9. The Tie that Binds: Cosmopolitan Obligation and the Primacy of Institutions

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Cosmopolitanism is one of those terms that seem to be always around, denoting something vaguely laudable and therefore more or less up for grabs. It is often used synonymously with terms like global justice, international justice, or international morality, and so has become a vehicle for expressing the idea of global obligations of justice. No job could be more important. Indeed it is so important that it cannot be safely left to a rhetoric of ‘global community’ and ‘humane world order’. Taking the idea of global obligations seriously, I will discuss what kind of theory such an idea requires.

Leaving the conceptual history to others for the moment, I will start by presenting what I see as three aspects of modern cosmopolitanism conceived as a position within political philosophy. I wish to emphasize that these three aspects in no way are meant to count as a definition, nor are they exhaustive, but they are there in the ongoing debate. What I want to highlight initially is cosmopolitan-

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1 This is an extended and much revised version of a text that was presented as a comment on Peter Kemp’s paper ‘Towards a Global Covenant: The Cosmopolitan Foundation of International Law’ at the conference ‘The Idea of Kosmopolis’, Södertörn University College, 24 March 2006.
ism conceived as a multifaceted position including, first, a certain attitude or state of mind; the cosmopolitan regards herself as a member of a global community, tied together by a thin tie of shared humanity. Second, the cosmopolitan is committed to moral universalism. The third is an institutional implication. Cosmopolitans support a global or transnational set of institutions with a degree of priority over local, national or regional institutions. These three together seem to form a backbone of contemporary cosmopolitan philosophy.

Of the three aspects outlined here, the third is often conceived as a consequence or a fall-out of the first two, as if a sense of a global community bound to a commitment to universal morality is what provides the rationale for global institutions. This I will question for three reasons. First, it is always a mistake in political philosophy to proceed from wishful thinking about people’s state of mind. Second, universality is indispensable to cosmopolitan thinking but it is not enough – indeed it is of the wrong kind – to provide a rationale for obligations that are global in scope. And finally, rather than regarding the third as a fall-out of the first two, we should regard it as the primary and distinctive feature of cosmopolitanism, entailing importantly a certain view of justice: justice as dependent on accountable institutions. But we still need something more, in addition to universality, to establish the idea of global institutional obligation. We need a thicker tie to bind us together.

The first aspect of contemporary cosmopolitanism, then, is a state of mind, a certain moral consciousness. The cosmopolitan regards himself as a member of a global community – humanity itself – something great and uncluttered within which borders and boundaries are arbitrary and morally underdetermined. On any reasonable understanding local ties and relationships are certainly not morally irrelevant – it is hard to imagine how life could be worth living without them – but there is a sense of being a member of something greater, which takes moral priority. We are bound together by the very fact that we are part of the same humanity. Nothing more than that is needed; indeed, it is necessary not to say more than that since as soon as you do, you risk reintroducing things that separate
rather than unite. This is a thin tie, in the sense that it is prior to all those layers that mark people as being this way rather than that, prior to commitments and loyalties that are personal and local or at least less than global. In his contribution to this volume, Peter Kemp seems to have this thin tie in mind as the basis of cosmopolitan obligation. He talks about ‘solidarity with all humanity’ as a step towards ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ and ‘the universal community to which a person belongs merely by virtue of belonging to humanity’.

