Agents of “True Emancipation”. Ukrainophile Ruthenian Cooperatives in Eastern Galicia 1904-1914

Piotr Wawrzeniuk

Galicia 1848-1914: History, economy, and demography

During the second half of the 19th century and prior to the First World War, the Austrian province of Galicia and Lodomeria\(^1\) underwent a great transformation. The peasantry, emancipated in 1848, faced the transition from a natural to a money economy, and, on the eve of the War, to capitalism. The same time saw the rise of nationalistic movements – Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish – in the province. The demographic growth sharpened a bitter economic competition within and between the ethnic groups. The transformation encompassed more than economic and ethnic matters. As the nationalistic movements gradually embraced the peasantry (and peasants embraced nationalist ideas), questions about participation in the public sphere and citizenship arose. As market-oriented production and interdependencies on the outer world increased, the traditional, deeply rooted beliefs of the rural society, the old local order of things, were placed in question. Tensions occurred not only between the ethnic groups or within them, but also within villages and production units as basic as the nuclear family.

In the processes mentioned above, the cooperative played a significant role as a prime mover of economic and societal change. This text examines a

\(^1\) Although first mentioned by *Rus’ Primary Chronicle* in 981, Galicia is traditionally understood as an Austrian province, *Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien*. It was absorbed into the Habsburg Empire as a result of the first partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1772 and expanded far beyond its original territory (the Ruthenian Palatinate in Poland-Lithuania) to encompass territory between the Zbruch River in the east and the area west of Kraków in the west. In 1910, Galicia had 7.9 million inhabitants. In the historical Galicia, in this text referred to as *eastern Galicia*, there were 62 percent Ruthenians, 25.3 percent Poles, and 8.2 percent Jews, while in Galicia as a whole, the three groups accounted for 42.9, 45.4 and 10.9 percent respectively; Magocsi, Paul Robert, “Galicia: A European Land”, in Hann, Chris; Magocsi, Paul Robert (eds.), *Galicia. A Multicultured Land*, Toronto 2005, p. 1-7; Hrytsak, Yaroslav, “Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia’s Ukrainians”, in Hann and Magocsi (eds.), *Galicia*, p. 185-186.
few aspects of the ideas and practices of the Ukrainophile\textsuperscript{2} branch of the Ruthenian cooperative movement in eastern Galicia 1904-1914. The emphasis is placed on agricultural cooperatives. The ideas behind the founding of cooperatives, along with various practical aspects of the building up of a functioning network of associations, are examined.\textsuperscript{3}

In 1848, the peasants of Galicia were emancipated. In the long run, this move opened the door for peasant participation in politics and in the reorganisation of societal life from below. In the short run, however, this dramatic breach with over three centuries of institutionalized serfdom did not bring about a substantial material improvement of the lives of the peasants. Quite the contrary, during several formative, transitional decades, the new order shook the centuries-old foundations of subsistence.

If one considers the long duration and deep structures of the old system, one can certainly talk of shock therapy in the time after the emancipation. The changes that followed the enfranchisement brought economic shocks and deepened social conflict within the local peasant society, while the therapy – coping with the new situation, resolving the aroused problems, and seizing the possibilities – lingered on for a considerable span of time. Before the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the peasantry of Galicia experienced a painful discovery of the new money economy, and, just before the outbreak of the First World War, of capitalism.

In the years following emancipation, the manor owners were anxious to secure working hands by making the peasants economically dependent. In addition, an enduring, province-wide conflict about the right to servitudes – pastures and woods – occurred. Since the Austrian take-over in 1772, the landlords had been appropriating former peasant communal lands. Traditionally, these lands provided wood for fuel and construction, and pastures for the cattle. Once in control of the lion’s share of woods and pastures, the landlords viewed the peasant utilization of these lands as somewhat granted regarding the servitude carried out by the peasants. According to this logic, the favour would no longer be granted once the servitude itself ceased. The peasantry viewed access to the woods and pastures as an inviolable right they had enjoyed since time immemorial. In all of Galicia, the disputes over pastures and woods lasted over two decades after emancipation. Generally, such conflicts ended with the peasants losing time and money invested in the legal procedures and grievances, as well as their rights to the servitudes.

\textsuperscript{2} By “Ukrainophile” I mean eastern Galician Ruthenian activists and institutions who believed there was a Ukrainian people who were linguistically, culturally, and historically distinct from Russian and Polish peoples and in the beginning of 20\textsuperscript{th} century formulated the creation of an Ukrainian state as a goal. Such a political entity should ideally encompass the entire Ukrainian ethnographic territory, but definitely eastern Galicia, Bukovyna and “Great Ukraine” – Ukrainian ethnographic territory under Russian rule.

\textsuperscript{3} For a more comprehensive presentation of the problem, see “The \textit{Ekonomist} and \textit{Samopo-mich}: tribunes of the cooperative cause” in this text.
did illegal occupations of the forests or sheer resistance by force help. Access to the servitudes could be granted – in exchange for labour on the manorial fields. Thus, the landlords tried to make certain that the new legal circumstances would not affect the old economic order.

In a region dominated by smallholder farms, the peasants strove to increase the acreage of the arable land, often by purchasing more land with money borrowed on the recently liberalized loan market. Many a peasant borrowed at exorbitant interest rates. Land was used as a security for the loans. This resulted in numerous forced auctions of the peasant farms and lands, as the debtors frequently were not able to fulfil their obligations towards the loaners. At the end of the 19th century, there were 3,000 such auctions in the whole of Galicia.

Richard L. Rudolph has argued that the peasants of eastern Galicia became pauperized “to an extent not known elsewhere in the Habsburg monarchy.” Huge population growth, the under-employment of labour in agriculture, and an influx of industrial goods from abroad were features of the post-emancipation reality that had to be faced. The outcome of the legal struggle for the woods and pastures was a decrease of the total acreage of peasant land. The population growth in eastern Galicia (from 3.45 million in 1869 to 5.3 million in 1910) in combination with traditional inheritance patterns caused a fragmentation of the peasant holdings. According to custom, the land was to be divided among the children. Numerous smallholdings created in such a way were frequently insufficient to support a farmer and his family, let alone generate a surplus that could be invested in the modernization of agriculture. At the same time, there was only a limited supply of work for people who had insufficient land to support them, or even no land at all. The peasant children were to become peasants not only because of custom, but because there were few other alternatives. The level and the pace of industrialization were low. The number of small producers grew until more efficient production elsewhere put them out of business. Marginal productivity of the labour was zero in eastern Galicia, Rudolph claims. The labour was so cheap that the building of factories was impeded. At the same time, there was only a limited market for industrial goods, as the purchasing power of the majority of the people was very low.

