The ideological fit between party grassroots and leaderships has long been a concern for political science, with members in general, and young members in particular, thought to be more radical. However, we do not know, first, whether this is still the case and, if it is, what drives members in different ideological directions. To investigate, we propose a new typology of members as radicals, moderates and aligned, and develop a theoretical framework that accounts for how political socialization and party contexts drive congruence and incongruence. We test this using YOUMEM survey data from over 4,000 members of 12 youth wings in six countries. Our results show that while radicals are the largest group in most youth wings, they are more common on the centre-left than the centre-right. They tend to have been in the youth wing for longer than aligned members, but are under-represented among politically ambitious members. Our findings thus shed light on opinion structures within political parties and provide a typology for future research on intra-party cohesion.

This study investigates how members of party youth wings perceive their respective youth wings and identifies areas they believe require improvement. Empirically, the study surveys the youth wings of eight Swedish political parties, exploring members' experiences using open-ended questions. The findings confirm that political and social aspects hold greater importance for youth wing members compared to material benefits. Additionally, the analysis reveals how members view the youth wing as a transformative community fostering personal growth, self-exploration and the development of values. Notably, the youth wing is seen as a community unified by shared values, with a collective vision for the world and a focus on collaborative efforts to realize that vision. Challenges include expectations set by the mother party, such as campaigning and career aspirations, and negative perceptions of the competitive political landscape, citing conflicts and factionalism.

Why does the radical right care so much about animals? In this study, we argue that the salience of animal advocacy within the radical right can be explained by its compatibility with these parties’ broader ideological framework. By analysing official documents from the radical right party the Sweden Democrats, we find that its animal advocacy is shaped by an ideological core consisting of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The SD argues, for example, that immigrants are more violent towards animals; that animal cruelty must be strongly punished; and that mistreatment of animals is contrary to the moral intuitions of ‘the people’. Rather than only being used instrumentally to denigrate the cultural practices of immigrants, however, the policies reflect a broader commitment to animal well-being. Still, they differ from the egalitarian and rights-based agenda of ‘animalist’ parties, promoting as they do a paternalistic animal-welfare agenda where compassion is owed to animals not because they are our equals, but rather because they are dependent on us. The findings improve our understanding of the radical right ideology and of how ethical principles in the animal-rights debate are integrated into broader ideological frameworks and translated into party policy.

This chapter summarises the findings of the book. The populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region share fundamental ideological characteristics with the European radical right. Migration and EU-scepticism are the most salient issues for the parties and their voters. However, while the combination of nativism and authoritarianism with liberal economic positions initially was hypothetized as the winning formula, the present PRR parties in the Nordic region have held and continue to hold centrist socio-economist positions, with some exceptions. By staking out unique policy positions in their opposition to immigration and the European Union in the Nordic political systems, these parties have carved out and met a voter demand. They have accepted the so-called Nordic welfare model, as well as parts of the gender equality model, and gradually come to defend some of the liberal values related to gender equality and LGBTQ-rights. The voters of the Nordic PRR parties are similar to radical right voters elsewhere in Europe: The majority are men; they are lower educated than and less satisfied with the way democracy works. Centre-right parties have included the PRR parties as full members in, or support parties to, government.

Historically, populist radical-right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region have been reluctant, or openly hostile, to extend rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people. The chapter maps and compares how the four parties – SD, DF, PS, and FrP – have positioned themselves on LGBTQ issues from the late 1990s until 2023. The analysis shows that all four parties have opposed gay partnership laws, same-sex marriage, and adoption rights for gay couples. Since the 2010s, the PRR parties have repositioned. They retain most of their positions, but they do not seek to actively repeal same-sex marriage legislation and adoption rights. Instead, they have increasingly profiled themselves in homonationalist ways – i.e., as protectors of LGBTQ rights against supposedly homophobic Others, especially immigrants from Muslim countries. The parties have been more reluctant on trans issues, as an essentialist view on gender differences has generally guided the parties’ policies.