This moral consciousness – the perception of a thin tie – makes an intuitive case for accepting the universal status of morality. If we are all part of a global community which is morally prior to local communities, then tying people’s moral status and what they can claim to historical circumstance and varying and unequal local ways of life will indeed appear illegitimate. So this moral consciousness – the sense of a thin tie, unencumbered by circumstance, binding all of humanity together – is supposed to work as a backdrop to the ethical position that morality is universal, which is the second aspect of the cosmopolitan position, its moral commitment. Particularly conducive perhaps to the cosmopolitan position is the doctrine of universal human rights, which not surprisingly is an established moral language in cosmopolitan theorizing and which rests easily with the thin tie. Saying that all individual people are equal rights-holders presupposes that all individual persons inhabit one moral world in which comparative assessments make sense. If all children everywhere have the same claims to shelter and education, then children denied these things have their rights violated. We do not need to know anything about them to know that this is the case. An important point of the thin tie is that it emphasizes that people do not need to do anything to qualify as members of this moral community. You are not granted membership as a prize for good behaviour, nor for anything that is contestable about you or that you could lose. That again is conducive to the universal doctrine of human rights. Membership is automatic; hence, no one is or can be excluded, and that is indeed important.
For some, the universality of morals and its concomitant commitment to a basic equality between holders of claims are regarded as so integral to cosmopolitan thinking that they have come to define it. David Held, for instance, argues that the three key elements of contemporary cosmopolitanism are egalitarian individualism, a requirement that the status of equal worth is acknowledged by everyone, and that all claims are treated impartially. On this account, the key elements of cosmopolitanism seem to amount to spelling out what is here referred to as the second aspect and hence nothing more (and nothing less) than ethical universalism.

The third aspect is what makes cosmopolitanism political, not merely moral. It is what puts the polis into kosmopolis. Those individual people who constitute the shared humanity within which each is, and is recognized by all as, equal, are conceived of as citizens of that global order. I will discuss some of the implications of this aspect, which I will take very seriously. The upshot of this will tell us something about the tensions between these three aspects of cosmopolitanism and the job it is supposed to do to secure global justice.

But let me first make a brief note about the term kosmopolis itself. In outlining what a cosmopolitan position might be, the term comes to our aid in an ambiguous yet challenging way. Kosmos means world but it also means harmony, order and ornament. Kosmos is the world in an encompassing sense – the entirety of crea-

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4 It is worthwhile to distinguish between basic equality, that is, that everyone is equal in moral status and has the same rights and can make the same claims on the basis of them, regardless of what rights we believe people have, and equality in application, that is that everyone has an equal claim to whatever it is that the system of rights is supposed to be a means to, for instance, capabilities or welfare. Basic equality emphasizes similarity; in this respect everyone is the same. Equality in application requires an acute understanding of when and how people are relevantly similar or different. Given that people are differently situated, equality in capabilities is not achieved by treating everyone the same.

tion – conceived as orderly, harmonious and, hence, beautiful. *Polis* is the site of politics, the full members of which are citizens (*polites*) who collectively govern themselves. It is the city, a small self-governing unit. Necessarily bounded and at least partially closed to the rest of the world, it is defined by its limits. The term *kosmopolis* can therefore be regarded as something of a pun, an oxymoron even, and the cosmopolitan as an empty category. Is not the very idea of *polis* – a bounded political unit – in opposition to *kosmos*? To put it in more contemporary words: Are not national allegiances – giving priority to ‘one’s own’ – what makes a just and harmonious world order impossible? And how could you be a citizen of the entire world if the very category of citizenship is predicated on the bounded political unit? Perhaps this is why the term cosmopolitan in everyday parlance has come to denote not a political agent committed to world harmony and global justice through politics, but an urban dweller, removed from politics at all levels but vaguely at home anywhere in the world as long as there is a Gap and a barista.

Let me illustrate: in the movie *The Student Prince*, set in Cambridge, an American Fulbright Scholar stretches languidly on her exercise mat in her college room, saying ‘I miss my coffee. I could kill for a decent non-fat latte’, adding in passing that she was raised a republican ‘as in Robespierre, not Reagan’. She is completely at ease, since away from home does not really mean anything if home is not a place, managing to make a reference to the *res publica* into an apolitical piece of small talk. Towards the end of the movie, the main character – a prince of the United Kingdom, burdened by the expectations of his appointed role, a prime but unwilling carrier of national allegiance – renounces his claim to the throne at the May Ball, shouting ‘I am a citizen of the world’ to an enthusiastic crowd of intoxicated new graduates. These two characters are representa-

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tives of what could be seen to be the only two possible responses to the oxymoronic pun of *kosmopolis*: ironic detachment from the political, from the very idea of being a citizen of anything, or active denouncement of the obvious, of the primacy of rights and obligations emanating from a fixed seat of bounded allegiance. What the latter response amounts to is turning the pun into a challenge, and a challenge it is, not only in practical, but also in theoretical terms. What could it possibly mean to be a citizen of the world?

