Bringing *Norden* Back In?

– A Case Study on Contemporary Nordic Security Cooperation

Author: Magnus Björnstjerna
Abstract

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This study explores the driving forces and motives behind contemporary Nordic security cooperation. It asks and investigates whether the security cooperation has a foundation based on a shared (peace) identity or is founded on rational and functionalistic calculations. Through applying a theoretical model based on the theory of Regional Security Complexes the study reveal how external and internal transformations affect the Nordic nations and forces them to respond. The study reveals how both these factors are important when explaining the responses of the Nordic states and the development of the Nordic security cooperation. While national strategies differ there is a need to look to the own region which has led the Nordic states to search for a security structure at home. The study concludes that all of the Nordic nations have had to respond to a changing external environment which has put pressure on their defense budgets which problematizes their national foreign policy and security strategies. A strong Nordic amity and tradition of cooperation has eased a stronger formal structure which increases cost-effectiveness and functionalism for the Nordic states security structures. This structure has replaced older identity based and influence searching structures. Conclusively, contemporary Nordic security cooperation can be said to increase the Nordic states’ security while simultaneously letting them follow their national security strategies. Norden is thus regaining importance and Nordic security cooperation show that the region is both active and proactive in dealing with their regional issues.

Key words: Nordic security, security cooperation, regional security complexes, regional politics, Norden
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<td>Council of Baltic Sea States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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1. Introduction

After World War II and during the Cold War ‘Norden’ gained reputation as a peaceful region which actively participated in UN-led peace operations. The Nordic case is special as one of few regions which has sustained such a long time without war which boosted the perception of Norden as influential and experienced in peace meditation. With the end of the Cold War the worldwide security environment changed and for the Nordic countries it led to a dilemma of approaching deeper international cooperation while Russia still was important and a future military threat could not be dismissed. While threats and conflicts are now more common in the form of civil wars (Kosovo) or terrorist attacks such as in England, Spain and Ireland the likelihood of a direct military seem to have decreased or even vanished. Intensified international cooperation through NATO, the EU or the UN demanded a military reformation in most European states where internationally deployed rapid reaction forces are to replace domestically stationed territorial defenses. With pressure (from international organizations) and a will to participate internationally to gain influence and to keep the military forces trained there is a demand on the states to keep a certain amount of military forces. At the same time, the expenses for training, equipment and international operations limits the possibility for small states to keep a high level of national defence forces since the cost would be unjustifiable domestically. This poses a problem for the Nordic countries which despite their size has received international influence through a long history of peace keeping missions. While they identify different potential domestic threats which require attention they need the influence as well as the benefits of future support earned from international cooperation. Traditionally, cooperation among the Nordic countries was claimed to be based on the perception of Norden as a region founded on peace and trust. By applying a wide security concept which diverge from a neorealist focus on the military and political sectors a more complex picture of the Nordic cooperation and threat perceptions might be revealed.

This master's thesis explores contemporary Nordic security cooperation (NSC), and what threat perceptions and other factors make the Nordic countries maintain or even deepen their security cooperation. It will overview the contemporary cooperation and see whether it is founded on identity and some type of ‘Nordic values’ or on functionalistic grounds. Recent voices have noted how national

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1 The Nordic Region or ‘Norden’ usually accounts for: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, while Scandinavia covers Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Occasionally areas such as the North Calotte, Kvarken, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands are also accounted for – these have limited importance in this study and will not be referred to by ‘Norden’, neither will the small nation of Iceland if not pointed out. See Møller 1989
2 ‘Region’ might refer to several things but is here referred to as a “coherent territory composed of two or more states” as sub region refers to a smaller territory involving only some states. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 18-20n.2
3 Skjelsbaek 1987: 63, see coming discussion on the risk of perceiving Norden as possessing ‘special peace characteristics’.

The Nordic region was involved both in World War II and the Cold War, although without intra-Nordic wars
calculations and rational effectiveness limited the older co-operations and has replaced identity as a foundation. As recently argued by Tuomas Forsberg, it seems as if the value driven Nordic cooperation has given way for a rationalization of the cooperation with functionalism and cost-effectiveness as driving forces\(^4\). This study investigates this argumentation and sees if, and how, the small Nordic states respond to the new security environment as well as internal (domestic and regional) and external (systemic and regional) transformations. The hypothesis is that a Nordic identity and the perception of “Nordic values” might ease and strengthen cooperation since the external international (or regional\(^5\)) context has reshaped the security environment which states respond to. This leads to internal regional transformations where increased and deepened cooperation is a rational way to both eat the cake (gaining international influence through international cooperation) and to keep it (reducing/shift ing their military funds through regional security cooperation). This revised analysis of Nordic security cooperation might provide a new understanding of what variables and factors influence how small states perceive their surroundings and respond to them in a regional context. It will also give us a better understanding of the mechanisms that feeds the Nordic security cooperation and how it has developed into the formalized structure it is today.

1.1 Research Questions

The aim of this study is to investigate the driving forces for the contemporary Nordic security cooperation through a twofold procedure; First, to map existing Nordic security cooperation and its driving forces. Secondly, to explain how it is affected by sometimes differing national responses to external changes and threat perceptions. The research questions and hypotheses are:

Q1 - How has Nordic security cooperation developed since the cold war and what formal structure and security cooperation exist today?

Q2 – How can this development be explained?

   H1 – The contemporary Nordic security cooperation is motivated by functionalistic reasoning, which might be eased but not driven by identity or value related interests.

   H2 – The Nordic states are affected differently by external transformations which makes it difficult to speak of a unified ‘Nordic identity’ since different national interests, strategies and threat perceptions lead to different opinions for how to structure for cooperation.

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\(^4\) Forsberg 2011

\(^5\) External systemic transformations might have national or sub-regional effects such as the new security environment at the end of the Cold War where Norden suddenly lost attention from the US and NATO.
These hypotheses are a product of theoretical assumptions, a thorough reading of previous literature and an understanding of the current dilemma in explaining the Nordic security cooperation. There is no general explanation of the cooperation and neither identity related or functionalistic arguments might explain it. The few existing Nordic security co-operations have been limited and contrary to what expected not all Nordic nations participated which limits the explanation of identity as sole causative explanation, which invites for a functionalistic argument.

1.2 Contributions and Limitations of the study

My contribution is to add additional and updated understandings of Nordic security cooperation by analyzing the cooperation through a different theoretical framework than what has usually been done as external factors is likely to be as important as internal when explaining the cooperation. The study intends to reveal how new incentives and driving forces are a product of a new security environment where the security cooperation is expected to be founded on different motives than previously.

Due to the time frame of the project, ‘contemporary’ empirical data complemented by older data is chosen. For this case a wider description over a shorter time span contrary to a longer development seems to be more suitable. Findings might later be incorporated in follow-up studies focusing on a longer time period. Regarding ‘the national threat perceptions’, as discussed in the theoretical section focus is on threats related to the study and which motivate the Nordic security cooperation. Opportunities might be as important as threats as incentives for security cooperation but will only indirectly be touched upon as rationalistic and functionalistic motives might indicate opportunities as they often come with some kind of reward or benefit. The amount and age of the empirical data differ due to the amount of policy reports or papers the countries release but is chosen from 2004 up to today based on relevance and its source. This choice of departure from 2004 is motivated by that it was the year the second latest Finnish Defence Policy and the important Swedish Defence Policy which set the agenda of the reformation of the Swedish armed forces were presented. This material is complemented by reports from various research institutes to provide thicker accounts of the countries.

1.3 Disposition of the study

The next section presents the theoretical framework by introducing previous research on the topic followed by a discussion of regional security perspectives and a final discussion of the theoretical framework. Then an overview and discussion of the methodological choices and structure is given. Then follow the empirical analysis and conclusion with some final remarks and proposals for future research.
2. Perspectives on Regional Security

2.1 Previous Research

This section will present previous research on Nordic cooperation. Two major factors affecting the Nordic cooperation have been identified and will be used as headers. A comprehensive account of previous research is offered since it contrasts this study and gives a background and empirical foundation to the empirical analysis. Much of the research, especially up to the end of the Cold War focused on how ‘Norden’ tackled the security dilemma with two neighboring superpowers. During the Cold War the Nordic countries pursued similar security policies which were “manifested in their alliance, stationing, and national defense policies, thereby limiting tension in their region and making a modest, yet significant, contribution to East-West détente in general”. Such reasoning is identified in much research on Nordic cooperation and is the topic of this master thesis, the two sometimes overlapping subjects – identity and functionality. They resemble Ferdinand Tönnies’ concepts of gesellschaft (rational will) and gemeinschaft (natural will) in how a society matures and becomes rational compared to when it was ‘immature’ and founded on identity. The concepts are somewhat conflicting, sometimes overlapping but show that there is no general perception of how or why the Nordic cooperation developed as it did.

2.1.1 The Cold War, the Nordic Dimension and Norden as Peacekeepers

In Helsinki, the Nordic Council decided in 1987 to investigate the potential for a Nordic cooperation in relation to their national security policies which led to a report published by NORDSAM - Challenges for Nordic Cooperation: disarmament, human rights and conflict solution. During an era of Nordic disarmament it was argued that the Nordic countries should do more than use political rhetoric to speed up the disarmament in Europe. The Cold War’s security stalemate made Norden and Germany the militarily most important area in the world, stuck in between the both superpowers and without any individually influential voice. In the report Sverre Lodgaard argues in favor for the political tactics of speaking jointly with one shared Nordic voice when expressing concerns since “five voices are

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6 For a good overview on the threat perceptions and the proposed responses see Björeman 1989 on how especially Sweden but also Norden was caught in between the interest zones of the USSR and USA. Also see Agrell 2000 for a description on Sweden’s security strategies up, until and after the Cold War based on Norden’s geographical situation or see Jerneck 2009:a for several accounts of the Swedish case during the Cold War

7 Møller 1997: 130

8 For a recent similar approach see Forsberg 2011

9 Tönnies 1988

10 Lindahl and Jansson 1987: 5

11 A research committee created 1967 which focus on issues of international politics, peace and conflict

12 Translation from the original title: Utmaningar för nordiskt samarbete: nedrustning, mänskliga rättigheter, konfliktlösning

13 Holm 1987: 9-10
better than one or two”. This approach to peace can be labeled a functional approach where the cooperation created a ‘peace identity’ which since then has been debated. This Nordic identity is argued to be evident as their cooperation was the most developed within the UN framework despite ‘the Nordic Balance’ with Denmark’s dual memberships in the European Communities and NATO (with Norway and Iceland) and Sweden and Finland’s neutrality. The concept is controversial and Møller notes that the concept is not inadequate but less impressive when contrasted with additional sectors and when challenged by external transformations in Europe.

How come such an identity could be so powerful? Hans E. Andersson breaks into the conceptualization of ‘identity’ and its meaning for Norden in relation to the EU. He adds to Karl Deutsch’s claim that Sweden in 1905 became a security community based on shared and common values that it has to include a “we-feeling”. He refers to Bengt Sundelius’s explanation of the Nordic cooperation as built around rational acting, functionality and pooling resources and that these political initiatives were not, and would not have been adequate without a shared Nordic background or identity. Through examples of the effect joint Nordic acting has had such, as the 1966 GATT meeting and the 1962 Helsinki agreement Andersson identifies an ongoing development rather than disbandment from the expressing of the identity. Even after Sweden and Finland entered the EU the Nordic identity is present but played down in favor of the new Nordic EU profile but in environmental negotiations the Nordic countries continued to speak jointly with a stronger voice. His conclusion is that in many policy areas there exist a Nordic identity which is often stronger than the national identity and only occasionally the cognitive aim is towards the EU or Norden. This means that the Nordic identity is very strong but that neither the EU nor Norden seems to be the most suitable arena to express that identity.

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14 Lodgaard 1987:30
15 In regard both to the role of the Nordic states as a buffer during World War II and the Cold War, as well as their peaceful approach to international politics. See Jerneck 2009:a for several accounts of Norden and Sweden as ‘bearers of peace’ and Jerneck 2009:b where he situates Sweden in a wider context and doubts Sweden’s exclusivity due to several factors that mattered more and let the region position itself as a region of peace, which make its current state and its history a myth. Furthermore see Joenniemi 2004, Browning and Joenniemi 2004 and Wiberg 2000 for theoretical accounts on how Norden is an anomaly rather than a security community, a discussion that will be presented in the theoretical part of the paper
16 Skjelsbaek 1987: 69-70
17 Møller 1989: 54-60
18 Møller 1989: 73, a subject that will be discussed shortly
19 Andersson 2001: 22-23, traits which still are highlighted in explaining Nordic cooperation see Haarde 1997: 42-44, for both similar and differing opinions see contributions to Jerneck 2009:a.
20 Andersson 2001: 23-24
21 Ibid: 65
22 Ibid: 71-72
23 Ibid: 98-100
24 Ibid: 275-276
25 ‘cognitive aim’ refers to the suitability of a specific arena such as the EU or Norden as the preferred means or actor
Nordic cooperation is nothing new; the formal Nordic Union based on the Kalmar Treaty, the Hanseatic League of the 14’th and 15’th century, cooperation in the Kattegat during the Great Northern War, the failed post World War II Scandinavian Defence Union, the creation of the Council of Baltic Sea States in 1992 followed by the North Calotte Committee and Barents Region initiative are just some examples of co-operations between Nordic, Baltic and North European countries. Lately, even a wild idea to establish a Nordic federal state has been suggested. One of the forms of cooperation that have received most attention is ‘the Nordic Dimension’ (ND), a concept introduced by the Finnish government in 1997 based on the perception that the Nordic countries had certain values to add to the EU. Much research focused on how the Nordic countries and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) were intended to improve the integration in the North-East. The cooperation was seen as a positive win-win interdependence which would lead to security and stability in the region and Wolfgang Wessel see the ND as “a means to add a broader view on foreign policy” applicable even outside the near regional area. When the Baltic States joined the EU, concerns were raised on how to respond to the new northern region with neighboring Russia. While many focused on the EU’s eventual regional instability, both Clive Archer and Kazimierz Musiał place Norden and the Baltic States in a single framework. Musiał agrees with Waever and Joenniemi that the Nordic focus has undergone a transition into a Baltic focus and that the Baltic area is a new framework for the Nordic countries. While Musiał emphasizes identities Archer focus on how Nordic involvement in the Baltic States replaced the role Germany, through the EU, was thought to have. Simultaneously, a Baltic identity transformation followed these external initiatives to separate themselves from their Soviet past.

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26 Dellenbrant and Kite 1995 describes the Northern networks from the Hanseatic League up to the Baltic Sea Region while Eriksson 1994 and Eriksson 1995 analyze the Norwegian Barents Initiative, Neretnieks 2006 focus on the Baltic Sea Region. Wilhelm Agrell 2000 gives a well written overview on the first attempt of a ‘Nordic Alliance’ which fails, develops and is awakened again in the form of the Scandinavian Defence Union. Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 1999: a gives several accounts of Nordic cooperation, many in an European perspective. Also see Herolf 2000 for a historical overview of Nordic cooperation and its implications for 21Th century politics. For an older overview see Padelford 1957
27 Wetterberg 2010, see also Analys Norden, November 2010
28 As noted by Ojanen 2001:14, the concept can be used in several ways; “a catchphrase, an umbrella concept covering many different phenomena that previously did not have a proper name, or an empty basket to be filled with suitable ingredients”.
29 Stenbäck 1997: 8, 17
30 Stålving 2001: 93
31 Ibid: 94
32 Wessels 2000: 18
33 Le Aalto 2006 who only focus on the EU’s foreign policy. Others have focused on EU’s acceleration and/or facilitation of change of security policies in the northern region post the Cold War such as Rieker 2006, or Ojanen 2001
34 Archer 1998, and Musial 2009
35 Musial 2009: 293, see also Joenniemi and Lehti 2001
36 Musial 2009: 294, compare to Jukarainen 1999 who argue that Norden has been geopolitically remade into an ‘eastwards faced euro-north’
37 Archer 1998: 46
38 Noreen and Sjöstedt 2004 discuss the Estonian identity as an example of the identity transformation process post-Cold War while Elzbieta Tromer 2006 presents a broader perspective on how the Baltic States have adapted themselves and their security since their EU-memberships. See Steinbock 2008: 200-201 for a contemporary overview of the Baltic countries.
The demise and shift from a Nordic to a Baltic identity was noted by Ole Waever back in 1992 who found three different paths for the Nordic countries; to be forgotten, to reinvigorate itself in a European Community/EU framework or ‘to go Baltic’\(^{39}\). As seen from this literature overview all three are still discussed. According to Archer, the Nordic involvement in the Baltic States can be explained both due to the Nordic relations with Russia as well as to prevent future instability in the Baltic region\(^{40}\). It is argued to be most important for the Nordic states themselves as “a Nordic project of some importance”\(^{41}\). Marko Lehti and Pertti Joenniemi raise the idea that Norden did not want to become a sub-region in Northern Europe\(^{42}\) and that the initiative to widen the North is seen as a way to have a “both/and” relation to the identities of Europeans and Nords without risking their influence. The interest of the Nordic Dimension peaked with Sweden and Finland’s EU-memberships but faded with emerging new threats and a shifted focus to the wider EU framework. Although, both Archer and Musiał show that the region is utilized to receive recognition, both inside and outside of the EU framework.

