This article presents survey results on Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians' perceptions concerning their influence over domestic decision making in European Union (EU) matters. In the literature the parliaments in Sweden and Finland are classified as powerful ones that can exert considerable influence over domestic EU policy making. Moreover, Finland and Sweden joined the EU at the same time. Therefore the overall expectation is that the parliaments should be equally powerful. However, the results from this survey indicate a significant difference in perceived influence between the two parliaments. It is obvious that Swedish parliamentarians perceive themselves as more marginalised in relation to the government than Finnish parliamentarians. After trying different explanations, it is concluded that the differences can be ascribed to the parliaments' different organisational set-ups for government oversight.

Why does the radical right care so much about animals? In this study, we argue that the salience of animal advocacy within the radical right can be explained by its compatibility with these parties’ broader ideological framework. By analysing official documents from the radical right party the Sweden Democrats, we find that its animal advocacy is shaped by an ideological core consisting of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The SD argues, for example, that immigrants are more violent towards animals; that animal cruelty must be strongly punished; and that mistreatment of animals is contrary to the moral intuitions of ‘the people’. Rather than only being used instrumentally to denigrate the cultural practices of immigrants, however, the policies reflect a broader commitment to animal well-being. Still, they differ from the egalitarian and rights-based agenda of ‘animalist’ parties, promoting as they do a paternalistic animal-welfare agenda where compassion is owed to animals not because they are our equals, but rather because they are dependent on us. The findings improve our understanding of the radical right ideology and of how ethical principles in the animal-rights debate are integrated into broader ideological frameworks and translated into party policy.

How well do the policies of the Nordic radical right parties represent the preferences of their voters? This chapter addresses this question by matching the positions of radical right parties and their voters on a number of key issues. Going beyond aggregate dimensions such as left/right or GAL/TAN, the analysis focuses on specific policies related to the ideological core features of the radical right – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – as well as to the environment and the economy. The results show that the radical right parties in the Nordic region provide voters with a unique policy package: they are more strongly opposed to immigration than are the parties from other party families, and they combine this position with an anti-European Union (EU) stance. However, in their cultural conservatism, their opposition to environmental protection, and their authoritarian stance on gay rights and civil liberties, the Nordic radical right parties are less representative of their voters.

In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR parties’ core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters’ preferences in terms of their opposition to immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the dimensionality of political competition.

This chapter analyses the government participation of the Nordic radical right parties. Why, for example, were most of the parties excluded from government cooperation for many years following their entry into their respective parliament? Why have some of the parties joined government coalitions as full cabinet members, while others have opted to remain parliamentary support parties? And why did two of the parties choose to leave the government in between elections? Drawing on theories of coalition formation, of party behaviour, and of mainstream-party reactions to the radical right, this chapter traces the transition of the Nordic radical right from opposition to power. The chapter shows that, although size and policy are factors of fundamental importance, we also need to consider party strategy if we are to explain the variation in government participation by radical right parties in the Nordic region.

This study compares members of political youth organisations and explains variations in material incentives for enrolment using both organisation-level and individual-level factors. Empirically, it is based on a web survey of about 3,000 members of eight Swedish youth organisations. The analysis shows that young people have a complex combination of concerns, with the main dividing line being whether or not material incentives are important. At the organisational level, the prevalence of material incentives among members is positively related to the size of the mother party and whether it has government experience. Further, we find a positive association between material incentives and economic dependence on the part of the youth organisation on its mother party. At the individual level, we find that members who see the main role of the youth organisation as being to provide support for the mother party and for those politically aligned with it are more likely to have material motives for their enrolment.

This study investigates how members of party youth wings perceive their respective youth wings and identifies areas they believe require improvement. Empirically, the study surveys the youth wings of eight Swedish political parties, exploring members' experiences using open-ended questions. The findings confirm that political and social aspects hold greater importance for youth wing members compared to material benefits. Additionally, the analysis reveals how members view the youth wing as a transformative community fostering personal growth, self-exploration and the development of values. Notably, the youth wing is seen as a community unified by shared values, with a collective vision for the world and a focus on collaborative efforts to realize that vision. Challenges include expectations set by the mother party, such as campaigning and career aspirations, and negative perceptions of the competitive political landscape, citing conflicts and factionalism.

Historically, populist radical-right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region have been reluctant, or openly hostile, to extend rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people. The chapter maps and compares how the four parties – SD, DF, PS, and FrP – have positioned themselves on LGBTQ issues from the late 1990s until 2023. The analysis shows that all four parties have opposed gay partnership laws, same-sex marriage, and adoption rights for gay couples. Since the 2010s, the PRR parties have repositioned. They retain most of their positions, but they do not seek to actively repeal same-sex marriage legislation and adoption rights. Instead, they have increasingly profiled themselves in homonationalist ways – i.e., as protectors of LGBTQ rights against supposedly homophobic Others, especially immigrants from Muslim countries. The parties have been more reluctant on trans issues, as an essentialist view on gender differences has generally guided the parties’ policies.

This chapter introduces the developments of and research on political actors called populist in the Nordic countries. The focus is on contemporary populist right-wing parties – the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, and the Norwegian Progress Party – though we discuss the history of Nordic populist parties on a more general level as well. Nordic research on populism has for the most part adopted political scientific, ideational, and empirical perspectives lacking genuine theoretical considerations. However, contextual differences can be found, and sociological and cultural approaches to studying populism have been promoted of late. The perspective on populism in media and communication studies has concentrated especially on the political communication of populist actors and the relationship between the media and populism. The future challenges for Nordic populism studies are linked to changing media and political environments, requiring a new look at their relationship.