What I wish to emphasize with this digression is that the term *kosmopolis* – if we take it seriously – imbues ‘cosmopolitanism’ with an implication which ‘global justice’ and ‘international morality’ do not have in themselves. This is the third aspect of cosmopolitanism.\(^7\) The universal moral commitment in relation to the global community bound together by the thin tie is realized through an institutional structure of which all are members. And the harmonious world-order envisaged by cosmopolitanism is a *polis*, the members of which are *citizens*. And citizenship entails rights and obligations in relation to the institutional order without which it cannot exist.

If we take seriously – or perhaps literally rather than metaphorically – the implications of the concept of a world citizen, it is certainly correct to say that in the absence of a globally accountable institutional order such an entity can exist only in the narrowest metaphorical sense. Citizenship – at any level – is a status function,\(^8\) dependent for its existence on institutions of a certain kind: the institution of law, a legislator, and an accountable form of government.

Kemp describes the concept of the cosmopolitan as implying ‘the idea of simultaneous citizenship in two societies: the national society into which a person is born or admitted, and the universal community to which a person belongs merely by virtue of belonging to humanity’. But one is not a citizen of a society or a commu-

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\(^7\) Another implication is an emphasis on the relation between justice and peace since *kosmos* is a world order without strife.

nity, on whatever level. One is a citizen of a political system run on the basis of collective self-government through representation and the rule of law. A transnational legal order (leaving the specifics of such an order open) is therefore not only a means for things like regulating relations between non-global institutional structures, countering the impact of economic globalization or preserving and managing peace. It is also necessary for the existence of the cosmopolitan.

If cosmopolitanism has a distinctive sharpness of its own, surely it must be this. This is why cosmopolitanism is not ‘merely’ a theory of global justice. This is also why, as I started out saying, this third feature of contemporary cosmopolitanism is not a fall-out from the other two, but primary, which in its turn makes the question whether cosmopolitanism requires or justifies international or transnational law a closed one, answered by the concept itself. Cosmopolitanism understood in this sense is predicated on a certain view of justice: justice can only be had through representative institutions that are accountable to its citizens. That is the difference between justice and charity. This is the important insight that cosmopolitanism brings to the table on matters of global justice. Not that morality is universal (although that is important as well) but that a just state of affairs (rather than a vaguely ‘good’ or ‘humane’ one) is a matter of institutional arrangement. Comparatively wealthy people can make poor people’s lives a whole lot better by well-targeted donations and they should do that, but, from the point of view of justice, such charitable actions are neither here nor there. It is perfectly possible to imagine a world that satisfies a certain pattern of distribution and where welfare levels are decent across the board. But where this happy state is a matter of personal benevolence and dependent for its continuation on the goodwill of a few mighty agents who cannot be held to account by those destined to lose out as soon as the goodwill fades it is not a state of justice – when justice is understood in the cosmopolitan sense – since it is not secured by a set of accountable institutions. So if we are concerned with global justice, then ipso facto we need global accountable institutions.
Now what does this tell us about the first two features of contemporary cosmopolitanism? The cosmopolitan consciousness – the *kosmos* as an imagined community tied together by the thin tie of a shared humanity – is a nice thought, but what function or status is it supposed to have? Is it an ideal? Possibly, but why? Is it better in itself that people regard themselves as thinly human in this way rather than as workers, environmentalists, women, Swedish, Swedish-Somali, newspaper readers, and human or all of these things at once in no particular order? Is it a norm? Surely not. We should resist any attempt at formulating norms about how people should conceive of themselves. Norms also need to have some resonance in what people are actually like and a capacity to be action guiding, which this one is not. Actions are particular to place, time, and circumstance; a sense of belonging to a totality does not tell us anything about what we should do. Presumably its role is supposed to be moral in the sense that it is wrapped up in the acknowledgement that morality is universal. But this is a mistake for two reasons.

