This thesis considers the epistemological value of the image as it occurs in the Platonic corpus. By implication of the theory of forms, the sensible world is often depicted throughout the dialogues as of inferior ontological weight as compared to the forms themselves. As an image is a body that at the same time is meant to represent a form, it is caught in the middle of these ontological poles. Given this, an understanding of the image grants insight to the possible bridging of these two spheres. The further consideration that images are a creation of man begs the question if something like a philosophical image, understood as the representation of something true, is considered as a possibility within Plato's thought. This thesis delves into this question, trying to understand how the image – something considered a lesser reality – can convey knowledge of a greater reality.

The text argues for a consistent view of the image across the dialogues. By showing that all production (poiēsis) in the dialogues is fundamentally tied to an epistemic position, images are ascertained as infused with either truth or falsehood. These distinctions are distributed in the differing notions of images used by Plato; notably phantasma and eikōn, making an epistemology of the image intelligible. Of the two the eikōn is singled out as the epistemologically beneficial image due to its analogical function. Developing this point further, this text argues that this sort of image can be considered as a form of original work (erga) as they equally serve as a proportionate rendition of a vision of the real forms. By the idea of an icon as an original work the appropriate philosophical image is reconsidered as the image of virtue (agalmata aretē). This notion of the image of the gods (agalma), which is most notably used in the depiction of Socrates at the end of the Symposium, finally provides an example which meets the criteria of knowledge to be found throughout the dialogues.