

The Times of Television: Representing, Anticipating, Forgetting the Cold War

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There seems to be quite a lot of history on television these days. This observation might be made in the most mundane of settings, in front of the TV on an average night while skipping through the channels (realizing that some version of WW2 is never far away). It might be confirmed systematically by studying the schedules of an average week (realizing how the better part of your prime-time viewing could easily be spent looking backwards, through fiction, documentaries, docudramas). It might find endorsement in the vogue for history in high-profile TV series such as *Rome* or *Mad Men*, which has been hailed as “the new rock ’n roll”¹ of the business. And it would resonate with a widespread consensus about the transformation of the medium in recent decades², during which the relative scarcity of centralized broadcasting has mutated into an abundance of “narrowcast” channels and time slots. One obvious way to fill all these slots: the relentless recycling of stored material.

This is not what television was supposed to be all about. Since its arrival, the essence of the medium has been identified with a paradigmatic form of transmission: the live broadcast. Thus television is claimed to be “relentlessly in the present, immediate, simultaneous, and continuous”.³ Its preferred temporal dimension is that of an “insistent presentness – a *This is going on*” rather than a *That has been*”⁴. Consequently, it will fail in representing the past: “[T]elevision produces forgetfulness, not memory, flow, not history.”⁵ “Its grammar, so to say, permits no access to the past.”⁶

To be sure, we might still question whether the past we see on the

television screen actually *is* history. For Fredric Jameson, we are looking at “images, simulacra, and pastiches of the past”, mere surrogates for our “historical amnesia”.⁷ For French historian Pierre Nora, we are riding on that “tidal wave of memorial concerns”,⁸ which actually reflects a double loss: that of memory as a spontaneous, social practice; and that of history as a professional, critical task.

Then again, we cannot be sure that the history we see on television actually *is* from the past. *The Live Broadcasting of History* was the provocative subtitle of Daniel Dayan’s and Elihu Katz’s seminal 1992 book on “media events”⁹, which defined a long-running genre: the live, ceremonial coverage on television of moon landings, Olympic games, royal weddings, and presidential elections. As far back as the early 1970s, Nora had proposed that historians must come to terms with “the return of the event”¹⁰: “From now on, the mass media has a monopoly on history”. What counted as a historical event could no longer be separated from the time of the “media system”, i.e. the “perpetual” or “chronic” present. We have by now become acquainted with 24-hour news channels such as CNN, which scour the present for moments of “instant history”: the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the election of a black American president, or revolution in an Egyptian square.

Today, it seems clear that television can be a site of both simultaneity and storage, can raise claims of “historical” significance *before, during* and *after* events take place. When live coverage and historicity converge, we enter unstable epistemological territory, potentially mined with “category mistakes” and/or secondary, derivative forms. (Is history really “witnessed” on television?¹¹ Do audio-visual archives really store “memories”?¹²). On the whole, television theory has had obvious problems in converting its categories into legitimate forms of knowledge. Film has its montage (transformed into historical experience by Walter Benjamin and Godard), the novel has its narrative (reused by historians, according to Hayden White). Television has its “flow”.¹³ Which not only lacks a “work”, it seems to avoid representation as such. “Television images”, writes Richard Dienst, “do not represent things so much as they take up time.”¹⁴ But what sort of time *is* that? Images on TV screens emerge from a scanning process that seems to recognize no “before” or “after”, the time of every image – live or recorded – ultimately referring to the time of its production (i.e. “real time”).¹⁵

“The Times of Television” is a project¹⁶ that attempts to describe three temporal forms used by television for historical representation: *the time of the chronicle*, in which television organizes successive flows of time through documentaries, drama series, annual chronicles, etc; *the time of catastrophe*, as in live broadcasts of traumatic events where history is represented as catastrophe, crisis, disaster, that is, as breaks in the flow of successive time; *the time of ritual*, as in the televised, pre-planned ceremonial events (Olympic games, presidential inaugurations: inviting audiences to witness history in the making). Its main hypothesis is that these three forms and their interrelations are fundamental for understanding how current television represents history.

