Most environmental problems are extremely long term and have cross-border implications. For environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) to achieve significant impact on environmental governance cross-border and sustained activities are required. The purpose of the paper is to identify key barriers and possible pathways to develop sustained and transnationalenvironmental activism among ENGOs operating in strikingly different political contexts.  

Our analysis is based on qualitative methodology and empirical analyses of ENGOs in six countries (Sweden, Germany, Poland, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia) and two regional contexts, the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea regions. The study is based on document analyses and semi-structured interviews with representatives from 4-6 key ENGOs in each country. The theoretical framework departs primarily from social movement theory.

The paper reveals intriguing similarities and differences between the countries regarding ENGOs' abilities to develop sustained and cross-border activism. We pay particular attention to differences in opportunity structures for resource mobilization. The last decades, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a key opportunity structure that in various ways facilitate cross-border collaboration and capacity building among ENGOs, particularly in Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries. However, the EU also considerably shapes the conditions for ENGOs to set independent long-term agendas. With the exception of Germany and Sweden, ENGOs rely heavily on their ability to develop a "project mind-set", which in turn requires fund-raising skills and procedures. Also ENGOs in Germany and Sweden make use of public grants. However, the fact that they historically have been able to mobilize huge number of members/supporters –which is still extremely difficult particularly in post-communist countries - have profound implications for abilities to develop transnational and sustained environmental activism. We discuss the role of (dis)trust (institutional vs. family-based trust), political culture and historical legacies to analyze these remarkably different conditions for resource mobilization.

A concrete result of the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban (COP17) was the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), with the aim of channelling $100 billion per year from developed countries to developing countries to support their efforts to respond to climate change and promote sustainable development. The emerging global architecture for climate finance raises significant questions related to public policy and environmental governance. Participatory governance practices, including freedom of information, are increasingly considered effective tools for both coping with environmental problems and finding sustainable solutions to development challenges. Moreover, without sufficient transparency in their decision making, the various climate funds are unlikely to attract a sufficient supply of urgently needed finance, and the ambitious targets of the GCF will be unmet. Yet, the question of the modality and process for governing climate finance is undetermined and obscure. The complexity of climate finance stems from a multi-level structure with international, regional, national, and sub-national actors; multi-sector dimensions, with both public and private donors and recipients; and the sector’s global/multilateral/multidirectional character. This article amplifies the “transparency pressure points” in climate finance generally and the GCF specifically. Public policymaking, in response to the many complex and urgent climate change challenges, may depend on securing the principle of freedom of information within the global climate finance architecture.