\textbf{2.1.2 The Nordic Countries as Rational Actors}

Much research is centered on a Nordic identity in relation to external forces, but an equal amount exist about the Nordic countries as individual rational actors driven by domestic factors. Identity might ease cooperation but it is in this case inferior to functionality or domestic matters\(^{43}\).

In his dissertation Fredrik Doeser analyzes the foreign policies of Sweden, Denmark and Finland to reveal how they share many threat perceptions and adapt their foreign policies much in agreement with each other. He looked to both the external shifts of power in the international system and the domestic support for certain foreign policies and found that the end of the Cold war made the agreements gradually shift. Apart from providing an understanding of the gradual shifts in foreign policy of small states he found that perception and domestic political factors matter\(^{44}\). He also found that gradual change is the common time frame but that the extent of the change and the effect differs. There are similarities, but Denmark differs by going for a transatlantic framework while Sweden and Finland headed for a West European one\(^{45}\). The perceptions were similar but the ends and the domestic political means to reach these differed leading to different national strategies\(^{46}\). He concludes that domestic factors and

\(^{39}\) Waever 1992: 77-78
\(^{40}\) Archer 1998: 53, also see Steinbock 2008: 207
\(^{41}\) Archer 1998: 57, a similar conclusion is offered by Christopher Jones and Johan Eriksson 2009: 181-184
\(^{42}\) Joenniemi and Lehti 2001: 17
\(^{43}\) Le Kite 1996 on how the Scandinavian countries debated EU membership, in relation to each other but still due to domestic functionality and domestic politics. This is also the topic for Forsberg 2011
\(^{44}\) Doeser 2008: 267
\(^{45}\) Ibid: 268
\(^{46}\) Ibid: 270-274
threat perceptions matter but that small states are more likely to change policy due to external factors than domestic ones\textsuperscript{47}. This breaks from the notion that identity or collective thinking plays a role and opens up for the complex relationship between external factors and domestic constraints which can explain outcomes even within a sub-regional framework and still give the same results\textsuperscript{48}. Lee Miles disagrees and argues that there is a strong link between shared domestic values and shared Nordic foreign policy management and values\textsuperscript{49}. While they are not evident in any institutionalized form he see these Nordic security value in the coordination of national policies in relation to the EU/ESDP\textsuperscript{50}.

One recent important collection of research on Nordic security and defence cooperation is The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy edited by Alyson J.K Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius. In their introduction they state that there never has been any voluntary gathering into what could be labeled a collective defence community and that their aim is to investigate whether the Nordic countries proceeds in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in calculation to “best […] projecting and realizing such common values; exploiting common assets and skills; and thus ensuring that the right Nordic ingredients are baked into the eventual European confection”\textsuperscript{51}. There is both convergence and divergence on the themes and perceptions of the Nordic countries cooperation; Jesper L. Christensen summarizes this by framing the Nordic cooperation as an overlapping alternative to the ESDP and that despite their relatively limited resources to influence the wider European agenda they have a long experience of cooperation which generates valuable influence\textsuperscript{52}. Bailes lists examples of Nordic security and defence co-operations\textsuperscript{53} which transformed into something different in today’s less threatening Post Cold War environment, noting that the region should be seen as a sub-region to the larger EU-family rather than as a separate security community\textsuperscript{54}. Pernille Rieker takes it further and argue that the Nordic states are converging, but within the EU-context where they are still ‘Norden’ but in a new external framework which might gain increased importance and a strong voice in EU’s comprehensive approach to security\textsuperscript{55}.

\textsuperscript{47} Doeser 2008: 284-285
\textsuperscript{48} Doeser takes examples of how the Finns insisted on not making security a concern for the Nordic Council (p.149) and how it changed after the end of the Cold War and with a new Finnish government in place (p.166) or how Sweden approached the Danes and the Norwegians with an invitation for a ‘Scandinavian Defence League’ in may 1948 regardless of the Finns situation – and how those talks later broke down (p.210).
\textsuperscript{49} Lee Miles 2006: 77, see Möller and Bjereld 2010 for a different perspective based on the Finish and Swedish experience
\textsuperscript{50} Miles 2006: 82
\textsuperscript{51} Bailes 2006: 2-3
\textsuperscript{52} Christensen 2006: 161
\textsuperscript{53} Bailes 2006: 4-26
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid: 26
\textsuperscript{55} Rieker 2006: 314
Teija Tiilikanen argues that the cooperation is still adjusting to the new EU/ESDP situation and is in between taking an “Atlanticist” (USA/NATO) or “European” direction which resemble Joenniemi and Lehti’s identification of a division between the ‘either/or’ versus ‘both/and’ approach between European and Nordic identity, which is claimed to decrease in favor for the latter. Herolf, in a comment to Tiilikanen agree except for the point that the Nordic countries may be more Atlanticist than Tiilikanen argues – it just shows differently. According to her, the Nordic cooperation is not obsolete, it is only utilized and functional when needed, such as in the case of a common, strong threat, which is hard to imagine today. Alternative frameworks to replace the Cold War peacekeeping identity exist but Christensen warns that they all have uncertain relevance and that the importance of the Nordic states’ strong international identity is eroding. While the EU/ESDP is argued to have replaced the importance and eventual future path of a Nordic cooperation, it still exist in different forms such as the rational and cost-effective cooperation of defence industrial collaboration, the common rhetorical agenda of limiting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the common objection, based on ‘Nordic values’, against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

2.1.3 Current Research on NSC

The latest attempt to deepen the Nordic cooperation is the Stoltenberg report published early in 2009 at the request of the Nordic foreign ministers. While previous research argue that a Nordic identity seems to have come and gone this report follows the latest trend with a shared Nordic rhetoric (over shared action) and a functional and cost-effective agenda. It builds on the assumption that geographical proximity matters regardless of the EU and NATO and that Norden once again is becoming a geopolitical area of interest and the proposal to use the Nordic nations’ defence budgets as cost-effectively as possible. Several of his 13 proposals in the reports are directly related to a rationalistic and ‘most-effective’ reasoning with an international Nordic Stabilization Task Force and shared

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56 Tiilikanen 2006: 65
57 Tiilikanen 2006: 50, further see Baldersheim and Stählberg 1999: b which discusses this ‘Europe of the region’, one might also argue that Norway is even taking a more transatlantic direction with increased cooperation with the US.
58 Joenniemi and Lehti 2000
59 Herolf 2006 68-69, for the Norwegian case and their traditional transatlantic identity see Graeger 2008 or Kibsgaard and Hansen Bundt 2001 for a historical and geopolitical overview.
60 Herolf 2006: 75
61 Christensen 2006: 164
62 Ibid: 165
63 Strömvik 2006: 204
64 Brozska 2006: 192, also see Lundmark 2003
65 Marsh: 250-251
66 Van Dassen and Wetter 2006: 265-266
67 Soltenberg 2009: 5
68 Ibid: 5-6
69 Ibid: 8-10
Nordic maritime monitoring- and satellite surveillance system etc\textsuperscript{70}. At the presentation of the report Stoltenberg highlighted the future and geopolitical concerns and stated that it was only us living in Norden that cared about Norden and that our mutually shared understanding would ease the cooperation\textsuperscript{71}. Apart from the functional gains new improved security cooperation would, especially when carried out abroad, lead to a once again improved standing, reputation and Nordic identity on the international arena\textsuperscript{72}.

The current research seems to position the cooperation either within an EU-framework while others look at the core of Nordic cooperation and how to resurrect it. Andreas Andersson analyzes Nordic peace support operations between 1991 and 1999 to look for a ‘Nordic approach’ through comparing its exceptionality with other co-operations or groupings\textsuperscript{73}. He found a lack of a specific ‘Nordic’ approach and that “the Nordic countries are far from a homogenous group”\textsuperscript{74} but rather heterogeneous which problematizes the application of the concept ‘Nordic approach’\textsuperscript{75}. Instead he concludes that a ‘group’ exists that participated more than other ‘groups’ in peacekeeping and similar endeavors\textsuperscript{76} but that it currently lack a single shared approach and the relative manpower from before\textsuperscript{77}. This breaks with the old self-perception of a ‘Nordic approach’ or identity – and as stated by Ståle Ulriksen it is clear that a goal has been to build a strong reputation and image\textsuperscript{78} and that “[c]ontemporary Nordic foreign policy is less about handling threats or geopolitical challenges directly than about seeking influence through international institutions”\textsuperscript{79} to manifest “Norden” or a Nordic identity. It is not surprise to Bengt Andersson that the Nordic nations look to their own interests since they have realized how modern threats are not bound by distance and that all states must take military responsibility for themselves\textsuperscript{80}. The ‘new security agenda’ makes Tomas Ries deem ‘Nordic security’ dated and irrelevant since European cooperation and development is prioritized over sub-regional cooperation\textsuperscript{81}. Adding to Andersson, Ulriksen identify how segmented cooperation has different levels of ‘Nordicness’ which creates an illusion of an incoherent cooperation\textsuperscript{82}. He argues in favor for a unifying common

\textsuperscript{70} Stoltenberg 2009: 12-14, 17-18  
\textsuperscript{71} Lassinanti 2009  
\textsuperscript{72} Ljung 2009: 12  
\textsuperscript{73} Andreas Andersson 2007  
\textsuperscript{74} Andersson 2007: 484  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid: 486  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid: 489  
\textsuperscript{77} Andersson 2007: 491, between 1986 and the 1990’s the amount of nations that had contributed to UN missions doubled Jakobsen 2007: 458  
\textsuperscript{78} Ulriksen 2007: 553  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid: 560  
\textsuperscript{80} B. Andersson 1999: 20  
\textsuperscript{81} Ries 2003:21  
\textsuperscript{82} Ulriksen 2007: 554
institutional framework. Ulriksen concludes that pooling of resources is just a rational cost calculation while influence and recognition no longer can be achieved within a Nordic framework but is achieved apart from the other, adding to Andersson’s argument. Peter Viggo Jakobsen gives a similar argument about how the Nordic peacekeeping model was swept away when the need for peacekeeping forces decreased in favor for offensive ones. Norden used to be most suitable for these tasks during the Cold War but became less suitable when the demands changed and the banner of human rights was missing and most of all how it is claimed to be only one of the ways to receive prestige and power today. Jakobsen argue that the Nordic cooperation possesses the ability for an enhanced civilian-military package which even would be able to prove influential in the EU, but that it requires some type of institution. In later contributions he found such a framework through the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) and the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT). Through this framework the Nordic countries once again can improve their standing, be more cost-effective and increase efficiency - the problem is to decide how, when and where to deploy the joint Nordic units. Pertti Salminen agrees that NORDCAPS could be a way to regain the old Cold War Nordic power projection and once again spread Nordic values. Others still argue that the Nordic countries are following their own national paths but converging on certain issues and according to Clive Archer NORDCAPS has only been used limitedly and for the Nordic and Baltic states to make an impact they must be able to have something to say which sets them apart from others – something which a deeper integration within the ESDP and EU framework may open up for. Herolf is not yet sure on how the cooperation is developing and while she argues that Nordic cooperation is based on a functional approach she admits that they have been able to influence the EU, but that an EU identity one day might rise and make the Nordic one less influential.

83 Similar to what is argued by Stoltenberg in his report
84 Ulriksen: 566
85 Jakobsen 2006:a: 381, see Lindal 1997: 27-32 on how the problem of non-alignment and neutrality became an obstacle
86 Jakobsen 2006:a: 389
87 Ibid: 389
88 Ibid: 391
89 Jakobsen 2007: 460-463, compare to Jakobsen 2006:b: chapter 8
90 Jakobsen 2007: 473
91 Ibid: 464-470
92 Salminen 2003:206
93 Archer 2008: chapter 11, compare to Kite 1996
94 Archer 2008: 210-211
95 Herolf 2000:150-151, one should not that she wrote this in 2000 and she like others seems to have changed her mind on the power of the EU and its effect on sub-regional identities. Thus one could argue that functionalism better at explains the cooperation today, which is in line with what much literature today is arguing, as has been presented in this section.
2.1.4 Positioning the study

There is a division among scholars that perceive the Nordic peace identity as dated and obsolete and those that argue in favor for its impact on international affairs. Some even claim that the concept of Norden has decreased in influence, value and it has even been questioned in an era with a thin line between peace and conflict. Irrespective of the unlikelihood of a military invasion, the Swedish Defense Research Agency raised concerns in a report from 2009 that Russia might be on the comeback. Notwithstanding the increased relevance of the EU and NATO this study is intended to break with old notions of Norden as a peaceful pluralistic security community which has lost influence, identity and power to NATO and the EU. Instead the study is positioned among those who claim the opposite that cooperation exist but no longer motivated by identity as the instrumental factor. I intend to reveal the existence of a Nordic identity, but which is inferior to functionalism and rational calculations when explaining contemporary Nordic security cooperation. Sweden and Finland were argued to be searching for their places in the post Cold War world and research claim that the Nordic countries chose separate paths. What this study add is that these separate paths affect the contemporary cooperation and its future direction. Instead of perceiving Norden as a ‘Deutschian’ security community the hypothesis is that the region has dual features: one relating to issues abroad where Nordic cooperation might be situated around values such as humanitarian rights and peace and one where differing domestic security policies is limiting the formalization of increased cooperation.

2.2 Theoretical Approaches to regional security cooperation

The idea behind security cooperation is that states seek security through cooperation which cost them some asset in exchange for some other asset which eventually will increase their security. What differs between IR-theories is the explanation for why states cooperate in the first place. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have claimed that traditional IR theories fail to capture the current system which is not captured by any version of polarity, globalization nor any “new world order”. The section starts with an overview of traditional IR-theories and discusses different theories of security cooperation, ending with a discussion of the theoretical framework and model for this study.

96 Archer 2003: 2
97 Bjered 2007: 48, see also Christopher Jones and Johan Erikson 2009: 169-170
98 Ljung 2009: 9-10
99 Ericson 2000: 13
100 Huldt et al 2001: 18, also see Christopher Jones and Johan Eriksson 2009
101 Regarding the claimed Finnish and Swedish search for security paths one should note the recent article by Möller and Bjereld explaining how they responded differently to the same issued even as if it looked that they acted similarly.
102 Due to the level of units this is not applicable to the case of Norden, Joenniemi 2003: 211
103 Müller 2002: 371
104 Ibid: 371
105 Buzan and Waever 2003: 3


2.2.1 Traditional IR-perspectives on security cooperation

Buzan and Waever criticize neorealist’s narrow view on polarity\(^\text{106}\) and ‘superpower bias’, where the subject is viewed and rules from above by the superpower/s\(^\text{107}\). Resembling the critique to traditional realist; these prisoners of ideology and static focus on states’ preferences in the anarchic system\(^\text{108}\) led Ken Booth to call for a new definition of realism\(^\text{109}\). Modern realists have loosened their focus on self-help and ad-hoc argued that norms are important to make states live up to entered agreements, the “intra-alliance equivalent of the security dilemma”\(^\text{110}\). It is argued that states’ understanding of risks and costs of non-cooperation is weighted against cooperation; this perspective might be true for smaller states but neglects the unequal power relationships between states\(^\text{111}\). There are efforts to separate from old explanations such as the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) which was created to decrease the role of great powers and to highlight local factors\(^\text{112}\).