Representing the Cold War

In the chronicle format, television seems to claim the role of a “proper” historian: *re-presenting* what actually happened, using well-established conventions. These have been summarized by one experienced producer as “the breaking up of historical events into smaller, accessible story-lines that can be well told using archive film and interviews with eye-witnesses”.¹⁷ This producer is referring to CNN’s documentary series *Cold War* (1998) (hereafter *CW*). This project was initiated by Ted Turner, CNN’s founder, and offered to Sir Jeremy Isaacs, producer of the classic series *The World at War* (1970). *CW* was supervised by a team of international historians representing both superpowers. Its original research included recording over 500 interviews with eye-witnesses and scanning over 8000 films in international archives. It generated a number of by-products, including a website with over a thousand pages, an instructor’s guide for classroom applications, coffee-table books, and pocket versions. The project core, however, was 24 hours of television broadcast by CNN and the BBC in 1998, which explicitly claimed to relate “the central story of our times”.¹⁸

In what ways, then, does such a representation of history reuse, intervene in, or transform traditional categories of historiography?

For Paul Ricoeur, historical knowledge always has a tripod basis: “trace, document, question”.¹⁹ These categories seem easily compatible with the components mentioned above: interviews (with firsthand witnesses of history), authentic images from the past (from the ar-

chives), and the narrative of an invisible voice-over (providing explanation and understanding). Moreover, Ricoeur has described the historian's task as being the establishing of a "third" time²⁰ – "historical time" – mediating between notions of time that are, on the one hand, universal (objective, in succession), and, on the other, existential (subjective, experienced, lived). *CW* is clearly aiming at historical transformations that have impact on our "ordinary lives", through modes of experience that television does well: the ephemeral, the everyday, the intimate, and the situated (this sense of the past radically fades when *CW* is translated into book format).

Even so, and perhaps for these reasons, CNN's series generated significant controversy. Commentators on the left and the right, political pundits as well as professional historians, found enough emissions and distortions to fill a book.²¹ Responding to those critics, John Lewis Gaddis, a leading historian of the Cold War and a senior consultant on the series, tried to explain the specifics of representing history on television. There were time constraints, of course, and limits to processes taking place in front of a camera. But the main mistake made by critics, according to Gaddis, was to expect *any* kind of "single interpretative framework".²² In *CW*, there were only the "multiple voices" of witnesses and the narrator of scripts that were authored by a different writers for each episode. Viewers of *CW* were thus given neither historical orthodoxy nor moral equivalency:

What they do get is an exposure to historical complexity: a sense of how things looked at the time, an awareness of how people who did not know the future attempted to anticipate it, perhaps even the ability to imagine themselves in their place and to ask the tough question: What would I, in similar circumstances, have done? In short, they gain historical maturity.²³

While some critics had clearly missed a more specific settling of accounts ("Who won? Who were the good guys and the bad guys?"), their frustration at the lack of *any* "moralizing impulse"²⁴ may signal a difference between television history and "history proper", at least of the sort practiced by professional historians since the late nineteenth century. For, according to Hayden White (in turn, invoking Hegel), there is only one way in which the narrative of a chain of *real* events

could possibly conclude: in a summing-up of their “meaning” for “the purpose of moralizing judgments”.²⁵ The lack of such an impulse may not be unique to history on television, of course. For White, this lack is precisely what distinguishes proper history from medieval history writing, i.e. from chronicles:

More specifically, the chronicle is usually marked by a failure to achieve narrative closure. It does not so much conclude as simply terminate. It starts off to tell a story but breaks off *in medias res*, in the chronicler’s own present.²⁶

“Into the middle of things” is, in *CW*’s case, into the present of television. In what ways, then, is history in *CW* organized according to the specific codes of televisual time? It is related in twenty-four hour-long episodes²⁷, i.e. units of clock time, or, with Ricoeur, “universal” time. This is, of course, also the unit of television scheduling, the primary context for any broadcasted program (more so than the “outside world”), and in itself a mediation of “universal” and “lived time” insofar as it proposes to synchronize the time of “watching television” with the experience of work, leisure, holidays, family time, etc.