Overall, the Nordic populist radical right (PRR) parties now connect more transnationally than they did some decades ago. They have emerged as institutionalized and relevant political actors within their party systems and – except for the Norwegian Progress Party – increasingly interact bilaterally as well as multilaterally within the Nordic Council and the EU. Based on unique data from autobiographies of current and previous party leaders, interviews with key party politicians and officials, as well as a complete set of party magazines published since the late 1990s, the chapter explores whether the process of parties becoming more institutionalized and influential has been facilitated by the transnational linkages. More specifically, the chapter investigates whether a PRR party in one country has contributed to the success of a PRR party in another country by (a) providing economic and human resources; (b) serving as a role model in terms of ideology, organization, and strategy; and/or (c) facilitating processes of becoming an acceptable party. The chapter finds that there are both direct and indirect cross-national diffusion effects in relation to these three aspects.

Surplus majority government is the most frequent type of cabinet in postwar Finland. The case study investigates the explicative power of two groups of theories of surplus majority government on the Finnish rainbow coalition formed in 1995. Firstly, theories that model surplus size as instrumental for government capability, i.e. surplus size as critical to decision-making capability, Secondly, theories that model the surplus size as a possibility or where the size is the result of the expected utility of government being higher than that of opposition for the political parties in terms of goal realisation. The main materials studied are internal party documentation and interviews with key people. The result of the study is that parties' strategic features best explain the surplus size of the rainbow coalition, since participation in government offers greater opportunities for the realisation of party goals, such as policy, votes and future office.

Agrarian-based populism has an almost uninterrupted presence in Finnish politics. Its various manifestations are analysed in this chapter. The main focus is on party-based agrarian populism: the Finnish Rural Party (1959-1995) and its successor party, the True Finns (from 1995 onwards). The endurance of populism in Finland, apart from its organisation, is due to both continuity in relation to its main appeal – its anti-establishment position, the rhetorical construction of a united and threatened ‘people’, and the restoration of popular sovereignty – and transformations to the contextual references of these core populist ideas. The party that started as an agrarian populist party for rural smallholders is today a populist radical right-wing party, with nationalism, expressed in anti-immigration and anti-EU positions, becoming more salient and more radical for the True Finns. It is concluded that a process of radicalisation took place, which was key to their electoral breakthrough in 2011.

This chapter summarises the findings of the book. The populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region share fundamental ideological characteristics with the European radical right. Migration and EU-scepticism are the most salient issues for the parties and their voters. However, while the combination of nativism and authoritarianism with liberal economic positions initially was hypothetized as the winning formula, the present PRR parties in the Nordic region have held and continue to hold centrist socio-economist positions, with some exceptions. By staking out unique policy positions in their opposition to immigration and the European Union in the Nordic political systems, these parties have carved out and met a voter demand. They have accepted the so-called Nordic welfare model, as well as parts of the gender equality model, and gradually come to defend some of the liberal values related to gender equality and LGBTQ-rights. The voters of the Nordic PRR parties are similar to radical right voters elsewhere in Europe: The majority are men; they are lower educated than and less satisfied with the way democracy works. Centre-right parties have included the PRR parties as full members in, or support parties to, government.

The Nordic states – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland 1 – have provided fertile terrain for populism, which is understood here as a ‘thin’ ideology ‘that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – “the pure people” versus the “corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale’ (Mudde 2004: 543). Populism embraces an anti-establishment position and an idea of two homogenous groups that stand in an antagonistic relationship to one another: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. As an ‘empty container’, the ‘people’ can refer to the citizens (demos), ‘our people’ (ethnos) and the ‘ordinary people’ (the ‘common man’) (Canovan 1999). This thin-centred ideology can and ultimately must combine with other ideologies to develop into electorally attractive alternatives. Historically, populism has manifested itself in and married with different, ‘fuller’ ideologies. Consequently, populism can be left- and right-wing – and even agrarian populism.

I rapporten kartläggs erfarenheterna av det reformerade folkinitiativet från det att det trädde i kraft i januari 2011 fram till januari 2020. I rapporten behandlas bland annat vilka frågor som är vanligast att folkomrösta om, hur högt valdeltagandet är och folkomröstningarnas genomslag.

Mainstream party reactions to the rise and persistence of populism have been rather peculiar in Finland. Contrary to other countries in Western Europe, where mainstream political parties have increasingly opened the door to cooperation with previously isolated populist parties, the Finnish case is about the mainstream moving from cooperation to the isolation of populist competitors. Indeed, soon after its parliamentary breakthrough in 2011, The Finns Party (PS), a populist radical right party, was involved in negotiations for the formation of the executive. Only after a brief period of governmental collaboration between 2015 and 2017, did mainstream centre-right parties turn to a marginalization strategy. This chapter assesses the causes and effects of the PS’s success. In particular, it considers how the party impacted on the dimensions of party competition and how mainstream parties responded to its challenge by adopting more ‘libertarian’ or ‘authoritarian’ positions. The chapter also includes a section focusing on how the PS interacted with a new populist party, Blue Reform (SIN), which was formed after its split in 2017.