Liberalism successfully explains outcomes of democratic cooperation and deepening, but two questions remain. First, the connection between democratic and ‘cooperative success’ and why non-democratic states would want to cooperate? Secondly, how excluded non-democratic “others” might be invited into the democratic cooperation. The first question touches onto rationalism and the second constructivist norms and identities and lack liberal explanation. Used alone, liberalism lacks full explanatory power\(^\text{113}\). ‘Globalists’ aim of deterritorialized world politics into a ‘world society’ is claimed to be an expression of US hegemony more than an autonomous process and global security is an aspiration, not a reality\(^\text{114}\), close to the insider/outsider debate of the democratic society\(^\text{115}\). Far-reaching globalization and deterritorialization probably undermine regional security perspectives but Waever deem such an extremely globalized world unlikely\(^\text{116}\). Buzan argue that interdependence is rather unlikely to reduce control and might instead increase the agenda of issues to disagree on\(^\text{117}\). Pertti Joenniemi remarks that liberal security, contrary to ‘common security’ or ‘asecurity’, is based on “normative preconditions set in order to deal with the transient other” and does not discuss the preconditions for cooperation\(^\text{118}\).

\(^{106}\) Buzan and Waever 2003: 6-7  
\(^{107}\) Ibid: 69  
\(^{108}\) Booth 1991: a: 16-17  
\(^{109}\) Ibid: 19  
\(^{110}\) Müller 2002: 372  
\(^{111}\) Charles Glaser discussed by Müller 2002: 372  
\(^{112}\) Buzan and Waever 2003: 46-47  
\(^{113}\) Müller 2002: 378-379  
\(^{114}\) Buzan and Waever 2003: 9-10, 43  
\(^{115}\) Buzan 1991: b  
\(^{116}\) Waever 2005: 156  
\(^{117}\) Buzan 1991 a: 43  
\(^{118}\) Joenniemi 2007: 130-131
Between liberalism and realism ‘the English School’ or ‘theory of international society’ wish to see a ‘society of states’ driven by ‘specialized statespeople’. Hedley Bull argues that “the principal of collective security implies that international order should rest not on a balance of power, but on a preponderance of power wielded by a combination of states acting as the agents of international society as a whole that will deter challenges to the system or deal with them if they occur”. Relations between human agents affect state behavior in an anarchical state-system where order is shaped by shared values and justice. When two or more states becomes interdependent of the behavior of the other a ‘system of states’ is created, while a ‘society of states’ is when a group of states conceive themselves to be interdependent and relations are regulated by rules. Contrary to realists states have succeeded to create an international society, although without guarantee that it will last. For these values and regulations to develop international order is necessary. Focus is on military power and competition among states and great powers but also the belief in pacifying norms and shared values. Problematic is the realistic focus on Westphalian states and a western bias which takes the state structure as granted, as well as the sociological conceptualizations of ‘values’ and ‘norms’. Barry Buzan has tried to improve this by looking at the regional level and institutions in the Middle East.

Finally, the constructivist security cooperation rests on two requirements. First, a structure permitting non-aggressive moves without the risk of perishing, inviting to cooperation and creation of non-violent norms. Second, that agents exist who find and utilize those options and develop mutual expectation around cooperative ways which leads to the emergence of norms. This makes possible the emergence of security cultures/subcultures since “policy aims at making the international and the domestic discourse on security compatible, while being shaped by both” which leads to the emergence of patterns, norms and similar domestic institutions. Norms and identities reveal how stability and change occur and do not exclude the instance of an international society. It does not confirm its unbreakable logic but critically examines processes that would seem as inevitable, leading to self-fulfilling prophecies.

119 Jackson and Sörensen 2007:131
120 Bull 2002: 231
121 Jackson and Sörensen 2007: 134, Linklater 2005:84
122 Jackson and Sörensen 2007: 159
123 Linklater 2005:88
124 Ibid:109
125 Halliday 2009:2-3
126 Ibid:17-21
127 Buzan 2009:
128 Müller 2002: 379
129 Ibid: 380
130 Müller 2002: 381, or how it is restructuring the global neighborhood by reshaping norms, identities etc, Bellamy 2004: 6
131 Guzzini 2004: 40, 45
2.2.2. Alternative Theories of Security Cooperation

In the mid 50’s Karl Deutsch wanted to find the causes and cures for conventional warfare; population growth, hunger, environmental problems etc, parts of the complex reality of the global development. Or summarized as: the “possible ways in which men some day might abolish war”. His solution was to study formations of communities in the forms of security communities rather than political communities. The idea is that members of the security-communities through integration will get a sense of community (group feeling) which will lead to peaceful change and prevent the expectations of war. He identified two types of historical security communities – the amalgamated (USA during the Cold War) and the pluralistic (Norden). The pluralistic security-community has received the most attention and is based on; mutual integration of norms and values, deep communication between the members and an existing sense of ‘we-feeling’. Opposite to some presented perception of Nordic cooperation, functionalism is not seen as a feature behind the creation of a security-community. Mutual beliefs, trust and the integration process are crucial for a pluralistic security-community and are increased through an increased administrative and capacity for each member, improved communication through social communication and cross border interaction which puts focus on states as well as society. While a pluralistic security-community is preferred one crucial factor is missing – long-term ties. As Ken Booth argues, these communities still participate in an anarchical system, similar to Bull’s claim about the uncertain stability of these communities over time. The exclusion of international war between nations does not necessarily make it a security community as long as internal violence or social conflicts exists which can spread which make the region or community unpredictable. While liberals might hail interdependence, more complex interdependence compared to increased democracy might harm rather than breed the creation of security communities.

132 Eberwein 1995: 341
133 Deutsch et al 1957:3
134 Ibid: 4-5
135 Ibid: 5
136 Ibid: 6-7, see table on page 7 for a fuller explanations of the different sub-groups
137 Ibid: 6
138 Ibid: 36
139 Deutsch et al 1957: 81-82. For critical notions see Joenniemi 2004 who claims that Norden never was a security community and that the deep integration was due to other factors than security.: see Browning and Joenniemi 2004 who perceive and study Norden as an asecurity community when trying to relate it to the Baltic Sea Region: Furthermore, Wiberg 2000 who gives an account of the security community theory and also holds it against the Nordic case which he concludes is an anomalous case with a certain history which makes it hard to explain through the idea of a security community.
140 Deutsch et al 1957:200-201
141 Booth 1991:b: 337
142 Bull 2002: 273-274, compare to the importance of identity, interdependence and institutions that Risse highlights as important factors for a security community to be healthy and which were damaged by the Iraqi crisis, Pouliot 2006:123
143 For examples of the ways this might happen see Nathan 2006
144 Eberwein 1995:354
At the same time there is nothing inherent in security communities that demand the non-existence of internal conflicts, it only demands that they are resolved peacefully.\textsuperscript{145}

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett intended to further the study on especially the pluralistic security community and focus on the idea that states can embed themselves in “sets of social relations that are understood as a community”.\textsuperscript{146} One of their important differences is that they try to get out from Deutsch’s European and Scandinavian focus on how a region can go from a zone of conflict to a zone of peace\textsuperscript{147} and instead apply it to a wider geographic area\textsuperscript{148}. They open up for transnational ties as well as international organizations and present a three tiered system from which one can study security-communities. Basically it relies on a foundation which breeds a structure and process of integration and social learning until it might result in mutual trust and eventually a collective identity\textsuperscript{149}. Adler has improved this reasoning of a ‘community of practice’ in how knowledge combined with self-restraint breeds a “social construction of rationality in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-restraint help constitute dependable expectations of peaceful change, and for normative evolution, in the sense that self-restraint beings about security through cooperation”\textsuperscript{150}. Their framework categorize communities depending on their development towards a security community according to a three phased scale – “nascent”, “ascendant” and “mature”, which is loosely or tightly coupled where the former has a more developed, or even an institutionalized, we-feeling (due to the normative evolution)\textsuperscript{151}. This framework compare theory and existing security systems and identifies the necessities for war ridden or troubled regions to develop and stabilize\textsuperscript{152}. While the ways to look at security communities has the goal of creating peace in an anarchical system Alex J. Bellamy take a more constructivist angle and warns for the insider/outsider relationship which is an effect of a security community. These insider/outsider relationships can take different shapes (regional fortress, ambivalent community, integrationist community)\textsuperscript{153} with the idea that insiders create outsiders and the relationship between the separate communities are framed by political choices and can thus be (re-)constructed\textsuperscript{154}. His contribution is important in relation to the warnings from Bull and Booth and regarding widening versus deepening of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Pouliot 2006: 121-122
\item Adler and Barnett 1998: 6
\item Guzzini 2004: 43
\item Ibid:48
\item Adler and Barnett 1998: 37-48
\item Adler 2008:196-197
\item Adler and Barnett 1998: 48-57
\item See Bah 2005. He apply RSCT and show through the case of the West African region how scholars might get the potential to narrow different potential outcomes and identify their current track and then give advice for how to develop to eventually go from a security complex to a security community.
\item Bellamy 2004: 10-12
\item Ibid: 178
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
security communities and the effects for the wider community. Amit Acharya study ASEAN’s transformation into a security community and remarks that the prospect for ASEAN to turn into a security community depends on intra-conflicts as well as the relations with the wider region. Laurie Nathan also touches upon this issue of intra-national conflicts and argue that the idea of security communities falsely accept regions were involved nations suffer from domestic instability and social conflicts. Elsewhere Hans Mouritzen positions the Baltic states in a framework with the prospects for a top-down or a bottom-up led community and finds that the most important factors is the external relations with Russia. This is exactly what Bellamy suggests, that conflict ridden regions, no matter how integrated they may be, still depend on the wider region. A flaw with security-communities is that even well developed, mature, communities might be unstable not only due to their internal relations but also due to their external. This seems more reasonable when applied to the wider security concept when issues of different definitions of concepts might turn into conflicts – even for highly developed western countries. As how the Iraqi crisis affected NATO painfully and problematically but that it by no means meant the demise of the security community. A final concern with security communities is the perceived link between integration and peace which Morten Bøås argues to be false and dependant on a very limited view on transnational flows which is similar to Robert G. Blanton who wants to connect the liberal peace theory with security communities in an attempt to add trade as a more important integration process. This would lead to increased interdependence but Adler brings up how Snyder states that a “community of practice consists of people who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying common practice”. Thus increased interdependence might improve the ties but it is the shared interest in using common practice and interest in learning that is crucial and which prevents eventual conflicts.

Robert Jervis tried to apply the concept of a ‘regime’ to international security among states and defined the concepts of ‘security regime’ as: “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate”. The obstacle for a successful security regime is its reliance on “mutual restraints and limitations on unilateral actions” which ties it to

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155 Acharya 1991: 174
156 Nathan 2006
157 Mouritzen 2004
158 See discussion below on the wider security concept encompassing more sectors than the traditional military one
159 Wagner 2003: 708-709, one should relate this to the warning regarding too extensive interdependence
159 Pouliot 2006: 119, for more disagreements between the US and Europe and internal in NATO see Miller 2001
160 Blanton 2006
161 Bøås 2000: 311-314
162 Blanton 2006
163 Adler 2008: 199
164 Jervis 1982: 357, also see Haas 1982 for a more theoretical account on the concept of ‘regimes’
the security dilemma\textsuperscript{165}. One crucial factor or restraint is contrasting military doctrines\textsuperscript{166}. Compared to security-communities the focus is on states and the governments with less attention on societies\textsuperscript{167}. Conditions such as mutual interest and belief in the values of the regime, belief in a status-quo and a belief in war as too costly are necessary for a security regime to exist\textsuperscript{168}. It is the role of mutual beliefs that is of importance for a strong security regime, which makes it more of ‘rules of behavior’ than power transformations\textsuperscript{169}. Ernst B. Haas agree and defines regimes as: arrangements “whose members sought to manage and limit conflicts of interest among them because they recognized that complex interdependence makes a game of pure conflict too costly”\textsuperscript{170}. Jervis only identified one existence of a security regime – the Concert of Europe, but others have identified NATO and EU as eventual or existing security regimes\textsuperscript{171}. Jervis does not accept short-run, narrow self-interest and momentary peace as signs of a security regime\textsuperscript{172}. While this seems skeptical in theory research is made such as that of Alex Andronov and Boris Maximov on the tension in South Asia between India and Pakistan where bilateral talks and confidence building measures are proposed to change competing threat perceptions\textsuperscript{173}. Or in the case of Eastern Europe where Malcolm Chalmers doubts the possibility of an Eastern European security regime due to the reluctance of the necessary external regions and states to participate in the creation of such a regime\textsuperscript{174}. Donald R. Rothwell discuss whether the Arctic Regime might learn from the Antarctic one and although he never really discuss the regime concept his case of the Arctic can be seen as a way in which regimes adapt to a broader security concept of non-military sectors\textsuperscript{175}. Security cultures is a recent perspective on security co-operations or rather on national and international security policies which focus on the cultural aspects between states where security is as a common good\textsuperscript{176}. As Keith Krause writes, “cultural factors can be used to explain persistent miscommunication and misperceptions on issues of war and peace\textsuperscript{177}” and on a deeper level account for the framing of issues (such as the ‘Nordic’ or the ‘Asian way’). In between the poles of ‘everything is culture’ and ‘cultures doesn’t matter’ he puts the light on the conditions and extents to which culture matters in

\textsuperscript{165} Jervis 1982: 358-360
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid: 376
\textsuperscript{167} See Dörfer 1997 on the Nordic countries replacement from a pluralistic European security-community to the Western security regime. Which might be seen as a shift between a constructivist/liberalist and realist/pseudo-constructivist pole.
\textsuperscript{168} Jervis 1982: 362-364
\textsuperscript{169} Eriksson 1993: 2
\textsuperscript{170} Haas 1982: 207
\textsuperscript{171} Eriksson 1993: 2, Dörfer 1997
\textsuperscript{172} Jervis 1982: 371
\textsuperscript{173} Andronov and Maximov 1999
\textsuperscript{174} Chalmers 1993
\textsuperscript{175} Rothwell 1994
\textsuperscript{176} Sperling 2010: 1
\textsuperscript{177} Krause 1999a: 1
international relations – between states and between the units of civilizations or communities\textsuperscript{178}. He points to four types of potential conflict cultures\textsuperscript{179}, political, strategic, security and diplomatic. He concludes that cultures are often fragmented, with intersecting sub-cultures (such as elite- and mass culture) and that security cultures might not explain how rational decisions are taken but helps to understand the ends in themselves\textsuperscript{180}. Empirically, Darryl Howlett and John Glenn study the sources that have emerged and changed within the individual Nordic countries which frame the Nordic security culture\textsuperscript{181}. Elsewhere James Sperling identifies four criteria for the definition of a national security culture; the world-view of the external environment, national identity, instrumental preferences and interaction preferences\textsuperscript{182}. This further what Krause found, that there is a clearly identifiable pattern of how different states depending on their development (Westphalian or post-Westphalian) either hold tight to their sovereignty and national culture (Eurasia) -or- establish a transnational security culture (Europe)\textsuperscript{183}. Thus, these perspectives might be better as instruments for creating better policies and understandings of ‘others’ than to account for international relations among cultures or communities.

2.2.5 Regional Security Complex Theory

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argued that the current system is not captured by traditional IR-perspectives. Instead they focus on different parts of the full picture and as the regional level evidently is important\textsuperscript{184} we need to understand both the global and the regional dynamics and how they integrate\textsuperscript{185}. This makes their approach in line with this study which aims to integrate both external and internal factors to explain the Nordic security cooperation. Their socio-constructivist neo-realism theoretical framework intends to explain regional security by providing “a compatible framework for area specialists” where national security is seen as a relational phenomenon understood through its embedment in international patterns of interdependence\textsuperscript{186}. Since “threats operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with neighbors will tend to have first priority”\textsuperscript{187}. There is a dual process where security complexes are generated by the ir geography and the anarchic system (from above) while the interaction between regional actors and their securitizations of threats are perceived by national actors from below. The structure created from below starts at the “regional level and is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Krause 1999a: 1-2
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid: 5-18
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Krause 1999b: 220-221
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Howlett and Glenn 2005
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Sperling 2010: 11-12
  \item \textsuperscript{183} Dorussen et al 2010: 287
  \item \textsuperscript{184} Buzan 1991c: 225-226, through a 4-level framework he showed the importance of the regional level
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Buzan and Waever 2003: 4, similar to Lake and Morgan 1997 who argue that we need general theories that incorporate regional relations (1997: 7) since states are increasingly solving them on the regional level and not the global (1997: 343)
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Buzan 1991c: 186-187
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid: 191
\end{itemize}
extended toward inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other”\textsuperscript{188} which is then affected by the global. Both internal (the domestic and regional events) and external factors (the system and interaction with the regional level) are looked at to see how units interact with themselves and their environment and reveal their perceived threats through ‘speech acts’ which frame things as potential security threats\textsuperscript{189}.

