The following essay aims to investigate Martin Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in Being and Time by taking into account the therein neglected existential-ontological aspect of birth. The point of departure is the concept of grundsein, i.e. Dasein being handed over itself as itself, groundlessly, with the remaining task of becoming its own basis from which it is able to properly project itself. In Being and Time this is made possible by actively grasping and appropriating ones ’ownmost possibility’ of being-towards-death. The present investigation however, raises the question whether or not Daseins other fundamental limit of being, namely birth, which in Being and Time is continuously disregarded, can provide a different understanding of grundsein; complementing the existing analysis by giving Dasein a more thorough framing. As for the proposed supplementing theory, the essay first turns to the concept of natality as it is developed in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition. Thereafter it traces the notion of birth as it unfolds in the work Relating Narratives by the contemporary Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero, who thematically remains close to Arendt, although not without some crucial differences. With that in mind, the essay finally returns to Heidegger for a critical exploration of the theories opposed. 

The present investigation aims to show that these theories of birth does in fact offer insights that are foreign to, albeit not irreconcilable with, the framework of Being and Time. Especially regarding that of mitsein, coexistence, which nonetheless also have inevitable consequences for the question of grundsein. By taking birth into consideration existentially, this essay seeks to shed light on what can be considered fundamentally relational aspects of Dasein as it is shown to be constitutively in-front-of, and a being-from-others. Furthermore there is shown to be an aspect of passive reception to Dasein, more specifically the non-negotiable gift of existence at all which unceasingly remains out of it’s reach; that is, arguably, somewhat overlooked in Being and Time (even though the concepts of thrownness and historicity may indicate such a condition). Lastly the author wishes to embed the existential-ontological matter of birth in the pressing planetary crisis of our time, asserting that the question of (human) birth and existence no longer can afford to ignore these biological-ecological aspects that are undeniably of due importance for the question at hand.

In this paper, I attempt to understand how Merleau-Ponty views the relation between nature and reflection, as well as the meaning behind the terms “human” and “animal” and the relations between them. I approach this by outlining the transition from Merleau-Ponty’s early philosophy (SB, PP) to his late philosophy (N, VI). Roughly understood as the shift from inquiries into the nature of experience to inquiries into the experience of nature. I show that this shift or turn can be understood in terms of a reconsideration of the nature of experience, which opens toward non-human animal reflection; to the simultaneous kinship and estrangement in animal interspecificity.

The paper is divided into three parts: In the first part, oriented around Phenomenology of Perception, I outline the grounding of reflection in the co-natural corporeity of perception. In the second part, I present the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s turn to nature through his reading of Schelling. What becomes visible here is his reversal of method following his turn to nature. Essentially, this reversal of method tempts a reconsideration of reflection: reflection is no longer separated from nature, but a fold within nature itself; a dehiscence of the flesh opening a “mirroring reflexive” within nature itself as nature’s self-reflection, exemplified through the sensing-sensible human body. In the third part, the same reversal of method is considered in relation to animality. I contrast Merleau-Ponty’s account of life and animality in his second course on nature against his views in The Structure of Behavior. Consequently, his account of the grounding of reflection in the corporeity of perception is deepened and his ontology of sensing-sensible is further clarified. In the last sections of the third part, I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human-animal relation, I then briefly discuss his account of painting as a privileged form of ontological expression, and I finally speculate openly about the alterity of other animals and the possibility of animal philosophies.

In this paper I examine how Merleau-Ponty develops Husserl’s genetic phenomenology through an elaboration of language, largely influenced by Saussure’s linguistics. Specifically, my focus will be on the unpublished notes to the course Sur le problème de la parole (On the Problem of Speech). I show how Merleau-Ponty recasts Husserl’s notion of the historicity of truth by means of an inquiry into the relation between truth and its linguistic expression. The account that Merleau-Ponty offers differs from Husserl’s in two important respects. Firstly, whereas Husserl describes a regressive inquiry of truth, Merleau-Ponty describes a regressive movement of truth, where every acquired truth seizes the tradition that precedes it. Secondly, this new notion of truth, and its dependency on its proper expression, opens up for a new understanding of literature.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relation between literary expression and experience in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. The principal focus is Merleau-Ponty’s investigations into literature, in two of his first courses at Collège de France, 1953- 1954: Sur le problème de la parole (On the Problem of Speech) and Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage (Research on the Literary Use of Language). While the former remains unpublished, the latter was finally published in 2013. At the time of his premature death, Merleau-Ponty left thousands of pages of working notes. They were supposed to contribute to a major philosophical work, the planned title of which was Être et monde (Being and world). Merleau-Ponty had planned to undertake an extensive examination of language in the last part of the work. However, in the absence of this text, the courses on literary language afford us the possibility of sketching the direction that this research might have taken.