Furthermore, like most of television, it is serialized: every episode displays some kind of independent, finite nature, while simultaneously serving as one unit in a serial chain that is presumably infinite.²⁸ When looking closer for a beginning and end of the whole chronicle, the viewer can identify familiar temporal categories. The first seconds of the first episode: a mechanical voice counting down – “5, 4, 3, 2, 1” – followed by images and the sound of a huge atomic explosion: time itself must come to a halt in order for this particular story to begin. The final seconds of the final episode: President George Bush, Sr. looks straight into the camera and declares that “the Cold War has now ended”: an excerpt from the President’s annual Christmas speech to the American people, i.e. a speech by the protagonist of a media event. In other words, the “time of this chronicle” is begun by “the time of catastrophe” and stopped by “the time of the ritual”.

Most discussion of television and representation sooner or later identifies a moment at which media and reality are about to implode, as if the answer to what television represents is: television itself. As if the self-identification of a witness to a third party – “believe me, I was

there” – is not only being raised by interviewees but *by the medium itself*. As if only television, like the State and its legal system in Hegel’s version of history, can supply proper subject matter. As if a “cold” war could not *take place* (Baudrillard) anywhere else, in accordance with that logic of “deterrence”, excluding any transition from the virtual to the actual.²⁹

With *CW*, this option may seem particularly tempting. After all, the history of the Cold War is more or less contemporaneous with the history of television³⁰ and the emergence of a spectator position, frequently illustrated in the series, for which historical events were already, initially, watched on television (the Kennedy assassination, the Beatles performing on The Ed Sullivan Show). We are perhaps given fair warning in the opening twenty-second credit sequence, the only staged sequence of the series, that introduces each episode: the eye of the camera is situated in the depths of a very dark hall. At the other end, we see silhouettes of a group of men – soldiers? – opening a door, letting in daylight, peeking into the dark with flashlights. This hall looks like an underground cave but its walls are screens, covered with a flurry of moving images – authentic scenes from the history of the Cold War, projected over one another. We barely have time to see that these are chronologically organized as the camera is moving from the depths of that dark/past towards the blinding light of the door/present which serves as a backdrop to the title, “Cold War”: Plato’s cave relocated in a bunker.

Even if this war did not “take place”, then, it certainly did *take time* (as suggested by the movement of that camera). And to the extent that television suggests that this time be experienced as “historical”, it certainly also implies that represented events “actually happened”, *outside* the world of television (much in the way that television wants us to assume that live media events are broadcasted, not created, “on location”).

For Ricoeur, the search for referentiality is ultimately what differentiates history from fiction. (A distinction that, according to Ricoeur, is not sufficiently recognized by White.) This search remains the task of the historian and is to be executed by the (often highly complex) linkage of trace, document, and question.³¹ On television, and particularly in *CW*, the apparent equivalent of such “linkage” is executed

through the *editing* – the mixing and switching³² – of archival footage, witnesses, and narrative. More precisely, the “search for referentiality” in *CW* unfolds as an attempt to compensate for or supplement not merely television’s own self-referentiality but the lack of veracity inherent in each component presented: archival footage, witnessing, and narrative.

To illustrate: The film clips come with a potential “reality effect”: an indexical guarantee that “this past was present” (and *CW* maintains a strict distinction with the imaginary, allowing no clips of fiction or reenactments). As unrelated instants, however, these clips may fall short as historical representations (much like real events in their singularity) to the extent that, as White puts it, they “do not offer themselves as stories”.³³ In *CW*, the narrator immediately steps in to provide linkage and coherence. In one sense, then, the voice-over legitimizes the authenticity of those images, at least for White, who claims that our “desire for the Real” is imposed upon historical events precisely through the coherence of stories. In another sense, the images legitimize the authenticity of the narrator’s account, since the idea that “real events are properly represented when they can be shown to display the formal coherency of a Story”³⁴ constitutes an “embarrassment”³⁵ – as this property is shared with fictional or imaginary events. Any storyteller of actual events is thus under pressure not to mix the orders of imaginary and real, a pressure that may be relieved by narrating them over indexical images.