Similar to security cultures, interstate structures are based on shared geography, history and cultural roots with relationships of amity or enmity\textsuperscript{190}. The spectrum of amity and enmity encompass the division between, conflict formation at the negative end – based on fear, rivalry and insecurity, and at the positive end security communities in which states create some larger unit and no longer fear each other, in between lies security regimes where states still fear each other but have made risk-decreasing arrangements\textsuperscript{191}. The internal and external factors and the proximity and history of neighboring nations create interdependent ‘complexes’ in which states need to cooperate to tackle common threats. This creates ‘in-set’s which aim to solve these issues instead of in interaction with outside actors\textsuperscript{192}. These regionally based clusters or ‘security complexes’ explain the “relative intensity of interstate security relations” which leads to regional patterns based on internal power distribution, amity/enmity and historical relations\textsuperscript{193}. This attempts to connect many of the previous theories in one single framework\textsuperscript{194}. Two more concepts are important; first, insulators, which is a state in between two regional complexes like a buffer, either in between (Burma), integrated in both but not really part of either (Turkey) or in between two different level complexes (Sweden or Finland)\textsuperscript{195}. The second concepts is overlay or penetration which is when a superior power limits the state’s ability to claim its interests and where the local complex cannot be identified due to the overlay, the opposite is when a state is so weak or has fallen and no longer can claim its own interests\textsuperscript{196}.

“Security complexes offer a systemic approach to security analysis which requires attention to the macro level of great power impact on the system, middle level of a local state’s relations and the micro level of domestic affairs”\textsuperscript{197}. Focus is on ‘sets of states’ in regional complexes where interaction may be due to

\textsuperscript{188} Waever 2005: 156, earlier it is said that it is easiest to approach top-down, Buzan and Waever 2003: 28
\textsuperscript{189} Buzan and Hansen 2009: chapter 2, see table on page 38 for a short summary
\textsuperscript{190} Buzan 1991:c: 189-191
\textsuperscript{191} Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 12
\textsuperscript{193} Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 11-12
\textsuperscript{194} As can be seen in the works of Bah 2005, Acharya 1991 and Bae and Moon 2005
\textsuperscript{195} Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 196, Buzan and Waever 2003: 40, one should also note that Buzan and Waever in their concluding remarks add the concept of “buffer” which is similar to an insulator within a RSC 2003: 483-487
\textsuperscript{197} Buzan 1991:c: 222
power games, not self-helping states where national security is an independent “good” among others\textsuperscript{198}. The order within these regional complexes is based on amity and enmity and on potential power which might increase or decrease due to \textit{internal or external transformations}. Internal transformations can be things such as Japan or India’s development or a superpower’s involvement/withdrawal such as the US in Afghanistan while external transformations might be the end of the Cold War or a new security environment which affect all states, resembling a regional twist on power politics\textsuperscript{199}. External transformations might lead to internal transformations and have internal consequences on the (sub-) regional or national level, as when a change of polarity or new emerging threats change the way states perceives their security. These internal transformations can be how states adapt their national forces or policies to respond to these changes but can also be national strategies or intra-regional changes to gain more influence or power such as when Finland increased their military forces at the end of the Cold War. Thus both changes in the external environment – outside of the region, as well as internal – changes within the region are likely to affect the way states perceive and structure their security. The important relation to analyze is how external transformations sometimes have direct internal impacts which reveal the factors which affect states and the whey they form their security policies and as incentives for security cooperation.

\subsection*{2.2.5.1 Widening the concept of Security}
Initially the theory lacked practical realization, had little empirical evidence and vague prescriptions of how to look at the full systemic picture to understand the parts, which made it as difficult to implement or dispute the theory\textsuperscript{200}. Later works improved the ‘levels of analysis’ where Buzan, Waever and de Wilde added that “nothing is intrinsic to levels themselves that suggests any particular pattern or priority of relations among them. Levels are simply ontological referents for \textit{where} things happen and not sources of explanations in themselves”\textsuperscript{201}. They went beyond the military and political sectors and invited more actors to voice speech acts. Perceived threats now could be found within the military, environmental, societal and political sectors and conflicts might be now handled differently than when the threat was of military character\textsuperscript{202}. This captures how global events can have local effects and vice versa which might lead to regional insecurity. Old state-centric approaches did not utilize mobile non-state actors and could not identify the new ways threats operate\textsuperscript{203}. States can deal with threats through three processes; first \textit{non-politization} which is when a state does not deal with the issue, then

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{198} Buzan 1991: c: 224
  \item \textsuperscript{199} Ibid: 212-214, or pages 216-219 for explanations of the concepts of internal and external transformation
  \item \textsuperscript{200} Petersen 1984: 852
  \item \textsuperscript{201} Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 5, see example on how sectors and levels operate in relation to each other 1998: 164-166
  \item \textsuperscript{202} Ibid, see separate chapters for a more in-depth discussion on each sector
  \item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid: 10-11, 207
\end{itemize}
politization which is when the issue is part of the political public policy but where the issue is not seen as an existential threat and finally securitization which is when an issue is perceived as an existential threat and demands a stronger involvement of the state. To better understand the securitization process they introduced sub- and micro-regions as potential ‘levels’ and shifted from the neorealist perspective’s prioritization of amity/enmity to an explicit social constructivist approach. This move overcame the risk of objectifying threats and invite a ‘constructive questioning’ of threats which capture the dynamic behind actors’ securitizations. The widening has also been criticized and David Skidmore see a shortcoming in the framing of the purpose, its direction and that it only contributes with “a snapshot of which issues dominate concerns over security in various countries and regions at a given time”. According to Buzan and Waever the theory opens up new areas, actors and interactions to analyze the RSCs by and their theory narrow the range of possible outcomes for given types of regions and enrich our understanding of the background against which specific policy solutions are taken.

2.2.5.2 Explaining Regional Powers

Buzan and Waever later applied securitization theory to empirical studies on RSC’s to add empirical evidence to the improved framework. They kept their socio-constructivist neo-realist perspective but contrary to neorealism labeled ‘distribution of power’ an independent variable among others and not the sole explanatory variable. The cold war restructured the world and the regional interactions and a new, wider, security agenda appeared. The regions of the world were divided into different spectrums depending on their development – strong or weak, post-, pre- or modern where most states were identified as modern where securitization is present and seen in patterns of outsider/insider. The postmodern states were mostly capitalist states, linked through common structures and more prone to desecuritize threats but where identity and migration still might be potential issues. Finally, pre-modern states consist of the third world or undeveloped states where conflict and securitization is

204 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 23-24, 29
205 Ibid: 19
206 Ibid: 207, 212
207 Ibid: 2-5
208 Skidmore 1999: 1011
209 Buzan and Waever 2003: 4
210 Buzan 1991: c: 248; The issue of full explanations of events is not new to social science and has been widely discussed. See JamesFearson and Alexander Wendt 2002 for a notion that we should solve problems, not fight over right or wrong
211 Buzan and Waever 2003: xvi, Hoogensen use this as a critique and argue that they have an undeveloped comment on the different security sectors and levels of analysis due to traits of neorealist state-centric focus 2005: 271-273
212 Buzan and Waever 2003: 4, they also note, 2003: 45 that the world could still be state-centric, as according to traditional theories, but that their framework is not.
213 Buzan and Waever 2003: 17-18
214 Ibid: 20-23
215 Ibid: 23-24
common. The theory uses interaction between all four levels to give a description of the type of regional complex that the states form which make it possible to hypostasize about its development. This helps to structure empirical area studies and to logically deduce the conditions for RSC-types to emerge among these ‘moving scenarios’ and possible conditions. From an unstructured region the path-dependent process might lead it to develop into a “standard” RSC in the form of a ‘conflict formation’, ‘security region’ or ‘security community’ according to certain conditions. Thus, we might be able to predict the emergence of RSCs by looking at their position on the spectrum. Mohammed Ayoob identifies further variables for why certain RSCs have not developed further and found three main factors: the need for a pivotal power within the region, the need of insulation from overlay or external/extra-regional influence and intervention and finally the need to see the effort as a collaborative venture towards a common goal. - not until these are met a security society or community develop. Moreover, the independent variables of amity/enmity and power relations within the international system and the regional complex give us mutually exclusive structures depending on their interaction level. Three types of powers were identified in a three-tiered scheme: superpowers, great powers and regional powers which manifest power differently. Superpowers have the potential to interfere in all regions through overlay or penetration while great powers are only slightly more influential than regional powers due to ‘system level calculations’ of present and future power calculations. Their power is bound to their own region and not abroad, which differ from traditional IR theories or from David Lake and Patrick Morgan who argue that great powers have a global reach and can participate as regular actors in any region. Lastly, regional powers are defined by the polarity of any given RSC such as unipolar (South Africa), bipolar (South Asia), multilateral (Middle East) etc. So to understand the regional interactions we must look at the system which is part of and affected but not dependent. In their work on regions and powers they also use internal and external transformations as variables to identify changing power relations either within (internal) or outside (external) the regional boundaries rather than as variables to identify threat perceptions. The theory enables to narrow down possible outcomes for different types of regions as well as to analyze and up to a point anticipate and explain

216 Buzan and Waever 2003: 51- 65 for the discussion on the descriptive aspect of the theory which ends with a summary of different RSCs on p.62. Buzan 2005 can probably be seen as one way of hypothesizing on the impact of different RSCs.
217 Buzan and Waever 2003: 66
218 Ibid: 83-87
219 Ayoob p.258-259
220 Buzan and Waever 2003: 27, separating them from ‘regional orders” vague borders between the regional and global
221 Ibid:34-37
222 Lake 1997: 64
223 Buzan and Waever 2003: 37-39 for an empirical case of the importance of knowing what type of distribution we have. Buzan 2005 made an effort to answer the question of “after bipolarity, what?” which lend further support to the argument that the regional matters as it affect the standing of the great powers which are bound to what happens in their regions. P.197
224 Buzan and Waever 2003: 53
developments within a certain region\textsuperscript{225}. This study utilizes its organizational scheme for empirical studies and its basis for theory-based scenarios since possible outcomes are known\textsuperscript{226}.

Except for the differing view on the possibility to participate in several RSCs Buzan and Waever further argue\textsuperscript{227}: first, that Lake and Morgan have a biased case selection which lacks a full holistic explanation regarding all existing regions\textsuperscript{228}, secondly, criticize their amount of potential causal variables beyond security. Finally, that they seem to argue that the global and regional can be merged, thus geographical proximity does not matter which dissolves the point of using different levels. In a more comparative approach Lake and Morgan study the values attached to the variables arguing that it is possible to predict regional outcomes even if different individual traits lead to different paths. Rather than amity and enmity or degrees of conflict they want to explain the dominant security patterns, orders, within RSCs\textsuperscript{229}. They identify five ideal types; \textit{integration}, \textit{pluralistic security community}, \textit{collective security}, \textit{great-power concert} and \textit{power restraining power}\textsuperscript{230}. Each RSC may consist of several of these depending on the order within the RSC and the ‘\textit{local externalities}’; threats brought upon a set of related states where the cost for overcoming it is shared, either in positive or negative ways (increased power due to an alliance contra weakened state with an increased risk of heavy migration)\textsuperscript{231}. Their regional orders are not geographically bound since great powers may have foreign policies which directly involve and affect the dynamic within other RSC\textsuperscript{232}. Similar to Buzan they argue that “military strength falls of sharply with distance” but focus on “military strength” where more strength means an improved reach\textsuperscript{233} and where power balancing is the default strategy\textsuperscript{234}. Powerful states may interfere and participate in several regions as actual ‘members’ if all units within the region perceive them as a member and they share common security problems\textsuperscript{235}. Both theories are criticized to neglect the ‘peace variable’ and that RSCT’s territorialization misses many of today’s important threats\textsuperscript{236}. Lake and Morgan is also claimed to overemphasize negative externalities and conflict: the former is claimed to miss how certain conflict formations have not had wars for a long time while the latter over focus on

\textsuperscript{225} Buzan and Waever 2003: 40
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid: 45
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid: 79-81
\textsuperscript{228} A critique on Buzan and Waever’s part but a notion shared by Hoogensen who although separate the two approaches due to their different objectives. Hoogensen 2005: 270
\textsuperscript{229} Lake and Morgan 1997:a: 8-9, Morgan 1997: 31-32
\textsuperscript{230} Morgan 1997: 32-42
\textsuperscript{231} Lake 1997: 48-57, which complements RSCT and Security Community to give a better overview of a case, Bah 2005
\textsuperscript{232} Morgan 1997: 28-29
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid: 29
\textsuperscript{234} Lake and Morgan 1997:b: 345
\textsuperscript{235} Lake and Morgan 1997:a: 11-12, 25, for a 5 point list of what to look for to find a RSC see Morgan 1997: 26
\textsuperscript{236} Tavares 2006: 62-63, 67
outdated state-centric inter-state conflicts which miss much positive inter-state relations that tries to solve intra-state conflicts.\textsuperscript{237}

2.2.6 Applying Theory in Empirical Analysis

Contrary to Buzan and Waever\textsuperscript{238} I claim that Norden is affected by internal and external transformations. A security community is a region of demilitarization and peace where violence is not a thinkable solution to interstate conflicts. Instead, external factors such as neighboring great powers (Russia) and a changing external context are perceived to have direct impact on the region which used to have NATO and the US as a watchdog. The important external transformation of a new security environment which brought along new potential threats such as environmental disasters, terrorism, transnational crime and trafficking is likely to have reshaped regional politics.\textsuperscript{239} Regional and national responses are readapting and security has taken a position between peace and power.\textsuperscript{240} This is why RSCT is preferred over theories where internal regional aspects are held more important than the actors’ interaction within and outside the region and external threats and changes. RSCT looks at both internal and external factors and utilizes the perceptions of the states or other important actors which reveal more of the reasoning behind their security perceptions. As seen in the theoretical discussion there are three ways for a state to deal with an eventual issue. They all depend on actors’ evaluation of potential threats but sometimes these actors do not wish to alarm the population when the threat is important but not existential.\textsuperscript{241} Several of the new threats are important but not existential threats, and actors might use securitizations as political moves to frame the importance of the threats differently depending on what they are a threat to.\textsuperscript{242} Securitization is also claimed to be un-conceptualized in terms of means, how collectives securitize issues\textsuperscript{243} and that it is not adequately addressed how it is “applied to the level of regional arrangements and the processes involved in the collective construction of, and responses to, threat agendas.”\textsuperscript{244} A relaxed use of securitization is suggested\textsuperscript{245} and Buzan and Waever admit that securitization is not necessary for RSCT. Therefore, in this study focus is on both securitization and politization\textsuperscript{246} when analyzing the data. Few peaceful countries are likely to portray other states’ non-military deeds as existential threats compared to the likelihood of framing it as a diplomatic and political

\textsuperscript{237} Tavares 2006: 63, 66-68
\textsuperscript{238} Buzan and Waever 2003: 47
\textsuperscript{239} Eriksson 1993:6-7
\textsuperscript{240} Buzan has developed his argument that security is an additional concept of importance, Buzan 1984 and Waever 2004
\textsuperscript{241} Eriksson 2001: 1-4
\textsuperscript{242} Bjereld 2001:16, Eriksson et al 2001: 100
\textsuperscript{243} Tavares 2006: 63, Haacke and Williams 2008: 776, 808
\textsuperscript{244} Haacke and Williams 2008: 776
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid: 808-809
\textsuperscript{246} For an example see Eriksson 2001 and Eriksson 2004
issue. From the empirical data instances where the state is perceived to have to act on an issue, regardless if it is existential or not will be analyzed.