First, asserting that morality is universal – that moral principles are valid equally for all regardless of circumstance – amounts to *not* making it dependent on people’s frame of mind, felt affinities or inclinations. Doubtlessly a cosmopolitan sense of belonging to the entirety of the world is conducive to an inclination to accept morality as universal but at the same time morality has its most important role to play when inclination and solidarity are absent. This was Kant’s point in saying that an action gains its moral worth from being done for the sake of duty rather than from inclination, be it self-interest, benevolence or a wish to do good. Contrary to popular belief, this is not meant to say that cold-bloodedness is good while benevolence is for wimps. Rather it is meant to preserve the commanding force of morality also when an inclination to do good is not there.9 Surely that is when the oppressed and dispossessed need it the most.

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9 ‘For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—is practical […] and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command’. Immanuel Kant, *Ground-work of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. and ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper
Second, it is important to acknowledge that universality is a formal feature of moral principles. It is a test, not of the content of what we believe but of our way of reasoning in relation to what we believe. In a recent article, Andrew Dobson has argued that the problem with framing the tie that binds us together in this thin way is that although it might be enough to get us to think that cosmopolitanism is right, it is not enough to motivate us to act as cosmopolitans, since a shared humanity is not compelling enough as a source of obligation.\textsuperscript{10} This strikes me as correct, but the problem for the cosmopolitan is more fundamental than that.

The intuitive pull of the cosmopolitan state of mind is that we—all humans—are all each other’s concern, in the sense that rights and obligations are the same for everyone. I cannot claim something for myself if I am not prepared to accept that everyone else has the same entitlement to it. Conversely, I cannot place obligations on others that I am not prepared to shoulder myself, and this goes for everyone wherever or whoever they are. The point to emphasize is that this is a formal feature that does not in itself tell us anything about what rights and obligations there are or how far and to whom they extend. One can be a perfectly consistent universalist without believing for a moment that rights and obligations are global in scope. ‘Everyone should give priority to their compatriots’ is a universal principle. It satisfies the formal feature of applying equally to all, but it is not an obvious cosmopolitan principle.\textsuperscript{11}

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Torchbooks, 1964), p. 67. The \textit{Groundwork} was first published as \textit{Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten} in 1785. \\
\textsuperscript{11} It can be a cosmopolitan principle given the assumption that some cosmopolitans make that the outcome on a global scale will be better for all if there is a moral division of labour along national lines, but it survives as a cosmopolitan principle only as long as and to the extent that the assumption is well-founded. \\
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have an obligation to look after all children’s welfare equally’) would be unreasonable as well as unworkable.

We can take the human rights doctrine, a quintessential universalist theory endorsed by many cosmopolitans, as an example. There is an intense debate going on at the moment about the disjunction between the universal system of human rights and the global justice it is supposed to serve. Thomas Pogge has put it succinctly. There are two senses, he says, in which human rights are universal: ‘Human rights are equally possessed by, and are also equally binding upon, each and every human being. These two features are compatible with a “nationalistic” interpretation of human rights, according to which any person’s responsibility for the fulfillment of human rights is limited by the boundaries of his or her society’. In international human rights law individual rights-holders have claims against their own governments, and governments have obligations in relation to their own population. There are no global carriers of obligation in relation to individual rights-holders. Nothing in this detracts from the universality of the system – and the system itself as expressing a world community of rights-holders certainly is in congruence with the cosmopolitan state of mind – but given that states as the primary bearers of obligation differ so greatly in resources, competence, ideology and will, it most definitely is a problem of global justice. There is nothing uncluttered about the actual circumstances in which claims can be made.

