Studentlitteratur , 2014, 11.[omarb.], p. 253-289Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet.
    Tendering Design when Price and Quality Is Uncertain: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Departing from a simple normative theory for the choice between lowest price, highest quality (beauty contest) and more complex scoring rules, we empirically investigate the behavior of local and central authorities. We survey a gross sample of 40 contracting entities about perceived key characteristics of products bought in 651 public procurements and collect data on supplier selection methods for these procurements. We compare actual scoring rules with theoretical norms and analyze what product characteristics make deviation from the norm more or less likely. In addition, a control group of 275 authorities was surveyed about similar but hypothetical procurements. We find that more complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality, in accordance with our hypotheses. However, authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partially driven by local habits or institutional inertia.

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  • 19.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Umeå University.
    Sourcing for government goods and services: Theory and evidence from Swedish Cities and Municipalities2013In: Charting a Course in Public Procurement Innovation and Knowledge Sharing / [ed] Gian Luigi Albano, Keith F. Snider and Khi V. Thai, Boca Raton, Florida: PrAcademics Press , 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Departing from a simple normative theory for the choice between lowest price, highest quality (beauty contest) and more complex scoring rules, we empirically investigate the behavior of cities and authorities. We survey a gross sample of 40 procuring entities about perceived key characteristics of products bought in 650 public procurements and collect data on award methods for these procurements. We compare actual scoring rules against the theoretical norms and analyze what product characteristics make deviation from the norm more or less likely. In addition, a control group of 100 authorities was surveyed about similar but hypothetical procurements. We find that more complex scoring rules are used more often when framework agreements are procured and less so when the procuring authority reports that they experience significant uncertainty about the delivered quality. Low weight given to price in the bid award process is associated with low perceived uncertainty concerning delivered quality.

  • 20.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå University.
    Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement2013In: Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, ISSN 1478-4092, E-ISSN 1873-6505, Vol. 19, no 2, p. 73-83Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality, lowest price is the preferable supplier selection method, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.

  • 21.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Upphandling och kundval av välfärdstjänster: en teoribakgrund2013Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Upphandling och kundval av välfärdstjänster och hur dessa bör utformas diskuteras utifrån ett teoretiskt och generellt ekonomiskt perspektiv, med fokus på entreprenader. Insikter ger den nationalekonomiska forskningen om hur upphandling och kundval kan förväntas fungera på marknader som dessa sammanfattas. Metoder för val av leverantör och kontraktsmodeller som är mer ändamålsenliga än andra beskrivs. Valet mellan upphandling och kundval diskuteras.

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    Upphandling och kundval
  • 22.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics. HUI Research.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå universitet / HUI Research.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    Högskolan Dalarna / HUI Research.
    Apoteksmarknadens omreglering: Effekter på följsamhet, priser och kostnader per dygnsdos2012Report (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet.
    Giancarlo, Spagnolo
    Handelshögskolan.
    Public Procurement and Non-contractible Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Many quality dimensions are hard to contract upon and are at risk of degradation when the service is procured rather than produced in-house. On the other hand, procurement may foster performance-improving innovation. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden for the 1990-2009 period, including survival rates, our measure of non-contractible quality, and indicators of subjectively perceived quality of service. We estimate the effects of municipalities’ decision to procure rather than produce in-house on non-contractible quality using a difference-in-difference approach and controlling for a number of other potential determinants. The results indicate that procurement significantly increases non-contractible quality as measured by survival rate, reduces the cost per resident but does not affect subjectively perceived quality.

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  • 24.
    Nilsson, Jan-Eric
    et al.
    VTI.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Mendell, Svante
    VTI.
    Nyström, Johan
    Pyddokke, Roger
    VTI.
    På spaning efter den innovativa myndigheten2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Regeringen har högt ställda ambitioner vad gäller produktivitetsutveckling och nytänkande i offentlig sektor. Man vill bland annat stärka innovationsbenägenheten för att få ut mer av de resurser som idag förbrukas och den vägen möta en del av de krav på ökade resurser som ställs. Genom att granska styrningen i offentlig sektor visar vi i denna uppsats att dagens myndigheter har mycket svaga incitament att bidra till en sådan vidareutveckling av verksamheten. Den omvandling som offentlig sektor genomgått under de senaste 30 åren, med en successivt ökad användning av kommersiella företag för tjänsteleverans, ger emellertid goda möjligheter att förändra detta förhållande. Eftersom det av flera skäl är svårt att tro att sådana förändringar kan tillkomma i en nerifrån-och-uppprocess menar vi att man måste ta politiskt ansvar för att få till stånd en förändring. En central komponent i detta är att komplettera dagens ekonomiska uppföljning, som i stor utsträckning säkerställer att aggregerade anslag används på det sätt som riksdagen avsett, med en uppföljning baserad på de projekt och andra verksamheter som upphandlas. De avtal som tecknas och de utbetalningar som görs mot dessa avtal ger mycket goda förutsättningar för att förbättra förståelsen av kostnadsutvecklingen och att förbättra styrningen i riktning mot att pröva nya lösningar

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  • 25.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    Högskolan Dalarna / HUI Research.
    Apoteksmarknadens omreglering: Effekter på följsamhet och priser2011Report (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Johansson, Per
    Foreign ownership and investment: do firms locate investments close to the headquarter?2011In: Review of World Economics, ISSN 1610-2878, E-ISSN 1610-2886, Vol. 147, no 4, p. 621-642Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using an international panel data set of the European pulp and paper industry, we address the issue of a possible home-bias effect for real investments in plants with foreign and domestic locations. We find that there is no effect after controlling for firm effects and plant and firm size. These findings are rubust to a number of different econometric specifications, including a difference-in-difference approach. Our findings appear to be relevant for the debate on the effect of foreign takeovers. As far as we are aware, home-bias effects in real investments within multinational firms have not been studied previously.

