This study investigates how members of party youth wings perceive their respective youth wings and identifies areas they believe require improvement. Empirically, the study surveys the youth wings of eight Swedish political parties, exploring members' experiences using open-ended questions. The findings confirm that political and social aspects hold greater importance for youth wing members compared to material benefits. Additionally, the analysis reveals how members view the youth wing as a transformative community fostering personal growth, self-exploration and the development of values. Notably, the youth wing is seen as a community unified by shared values, with a collective vision for the world and a focus on collaborative efforts to realize that vision. Challenges include expectations set by the mother party, such as campaigning and career aspirations, and negative perceptions of the competitive political landscape, citing conflicts and factionalism.

This chapter summarises the findings of the book. The populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region share fundamental ideological characteristics with the European radical right. Migration and EU-scepticism are the most salient issues for the parties and their voters. However, while the combination of nativism and authoritarianism with liberal economic positions initially was hypothetized as the winning formula, the present PRR parties in the Nordic region have held and continue to hold centrist socio-economist positions, with some exceptions. By staking out unique policy positions in their opposition to immigration and the European Union in the Nordic political systems, these parties have carved out and met a voter demand. They have accepted the so-called Nordic welfare model, as well as parts of the gender equality model, and gradually come to defend some of the liberal values related to gender equality and LGBTQ-rights. The voters of the Nordic PRR parties are similar to radical right voters elsewhere in Europe: The majority are men; they are lower educated than and less satisfied with the way democracy works. Centre-right parties have included the PRR parties as full members in, or support parties to, government.

Historically, populist radical-right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region have been reluctant, or openly hostile, to extend rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people. The chapter maps and compares how the four parties – SD, DF, PS, and FrP – have positioned themselves on LGBTQ issues from the late 1990s until 2023. The analysis shows that all four parties have opposed gay partnership laws, same-sex marriage, and adoption rights for gay couples. Since the 2010s, the PRR parties have repositioned. They retain most of their positions, but they do not seek to actively repeal same-sex marriage legislation and adoption rights. Instead, they have increasingly profiled themselves in homonationalist ways – i.e., as protectors of LGBTQ rights against supposedly homophobic Others, especially immigrants from Muslim countries. The parties have been more reluctant on trans issues, as an essentialist view on gender differences has generally guided the parties’ policies.

Despite being frequently portrayed as a consensual, egalitarian and progressive region of Europe, the Nordic region has been a fertile soil for right-wing populism. In fact, the rise and persistence of a new family of populist radical right (PRR) parties is perhaps one of the most significant postwar political developments in this region. Right-wing populism has been around in the Nordic systems since the late 1950s. The chapter distinguishes between two generations of far-right parties in the Nordic region: A first generation of right-wing populists, and a second generation of PRR parties. The chapter maps out the ideological origins and development of the present PRR parties: The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS), the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD). The chapter stresses the path-dependent character of their transformation into electorally successful and governmental parties. The themes and the structure of the book are presented.

How well do the policies of the Nordic radical right parties represent the preferences of their voters? This chapter addresses this question by matching the positions of radical right parties and their voters on a number of key issues. Going beyond aggregate dimensions such as left/right or GAL/TAN, the analysis focuses on specific policies related to the ideological core features of the radical right – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – as well as to the environment and the economy. The results show that the radical right parties in the Nordic region provide voters with a unique policy package: they are more strongly opposed to immigration than are the parties from other party families, and they combine this position with an anti-European Union (EU) stance. However, in their cultural conservatism, their opposition to environmental protection, and their authoritarian stance on gay rights and civil liberties, the Nordic radical right parties are less representative of their voters.

The populist radical right (PRR) parties in the Nordic region have acted in political systems and societies in which gender equality, from a comparative perspective, has been an important political project. This chapter analyses how the parties have acted in these “gender-friendly” environments and pinpoints the changes in policies that have taken place over time. The predecessor parties of the present PRR parties vehemently opposed the Nordic gender model which was believed to destroy the heteronormative nuclear family. By the beginning of the 2000s, however, the Nordic PRR parties had come to accept these policies as beneficial for balancing working life with family responsibilities. Moreover, they even embraced it as part of the Nordic political identity and as something to take pride in. As such, they have increasingly expressed femonationalist views i.e. that gender equality is an important value that has been achieved in their own countries and that immigrant “foreign” cultures – particularly Islam – are incompatible with this Nordic tradition. While the parties have adapted to mainstream positions within the Nordic gender welfare model, they have consistently opposed affirmative actions such as quotas, public support to gender awareness projects and research.

This chapter analyses the government participation of the Nordic radical right parties. Why, for example, were most of the parties excluded from government cooperation for many years following their entry into their respective parliament? Why have some of the parties joined government coalitions as full cabinet members, while others have opted to remain parliamentary support parties? And why did two of the parties choose to leave the government in between elections? Drawing on theories of coalition formation, of party behaviour, and of mainstream-party reactions to the radical right, this chapter traces the transition of the Nordic radical right from opposition to power. The chapter shows that, although size and policy are factors of fundamental importance, we also need to consider party strategy if we are to explain the variation in government participation by radical right parties in the Nordic region.

This edited volume examines populist radical right parties in the Nordic region.

Somewhat surprisingly given the image of a consensual, egalitarian, and progressive region of Europe, the Nordic countries have been fertile ground for the radical right. Not only have radical right parties persisted for many decades, but they are currently much stronger in this region than in most other European countries today. In this book, the contributors analyse the electoral, ideological, and organisational aspects of the radical right in the Nordic region: The Progress Party in Norway (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP), the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD), Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), and the Finns party (Perussuomalaiset, PS). It also explores how mainstream parties and the media have reacted to the rise of the radical right, whether the radical right is integrated into mainstream politics, the extent to which they challenge the dominant ideological paradigm of Nordic politics and whether they mobilise and organise differently to other parties. Understanding the Nordic radical right is crucial to comprehending the transformation of Nordic politics but also changes in European politics more generally.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Scandinavian politics, populism, the radical right, and comparative party politics.

Overall, the Nordic populist radical right (PRR) parties now connect more transnationally than they did some decades ago. They have emerged as institutionalized and relevant political actors within their party systems and – except for the Norwegian Progress Party – increasingly interact bilaterally as well as multilaterally within the Nordic Council and the EU. Based on unique data from autobiographies of current and previous party leaders, interviews with key party politicians and officials, as well as a complete set of party magazines published since the late 1990s, the chapter explores whether the process of parties becoming more institutionalized and influential has been facilitated by the transnational linkages. More specifically, the chapter investigates whether a PRR party in one country has contributed to the success of a PRR party in another country by (a) providing economic and human resources; (b) serving as a role model in terms of ideology, organization, and strategy; and/or (c) facilitating processes of becoming an acceptable party. The chapter finds that there are both direct and indirect cross-national diffusion effects in relation to these three aspects.

This study compares members of political youth organisations and explains variations in material incentives for enrolment using both organisation-level and individual-level factors. Empirically, it is based on a web survey of about 3,000 members of eight Swedish youth organisations. The analysis shows that young people have a complex combination of concerns, with the main dividing line being whether or not material incentives are important. At the organisational level, the prevalence of material incentives among members is positively related to the size of the mother party and whether it has government experience. Further, we find a positive association between material incentives and economic dependence on the part of the youth organisation on its mother party. At the individual level, we find that members who see the main role of the youth organisation as being to provide support for the mother party and for those politically aligned with it are more likely to have material motives for their enrolment.