The examination of literary language use is, for Merleau-Ponty, made possible by an understanding of language found in Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics. Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Saussurean linguistics anticipates the structuralist reading that was later to dominate the intellectual scene. Instead of reading the linguistics of Saussure in opposition to phenomenology, he finds in the former an ally that allows him to think Husserlian phenomenology further.

In the course notes, Merleau-Ponty explores the relation between sensible experience and linguistic expressions through close readings of Proust, Valéry and Stendhal. In the writing of Marcel Proust, he finds a writer that perpetually examines his experience, searching for expressions that are capable of bringing it forth. In Stendhal’s writing, Merleau-Ponty finds a literary method that makes the world appear through the “small true facts” that describe it. Finally, in Paul Valéry’s poetic writing he finds a writer superimposing words over other words, in order to create new significations. In their literary writing he finds a capacity to seize the world anew, beyond our habitual preconceptions of it, thus bringing us closer to the experience we already perceive.

The purpose of this thesis is to emphasize the significance of narrative in giving voice to survivors of gender-based violence, and in breaking the silence surrounding this issue – matters that statistical reports tend to overlook. The voices of survivors of gender-based violence are often disregarded or not heard in statistical reports, despite their significance for understanding and addressing it. Therefore, I seek to deepen our understanding of the consequences of gender-based violence by reading survivors’ narratives alongside a number of philosophical thinkers who are not typically read together, but whose work can contribute to a better understanding of the violence itself and the narration that arises in its wake, namely Adriana Cavarero, Susan J. Brison, Kelly Oliver, and María Lugones. 

By applying several philosophical concepts to listen to what the narratives of the victims express, I also intend to contextualize them within a larger societal framework, to better understand the impact of gender-based violence. I will be drawing from Susan Brison’s concept aftermath, Adriana Cavarero’s discussion of relating narratives, horrorism, and narrative against destruction, as well as María Lugones’s concept “world”-travelling. The narratives I engage tend to convey that gaslighting is a significant aspect of the abuse, which is why I choose to analyze it with reference to Kelly Oliver’s work. 

My hope is that my thesis will complement and enrich the quantitative and statistical approach represented by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions. I prioritize the voices of survivors, allowing their narratives to guide the discourse. This approach, influenced by Cavarero, emphasizes the importance of centering the experiences of those directly affected by violence, and by listening to their stories I want to increase awareness and understanding of the violence perpetrated against them. In the face of what Cavarero calls ontological violence, it becomes important to start listening to the voices of the survivors, as they need to be heard. I also aim to initiate societal debates and actions that can lead to change and support for those affected by gender-based violence.

In contrast to the constantly increasing surveillance of the streets of cities, Jane Jacobs’ theory of the ‘eyes on the street’ offers a theory of a positive form of surveillance and these eyes can thus perhaps take on the role of a counterforce to problematic forms of surveillance. To examine under what conditions Jacobs could help formulate such a counterforce is the main aim in this article. But for this purpose, certain obstacles need to be addressed, for instance, the usage of Jacobs’ theory in the field of CPTED. What in Jacobs’ theory makes it vulnerable to this kind of usage? In order for Jacobs’ street-eyes to avoid becoming a prolonged arm for state surveillance, this article suggests a critical reading of Jacobs’ thinking in relation to Foucault’s surveillance-critique, ultimately with the aim to strengthen her eyes on the street. 

The concepts and phenomena of civil society, political economy and labour are ambivalent matters in Hegel’s political philosophy. They simultaneously contain productive and destructive potential in the realization of the political community. This article investigates Hegel’s concept of labour against the backdrop of his theory of civil society in order to bring forth the ambiguous role of labour in relation to the ’capitalism’ of civil society. According to Hegel, labour is both economically productive and the activity by which the society and its members can transcend the mere capitalistic dimensions of society. Labour can therefore simultaneously be understood as capitalistic and non-capitalistic in Hegel’s political philosophy. The cultivating dimensions of labour in Hegel’s theory offer a counterpart to the mere capitalistic forms of labour. Labour can therefore be used as a promising platform for the discussion of the relation between economy and culture and for the revitalization of capitalism critique.