The theoretical model which will be applied in the empirical analysis is a trimmed modification of Buzan and Waever’s RSCT. The model is suitable for this study since it acknowledge the relationship between external and internal transformations and the consequences and effects they have on the national actions and security perceptions, which may explain the security cooperation. Norden and Nordic cooperation has traditionally been seen as a value based security community where inter-Nordic conflict is seen as unlikely. While this explains how a Nordic identity might ease cooperation it does not explain why security cooperation exists or how they are affected by external factors. The theoretical model that will be used here will explain both why the cooperation exists and identify its driving forces, whether they are identity, shared values or functionalistic necessity. The model utilizes the different components of RSCT but will play down securitization/politizations and exclude ‘sectors’ and ‘means’ from the model since it is unfruitful to note all instances of perceived threats and each sector when they are likely to be of cross-sectored character and the means are likely to be part of larger solutions. Instead, securitizations/politizations will be presented in a thick, free flowing descriptive way which gives a better descriptive flow of the Nordic nations’ security perceptions and explains more of the contexts. As focus is on threat perceptions and their consequences and how they might motivate security cooperation the independent variables of external and internal transformations will be in reference to the meaning Buzan gave them in People, States, and Fear. Their meaning in Regions and Powers puts more emphasis on power and regional formation which is of less importance as the post-modern Nordic region is still a security community but affected and partly dependent on the wider European region and external factors.

The dependent variable is Nordic security cooperation which I intend to investigate whether it is built on a Nordic identity or on functionalism and rational calculations. The security cooperation is likely to cross all levels since it is based on the sub-regional level but will operate on the international and even the national level. Thus, evidence of security cooperation might be found on all levels. The Nordic security cooperation is found through an analysis of the national security perceptions which gather the national threat perceptions which are a product of different background and independent variables.

247 To note all instances of politizations require book lengths and is of less importance in how it affects NSC. To present securitizations in the traditional way is more suitable for process-tracing or comparative studies.
At the international and regional level the international context is a background variable which shapes the context of the international system and thus also shapes the context in which the security cooperation emerges. The international context encompasses eventual overlay, penetrations or insulator statuses of different states, which emerge on this level while their impact and the responses to them are found within the official documents and on the national level. The international context might be the system polarity or power – is nations and regions adapting differently to a bipolar or a multipolar world or increasing their power or whether an external power recently came in possession of say weapons of mass destruction? The international context does not have to, but might, affect the national perceptions or the co-operations, such as how Nordic security cooperation was turned down during the Cold War due to different threat perceptions and strategies in relation to Russia.

This leads to the second variable at the international level – external transformation. When the Cold War ended a transformation (change) of the international system occurred with the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, and the shift in itself was an incentive for increasing cooperation between units that previously were tied to either superpower. Lately, one might argue that we once again see such a transformation with the increasing international power of China, India and Brazil. There are also external transformations which both shape and are shaped by the international context. The emergence of alliances as a response to a changing international power pattern is a clear example of the two-way relationship between the two variables. At the same time a changing security environment is a change in the international context which leads to external transformations when the states see the effect of the new threats at home and are forced to adapt to the new situation. External transformations cross the borders of the international down to the sub-regional level as they lead to consequences on all levels, thus they might also affect the national level, as shown by the example of Finland after the Cold War. External transformation can be an ongoing, or a recent, change or event or even the emergence of something like a new important actor, organization or threat. The responses to external transformations are more common to be found at the national level which explains the two-way relationship between external and internal transformations. Focus here will be on external transformations which affect the threat perceptions of Nordic states and which might explain the outcome of the security cooperation.
*Internal transformations* can occur for several reasons; either as a consequence to an external transformation where a nation or the sub-region has to adapt or respond to a change in inter international or regional environment. It can also be a response of the national threat perception or due to a change of amity/enmity. A country’s threat perception might suddenly change due to an internal transformation where the relationship between external- and internal transformations shape the national perception of the need for security cooperation. An example is of how Denmark and Norway are members of NATO which might limit their willingness and need to participate in Nordic security cooperation, but where external factors might have internal consequences, forcing them to rethink their opinion of such cooperation. Internal transformations can thus be both a consequence to other variables or as a transformative variable in itself. Internal-, just like external transformation is about change, of environment or a change of rules. Internal transformations can span from everything from a change in domestic politics (from an outward to a protectionist government) to the forced need to respond to new kinds of threats that demand a change in national structure (as the perceived need to cooperate to secure the state against a threat). It can also encompass opportunities such as Finland’s regained possibility to form an army after the Cold War or a country’s mandate to join an international organization. Thus internal consequences cross all levels but when they reach the regional or international level it is more likely to be in the form of an external consequence to an internal transformation.

The background variable of *amity and enmity* is important as it might promote or limit mutual trust and so also the possibility to deepen cooperation. Amity is likely to increase the possibility of a formalized cooperation as well as the breadth and depth of it while enmity might still lead to cooperation but which is likely to be more limited and only seen as necessary to overcome a threat. Evidence of amity and enmity are found in the national threat perceptions and there is a two-way relationship where a change in either might lead to a change in the other. If two usually friendly states suddenly perceive each other as doing something wrong, as a cause of a new government, power balance or action it might problematize relations which might decrease the previous feeling of amity, either directly or as a part of an internal transformation. Patterns of amity and enmity are also found on the national level within the national context and the perceived role of the region, separate from the national threat perceptions. In the Nordic case the existence of a Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers and a long history of open borders and far reaching cross-border interaction is a strong indicator of amity.

The final step before, but also part of, the outcome is the *national threat perceptions* which are analyzed through a qualitative text analysis. The effects of internal and external transformations and the international context is seen in the way the national threat perceptions are presented in speeches, official
policy documents, reports and action. By analyzing these sources the motives or argumentations for why security cooperation might be of importance are found. Differing or similar perceptions might be incentives for cooperation and driving forces such as identity, functionalism or rational needs might be found which creates a description of why the nations feel that security cooperation is needed. By analyzing these differences and similarities it is possible to see how they might respond differently due to national strategies or as different responses to different internal- or external transformations. The security cooperation might then be related to these other variables to see if and possibly how they have influenced the structure of the cooperation.

3. Methodological Considerations

The research objective of this study is based on theoretical choices with the intention to choose the best methodology to answer the research questions and fill eventual gaps or contradictions in theory or in empirical data. Depending on the answer to the question “what do I want to learn?” the researcher choose one method or utilize the complementarily nature of using additive methods. This section will describe the methodological choices and the structure applied to answer the research questions.

3.1 Structure of the Case Study

The choice of research design puts focus either on theory or on the research objective and method, and the case/s chosen for the study should either explain the existence of an empirically universal case or how well the case/s fit with the chosen theory’s prediction of the variation (or lack of) in the outcome? At its best, the case selection should be representative or rest “at least implicitly upon an analysis of a larger population of potential cases”.

The research objective of this study is to update the account on contemporary Nordic security cooperation and investigate how domestic politics influence the expansion of the cooperation. Society is never totally fixed or constant with the consequence that previous explanations and frameworks might

248 George and Bennet 2005: 70
249 Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673
250 Bryman and Bell 2005: 487–488, 492, George and Bennet 2005: 59. A combination of methods might even lead to a more holistic perspective of the topic which might provide valuable new information even if the technical issue of how data may be translated between the methods and how variables are operationalized and defined, see Devine 2002: 202
251 As suggested by Hall 2003: 374-375
252 George and Bennet 2005: 77
253 Gerring 2007: 145
254 Ibid: 88
later be outdated\textsuperscript{255}. Consequently, a qualitative approach is preferred which understands the case from ‘within’ contrary to explain it objectively ‘outside’ of the case. So between breadth (broader, less explanatory) and depth (narrow, deep understandings) the latter is chosen. This case study relies on “contextual evidence and deductive logic to reconstruct causality within a single case”\textsuperscript{256}. Thus a single case approach which explains ‘how’ and ‘whether’ rather than ‘how much’ or in causal terms is preferred\textsuperscript{257}. While there are several typologies of case study research strategies\textsuperscript{258}, Gerring, George and Bennet and Tarrow seems to favor versions of process-tracing (Gerring), building-block strategy (George and Bennet) and dual-process tracing (Tarrow) as theory-building research objectives\textsuperscript{259}. These strategies analyze a one case study, small-n study or an “instance of class of events”\textsuperscript{260} holistically to add to the larger explanation by offering something to, or building on, a wider theory or they test hypotheses for a future case study\textsuperscript{261}. This study applies a building-block strategy which collects smaller pieces, or blocks, which together contributes, strengthens or makes it possible to further theorize from the general theory\textsuperscript{262}. Accordingly, the theoretical aim is to contribute with an additional and updated ‘block’ to the theory of regional security complexes and to update the ‘block’ on contemporary Nordic security cooperation and the Nordic nations’ threat perceptions. Thus the design of the study is x- and y-centered where the outcome and fit with the theory is as important as the variables\textsuperscript{263}. Most social science theories use a certain focus or ‘wavelength’ for their lens which makes some parts clearer while dismissing others\textsuperscript{264}, a building block strategy lets others later widen or reset that lens while being able to build on previous findings.

This study is a single case study with the case of ‘an event of Nordic security cooperation’ where it would be inappropriate to add countries outside the current region\textsuperscript{265}. Instead the case is subjectively chosen to improve the knowledge of the security cooperation within this specific region. Subsequent studies might later apply the findings in cross-case comparisons to generalize further on sub complex security cooperation. This limits the current scope condition to contemporary Nordic security

\textsuperscript{255} George and Bennet 2005: 90-91
\textsuperscript{256} Gerring 2007: 172
\textsuperscript{257} George and Bennet 2005:49, causation in social sciences is discussed by most researchers but is the topic for Gerring 2005
\textsuperscript{258} The most famous are Lijphart 1971, Eckstein 1975 and Van Evera 1997
\textsuperscript{259} George and Bennet 2005: 76-79, Gerring 2007: chapter 7, Tarrow 2010
\textsuperscript{260} George and Bennet 2005:17-18
\textsuperscript{261} See among others Flyvbjerg 2006 and Tarrow 2010
\textsuperscript{262} George and Bennet 2005: 76-78
\textsuperscript{263} Gerring 2007:71-74
\textsuperscript{264} Buzan and Gonzales-Pelaez 2009:226
\textsuperscript{265} Which would provide a solution to the problem of cases chosen on the dependent variable but which is more suitable for studies with general claims of causality. See Geddes 1990 and Collier And Mahoney 1996: 66-68
cooperation and leave out other non-Nordic co-operations or issues which are not perceived to be related to national/regional security. This study has a reasonably theory generating/building approach which favors the ability to strengthen the conceptual validity by providing better understandings and definitions of the variables as well as to provide new patterns, models and explanatory mechanisms. At the same time the aim to generalize outside of the specific case is limited. It is chosen among a wider population of regional security co-operations where later studies can compare the findings to search for additional patterns. The problem is the constructivist foundation where case specific contexts problematize direct comparisons. By aiming for a clearly argued research structure with an appropriate research design George and Bennett’s method of structured and focused comparison is utilized; structured in ways of using clear data which makes cumulation of the findings possible, as well as focused in dealing only with certain aspects of a case which opens up for the possibility for others to add more cases to it to see whether the theory still holds true. This diverges from King, Keohane and Verba who disagrees that process-tracing give in depth knowledge of complex phenomena or that single case studies might generate and test hypothesis’s and suffer from case selection bias.

3.2 Ontology and Epistemology

This study’s theoretical framework is a sort of looking glass to observe the complex intra-relations within the chosen region. To reveal the perceptions within the regional relations a socio-constructivist approach is suitable. The socio-constructivist ontology sees the social reality as existing only by human agreement where our perceptions are “changeable” and “contestable”. Constructivism is not one single “ism” but rather a “specific position in the philosophy of the social sciences”. This study applies a method of text analysis which positions it closer to the reflectivist and interpretativst side at the spectrum of rationalist-reflectivist. The rationalist end perceives the world as path dependant and calculated to maximize the gains while the opposite reflectivist ends sees things as relative and constructed. The interpretativst approach lay in between, leaning towards the reflectivist side, and has a holistic focus and present data in thick narratives based on the perceptions of individuals, a community

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266 Scope condition sets the population one investigate and can be limited to only refer to a small population or unit within it.
267 For the debate on the appropriateness of theory generating approaches and the possibility to use (single-) case studies for this see Jahn 2010 and his claim on p.28, a view sometimes shared by case study researchers who tries to find solutions, see Gerring 2007: 18, 39, for a different view see Lees (2006) or for the positive notions on case studies see Flyvbjerg 2006.
268 George and Bennet 2005: 19-20
269 Ibid: 19-22
270 See discussion below
271 George and Bennet 2005: 68
272 Ibid: 12-13, 23-25, 32-33, George and Bennet do not defend case selection bias, but see several ways a certain type of bias still contribute to case studies contrary to what others claim.
273 Christiansen, Jörgensen and Wiener 2001: 3
or other social collectivities. Thus, in this study people and states are seen as real, tangible actors but their ideas, values and norms are seen as constructed and when they clash they relate to each other as potential threats. This makes it compatible with the method to present data in a structured and focused manner to make it useful and valid. Furthermore, the constructivist approach show how the outcomes of our social reality is affected by our construction of values, ideas, interpretations and understandings which makes the researcher subjective since the presentation is based on his ‘reading’ of it. This ‘double hermeneutics’ is not unproblematic but seen as normal and is solved by gathering similar accounts of the same phenomena. Regardless of the limitation to predict one can still test theories and explore the involved conditions, cases and variables. Critics of constructivism question the limitation of testable propositions. They propose a way to limit the theoretical assumptions and give more precise, narrower, definitions of concepts and better specifications of the causal mechanism which might generate testable hypotheses. This is also in favor of a building block strategy.

3.3 Text Analysis, Data and Sources

The study applies a method of qualitative text analysis on official documents, speeches and reports to find and analyze the ‘securitizations’ and ‘politisizations’ which is then related to the Nordic nations’ national security and defence policies and to social and historical patterns of amity/enmity. While the analysis will be presented in a descriptive way the reading of the sources are conducted in a qualitative way which seeks “to understand the experiences and practices of key informants and to locate them firmly in context”. Because the perceptions of reality is seen as constructed they might be altered over time, but by learning about the indicators for this change we might study it. By analyzing quotes, official documents and reports we find the ‘theme’ of the contemporary context. This ‘hermeneutic circle’ analyzes bits from the national contexts where the understanding of the wider context (the Nordic security cooperation) is dependent on these bits. So through capturing the context, interpretations and experiences hypotheses or variables for future research might be provided.

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275 Della Porta and Keating 2008: 30
276 Extracted from Marsh and Furlong 2002: 26-30
277 Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19
278 Moravesik 2001: 180
279 Moravesik 2001: 181, Barkin 2010: 154-156 suggest that narrower definitions may lead constructivist theory closer to rationalism and realism through better core concepts which will make it easier to use both approaches alongside each other.
280 Bryman and Bell 2005: 442-443, an example is Jong-Yun Bae and Chung-in Moon 2005 on how historical roots between China and North Korea make China reluctant to interfere in North Korean affairs, affecting the whole sub-region
281 Devine 2002: 197
282 Such as that of the end of the Cold War, this is a whole research field within RSCT and where among others Mohammed Ayoob offer RSCT more variables which may explain why certain RSC’s have not developed further. See Ayoob 1999
283 Bryman and Bell 2005: 438-440
284 Bergström and Boréus 2005: 24-25
285 Devine 2002: 201
Data will be drawn from primary sources such as interviews, official reports, propositions, documents, speeches or statements by leading officials. They will be complimented by secondary sources such as research reports, previous research and other published texts to strengthen eventual claims, understandings and to widen the accounts of national threat perceptions\textsuperscript{286}. They might also reveal formalized Nordic security co-operations which are not discussed in formal policy reports. A data selection as wide as possible is to prefer and thus official documents as well as governmental propositions and papers will be utilized. Even if governmental propositions are only policy proposals they give an insight into the national contexts and are parts of the perceptions that leading politicians hold. All sources will be judged according to the criteria of authenticity, reliability, representation and ‘purpose’\textsuperscript{287}. Authentic if the source is undisputed and sound and reliable if it is not biased. Representative if the data is representative of its category and finally its purpose must be honest and the material should be easy to understand and apply. Credibility and the importance to triangulate information with additional sources to avoid bias are also important. Roughly, “the most important rule for all data is to report how the data were created and how we came to possess them”\textsuperscript{288}. These will be fulfilled by using a wide selection of sources and implicitly and explicitly make use of as much material as possible. Subjective perception bias is not seen as a problematic since it is the aim of the study.

