In this chapter I will attempt to develop a phenomenology of parts of the human body that have been removed from their site of origin but nevertheless preserve their “aliveness.” What happens when human body parts are stored in the medical laboratory and are even being transformed or cultivated there? How are we to view the ontological and ethical status of cells and organs that are being transplanted from one human body to another? Do these body parts preserve some kind of relationship to their source of origin: that is, the person from whom they have been retrieved? Do they belong to the person they originate from and, if so, in what way? What implications does this type of ownership have for ethical analysis? In some cases, at least, would the concept of sharing be more adequate in describing transfer of body parts between persons than the idea of a gift being made?

In this paper, changes in identity and selfhood experienced through organ transplantation are analyzed from a phenomenological point of view. The chief examples are heart and face transplants. Similarities and differences between the examples are fleshed out by way of identifying three layers of selfhood in which the procedures have effects: embodied selfhood, self-reflection, and social-narrative identity. Organ transplantation is tied to processes of alienation in the three layers of selfhood, first and foremost a bodily alienation experienced through illness or injury and in going through and recovering from the operation. However, in cases in which the organ in question is taken to harbor the identity of another person, because of its symbolic qualities (the heart) or its expressive qualities (the face), the alienation process may also involve the otherness of another person making itself, at least imaginatively, known.

Departing from three metaphors—the body as gift, resource, and commodity—the book explores the contemporary exchange of organs, tissues, and cells. Although the gift is the sanctioned metaphor for donating parts of the body, the underlying perspective from the side of states, authorities, and the medical establishment often seems to be that the body shall be understood as a resource. But medicine, as some of the contributors to this book show, is not sealed off from the market economy. Increasingly, therefore, body parts become commodities on legal as well as illegal markets.

The chapters of the book are arranged in a way that presents, one after the other, the three metaphors of the body, starting with the body as gift, proceeding by way of the body as resource, and ending in the body as commodity. Although all three metaphors as ways of conceptualizing and making use of the human body can be found throughout human history, the present drive of commercialization will increasingly force us to identify and scrutinize the way these metaphors are used. Not only in addressing the fascinating question of what kind of an object (subject) the human body is, but also in trying to decipher what interests lurk behind the use of the metaphors in question when claiming that human bodies, organs, tissues, and cells are gifts, resources or commodities. The ambition of this volume is to address and remedy the need of a hermeneutics not only of depth, but also of suspicion, in the case of organ transplantation and other medical technologies involving the transfer of human tissues and cells.