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5 Himka, *Galician Villagers*, p. 38.
Stella Hryniuk has opposed a “gloom and doom” picture of eastern Galicia at the turn of the 20th century, and draws a picture of improvements in the literacy rates, agricultural production, and cattle breeding in eastern Galicia in the last decades of the 19th century. By 1900, there was a well-functioning transportation system in the region that enabled easier and more comfortable travel for the population and more effective transportation of the agricultural products from eastern Galicia to the outside markets.9

The emancipation of 1848 was a profound precondition for peasant participation in national politics. According to Himka, “without personal emancipation and mobility and without the weakening of the manor’s power in the village, the national movement could never have penetrated the peasantry.”10 The momentous reform lessened the dependency of the peasantry on the manors and created links to the central power, independent of the landlords.11

The constitutional reforms of the 1860s and 1870s in the Habsburg Empire constituted the second important precondition for the peasant entrance into, and participation in, politics. The all-Austrian constitution guaranteed freedom of association and introduced an elected parliament. Regional parties were allowed. While the former opened for the construction of various peasant organizations such as reading clubs and many others, the latter “forced the national intelligentsia in the city to undertake an effective propagation of the national idea among the newly enfranchised Ukrainian masses in the countryside.”12 This was of course also valid for the mass of Polish peasants in Galicia. However, the Polish nobility controlled the institutions of Galicia after 1868. Being socially just as alien to Polish as to Ukrainian peasantry alike, the Polish nobility was linguistically, ethnically, and religiously related to the former.

Galicia was a highly contested territory. It was seen as a “Piedmont” of not only Ukrainian but also Polish nationalism. The defeat of the Polish uprising in the Russian part of Poland in 1863-1864, along with the development of the constitutional framework of the Habsburg Empire and the virtual autonomy granted to the Polish administrators of Galicia after Ausgleich in 1867, made the conditions favourable. Further revolt was seen as pointless, and priority was given to organic, step-by-step work within the framework of the Habsburg Empire.13

The road from enfranchisement to political and national mass mobilization was not a straightforward one. It took several decades, and could only occur when a widespread mass of peasants linked an improvement of their

10 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 27.
12 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. xxiv; see also Kai Struve’s article in this anthology.
socio-economic situation to the national Ukrainian project. The organization of the reading rooms, temperance societies, and cooperatives (village shops, agricultural cooperatives, and other forms of associations) functioned as a catalyst of the rise of the mass national movement among Galician Ukrainians.

At the time of the emancipation of the serfs in Galicia, the Greek Catholic clergy and seminarians constituted an embryo of the national movement. The revolutionary events of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire in general and Galicia in particular, “left in its wake a nationally conscious intelligentsia, both clerical and secular.” In addition, there was a mass of emancipated peasants that could potentially be schooled into a national (Ruthenian/Ukrainian) consciousness. The Ruthenian Supreme Council (Holovna Ruska Rada) was created in order to channel the demands of the Ruthenian population. Although the members of the Council were recruited among the Greek Catholic clergy and laymen, peasants engaged in politics on an earlier unprecedented scale, and delivered twelve representatives to Vienna.14

Peasants soon began to formulate the landlord-peasant conflict in terms of a Polish-Ukrainian conflict. It was interpreted in direct and down-to-earth socio-economic terms. The peasants were often interested in the national movement insofar as it could bring about cultural and economic improvements.15

Within a few years, the Ruthenian Supreme Council’s authority waned, as it turned out to be toothless when it came to dealing with peasants’ grievances and petitions. Peasants turned their immediate attention to the emerging struggle over woods and pastures, facing the new legal and economic circumstances. However, national sentiments were awakened once again due to the long-time efforts of a group of activists who promoted nationally oriented newspapers and education in the Galician villages.

Servitude struggles turned out to be formative for many village activists. The need of education was realized, as the opponents in the struggle were often well educated, and were frequently lawyers. When the reading rooms were founded, there was a stress on education from the beginning.16 Generally, the reading rooms were “institutions that provided popular adult education with a national orientation.”17 According to Hryniuk, reading rooms played a great role in the dissemination of agricultural knowledge and education, which assisted in increasing agricultural productivity in the last years of the 19th century.18 However, the literacy rates were not encouraging – in

16 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 52-55.
17 Himka, Galician Villagers, p. 86.
18 Hryniuk, Peasants with Promise, p. 101, p. 129-130, citation p. 130.
1890, ninety percent of the Ukrainian population in eastern Galicia and the neighbouring Bukovyna were illiterate. Ukrainian schools were generally of a lower quality than the Polish ones, and were poorly funded and overcrowded. The Ukrainian schools were also viewed as a threat to the existing patriarchal order, and found little understanding within the Polish-dominated Crownland School Council.\textsuperscript{19}

From the end of the 1860s, renewed attempts were made to improve villagers’ education and propagate the ideas of self-help (shops, granaries, cooperatives) in the villages.\textsuperscript{20} The Ukrainophile \textit{Prosvita} Society (founded in 1868) issued 348 titles (3 million copies) in booklet form between 1877 and 1914. During the same period, 305 titles in 2.5 million copies were distributed among the \textit{Prosvita} reading rooms in Galicia.\textsuperscript{21} Its Moscowophile antagonist, the \textit{Kachkovsky} Society (founded in 1872), published more than \textit{Prosvita} during the first years of its existence, but it slid into decline during the last years of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The competition between the \textit{Prosvita} and \textit{Kachkovsky} Societies boosted the number of publications and improved the quality of the printed matter. Both Societies encouraged the readership and the members of the reading rooms “to found cooperative shops, savings and loan societies and grain storage facilities.”\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Ekonomist} and \textit{Samopomich}: tribunes of the cooperative cause

In the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the peasant masses of eastern Galicia, no matter their ethnicity, had to face in one way or another, matters of agricultural modernization, rationalization, and citizenship\textsuperscript{23}. In the processes mentioned above, the cooperative played a significant role as a prime mover of economic and societal change.

The cooperative idea was used by various groups in Central Europe. This text concentrates on the ideas and practices of the Ukrainophile branch of the Ruthenian cooperative movement in eastern Galicia in the years 1904-1914. The first part of the text illuminates the logic behind the creation of the cooperatives and the ways in which Ruthenian activists in Lviv and regional centres facilitated the creation of cooperatives. The text reveals reasoning of the activists, and shows how their considerations were turned into practice.

\textsuperscript{19} Himka, \textit{Galician Villagers}, p. 60-65.
\textsuperscript{21} Hryniuk, \textit{Peasants with Promise}, p. 91-92.
\textsuperscript{22} Hryniuk, \textit{Peasants with Promise}, p. 94-95 (citation p. 95).
\textsuperscript{23} For a comprehensive overview of the term “citizenship”, see the articles of Fredrik Eriksson and Anu-Mai Kõll in this anthology.
The second part is divided in two sections. The first section follows the growth of a few local cooperatives into a Crownland-wide Union that controlled a considerable number of dairy cooperatives. Who was allowed to join? What were the conditions of acceptance into the cooperative community? The second section identifies the groups of people who, for various reasons, were excluded from the cooperative project.