3.4 Validity and reliability

Regardless of design there are sets of criteria to hold the research against which might differ in importance depending on the research objective, level of abstraction and generalization\textsuperscript{289}. The first set is the traditional validity, reliability and the possibility to replicate – are you studying what you think you are studying, is the operationalization of concepts and variables trustworthy, is the data used in correct manners and transparent enough for others to replicate?\textsuperscript{290} Clear interpretations and conclusions of the texts with sound sources improve the reliability, increases the transparency\textsuperscript{291} and the possibility replicate the study. It is argued that the criteria of validity and reliability better suit variable measuring quantitative studies\textsuperscript{292} and that ‘trustworthiness’ is a better aim, which will be in mind when presenting the data\textsuperscript{293}. George and Bennet are also less strict and argue that case studies are only accounts of a

\textsuperscript{286} Lundgren 2007 applies a full array of sources to capture the context and national perception in a similar study.

\textsuperscript{287} John Scott’s criteria cited in Bryman and Bell 2005: 425, my translation and understanding of them.

\textsuperscript{288} King, Keohane and Verba quoted in George and Bennet 2005: 106

\textsuperscript{289} Devine 2002: 205

\textsuperscript{290} Bryman and Bell 2005: 48-51, 304-306

\textsuperscript{291} An added criteria which sums up much of the others, George and Bennet 2005: 106

\textsuperscript{292} Bryman and Bell 2005: 304-305. Although, there proposals that the traditional concepts can be applied to qualitative research, they just have to be tweaked a little, see LeCompte and Goetz’s discussion in Bryman and Bell 2005: 305-306

\textsuperscript{293} Bryman and Bell 2005: 50, 306-309
subclass within a phenomenon which cannot be directly transferred to the broader phenomenon. While external validity usually suffers in case studies which do not represent the full population, internal validity is strong due to the superior knowledge of the case. Thus creditability (credible research and results?), transferability (is it transparent and may be applied in other settings?), dependability (tied to a certain time or situation?) and finally confirmability (biased?) will lead this study. The second set of criteria criticizes the ‘realist’ perception of reality and what we can understand and explain and is more attuned with the interpretativist and social-constructivist foundation of this study. These criteria will be fulfilled by being transparent, give thick descriptions of what, how and why is done and that the research design can be replicated regardless of time or place.

4. Explaining Nordic Security Cooperation

This section presents the empirical analysis of the study divided into two main parts. The first part show how the dependent variable, the contemporary Nordic security cooperation, has developed and is structured. The second part follows the theoretical model and starts with a descriptive overview of the Nordic countries’ national threat perceptions and what internal and external transformations affect their perceptions and how it influences the structure of the security cooperation. After the overview of the Nordic nations a section summarize and compare them to show how differing, or shared, perceptions or interests has been a motivating force for the way the cooperation has been structured. This section also includes the variable of amity/enmity and focus on the Nordic nations in relation to the region as well as the international system.

4.1 Nordic Security Co-operations

Various factors speak in favor of the importance of the Nordic and Northern European areas: the widening of EU and NATO as well as Russia’s uncertain development motivates a focus on the area even though the starting assumption is that no direct threat to any country in the area exists. With only small standing armies with limited deterrence it indirectly makes it harder for NATO or the EU to intervene in a situation of conflict, thus regional cooperation is a rational way to strengthen the regional security. A joint Norwegian and Swedish research report suggest several areas where

294 George and Bennet 2005:78
296 Bryman and Bell 2005: 306
298 Ljung 2005:b: 15-16
intensified cooperation among the Nordic countries would be of mutual interest: materiel cooperation (including logistics and maintenance), education, military research, operative cooperation and finally the security aspects\textsuperscript{299}. In the report the Swedish commander-in-chief at the time stated that from a military perspective an increased Nordic cooperation have huge advantages\textsuperscript{300}. Some benefits would be increased competence, a stronger international role and identity, unified military acting and cost-efficient materiel acquisitions\textsuperscript{301}. One potential problem is sprung from differing memberships in the EU and NATO with different perspectives of when to act and in what constellation\textsuperscript{302}. The problem might be solved through the cooperation within the Nordic Battle Group or a structure which would lie in between EU and NATO\textsuperscript{303}. Another similar problem is where to deploy, and this in despite of multiple benefits such as economic effectiveness, experience, positive spillover from the regional cooperation, the label as a “good example”, better role division for NATO and the ESDP and the positive image of a region of good values\textsuperscript{304}. Doubtful voices have been heard regarding how different strategy perceptions and interests limit the depth and breadth of the cooperation\textsuperscript{305} and that the cooperation is dependent of the wider international arena\textsuperscript{306}. Regardless, the formal cooperation has developed throughout the last couple of years years and recently quite fast.

Among Stoltenberg’s 13 proposals, some were more likely to be implemented sooner than others. A 2009 report argued that the proposals of a Nordic stabilization force, a joint surveillance over Iceland, military cooperation on transports, medical service, education, material and exercises, shared amphibious units and finally the possibility of a declaration of solidarity were possible\textsuperscript{307}. While these where practically ‘possible’ proposals the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs had a different view at a meeting in Reykjavik on 8-9 June 2009. At the meeting Stoltenberg’s proposals were discussed and six of them received practical attention; the stabilization task force, air surveillance, shared satellite system, resource network against cyber-attacks, cooperation between foreign services and finally military cooperation\textsuperscript{308}. Not all Nordic countries were as enthusiastic about the cooperation, most notably Denmark, but the way the cooperation seemed to be formed allowed countries to stay outside of operations or parts of the cooperation to fulfill duties in line with other coalitions of alliances\textsuperscript{309}. As

\textsuperscript{299} Ljung 2007, a report Stoltenberg built on in his report, Stoltenberg 2009: 6
\textsuperscript{300} Ljung 2007: 9
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid 2007
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid: 24-25
\textsuperscript{303} Neretnieks and Kaljurand 2007: 29, Spongenberg 2010
\textsuperscript{304} Neretnieks and Kaljurand 2007: 44-49
\textsuperscript{305} Archer 2010, Ljung 2005:c: 152-153
\textsuperscript{306} Petersson 2005: 189
\textsuperscript{307} Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 86-87
\textsuperscript{308} Archer 2010: 57-63, Ljung 2007: 34
\textsuperscript{309} Archer 2010: 70
when Denmark remained outside the Air Wing cooperation in the High North which is aimed to increase effectiveness and reduce costs in air-to-air and ground-to-air cross-border exercises.\textsuperscript{310}

It is argued that the North European region is developing slowly and that the new strategic environment causes a problem for the Nordic countries which wish both to cooperate on more issues while at the same time focus on their national interests.\textsuperscript{311} But contrary to the reluctance to discuss the matter in 2009 and the doubts that the Swedish and Stoltenberg’s proposal of a Nordic declaration of solidarity would ever be realized – such a declaration was signed in April 2011. The declaration states that due to their shared interests and geographical proximity it is natural for the Nordic countries to solve foreign and security policy issues in a way of solidarity, and in the event of an attack on any Nordic country the others shall offer relevant means to help.\textsuperscript{312} The declaration further states that it should be seen as a complement to established European and Euro-Atlantic co-operations.\textsuperscript{313} The first practical step will be in the field of cyber security, followed by other practical measures.\textsuperscript{314} The declaration was welcomed by the current president of the Nordic Council, Henrik Dam Kristensen, who expressed a wish that the formalized cooperation would be placed under the responsibility of the Nordic Council; a council that previously has not wished to deal with issues of foreign or security policy.\textsuperscript{315} What effects the declaration will have on the wider security cooperation is still uncertain but it should be seen as a complement to existing EU and NATO cooperation which might put limits on the Nordic cooperation. It might also be seen as only a formal complement or statement to the deepened formal cooperation, which does not harm existing NATO or EU relations.\textsuperscript{316} The declaration should also be seen in the perspective of the Lisbon Treaty (article 188 r), which might have eased the formal Nordic declaration of solidarity while at the same time questioning the need for it.\textsuperscript{317}

Formal Nordic cooperation has existed since the 1990’s where the Nordic countries made effective use of their shared interests through a common armament framework (the Nordic Armaments Cooperation, NORDAC)\textsuperscript{318} and a framework for cooperation within UN-led peace operations (the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade, SHIRBRIG)\textsuperscript{319}. There was also an institutionalized framework for the Nordic

\textsuperscript{310} NORDEFCO 2011:b: 10-11
\textsuperscript{311} Ljung 2005:c: 157- 164
\textsuperscript{312} Norwegian Government 2011:a
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{314} Norwegian Government 2011:b
\textsuperscript{315} Kristensen 2011
\textsuperscript{316} Enestam 2010, Pop 2009
\textsuperscript{317} Enestam 2010
\textsuperscript{318} Ljung 2007: 14, 34
\textsuperscript{319} Jakobsen 2006:b: 2
countries’ work in the UN – the Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters (NORDSAMFN) which was replaced in 1997 by the Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). NORDCAPS was initially intended to plan and coordinate future joint Nordic peace co-operations with forces up to brigade size. Neither SHIRBRIG nor NORDCAPS were intended for offensive enforcement operations and had only mandates to enforce ceasefires and peace agreements.

The 2009 Finnish presidency of the Nordic Defence Cooperation aimed to enhance and start the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) which would focus on joint steering, coordination and implementation of joint Nordic defence operations. Another aim was to find a comprehensive structure to encompass the work within NORDSUP, NORDAC and NORDCAPS to improve their effectiveness. Later on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) established that the old agreements of NORDSUP, NORDAC and NORDCAPS had been moved to a new structure – the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The MoU stated that the comprehensive approach to defence cooperation include but is not limited to among other things a developed rationalization of materiel, improved competitiveness of the defence industry, enhance abilities of joint operations and to achieve technological benefits. NORDEFCO “should be seen as a structure for cooperation, rather than an organizational entity” with the aim to “minimize bureaucracy and duplication of work, and to make the cooperation an integrated part of daily business where implemented activities should be managed through the ordinary national chains of command”.

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320 Jakobsen 2006:b: 4, Granholm 2005: 112-113
322 Jakobsen 2006:b: 212
323 Finnish Ministry of Defence Nordic Defence Cooperation
324 Ibid.
325 Government Offices of Sweden 2009
326 NORDEFCO 2009: 3
327 NORDEFCO 2011:b: 5
328 Ibid.
The NORDEFCO structure is built on committees which structure the cooperation and where the Chiefs of Defence usually meets twice a year to discuss the cooperation. NORDEFCO consists of five “Joint Co-operation Areas”, NORDEFCO COPA, which have different functions but are connected in a single structure: Swedish led strategic development (COPA SD), Finnish led capabilities (COPA CAPA), Danish led human resources and education (COPA HR&E), Norwegian led training and exercises (COPA TR&EX) and finally Swedish led operations (COPA OPS). At least two, but up to all members’ participate in an operation or area of cooperation, and when needed or requested it is possible to include outside countries. NORDEFCO can easily be seen as a first step towards implementing more of Stoltenberg’s proposals than first expected, the inclusion of NORDCAPS in NORDEFCO also included the informal Nordic Brigade which became the formal Nordic Battle Group. The battle group has units from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Ireland. The battle group participate in EU led rapid reaction operations and a first group was ready in 2008 while a second should be able to be deployed in 2011, and despite that it functions under EU non EU-members which are candidate countries or members of NATO are allowed to participate. Sweden is the framework nation and is in charge of all preparatory work and hosts the training of the NBG in Sweden while the operational headquarter lies in Northwood outside London. The battle group is aimed to strengthen the Nordic cooperation and Sweden sees it as a way to take responsibility to promote peace and security within and outside its near areas.

The achievements of the cooperation during 2010 were among other things the formalization of the cooperation itself and the publication of 53 studies and projects which kick-started NORDEFCO. Regarding procurement and capability development, during the year 2010 Sweden and Norway jointly invested in the ARCHER artillery system while Finland acquired the Norwegian defence system NASAMS which are two of the projects that has led to savings and to mutual and cooperative gains. The cooperation was calculated to have saved the Nordic countries up to 80 million Euros in 2010. The cooperation between NORDEFCO and the Baltic States has also increased and will continue on a case-by-case basis. The future aims are declared in “a vision 2020” for NORDEFCO and aims: To

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329 NORDEFCO 2009: 4
330 See NORDEFCO 2011:a or NORDEFCO 2011:b: 16-17, 19-33 for more explicit projects and responsibilities
331 NORDEFCO 2009: 6,
332 Forsberg 2011: 4, NORDCAPS Nordic Brigade
333 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 2, 6
334 Government Offices of Sweden The Nordic Battle Group Concept
335 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 3
336 NORDEFCO 2011:b: 8
337 Ibid: 4
338 Ibid: 13
339 Ibid: 14, 36
explore the possibility for further advanced interoperability between the armed forces, to improve the cost efficiency in capability development and increased operational effect, to develop appropriate common approaches and solutions to meet national capability requirements, to identify appropriate opportunities for armaments and systems similarity, to streamline national procedures, rules and regulations to the possible extent, and remove unnecessary obstacles and bureaucracy in order to facilitate day-to-day cross-border cooperation and to witness a competitive defence industry able to provide support as required in the development of defence capabilities.

So within the last two or three years several steps have been taken to improve and formalize the Nordic security cooperation. The different structures became so well incorporated that a unified structure was preferred. Despite NORDEFCO’s potential and its impact on the national defence structures it has not received much official attention. Neither have the declaration of solidarity which was perceived to be unthinkable in 2009 but which quickly gained attention and was formalized in 2011. The formalization of the declaration of solidarity and the NORDEFCO structure can be traced to previous Nordic co-operations and feelings of mutual trust, but the official documents and policies states that the main achievements and aims of the cooperation are of functional character. Rationalization of the national defenses, cost-effectiveness and increased effectiveness, experience and training for the military units are the main incentives for cooperation.

4.2 Diverging National Threat Perceptions?
This section explains each Nordic nation’s threat perceptions through the theoretical model. A thick description is presented where external and internal transformations are identified and analyzed together to show their relationship and how they affect the Nordic states. The role of Norden, Nordic cooperation as well as eventual argumentation regarding identity and functionalism will be presented and how the country perceives its security to be structured best. After the overview of each nation a summary will put them in a regional perspective where they are contrasted to each other and their external and internal transformations are analyzed. The link between national interests and regional cooperation and perceptions of amity and enmity will also be discussed.

4.2.1. Norway
Most Norwegian reports, speeches and policy papers see “the High North” (the geographical area around the Barents Sea) as the most important strategic area in the coming years and focus on the

340 NORDEFCO 2011:b: 37
stability and development in the area. Extensive globalization and a changing geopolitical landscape with new upcoming powers, the importance of non-state actors and the demanding environmental threats are external transformations which have internal effects on Norwegian security. The way states’ interest become interwoven is an external transformation with internal national consequences and responses and the way the US’s unipolar status is challenged by China, India, Russia and others is argued to have consequences for Norway, although not in any threatening ways. The boundaries between domestic and external events are diminishing and sectors such as the political, military, economical and societal are merged into a comprehensive cross-sectored concept. The new broad security concept puts focus on a functioning society where political, IT-sectoried or military pressure is seen as new expressions of threats to the country. Other areas gaining increased relevance due to globalization are increased migration, the communication revolution and the role of new non-state actors. Globalization is argued to have removed the lines between one’s own and others’ interest in the fields of economy, society and technology and even though it is said to have caused new challenges, Norway refute the claim that it has weakened the nation state. Instead it is argued to extend “Norway’s interests in the direction of traditional idealpolitik, which assumes greater importance” and the aim of the Norwegian foreign policy is to expand the Norwegian security and welfare interests.

International or global threats are seen as potential threats which might easily spread to other regions or levels than where they originated and which might threaten the Norwegian society, political stability and security. Threats such as global climate change threaten several sectors due to its consequences and pose a problem of eventual transnational conflicts which might spread and become a direct threat to Norway. Thus, the development in faraway regions such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia play an important factor for Norwegian foreign policy. Not as potential military threats but in a political way due to the Norwegian aim to contribute to peace and stability abroad. International cooperation is claimed to overcome most external threats and conflicts and needs to be furthered. Global epidemics such as SARS has also showed the importance of mutual trust among states, how it benefits everyone.

343 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 30-33
344 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:c: 19-21
345 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b
347 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 22
348 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 21-22
349 Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:a: 15
350 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 25-29
352 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 43-47
and how trust, legitimacy and effectiveness must be well balanced to stabilize international cooperation\textsuperscript{352}. Norwegian international cooperation is founded on three pillars or forums through which Norway participate: NATO as the security cornerstone, the EU for crisis management and as complementing NATO and finally the Nordic cooperation in which cooperation will be of cost-effective and functional importance for all participating countries\textsuperscript{353}.

