Upphandling och kundval av välfärdstjänster och hur dessa bör utformas diskuteras utifrån ett teoretiskt och generellt ekonomiskt perspektiv, med fokus på entreprenader. Insikter ger den nationalekonomiska forskningen om hur upphandling och kundval kan förväntas fungera på marknader som dessa sammanfattas. Metoder för val av leverantör och kontraktsmodeller som är mer ändamålsenliga än andra beskrivs. Valet mellan upphandling och kundval diskuteras.

Purpose: This study aims to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of government auditing of local authorities’ compliance with the procurement rules.

Design/methodology/approach: A diff-in-diff approach is used where the measure of compliance is (changes in) the incidence of private litigation under the Public Procurement Act, in audited vs non-audited municipalities. Further, semi-structured interviews were conducted with chief procurement officials.

Findings: No statistically significant effect is found. While strong effects of audits can be ruled out, the statistical results and the interviews do not, however, contradict a modest but long-lasting effect.

Originality/value: Few studies have addressed the effect of public procurement auditing on compliance. This study develops an empirical framework and presents empirical results.

According to the essential-facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the "Bronner criterion", proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when a symmetric infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in low-risk mature markets.

The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.

In 2009 and 2010, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. One of the stated policy goals was to achieve low costs for pharmaceutical products dispensed in Sweden. We use price and sales data for off-patent brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals to estimate a log-linear regression model, allowing us to assess how the policy changes affected the cost per defined daily dose. The estimated effect is an 18 % cost reduction per defined daily dose at the retail level and a 34 % reduction in the prices at the wholesale level (pharmacies’ purchase prices). The empirical results suggest that the cost reductions were caused by the introduction of a price cap, an obligation to dispense the lowest-cost generic substitute available in the whole Swedish market, and the introduction of well-defined exchange groups. The reforms thus reduced the cost per defined daily dose for consumers while being advantageous also for the pharmacies, who saw their retail margins increase. However, pharmaceutical firms supplying off-patent pharmaceuticals experienced a clear reduction in the price received for their products.

We study the effect of the degree of exclusivity for the lowest bidder on the average price of generic pharmaceuticals in the short and long terms. Our results indicate that a 1-percentage-point gain in market share of the lowest bidder reduces average costs by 0.2% in the short term and 0.8% in the long term, but also reduces the number of firms by 1%. We find that reducing the number of firms has a strong positive (and hence counteracting) effect on average prices, a 1% reduction raising prices by approximately 1%.

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates. © 2016

Using an international panel data set of the European pulp and paper industry, we address the issue of a possible home-bias effect for real investments in plants with foreign and domestic locations. We find that there is no effect after controlling for firm effects and plant and firm size. These findings are rubust to a number of different econometric specifications, including a difference-in-difference approach. Our findings appear to be relevant for the debate on the effect of foreign takeovers. As far as we are aware, home-bias effects in real investments within multinational firms have not been studied previously.

We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literatures can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.

The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality, lowest price is the preferable supplier selection method, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.

Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account for less than 10%, and potential competition matters for around 5%, of in-depth merger investigations in both jurisdictions, while purely conglomerate mergers are extremely rare or non-existent. The share of collusion investigations falls over time in both jurisdictions. However, the US relies on collusion theory more than three times as often as the EU, where over 80% of the horizontal cases address dominance. Across both regimes, roughly one eighth of all recent horizontal investigations have been analysed as non-dominance unilateral-effects cases. Only minor differences in the average probability of a merger being challenged are observed when controlling for market share. The 2004 EU reforms seem to be leading towards at least some convergence of enforcement policy.

This article addresses the relation between the design of regulatory agencies and efficiency, arguing that authority concentrated to a single individual outperforms more collegial decision-making when the regulated firms' interests are aligned. The tentative explanation is that concentrated leadership reduces the risk for capture. This argument is developed from an empirical case on the markets for mobile and fixed broadband. In the mobile market, the regulated firms are similarly positioned, whereas in the fixed broadband market, the firms typically have adversarial positions, with an incumbent being challenged by entrants. A statistical analysis of regulatory agencies in 33 European countries lends support to the argument that regulation of mobile broadband benefits from having a single decision-maker whereas a bureaucratic regulation with more collegiality functions as well for the fixed broadband.