Minima city är en uppgörelse med staden i tre kapitel. Utifra n en rad filosofer och författare ställs fra gan om stadens situation och framtid. Trots att mörka utveck­lingslinjer och en urholkning av stadens vitalitet är tydligt erfar­bara söker sig boken fram till en minimal optimism: kanske skul­le det trots allt kunna finnas en öppning för en möjlig levande stad?

Since Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch in the 1920s, Hegelian Marxism has played a prominent role as a radical intellectual tradition in modern political theory. This anthology investigates how these Hegelian Marxists, in different historical, political and intellectual contexts during the last century, have employed Hegel’s philosophy with the aim of developing and renewing Marxist theory.

Besides Lukács and Korsch the volume includes articles dealing with the thoughts of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Evald Ilyenkov, Lucio Colletti and Slavoj Žižek. The overall purpose is to investigate if, and the degree to which, these thinkers could be interpreted as Hegelian Marxists, and how they use the Hegelian philosophy to better understand their own current society as well as situate themselves in relation to orthodox forms of Marxism. Taken together, the articles can hopefully contribute to an intensification of discussions about the critical and self-criticalphilosophy of Marxism today.

From its inception, Critical Theory was a project that not only intended to study modern society, but also to change it. Today, with almost a century passed, the term has acquired a life of its own and is used across the intellectual field, institutionally as well geographically.

Thus, to ask about the past, present, and future of Critical Theory means opening it up and exposing it to new influences. This is a consequence of the claim that theory is not outside history, but must always respond to a changing present grasped in its contradictions and opened up towards other possibilities; a process that involves a constant reappraisal of what Critical Theory is today.

This essay seeks to understand Hannah Arendt’s notion of the political as an “in-between.” The in-between appears to be the intersubjectivity and relations of interaction in a public sphere, which Arendt suggests as a way of understanding the political as an end in itself. Judith Butler has distinguished Arendt’s notion of the political as essentially relational, but which dismisses the material interdependence as a precondition to political participation. This essay argues that Arendt's notion of the political must be seen in context of her critique of modernity in which the public sphere is dominated by economic terms, “the social”. This essay provides a background for this critique, and how Arendt's distinction between the political and "the social" can be understood. The result is a politics separated from economics, but in which we can stress the question of intersubjectivity at its core. The conclusion is that Arendt certainly recognizes material interdependence as a precondition for politics, but the political in Arendtentian terms insist on a political commonality beyond any common ground, for which the in-between and the relation can emerge as the (non)essence.

The focus of this essay is to examine and reconstruct one of Theodor Adorno's most enigmatic philosophical concepts – the notion of mimesis. Mimesis is a fundamental pole in language, relating to imitation and mimicry. It plays an important role in all of Adorno's writings, although it is rarely if ever defined rigorously as a concept. In this essay I will develop an analysis of the mimetic that traces Adornos use of the concept in two of his major works: The Dialectic of Enlightenment and Aesthetic Theory. Adorno relates the question of mimesis to the dichotomy of nature and culture, it manifests as a mediating link between the two. Mimesis is a central trait in all culture in the sense that it is the means by which humans explain their position in the world they inhabit. By mimicking the world around them, the dangers of this world becomes intelligible and, ultimately, exploitable in human affairs. In this sense the spheres of nature and culture are revealed as an interconnected whole within the mimetic logic of identification. This reading of mimesis marks in a broader sense the ontological status that Adorno ascribes to aesthetics: the mimetic is at the same time an element of linguistic ontology and a thoroughly aesthetical notion. This essay will explore this reading of mimesis and develop the notion within the framework of the nature/culture dichotomy, focusing on Adorno's theory of prehistoric mimesis in ancient society and modern mimesis in radical art. The mimetic pole is central to the workings of the new and the unknown in the aesthetic sphere and it is a crucial element in Adorno's theory of modern aesthetics. A study of Adorno's notion of mimesis has a potential to illustrate the significance he attributes to aesthetics overall. Through the mimetic element inherent in art, aesthetics becomes more than just a field of experience, it marks a central element in all human conduct.