Two cooperative journals have been used. The *Ekonomist* was an economical-agricultural monthly issued by the Crownland Auditing Union (*Kraiivy Soiuz Revizyinyi*). The journal first appeared in 1904. *Samopomich* (*Self-help*) was a supplement to the *Ekonomist*, but was designed to function independently, and could be bought separately. The first issue was published in February 1909. *Samopomich* was supposed to appeal to a wider audience and contained photos, drawings, poems, and short stories which were supposed to strengthen the Ruthenian morale.

The weak and underprivileged strike back. Advantages of the cooperative

The creation of cooperatives was described as a remedy to the ills suffered by Ruthenians in eastern Galicia. Cooperatives were the ultimate method to be used in fighting the oppression that had metamorphosed from feudalism to capitalism. “The rebelling peasant masses (Bauernkriege) have been replaced by the economic cooperatives.”24 The peasantry was entering an era of peaceful, organized economic and social transition led by the cooperative movement instead of continuing along the old way of chaos and violence. The changes would be achieved with “weapons given to us by the current way of organisation, that is competition and freedom.”25

The Ruthenians have been kept ignorant by aliens and by their own kind, the *Ekonomist* claimed. Although they officially enjoyed the same political rights as Germans, Czechs, or Poles, this was not true in practice. Ruthenians were too weak to claim and exercise their full rights in the way that the other peoples of the Double Monarchy did. Backwardness and oppression could be fought once credit, commerce, dairy, and other cooperatives were created. The Ruthenian institutions could improve the situation, as they practically “had functioned as our government”. This process should be initiated from below. Wilhelm Tell was proposed as a model, as he acted without “counseling, complaining, or singing” before taking action.26 There had been too

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24 *Ekonomist*, 1904: 12, p. 1. All issues of the *Ekonomist* used in this work are stored at the Stefanyk Scientific Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Lviv, number Ж 23763.
strong a stress on the cultural aspects of the national revival, and too feeble an inclination towards decisive action among the Ruthenian intelligentsia.

Rather than accepting the views imposed by capitalists, philanthropists, and the state, members of cooperatives should learn to conduct an independent life, and make people masters of their own lives.\(^{27}\) Hard work was needed. Thus, the Prosvita Enlightenment Society decided to engage in organizing Ruthenians in cooperatives, to battle low agricultural productivity and exploitive middle hands. There also was a fierce Polish political opposition to “true emancipation” of the Ruthenians, and an ongoing Polish colonization of eastern Galicia.\(^{28}\) The schools, the reading rooms, the saving banks, the economic cooperatives “each of our villages should be a link of the cultural chain that should encircle our whole nation in order to protect it from usury, to ensure it has access to cheap credit, and to rise its material and economic level.”\(^{29}\) A protective net would encircle the Ruthenians in eastern Galicia, and stimulate enlightenment and economic progress. Each link was to be a rampart of economic progress and national consciousness.

After 1848, the Ruthenians attained some political representation, and Ruthenian schools and university faculties were opened at the universities. However, the political struggle was not enough according to Samopomich.\(^{30}\) Among the best ways to strengthen a nation is economic self-help. The Polish lords had taken Ruthenian land, while commerce, manufacturing, and banking were also in alien hands. Economic power was entirely held by alien hands. The commercial, trade, credit, and manufacture middle-hands needed to be removed from the business. The land should be returned to those who toil it. However, “the alien exploiters” (Poles, Jews, Russians) should not be replaced by Ruthenian ones. The change was conceivable with help of the economic form of organization offered by cooperative.\(^{31}\) Three groups of people were clearly excluded: Poles, Jews, and Russians – all recognized as exploiters and aliens. Along with Ruthenians who engaged in trade or production as middle men, Poles, Jews and Muscovites were to be excluded from the cooperatives.

Cooperative was depicted as something natural, almost organic. In the beginning, there was a primordial, unconscious cooperation. It was corrupted by slave cooperation controlled, which was controlled by the great military realms, princes, and kings. Capitalistic cooperation succeeded it. It built upon total dependence of the workers on the manufacturer or estate/land

\(^{28}\) *Ekonomist*, 1906: 12, p. 9-10.
\(^{29}\) *Ekonomist*, 1908: 12, p. 22.
\(^{30}\) *Samopomich*, 1909: 1, p. 2-3.
\(^{31}\) *Samopomich*, 1909: 3. Apparently, as “Muscovites” (Russians) are mentioned, the article refers to the action needed in the entire territory populated by Ukrainophones. In the article, the Ukrainian ethnographic territory is treated as one entity, with Galicia being a part of a larger all-Ukrainian context.
owner. The future belonged to a free cooperation which would encompass all spheres of life, with the motto “all for one – one for all.”

Animals and people in primitive societies had always been interdependent and cooperated for joint benefit. Thus, a cooperative was a natural form of joint work, the editor noted. The image of the cooperative form of joint action was pictured as an organic, natural form of working towards a common goal. Cooperative was a suitable tool for the underdogs who individually lacked the means to transform their lives. They could only promote their goals if they acted as a group.

According to the journals, cooperation would bring about the true emancipation of Ruthenian peasants. Regrettably, the important economic matters had been largely neglected. The liberation from an economic dependence on Poles, Jews, or fellow Ruthenians who functioned as middle men on the market could be achieved only by the founding of cooperatives of various types. Cooperatives were viewed as a straightforward route to an economic mass emancipation that would strengthen the political position of Ruthenians. Cooperation was a tool of economic change, and as a natural, organic form of joint human work, an honest way of securing resources without falling into the pits of parasitism.

From theory to practice; from the centre to the regions

While the section above dealt mainly with the visions of cooperation as described by the cooperative journals, this part investigates how the visions and ideas were put into practice. A brochure published by Prosvita in 1904 explained the goals and importance of cooperatives. It also presented the model statutes of a cooperative form called “the Ruthenian People’s Home” (Narodnyi Ruskyi Dim). Cooperatives founded in accordance with RPH statutes could be created on the basis of one or several villages. Such cooperatives could buy, sell, and rent land on behalf of the members, and stock agricultural tools, synthetic fertilizers, grain, selected seeds, and various agricultural products for members’ needs. In addition, the cooperatives could refine and sell the aforementioned products, maintain model farms, and trade products and goods needed by the members. They could accept deposits for saving and grant loans to their members, and diffuse professional knowledge by arranging meetings, lectures, visitations, courses, and exhibitions. Various enterprises could be started by an RPH cooperative without the need for registering a new cooperative as long as such firms merely served the needs

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32 Samopomich, 1909: 3, p. 2-3, citation p. 3.
of the members. Several branches of economic activity could be gathered under one single organizational umbrella, it was argued.\textsuperscript{34}

An RPH cooperative’s task was to gather inhabitants of one or several villages in one single association. The traditional, local community was used as a basis. The members would have the possibility of investing part of the profits in productive goals. Non-members should be excluded from the work of the cooperation. An RPH cooperation would also benefit from a tax reduction. People interested in founding such a cooperative were asked to contact the Crownland Credit Union, which would then send the statutes and forms needed for a successful registration.

