This essay is an examination of the examples in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. The examples which I have focused on all converge in an idea of wildness. These examples of the beautiful are illuminated by a culture-historical perspective, where the literary and scientific travelogue genre is of great importance. Apart from being exegetic and culture historical, my method is also analytic. The general ambition is to answer the question; what is the parrot doing in the third Critique and what makes it a better example of a free beauty than a jackdaw? Taking as point of departure Jacques Derrida’s notion of parergonality, the example is primarily understood as formative for the thesis, not only as illustrative. By analysing Kant’s use of the wild, exotic and colourful objects as examples the essay intends to show how imagination and understanding operates in the beautiful. The parrot thus corresponds with the role of imagination in its relation to understanding in aesthetic judgement. The examples manifest the strength of the imagination and how it dominates understanding through its wildness. The aim is to present a way to approach the restful contemplation that Kant ascribes to the mind in the experience of the beautiful as bearer of a movement with considerable importance. Rodolphe Gasché’s emphasis on the wild examples as a precognitive minimum for understanding and Hannah Arendt’s view on imagination as an ability of intuition without the presence of the object, have also been essential for my argument.