In 1985, the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard curated “Les Immatériaux” at Centre Georges Pompidou. Though widely misunderstood at the time, the exhibition marked a “curatorial turn” in critical theory. Through its experimental layout and hybrid presentation of objects, technologies, and ideas, this pioneering exploration of virtuality reflected on the exhibition as a medium of communication, and anticipated a deeper engagement with immersive and digital space in both art and theory. In Spacing Philosophy, Daniel Birnbaum and Sven-Olov Wallenstein analyze the significance and logic of Lyotard’s exhibition while contextualizing it in the history of exhibition practices, the philosophical tradition, and Lyotard’s own work on aesthetics and phenomenology. “Les Immatériaux” can thus be seen as a culmination and materialization of a life’s work as well as a primer for the many thought-exhibitions produced in the following decades.

This essay examines the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, the ultimate ground of philosophy is the infinite self-positing activity of the I. However, this self-positing activity must have as its product a determined I, and therefore it must establish a limit to the I’s original infinity. Further, such a limit is only thinkable as a relation to that which lies beyond it: the negation of the I, or the not-I.

By this characterization of the nature of the I, Fichte establishes it as a paradoxical concept that is at once infinite and finite. To solve this paradox, he introduces the concept of a “check” (Anstoβ) that puts a halt to the outward-striving activity of the I. In experiencing this check, the I is not limited by something outside of itself, which would negate its position as the ultimate ground of its own being, but rather is given the task of positing its own limit.

In Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte develops this idea through another concept: that of a “summons” (Aufforderung) given to the I by another subject. Since the I is characterized by containing the ground of its own being, the intersubjective relation to the other is conditioned by the I limiting itself, so that the self-grounding character of the other can be recognized. In experiencing the summons of the other, though, the I does not only posit a limit for itself, but also becomes conscious of its own nature as a free, self-positing subject. Intersubjectivity, therefore, must be considered a fundamental element of the I as such. In Fichte’s own words: “No I, no Thou; no Thou, no I.”

In a famous passage in Ideas I, Husserl claims that the pure consciousness is to be understood as independent of anything apart from itself in order to constitute itself, and that it therefore is able exist without a world at all. This notion seems to be contradicted in many of Husserl’s other works as well as stand in conflict with the core of phenomenology itself as a descriptive science of intentional consciousness. Three years before the publication of Ideas I, Husserl held a series of lectures that were later published with the title The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Here, in stark contrast to Ideas I, the inquiry culminates in stepping beyond the subject as self-given and immanent by instead focusing on intersbjectivity and phenomenological time-consciousness. This essay sets out to examine the relation between the transcendental subject in these two works. It is argued that, while the phenomenological epoché indeed establishes a subject that is prior to the world in the sense that it does not need to suppose the world to guarantee its own existence, Husserl’s philosophical project in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology shows the importance of going beyond such an immanent subject to uncover the full phenomenological field. 

For phenomenology, subjective experience is essential, as is the relationship with the other. But despite these central themes, the relationship between bodies is not primary focus. Philosophical understanding of bodily encounter is lacking. It is for this reason I have put Maurice Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with psychoanalyst and paediatrician Donald Winnicott who claims that the meeting between bodies is vital. Merleau-Ponty talks about the body's relationship with the other based on an intentional act of the subject. How the body comes into being with the world. Winnicott talks about the subject as continually developing through the interaction of bodies where the intention is expressed somewhat differently. He argues that it ́s not always the child's intention that matters. Winnicott also claims that my own body has not always had the experience of being a separate body. There is a phase in development where the child is a subjectobject as he puts it. With no border between the other. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the formation of subjectivity. The thesis contribution is a complement to philosophical understanding of subject-construction with the desire to point toward the responsibility of the body who has come further in life.

In this paper I argue that there is an affinity between the `dissident' in Havel's essay " The Power of the Powerless" and the `spectre' in Derrida's readings of Marx. Both are manifestations of a specific modern temporality that Derrida calls "disjointed", because it is haunted by a revolutionary force and claim for justice. Both also evoke the weak messianic power inherent in Walter Benjamin's historiography and the spectral responsibility recognised by this power, that is, our responsibility for past and future generations. In post-totalitarian Czechoslovakia, the "nonpolitical" dissident community prefigured the renewal of moral experiences of responsibility and solidarity. In contemporary discussions of democracy, the figure of the spectre is a reminder of the significance of the Marxist legacy beyond its ideological doctrine.