Needless to say, many cosmopolitans know this and worry about it. The international human rights system falls short of the requirement embedded in the institutional implication of the cosmopolitan position but neither of the other two aspects of cosmopolitanism explain why. Universality – a formal feature – is not the same thing as global reach – a substantial feature. And we certainly cannot

12 Thomas Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, in Kuper (ed.), Global Responsibilities, pp. 17–18. It is worth noting that ‘universal’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ are often used synonymously to mean ‘encompassing all humans’ (an example is Onora O’Neill’s contribution to the same volume, ‘Agents of Justice’, in Kuper (ed.), Global Responsibilities, p. 37), which is not wrong but makes it more difficult to conceptualise the tension between the universal status of a principle and its substantive global reach.
base the case for global obligation on psychologically and anthropologically unfounded notions about the sense of a thin tie. If it is there it could still not be action guiding. And if it is not there, then that is testimony to how badly we need a more stable foundation for global obligation. For that we need a thicker tie, not merely for the sake of motivation (even though that seems true as well) but for the sake of the global reach of obligation.

So, for cosmopolitanism to provide a principle of action that takes seriously the idea of one global community of citizens, the thin tie needs to be supplemented by something thicker, capable of grounding obligations that are global in scope but still reasonably action guiding and which hold independently regardless of whether people happen to feel solidarity with all of humanity or not. Surely, as Kant reminds us, obligation has its most important work to do when inclination is absent.

In *Perpetual Peace* Kant says that through colonization and trade ‘[t]he peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere’. Colonization and trade are not what establishes the universal category of right and its violation. It might establish a moral consciousness of right being violated in places where we have never been and do not know anybody. If it does then we might acquire some sort of ‘cosmopolitan state of mind’ but that does not establish the universal category of right and its violation either, even if it might smooth the way for its general acceptance. What colonization and trade do, however, is to support the case for global obligation, obligations that are not only universal in character, but also global in scope, since colonization and trade globalize cause and effect of what we do and don’t do. Here is the missing thick tie, and really it is not that thick. It is a matter of identifying proper circumstances of justice, in appreciation of the fact that with a

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global reach of the effects of what we collectively do and don’t do, responsibility is globalized as well. This responsibility is collective, not necessarily irreducibly so but still. If there are global obligations, as the thick tie entails, then we are obligated to set up and support those institutions necessary to realise the object of our obligations. We do not need to have a cosmopolitan state of mind for this to be true.

So what is the thick tie? When Rawls, following Hume, makes the striking point that for issues of justice and injustice to make sense, certain circumstances have to obtain already, he proceeds from the category of a society, understood as a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage […] typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests’. In the absence of conflicting interests and desires in relation to moderately scarce resources, where cooperation is both necessary and possible, ‘there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice’. I do not wish to assess the merits of Rawls’s principles of justice (he himself had surely a bounded and closed society in mind), nor his later contribution to the debate on global justice. I merely wish to insist that the foundation of global obligations of justice is in fact found here. Not in a vague idea of a shared humanity, nor in the formal feature of morality as universal, but in a certain view of what role is played by justice and what its subject is. The thick tie is the cooperative and conflicting venture of agents who depend on and compete with each other and that tie is certainly global no matter how people conceive of themselves. That tie is the circumstances of global justice.

I have argued that what I started out describing as the third aspect of cosmopolitanism is really its distinctive feature. It makes it not a

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14 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 126–128; see also p. 4. Cf., David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), Book III, Part II, Section ii: ‘I have already observ’d, that justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity: And the situation of external objects is their easy change, join’d to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men’.
theory of a ‘good world’ or a ‘humane world order’ but primarily a
type of a just set of global institutions within which individual
agents are citizens in the sense that they have the status function of
being carriers of claims and obligations in relation to the set of in-
stitutions which is accountable to them. This is in acknowledgment
of the fact that the tie that defines the circumstances of justice is
indeed global. This certainly presupposes moral universalism, but
so do lots of other theories. It makes the cosmopolitan state of mind
largely redundant since the circumstances of global justice are
partly defined by the absence of it.