In the near region Russia is seen as a key partner for Norwegian foreign policy and intensified cooperation in the High North is preferred. But Russia’s unclear development makes the cooperation tense and NATO is seen as an important partner for Norway to keep a symmetric relationship with Russia\textsuperscript{354}. Furthermore, the potential disaster of an eventual emergency or meltdown in Russian power plants and nuclear facilities bordering Norway has received attention due to their potential effect on the High North\textsuperscript{355}. During the Cold War NATO’s close overview of Northern Europe made an extensive Norwegian defence less important, but with NATO’s shifting focus Norway either have to make the area strategically important again or improve their defence forces\textsuperscript{356}. The Arctic region states face the same threats and accordingly Norway wants them to cooperate, especially since the area has global importance in the energy and environmental sectors and with Norway’s role as oil, gas and transport provider\textsuperscript{357}. In almost every policy report the energy sector is argued to be a main priority, either in a Norwegian perspective or in relation to the Night North due to its effect on the economy, the environment, and the energy resources and as a potential area for conflict.

There are no direct existential threats identified but demilitarization is not discussed since minor potential threats or military conflicts quickly might erupt, either in the High North or in the near region and with the uncertain involvement of the US or NATO Norway has to focus on their national defence\textsuperscript{358}. A couple of less serious but potential, instead of existential, threats are identified, such as a weakening of Norwegian sea power, issues relating to the High North, isolated terrorist attacks and eventual threats to Norwegians abroad\textsuperscript{359}. Norway’s national defence is centered on preventing threats.

\textsuperscript{352} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 43-47
\textsuperscript{355} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005
\textsuperscript{356} Granholm 2005: 107-108
\textsuperscript{357} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 50-72
\textsuperscript{359} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:b: 40-42
against the country’s sovereignty, the collective security of Norway and its allies, the protection of Norwegian and NATO interest - either alone or in cooperation with others both abroad or at home to secure the Norwegian society\textsuperscript{360}. With no direct existential threat and an international focus Norway has focused on the High North where a range of possible conflict might escalate and where cooperation with Russia is seen as inevitable due the power balance. To face this Norway has sought cooperation with other Arctic states and tried to involve these and Russia in as many co-operations as possible as a means to secure the area\textsuperscript{361}. An analysis of the Norwegian strategic concept reveals that despite the rhetoric of globalization and international challenges six out of eight tasks that were assigned to the Norwegian armed forces are directed to Norway or its neighboring areas\textsuperscript{362}. While a military threat is unlikely it is not excluded. Norwegian rhetoric and actions are not always the same and it can be argued that Norway sticks to a traditional military/political perspective, extended to include the High North.

\section*{4.2.2 Denmark}

In 2006 the Danish government stated that globalization had harmful effects on the political, economic and social sectors where cross-border problems and a changing polarity of world politics might lead to economic and political changes\textsuperscript{363}. Globalization was said to “reduce the historical divisions between domestic and foreign policies” and consequently increased attention to global problems such as poverty, food shortages and domestic conflicts was required\textsuperscript{364}. The Danish strategy from 2009 follow this perspective and state that threats require new global and multilateral solutions and in a new complex world it is important to prioritize and have well managed resources and well-chosen tasks where security and development goes hand in hand\textsuperscript{365}. This broad security approach has been the hallmark of the Danish foreign policy since 2001 where a stronger EU has been the main imperative to handle these broad issues\textsuperscript{366}. The external transformation of the economic crisis led to both internal and external consequences for the affected states and the Danish government has marked the importance of strong international and multilateral institutions to stabilize the future economic system\textsuperscript{367}. This is put in wider perspective where they identify the external transformation in the global system with the emerging Asian great powers, the transformation of NATO and the need to have good relations with the US\textsuperscript{368}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{360} Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 21, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:c: 8-12
\item \textsuperscript{361} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:c: 26
\item \textsuperscript{362} Archer 2010: 67
\item \textsuperscript{363} Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 5-7
\item \textsuperscript{364} Ibid: 8
\item \textsuperscript{365} Federspiel 2009: 33-34, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 1
\item \textsuperscript{366} Espersen 2010, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:4-5
\item \textsuperscript{367} Grube 2010: 15-20, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 1-2
\item \textsuperscript{368} Grube 2010: 23-26, 28-30, Espersen 2010
\end{itemize}
Denmark’s dual membership in the EU and NATO has given them a solid political foundation and has helped them adapt to a new environment.

Denmark find their contemporary threats in the social and environmental sectors with issues of climate change, food insecurity and globalized matters, threats which require better coordination with others as well as within the own government. The Danish government identify threats within two areas: globally crosscutting (terrorism, food, climate etc) and crisis management efforts (stabilization of fragile states etc) and suggested that international solutions, cooperation and EU-initiatives must try to mitigate these food, financial and environmental issues. Denmark’s “active” and “comprehensive” approach to international issues invites them to participate where it is needed, such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the strategy for development aims to ensure them as a preferred partner.

Regarding the Russian – Georgian crisis in 2009 Denmark did not judge it as a military issue but appreciated that EU resolved the situation and their strategy is to let EU handle eventual issues with Russia while Denmark will try to improve Russian bilateral cooperation. In February 2011 Denmark signed a statement of cooperation with Russia on defensive matters, primarily associated to maritime issues but with prospects for future cooperation in other areas and in the Arctic. Since Denmark is a coastal state, eventual negative development in the Arctic or Barents Sea will be of importance for Danish interests in the regions. The main frameworks for military deployment are NATO and the UN and it is through NATO that they share their perception of Russia as an assertive power. The Nordic cooperation and the Arctic Council is said to improve the cost-effectiveness and security of the eventual future conflict area of the Arctic region which is of importance for the Danish areas of Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. The work within the Arctic region and the Nord Stream project in the Baltic Sea show how energy security help states to protect and maximize national interests and reveals the importance to not become dependent on energy from a single country, with Denmark as the only net energy exporter in the EU. Instead, rather than conflict Denmark wants the Nord Stream project to give mutual benefits and breed cooperation and urges Russia and EU-members to not politicize the

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369 Federspiel 2009: 15, Grube 2010: 19
370 Federspiel 2009: 16-21
371 Federspiel 2009: 21-25, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 1, 3
372 Grube 2010: 32
373 Federspiel 2009: 25-26
374 Grube 2010: 27
375 Danish Ministry of Defence2011:b, see also the memorandum, Danish Ministry of Defence 2011:a
376 Federspiel 2009: 32.33, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 3
378 Møller 2008
project or be drawn into a game of power politics\textsuperscript{379}. Nordic Cooperation is referred to as the Nordic Council with the aim to strengthen the response to globalization, but also informal foreign and defence policy cooperation, development assistance and trade policy are mentioned\textsuperscript{380}.

Since no neighboring nations are threatening Denmark and their focus is on international cooperation, the mission of the Danish defence forces it to promote peaceful and democratic development in the world\textsuperscript{381}. This has led to a re-organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer to the new surroundings\textsuperscript{382}. The result is an ‘active foreign policy’ with focus on global hot spots such as Afghanistan (through NATO/ISAF), piracy around Somalia (alone and through the UN), the Middle East (through the EU), Iran (through the UN, the EU and alone) and the fight against terrorism (through the UN, EU, NATO and alone or bilaterally)\textsuperscript{383}. The effects of the external transformations are the main imperatives for the new Danish foreign policy which is directed at global issues through the frameworks of NATO, the UN and the EU, and is likely to continue. Denmark have a special position due to their dual memberships of both EU and NATO and their opt-out clause has made the EU’s development in the fields of security and defence problematic and might risk Danish maneuverability in international operations\textsuperscript{384}. Thus it is important with a strong EU which cooperates with the US in economic and security matters\textsuperscript{385}.

4.2.3 Finland

Despite that the objective of the Finnish security policy has been to promote and secure stability and security in the Northern Europe, the 2004 security and defence policy stated that “stability has increased in the areas close to Finland”\textsuperscript{386}. Most threats that are presented in the policy (such as terrorism, food crisis, failing states and environmental problems) are claimed to be of global and cross-border character where the strong relationship between internal and external links cannot be seen as unrelated\textsuperscript{387}. These threats are said to be of central importance to be dealt with on all levels and through bi- or multilateral cooperation in tandem with the EU\textsuperscript{388}. In the 2009 policy the economy is seen as more vulnerable than ever it is alarming how it strikes poor and developing countries since most crises and security threats are

\textsuperscript{379} Møller 2008
\textsuperscript{380} Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 12
\textsuperscript{382} Grube 2010: 41-42
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid: 34-41
\textsuperscript{384} Granholm 2005: 109
\textsuperscript{385} Ljung 2005:c: 150
\textsuperscript{386} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 5-6, 82
\textsuperscript{387} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004:16-20, 75-77, Division of Defence Command Finland 2008: 31
\textsuperscript{388} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 30, Division of Defence Command Finland 2008: 31
formed abroad in regions such as North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia which calls for a reformation of the economic system\(^{389}\). The line between conflict and peace is perceived as nebulous and political, economic and informational pressures are considered as new types of aggressions\(^{390}\). Externally, the recent tension between the US and the EU is problematic does not danger the existing co-operations since the need to respond to the new security challenges will hopefully make the cooperation well functioning again\(^{391}\).

In 2004 Russia was not framed as a direct threat but there were several interest areas that were identified as of shared importance and which holds risks for Finland\(^{392}\). This perception changed in the 2009 policy when the economic crisis hit the global economy and the military conflict between Russia and Georgia revealed the capability of the Russian army\(^{393}\). Contrary to the 2004 policy it is now argued that “the possibility of armed aggression against Finland or the threat thereof cannot be categorically excluded”\(^{394}\). Even if a possible NATO membership is said to increase the Finnish security it is considered to lead to repercussions for the security of Northern Europe and Finland’s neighbors\(^{395}\). Instead, Finland wants to see the presence of the EU, NATO and especially the US in the region since it may deter Russia\(^{396}\). Russia is still not framed explicitly as a direct threat but its new assertive role makes Finland note the importance of a strong national defensive force ready for a worst case scenario\(^{397}\) and with military cooperation to improve the security in the Baltic Sea\(^{398}\). In the near region apart from Russia’s uncertain development, identified issues are environmental security relating to oil transports and extreme weather changes\(^{399}\). A strong defence is still a precondition for the Finnish security despite that the Finnish military capabilities are made more interoperable in accordance with “international norms and standards”\(^{400}\).

Clearer cooperative mechanisms among the Nordic nations are suggested to implement the Finnish objective of protecting Northern Europe\(^{401}\). This is furthered in the 2009 policy and the Nordic cooperation receives attention in the areas of security and defence while Finland also presents the goal

\(^{389}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009:12-14
\(^{390}\) Ibid: 18
\(^{391}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 57-58, 75-76
\(^{392}\) Ibid: 66-69
\(^{393}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009:18
\(^{394}\) Ibid: 81
\(^{395}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009:80
\(^{396}\) Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 26
\(^{397}\) Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:a: 13, Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 25, Division of Defence Command Finland 2008: 30-31
\(^{398}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009:115
\(^{399}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 141-142
\(^{400}\) Ibid: 77, 100-104
\(^{401}\) Ibid: 82
to improve their participation in EU and UN crisis management\textsuperscript{402} to increase its role as a peace mediator\textsuperscript{403}. Crisis management and peace mediation is the key foreign policy instruments for promoting stability in different parts of the world and the international means and co-operations of the EU, NATO, UN and OSCE-led operations require more interoperable Finnish force\textsuperscript{404}. By reallocating resources to make new capabilities possible in peacetime, expenses and make operations are made more efficient the Finnish army has lately undergone a reformation\textsuperscript{405}. Regardless of whether Finland is in war or not, by 2012 the defence forces will be able to be operable at home and abroad to safeguard both the own territory and to seek influence through international operations\textsuperscript{406}. This internal transformation is based on an outward looking Finland approach which cannot exclude the possibility of a future conflict in the near regions, which create a dilemma on how to structure the army.

The Finnish standing army is utilized both at home and abroad on international missions, and compared to Denmark it is seen as a way to deter and prevent military threats to the country\textsuperscript{407}. The readiness of the army is increased in times of war or conflict but even in peacetimes there is a high alert which is seen in the everyday policing missions of Finnish territory by the air forces\textsuperscript{408}. Despite the differences of the basic defence strategies, the Nordic armed forces are said to share the same challenges and thus intensified cooperation is both rational (“to rein budgetary pressures”), has functional gains (“improved operability”) and a permanent structural agreement was said to be of interest\textsuperscript{409}. Nordic security cooperation gives both practical and economical benefits for Finland while strategically it has to rely on its own defence capacity\textsuperscript{410}. Ever since the end of the Cold War Finland has intensified its international participation to promote peace and solve global issues, and that process is likely to increase in depth and range. Finland still perceives Russia and its eastern border as a potential conflict zone. Finnish internal transformation is ongoing while internal transformation is ongoing in the development of the Finnish defence forces it is adapting to the external transformations in its neighboring areas.

\textsuperscript{402} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009:94-102
\textsuperscript{403} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 2010, Finland aims to be a great power in peace mediation
\textsuperscript{404} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009: 99-100
\textsuperscript{405} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2004: 121-122
\textsuperscript{406} Division of Defence Command Finland 2008
\textsuperscript{407} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009: 109-110, although a restructuring of the army is ongoing and seen in the transformation of the regional brigade into smaller regional battle groups and the decreased number of jaeger brigades \textsuperscript{p.127}
\textsuperscript{408} Facts about National Defence 2008: 26-27
\textsuperscript{409} Finnish Prime Minister’s Office 2009: 115, Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 26
\textsuperscript{410} Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 88
4.2.4 Sweden

Just like its Nordic neighbors Sweden see a diminishing line between domestic and international interests and responsibilities and since we share increasing amounts of common interests it is more important to protect the free flows of goods, values and interests than safeguard one’s own territory\textsuperscript{411}. The most important threats lack boundaries and are directed at the functioning of societies in the form of everything from environmental changes, terrorist attacks, pandemics and electricity shortages\textsuperscript{412}. It is important for the UN and for the Nordic countries to act together to solve these cross-sectored threats\textsuperscript{413}. Many of these threats such as poverty and regional conflicts might lead to instability, arms proliferation, trafficking and crime should be prevented abroad at their place of origin through international cooperation\textsuperscript{414}.

Sweden has kept a strong army since external threats directed explicitly at Sweden is considered to be unlikely but not be dismissed. Instead, the objective of the armed forces has changed from safeguarding Swedish territory to strengthening international peace and stability which require them to be trained and accessible at all times\textsuperscript{415}. The reformation of the Swedish defence has taken place since 2004\textsuperscript{416} with the intention to alone or together with others prevent conflicts and war, to protect the country’s sovereignty and to protect the functionality of the society\textsuperscript{417}. The 2006 defence report dealt particularly with the subject of reforming the Swedish defence structure to becoming more efficient, cost-effective and to encompass both national threats against society and international operations\textsuperscript{418}. As a complement to national security policies and to develop the cooperation, one strategy is to cooperate internationally with fellow Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{419} Sweden also presented a formal declaration of solidarity in reference to the informal 2007 declaration of solidarity (DS 2007:46) saying that Sweden will not stay passive in the event of an attack or catastrophe in a Nordic or EU-member country\textsuperscript{420}.

Sweden is said to be affected by external transformations such as the development towards a multipolar world, the importance of energy and environmental issues and the challenges in the Baltic Sea and

\textsuperscript{412} Swedish Ministry of Defence 2006:1: 16-17
\textsuperscript{413} Swedish Ministry of Defence 2008:48: 20-21
\textsuperscript{414} Swedish Ministry of Defence 2006:1: 18-21
\textsuperscript{416} For a good overview of the decision and reformation see Syrén 2009: 10-19
\textsuperscript{418} Swedish Ministry of Defence 2006:1
\textsuperscript{419} Swedish Ministry of Defence 2008: 48: 39, the cooperation with the Nordic countries is the focus of the governments yearly reports on Nordic cooperation: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008, 2009 and 2010, also see Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:a: 17 and Bildt 2009
regarding Russia it is noted that Sweden will judge Russian development depending on their action. A military threat directed at Sweden or any other EU-member is argued to be unlikely which makes it suitable with a cooperative civilian-military capacity built on participation from the members’ countries, UN and NATO to deal with these cross-cutting issues. Although the 2008/2009 policy report argues in favor for a demilitarized view on its surrounding, the government’s proposition proposed that a panzer unit will be stationed on Gotland, one of the strategic spots used during the Cold war. Just like state perceptions, the military present the same broad security perceptions but also highlight the high amounts of external information gathering and surveillance activities around Swedish territory.