Finally, more practical instructions such as where to go to register, the costs involved, and how to arrange a founding meeting in accordance to the statutes were all provided. Such a meeting would decide where the cooperative would be based and from which villages the members would be recruited. A council of the cooperative should be elected from among those present. The council should then choose three members for the cooperative’s management.\textsuperscript{35} The empty spaces in the statutes should be filled in. The members should apply for membership and pay their share. They were also expected to deposit their savings into the cooperative.\textsuperscript{36} After a cooperative was founded, CAU offered further tutorial and administrative assistance to the local cooperative activists. The practical advice and bureaucratic support mentioned above bore fruit. The \textit{Ekonomist} reported sixty-nine cooperatives with RPH statutes at the end of 1907.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1905, 72 of 100 various cooperatives registered by the Crownland Auditing Union were founded in 1900 or later.\textsuperscript{38} In August 1910, the number of member cooperatives of CAU was 390. 53 of those were of agricultural character. They were designed to deal with several aspects of agriculture: providing credits, consumer goods, or conducting dairy cooperatives. The number of cooperatives increased threefold between 1905 and 1910. The increase in the number of “purely” agricultural cooperatives was even more notable: fourfold, from 13 to 53.

The founding of cooperatives was supported in various ways from the central organizations. Model statutes could be provided along with a handbook and judicial and practical work. Thanks to the expertise of the Ruthenian activists at CAU, cooperatives created in accordance with the model statutes benefited from tax reductions. Ideally, the activity of a cooperation would encompass one or a handful of villages. As in most joint operations, participants were expected to pay shares. Needless to say, the requirement to buy shares and actively participate must have made membership for people

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ekonomist}, 1905: 1, p. 14.  
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ekonomist}, 1905: 1, p. 15.  
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ekonomist}, 1908: 1, p. 9.  
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ekonomist}, 1906: 1, p. 1-6.
with few means cumbersome, if not impossible. There were two more aspects that limited admission to a cooperative: geographical and social. Limited geographical space not only created cooperatives of a manageable size, but also indirectly referred the members to the traditional bonds and loyalties in the locality.

A success story: Stryi Prosvita Section and the rise of Ruthenian dairy cooperatives

In this part of the text, the development of dairy cooperatives is highlighted. Dairy cooperatives developed dynamically and were viewed as an example to follow. They were also viewed as the forerunners of modernization and as a very crucial instrument in the shift from grain production to dairy production, cattle breeding, and horticulture. This shift was considered necessary because of the scarcity of arable land among the Ruthenians in Galicia.39 The work of the dairy cooperatives attracted intense attention from the journals, as these cooperatives apparently were considered a success story.

Frequent calls to organize the cooperatives “from below” suggest a different reality. Although there was a vivid interest in economic improvement among the peasantry, the activists had to channel it into manageable forms of work.

A half-anonymous letter writer, “Vasyl from Bizhkhiv”, claimed that any future organization that could gather the peasants “should organise its forces not from above, but from below.”40 The reality was often not as simple, and it turned out to be rather difficult to realize this ideal.

The examples of work by the activists give insights into the gradually planned and coordinated joint work by various Ruthenian organizations. In March 1904, the Ekonomist described the dynamic and well-planned work of the Prosvita section in the district of Stryi, a small town situated over 100 km south of Lviv. Questionnaires were sent out and conferences held to investigate which industry would be most suitable for the district. It was agreed that weaving and dairy farming would be the most fitting. Fourteen pupils who would become future teachers of weaving were sent to the Crownland School of Weaving in Łańcut.

The supply of arable land was scarce in the Stryi region (it is situated in a highland area on the foothills of the Carpathians), while the supply of pastures was good. Conditions were good for dairy production and cattle breed-

39 For instance, two turf cooperatives were founded in the villages of Perehnyiv and Hriada (Ekonomist, 1904: 16); a dairy cooperative was founded in Zavadiv, headed by father Ostap Nizhankovsky (Ekonomist, 1904: 11, p. 16); and another peasant (selianska) dairy cooperative was created in Myshynia close to Kolomyia (Ekonomist, 1904: 8, p. 23).
40 Ekonomist, 1904: 8, p. 12.
ing. However, Ruthenian dairy producers lacked the skills for the proper handling and processing of milk. German colonists dominated the local market. According to the organizers, the foundation for successful dairy production by the Ruthenians could be laid by teaching them about the proper ways of handling the cattle and milk. In order to meet these needs, a conference was organized in Stryi and included participation of Mr. Biedron, a former dairy teacher, and Mr. Harasevych, who had learned dairy techniques in Denmark and who had worked on dairy farms abroad. It was agreed that the Prosvita section in Stryi would organise the dairy business “for the time being”. Lectures on dairy farming and courses about the practical aspects were in high demand in many villages.

A central dairy would be created in Stryi, supported by smaller local dairies that would mainly deal with the separating of cream. The central dairy would engage in the production, distribution, and sale of butter. Finally, local Ruthenians needed to obtain appropriate schooling, so that the local dairies and the central dairy in Stryi could be managed efficiently.41

Several lectures on dairy production were held in February and March 1904. All sections of Prosvita should follow the example of the Stryi section, the Ekonomist concluded. The time for action was ripe “if we want to be a living nation.”42 The Stryi section was presented as an example of how Prosvita sections could successfully deal with the technical aspects of the agricultural work by inquiring about the situation in a region, and by providing professionals for lectures and discussions with the peasants etc.43

In 1905, the Stryi section of Prosvita reported that several cooperatives were founded in the region. The demand for, and sales of, butter were very good thanks to its high quality. The note ended with a rhetorical question which was supposed to spur other Prosvita sections to follow the Stryi example: “Does Prosvita Society not have more sections in Galicia?”44

Father Nizhankovsky, who took part in the organizing of many cooperatives, would not leave any details unattended. A founding of a future cooperative should be preceded by a distribution of literature, lectures, courses, and general information.45 Apparently this was being done with a great deal of success in the Stryi district.

In 1905, further expansion of the dairy cooperatives was halted, as there was a need for lectures and information, and a lack of ice-making facilities was felt. Inspired by the Stryi section, the Rohatyn and Berezhany sections of Prosvita sent people to the dairy cooperatives in Stryi District to learn and the bring back the knowledge to their home districts.46

41 Ekonomist, 1904: 3, p. 20.
42 Ekonomist, 1904: 3, p. 21.
43 Ekonomist, 1904: 7, p. 23.
44 Ekonomist, 1905: 2, p.16.
46 Ekonomist, 1905: 5, p.15.
In September 1905, the Stryi section of *Prosvita* opened a technical Dairy Bureau. Its task was to distribute the dairy machines and tools needed for the production of butter to all cooperatives both in the Stryi district and throughout Galicia.\(^{47}\) In the same month, the Crownland Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi (Kraievyi Union Ruskykh Molocharskykh Spilok v Stryiu, from now on referred to as “the Union”) was created. Its ambition was to gather all Ruthenian dairy cooperatives into one single structure. At the specially created bureau for the selling of butter, people interested in the dairy business could consult a special commercial clerk.\(^{48}\) The *Ekonomist* viewed the Union as the main vehicle of the rationalization of agriculture, with a re-orientation from grain to dairy production as the main task.\(^{49}\)