Literature has a central place in Hannah Arendt’s writings. In particular, scholars continually discuss the implications of storytelling to her theory of action. This paper takes a different approach by drawing attention to an early literary essay, ”Rilke’s Duino Elegies”, which Arendt co-authored with Günther Stern (later Anders) in 1930. The paper locates the essay in the early twentieth century intellectual response to the ”break in tradition”, arguing that the construction of a poetics dramatized in the Duino Elegies is crucial for judging the originality of Arendt’s philosophical methodology, and the ontological significance of her poetic conception of praise. In this conception, meaning is to be found in things as they appear to human beings capable of using the language designating them poetically. I present my interpretation of the Arendt-Stern essay by contrasting it with Heidegger’s comment on the eighth Elegy from 1942-43 and Blanchot’s reading of Rilke from 1955.

In this essay I make a comprehensive presentation of Après la finitude by Quentin Meillassoux. The basic concepts of the book are introduced and the main lines of arguments are exposed. The focus lies on the relationship between science and philosophy, understood on the basis of a presumed conflict between on the one hand what Meillassoux calls the ancestral statements of science and on the other what he calls the correlationism of modern philosophy. Finally, I discuss the response of two prominent scholars of continental philosophy, Martin Hägglund and Catherine Malabou, to the ideas developed in Après la finitude, and thustry to assess Meillassoux’s contributionto contemporary philosophy

“Becoming one” with the horse is often understood as a romantic ideal. In this article, we want to explore in which ways human beings and horses in riding can be understood as one body. By means of the phenomenological tradition different aspects of the centaur’s embodiment are analysed. It is argued that the centaur is a merged unit that finds its movements, directions, time, and bodily contours through “pactive” movements, atmospheres, and habits. In this way, it is possible to train the ability to merge into new units. Centaurs do exist. 

This anthology takes its starting point in the conviction that a phenomenologyof pregnancy could play an important role in contemporary thought. Stating this is also an acknowledgment that it doesn’t play such a role—yet. The aim of this anthology is to contribute to making philosophical reflectionon pregnancy a greater part of the discussions to come.

The fundamental and irreducible experience of carrying a child and bringing forth new life from one’s own body is in this anthology subjected to careful analyses that specifically, though not exclusively, draw on female experiences. In this way the crucial role of a phenomenology of pregnancy for contemporary thought is investigated. Exploring the phenomenon of pregnancy not just as a biological process, but also as a problem of lived bodily meaning, the contributions investigate a wide array of experiences that engage the limits of human life, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and ethics, but also opens important methodological perspectives on the relation transcendental phenomenology and empirical research.

The idea of a limit of reason, a measure that defines reason and that it must not overstep, has been a constitutive part of philosophy since its beginnings in Greek thought. Placing itself in opposition to the madness of hubris, the excesses of tragedy, and the stories of religion and myth, philosophy expels its others just as much as it thrives on them. It begins and ends at the limit; it is drawn towards its outside, and exists as a perpetual attempt to find a line of demarcation that always ends up passing through its interior.

The present collection analyzes the phenomenon of limit and excess, through readings that range from tragedy and Greek thought, through early Christianity and the Renaissance, to modern phenomenology and philosophy of language.

This thesis argues, contrary to Gilles Deleuze’s critique of method and disavowal of textuality, that there is a re-constructive textual method at work in Deleuze’s 1968 treatise Différence et répétition. It is a method not for interpretation, representation, or deconstruction but for prolonging and reactivating historical and contemporary texts into the present and for the future. It is demonstrated how Deleuze’s method synthesises temporally and thematically heterogeneous texts and make them resonate with each other. The analysis is conducted, first, through a notion of telling stories as a complementary device to Deleuze’s definition of philosophy as the creation of concepts. Second, by showing how Deleuze – instead of offering solutions – connects, develops, and repeats problems from which the new is drawn. Third, by discussing his positive and re-constructive concept of critique and by arguing that his use of free indirect discourse should be understood as a metaphysical and political tool. Finally, by claiming that Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity can be viewed as a synthetic and methodological device that brings a heterogeneous given together. In concluding, it is proposed that Deleuze draws on tools and technics developed in literature and mathematics, specifically differential calculus and geometry, to develop methods for philosophy. Studying Deleuze’s method in Différence et répétition not only offers a prism for throwing new light on Deleuze’s philosophy through his understudied methodology, but also contributes to the development of innovative philosophically inspired methods for re-constructing the present. In addition, this study shows that while Deleuze pushed continental philosophy beyond its hermeneutic, structuralist, and existentialist heritage, he also contributed to the development of novel methodologies. (For a copy of the full text, do not hesitate to contact me: emet.brulin[at]gmail.com)