  • 27.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Nilsson, Jan-Eric
    VTI.
    Hur genomförs upphandlingar i Sverige?: Resultat från en stickprovsundersökning2011In: På jakt efter den goda affären: Analys och erfarenhetar av den offentliga upphandlingen, Stockholm: Regeringskansliet , 2011, p. 367-375Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Konkurrens- och regleringspolitik i Sverige2011In: Marknad och politik / [ed] Lars Hultkrantz, Hans Tson Söderström, Stockholm: SNS förlag , 2011, 9. uppl., p. 256-290Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Coate, Malcolm B.
    Jakobsson, Maria
    Ulrick, Shawn W.
    Merger Control in the European Union and The United States: Just the Facts2011In: European Competition Journal, ISSN 1744-1056, E-ISSN 1757-8396, Vol. 7, no 1, p. 89-125Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account for less than 10%, and potential competition matters for around 5%, of in-depth merger investigations in both jurisdictions, while purely conglomerate mergers are extremely rare or non-existent. The share of collusion investigations falls over time in both jurisdictions. However, the US relies on collusion theory more than three times as often as the EU, where over 80% of the horizontal cases address dominance. Across both regimes, roughly one eighth of all recent horizontal investigations have been analysed as non-dominance unilateral-effects cases. Only minor differences in the average probability of a merger being challenged are observed when controlling for market share. The 2004 EU reforms seem to be leading towards at least some convergence of enforcement policy.

  • 30.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Idén, Tobias
    Lundgren, Sofia
    Madell, Tom
    Offentlig upphandling: på rätt sätt och rätt pris2011Book (Other academic)
  • 31.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Tender Evaluation and Award Methodologies in Public Procurement2011Report (Other academic)
  • 32.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Stennek, Johan
    Bättre spelregler på apoteksmarknaden2010In: Förberedelsearbetet i apoteksreformen, Stockholm: Riksrevisionen , 2010, , p. 126p. -126Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Coate, Malcolm
    Jakobsson, Maria
    Ulrick, Shawn
    Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States2010In: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0889-938X, E-ISSN 1573-7160, Vol. 36, no 4, p. 305-331Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 34.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Stake, Johan Y.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Sundelin, Hans Christian
    Samordnade ramavtal: en empirisk undersökning2010Report (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Att utvärdera anbud: utvärderingsmodeller i teori och praktik2009Report (Other academic)
  • 36.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Guibourg, Gabriela
    Segendorf, Björn
    Card and cash payments from a social perspective in Sweden2009In: Evolving payment habits: proceedings of the Bank of Finland Payment Habits Seminar 2008 / [ed] Harry Leinonen, Helsinki: Suomen Pankk , 2009, p. 21-42Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 37. Henriksson, Lars
    et al.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Fridensköld, Emilie
    Stennek, Johan
    En ny ransonerings- och prisregleringslag: slutbetänkande2009Report (Other academic)
  • 38. Henriksson, Lars
    et al.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Fridensköld, Emilie
    Stennek, Johan
    Ransonering och prisreglering i krig och fred: delbetänkande2009Report (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Guibourg, Gabriela
    Segendorf, Björn
    Card and cash payments from a social perspective2008In: Economic review, ISSN 2001-029X, no 2, p. 42-59Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Competition in Services or Infrastructure-based Competition?: A Review of the Regulatory Schemes2008In: Infrastructure versus service-based competition: the case of mobile telecommunications / [ed] Laurent Benzoni, Patrice Geoffron, Martin Cave, Paris: Quantifica publishing , 2008, p. 17-32Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 41.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Offentlig upphandling och offentliga inköp: omfattning och sammansättning2008Report (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement2008In: De Economist, ISSN 0013-063X, E-ISSN 1572-9982, Vol. 156, no 4, p. 387-409Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 43.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Guibourg, Gabriela
    Segendorf, Björn
    The costs of paying: private and social costs of cash and card payments2007Report (Other academic)
  • 44.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Stennek, Johan
    TV-Distribution in Sweden: Is It Competitive?2007Report (Other academic)
  • 45. Bergman, Mats
    The pros and cons of information sharing2006Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 46.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    A Welfare Ranking of Two-Sided Market Regimes2005Report (Other academic)
  • 47. Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Jakobsson, Maria
    Razo, Carlos
    An econometric analysis of the European Commission’s Merger Decisions2005In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0167-7187, E-ISSN 1873-7986, Vol. 23, no 9/10, p. 717-737Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 48. Nilsson, Jan-Eric
    et al.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Political Science, Economics and Law, Economics.
    Pyddyke, Roger
    Den svåra beställarrollen: om konkurrensutsättning och upphandling i offentlig sektor2005Book (Other academic)
  • 49. Bergman, Mats
    Ekonomisk expertgrupp förordar effektanalys2005In: Konkurrensnytt, ISSN 1404-7217, no 6, p. 4-5Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 50.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University College, School of Social Sciences, Economics.
    Kunderna betalar inte kartellböter2005In: Dagens industri, ISSN 0346-640X, no 2 marsArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
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