During this time, other cooperatives within the agricultural sphere were started, frequently with a Greek Catholic cleric as the architect. The list of Greek Catholic clergy engaged in the formation of cooperatives was lengthy.\(^{50}\) The extraordinary role played by Nizhankovsky in the development of the dairy cooperatives in the Stryi region is perhaps the most illustrative example of the importance of the Greek Catholic clergy for the growing cooperative movement. Peasants were often organized and helped by the traditional village authority – the priest.\(^{51}\)

The cooperative dairy business continued to expand in the Stryi district and in other parts of Galicia. Interest in dairy cooperatives spread rapidly in the southern parts of eastern Galicia. In 1906, the *Ekonomist* reported on the founding of new cooperatives in the Zhydachiv, Drohobych, and Kolomyia districts.\(^{52}\)

The Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives had a wide range of activities. The Union’s ambition was the diffusion of professional information about the dairy business and to help start new cooperatives by sending an instructor. In addition, the Union would supervise the work of the cooperatives by sending controllers. When possible, it would help to find a market for butter. The Union had stored dairy machines and various dairy tools and instruments, and placed people who intended to engage in the dairy cooperative business at the already-existing cooperatives so they could practice and learn. The Union provided written information in 150 cases, for private persons and for reading rooms and associations. Fathers Nizhankovsky and Borachyk were frequently sent as the representatives of the Union to the meetings of the member cooperatives. Dairy instructors employed by the Union supervised numerous cooperatives, working between one and three days at each dairy.

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\(^{48}\) *Ekonomist*, 1905: 11, p. 15.


\(^{50}\) *Ekonomist*, 1905: 11, p. 16; 1905: 4, p. 16; 1905: 5, p. 16; 1905: 8, p. 16.

\(^{51}\) Himka, *Galician Villagers*.

The Union was in contact with several state and provincial organizations. It promised various forms of support and advice if a cooperative became a member of the Union.\textsuperscript{53} Obviously, the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives swiftly developed into a dynamic organization that enabled and facilitated the work of the dairy cooperatives in large parts of eastern Galicia. It offered support to people who intended to found cooperatives, and provided professional advice and practical support to the cooperatives already on the market. Its function thus had double importance. The Union functioned as a supervising, co-ordinating organization and as a prime mover of transformation, modernization, and adaptation to the market of the regional Ruthenian agriculture.

Coping with growing pains

With time, the period of expansion of the Union was succeeded by a time of evaluation, deliberation, and change. Expectations as to the members and the standard procedures upon creation of the cooperatives were presented. The guidelines of how to found and maintain a financially sustainable dairy cooperative were formulated. There should be enough members to secure a daily supply of milk from one hundred cows or a daily supply of two hundred litres. If not, the income of the cooperative would entirely be eaten up by the costs of the employment of the dairy worker, the acquisition of the machines, and administration. If there were a satisfactory number of candidates in a village, a meeting should be summoned. All those who gathered should deliver all of their milk to the dairy cooperative, except for milk used for household needs. Such a text should be placed on the top of a paper, while below, there would be a table stipulating the names of the signers, the share invested by them, the number of milk cows they owned, and their signatures.\textsuperscript{54}

After the document was signed and completed, an application would be sent to Stryi. Then the Union would send its delegate to the pending dairy cooperative. On that day, a general meeting would be summoned with several fixed tasks: 1) the opening of the meeting; 2) the formulation of the statutes of the cooperative; 3) an election of the board direction and the supervising council; 4) a decision about location of the dairy cooperative; and 5) the question of employment of a dairy worker. The delegate of the Union would send the documents compiled at the meeting to Stryi. The Union would then make arrangements for the legal registration of the cooperative.

\textsuperscript{53} Ekonomist, 1908: 5, p. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{54} Ekonomist, 1908: 7, p. 10-11.
A dairy cooperative worker candidate would be sent to practice at one of the Union’s dairies for a period of 2-3 weeks. The worker or his future employer would pay.

The Union would deliver the machines needed for production. The more ready cash a cooperative could pay, the lower the price. The butter should be delivered to Stryi for distribution to the Union’s shops. People who were “Ruthenians at heart” and cared for the wellbeing of the nation should found dairy cooperatives, the Ekonomist commanded.55

In the 1st issue of the Ekonomist in 1909, the Union stated that its main income came from functioning as the middle man in the sales of dairy machinery and the products from the member dairy cooperatives. The Galician Diet (Sejm) granted the Union a subsidy of 3000 Kronen. The central government in Vienna added 15400. Four hundred Kronen of this sum was reserved for the forthcoming agricultural exhibition, 2000 for the publishing of a professional dairy cooperative journal, and 13000 for the purchase of dairy machines and subventions to the member dairies.56

Information about the annual meeting of the Union in 1910 gives an idea of the dynamic development of the organization and the problems it faced.57 The meeting presented the Executive Council with several urgent issues to be dealt with. Only member cooperatives which signed a document obliging them to deliver butter solely to the Union or its appointees would be granted credit for the acquisition of machines and other products. The same rule would apply to the cash credits from the Union. Cooperatives that broke these regulations would face exclusion from the Union as well as the withdrawal of credits from the Crownland Credit Union. Apparently there were several cooperatives that used the Union in Stryi merely as a source of cheap credit and know-how, and were not directly interested in the construction of the Ruthenian, nationally conscious and economically solid, cooperative body. The cooperatives that were members of the Union only formally but did not maintain commercial relations with it should establish such relations prior to 1st August 1910. The Direction of the Union was instructed to examine the local relations in these cooperatives, and to take the steps it deemed appropriate. Cooperatives which sold butter to other parties than the Union would be fined with 40 Kreuzer per 1kg of butter. A veterinarian was needed to examine the cattle that had recently purchased in large quantities by the members. Supervision of sanitation matters also called for a veterinarian’s skills. Arrangements needed to be made to locate a financial institution that would grant the Union a current account, so that the payments for the butter would reach the members quicker. The member cooperatives declared themselves to be satisfied with the work of the Union. The meeting condemned

55 Ekonomist, 1909: 7, p. 11.
56 Ekonomist, 1909: 1, p. 29.
57 Ekonomist, 1910: 8/9, p. 207.
all attacks (unfortunately not clearly referred to) against the direction of the Union as “acts of personal prejudice with detriment to the Ruthenian dairy cooperatives.” Information about the massive purchase of cattle among the cooperative members and the growing numbers of the member cooperatives of the Union certainly suggest a period of increased confidence in the future, and a time of growth, expansion, and network building of Ruthenian economic institutions on a regional level.

