In this article, we examine the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). Recent research points to when and why they are likely to occur, but these explanations are pitched at aggregate level, and they are less satisfying when applied to our particular cases. Rather than institutional or party-system features, we concentrate on the parties themselves – a level of analysis that raises theoretical and methodological challenges, which we discuss. Empirically, we investigate two cases of PEC in 2005–2006. One involved three Norwegian left-of-centre parties, the other involved four Swedish right-of-centre parties; both marked major departures from established behavioural patterns. We suggest certain conditions that may be necessary for a PEC to be formed. In particular, we argue that ‘decisive’ parties must prioritize office at the moment of decision, and that this preference order may be induced by some sort of environmental or intra-party stimulus.
This article examines the institutional arrangements between Social Democratic parties and trade unions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. First, the authors show how these relations have weakened at a varying pace. Party–union ties are now quite distant in Denmark, but remain relatively close in Norway and, especially, Sweden. Second, the authors explore this variation using a simple model of political exchange. The finding is that the intensity of the relationship is correlated with the resources that each side can derive from the other, which in turn reflects national differences. Yet it is also clear that the degree of change is related to the formative phase of the institutional arrangement itself: the weaker the ties were from the beginning, the more easily they unravel in response to environmental changes.
In this essay, we examine the introduction of three points for a win in senior football, a reform that eventually became universally adopted. We have two objectives. First, we seek to answer the question of whether the effect of the new system has justified its proliferation. The second objective is to present a methodological discussion about how to measure this effect, which involves judgments that many would say are entirely subjective and which, at best, are hard to operationalize - a problem that is not unusual in social science. We measure the ’excitingness’ of football through constructing an index of two distinct features of any match. We then apply the index to our data by combining quantitative analysis with strategic case-selection. Our preliminary findings are that three points for a win does seem to boost football’s excitingness, but that the improvement takes four to five years to take full effect.
This article addresses political-party organization in Estonia, especially candidate selection. Its first objective is to describe the ways in which the main parties chose their candidates before the 2011 parliamentary election. A second objective is to evaluate those procedures in light of expectations generated by established theory. The focus is on two conditions: the institutional framework, particularly the electoral system, and the relative youth of Estonian democracy. The evidence confirms these expectations only partially, which suggests that an individual party’s ideological, organizational and strategic circumstances, in addition to structural and institutional conditions, are critical to understanding why it performs this basic function as it does.
Well-known theories of party organization and behaviour suggest that the mass parties of Western Europe have evolved into new models, with more powerful and autonomous leaderships and weaker memberships and collateral organizations. However, these theories have not really been tested in in-depth case studies - particularly beyond the national level of the parties. This article examines the mass party par excellence, the Swedish Social Democratic Party and focuses on the party’s traditionally close relationship with the blue-collar trade unions. There is evidence to support the theories of party change, but these organizational developments are patchy at the local level. Moreover, various data deployed in support of the theories may be understating the enduring influence of collateral organizations within parties.
Sweden’s referendum on whether to join EMU produced an emphatic No. The murder of one of the Yes side’s leading representatives thus appeared not to have affected the result. Cleavages exposed in the referendum on EU membership nine years previously were even more apparent this time; yet No-voters were also to found across the political, regional and social spectrums. As well as describing the campaign and explaining the outcome, this article focuses on the campaign strategies adopted by parties and other actors. Lessons from previous campaigns had been learned by the opponents of EMU, but largely forgotten by its supporters.
The issue of European integration has disrupted party politics in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in various ways. This article assesses the impact of internal division over Europe within certain parties, and these parties’ responses to it. It is argued that party leaderships have increasingly attempted to compartmentalize the different arenas in which they operate, and to isolate potentially damaging European questions in quarantined areas. This can be observed in, for example, party leaders’ resort to referendums to decide contentious EU-related matters, the suspension of party discipline when such matters are debated and the careful sequencing of different party goals. The experiences of the Scandinavian social democratic parties are examined as comparative cases. Finally, some hypotheses that might inform further research are suggested, and some wider consequences of these strategies of compartmentalization are discussed.
Political parties are essential for parliamentary democracy, the form of government that prevails in most European states. But how have parties adapted to modern society – not least a new layer of political decision-making in the EU? Should we talk of a crisis of party democracy?
This book reports the findings of a comparative survey of parties in four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland and Sweden, all EU member states; and Norway, which remains outside the Union. Using original data, it explores how power is exercised within party organisations and their respective parliamentary groups.
Within an analytical framework that envisages a party as a series of delegation relationships, the book illuminates how leaders are chosen, how election candidates are selected, how manifestos are written – and how a party's various elements are co-ordinated. For all the challenges posed by multi-level governance, parties retain much of their capacity for making democracy work.
In the Swedish parliamentary election of 7 September 2018, the biggest parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderates, both lost votes compared to their scores in the previous election, but not as many as they had feared. Commensurately, the radical-right challenger party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), which had seemed certain to profit from Sweden's dramatic experience of the European migration crisis, did well, but not as well as it had hoped. The result left the array of parliamentary forces fragmented and finely balanced. Only after months of negotiations could a government be formed. Eventually, the incumbent coalition received a renewed parliamentary mandate. At the same time, the party system was transformed.
The question of how party leaders are selected has recently, and belatedly, come under systematic comparative scrutiny. If it is the location of intra-party power that interests us, however, it might be that some of the more observable indicators in such processes, such as the identity of the selectorate, are not actually the most revealing ones. Using a delegation perspective, we thus present a framework for analysing prior steps in leader selection and relate it to various ideal-typical constellations of intra-party power. The framework encompasses, first, what we call precursory delegation, with focus especially on an agent that, formally or informally, manages the selection process before it reaches the selectorate. Second, the framework takes account of the degree to which the process is managed rather than left open to free competition between leader candidates. We illustrate the framework primarily with instances of leader selection in two Swedish parties.
The parliamentary election of 14 September 2014 induced decidedly mixed feelings in the Swedish Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna). It led to the ejection of the centre-right government and the installation, for the first time, of Green cabinet ministers. However, the party also experienced a small but unexpected loss of votes compared to its score in the previous election. Moreover, partly because a far-right party built impressively on its breakthrough into the national parliament in 2010, the new government rests on a precariously narrow parliamentary base.
Are right-wing populist parties fundamentally diff erent from other types? Th is article exploresone aspect of what we call the exceptionalist thesis. Th e thesis could be applied to a wide rangeof party characteristics, but here we focus on leadership. In this context, our case study is of theSweden Democrats (SD). First, we examine how SD selects its leader. Second, we assess how leadershipworks in practice in SD, especially regarding party management. We also review how thisleadership style has gone down with voters. We mix our own interpretation of these data withother scholars’ assessments. Generally, we fi nd little evidence, at least in this exploratory inquiry,to support the exceptionalist thesis.
The likely effects of the ongoing process of European integration on the internal workings of national political parties have hitherto attracted surprisingly little attention in comparative research. This conceptual article discusses how the increasing relevance of European-level decision making may have changed the balance of power within national political parties. It identifies two groups of party actors who are most likely to benefit from the process of Europeanisation of national political parties. First, the ‘executive bias’ of European Union (EU) decision making is likely to work in favour of party elites in general. However, while they may gain power in intra-party decision making, their control over the national policy agenda is likely to become increasingly eroded through a general shift of policy control to the European level. Second, EU specialists (i.e., those who specialise in EU affairs) are likely to have more access to resources and more control over policy decisions within national parties because of the growing importance of European integration. These propositions are discussed in detail and are then assessed with reference to the main findings from a major empirical study of the topic.