In standard philosophical classifications of feelings, bodily pain is not considered an emotion, since it does not contain any beliefs or judgments about the world in the way that emotions do (Goldie 2000). I am mad, sad, afraid, or happy about something (not) being the case, but when I find myself in pain this intentional structure is not present. Pain is therefore classified as a pre-intentional feeling, which makes (a part of) the body appear in a specific (painful) way, which does not, however, have a proper meaning content. Bodily sensations can be of the negative sort—pains, itches, feelings of being too hot or cold—or of the positive sort—tickles, feelings of bodily comfort or orgasms—but they do not carry any cognitive content beyond this perceived painfulness or pleasantness of the body (parts).

Phenomenology has the potential of improving upon such narrow conceptions of pain by showing how it is a peculiar and many-faced form of embodied experience. To be in pain is not only to perceive parts of one’s body in a certain way but also to feel how the perceived world changes in structure and content. Accordingly, pain can be explored and understood as an embodied mood; a way of finding oneself in the world that typically leads to certain emotions of the negative type: frustration, irritation, anger, fear, sadness, self-pity or even loss of hope and trust in others (Kusch and Ratcliffe forthcoming; Svenaeus 2015, 2017, chapter 2). Such emotions, that typically occur if pain is intense and long lasting, display beliefs about the situation of the pain sufferer that are nurtured by the bodily affliction.