Youth wings fulfil vital democratic functions. They connect parties with young people, socialise them into political life, and train future candidates and officials. Yet, youth wings have been largely overlooked by party scholars. In this article, we present the Youth Wing Membership Survey (YOUMEM) dataset. With responses from over 5000 members of 12 centre-left and centre-right youth wings in Australia, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, YOUMEM is the largest comparative study of youth wing members ever conducted. Using the dataset, we examine some basic questions about youth wing members: who they are, when and why they join. We find that youth wing members are primarily men and highly educated. Many have relatives who were party members, and most are extremely ambitious compared to senior party members. Beyond these commonalities, we also uncover differences across party families and countries. Our project provides a unique window on the young people in contemporary youth wings.

Despite being frequently portrayed as a consensual, egalitarian and progressive region of Europe, the Nordic region has been a fertile soil for right-wing populism. In fact, the rise and persistence of a new family of populist radical right (PRR) parties is perhaps one of the most significant postwar political developments in this region. Right-wing populism has been around in the Nordic systems since the late 1950s. The chapter distinguishes between two generations of far-right parties in the Nordic region: A first generation of right-wing populists, and a second generation of PRR parties. The chapter maps out the ideological origins and development of the present PRR parties: The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS), the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). The chapter stresses the path-dependent character of their transformation into electorally successful and governmental parties. The themes and the structure of the book are presented.

Migration har sedan början av 2000-talet blivit en allt viktigare politisk fråga i de nordiska länderna Sverige, Finland, Norge och Danmark. På det migrationspolitiska området har de nordiska länderna, i likhet med övriga Europa, infört nya regler och förändrat lagstiftningen. Från olika utgångspunkter har länderna närmat sig varandra vad gäller migrationslagstiftningens utformning (det vill säga asyl-/flyktinginvandring; familjeåterföreningsinvandring; arbetsmarknadsinvandring från utanför EU).

Syftet med denna rapport är att analysera utformningen av lagstiftningen på det migrationspolitiska området i de fyra nordiska länderna Sverige, Danmark, Norge och Finland under perioden 2000 till 2022 (notera att rapporten inte behandlar integration, det vill säga, åtgärder riktade till de personer som erhållit tillstånd att komma in i landet). Rapportens ambition är inte att förklara och etablera orsakssamband mellan olika faktorer, men lagstiftningen på det migrationspolitiska området relateras till ett antal aspekter som lyfts fram i tidigare forskning och utgör grunden för rapportens tre preciserade frågeställningar:

När har populistiska högerradikala partier fått möjlighet att direkt påverka regeringspolitik (antingen via formell regeringsmedverkan eller som stödparti)?

Vilket väljarstöd har de högerradikala partierna haft?

Vilken har invandringens nivå varit?

How well do the policies of the Nordic radical right parties represent the preferences of their voters? This chapter addresses this question by matching the positions of radical right parties and their voters on a number of key issues. Going beyond aggregate dimensions such as left/right or GAL/TAN, the analysis focuses on specific policies related to the ideological core features of the radical right – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – as well as to the environment and the economy. The results show that the radical right parties in the Nordic region provide voters with a unique policy package: they are more strongly opposed to immigration than are the parties from other party families, and they combine this position with an anti-European Union (EU) stance. However, in their cultural conservatism, their opposition to environmental protection, and their authoritarian stance on gay rights and civil liberties, the Nordic radical right parties are less representative of their voters.

The populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region have acted in political systems and societies in which gender equality, from a comparative perspective, has been an important political project. This chapter analyses how the parties have acted in these “gender-friendly” environments and pinpoints the changes in policies that have taken place over time. The predecessor parties of the present PRR parties vehemently opposed the Nordic gender model which was believed to destroy the heteronormative nuclear family. By the beginning of the 2000s, however, the Nordic PRR parties had come to accept these policies as beneficial for balancing working life with family responsibilities. Moreover, they even embraced it as part of the Nordic political identity and as something to take pride in. As such, they have increasingly expressed femonationalist views i.e. that gender equality is an important value that has been achieved in their own countries and that immigrant “foreign” cultures – particularly Islam – are incompatible with this Nordic tradition. While the parties have adapted to mainstream positions within the Nordic gender welfare model, they have consistently opposed affirmative actions such as quotas, public support to gender awareness projects and research.