At the end of 1909, the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives had two hundred members. The number had doubled compared to 1908. These numbers included 77 cooperatives and other institutions, while the remaining members were private persons – 71 belonging to “lay intelligentsia”, 36 priests, and 16 peasants, who accounted for 123 non-cooperative members. The non-organisation members strongly outnumbered the number of the organizations, which were presumably mostly dairy cooperatives. What also is striking is the tremendous growth of the number of the cooperatives, which rose from 17 to 77 in merely a year. Such a number of organizations called for increased discipline, supervision, and intervention from the side of the Union. At the same time, one finds that the cooperatives were a minority in the Union, while the majority of the members were characterized as “lay intelligentsia” or clergy. Even if one added the number of (one may presume) nationally conscious peasants – sixteen persons – to the number of cooperatives, the balance would still be 107 to 93 in favour of the traditional elite of the Ruthenians. This indicates that the movement still needed support, or was considered to need it, from the side of the patriotically-inclined intelligentsia and priests who economically supported the cooperative movement. These numbers also suggest that Ukrainian agricultural cooperatives in eastern Galicia indeed still were a “from above” project, as indicated earlier in this text.

At the end of 1910, the Union had 235 members. It generated a profit of 2291.06 Kronen in 1910. The Ekonomist found these results even more impressive, as the work had been accomplished by Ruthenians alone, despite the obstacles created by the “aliens.”

This part of the text examined the creation of dairy cooperatives on the local level and their expansion into a Crownland-wide organization – the Union of Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi. The role of persons with no peasant affiliations, such as priests (traditionally a person of trust and authority) and so-called lay intelligentsia was important. The mission of these people seemed to have been twofold: to improve the situation of the peasantry by satisfying their most urgent economic needs, and to incorporate them in the national movement. The initiative seems to have come “from above”, as most of the dairy cooperatives mentioned in the journals were created on the

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58 *Ekonomist*, 1910: 8/9, p. 207.
59 *Ekonomist*, 1911: 1.
initiative of the local reading room under the patronage of the Prosvita Society. The initiative emanated from Lviv and from the regional centres such as Stryi, Rohatyn, and Berezhany. It emanated from the Crownland level to the regional level, rather than to a local level. The number of lay intelligentsia and clergy members of the Union points at the fact that the movement was considered to be in need of support. It also suggests that the cooperative movement was still mainly a project of the Ruthenian elite in eastern Galicia.

This was an “organic”, patient, step-by-step, and vertically-directed procedure that started with an investigation of the local conditions. The activists provided the peasants with manifold help. Representatives and instructors from Stryi were sent to supervise the first steps of the dairy production. With time, the Stryi region’s cooperatives united under the umbrella of the Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives, whose ambition was to gather all Ruthenian dairy cooperatives. The Union sold and distributed dairy machines; it bought, distributed and sold butter; it provided information to the villages where dairy cooperatives were planned and gave advice and practical help to member cooperatives. The Union provided loans for the member cooperatives. In a rather short time, there was a notable expansion, from a handful of local cooperatives to a cooperative organization at an all-Galician level. The activities of cooperative activists in the Stryi district also apparently inspired the Ruthenian activists in neighbouring districts such as Drobobych, Zhydachiv, Rohatyn, and Berezhany.

**Threats to cooperation: irrational and superstitious women**

The cooperatives faced other obstacles than those which had to do with economics or with faltering loyalty. Sparks of obstruction were inherent in the traditional Carpathian folk beliefs, the traditional male and female spheres in the agricultural society, and the gendered division of labour and income on the farm. In 1909, Samopomich monitored some of the problems facing the dairy cooperative in the village of Liakhivtsi. The first dairy cooperative in the Bohorodchany district was created in Liakhivtsi, and the village had 2400 inhabitants, who mainly lived off of agriculture and cattle breeding. There were smallholders and the landless, too, who often made their living from part-time farming and additional work such as transports using a horse and carriage. There were many horses in the village – over 400, while there were 2000 horn cattle, including 450 cows.60

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60 Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 1. The author, the signature O. O., refers to the stories published in Samopomich about the development of the dairy cooperatives in Berezhnytsia Shliakhotska (1909: 5) and Bodnariv (1909: 6).
Horses and oxen received most of the attention, while cows were somewhat neglected. There were 1000 morgi of pastures, but they were in bad condition. Liakhivtsi was considered to be one of the most “enlightened” villages in the Bohorodchany district. There were two reading rooms of the Prosvita Society, and a section of the Sich Society. However, the members were only recruited among the male population, while the women of Liakhivtsi were “terribly neglected” and were drowning in “darkness and superstition.” One could usually foresee several obstacles when a dairy cooperative took its first steps, but in Liakhivtsi the problems occurred because of the beliefs of the village women and their fear and distrust of the machines. The women believed in the old saying “farmer, know your farm, but leave the pots alone”. The superstition that surrounded milk production was “ridiculous and terrifying”, the editor wrote. One finds a clear line drawn between the village men, whose activities were synonymous with “enlightened” behaviour, and the village women, who were branded as backward and as adverse to progress. One also finds a definition of what “enlightened” meant to the reporter. It was defined as an active membership in patriotically inclined cultural and economic organizations. In this case, however, “enlightenment” had not yet yielded a thoroughly rational utilization of the resources of the villagers. Several among the village men were interested in short-term gains from transportation of timber, while the women were not even guided by economic considerations, but instead by “superstitious” beliefs.

The witch was the greatest enemy of a farmwife (gazdynia). Any village woman could become a witch, leaving her house and flying out through the chimney at night to milk another farmwife’s cows. The cows lost their milk because it would immediately be passed to the witch’s cows.

A farmwife could also “provide a reason” for milk to dry out, for example if milk from one’s own cow was mixed with someone else’s cow’s milk. Then the cow would cease to produce milk. Nor was letting somebody else’s cow drink milk from one’s own cow wise. Several people demanded that the dairy worker pour processed milk on the village road rather than having such milk be redistributed among the cooperators.

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61 1 morga was equivalent to 5600 m².
62 Sich Society was a patriotic sport organization under the patronage of the Radical Party, active in the first two decades of the 20th century. Its main goal was to improve and cultivate the physical and moral spirit of the nation. Sich Society organized demonstrations and sport events on a local, regional, and all-Austrian level; Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy (Kyiv 2001), p. 756-757. On the eve of the First World War, Sich Society and its politically less radical equivalent, Sokil Society, increasingly gained a paramilitary character, and functioned as an important recruiting ground for the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen Division that fought in the Austrian Army during the War, and against the Poles in the West Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919; see Struve, Kai, Bauern und Nation in Galizien. Über Zugehörigkeit und sociale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2005), p. 285-288.  
The founders of the cooperative certainly knew about these beliefs, but claimed not to care about the “superstition of old women” (babski zabobony). However, propagation for the cooperative cause among the village women bore no fruit. To make the matters worse, Jews who earlier had functioned as middle men in the trade dairy products campaigned against the cooperative, as they saw their earning potential slipping out of their hands.

