


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Hawks and doves on the Korean peninsula

A content analysis of United States and
South Korea policy vis-à-vis North Korea in
2013

Author: Simon Holmgren

Supervisor: Mikael Blomdahl



Abstract

Hawks and doves on the Korean peninsula: A content analysis of United States and South Korea policy vis-à-vis the North Korea in 2013.

This study examines the South Korea President Park Geun-hye and United States President Obama respective administration's policy vis-à-vis North Korea. The scope is narrowed down to the year 2013, during which the regime in Pyongyang conducted its third nuclear test. How to perceive and engage the regime in Pyongyang have been debated in the post-cold war era, divided into progressive (doves) and hard liners (hawks). Periods of policy discrepancy have occurred between Washington and Seoul, that have been observed to bear effect on North Korean behavior vis-à-vis South Korea. This study ties on to the contemporary policy debate in Seoul and Washington on North Korean engagement strategies. Moreover, expanding the scope and examines the respective administration's policy through a analytical framework based on a content analysis from a system level perspective. Furthermore, how neo-realism, neo-liberalism and the concept of reciprocity can shed light upon respective policies and give a sense of notion of alignment or discrepancy between Seoul and Washington.

Keywords: South Korea, North Korea, United States, foreign policy, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, reciprocity

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Abbreviations

ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
IR	International Relations
KIC	Kaesong industrial complex
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency
NAPCI	North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative
ROK	Republic of Korea
U.S.-ROK alliance	United States and Republic of Korea alliance

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1 Introduction

The Korean peninsula serves as the last hot spot from the cold war and still hosts the unresolved conflict between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (referred to as North Korea) and The Republic of Korea (referred to as South Korea). The conflict has been paused since 1953 when the armistice agreement was signed. United States has since the war served as *the* key ally to South Korea¹. Today approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea and alongside the 38th parallel demilitarized zone (referred to as DMZ) that separates the two Koreas (Cordesman et al 2013, p.17).

The North Korean regime has seen the status quo changed over time. The end of the cold war changed the condition for the North Korean regime, subsequently the economic support and subsidies from Moscow and Beijing were dismantled (Cha 2011, p.349-350; Lankov 2013, p.69-71; Oberdorfer 1998, p.157, 177-179). The plan oriented economy based on *juche* ideology, self-reliance, has led the staggering economy out to dry and resulted in a devastated condition with extreme poverty, nonetheless, the country is still the most closed in the world. Today South Korea outperforms North Korea in terms of gross national income by a multiple of 38 times (CSIS 2013c). The post-cold war economic collapse has according to the Russian scholar and North Korean expert Andrei Lankov led the regime to pursue a survival strategy based on crisis diplomacy and the development of nuclear weapons². A strategy that has boosted Pyongyang's negotiation leverage and increased attention from the international community to seek a deal that would denuclearize the North (Doyle 1997, p.113-116; Lankov 2013, p.145-152). Negotiations have ensured aid, economic support and security assurance in exchange for denuclearization. An objective not yet achieved.

During the last 20 years the North Korean nuclear development program has led to several crises on the peninsula. The international community spearheaded by United States has

¹ The alliance between South Korea and United States (further referred to U.S.-ROK alliance) established 1954 after the Korean war. United States military presence on the ground can be seen to function as a tripwire in an event of a North Korean attack, both as deterrence towards North Korea as well as security assurance to South Korea of United States commitment (Cha 1997, p.613; Kang 2003, p.323; Nam 2006, p.617; Snyder, 2009).

² However, as pointed out by Snyder and Lankov, North Korean crisis diplomacy is not il-logical it is rather a mean for survival. North Korean leaders have known so far how avoid crossing the red line and trigger escalation towards a full-scale war (Lankov 2013, p. xii-xiii, 176-179; Snyder 1999, p.8).

addressed these in order to prevent nuclear proliferation and secure regional stability. The well known American scholar Joseph Nye argues that the "nuclear card" helps the regime in Pyongyang to stay in power without opening the country to economic reform, which would likely bring an end to the ruling elite (Nye & Welch 2010, p.60; Ruediger 2011; Park 2013, p.326). In early February 2013, same year as the South Korean President, Park Geun-hye, was inaugural, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test and threw the peninsula once more in to a state of uncertainty (Berger, 2013; Park, M. 2013; Sang-Hun, et al., 2013).

1.1 Problem Formulation

The problems on the Korean peninsula, how to denuclearize North Korea and reach a peace agreement between the two Koreas, are still unsolved. The issue of how to address and engage North Korea is an ongoing debate in Seoul and Washington. There are many different opinions how to perceive North Korea and which approach that would work better to achieve peaceful inter-Korean relations. The contemporary debate in the post-cold war era has divided policy makers, scholars and pundit into different camps (Cha & Kang 2003, p.2-3; Lankov 2013, p.203-204)³.

The (*doves*) progressive side (e.g. Chung Moon-In, David Kang, Wade Huntley) argues that the regime strive for nuclear weapons steams from insecurity and that it could be relieved through engagement, economic benefits and cooperation based on unconditional *diffuse reciprocity* e.g. Sunshine policy⁴ (Kang 2003, p.311; Kim, Y. 2013, p.187-189). The regime insecurity will be eased and incentive to reciprocate will increase which could eventually lead to a "Chinese-style" reform according to Andrei Lankov (Cha 2002, p.41-42; Kang 2003,

³ Victor Cha acknowledges that throughout the cold war U.S. and South Korea policy were convergent and pursued hard-line deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea, this however changed with the end of the cold war and the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. The Agreed Framework, which ended the crisis, implied a change toward a more pluralistic concept of security on the peninsula. The agreement with North Korea emphasized dialog and engagement over the cold war era containment policy, marking a shift in U.S. security policy in Asia (Cha 1997).

⁴ Sunshine policy an engagement strategy, based on the separation of economic cooperation and politics, architected by former South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, 1998-2002. Armed provocations were not to be tolerated and absorption of North Korea ruled out. In addition, reconciliation and cooperation were to be pursued in a positive spirit. (Cho 2010, p.99; Jonsson 2006; Lankov 2013, p.151-152).

p.315; Lankov 2013, p.203-204). Contrary, hard liners (*hawks*) stress that North Korea should be approached with a tit-for-tat, *specific*, reciprocity based on containment, deterrence, sanctions and coercive means. In addition, North Korean brinkmanship and repetitive violation and cheating of non proliferation agreements have disclosed the "evil" intentions of the regime (Cha 1997, p.611-613; Yoon 2011, p.258-261). Assuming the regime is on the brink of ruin, pressure combined with threat of military use will defer North Korea to denuclearize or cause the regime to collapse. Where hawks see soft line policy of unconditional engagement based on diffuse reciprocity as appeasement, doves argue that hawks are irresponsible ideologues (Cha & Kang 2003, p.2-3; Lankov 2013, p.204).

Furthermore, previous research on the triangular effects on policy alignment between Seoul and Washington indicates that choice of policy based on specific or diffuse reciprocity bear effect on North Korean behavior vis-à-vis South Korea. In addition, discrepancy between Seoul and Washington during the post-cold war era, where the latter assumed a hawk approach and the former a dove approach, have led to less peaceful inter-Korean relations according to the South Korean scholar Jong-Han Yoon (2011). This study relates to the empirical and theoretical findings from previous research and build upon these when analyzing the current South Korean administration policy vis-à-vis North Korea and level of policy alignment with United States.

The aim of this study is to grasp on to these divergent views, hawks vs. doves, and policy disparity that bear effect on the inter-Korean relations. Tied to the contemporary debate and by drawing upon previous research, this study sets out to examine the policy of the Park Geun-hye administration and Barack Obama administration in the light of neo-liberalism and neo-realism. Moreover, to examine how these theories can explain current policy and by including the concept of reciprocity providing an extra dimension. The theories are well established on both sides of the pacific and serves as major influence in policy making. Streams of neo-realism and neo-liberalism can be related to the perspectives representative in the *hawks vs. doves* debate, why the choice of the neo-neo theories suits well for studying the current two administrations approach vis-à-vis North Korea. Furthermore, combined with *specific* and *diffuse reciprocity* brings about a extra dimension related to the contemporary policy debate.

1.3 Aim, Objective and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to analyze the current policies from South Korea and United States vis-à-vis North Korea from a theoretical standpoint, through the lens of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Since the Park Geun-hye administration recently was installed in the Blue House, Seoul, this study is timely to evaluate and examine the choice of policy from the administration and how it relates to United States policy. Moreover, analyze how neo-liberalism and neo-realism can explain the respective North Korea policy from a system level perspective. Furthermore this study will compare the two policy directions, to find out whether they show signs of alignment or discrepancy. This study will therefore include the concept of reciprocity to enhance the comparative analysis of the administrations ground approach vis-à-vis North Korea. This will not only bring about a understanding of respective policy from a system level but also adhere to the contemporary policy debate, hard line (*hawks*) vs. soft line (*doves*).

The following question can therefore be raised;

- How can neo-realism and neo-liberalism shed light upon the current policy from Seoul and Washington vis-à-vis North Korea from a system level perspective?
- To what extent can we sense a notion of discrepancy or alignment between policies from Seoul and Washington in terms of content of reciprocity?

1.4 Delimitations

The focus in this study is towards United States and South Korea and their policies vis-à-vis North Korea during the year 2013. Why this study focus on the policies during the year 2013, is firstly due to that the same year a new president, Park Geun-hye, were inaugural in Seoul - that will most likely shape the South's North Korea policy. On a second note it is interesting to understand how the Park Geun-hye administration responded to the third North Korean nuclear test. Thirdly, due to the limited time to conduct the study the scope of has been narrowed down to focus only on the year 2013.

North Korea seeks recognition from United States more than any other state, why the study of United States policy is at hand. However, impact from other states in the region, e.g. China as the state with closest ties to North Korea, has been left out in this study. The same goes for the other 6 part talk member states⁵, Japan and Russia due to the time aspect. Furthermore, the focus is to tie on to previous studies and close ties between the United States and South Korea and how their policies correlate or diverge, converges, to the contemporary policy debate on *hawks vs. doves* in Seoul and Washington.

This study has focused on theories that seek explanatory power from system level perspective. Domestic aspects and actor specific perspectives have been left out, mainly to limit the scope of the study. This discussion is presented in more length in the chapter; theoretical framework.