Still, whether separately or in combination, neither narrator nor indexical image has the credentials for the type of authority most treasured by television, that of “being there”. The invisible narrator will make no such claims, and the camera may have once registered the past as present, but those (causal) relations are no longer in effect. There is, of course, a risk of retroactive manipulation. Prior to that, however, the camera falls short in another sense: while the act of mechanical recording may guarantee objectivity, the camera cannot give testimony.³⁶ But, then again, *CW* will present its own long line of witnesses. In fact, the only talking heads allowed on screen are people who “saw it with their own eyes” (i.e. not history experts, location guides, or interviewers). This again furthers the distance from imaginary orders (fictions, after all, are not “witnessed”). To be sure, those

witnesses will introduce the frailty of human memory (forgetting, misrepresenting), and the risk of subjective interests (committing perjury). But, again, these pitfalls may be instantly countered by the objective recording of the camera or the coherency of the narrative.

Hayden White suggests that the “realness” of any historical discourse consists, not only in events having occurred, but in their being remembered and placed in chronological sequence. If so, then *CW* holds a full deck of cards. Taken separately, historical footage, witness, and narrator are surely disparate, possibly contradictory, regimes of authenticity and truth (as are the related discourses on “media”, “memory” and “history”).³⁷ But when merged as in *CW*, the effect might be, to use another distinction by White, a history that is not so much “narrated” as “narrativized”, a history in which “events seem to tell themselves”.³⁸ To exemplify: We see historical images of Soviet tanks surrounded by protesting Czechs in the streets of Prague in 1968, the voice of the narrator stating the time, location, and circumstances. His voice is suddenly interrupted by a Czech woman describing the pain of her knee being crushed under a tank. In the footage, we now see the face of a young woman in agony under one of the tanks, and, within seconds, her face, thirty years later, bearing witness. We can now forget what the narrator was saying (he was setting up that switch) since events are “telling themselves”, media, memory and history all contributing to cover any potential shortcoming in each another (yes, those images were authentic; yes, the memory of that woman can be trusted; yes, those events in Prague belong to a chronological sequence; yes, the work of time can be registered: it is already marked in that woman’s face).

Anticipating the Cold War

Watching witnesses on television has temporal as well as epistemological implications. While those witnesses may reiterate the past, they are also well suited to the “insistent presentness” of television, talking to us as if in real time, in neutral studio settings, never accompanied by music or sound effects (unlike the narrator or the voices from the archives). In fact, in the way that their faces and voices return to fill the screen, they resemble news anchormen: points of convergence in

the present for any story that might come out of the past. And to witness someone bearing witness, as viewers of *CW* do, is already in a sense to be engaged in time travel. For Dori Laub, who videorecorded Holocaust survivors for the Yale Project, it means accepting “an event that has not yet come into existence, in spite of the overwhelming nature of the reality of its existence”. And, moreover, that this event “in effect, *does not end*”.³⁹ Just like the medieval chronicler who, according to White, represents historical reality “as if real events appeared to human consciousness in the form of unfinished stories”.⁴⁰

In other words, the time of witnessing may be well adapted to the time of television, which may be well adapted to the time of the chronicle. If John Gaddis is to be believed, it might all end up in “historical maturity”: the “awareness of how people who did not know the future attempted to anticipate it”. Anticipation is, no doubt, the attitude to time that *CW* wants to promote in its viewers: “For forty-five years”, declares the slogan to the series, “the world held its breath”.⁴¹ On television, the “story of our times” is a story waiting for its event – nuclear Armageddon – to happen. Which, as we well *know* by now, it did *not*. So how are we to engage with *that* story?

In the prologue to the first episode, after the atomic blast but before the opening credits, the narrator speaks for the first time:

A cloud hides the sky. A nuclear shadows falls across the human future.
Midway through the twentieth century, two superpowers prepared for
a conflict which might have ended life on the planet.

*Switch from atomic explosion to images from the present: the exteriors of a
luxurious hotel.*

Spring flowers, the warm light of day. The pleasures of life. But under
this American hotel there was a hidden gate. It led to an underworld.

*Switch to underground facilities: empty screening rooms, plenary halls,
bedrooms, showers, weapon supplies. The narrator is now our guide to a real
Cold War bunker.*

This was the shelter for members of the United States Congress in the
event of nuclear war. Down here, the politicians would represent the
dead and the dying in the world overhead. For a handful of human
beings, there was all they needed to wait out the nuclear winter. But
nerves might snap, then order would be kept by force. The lost world

above the shelter would become only a memory, a myth. The living would come to envy the dead.