I have, of course, said nothing about what a cosmopolitan theory of
justice would or should look like. I have merely discussed what
kind of theory it is. This leads me to make a few concluding re-
marks about a choice that Peter Kemp, in his contribution to this
volume, presents to us as a stark one, between Hobbes and Kant in
relation to peace, which in cosmopolitan thinking is intrinsically
linked to justice.

Kemp points out that in Hobbes’s state of nature everyone is at
war with everyone else. From this he seems to conclude that the
covenant – the transformative acting ‘as if’ that constructs the
commonwealth – is an expression of a wish to avoid death. This is
in alleged opposition to Kant, for whom the social contract is an
expression of a wish to live together in peace. But framing this as a
stark choice is misleading. After all, Hobbes’s first law of nature is
not ‘avoid death’ but ‘seek peace and follow it’. 15 There are, of
course, any number of choices to be made between Hobbes and
Kant, 16 but the choice whether or not we wish to live in peace is not

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16 One important difference of opinion between them concerns whether there can be peace without subordination to a sovereign power, something that Hobbes flatly denies (*Leviathan* Part II, Chapter xvii, Paragraph 4). If we think about cosmopolitanism, and its commitment to peace, in terms of a global covenant, a Hobbesian global covenant (to the extent such a thing seems palatable) would have to be a covenant constructing a world sovereign. A Kantian global cove-
one of them, nor is the idea of what kind of state a peaceful state is. In fact, there are striking and in this context quite important similarities between Hobbes’s and Kant’s ideas about peace. They both describe the state of nature – a state unregulated by law, defined by its absence of law as an institution – as a state of war, not because it is characterized by actual strife and violence but because whatever tranquility might be enjoyed in it is always unstable, precisely because there are no institutions capable of guaranteeing its continuation. Both Kant and Hobbes maintain that peace is impossible without adequate institutions and that is our reason for establishing institutions capable of ending the natural state of war. But both also make the existence of adequate institutions a definitional feature of peace.17 A state of peace must be formally instituted and guaranteed, which requires a lawful state. In the absence of institutions there can be no such thing as peace, only temporary armistice and a lot of fear. In an important aspect, this concept of what peace is that we find in both Hobbes the authoritarian and Kant the republicanism ties in with what I have said about the institutional implication of cosmopolitanism being its primary and distinctive feature. Just as we cannot talk about justice in the absence of proper institutions we cannot talk about peace in the absence of proper institutions because both justice and peace are functions of institutional structures. It is interesting to note how similar Rawls’s description of the circumstances of justice is to Hobbes’s description of the state of nature.18 Both are situations of absent or at least limited goodness and solidarity, but that is not the problem – indeed it is part of the

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17 ‘A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is rather a state of war. For even if it does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted’. Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 98. ‘[D]uring the time that men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war […] so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE’. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter xiii, Paragraph 8.

human condition – and, importantly, more of these admirable things would not be the solution. The solution is adequate institutions. I absolutely do not mean to make any comparisons here other than this very general one: goodness and benevolence are fickle companions, and in matters of justice and peace fickleness is an anathema.

A thin tie is easily broken. A thoroughly institutionalized one is not. Members of a global community can be regarded from different vantage points and what they are will vary correspondingly. It might be difficult to shake the oxymoronic feel of ‘the global city’. But it is not very difficult to figure out what is meant by regarding everyone as a citizen in relation to the global effects of what we do and do not do. A citizen is not a recipient of benevolence but a maker of claims in relation to accountable institutions. If we want \textit{kosmos} – a harmonious world order – it had better be organized along the principles of a \textit{polis}. That does not answer the question of what a just world would look like and how it is achieved. But it does answer the question of how to conceive of the people in it. That is the insight that cosmopolitanism brings to the table in matters of global obligation.

References