⁵ Six party talks (6 part talks) a multilateral framework, includes China, North and South Korea, the United States, Russia and Japan, established in 2003 with the purpose to achieve North Korean denuclearization through negotiations and diplomacy. The six party talks is currently on hold since Pyongyang withdrew from the negotiations in 2009 after United Nations Security Council implemented sanctions in a response to North Korean ballistic missile tests (Bajoria & Xu 2013; Berger 2013; Sang-hun 2013).


1.4 Method and Design

A study that applies theories to a certain case in order to analyze a certain phenomenon is often regarded as a theory consuming. By applying existing theories to the case and examine how the phenomenon can be understood and explained (Esaiasson et al. 2012, p.41-43). Contrary a theory-testing study aims at take ground in testing the theory on a case to either weaken or strengthen the theory (Esaiasson et al. 2012, p.41). This study is a theory consuming study since it trying to explain and examine policy direction from Seoul and Washington with different theories (neo-liberalism & neo-realism) and explanatory factors (reciprocity).

This study will examine the current policies based on a qualitative content analysis. Empirical material will be primarily of speeches and statements regarding North Korea policy during 2013 by the two presidents, Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye, and from their respective administrations. By applying a content analysis it allows a researcher to study a phenomenon on distance. The researcher can identify themes and structures from the empirical material and sort these into categories (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.51).

The empirical material will be examined and analyzed by using *ideal* types of respective theory, based on key aspects, to identify themes and content in terms of; neo-liberalism, neo-realism and reciprocity. The *ideal* types are presented and discussed in more detail in the chapter theoretical framework.

Figure 1.1 Method design



1.5 Disposition

The phenomenon that this study aims to analyze is South Korea's and United States' policy vis-à-vis North Korea on a systemic level and through the concept of reciprocity. This will be done by using theories of international relations to explain the current policy direction. In addition, by using the concept of reciprocity this study will try to explain the ground position of the United States and South Korea vis-à-vis North Korea, adhering to previous studies and the contemporary policy debate.

As we proceed from the introduction, the second section contains previous research which explains and describes the contemporary debate on policy choices in Seoul and Washington. How discrepancy or alignment between South Korea and United States in policy vis-à-vis North Korea bear effects on inter-Korean relations, North-South.

The third and fourth part; Theories and methodological framework explains the theoretical framework and the ideal types found in the political theories neo-liberalism and neo-realism, to further understand the policy direction and to be able to highlight similarities and differences between theory and empirics. The methodological approach in this study is a qualitative content analysis, which will be conducted on the primary sources of speeches from President Park Geun-hye administration and President Barack Obama administration regarding policy toward North Korea.

The fifth part; Analysis and conclusion, analyzes the empirics in order to apprehend a understanding of United States and South Korea's policy vis-à-vis North Korea. To find explanatory power from the theories, level of coordination between the two administrations in terms of policy direction, *specific* or *diffuse* reciprocity. To summarize the study, further implications are discussed in the end.

2 Previous Research

There is a vast range of research conducted in the field of policy on inter-Korean relations, unification and the United States involvement on the peninsula. For this study I have searched through SöderScholar, JStor, Social Sciences Citation Index and Google Scholar for articles on North Korea policy. I have limited the result by selecting the period between; 2000 - 2013 and using the following keywords: North Korea, foreign policy, United States, South Korea.

Two articles used in this study; "Reciprocity in South Korean Security Policy vis-à-vis North Korea and United States" by Young-Geun Kim and "The effect of US Foreign Policy on the Relationship between South and North Korea: Time series analysis of the post-cold war era" by Jong-Han Yoon. Articles presenting a Korean perspective were obtained from ASAN policy institute, Korean Institute of Defense Analysis, *KIDA*, and Korean Institute for National Unification, *KINU*. A comprehensive U.S perspective were gathered from established research institutes as Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, and Council on Foreign Relations, CFR.

The influential American scholar and former White House National Security advisor Victor Cha (2002) argues that United States should engage North Korea in a combination of hard line and soft line policy. Hawks in Washington that perceive soft line engagement as appeasement should rather support engagement, given it could prevent Pyongyang to misinterpret a polarization of conditions deriving from a hard line approach. In addition, by not pursuing isolation or coercion towards North Korea, this would likely decrease rational incentives for hostilities responses from Pyongyang. Instead, adopting a policy based on conditional diplomacy alongside economic incentive would motivate a more cooperative behavior from North Korea and prevent nuclear proliferation (Cha 2002, p.44, 71-72). Therefore, Washington and Seoul should uphold a containment military deterrence posture combined with engagement towards Pyongyang. This would give the regime the opportunity to prove it seeks cooperation, however, if Pyongyang divers then U.S.-ROK has means to convert the carrots of engagement into sticks.

The South Korean scholar Young-Geun Kim (2013) observes that policy discrepancy in the post-cold war era between administrations in Seoul and Washington correlates with the level of peaceful inter-Korean relations. Further Young-Geun Kim acknowledges that when Seoul pursues a dovish (soft line) unconditioned policy based on diffuse reciprocity together with Washington, Pyongyang seeks negotiation with both parties. However, if Washington adopts

a hawkish (hard line) conditioned policy based on specific reciprocity while Seoul continues with a soft line, the regime in Pyongyang seeks recognition from Washington over Seoul (Kim, Y. 2013, p.198-201). Hence, there is less significance when Seoul diverges from a U.S. - South Korea coordinated policy compared to a policy shift from Washington. Moreover, recent years of tension converges with hard line policy direction from Seoul and Washington (Kim, Y. 2013, p.202-205). Therefore, Young-Geun Kim argues for a policy based on diffuse reciprocity coordinated between U.S. and South Korea, hence it will enhance peaceful inter-Korean relations.

A similar approach is argued by the South Korean scholar Jong-Han Yoon (2011) that acknowledges importance of the triangular effects between North-, South Korea and United States. How the United States policy has a greater impact, in comparison to South Korea, on North Korean behavior vis-à-vis South Korea (Yoon 2011, p.277-278). Furthermore, when Washington maintains a (soft line) cooperative and diffuse approach this correlates with a significant positive impact on inter-Korean relations, thus increases cooperative behavior from North Korea vis-à-vis South Korea. On the contrary, a (hard line) specific reciprocity based policy increases the probability of more hostile behavior from Pyongyang towards Seoul. In addition, policy disparity between Seoul and Washington, when the former purses a soft line policy and the latter a hard line policy, converges with a negative effect on inter-Korean relations. Despite that North Korea at times cheats and breaches agreements and negotiations, Jong-Han Yoon and other scholars (Cha & Kang 2003) find that correlation of North Korea's reactive behavior to policy direction from United States reflects a general pattern (Yoon 2011, p.278-282). Therefore, Jong-Han Yoon suggests that the United States to maintain a soft line policy and for South Korea to mitigate policy with Washington if divergence occurs.

In addition, the South Korean scholar Jong-Yun, observes that lack of harmony between United States and South Korea in dealing with North Korea not only resulted in less effective policy but also damaged bilateral ties between the two (Bae 2010).

The American scholar Scott Snyder acknowledges the partnership between United States and South Korea often during crisis falls back to the cold war patron-client relationship, there is need to enhance the balance in the alliance towards a more equal partnership. One critical aspect to this challenge is to bridge the gap in views upon security, whereas U.S. have a global perspective South Korea's ideological polarized security perspective rather begins and ends with the peninsula (Snyder 2009, p.2). Moreover, Scott Snyder argues that the criticism and debate that rose in the early 2000s regarding whether South Korean foreign policy should

be so closely tied to U.S. policy rather reflects a partnership which is not up to date based on cold war patterns and structures (Snyder 2009, p.6-7). However, Snyder acknowledges in contrast to Jong-Yun that despite the controversy and North Korea policy disparity between the Roh-Moo-hyun and the Bush administration, cooperation was achieved in areas as e.g. troop dispatch to Iraq and Free Trade agreement (Snyder 2009, p.10). Therefore, efforts to update the partnership and alliance to reflect should be sought.

Figure 2.1 Post-cold war era, South Korea and U.S. policy direction (Kim, Y. 2013, p.199).

	Cooperative	Competitive/conflict (non-cooperative)				Cooperative	?
Administration	Kim Dae-jung "Sunshine Policy" Unconditionend engagement & diffuse reciprocity	Roh Moo-hyun (soft line)				Lee Myung-bak (hard line)	Park Geun-hye 
	Clinton (soft line)	Bush (hard line) Conditioned strategy & specific reciprocity	Bush (hard line) Conditioned strategy & specific reciprocity		Obama (hard line) Strategic patience	Barack Obama 	
	1998 1999 2000	2001 2002 2003	2004 2005 2006	2007 2008	2009 2010 2011 2012	2013	

3 Theoretical Framework

In the sections below the theoretical framework key parts will be explained and discussed how they are applied in this study. This study’s theoretical framework consists of two IR theories, neo-liberalism and neo-realism and the concept of reciprocity. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism analyzes and examines state behavior on system level. The concept of reciprocity functions as a third pillar to examine content in the policies of either specific or diffuse reciprocity. These theories and concepts have been chosen since they strongly relate to contemporary policy debate. At first a discussion is presented on arguments for applying a system level approach and possible alternative approaches to this study. Thereafter the ideal types, used to operationalize respective theory are presented and explained.

3.1 Theory Discussion

Applying neo-realism in policy analysis are explained by the American scholar William C. Wohlforth, used in the right setting it can be a powerful analyst tool when knowing the conditions of the theory and its compability to the scenario relating to given parameters of the theory. Thus, avoid the pitfalls and criticism of realism as discrepancy in its accuracy predicting foreign policy events e.g. the end of the cold war. Neo-realism would apply to the case of North Korea, since the security conditions in the region relates to key general assumptions and principles of the theory as argued by Wohlforth how it explains alliances, military build-ups and rivalries in terms of balance of power, hence providing this study with a sharpen analytic tool (Smith et al 2012, p.47-53).

Critique against choice of theories and analytical framework in this study could be why excluding the subfield in IR, foreign policy analysis (FPA). Traditional IR theories see the systematic structure as generator of state behavior, contrary, FPA functions between the structure- and unit level. FPA can be described to consist of those actions made by governmental representative which act upon behalf of a sovereign states identified goal and objectives (Carlsnaes, Risse et al 2002, p. 331-332,335). The American scholar Valerie M. Hudson concedes foreign policy as an approach chosen by the national government to achieve its own goals in its relations with external entities, including decisions to do nothing. Emphasizing FPA as a multilevel discipline that tend to see foreign policy beyond a "black box" thinking of states as decisions makers and instead as a actor specific perspective (Hudson 2005, p.2-3; Smith et al 2012, p.14).

Kenneth Waltz argues that neo-realism does not fully apply in a coherent way together with FPA, hence the system level focus for explanatory power in this study instead of an actor-specific. Moreover, analysis of state power capability and thrive for survival in a anarchic environment gives the structure of the international system the explanatory role of states behavior. Thus this study will not focus on unveiling the "black box" nor to understand foreign policy as a actor specific theory that includes common aspects within FPA e.g. perception, domestic factors, organizational behavior or group thinking. Waltz points to that neo-realism, in a response to his critics, and his theory of international politics functions neither to neglect or to replace a unit actor analysis, moreover, that the structure tells us how a

system shapes behavior of states and their actions and as any theory it has limitations, whilst it can identify general outcomes and tendencies (Keohane 1986b, p.337-345).

Neo-liberalism described as a domestic theory in international context. Contrary to neo-realism, neo-liberalism could be of significance, implemented in FPA due to its focus on domestic aspects (Smith et al 2012, p.65-69). However, both theories share the same ontological approach; seeing the world as anarchic with the state as the main actor. Neo-liberals argue that institutions can play a vital role to mitigate distrust between states where neo-realists argue that institutions impact on states behavior are minimal due to the constraints of the anarchic system (Waltz 1979, p.105-107; Keohane 1986b, p.195-197).

In line with Waltz, this study, based on a system level analysis, will not fragmentize the decision maker process into a actor specific analysis as argued by Valerie M. Hudson, rather focusing on the state as unitary actor. The objective in this study is to examine and find explanatory power from a international structure level perspective. Furthermore, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, share a strong position within the IR debate in United States and South Korea (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.116; Carlsnaes, Mearsheimer 1995, p.49; Risse et al 2002, p.15; Rourke 2007, p.26). Policy- and decisions makers are too a large degree influenced by the theories, thus this study could make a contribution to the neo-neo debate in terms of policy vis-à-vis North Korea (Cha 1997, p.610-611; Kim, Y. 2013, p.185).

3.2 Operationalizing: Ideal type and key aspects

Neo-realism and neo-liberalism are applied by constructing *ideal* types, based on identified key aspects of respective theory. An ideal type illustrates the core dimensions and aspects that characterize a phenomenon or theory (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.63). Well aware of the diversity and the broad spectrum within both theories, an ideal type can thus not capture everything, hence conceived as how this study interprets the theories. The ideal types should contain of aspects in order to operationalize the theory or concept (Esaiasson et al 2012, p.143-144). Operating with ideal types the different types should strive to consist of diametrical aspects; mirrored with each other (Bryman 2011, p.294-295). The applied ideal types and subsequently aspects are presented below and explained further in detail under the next paragraphs in this section.

3.3 Neo-realism

Neo-realism and its proponents (e.g. Waltz, Grieco and Mearsheimer) assert as classical realism that the main actor in the anarchic system is the state. The main critical goal in a anarchic system is survival, which all actors strive for, hence this study interlaced part of North Korea's strive for survival in the international system. States are to rely on their own means to achieve survival in an anarchic system, since the competitive system promotes self-help rather than cooperation. In an anarchic system where states seek to maximize their power and influence thus creates an environment of uncertainty and a situation of security dilemma.

Security dilemma where one state's actions to increase its own security will decrease another state's security, that trigger both states to further increase their (in)security (Nye & Welch 2010, p.17; Mearsheimer 2011, p.430). Since there are no authority that stands above the anarchic international system to enforce rule, law and norms, every state has to rely on their self-help. This motivates states behavior and policy that creates a constant "state of war" (Mearsheimer 1995, p.10; Nye & Welch 2010, p.60).

Self-help and the anarchic structure of the world effects states to provide means for its own protection, thus seek *balance of power* in order to survive (Mearsheimer 1995, p.11; Waltz 1979, p.105). With absence of a supranational authority to enforce rules and maintain order establish an environment where violence or the threat of it may occur (Waltz 1979, p.102). States behavior and reaction to the anarchic system is contented to their position in the international system, all states are similar in their means to achieve security but differs in their capability. Therefore, Waltz argue that states seek to maintain or shape their position through balance of power - to seek balance rather than maximize its power (Waltz 1979, p.126). If a state seek to bandwagon with the strongest it is to secure its position. Since security is the number one objective for a state in a anarchic system, only after this may other goals be sought such as development, profit, power.

The concept of *relative gains and absolute gains* are according to the American scholar and neo-realist Joseph M. Grieco means for states to increase their power and influence through cooperation among states. Through cooperation states may obtain absolute gains in terms of capabilities, however difference between neo-realist and neo-liberalist concerning cooperation is state perception of relative gains and the role of international institutions as mediator (Carlsnaes, Risse et al 2002, p.195; Grieco 1990, p.4-5, 27-28). Neo-realists argue that states interest in security and power constrain their possibilities to cooperate even if they have mutual interest (Grieco 1990, p.4; Keohane 1998, p.88).

According to Grieco states cooperate in order achieve *relative gains*, thus emphasize who gains more. The objective with cooperation is to prevent others to gain more in relative terms (Grieco, Powell & Snidal 1993, p.729). Furthermore, the prospect for international institutions to serve as a mediator and foster cooperation are marginalized in a anarchic system. Since the strive for relative gains increases the likely hood of cheating when a actor sees the counterpart gain more in relative terms (Mearsheimer 1995, p.12. Contrary, neo-liberals argue that states cooperate in areas where there are mutual benefit and possibilities of maximizing absolute gains for all parts (Chatterjee 2003, p.135).

3.4 Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalists share the ontology of neo-realists that the international structure is anarchic but differs over the role of actors. Neo-liberalists argue the international system has become more pluralistic and that states are not the only actor, hence non-state-actors are also important due to the increased interdependence in the globalized world (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.121; Chatterjee 2003, p.130). Critique against neo-realism is that conflict and security is given to much effort and less on interdependence and the capacity of international institutions to function as mediator to increase trust and cooperation between states in the system (Grieco 1990, p.27). Neo-liberalists argue if states cooperate and integrate into communities which promote economic growth, this leads to prosperity and peace. Through engagement, trade and economic cooperation an increased interdependence and regional integration has the potential of contributing *spill-over/linkages effects* in other areas e.g. security (Schmitter 2005, p.256).

The neo-liberal perspective on relative and absolute gains assumes that states seek to maximize their *absolute gains* through cooperation rather than comparing relative gains as neo-realists (Carlsnaes, Risse et al 2002, p. 374). Neo-liberalist agrees with neo-realist that the state is a rational actor but differs where they see value in cooperative behavior and strive to maximize absolute gains for all parties, easier to achieve where there is mutual interest (Chatterjee 2003, p.130). Recognizing obstacle in cooperation such as non-compliance and cheating and that it might be more difficult to achieve cooperation where there is no mutual interest. However, neo-liberalist argues that international institutions can overcome obstacles in cooperation and states inhibitions to cheat and to serve as mediator governing an anarchic and competitive system (Grieco, Powell & Snidal 1993, p.729; Keohane 1998, p.86; Mearsheimer 1995, p.17).

Neo-liberal response to security threats is to promote regional and international cooperation in order to create norms and regimes to foster policy that will cope with the threats. The main argument to achieve *security through cooperation* is by adopting a multilateral approach instead of an unilateral (preemptive strike policy) approach to security threats (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.122; Cha 2010, p.160). According to Joseph Nye this gives institutions a role to stabilize and shape expectations thus creating a framework that minimize the effect of anarchy and security dilemma (Nye & Welch 2010, p.59-60).

3.5 Reciprocity

The American scholar Robert Axelrod presents in his book, "The Evolution of Cooperation", ways of how states interact in order to achieve cooperation and lays out one of the ground settings, issue for achieving cooperation or not, how to deal with the security dilemma (Axelrod 1984, p.1-5). The key aspect of successful cooperation is based on reciprocity and acknowledgement of the shadow of the future in order to make the process sustainable (Axelrod 1984, p.173). This concept relates to how South Korea and United States have addressed North Korea and in particular to the hard line and soft line approaches in the post-cold war era. Diffuse reciprocity has been significant for the engagement policies and specific reciprocity connected to hard line policies. These two concepts will bring more depth to the analytical framework to examine the direction of South Korea and United States current policies. The concept of reciprocity can be defined as; parties maintain balance in treatment by granting obligations and equivalent rights and benefits to each other. *Diffuse reciprocity* imposes on the receiving part for repayment in the future, moreover, boils down to "first give and then receive". Explained as unconditioned approach where the stronger side gives first to set the other side at ease and then to yield in return in the future (Keohane 1986a, p.20-21; Kim, Y. 2013, p.187).

Specific reciprocity, a tit-for-tat approach, is based on contingency that reactions from the other part are rewarded or stopped when these are not progressing. The parties maintains a balance of treatment by one side treats the other side in the same way that the other side behaves "good for good and bad for bad" (Keohane 1986a, p.9-10; Kim, Y. 2013, p.189).

One side effect of specific reciprocity is pointed out by Robert Axelrod called *echo effects*, if either of two parties starts with a malicious move and other part respond with specific reciprocity, cooperation cannot be achieved as long as both parties carry on with the same strategy (Axelrod 1984, p.136-138; Kim, Y. 2013, p.183-189).

4 Methodology

The methodology in this study is based on a qualitative content analysis, described as a systematic description of the content of an empirical material. A method that is suitable for identifying trends, patterns and changes over time of a phenomenon through a larger amount of material, by sorting these into different categories (Bryman 2011, p.528; Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.51-53). Content analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative, however, the core question for either method is to analyze and understand what the text is trying to tell (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.44). Critiques against qualitative analysis argue that quotes or content that are analyzed could be brought out of context when large amount of text are being interpreted and fragmented (Bryman 2011, p.526-527). The context in the empirics is to large extent narrowed down to specific statements and speeches regarding North Korea, hence this can partly be avoided.

Regarding concept validity in this study, a indication on how the study's theoretical definition matches the operationalize indicators, one argument for upholding a good validity in this study is how the indicators that constructs the ideal types are well established within the main stream theories and the academia (Bryman 2011, p.351; Esaiasson et al 2012, p.58). In addition, the indicators complies with previous research and the notion of accumulatively. The operationalizing could however be subject to another researchers interpretation of the theories, moreover, another researcher could emphasize additional aspects when constructing the ideal types (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.169). However, as discussed under the paragraph ideal types; the interpretation and construction of the ideal types is based on key aspects to illustrate the core of the phenomenon. Given how established the theories and there the perspective are within the IR field, this would argue for good concept validity in the study.

Considering reliability and intersubjectivity, how another researcher can duplicate the study and achieve the same result, there could leave room for a sliding degree when interpreting the key aspects and concepts identified from the ideal types to the empirics due to pre-understanding from another researcher (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.42). However, with regards to the transparency of the study as exemplified in how the key aspects are being interpreted in the next paragraph and secondly how the study adheres to main stream IR theories, the study should count for good intersubjectivity and provide another researcher with similar results (Esaiasson et al 2012, p.60).

Organizing the methodological framework in a systematic manner and clearly explaining how different categories will be applied, the study can achieve transparency and reliability. In the analytic phase in order to achieve good reliability and avoid unintended systematical slip into a gradual favored direction when interpreting the material. The analytical phase was conducted by going through speeches and statements from respective administration and time period in a wrap-around order (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.58). In the next section it is further explained how the analytical framework, in particular the ideal types respective dimensions, will be applied.

4.1 Qualitative Content Analysis: Analytical Framework

When conducting a content analysis there are certain steps to take, firstly, empiric material should be defined - important to set a time frame and established criteria for selection of sources (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.54). In this study, the time period is set to focus on the year 2013 and the criteria for selection of sources are; at first hand presidential speeches and statements, secondly, other official statements from respective administration that relates to their North Korea policy. This is discussed in more length under the paragraph sources.

Secondly, a coding scheme consisting of words, metaphors or themes should be constructed that clearly defines what is what (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.55). This study coding scheme consist of three dimensions, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and reciprocity, with key aspects and themes from each theory based on ideal types described in the chapter theoretical framework.

Lastly, analyze of the empirical material based on the coding scheme. To enhance the understanding of the analytical framework, each dimension are described how it will be interpreted combined with example in the next section. When content is analyzed from the empirical material in this study it is explained and sorted out accordingly to the dimensions and key aspects/themes from the analytical framework. This all together would compose for good reliability and for another researcher to draw the same interpretation of the extract (Bryman 2011, p.197-198; Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.81).

Table 4.1 Operationalizing: Ideal types and key aspects

Theory / Concept			
Dimension	Neo-realism	Neo-liberalism	Reciprocity
Key aspects or themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security dilemma • Balance of power • Relative gains 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security cooperation • Spill-over effects • Absolute gains 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific • Diffuse

4.2 Dimensions

The framework consists of three dimensions; neo-realism, neo-liberalism and reciprocity. Each of the dimensions is described combined with examples in order to enhance understanding and the transparency of the theoretical framework. Presentation of the analyze of the empirical sources will be presented as a narrative text, summarizing the main contents of statements, speeches and policy, followed by exemplified quotes and brief interpretative text.

Dimension I: Neo-realism

This dimension will examine material for contents of neo-realism, how Seoul and Washington's North Korea policy can be understood from a neo-realistic lens in terms of power balance, deterrence and security dilemma. How states are rational actor, relying on self-help, and seek to maximize their goals at first hand to survive. The uncertainty of other states intentions makes it likely for a state to perceive other states defensive actions, to secure its own survival, as offensive and expansive actions. Exemplified by President Park Geun-hye installation speech, February 2013, president addressed the nuclear threat from North Korea as a stress the survival of South Korea.

North Korea's recent nuclear test is a challenge to the survival and future of the Korean people, and there should be no mistaking that the biggest victim will be none other than North Korea itself (Park 2013a).

- President Park Geun-hye Inaugural speech on the 25th of February 2013.

Dimension II: Neo-liberalism

This dimension will examine contents of neo-liberalistic aspects of cooperation and multilateralism in securing national interest, international cooperation and spill-over effects, institutions as mediator and state cooperation to achieve absolute gains. E.g. President Park Geun-hye seeks to enhance multilateral cooperation within the region of Eurasia, in order to secure nuclear safety and expanded trade between states.

Third, we must establish Eurasia as a continent of peace. Threats to peace and security are our biggest obstacles to trade and cultural exchanges, and they must first be resolved before a new era in our history can begin. In recent times, we have found ourselves confronting various new challenges in security—nuclear safety, natural disasters and climate change, for example—in addition to more traditional security threats (Park 2013k).

- Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia on the 18th of October 2013.

Dimension III - Reciprocity

This dimension analyzes content of reciprocity, which is to understand policy of either specific or diffuse reciprocity - how United States and South Korea approach North Korea. Given the idea of *specific reciprocity*, a tit-for-tat manner where good is treated with good, and bad with bad. In a statement from January 2013 United State Special representative to North Korea policy, Glyn Davies point to specific reciprocity vis-à-vis North Korea.

President made this clear last November when he said, "...let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States of America." But let me state the obvious: North Korea's reckless provocations have certainly raised the bar for a return to dialogue (Davies 2013a).

- Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, on the 7th of March 2013.

Further, example given of diffuse reciprocity. When addressing the North Korean humanitarian situation, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea opens up for more assistance in case of North Korean response of changed behavior from provocative and nuclear weapon

brinkmanship. Indicating a *diffuse reciprocity*, that South Korea will provide humanitarian assistance regardless of the political situation between the two states.

We can no longer turn a blind eye to hunger and other difficulties facing people on the other side of the Peninsula. Regardless of the political situation, the new Administration will continue its humanitarian assistance and exchanges. What matters the most, however, is changes on the part of the North and their behavior. We are sincerely looking forward to such changes in the North and are ready to redouble our efforts to help it with an open mind (Park 2013i).

- Address by President Park Geun-hye at the 68th anniversary of Liberation on the 15th of August 2013.

4.3 Sources

Primary empirical sources are explicit official statements, remarks and speeches from the administrations in Washington and Seoul, made during the period January - December 2013. Documents have been retrieved online from respective government official websites. Selection was made according to the following criterions; either to contain an explicit content of North Korea policy or to be presented in the context of the North East Asia region. Official documents from the South Korean administration includes presidential statement, speeches and remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yun Byung-se. Available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and the official Governmental website korea.net, the latter includes statements, remarks and speeches by President Park Geun-hye⁶. Official statements, speeches and remarks from the Obama administration, were retrieved from the White House and the Department of State official websites⁷. Primary sources are: presidential documents, documents from Secretary of State, John Kerry and including Special Representative of the Secretary of State for North Korea Policy, the Vice President Joe Biden and senior officials. Due to South Korea's close proximity to North Korea, there were easier to find presidential statements regarding North Korea than from President Barack Obama.

⁶ For further information see the reference list for direct links, or use the following links; <http://www.korea.net/Government/Administration/President-Park-Geun-hye>, <http://www.mofa.go.kr>

⁷ For further information see the reference list for direct links, or use the following links; <http://www.whitehouse.gov>, <http://www.state.gov/index.htm>

Therefore, a substantial amount of United States sources are from e.g. senior officials in the Obama administration compared to sources regarding South Korean policy.

The British scholar Alan Bryman argues that the use of printed sources are most preferable for a content analysis methodological approach (Bryman 2011, p.282-283). In order to codify and analyze the primary sources, software for qualitative content analysis was used (MAXQDA). Since all empirical sources are official government documents, that are published almost instantaneously after a speech or remarks have been delivered, thus possibility of adjusting are inconsiderable. Given the comprehensive amount of sources from presidential statements to governmental officials, hence the study should account for good reliability (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.43). Furthermore, presidential orders and policy implies high credibility, hence the aspect of democratic elected leaders. Thus giving the study of policy direction of South Korea and United States good validity of studying what it is outlined to study (Bergström & Boréus 2012, p.42). For a complete list of the South Korean and United States empirical sources used in this study see the two tables in the appendix. Empirical sources cited in the study can be found in the references list.

5 Analysis

5.1 South Korea

When President Park Geun-hye were inaugural as President on the 25th of February 2013, the premise for inter-Korean relations were against the backdrop of a North Korean test launch of long distance ballistic missiles in late 2012 and a third nuclear test conducted on the 12th of February 2013 (Sang-Hun 2013). Actions condemned by the international community alongside tightened sanctions, unanimous approved by UNSC, on the 7th of March 2013 (UNSC 2013). The security concern was indeed presence on the peninsula and of importance for the new President Park Geun-hye to address. North Korea continued throughout February to May with harsh rhetoric and belligerent provocations e.g. a North Korean diplomat, Jon Yong Rying, out lashed at a UN Conference on Disarmament held in Geneva just days before the inaugural "... a new-born puppy knows no fear of a tiger. South Korea's erratic behavior would only herald its final destruction"(CSIS 2013a).

Key themes for the Park Geun-hye administration North Korea policy and in generally for North East Asia region boils down to; first, *security and survival* for South Korea is essential and have been stressed throughout the year, second, a key aspect is the *U.S.-ROK alliance* and balance of power, third, the president introduced her concept of "trust politik" and presented a strategy called *trust building process*, fourth, strategy that is based on the notion of *credible deterrence*, fifth, building on what is described as the "asian paradox", Park introduced regional cooperation with the *North East Asia Peace Initiative*, in order to start dealing with softer issues given cooperation thus should spill over to security related issues, the last theme, the always present discussion on Korean *unification* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a; Park 2013l).

5.1.1 Dimension I: Neo-realism

The security environment on the peninsula was indeed tense, and uncertain what to expect given recent leadership transition in North Korea and South Korea. President Park Geun-hye stressed the *threat of survival* of the Korean people and nation. Portraying the nuclear threat from North Korea in terms of "North Korea's recent nuclear test is a challenge to the survival

and future of the Korean people (..) outstanding security challenges, including the North Korean nuclear threat" (Park 2013a). Whereas interpreted in terms of that the North Korean nuclear test threatens the reconciliation and unification process on the Korean peninsula as well as the existence of South Korea. *Survival* described by neo-realism, where the anarchic system supplies a "constant state of war", states behavior is first to seek survival hence the competitive milieu (Waltz 1979, p.102, 126). That was pointed out by the president in her inaugural speech.

Happiness can only flourish when people feel comfortable and secure. I pledge to you today that I will not tolerate any action that threatens the lives of our people and the security of our nation (Park 2013a). - President Park Geun-hye inaugural speech on the 25th of February 2013.

Furthermore, as states are seen as rational actors according to neo-realism they seek to maximize their goals, the primary goal is survival before other objectives and goals can be reached. Emphasized, by President Park Geun-hye at many occasions, if the people in South Korea remained insecure, other gains are meaningless (Park 2013a). The goal for South Korea is to seek at first a secure position and survival, then seek other goals according to Park Geun-hye (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.119; Waltz 1979, p.105). Brinkmanship and hard rhetoric continued from North Korea during February to May. Threats of annihilation of the U.S. imperialist aggressors, further announcing that the regime nullified all nonaggression and denuclearization agreements with South and putting all North-South relations in "a state of war". The regime cut of the military hotline with Seoul and at the end of April threatened with final decisive and serious measures if South Korea doesn't stop issuing ultimatums (CSIS 2013a).

"North Korea military personnel are standing by to annihilate the US imperialist aggressors, only awaiting an order from Supreme Commander Marshal Kim Jong Un" (CSIS 2013a) - Statement from the Korean Central News Agency of DPRK on the 20th of March 2013

In response to these provocations Park Geun-hye condemned the North on several occasions and stressed the imperative for security and survival (Park 2013c; Park 2013b; Park 2013e). At the memorial service of the sinking of Cheonan on the 26th of March 2013, the president underlined the threat to South Korean security, "North Korea is still threatening our peace and security with its nuclear tests, the launch of missiles and rhetoric claiming to nullify

the Armistice Agreement" (Park 2013d). Applying how threats and provocations from North Korea create an atmosphere of uncertainty on the peninsula and in the region.

The security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula now hangs in the balance. North Korea is pushing ahead with nuclear tests and the development of long-range missiles while threatening to nullify the Armistice Agreement. On top of this, binational territorial disputes and an arms race in Northeast Asia are growing increasingly fierce (Park 2013c).
- Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the joint commissioning ceremony of the military Academies on the 4th of March 2013.

Park Geun-hye points to the situation in North East Asia as explained through *security dilemma*, whereas one states actions, in this case North Korean conducts nuclear test, in order to increase their own safety instead decreases the security of other states. This relates not only South Korea but the whole North East Asian region (Mearsheimer 2011, p.430). Given as states are rational actors and the uncertainty of other states intentions makes it likely for a state to perceive other states defensive actions to secure its own survival as offensive and expansive actions (Nye & Welch 2010, p.60). The anarchic system where states seek to seek to maximize their power and influence thus creates an environment of uncertainty and a situation of security dilemma according to neo-realism which this situation points to (Mearsheimer 1995, p.10). Therefore, the South Korean capacity to deter North Korea is linked to military power of their forces and in particular to the bilateral defense treaty and alliance with United States, which contributes to South Korean defense capability. With the means of a strong defense posture in order to balance a aggressive North. According to Kenneth N. Waltz states in an *anarchic system seek balance in order to secure its position*, South Korea balance with the United States in order to secure its position on the Korean peninsula (Waltz 1979, p.126).

In order to further strengthen such security capabilities, my Administration will actively boost defense cooperation with partner countries as well as our own national defense capacity (Park 2103h).
- President Park Geun-hye at the joint commissioning ceremony of the military Academies on the 4th of March 2013.

In order to uphold a firm stance and defense posture towards North Korea. Park Geun-hye emphasized the role of credible deterrence in response to provocative behavior. In her inaugural speech she pointed out "I will move forward step by step to build trust between the South and the North on the basis of credible deterrence" (Park 2013a). Furthermore, in public

speeches during February to May; "We will resolutely deal with North Korea's provocations (...) While provocations by the North will be met by stronger counter-responses" (Park 2013b; Park 2013d). In a speech on the 27th of July 2013, to commemorating participation of U.N. forces in the Korea War "I will never tolerate any provocation that poses a threat to the life and property of our people. On the strength of resolute deterrent capabilities and close cooperation with the international community (...)" (Park 2013h). The counter responses to North Korean brinkmanship are strongly confirmed by South Korean officials as well by United States officials hence to the U.S.-ROK alliance and presence of United States military on the ground. President Barack Obama stated in the aftermath of the nuclear test on the 12th of February 2013;

North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs constitute a threat to U.S. national security and to international peace and security. The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korean provocations and steadfast in our defense commitments to allies in the region. (Obama 2013a)

South Korean Foreign Minister, Yun Byung-se, stressed the importance of increased defense capabilities in early April 2013 at a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry regarding the issue on strengthening South Korean defense capability through the *military alliance* with United States to deter North Korea; "tension is getting higher on the Korean peninsula, and is critically important for the U.S. and South Korea to enhance its defense capabilities" (Byung-se 2013a). Responded by Secretary of State John Kerry; "President made the decision to redeploy missile defense with respect to the United States itself as well as to take other preparations in the region and to send a very clear signal to our allies and the North alike that the United States will defend our allies and that we will not be subject to irrational or reckless provocation." (Kerry 2013a). Viewing this in the light of neo-realism and a system level perspective; South Korea's struggle for survival and securing its position give means to *balance of power* alongside the ally United States which enables South Korea to maintain its position (Waltz 1979, p.126).

Hence, when President Park Geun-hye met with United States President Barack Obama in Washington on the 7th of May 7 2013 the issue at stake was North Korea and U.S.-ROK cooperation. Barack Obama announced his support for Park Geun-hye proposed "Trustpolitik" and trust building process "The President and I noted that it is important that we continue to strengthen our deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and conventional

weapons threat and shared the view that in this respect" (Park 2013e). Clearly indicating a continued *policy alignment* between the two states regarding their North Korea policy (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013a). Moreover, the statement implies a strengthened deterrence towards North Korea and a unweaved continued commitment of United States military presence on the Korean peninsula in a response to Pyongyang's threats and provocations (Cha, 2013; Joon-seung, 2013).

5.1.2 Dimension II: Neo-liberalism

As tension eased the dialogue regarding the reopening of Kaesong industrial complex (KIC) opened up during the summer. South Korean policy shifted from survival and security to a more regional focus. President Park Geun-hye initiated a multilateral cooperation initiative earlier in the year, North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (Park 2013l). The main proposition of NAPCI relates to the neo-liberalistic idea of institutions as mediator to foster cooperation. Moreover, advocating *multilateral cooperation* on softer issues to increase cooperation in the region that would led to spill-over effect into other more security related areas (Nye & Welch 2010, p.59-60). President Park emphasized the idea of *spill-over effect* as means for the North East Asia region to deal with regional security issues, in particular North Korea, in a more cooperative manner (Park 2013l; Schmitter 2005, p.256). The initiated multilateral approach, NAPCI, encourages North Korea to address and cooperate on denuclearization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a, p.13). Thus advancing security related issues away from what is described by many experts as the *Asian paradox* - given the increased regional disputes, e.g. Dokdo/Senkaku, Taiwan Strait, despite the increased economic development and trade expansion in the region (Park 2013l).

The present situation is a paradoxical one, in which the level of economic interdependence in the region is growing even as the tensions surrounding historical and territorial issues continue to rise. The Northeast Asian Peace Initiative that I introduced seeks to overcome this challenge by providing a framework for multilateral dialogue that begins to implement cooperation and dialogue in the areas where this is currently possible and later expands the scope of cooperation to different areas such as security (Park 2013i).

- Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 68th anniversary of Liberation on the 15th of August 2013.

The Asian paradox ought to be at odds that the neo-liberal notion of economic *interdependence* foster coherency and *cooperation between states*, however, the means for South Korea to address this is thus with the same recipe, as described above by Park Geun-hye. Arguing from the neo-liberal standpoint that by engage in trade and economic cooperation, moreover, pursuing cooperation on softer non-traditional security issues e.g. environment, cyber security, energy security, will enhance possibility to reach agreements on more tense security related issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a; Schmitter 2005, p.256). Expanding the scope during the year for multilateral cooperation, the South Korean president also outlined a Eurasia regional cooperation project, further embracing idea of *multilateral approach* to regional security concerns e.g. North Korea, "We must establish Eurasia as a continent of peace. Threats to peace and security are our biggest obstacles to trade and cultural exchanges (...) tensions continue in the region. The danger of a military collision exists as always" (Cha 2010; Park 2013j; Park 2013k; Park 2013l; Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.122). As well as achieving *absolute gains* with expanding economic cooperation into the Eurasia region. Nevertheless, the South Korean approach have emphasized a multilateral approach from the start of the year; "To ease tensions and conflicts (..) to strengthen trust with countries in the region, including the United States, China, Japan, Russia and other Asian and Oceanic countries (Park 2013a). Further underlying the neo-liberal dimension of the South Korean policy that is advocating a *multilateral approach* instead of an idea of a unilateral preemptive strike policy to global security threats (Cha 2010, p.160). Thus giving NAPCI together with existing regional institutional mechanism for cooperation e.g. ASEAN regional forum, East Asia Summit, Trilateral Cooperation the possibilities to minimize the effect of security dilemma (Nye & Welch 2010, p.59-60).

5.1.3 Dimension III: Reciprocity

The South Korean administration has in terms of reciprocity towards North Korea, to large degree, pursued a *specific reciprocity*, that is "good for good and bad for bad" (Kim, Y. 2013, p.183-189). The posture since President Park Geun-hye inaugural speech and throughout the year the demand for North Korea to live up their previous obligations and start showing sincere steps towards denuclearization, thus becoming a "responsible member of the international community", in order for South Korean engagement and economic support.

Outlined by President Park as "If North Korea made the right choice, exchanges and cooperation would be expanded, and we would redouble our efforts to open the way for joint" (Park 2013h). This has been repeated by the South Korean administration on several occasions (Byung-se 2013b; Park 2013c; Park 2013b; Park 2013g; Park 2013h; Park 2013j).

When North Korea abandons its nuclear ambitions and ceases its provocations, it will be able to become a responsible member of the international community. Only then will the path toward shared development by South and North be opened to us and only then will the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula begin in earnest...While provocations by the North will be met by stronger counter-responses, the North's willingness to make the right choice and walk the path of change will be answered with more flexible engagement (Park 2013b).

- Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 94th March First Independence Movement Day on the 4th of March 2013.

This statement shows that the only way South Korea will to start engage North Korea in terms of enhanced economic support and cooperation would be if Pyongyang makes the right choice, which is to abandon its nuclear weapons program and stop with provocations. Explained by Park Geun-hye in a speech on the 18th November 2013 to the National Assembly in Seoul "Once trust is developed between the Koreans on issues including the North Korean nuclear armament, there will be room for a wider range of economic cooperation" (Park 2013m). This policy direction from Seoul towards Pyongyang is in many ways similar to the previous Lee Myung-bak administration, that pursued a specific reciprocity under the demise of engagement if North Korea denuclearized (Ohm 2012, p.18; Kim, Y. 2013, p.192-193). However, there have also been a more flexible approach vis-à-vis North Korea in terms of reciprocity, compared to the predecessor Lee Myung-bak, thus, not to the extent of the former "Sunshine policy". Nevertheless, Park Geun-hye have emphasized for the separation between humanitarian assistance and pre-condition of denuclearization (Park2013i; Park 2013i).

We can no longer turn a blind eye to hunger and other difficulties facing people on the other side of the Peninsula. Regardless of the political situation, the new Administration will continue its humanitarian assistance and exchanges (Park 2013i).

- Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 68th anniversary of Liberation on the 15th of August 2013.

The separation of humanitarian aid was also announced by the president at the address to the joint Session of the United States Congress in May "The Republic of Korea will never accept a nuclear-armed North Korea (...). at the same time, I will not link humanitarian aid provided to the North Korean people (..) to the political situation"(Park 2013f). Indicating that South Korea are pursuing a *middle road in terms of reciprocity*, that a nuclear North Korea is not acceptable, hence the demand for denuclearization, and provocations will be responded decisively, however, some level of humanitarian aid and economic cooperation will persist. Thus South Korea opens up towards some degree of *diffuse reciprocity*, whereas imposing for a repayment in the future (Axelrod 1984, p.136-138). The Unification Ministry in South Korea announced in early September to send humanitarian aid worth \$6.3 million to the North Korea through multilateral organizations and NGOs e.g. the World Health Organization (WHO). Provided in the wake of the eased tension and ongoing talks throughout the summer regarding the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (CSIS 2013b).

5.1.4 Summary: South Korea

South Korea policy vis-à-vis North Korea under the Park administration can adhere to both neo-liberalism and neo-realism for explanatory power. Neo-realism can shed light upon why South Korea seeks to balance North Korea with the support from their long time ally United States. The role of survival for South Korea has been underlined throughout the year. There are clear streams of neo-liberal content in the policy, whereas, South Korea seeks to address security concerns on the peninsula and the region through multilateral cooperation. Engagement with other actors in the region, seeking to yield spill-over effects to security issues, which not only relates to North Korea, moreover, to the whole region. The Park administration have not initiated any u-turns when it comes to approaching North Korea, there is still a ground condition for negotiations, based on - North Korea need to show sincere steps towards denuclearization and live up to international obligations before progress in inter-Korean relations can be made. However, there was a opening during the second half of the year, towards, a more diffuse reciprocity, where President Park initiated unconditioned aid on few occasions. As well emphasize by foreign minister Yun. This implying there might open towards a middle road in terms of reciprocity, taking a few steps away from former Lee Myung-bak hard-line policy based on specific reciprocity towards a policy based on diffuse reciprocity.

5.2 United States

During Barack Obama's first term, 2009-2012, United States pursued a specific reciprocity policy vis-à-vis North Korea, in line with the previous Bush administration (Kim, Y. 2013, p.196-197). The Obama administration policy strategic patience means United States always leave the door open for dialog but await the first move from Pyongyang (Lankov 2013, p.177). Moreover, North Korea should see United States as a potential trading partner that will convene to give economic support and pursue normalization of relations, under the right condition, if they first give up their nuclear weapons development program and show signs of positive efforts to return to the six-party talks (Council on Foreign Relations 2010, p.9-10; Korea institute for national unification 2013, p.61-63). Park Geun-hye predecessor Lee Myung-bak, 2008-2013, aligned with both Bush and Obama and pursued a hard line specific reciprocity policy; to contain and deter North Korea from provocations, and only after sincere progress from Pyongyang on denuclearization expanded trade and economic aid would follow (Council on Foreign Relations 2010, p.4-5, 27; Kim, Y. 2013, p.198-201).

United States North Korea policy intertwines with their larger strategy in re-balancing towards Asia-Pacific. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton introduced the re-balance strategy or "Pivot to Asia" - to reorient American leadership and foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific to recognize the region's global economic and political significance in the 21st century (Campbell & Andrews 2013; Clinton 2011). Despite the economic growth and interdependence in the region there is continuous instability as territorial disputes, growing defense budgets and provocative North Korea (Campbell & Ratner 2014). Thus by advancing U.S. economic and security interest in the region, moreover, prioritizing alliances and engagement with multilateral institutions in the region to sustain peace and security; e.g. counter proliferation efforts of North Korea (Campbell & Ratner 2014).

As for the beginning of 2013, North Korean conducted its third nuclear test on the eve of President Barack Obama's State of the Union address on the 12th of February 2013. Condemned by President Barack Obama as "a highly provocative act" and responded with a UNSC Resolution 2094, that enhanced financial measures against Pyongyang, adopted unanimously on March 7 (CSIS, 2013a). How would U.S. adopt policy vis-à-vis North Korea during 2013 and how would U.S.-ROK alliance serve as platform to coordinate policy or disparity?

5.2.1 Dimension I: Neo-realism

"America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons. The regime in North Korea must know that they will only achieve security and prosperity by meeting their international obligations" (Obama 2013a).

- Barack Obama in the State of the Union speech on the 12th of February 2013

A nuclear North Korea armed with long distance missile capability would trigger a regional security dilemma spiral and transform the security environment in the region. Barack Obama administration have stated clear that they will not accept a nuclear North Korea at any circumstances and the impact of the third North Korean nuclear test have led to increased defense capabilities from United States and South Korea on the peninsula. In a joint statement president Barack Obama and president Park Geun-hye emphasized the increased defense capabilities, "we are resolved to continue to defend our citizens against North Korea's provocations by strengthening our comprehensive, interoperable, and combined defense capabilities, to include shared efforts to counter the missile threat posed by North Korea and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems."(Obama 2013d). As deterrence measures United States strategic command flew B-2 stealth bombers to the peninsula as part of the military exercise in March (CSIS, 2013a). The *power balance* in the region would subsequently change with a nuclear North Korea combined with full range long distance ballistic missiles. A game changer which likely would trigger a *security dilemma* scenario and nuclear weapons race in the region thus further decrease the security environment (Mearsheimer 2011, p.430). Why United States has interest to prevent development of full capabilities as well as to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology. Susan Rice, national security advisor, acknowledges in a speech late November 2013 that the North Korean regime poses a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, Susan Rice describes how North Korean military capabilities and technology constitutes a threat to the region as well as to the United States.

"The regime threatens its neighbors. Pyongyang proliferates dangerous goods and technologies. It seeks to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and its long-range missile program in flagrant violation of international law. Consequently, one of our most pressing security goals is to roll back the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and other WMD programs. "

- Susan Rice, National Security Advisor on the 20th of November 2013.

The policy of strategic patience of containment and deterrence would serve to defer North Korea from provocations, while at same time keep an open hand for dialog and engagement given North Korea would progress towards denuclearization (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.120). Further outlined by the United States administration ensure the support through their defense capabilities to increase the *deterrence* posture on the peninsula. Increasingly in the aftermath of the third nuclear test and North Korean provocations.

President Park's approach is very compatible with my approach and the approach that we have been taking together for several years now. And I understand it, the key is that we will be prepared for a deterrence; that we will respond to aggression; that we will not reward provocative actions; but that we will maintain an openness to an engagement process when we see North Korea taking steps that would indicate that it is following a different path (Obama 2013d)

- Remarks by President Obama and President Park of South Korea in a Joint Press Conference East Room, on the 7th of May 2013.

Re-balance toward the region where U.S.-ROK alliance serve as a hub, for U.S. strategy and preserve relative power in the region. To contain North Korea, given a stronger position for Pyongyang would change the power balance in the region, given their military capabilities would advance further toward increased capability of their ballistic long-distance missiles (Smith Dunne p.78). Rebalance toward the region would be rational from a perspective of increasingly economic and political importance (Smith Dunne p.79)

President Barack Obama condemned in February the third North Korean nuclear test and refereed to the multilateral forum, six-party talks, and United Nations Security Council to coordinate and pursue firm action (Obama 2013b). Sanctions as *coercive means* to change North Korean behavior "We are also working closely with the UN Security Council's DPRK sanctions committee and its Panel of Experts, the EU (...) to harmonize our sanctions programs and to ensure the full and transparent implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, and 2087, which remain the heart of the multilateral sanctions regime" (Davies 2013a). The U.S. policy impedes a hard line stance towards North Korea, give the developments early on in the year, have not eased up that position. The response to the regime in Pyongyang's brinkmanship and the need to live up to international obligations otherwise more sanctions and firm actions will follow (Office of the Press Secretary 2013a).

5.2.2 Dimension II: Neo-liberalism

United States have pursued a *multilateral approach* to address the North Korean nuclear issue, moreover, that also goes hand in hand with a broader strategy of rebalancing to Asia (Clinton 2011). The importance of multilateral cooperation to address the security concerns regarding the risk of nuclear proliferation and regional security in North East Asia have been pointed out by the Obama administration (Snyder 2009).

"Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will consequently remain a vital component of our efforts to impede the DPRK's efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities" (Davies 2013a).

- Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Policy Testimony Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations Washington, DC, on the 7th of March 2013.

One of the most important functions to mitigate and shape North Korean expectations and behavior have been through the six-party talks, institution such as six-party talks can according to Joseph Nye help to create a framework to minimize effect of anarchy and security dilemma, e.g. minimize Pyongyang security concerns (Grieco 1990, p.27; Nye & Welch 2010, p.59-60). U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and South Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se insisted on the work to continue among the six-party members, to establish pressure on North Korea to adhere "North Korea must adhere to its international obligations and commitments or face further isolation." (Kerry 2013b). Nonetheless, the six-party talks are still at halt, and given the current hurdle that North Korea needs to live up to their previous obligations have not been fulfilled, the premise to open up the six-party talks are in a locked position. The lack of compliance from North Korea on their obligation was explained by the U.S. Special Representative on North Korea Policy Glyn Davies in September.

"And right now, we simply do not see the positive attitude of North Korea toward fulfilling its obligations, its commitments, to living up to UN Security Council Resolutions, and we need to see that. We need to see some sign that they are sincere about what is the central issue of the Six-Party process, which is the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" (2013c).

- Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy, U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Remarks to Press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, South Korea on the 10th of September 2013.

There were no signs of resumption of the Six-party talks during the second half of the year, put forward by Glyn Davies that there is still no signs "we simply do not see the positive attitude of North Korea toward fulfilling its obligations, its commitments, to living up to UN Security Council Resolutions, and we need to see that" (Davies 2013c; Davies 2013d; Davies 2013e). The impact of Six-party talks as regional forum to address security concerns has therefore been limited during the year.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledges at a meeting with foreign minister Yun, on the 12th of April 2013 how there are several means to engage in *multilateral cooperation*, where, the U.S.-ROK alliance constitutes a foundation for U.S regional expansion. The U.S.-ROK alliance have thrived for 60 years, and the bilateral security agreement have turned into a global partnership between United States and South Korea (Kerry 2013b). The importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance has been repeatedly emphasized by officials from the Obama administration, e.g. Vice President Joe Biden, Tom Dillion, National Security Advisor to the President, interlinked the U.S.-ROK alliance to the re-balance strategy "strengthen the alliance aligns with the rebalancing strategy towards Asia" (Biden 2013a; Office of the Press Secretary 2013a).

"We're determined to strengthen our alliances, cultivate new partners in the Pacific Basin, build constructive relations with China, pursue major agreements that further integrate our economies, and join and strengthen the institutions of the Asia Pacific and of the East Asian Summit -- APEC, ASEAN and others" (Biden 2013b).

- Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on U.S.-Korea Relations and the Asia-Pacific Yonsei University Seoul, Republic of Korea on the 6th of December 2013.

A view coordinated with South Korea, recognized by President Park in may during the U.S.-ROK summit in Washington, "the alliance should continue to serve as function as linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia" (Obama 2013d). The *alliance with South Korea* serves both as strategic value for United States as means for U.S. policy to enhance their presence in the region and address the nuclear proliferation threat from North Korea. Having said that, the alliance functions as a regional hub and can thus be explained from a neo-liberal view to enhance multilateral cooperation as well as bilateral cooperation with South Korea on security issues regarding the Korean peninsula, instead of pursuing a unilateral approach to security threats (Cha 2010). Moreover, the 60 year long alliance have advanced further with the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, entered into force

2012, between United States and South Korea (Office of the Press Secretary 2013b; Weitz 2013, p.309). Acknowledged by President Barack Obama as "the KORUS FTA enhances our credibility as a Pacific power and tells the world that we will remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific region". In addition, President Park Geun-hye described the free trade agreement as means for United States to rebalance towards the region (Park 2013f). Thus, by enhancing cooperation within the U.S.-ROK alliance both parties can reach *absolute gains*, as increased regional security, by intertwining their strategies as the "re-balance to Asia" (Carlsnaes, Risse et al 2002, p. 374). Furthermore, also by participating in East Asia Summit forum United States seek to deal with security in the region, in particular North Korea (Office of the Press Secretary 2013a).

The multilateral approach is reassured in the policy vis-à-vis North Korea by cooperating with the international community on the impact on global security that nuclear North Korea constitutes. United States seeks support from the international community to put pressure on North Korea and regional collaboration, 6 -part talks as well global, United Nation Security. Combined with other regional forums, EAS, ASAN, these serves as multilateral institutions to initiate cooperation in areas as economic, security e.g. North Korea. United States builds cooperation among actors in the international system to cope with the nuclear threat from North Korea (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.122; Byung-se 2013c; Cha 2010).

5.2.3 Dimension III: Reciprocity

United States approach vis-à-vis North Korea in terms of reciprocity have been consistent throughout the year - the baseline for negotiations and for U.S. to enter talks have been for North Korea to live up to previous international obligation, stop provocations and change the course towards a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. This baseline has persisted throughout the Obama administration since entered office in 2009. Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor, commented on why United States refuses to reward bad North Korean behavior "The United States will not play the game of accepting empty promises or yielding to threats. As former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, we won't buy the same horse twice." (Office of the Press Secretary 2013a). At the bilateral summit between United States and South Korea, May 7, President Obama addressed the issue regarding entering negotiations with North Korea.

"Our two nations are prepared to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build trust. But as always -- and as President Park has made clear -- the burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula." (Obama 2013d) - President Barack Obama on the 7th of May 2013.

Clearly stating that a first move is expected to come from Pyongyang before any diplomatic engagement from United States are expected. A position that was reaffirmed several times during the year from Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korean policy in the Obama administration. Davies stated in the wake of North Korean brinkmanship in early March "The United States offered—and has continued to offer—Pyongyang an improved relationship with the United States and integration into the international community, provided North Korea demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments" (Kerry, 2013a). Specific reciprocity based on a tit-for-tat approach and contingency where actions are stopped from the other part when the counterpart are not progressing (Keohane 1986a, p.10). The balance of treatment, where one side treats the other side in the same way that in this case North Korea behaves, moreover, international sanctions were further tighten in the aftermath of the nuclear test in February (Kim, Y. 2013, p.189). On the 7th of March 2013 United Nation Security Council unanimous adopted resolution 2094 of mandatory financial measures against North Korea (CSIS, 2013a). Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the specific reciprocity policy in the end of the year at a visit in Seoul, where he concluded that "North Korea can never achieve security and prosperity so long as it pursues nuclear weapons -- period" and underlying that the condition for United States to go back to six-party talks are "when North Korea demonstrates its full commitment to complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization" (Biden, 2013b). The Obama administration view on diffuse reciprocity was expressed by Secretary of State John Kerry in a remark at a press conference where he explained that in principle United States would not engage North Korea in negotiations, aid or economic assistance unless they have lived up to the standards that have been laid out and to move towards the denuclearization or to embrace denuclearization. Furthermore, that these steps have been verifiable and are real sincere steps going forward (Kerry, 2013a). However, Glyn Davies argued for a convergent view in terms of reciprocity despite the diffuse approach pursued by South Korea to reach a re-opening of KIC, acknowledge the importance of KIC to the South Korean government (Davies 2013b). The strategic patience, awaiting North Korea to initiate first move, and responding with a tit-for-

tat behavior can relate to the side effect of specific reciprocity called echo effects. Explained by Robert Axelrod that cooperation cannot be achieved as long as both parties continue with the same tit-for-tat approach (Axelrod 1984, p.136-138).

5.2.4 Summary: United States

The United States administration has been very clear in the statements regarding North Korea in terms of deterrence capability, *military alliance* and defense posture with its allies South Korea. The Obama administration has been consistent in denouncing North Korean threats and provocations both aimed at allies as to United States itself. The step that North Korea needs to take according to the United States policy towards North Korea is sincere steps of denuclearization that shows sign of commitment (Biden 2013b; Davis 2013h; Davis 2013g; Davis 2013f; Rice 2013). Secretary of State John Kerry message to North Korea during his visit in Seoul in April; "They simply have to be prepared to live up to the international obligations and standards which they have accepted, and make it clear they will move to denuclearization as part of the talks, and those talks could begin." (Kerry 2013a).

The military alliance with South Korea, U.S.-ROK alliance there has been consistent and common ground between the two allies in which way to respond to North Korea. When President Park Geun-hye made her first official visit abroad, visiting President Barack Obama, in much of assure each other of their strong commitment to their mutual defense treaty. Barack Obama expressed this on the U.S.-ROK alliance summit in Washington on the 7th of May 2013.

President Park's approach is very compatible with my approach and the approach that we have been taking together for several years...key is that we will be prepared for a deterrence; that we will respond to aggression; that we will not reward provocative actions; but that we will maintain an openness to an engagement process when we see North Korea taking steps that would indicate that it is following a different path. And that's exactly the right approach (Obama 2013d) - Remarks by President Obama on the 7th of May 2013.

The policy coordination from Seoul and Washington are much assured, in terms of coordination and their efforts; Secretary of State John Kerry further issued statement in October 2013, "...we have been able to see our partnership evolve further into a comprehensive strategic alliance" (Kerry 2013c). Which emphasize the history and how the

alliance as grow in many more areas than just military alliance, previous year in 2012 South Korea and United States signed a Free trade agreement which have been fully implemented thus furthermore strengthen the US-ROK alliance (Campbell & Ratner 2014).

6 Conclusions

Results from this study imply that South Korea and United states to a large degree share a coordinated policy regarding North Korea, despite, some minor differences on engagement over the year. The response to the North Korean regimes third nuclear test and brinkmanship in the beginning of the year 2013, resulted in a *united front* from United States and South Korea, moreover, gave room for the two administrations to emphasize and *strengthen their deterrence* capabilities. Therefore, the South Korean President Park Geun-hye repeatedly expressed the importance of the survival of Korean people.

From a neo-realistic standpoint, South Korea's position in the international system with a neighbor that pursues increased military capabilities through the development of nuclear weapons and long distance ballistic missiles. This would be a game changer that further paves the way for a new relative power balance in the region. Given as well the historic events and incidents in recent years, e.g. the sinking of Cheonan in 2010, and the stale-mate tensed conflict, the survival for South Korea is at stake. The third nuclear test in 2013 further heightened tension on the peninsula. Neo-realism can explain how the South Korean president Park Geun-hye stresses importance of survival and the need for a close and coordinated relationship with United States. The means to rely on United States as an ally to provide assistance in securing South Koreas position in the international system can be explained from a neo-realistic perspective of balance of power (Mearsheimer 1995, p.11). However, there is potential risk at hand given that North Korea would develop its full nuclear and long distance ballistic missiles capacities, this would not only change the security environment in North East Asia but in particular give means to a intensified response from the United States. Moreover, this would led to a security dilemma spiral in the region which both United States and the other six-party talk member states in the region share a common interest to prevent occurring. Therefore, to stop North Korea from developing full nuclear capacity is a common objective of all six-party talk members. Hence, this course of action would turn-around the

table in favor to Pyongyang given the increased relative power (Mearsheimer 1995, p.10). The United States policy in North East Asia, that seeks to prevent global proliferation, goes beyond North Korea to include the whole Asia-pacific region in terms of their (Campbell 2013).

In terms of content of neo-liberal ideas in the South Korean and United States North Korea policy can be found in their efforts by promoting multilateral cooperation to enhance security and regional economic integration, with the objective to increase trust among states in the region (Carlsnaes, Risse et al 2002, p. 374). The North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, pioneered by Park Geun-hye, claims to address regional cooperation on softer issues e.g. environmental, cyber security in order to induce spill-over effects in to more pressing issues as North Korean nuclear development and regional security (Park 2013k; Park 2013l). Hence, a neo-liberal perspective on interdependence and regional integration as potential linkage effects and the value in cooperation to achieve absolute gains instead of relative gains would therefore explain the policy (Chatterjee 2003, p.130, p.122; Schmitter 2005, p.256). The North East Asia Initiative can be said to correlate with the larger regional U.S. strategy, re-balance towards Asia, where United States seeks to enhance cooperation in areas of economic, security and people-to-people ties, to strengthen U.S. presences as well as be integral part in the 21st century. United States emphasize the importance of alliances in the region, focus on to address pressing security issues as North Korea and nuclear proliferation (Campbell & Ratner 2014). Having said that, one of the key interest for U.S. in the region, with regards to the Korean peninsula, is to prevent proliferation of nuclear capabilities. North Korean denuclearization is also emphasized by the South Korean administration, however, the close proximity and overarching objective in Seoul of unification of the Korean people implies a different perspective than U.S. On this point, Scott Snyder argues that United States and South Korea should overcome the difference on security policy, where United States views security in global term while South Korea focus begins and ends with the peninsula (Snyder 2009). This can also be seen in terms of content of reciprocity during the year in the respective policy from United States and South Korea. Obama administration continues along the specific reciprocity line "strategic patience" from the first term, and the predecessor Bush, where South Korea opens up to diverge from the specific reciprocity during the year to some degree of content of diffuse reciprocity.

In terms of reciprocity the main response and standpoint from both United States and South Korea towards North Korea adheres to specific reciprocity. However, some degree of opening towards a more diffuse reciprocity came from South Korea during the year - indicating a policy difference with United States. Nevertheless, Park Geun-hye has announced that North Korea needs to give up its nuclear ambition in order for South Korea to expand its economic cooperation and enter dialog towards peace. With regards to specific reciprocity it is the same approach uphold by the previous administration in Seoul and the Obama administration under the first term. Hence, the triangular effects according to Jong-Han Yoon (2011), where hard line policy from Washington bear impact on North Korean behavior vis-à-vis South Korea, would therefore converge with a negative effect on inter-korean relation.

The strategy from Seoul to pursue a trust building process through the means of credible deterrence, which is through a military capability that should be strong enough to deter North Korea from provocations. This can also be interpreted in terms of a security dilemma, hence North Korea capability of nuclear weapon and striving for ballistic missile capability to threaten United States mainland triggers a arms race in the region. The hard line policy choice from Seoul is more close to the approach proposed by Victor Cha (2002) based on a strategy of upholding a containment military deterrence posture combined with engagement towards Pyongyang, in order to be able to use carrots as sticks if North Korea change its behavior to a more provocative. This perspective aligns with the South Korean administration policy of credible deterrence from President Park Geun-hye. On the contrary, argued by the progressive scholars Young-Geun Kim (2013) and Jong-Han Yoon (2011) that a diffuse reciprocity with a soft line, neo-liberal engagement policy would encourage more peaceful inter-Korean relationship rather than how the situation thus far on the peninsula have emerged under Lee Myung-bak hawkish approach. However, Victor Cha points out that the North Korean survival strategy to pursue nuclear weapons to secure its position in a anarchic system, is far from compatible with today's policy direction from Seoul and Washington. North Korea wants to be acknowledge as a nuclear state by United States and secure its regime survival, its stands on the far side of the rest of the international community and in particular United States and South Korea (Cha 2009, p.123).

Where the specific demand from Seoul and Washington to return to the negotiation table is that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear capability and live up to its previous commitment. Resuming from the scholar Young-Geun Kim (2013) who concludes that the policy of the

previous administration of Bush and Lee Myung-bak, which both sought a hard line specific reciprocity policy, indeed is very much aligned and similar with the policy of the current two administrations in Seoul and Washington. Hence, the outlook in reliance with previous research from Young-Geun Kim and Jong-Han Yoon would be that tension and provocation will prevail, unless a change in policy direction occurs (Kim, Y. 2013, p.198-201).

7 Future Research

This thesis could provide a foundation for further research in policy field on the Korean peninsula by including domestic aspects, linking these with system variables, suggested through FPA, neoclassic realism and Putnam "two level game theory". Robert D. Putnam acknowledges that political leaders must consider both domestic and international aspects when negotiating in the international arena (Putnam 1988). Domestic politics and international relations are inevitably linked together, moreover, state-centric theories, e.g. applied in this study, inadequately recognize these linkages Putnam concludes. Domestic aspect e.g. public opinion in South Korea attributes less importance to South-North relations in favor of domestic issues, however, tendency points towards that the slight majority prefer engagement policy over sanctions and containment which correlates with their political orientation (ASAN 2011; ASAN 2013). The split in South Korean domestic politics between conservatives and progressive, suggested by Sung-Bin Ko to also reflect the polarized divide in policy towards North Korea, containment or engagement (Sung-Bon 2006; Jong-Yun 2010, p.342). State-centric and international aspects could therefore intertwine with domestic aspects to further understand policy vis-à-vis North Korea, hence, approaching South-North relations with Putnam "two-level games" theory could be applicable for future research. In addition, decoding the decision making process from a actor specific perspective suggested by Valerie M. Hudson could interrelate to further understand the impact of domestic aspects (Hudson 2005). Preferable by including a neo-classical perspective that seek to place domestic politics as intervening variable and a bridge between structural and unit-level factors (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2011, p.92).

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Appendix

Table 7.1 List of empirical sources, United States

Nr	State	Designation	Date	Subject	Source
1	United States	President Barack Obama	2013-02-12	State of the Union Address Tuesday, February 12, 2013 Washington, DC	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
2	United States	President Barack Obama	2013-02-12	Statement by the President on North Korean announcement of nuclear test	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
3	United States	President Barack Obama	2013-02-22	Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan After Bilateral Meeting Oval Office	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
4	United States	Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy	2013-03-07	U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Policy Testimony Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations Washington, DC	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
5	United States	Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President	2013-03-11	Remarks on "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013" The Asia Society New York	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
6	United States	John Kerry Secretary of State	2013-04-02	Remarks With Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Yun Byung-se After Their Meeting, Washington, DC	United States Department of State
7	United States	John Kerry Secretary of State	2013-04-12	Remarks With Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se After Their Meeting Seoul, South Korea	United States Department of State
8	United States	John Kerry Secretary of State	2013-04-13	Joint Statement Adopted at the United States-Republic of Korea Foreign Ministers' Meeting	Office of the Spokesperson United States Department of State
9	United States	White House, Office of the Spokesperson	2013-05-07	Fact Sheet: The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance	Office of the Spokesperson
10	United States	President Barack Obama	2013-05-07	Remarks by President Obama and President Park of South Korea in a Joint Press Conference East Room	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
11	United States	Press release, Office of the Press Secretary	2013-05-07	Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
12	United States	Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy	2013-05-14	Remarks to Press in Seoul, South Korea	United States Department of State
13	United States	Press release, Office of the Press Secretary	2013-06-21	Notice -- Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
14	United States	James P. Zumwalt Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary	2013-06-27	Next Steps in the U.S. - Republic of Korea Alliance Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Washington, DC	United States Department of State
15	United States	Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy	2013-09-10	Remarks to Press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, South Korea	United States Department of State
16	United States	John Kerry Secretary of State	2013-10-01	Remarks With Republic of Korea President Park Geun-hye At Their Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei	United States Department of State
17	United States	National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice	2013-11-20	Remarks on "America's Future in Asia" At Georgetown University, Gaston Hall Washington, D.C	The White House Office of the Press Secretary
18	United States	Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea	2013-11-22	Remarks to Press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul, South Korea	United States Department of State
19	United States	Glyn Davies Special Representative for North Korea policy	2013-11-25	Remarks to Press at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan	United States Department of State
20	United States	Vice President Joe Biden	2013-12-06	Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on U.S.-Korea Relations and the Asia-Pacific Yonsei University Seoul, Republic of Korea	The White House Office of the Vice President
21	United States	Vice President Joe Biden	2013-12-06	Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden and Republic of Korea President Park Geun-Hye in a Bilateral Meeting Blue House Seoul, South Korea	The White House Office of the Vice President

Table 7.2 List of empirical sources, South Korea

Nr	State	Designation	Date	Subject	Source
1	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-02-25	Inauguration Speech "Opening a New Era of Hope"	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
2	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-03-04	Address on the 94th March First Independence Movement Day	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
3	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-03-04	Remarks at the joint commissioning ceremony of the military Academies	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
4	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-03-26	Remarks at Memorial Service on the third anniversary of the sinking of the Cheonan	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
5	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-04-19	Remarks at Science Day and Information and Communication Day	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
6	South Korea	Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se	2013-04-27	Discussions on Preparations for President Park's US summit	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
7	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-05-08	Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at a joint press conference following a summit with U.S. President Barack Obama	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
8	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-05-09	Address by President Park Geun-hye to the joint Session of the United States Congress	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
9	South Korea	Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se	2013-05-27	Press Briefing Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
9	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-07-01	President meets with Zhang Dejiang, chairman of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
10	South Korea	Office of the President	2013-07-01	Summary of meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
11	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-07-22	Remarks at the ceremony honoring the UN Korean War Veterans	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
12	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-07-27	Remarks at the ceremony commemorating the participation of U.N. Forces in the Korean War	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
13	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-08-15	Address on the 68th anniversary of Liberation	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
14	South Korea	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yun Byung-se	2013-09-27	Keynote Address at the 68th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations New York	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
15	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-10-02	Address at the 65th Armed Forces Day	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
17	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-10-18	Remarks at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
18	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-11-05	Remarks at the Parliament of the United Kingdom	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
19	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-11-14	Congratulatory speech at the 2013 IFANS Conference on Global Affairs	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President
20	South Korea	President Park Geun-hye	2013-11-18	Address by President Park Geun-hye at the National Assembly	Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President