Not what “has happened”, nor what “is happening”, but “what would come to happen”. The projection of a (hypothetical) future into a past yet to be determined. The equivalent of projecting a (hypothetical) past into the future, i.e. the “future anterior” or future perfect (what “will have happened”). This was the tense that leapt out at Roland Barthes in his readings of historical photographs: the prisoner about to be executed in a nineteenth-century American jail “*that is dead and that is going to die*”.⁴² Also the tense of Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project in which Benjamin, according to Peter Szondi, “could see future events only in those instances where they already had moved into the past.”⁴³ In the opening sequences of *CW*, we see a past activated through anticipation of (extreme) future trauma. When this happens, a televised event is no longer securely attached to the past. For Thomas Elsaesser, this may be what ultimately distinguishes the mediated past from the past of the historian:

By this I mean that a past event, passed on in media images, is both un-dead and not-alive. It is always exceeding, in whatever small and insignificant way, the place and time, the status and hierarchy a historian might assign to it. This makes the discourse of media memory constitutively traumatic: always ready to return, always capable of jumping at us, fundamentally uncanny, never to be forgotten, but also never quite remembered, because interfered with, blurred, or overlaid by other images, other memories.⁴⁴

Forgetting the Cold War

Except that, sometimes, some images *are* forgotten. Surprisingly, despite the lively debate and vast resources expended, this is the fate of the *CW* series, a decade after its initial screening. It was never made available on DVD, and is nowhere to be found in that multichannel process of recycling. The homepage which CNN created to accompany the series was “retired” in 2009. To see *CW* today requires the mobilizing of old communication media: tracking down eight used VHS-cassettes, having them delivered to your door, and locating a VHS player that still works.

“Why is this series buried?”⁴⁵ asks a frustrated online commentator after failing to find more episodes. “Is it too long? Has America/the world moved on?” CNN has stated that its copyright for much of the archival footage only lasted for ten years. If so, the “story of our times” not only lacked closure but was destined to self-destruct in the legal system of immaterial rights. Online commentators are more inclined to believe that America did indeed “move on” and that the narrative of its past took a drastic turn after 9/11. If so, we may be registering the effect of what Aleide Assman has termed an “impact event”⁴⁶ – one that must be remembered but that exceeds the form of existing cultural patterns.

Could the events of 9/11 be told in a televised chronicle like *CW*? Does this form belong to the past? Watching the series today, one notes something, well, outdated about not only its content (the Cold War world) but also its technology (those VHS tapes). This certainly need not imply the end of television, nor of history. But maybe it offers an opening for historical analysis, at least for someone like Walter Benjamin, who found that newly obsolete objects were peculiarly charged with historical energy. In this case, the object left behind would be the “story of our times” as described above: situated in between liveness and historicity, using the future anterior tense, and employing multiple registers of referentiality and authenticity – witnessing, narrative, documentary footage – all supplementing each another as if historical events can “tell themselves”. A full deck of cards to illustrate, in Elsaesser’s terms again, the potential of the three discourses of “history”, “memory” and “media”, though often in dispute, to function as each other’s guardians. Has this potential been lost? If so, are we better or worse off?

Notes

1. Taylor Downing, “Bringing the Past to the Small Screen”, (in) David Cannadine (ed.) *History and the Media* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7.
2. Cf. Milly Buonanno, *The Age of Television: Experiences and Theories*, (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2008), and John Ellis, *Seeing Things: Television in the Age of Uncertainty* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
3. Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 24.
4. Mary Ann Doane, “Information, Crisis, Catastrophe”, (in) Patricia Mellen-

camp (ed.) *Logics of Television* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 222.

5. Stephen Heath, "Representing Television" (in) Patricia Mellencamp (ed.) 1990, 279.

6. Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, (London: Penguin, 1986), 136.

7. Anders Stephanson and Fredric Jameson, "Regarding Postmodernism: A Conversation with Fredric Jameson", *Social Text*, No. 21 (1989), 18.