There was another problem concerning the village women. Traditionally, the income from the sales of the dairy products (along with eggs and hens) could be spent by a gazdynia in accordance to her will. It was the sole source of income under a farmwife’s control. However, the farmer (gazda) collected the monthly return from the cooperative. This seemingly “ridiculous” reason, the editor wrote, increases in importance if one considers that the farmers often claim to, or exercise, full control over the farm’s liquid assets.64 This probably occurred on every farm, but occurred at least on each second farm, the author estimated. Several women refused to deliver milk to the dairy because they disagreed with their men as to who should collect the payment.65

Farmwomen continued from time to time to appear as a problem in the journals. Apparently the unwillingness of the women to give up the income was long-lived. In 1910, Samopomich reported that women hampered the development of a dairy cooperative in Dolyna District.66 In 1914, Samopomich complained that “not all of our farmwives know about the advantages of the dairy cooperatives.” Thus, cooperatives had yet not been “introduced everywhere”. The hardest task, however, was to convince the women that butter produced with home methods was of poorer quality than the butter produced at the dairy cooperative, and that such butter would give a meagre price compared to the price of the butter produced with modern methods.67 Thus, there were several obstacles to the fruitful development of the village dairy business (understood by the activists as gathering in one single cooperative and working jointly in accordance to rational and modern methods). There was a tendency among the men to go for quick gains rather than to dedicate themselves to long-term efforts. This resulted in the favouring of the horses, the animals that brought an income from timber transports. Cows were neglected and malnutritioned as the result of horses having access to the best fodder. In addition, the village women were considered to be superstitious and were anxious to retain their traditional income from dairy products, the income that now was being claimed by their men.

This section of the text found that the growth of dairy cooperatives could face several obstacles. As the shift from grain production (traditionally male-

64 Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 2.
65 Samopomich, 1909: 7, p. 3.
67 Samopomich, 1914: 3/4, p. 3.
dominated) to dairy production (traditionally female-dominated) continued, controversies over scarce resources increased. Traditionally, the farmwife retained the income from the “female” sectors of the farm, such as dairy production, poultry and petty animals. Now, the men claimed their traditional economic authority as husbandmen to collect the income of the farm. In addition to this prevalent folk beliefs and taboos concerning the handling of milk made a switch to modern dairy farming problematic. Although several men favoured the manly coded horses, depreciated the nutrition of horn cattle, and pursued what the editors viewed as short gains, they were not seen as backward. Women, however, were mostly depicted as backward and superstitious, while men generally were described as “enlightened.” In being depicted as an obstacle to successful rise of the cooperatives (and thus, indirectly, to the patriotic cause), women were being eradicated from the positively coded field of modernization, reserved for the “enlightened” and “rational” (and therefore patriotic) and frequently land-owning men. This process was not typical for Liakhivtsi and the Galician Sub-Carpathian regions, but was a part of an European current. More often than not, the gendered division of labour was renegotiated and re-evaluated in accordance to the shifting market situation. This process occurred as the spheres formerly reserved for women (earlier regarded as rather insignificant or a complement to the tasks of men) gained more attention from the rural society because of their growing significance for the market.68

Ethnicity and exclusion: Groups potentially dangerous to cooperatives

From the late 19th century, Galician villagers, artisans, small-shop keepers, and a growing number of industrial workers felt the growing impact of the money economy and the market. The possibilities of earning a living decreased while competition for the all-scarcer resources hardened. This process lead to growing tensions between the national and ethnic groups of the Crownland. The mass-migration from rural to urban areas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries further sharpened the competition between Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews.69 According to Anna Weronika Wendland, the public sphere in Lviv during several decades of the late Habsburg rule “strengthened communication inside a national group without necessarily leading to mono-

lithic identities and mutual exclusion between groups.” However, the atmosphere was gradually “poisoned” by the increasing Polish-Ukrainian conflict.70 Although one may question whether the relations really were so cordial, there is no doubt that the inter-ethnic relations on the eve of World War I seriously deteriorated. Inevitably, such an “atmosphere” also had an impact on the economic visions and ways of action of the different competing ethnic groups.

The term “economic nationalism” has frequently been used to describe a certain set of conditions in Central Europe. Most generally, it has meant economic mobilization along ethnical lines. On the state level, economic nationalism often influenced government economic policy. Such measures, if directed inwards, could mean a favouring of the majority ethnic group, for example by supplying a legal framework that curtailed the economic activities of the minorities and favoured those of the majority (cheap loans, etc). The outward economic measures inspired by economic nationalism could mean state protectionism such as tariffs and custom fees on imports, and limitations or bans on the export of certain goods.

The call “each to its own kind” instructed an ethnic group to buy only at the shops owned by one’s own ethnic group (where, ideally, only goods produced by one’s own ethnic group were sold). The universality of this urge in Central Europe before the First World War and between the wars is obvious. The phrase exists in German, Czech, Polish, and Ukrainian.71

As the Ekonomist and Samopomich were the official organs of the Crownland Auditing Union, they mirrored the organization’s view of the other main ethnic and political groups: the Poles, the Jews, and the Moscow-philes. One finds information about why these groups were considered detrimental to the Ukrainian national cause in Galicia, and why the cooperation with these groups was to be restricted.

The theme of Polish and Jewish opposition to, and obstruction of, the improvement among the Ruthenian peasants was one of the main themes of the articles where other ethnic groups were commented. However, the motives of Poles and Jews for the actions considered as anti-Ukrainian were different. German historian Kai Struve has claimed that the main goal of the Ukrainian national movement in the end of the 19th century was to “realize equal rights with the Poles, both the Polish and Ruthenian intelligentsia saw a direct economic threat in the Jews who occupied most intermediary functions in the rural economy.” Jewish usurers and tavern keepers were held

responsible for the poor economic and health conditions of the Polish and Ukrainian rural populations.72

“What do we do to liberate the people from the economic dependence on the Poles and their accomplices, the Jews, and protect them from de-nationalization and spiritual corruption?” – the author of the article “Cooperation and education” asked. He scrutinized and commented on the activities of the Ukrainian educational organizations in the sphere of cooperation and agriculture.73 Later in the same issue, it was found that “economic slavery is the reason behind political and cultural slavery.” The economic organisation was seen as the beginning of the Ukrainian emancipation from dependence on the Poles and the Jews.74 Clearly, the improvement of the Ruthenians’ economy was seen as the key to further improvements in the cultural and political fields.

