Sweden has been one of the major providers of development aid to Third World countries, measured in per cent of the gross national income (GNI). Since the mid-1970s the country has always surpassed the 0.7 per cent goal propagated by the United Nations and sometimes exceeded the own, more ambitious goal of one per cent. The paper examines a variety of explanations for this extraordinary donor behavior and concludes that it may best be explained by ideological and strategic considerations made public by Swedish decision makers on both the national and the global level. Development aid has been an investment in international prestige and influence and, during the Cold War, also a marker of Swedish non-alignment in security policy matters. At the same time, the consonance of having a comprehensive domestic welfare system alongside the idea that international assistance should be given to those in need has given the country a consistent image. Domestically, development aid has been an issue that created an opportunity for social democrats to characterize the centre-right parties as divided on a foreign policy issue.