8. Pierre Nora, "Reasons For the Current Upsurge in Memory", *Transit/Eurozine*, 2002, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-04-19-nora-en.html>

9. Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz: *Media Events. The Live Broadcasting of History*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

10. Pierre Nora, "L'événement monstre", *Communications* 18, 1972, and "Le retour de l'événement", in *Faire de l'histoire vol 1* (Paris: Gallimard, 1974).

11. John Durham Peters claims it can't, in "Witnessing", (in) Paul Frosh & Amit Pinchevski, *Media Witnessing: Testimony in the Age of Mass Communication*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 35.

12. For Pierre Nora, such memories are "prosthetic": "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire", *Representations* 26 (Spring 1989).

13. The main concept of television theory, first established in Raymond Williams, *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (London: Routledge, 1974/1997).

14. Richard Dienst, *Still Life in Real Time: Theory After Television* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 64.

15. Cf. Andrzej Gwóźdz, "Aspects of Television Temporality", *Kinema, A Journal of Film and Audiovisual Media*, 2008. <http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php?id=205&feature>

16. Supported by the Royal Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, headed by the author, including Amanda Lagerkvist, Södertörn University, and Paul Achter, University of Richmond.

17. Taylor Downing (one of the co-writers of *Cold War*): "History on Television: The Making of *Cold War*, 1998" (in) Marcia Landy (ed.), *The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2001). Downing connects the establishing of this format to Jeremy Isaacs' 1970s television series on WW2, *The World at War*. In terms of the six historical modes of documentary film defined in Bill Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary* (Bloomington, Ind: University of Indiana Press, 2001), it resembles the "expository mode" – using an objective, "Voice of God", voice-over for narration, explanation and argument, with footage added to strengthen the narrative. This mode was established in documentaries of the 1920s and 1930s, and became influential in news-reel reporting during WW2.

18. Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War* (London: Abacus, 1998/2008), ix.

19. Paul Ricoeur, *Minne, historia, glömska (La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*, 2000, Göteborg: Daidalos, 2005), 234.

20. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
21. Arnold Beichman (ed.), *CNN's Cold War Documentary: Issues and Controversy* (Stanford, Ca.; Hoover Institution Press, 2000).
22. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, Television, and the Approximation of Truth", (in) Arnold Beichman (ed.) 2000.
23. Gaddis 2000, 43.
24. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 24.
25. White, 1990, 24.
26. White, 1990, 5.
27. In fact, closer to 50 minutes, the equivalent of an hour prescribed by the international standards of television, in expectance of the "natural breaks" of commercials.
28. Cf. Buonnano 2008.
29. Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995).
30. Cf. James Schwoch, *Global TV: New Media and the Cold War, 1946-1969* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2009).
31. Ricoeur, 2005, 324.
32. An extended version of this paper, in preparation, uses Dienst's (1994) distinction between "still time" and "automatic time" to elaborate on television's "mixing and switching".
33. White, 1990, 4.
34. White, 1990, 4.
35. White, 1990, 21.
36. Cf. Guido Isekenmeier, "Technical Testimony: (Audio-)Visual Media as Witness", in Ulrik Ekman and Frederik Tygstrup (eds.), *Witness: Memory, Representation, and the Media in Question* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2008), and Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, "The Archive Market: Truth, Testimony, Evidence", in *Echographies of Television* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
37. Thomas Elsaesser, "History, Media, and Memory - Three Discourses in Dispute", in Ulrik Ekman and Frederik Tygstrup (eds.), *Witness: Memory, Representation, and the Media in Question* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2008).
38. Benveniste quoted in White, 1990, 3.
39. Dori Laub, "Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening", in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 57.
40. White, 1990, 5.
41. Isaacs & Downing, 1998/2008, cover.
42. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (London: Vintage/Random House, 2000), 96.
43. Peter Szondi, "Hope in the Past: On Walter Benjamin", *Critical Inquiry* Spring 1978, Vol.4:3, 501

44. Elsaesser, 2008, 409.
45. <http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/cold-war/>
46. Aleida Assman, “Resonance and Impact – The Role of Emotions in Cultural Memory”, notes from lecture at Södertörn University, 18/5 2001, (in preparation for publication as Södertörn Lectures 6).