Among the Nordic countries Sweden is the one which relies the most on others on part of their security and seems to take external aid for granted when reforming their military defence forces and as the basis for the declaration of solidarity. Since the Cold War, Sweden has led a simple life stuck in between both the old superpowers and adapted to the situation by focusing on international obligation. Sweden has adapted to the new security situation and reformed its national defence to both participate in international operations and safeguard the Swedish society’s functionality. According to some, this internal transformation has been worrisome since it seems to take for granted that the situation where Sweden lack any military threat of any kind will last or that other states to come to their rescue in case of a national disaster or emergency.

4.2.5 Norden as a Security Region – A Summary

A trend in all the Nordic countries is that they are adapting to a new transforming security environment; new great powers emerge, the American role in Europe (especially Northern Europe) is decreasing and international cooperation is intensifying. At the same time environmental threats and energy issues is demanding more attention. These are all part of a changing international context where these external transformations has affected the whole world, so also the Nordic states. The Nordic states have all had internal consequences as a result of these external changes and they all have clearly stated how they are to respond to them, although somewhat differently. They all favor international participation and the importance of strong international ties which have positive spillover effects on their own security.

For Norway the new situation in the High North brings an external transformation as the US brought

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423 Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009
424 Swedish Armed Forces 2009: 14-21, speech by Göranson 2011: 5
425 Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 49
426 Syrén 2009: 33-36
427 Swedish Armed Forces2010: 26-27, for more pessimistic views see Swedish Armed Forces 2010:156-165 and Wahlbäck 2010
back their troops from Iceland\(^{428}\) as well as the emerging potential environmental and energy issues in the area. This leads to a direct internal national consequence as they have to secure the region which they try to do through framing it as important for NATO. This can be seen as an internal transformation where they focus both on the national territory and the High North while they simultaneously intensify their cooperation in multilateral co-operations as a step to increase interdependence in the area. As Norway identify the new security environment and call for international participation to solve global problems and conflicts the Norwegian policies seems to prioritize the own region.

Finland has been evidently affected by a changing international context, and the post Cold War situation and the external transformation with the weakening of Russia has improved Finnish security as they now have been able to organize a larger army and participate internationally. This internal transformation of the Finnish forces is still held in relation to the consequence of the Russian situation where Finland still keeps a strong operable army to protect Finnish territory. To maximize effectiveness of this expensive endeavor the forces are utilized abroad as a way to get training and as a way for Finland to gain influence and increase their security. International operations can also be seen as an internal transformation as it is needed to justify a continuously high military budget. The relationship with Russia is at a status quo and while NATO membership would be a positive strategic move it would move Finland and Russian relations back to one colored by enmity.

Sweden has acknowledged the changing international context and new emerging external challenges and as part of their post Cold-War development and transformation they have reformed their military forces over the last decade into an efficient battle group centered army which will improve Sweden’s international presence. This internal transformation has been criticized as there is a risk that Sweden relies too much on external aid when it might be needed. Sweden is also stuck with an expensive military organization with a high technological defence industry, standby defence forces and extensive international forces without any perceived direct military threats. Sweden perceive some unstable areas which might danger Swedish territory in the east or south eastern parts of Europe and it might seem as if Sweden still perceive Finland to be a buffer both these areas. This seems irrational as boundaries and buffers are useless as it is stated that threats no longer are bound to a certain territory and spread easily and fast. Sweden still gives an ambivalent picture with international activity while reforming their military structure and promoting deep Nordic security cooperation\(^{429}\) while neglecting their own region.

\(^{428}\) Sponenberg 2010 and Stoltenberg 2009 proposal number 2 both touch upon the effect it had on the region and Iceland’s future development. See Helgason 2010 for a reflection on Iceland’s situation, also see Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 40

\(^{429}\) Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 18, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 15
Denmark has a special position since neither Russia nor the High North is in their direct territory even though the country still perceives these two as important. Instead the dual memberships in the EU and NATO has improved Danish security and let them participate internationally as a way to promote stability in the world. But these memberships have also led to a difficult division of duties and activity. Denmark thus has not had as evident internal transformations or consequences as a result of the international context or any external transformations but has carried on in accordance with their active international strategy. At the same time the division of duties and responsibilities between the EU and NATO is likely to have to be solved sooner or later and might clash with Nordic security cooperation.

As Norway has proposed a joint Nordic seat in the G20 and that the Nordic peace keeping identity is the foundation for a joint Nordic initiative in Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{430} it seems accurate to say that a strong sense of amity still exists\textsuperscript{431}. Norway has also noted that Finland, which looks further north due to the climate change and the Russian-Norwegian cooperation in the area\textsuperscript{432}, might learn from lessons from the High North. On a more formal basis the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers have made several contributions to interaction and increased openness in the area and programs are started to find and remove boundaries and tariffs between Nordic countries. Thus all the Nordic states perceive the role of the region to be important and a common responsibility. Most of all, the Nordic declaration of solidarity must be seen as the most evident proof of Nordic amity.

All of the Nordic states participate internationally in a new security environment (context) where international participation is an important way to gain influence and recognition. The countries share many foreign and security issues and as Stoltenberg argues “[T]here is a widely held view that the Nordic region is becoming increasingly important in geopolitical and strategic terms”\textsuperscript{433}. With the external transformations with the US redirecting its attention to the pacific and south Asia it is not surprising that cooperation has intensified lately with Finland is increasing their attention to the Northern Dimension and Norway to the high North. There have been external transformations even closer to the Nordic region as there has been both positive and negative development in the Baltic Sea and in the Baltic States. Negative transformations which have affected the Nordic region and especially Sweden and Finland has been Russia’s negative perception of the Baltic development, there has been problems in the efforts to streamline regional integration due to differing national interests, the Nord

\textsuperscript{430} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs News Story, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008
\textsuperscript{431} Nordic Council of Ministers 2011: 6-8, Nordic Council of Ministers 2006: 9-14, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 1, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 1
\textsuperscript{432} Stubholt, 2007, Heikillä 2010
\textsuperscript{433} Stoltenberg 2009:5
Stream project has been troublesome and US-Russian relations have been tense and affected the region and the uncertain development in the High North has been of importance to the whole region. It is argued that no country in the region can neglect the idea of a Russian military attack and the Nord Stream project has improved Russia’s leverage in the Baltic Sea and may steer up internal European disagreements and there is a risk of remilitarization in the Baltic Sea. This can be seen both as a change in the international context (environmental and energy sector) and as external transformations (relations with Russia), but most importantly it has had an internal impact on all the Nordic regions as well as for the Baltic States. They have had to readapt to the situation in their near region which demands increased attention which might be difficult when their previous strategies or interest were elsewhere. Thus, it might be argued that these external transformations have direct internal consequences which are dealt with through cooperation, based on a long history of amity. Evidently the relationship between external- and internal factors is continuously affecting the Nordic region and the Nordic nations’ threat perceptions and responses.

While national threat perceptions and interests are to participate internationally a national defence is still a precondition for territorial security. In a time with decreasing military budgets Nordic security cooperation is seen as a rational and cost-effective way to meet future challenges in the Nordic region and cooperation is argued to be needed to stay updated and operative with suitable equipment and training. Based on Stoltenberg’s report, an article by all the Nordic foreign ministers explain that thanks to the long and close relationship between the Nordic countries cooperation is possible to solve the new challenges. Both Stoltenberg and Swedish reports note that deepened cooperation is compatible with other national obligations and might promote rationality and effectiveness and is compatible with all the Nordic countries individual security and defence policies. Evidently, a Nordic identity has brought the nations together and made it easier to build on the long experience of cooperation and knowledge of each other. But the incentive for the cooperation is the increasing costs (internal transformation) and the need to make their forces more effective in a time where small states have to participate internationally to receive influence and solve international crisis’s (internal and external transformation). It is also needed to be able to count on their support in an eventual future crisis (internal transformation) at home. This has led to a dilemma where they have to update their national

435 Ljung and Neretnieks 2009:b: 42
436 Larsson 2007: 6, 49
438 Espersen, Stubb, Skarphedinsson, Störe and Bildt 2010
defenses while at the same time paying attention to their own region. The nations could search for national security alone but most likely it would be ineffective and the costs would still seem unjustified. Accordingly, stronger regional co-operations are a logical step, with or without NATO or EU memberships in a time where external factors and transformations are as influential on national security as national issues.

5. Conclusion

This section summarizes the findings and sees if the study; answers the research questions and whether the hypotheses were accurate. The section ends with suggestions for further research.

Q1 – From the previous research and the empirical analysis it is clear that Nordic security cooperation developed slowly in the aftermath of the Cold War but has intensified and deepened over the last couple of years. Previous structures paved way for a more effective structure in the form of NORDEFCO. The division between identity and function has been evident in the empirical data on the Nordic security cooperation. The study reveals how a strong sense of amity eases cooperation due to shared understanding and interests. It also eased the possibility to sign the Nordic declaration of solidarity and was one of Stoltenberg’s major incentives for Nordic security cooperation. Despite doubtful voices and an unwillingness to discuss Stoltenberg’s suggestion, the declaration was signed only two years later. The Nordic “we-ness” might have eased incentives for cooperation but the driving forces, identified in all of the Nordic countries’ national documents as well as in NORDEFCO documents, has been the need to make ends and means meet. Cost-effectiveness, rationalization of the defence forces and increased demands from both the domestic and the international arena has made it inevitable to search for new ways to structure national security. As the empirical analysis show it is “natural” for the Nordic countries to cooperate since they have common threats concerning their region. National differences still exist and not all Nordic countries have to participate in cooperative endeavors. Thus it is motivated to argue that the cooperation is not based on common values, identity or goals – but from rational calculations that benefits them all. While this motivates contemporary cooperation and is the driving force for a stronger structure the future development is difficult to predict. Eventually a process to streamline the cooperation with the Nordic countries’ strategies will be seen as necessary and much seems to depend on what happens in the High North and the Baltic Sea.
Q2 – How can the development be explained then and what factors, transformations or changes have led to the formalization of the security cooperation? The model has highlighted internal and external transformations to explain diverging national interests of the Nordic nations which affect the way the cooperation formalized. All the Nordic countries have repeatedly stated that the new security environments with cross-sectored, cross-level and cross-border threats are their main concern. The empirical analysis has shown that all the Nordic countries have diverging national strategic interests: Norway focus on the High North, Denmark on international operations and NATO, Sweden, reform their army and still search for a new post-Cold War role and finally Finland who have adapted to a new security situation but are stuck between a focus on the traditional military sector and a willingness to participate internationally. These are all diverging strategies caused by a transformation in the external arena with a changed international context where new threats, actors, opportunities and demands force the countries to readapt. At the same time, they are affected in quite similar ways which is an incentive to cooperate on solutions to new threats, as an example they all have different interests in the High North. As a result it is easier to speak of a shared effort to promote stability in the Nordic region than to speak of an explicit Nordic identity. The countries have shown different responses and different national strategies (internal transformations) to the external changes and while they sometimes overlap, national interests seem to have the final say. They identify similar external changes and threats but their different main priorities make it natural to structure the security cooperation in a way that is in line with their diverging priorities. They all benefit from deepened cooperation as long as they do not interfere with other memberships. As seen in the slow development following Stoltenberg’s report the Nordic countries had to overview their national policies to see if they fit formal Nordic security cooperation, but developed quickly when the cooperation finally was realized. This limit the depth and breadth of the cooperation as none of the Nordic members wants the cooperation to clash with their other obligations.

Nordic security cooperation does not replace national strategies but improve the effectiveness of the training, maintenance, materiel acquisition of the forces and national military structures. It increases the impact compared to what individual national responses would have and is more beneficial as they can pool their voice in an international context. The Nordic Rapid Reaction Force, which Denmark is not a part of, should be seen in an EU context as an internationally deployed formal joint Nordic unit which gain international influence rather than being a first step to a common Nordic defence. From the empirical analysis it seems evident that the Nordic countries identify and adapt to the same external transformations, although differently – both because of their post-Cold War development but also as a direct consequence of how they are impacted differently. The structure of the formal cooperation reveals how diverging national interests influence and limits the cooperation. Consequently, the cooperation
deal with areas of shared importance and interest while leaving out those where they have too diverging agendas.

The first hypothesis predicting the functionalistic and rational superiority over identity as basis for the cooperation seems to corroborate. The Nordic security cooperation is motivated by functionalistic reasoning and cost-effectiveness while Nordic amity has been an important incentive. The cooperation developed from founded on identity and values into one which is needed to cope with the new security environment and keep the defenses up to date without bearing all the costs.

The second hypothesis predicting that the structure of the cooperation is affected by different national strategies and responses seems to corroborate as well. The Nordic states are affected differently and do have different internal national responses to the external transformations which impacts the structuring of the cooperation. National security policies and threat perceptions are shaped and reshaped constantly both as a result of domestic (internal) factors such as increased influence, power or capabilities, but also, and more commonly in the case of Norden as a result of external changes. This relation might change in the future and may be of temporary importance, but regardless remain an important factor for the development of Nordic regional security and security cooperation.

Since both hypotheses corroborates it is justified to claim that Nordic security cooperation has developed and intensified as a result of national and regional responses to a changing external environment. Internal factors (transformations) and the need for cooperation have been important as driving forces and been eased by the “natural” solution for the Nordic states to rationalize their defenses and make their security structures more cost-effective. Identity and values are part of the foundation of the cooperation, but has not been the factors that have led to the recent restructuring and deepening of it.

The study has helped to put Norden back on the map by revealing the importance of the region and the Nordic security cooperation, even in an international context. The Nordic states have found new ways to cooperate which are deeper and more far reaching than any previous attempts with NORDEFCO and the Nordic declaration of solidarity at the top of it all. As seen, even the Nordic Council has expressed a wish to be involved, even if it is only in the area of the declaration of solidarity. When old co-operations are compared to new one through what this study and previous research has revealed it now seems as if the picture is much clearer. Even though the Nordic region is framed a peaceful security community when focusing only on internal dynamic the region is nevertheless affected by external changes and
power politics. Thus it might be argued that it is evident that neither a liberal nor a realist framework might account for the cooperation alone, and this study helped to show why.

The Nordic region may be even more important in the future as the Baltic Sea and the Night North increase in importance and this study has helped to express the future importance of these areas and how they are perceived from a Nordic perspective. Despite different national strategies or interests the region is strategically important and a strong formal cooperation is crucial to offer a strong Nordic voice in discussions concerning the region. The study explains the forces that shape the diverging national strategies and their effect on the cooperation, which might be a good basis for future policy making. Through knowledge of what effects the national threat perceptions and their relationship with their involvement in cooperative affairs a valuable variable has been found for future case studies. Despite the sometimes problematic division of separating external from internal transformations and their directions or consequences, the thick description of the Nordic states’ threat perception is an important contribution in itself. By providing an updated description of all the Nordic states’ respective threat perceptions as well as a glance of their individual development this study offer both a comprehensive analysis of the Nordic security cooperation and a valuable contribution to the discussion of how and why the Nordic states cooperate on security matters which might be valuable for future research.

**5.1 Suggestions for Further Research**

There are some suggestions for future research which would improve the knowledge of this specific case as well as the research on (sub-) regional security; first it would be both interesting and important to separate the perceptions of military officials and politicians and if they perceive the need to regional security cooperation differently. There are arguments that, especially in Norden, politicians and military officials have different perceptions of the security environment and a comparison between the perceptions on this topic would be interesting. Norden would be a good case, but any (sub-) regional cooperation would be as suitable. A second area for future research would be to compare the findings from this study of the importance of external transformations’ impact on the internal relations between the region and the domestic. Does it differ between Norden and a (sub-) region in Latin America or in South Asia? This opens up to apply other theories of security cooperation to the case of contemporary Norden to see if they would reach the same conclusions as before, which I predict they would not. To improve the knowledge and understanding of the perceptions it would be of interest to see studies involving interviews. It is done occasionally but not in any broader or fuller case study. These would be able to reveal how politicians and formal official policies sometimes perceive things differently.
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