Samopomich was aware that exclusion on ethnic arguments was contrary to the cooperative ideals. It would be good if people in ethnically mixed villages respected each other’s “national rights”, and did not fight each other because of ethnicity, it was concluded. It would also be good if the stronger did not take advantage of the weaker. In such a situation, cooperative principles could be fully applied. However, the reality was different. Ruthenians were not the equals of Poles and Russians, “and not all the Poles in Galicia or the Russians in Ukraine grant us the right to independent national existence”. Nor were there any friends of Ruthenians at the top of the cooperative movement, resulting in an exclusion from crucial decision-making about the development of the cooperatives.75 Poles seldom wished Ruthenians any good, and would not refrain from making Ruthenians “a fertilizer for their own cultural, political, and economic development”, as a remark about registering Ukrainophone Roman Catholics and Poles in the forthcoming population survey in 1910 indicated.76 Poles took great pains to divide and debilitate Ruthenian cooperatives. The actions were orchestrated by Dr. Stefan Stefczyk, head of the Bureau of Patronage of agrarian cooperatives under the Crownland Section. Stefczyk sought to establish Polish cooperatives where Ruthenian cooperatives already operated. The newly opened Polish cooperatives were then generously showered with public funds from the Crownland Section, and could potentially be attractive to Ruthenian peasants. The Ekonomist identified Stefczyk’s actions as an act of Polonization.77

Never was the tone so indignant and full of sarcasm and distaste as when the activities of the Moscowphile Kachkovsky Society and other Moscow-

73 Samopomich, 1914: 1/2, p. 6.
74 Samopomich, 1914: 1/2, p. 17.
phile associations were commented on. It was found that the Kachkovsky Society was denied the support of the Polish controlled Crownland Section (*Wydział krajowy*), as the Society’s activities were deemed as detrimental to the state. Quite rightly, it was concluded.78 Out of 1097 reading rooms of the Society, only 426 answered the questionnaire distributed by the Society. This was an indication of the true number of reading rooms under the patronage of the Moscowphiles, the text concluded.

The author also criticized *Rilnychyi Soiuz* (Agricultural Union), founded by the Kachkovsky Society. After all, *Silskyi Hospodar* (Farmer, an Ukrainophile organization) existed already. Its task was to facilitate the work of the Ruthenian farmers. The founding of the Moscowphile *Tsentralnyi molocharskyi Union* (Central Dairy Union), a dairy cooperative organization on the Galician level, was also considered as an hostile act, as there already was an organization with such functions in Stryi. The new organization was under the patronage of *Wydział krajowy*, the executive body of the Polish-dominated Galician Diet. The Poles probably applauded the action, as the dynamic Union of the Ruthenian Dairy Cooperatives in Stryi had never been popular among them, the journal claimed. 16 of the 32 Moscowphile dairy cooperatives were gathered under the patronage of *Wydział krajowy*.

Thus, the activities of the Moscowphiles were misdirected, as there were no “Russian” peasants in Galicia, only “Ruthenian.” Thus, there was no base for the activities of the Moscowphiles. Here, the author’s irony was directed towards the use of the word “ruskyi”79, which in Russian (*ruskii*) refers to an ethnically Russian person, while in Polish and Ukrainian the word by this time referred to a Ruthenian/Ukrainian.

This was “treason”. The Moscowphiles spread their “poison” and weakened the nation by creating organizations that competed with already existing ones. The Moscowphiles were attempting to create a nation that was not there and manipulated “dark, blinded peasants.” In the article, the author used many of the linguistically Russian terms used by the Kachkovsky Society. They were used with sarcasm and placed in citation marks, to signify the foolishness and oddity of the *Kachkovsky Society*.80

In 1912, the *Ekonomist* turned the attention of the readers and “our people” to the “clandestine and dishonest agitation of the Muscovites”. This time, it was about the attempts to talk the agents of the Ukrainophile *Dnister* insurance company into joining the Czech *Slavia* insurance company. In the Husiatyn District, the agitation among peasants fell on deaf ears, and propaganda did not work. Doubled efforts should be made to propagate for *Dnister* among Ruthenians, the journal suggested. The company donated consid-

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78 *Ekonomist*, 1910: 8/9, p. 199.
80 *Ekonomist*, 1910: 8/9, p. 201.
erable sums to the national cause, and *Slavia* did not offer better insurance terms than *Dniester*.

The report “Moscowphile business” manifested *Samopomich*’s Schadenfreude over the financial problems of the Moscowphile organizations in Kolomyia. Intemperance and thefts have taken place, it was reported. Debt bills have disappeared, among other things. The case would probably be passed to a prosecutor. The *Ekonomist* reported further Moscowphile economic abuses in 1912. It was noted that a shop in a “Moscowphile” village in the Stanislawiv region went bankrupt.

In 1910, six Moscowphile cooperatives left the Crownland Auditing Union, according to *Samopomich*. Apparently, Moscowphiles felt pressure from the Ukrainophile activists on the local level, too. In the report for 1910, Kachkovsky Society complained that Ukrainophiles obstructed the work of the Society and its organizations. The *Ekonomist* rejoiced, as these activities showed that there were active, nationally conscious people out there ready to take action.

Thus, the actions of Poles and Jews opened the way for “denationalization” and “spiritual corruption.” Jewish and other non-Ruthenian associations could be momentously dangerous to the welfare of the Ruthenian peasantry and the national prospects of the Ruthenians in Galicia at large. Moscowphiles were, to put it bluntly, the enemy within the ranks of the Galician Ruthenians. They were described as morally corrupt and as manipulators of the “dark and blinded” peasants. At the same time, the Moscowphiles were described as being inclined towards doubtful economic machinations that would weaken the economic strength of the Ruthenian community. The Moscowphiles were declared to represent alien (Russian) interests, and had connections to Polish political (*Wydział Krajowy*), and Czech business interests – only to keep the Ruthenians divided.

**Conclusion**

This text examined several aspects of the creation and expansion of Ukrainophile Ruthenian agricultural cooperatives in eastern Galicia from 1904 to 1914. The text examined the motives behind the founding of cooperatives. The processes of founding and building up the cooperatives were also illuminated. At the same time, groups considered as problematic or directly obstructive to the functioning of cooperatives, and the strategies concerning these groups, were identified.

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81 *Ekonomist*, 1912: 2, p. 45.
82 *Samopomich*, 1910: 3, p. 6.
84 *Samopomich*, 1911: 3-4, p. 25-26.
Cooperatives were viewed as a tool of economic liberation. Once economic strength was attained, a successful pursuit of political rights would follow, the cooperative journals believed. Cooperatives were viewed as an organic and natural form of cooperation well suited for the economically and politically weak. The activists realized that an improvement of people’s material situations would make the cooperative idea (and, of course, the national idea) attractive in the villages. The creation of cooperatives was facilitated by ready-made statutes and judicial and practical help offered by the activists in Lviv and in regional centres once a cooperative began to operate.

There were groups who were identified as obstacles to the growth of cooperatives. These groups were excluded from, or limited in, their access to the cooperatives. The most explicit exclusion was the one based on ethnicity. Poles were excluded as former feudal lords whose intentions to enslave and control the Ruthenians have not changed, although the times have. Jews were either depicted as agents of Poles or as people opposed to economic improvement among Ruthenians because it hampered their traditional position as middle men. Moscowphiles, although considered ethnically Ruthenian, were viewed as potentially dangerous because they imagined themselves to be a branch of the Great Russian people, and thus posed a threat to Ruthenian ethnicity and its economy alike.

Women were frequently viewed as an obstacle to improvement and modernization because of folk beliefs they nurtured. Women were also considered as an obstacle to improvement because many of them would not transfer the authority over the income from dairy production (which traditionally had belonged to them) to their husbands, who now claimed the right to collect the money. The activists also found it hard to explain the advantages of the modern dairy production to many women, who continued to use traditional methods and tools. At the same time, most of the Ruthenian men were described as “enlightened” and “rational”.