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Tendering Design when Price and Quality Is Uncertain: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement
Södertörn University, School of Social Sciences, Economics.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5026-9479
Umeå universitet.
2014 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Departing from a simple normative theory for the choice between lowest price, highest quality (beauty contest) and more complex scoring rules, we empirically investigate the behavior of local and central authorities. We survey a gross sample of 40 contracting entities about perceived key characteristics of products bought in 651 public procurements and collect data on supplier selection methods for these procurements. We compare actual scoring rules with theoretical norms and analyze what product characteristics make deviation from the norm more or less likely. In addition, a control group of 275 authorities was surveyed about similar but hypothetical procurements. We find that more complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality, in accordance with our hypotheses. However, authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partially driven by local habits or institutional inertia.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2014. , 38 p.
Series
Umeå Economic Studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 895
Keyword [en]
Auctions, Contracting, Habit behavior, Moral hazard, Scoring rules, Supplier selection
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Politics, Economy and the Organization of Society
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-25755OAI: oai:DiVA.org:sh-25755DiVA: diva2:777836
Available from: 2015-01-09 Created: 2015-01-09 Last updated: 2016-09-19Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(978 kB)93 downloads
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File name FULLTEXT02.pdfFile size 978 kBChecksum SHA-512
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Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Other links

http://www.usbe.umu.se/enheter/econ/ues/ues895/

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf