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1. Definition of exclaves

An exclave is a territory that is part of an independent state but separated from the main area by the territory of another state or by other states. Some scholars, such as Catudal\(^1\), do not count as exclaves areas that have water connection to the mainland, although such territories usually also need land routes to their mainland, which involves many of the problems that inland exclaves suffer from. Islands surrounded by foreign or international waters, such as most French Overseas Départements, usually do not count as exclaves, while French Guiana, with land borders towards Brazil and Suriname, might be called an exclave of France. In this case the area is formally under the same jurisdiction as the mainland.

Another question of definition is the political relationship between mainland and the external territory. External territories under colonial rule are not seen as exclaves, but there are borderline cases, especially with states that are characterized by the lack of a common political homogeneity, so called conglomerate states. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland includes, at least in certain matters, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, and to some extent also the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar. In spite of its large degree of self-governance, Gibraltar is part of the conglomerate state and can thus be defined as an exclave\(^2\). The most significant and unique example of a borderline exclave, however, would be West Berlin during 1961–1989. It was formally three-quarters of the Allied Territory of Berlin, but closely related to the Federal Republic of Germany (see below).

2. Towards a theory of exclaves

A theory is a comprehensive model of a process or a state of affairs, which seeks to explain its causes. An exclave is a legal entity, under a certain type of jurisdiction, but its spatial uniqueness lies in its spatial configuration in relation to the surrounding geopolitical entities. While early scholars in political geography and geopolitics

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\(^1\) H. Catudal, *The Exclave Problem of Western Europe*, University of Alabama Press, University, AL 1979, p. 5.

(particularly Ratzel and Kjellén around 1900) mentioned the existence of states and political networks of scattered territories (like Venice, pre-1871 Germany and the Hanseatic League), they saw them as a historical step towards the contained territorial state, based on the idea of an organism3.

After a long hiatus caused by the malevolent use of geopolitical ideas by Nazi Germany and other states, interest in enclaves and exclaves reappeared after the second world war, with a few analytical exceptions4 mainly as descriptive curiosities in handbooks of Political Geography5. Recent scholarship in political geography and neighbouring disciplines either ignores the subject6 or concentrates on individual cases. There is thus a lack of general theory about exclaves both in geography and other disciplines. Even in Vinokurov’s book A Theory of Enclaves, there is no serious attempt to formulate a general theory; it is mainly a valuable discussion of definitions and individual cases7. While a general theory of exclaves would encompass the causality of exclave existence and maintenance, more specified sub-theories would try to explain an exclave’s coming into existence (a generic theory), its maintenance by the reign (a functional theory) or its effects on its population (a socio-demographic theory).

A generic (historical) theory. Exclaves have come into existence under varying conditions. In most cases, however, they have one thing in common: their origins are almost all as third-order territories belonging to a second-order territory where the first-order territory is formally an independent state. The internal (domestic) exclave is at most an administrative problem. If the second-order territory becomes independent, the formerly domestic exclave becomes a territory surrounded by a different state.

Historically, there are three phases in the development of exclaves.
– One is the change from feudalism into territorial states in Europe, in the period 1500–1815 (in Germany, up to 1871), when land ownership and fiefdoms eventually turned into politically defined states.
– The second is the independence of former colonial or protectorate territories, 1945–2002 (India-Bangladesh, South Africa, East Timor). The division of land between the Trucial sheikhdoms on the Arabian peninsula in the 1950–60s, and their further development into the United Arab Emirates and the state of Oman, respectively, is a case in this category.
– The third is the break-up of federal states (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) into independent states around 1990, creating a large number of exclaves, such as Kaliningrad, Nakhitelchev and Dubrovnik.

4 Works by Minghi and Robinson, see E. Vinokurov, A theory of enclaves…, op. cit., p. 57 ff.
A functional theory focuses on the way that the independent state and its territory form the playground for political homogenizing, or nation-building. Through its location beyond the mainland territory, the exclave problematizes the nation-building of the territorial state. How does the government act in order to make the exclave a self-evident (natural) part of its territory?

This can be accomplished in many ways – through educational indoctrination, unifying symbols, through the building of infrastructural networks (roads and railways, telephone lines) and attempts at containment of the territory (border controls, customs duties). Such efforts aim to create a unity between the state as an organization and the nation (the inhabitants)\(^8\). These efforts also include attempts to form an integrated territorial economy, either by trying to equalize economic conditions between the exclave and the mainland, or by the opposite – that is, using the absolute or relative location of the exclave to develop a special economic climate\(^9\).

A socio-demographic theory of exclaves would focus on how exclave inhabitants behave in relation to the situation. Does the exclave situation bring about a particular demographic, ethnic or cultural deviance in relation to the mainland? Do exclave inhabitants accept their belonging and identity, in spite of their separation by another state, or do they show differences in spatial and social behaviour\(^10\)? What are the economic implications of the exclave situation, ranging from difficulties of provisions to attractiveness to tourism\(^11\)?

In order to understand the predicament of the exclave, we have to study both the formal behaviour of the state government (legislation, infrastructural arrangement and symbolification) and all acts of allegiance or deviance from the exclave dwellers. The genesis of the exclave may be interesting, but mainly from a symbolic and historiographical pint of view.

3. Exclaves in history

Before the formation of reigns into well-defined territories, rule over land could be divided into different categories, such as ecclesiastical and hereditary ownership, in turn divided into fiefdoms. The inhabitants’ allegiance was directed to the worldly ruler and, in the Christian areas, toward the representative of God, rather than to a nation or a country. Rulers shifted because of wars, but also because of marital arrangements among the ruling families. Some rulers developed a rather stable terri-
tory (e.g. Spain after the union of Castile and Aragon; France, Denmark and Sweden since around 1200). Other areas, particularly the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as well as the Italian peninsula, consisted in reality of a shifting number of territories under different rulers, in some cases republics. Often cities were independent or formed networks of co-operating territories, such as the Republic of Venice and the Hanseatic League. Under these conditions, territorial contiguity was not a necessity. However, states with a weak territorial basis, like Burgundy, which was divided into main areas 150 kilometers apart, were bound to fail (as it did in 1477), and the dispersed territories of the Habsburg Empire each developed into the territorial states of Austria (the Habsburg mainland, later Austria-Hungary), Spain and Belgium. Only in Germany and Italy did the process of territorial unification, spurred by technologies of communication, take longer.

With the emergence of a mutually recognized system of states through the Westphalian Peace of 1648, the relation between reign and territory became more stable – and the problem of territorial cohesion successively more acute. Yet it also created new non-contiguous territorial units. In the Westphalian Peace, the Kingdom of Sweden was awarded a number of territories within the Holy German Empire: the Archdiocese of Bremen, the Diocese of Verden, Vorpommern (Western Pomerania) including the city of Stettin, Rügen and the town of Wismar, including some surrounding spatially detached areas. For a short period, until 1658, all of these areas could be seen as exclaves of Swedish supremacy. However, with Sweden’s annexation of the formerly Danish southern tip of the Scandinavian peninsula, Pomerania and Rügen on the Baltic became an overseas part of the Kingdom, formally duchies ruled by the Swedish king as a member of the Council of the German Empire. The other Swedish possessions can be seen as inland exclaves. Because of their dispersion, they proved difficult to protect and also to rule. Postal connections from Stockholm had to be directed via Hamburg and delivered in a rather primitive way. Bremen-Verden was sold to Hanover in 1719, while the Wismar possessions were pledged to the Duchy of Wismar-Schwerin in 1803 for a period of 100 years, with the right to claim it back. In 1903 Sweden waived its claim to the German-Prussian state. Denmark and France also kept exclaves within Germany during the period up the formal unification of Germany in 1871. But, of course, the largest number of exclaves within Germany was those of the many German states.

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13 Ibidem, pp. 440–446.
4. East Prussia/Kaliningrad – a recurrent exclave

The most important exclave of any German state was, during two periods, East Prussia. The area was conquered by the German Order in the 13th century in an area inhabited by Prussian, Lithuanian and Polish ethnic groups. In the following centuries, the area was settled by German speakers and other ethnic groups were partly assimilated. In 1525 the German Order State submitted to the Polish-Lithuanian state as a duchy, while simultaneously adopting Protestantism. In 1618 it was inherited by the elector (Kurfürst) of Brandenburg and in 1660, at the Peace of Oliwa, it was formally made part of Brandenburg. It remained an exclave of Brandenburg until 1772, when Brandenburg (now named Prussia) captured Western Prussia, thereby uniting the two main territories. Beside East Prussia, Brandenburg after 1648 had at least six exclaves, mostly west of the main area. Until the formal federalization of Germany into an empire in 1871, Prussia extended its territory into larger territories of Northern Germany, but still with large areas of exclaves.

After Germany’s defeat in the First World War, the Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919 prescribed plebiscites in, among other places, areas of West and East Prussia that were contested by Germany and Poland. The result was an almost total victory for the German side, even in areas dominated by Protestant Polish-speakers, Masurians. These areas were included in the German exclave of East Prussia, separated from the mainland by the Free City of Danzig, under Polish supremacy, and by a small corridor of Poland reaching the Baltic Sea and the new harbor of Gdynia. Rail traffic between the German mainland and East Prussia was provided by German Railways, partly with sealed wagons to avoid Polish visa requirements, and a special boat service, Seedienst Ostpreußen (Sea Service East Prussia), with connections from Swinemünde to Pillau. A motorway (Autobahn) between Berlin, Stettin and Königsberg was planned from 1932 and implemented as motorway beyond Stettin in 1937, while the two-lane Königsberg-Elbing road, road prepared with bridges and four lanes, was finished in 1938. A connection through the Polish Corridor and Danzig was resisted by Poland but secretly planned by Germany. Today, the parts finished by 1938 are in use on Berlin–Szczecin and, to some extent, Kaliningrad–Elblag. Especially after the Nazi takeover in 1933, German propaganda used the corridor arrangement as an attack on Polish supremacy. A German postcard from 1937 depicts the corridor als Verwaltungszerstörer (as a destroyer of administrative areas).

The second world war ended the history of East Prussia, but laid the foundation for a new exclave situation. In two Soviet-Polish agreements in 1945, the area was

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17 A. Kossert, Ostpreussen. Geschichte und Mythos, Siedler, München 2005, pp. 32-75.
20 K. Lärmer, Autobahnbaub in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin (Ost) 1975, pp. 103-134.
divided into a southern part to be included in Poland, whereas the northern part would be part of the RSFSR, (the Russian republic of the Soviet Union) as an exclave, Kaliningrad Oblast’, within the Union. With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the area became a state exclave. Kaliningrad Oblast’ in 2012 has a status as a special economic zone, which has meant customs-free trade with the neighboring states, large-scale smuggling to and from Russia, and tax breaks for investment. Transit traffic and visa requirements are major issues for the exclave. Trains connecting Russia with the exclave have to cross Belarus and Lithuania, requiring lengthy stops at the borders. Border controls during the ride would shorten the time considerably (as with the sealed trains used from Germany to East Prussia in the interwar period). Subsidized flights to Moscow and St Petersburg are available to students and pensioners, but an extension to all Kaliningraders is being discussed. Concerning visa requirements, a Russian proposal to install a visa-free zone covering the whole Kaliningrad area and an equal-sized part of neighboring Poland, including Gdansk, was launched by (then) prime minister Medvedev, but will meet with extreme difficulties if to have a EU sanction.

5. West Berlin – an exclave with exclaves

From 1945 until 1989–90, West Berlin was the most famous example of a state exclave, although, according international law, it was not part of the German Federal Republic (FRG), but under control of the Allied command (as was East Berlin, though only de jure). However, with the successive but partial integration into the FRG, it functioned as part of the state, albeit under special regulation. The containment of West Berlin was a successive process. A decisive moment was on in June 24 1948, when West Germany and West Berlin introduced a new currency. It was followed by a Soviet closure of all land connections to Western Germany, lasting almost one year. While divided into four sectors, Berlin was still open, and West Berliners still had access to the hinterland of Berlin. But with the creation of the GDR in 1949 (later to include East Berlin as its capital), West Berliners’ access to areas beyond the town limit was curtailed. In 1949 West Berlin got a constitution, resembling that of the Hansestadt Länder of Hamburg and Bremen, but the Allied powers denied any formal inclusion into the Federal Republic. West Berlin had parliamentarians in the German Bundestag in Bonn; they had the right to speak but not to vote. In 1952 the Soviet/GDR authorities cut telephone connections with West

22 A. Kossert, Ostpreussen. Geschichte und Mythos..., op. cit., p. 332.
Berlin; West Berliners were no longer allowed into the GDR outside East Berlin. On August 13, 1961 the Berlin Wall was built, and almost all infrastructural networks and personal contacts truncated. The closure caused by the border zone negatively affected its western vicinity. It created dead-end streets and zones of economic decay.

In some respects, the formal status of Berlin as under allied administration remained, particularly the right of allied military to cross over into other sectors. While presenting Berlin (East) as the capital of the GDR, Soviet and GDR authorities refused to accept West Berlin as part of the FRG, and in 1958 proposed – unsuccessfully – that it be made a Free City, without formal links to the FRG or to the Allied command. The question of transit roads and waterways from the FRG to West Berlin that had caused occasional blockades and intimidations by the GDR was finally solved through an agreement between the occupation powers (with assistance of the two German states) in 1971, effective from 1972. But while this agreement recognized the special relations between West Berlin and the FRG, it also stated that the former was not a constituent part of the Federal Republic. West Berlin’s special status (which included exemption from military conscription and receipt of cultural subsidies from the German government in Bonn) prompted immigration of intellectuals and students from other parts of Germany and immigrants from abroad, including Russian Jews, often via Israel.

West Berlin inherited a number of administrative exclaves from the 1920 amalgamation of municipalities into Greater Berlin. Beyond the city border, a number of small territories, two of which were populated, were found to belong to Berlin, despite their being totally surrounded by another Kreis. In most cases, this political affiliation went back to medieval ownership patterns. In spite of several attempts to solve the problems by annexation into the Teltow (after 1952 Potsdam) Kreis, a formal change required a decision by the Diet and this was never accomplished.

When the Allied powers divided Germany into occupation zones, the problem of administrative exclaves was never solved. After the split into East and West Berlin, the latter area kept 12 exclaves (belonging to the US and British sectors) as exclaves within the territory of the GDR (that is, not within East Berlin). The most important exclave was Steinstücken, the only area to have a substantial population, comprising a few hundred people. Steinstücken is situated near Babelsberg in Potsdam, around one kilometer beyond the former border between West Berlin and the GDR. Before its territorial attachment to West Berlin, the area was the object of a number of intrusions or containments of Soviet or GDR authorities, especially until

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27 Ibidem, p. 166 ff.
1952. In 1961 the area was contained by fences and barbed wire, and in 1964 a (Berlin) wall was built around the territory. A small road, checked by GDR border guards, connected it to West Berlin. Only residents, certain service and rescue personnel, the school bus, some suppliers and people with GDR visas were allowed through. Water and electricity were supplied from the GDR, while telephone connections were attached to the West Berlin net. By an agreement on territorial exchanges, valid from 1972, the connecting road (framed by a wall) was annexed to West Berlin, thus ending the exclave history of Steinstücken. The agreement reduced the number of exclaves to four, all uninhabited, but in two cases consisting of primitive allotment gardens belonging to West Berlin owners who had the right to stay during daytime. In 1988, a new agreement abolished the remaining exclaves by adjoining some of them to the GDR, some to West Berlin. With the unification of Germany in 1990, West Berlin disappeared as a state exclave.

6. Colonial and post-colonial exclaves – some examples

While Europe is the scope of this publication, European powers have been active in both the delineation of overseas territories, often as a result of land grabs, and in the management (or mismanagement) of their transition to independence. In the following, I give some examples of post-colonial exclave management, with special emphasis on some particular aspects.

**Walvis Bay** (German Walfischbucht) is an area on the coast of Namibia annexed by Great Britain in 1878, while the surrounding areas were annexed by Germany in 1884. When former German South-West Africa became a mandate area under South Africa in 1920, Walvis Bay remained an exclave of South Africa. It remained so in 1990 when Namibia became independent. However, when South Africa held its first democratic election, in 1994, the area was given to Namibia. Giving territory away must be seen as a very unusual decision, notwithstanding the fact that Walvis Bay is more important to Namibia than it would be, under present conditions, to South Africa.

**Musandam.** One of the world’s most strategic exclaves is located at the Strait of Hormuz, one of the busiest waterways in the world. Some 90 per cent of the Gulf’s oil exports pass through this narrow passageway. Vital as it is to the oil trade, the Strait also serves as a principal trade and shipping portal to the markets and resources of the Orient. On one side of the Strait lies the Arabian Gulf; on the other, the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Iranian province of Bandar Abbas looks down from the north, while to the south, the governorate of Musandam oversees traffic through the narrow sea channel, since the shipping

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34 Ibidem, p. 99.
lanes lie within the territorial waters of Oman. Throughout late 1959 and early 1960, Julian Walker managed to induce the agreement of all but the Qasimi sheiks of Sharjah and Ras-al-Kheimah to boundary agreements with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. What resulted was a punctuated boundary and Oman split into three parts by the newly defined tribal territories of the Trucial Coast sheikhdoms. Since the federation of these sheikhdoms into the United Arab Emirates during 1971, Oman remains the only non-contiguous, land-based territory in the peninsula. Through the control of the Musandam peninsula, Oman shares the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz with Iran. Between the Omani mainland and the Musandam exclave, in the UAE Emirate of Fujairah, is the Omani exclave of Madha. Its most important family chose to belong to Oman. But within Madha is an exclave of Fujairah, because one family clan choose that emirate. Until 1958 Oman had another exclave, Gwadar, on the coast of Pakistan, which acquired the insignificant fishing hamlet, turning it into a major port.

While the establishment of the different exclaves reminds of a feudal European past, the Musandam case rather reflects a geopolitical stronghold, supported so far by both Iran and the main users of the Gulf oil trade.

Alaska as an exclave is an exception from the rule of colony-to-independence, in its having been part of Imperial Russia and then sold to the United States in 1867. While both Russia’s and the USA’s access to the territory was by ship, proposals for a highway from the contiguous USA to Alaska originated in the 1920s. Much of the route would pass through Canada, but the Canadian government perceived no value in putting up the required funds to build the road. With the outbreak of the Second World War, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, American lines of communication with Alaska by sea were seriously threatened and alternative routes had to be opened.

In February 1942 the construction of the Alaska Highway was approved by the United States. Canada agreed to allow construction as long as the United States bore the full cost, and that the road and other facilities in Canada be turned over to Canadian authority after the war ended. The needs of war dictated the final route, intended to link the airfields that conveyed lend-lease aircraft from the United States to the Soviet Union via the Bering Strait. For this reason, a rather impractical, long route over extremely difficult terrain was chosen. Later on, several improvements have considerably shortened the route.

The Alaskan Highway illustrates the need for integration of mainland and exclave, but, unlike the East Prussian and in some respects the Kaliningrad cases, the

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38 http://www.themilepost.com/.
intervening state was not seen as an enemy or as an unwilling player, not least because the infrastructural investment was made by the exclave owner. An example of a direct enemy relation would be between India and the two territories of Pakistan. That situation was solved by the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1972, which left a large number of small enclaves/exclaves on the border with India, the so-called Cooch Behar case.

7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research.

In order to explain the important facts of exclaves, geographical and historical studies of exclaves have to include all aspects - temporal, spatial or otherwise. Some similarities between different exclave situations are obvious: access; relations to the intervening state; and cultural and emotional relation to the mainland. While the first two aspects are relatively well covered in the academic discourse so far, the question of the exclave dwellers’ emotional and behavioral relation to the mainland, as well as to the surrounding political régime(s), has not been given much attention. This may be understandable, as such aspects are both difficult to study and, in many cases, also delicate in nature. While questions of national or regional identity may also be extremely vague and multi-faceted, studies of the actual spatial behavior of exclave dwellers might reveal how well the mainland has been able to integrate its outsiders into the nation. Deutsch’s idea from 1956 is still valid: “Our problem was to find out whether, and to what extent, a non-arbitrary boundary between political systems exists. We began with the assumption that you cannot take for granted the politically established boundaries of the day. Rather we tried this: Take a large number of human beings on a map. Try to find out as far as possible, empirically, what their field relations are, and see whether we get the boundaries from the differential flow of transactions between them. This may be, for instance, market fluctuations in economic life, or it might be cultural diffusion, or some kind of political behaviour, or it might be communication”.

This type of study, however difficult, would reveal the actual degree of integration of the exclave into its mainland structure. It would probably also reveal the very special anomaly that characterizes exclaves in the world of territorial states.

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39 See e.g. E. Vinokurov, A Theory of Enclaves..., op. cit., p. 137 ff.