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Animal advocacy and the radical right: the case of Sweden

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ABSTRACT

Why does the radical right care so much about animals? In this study, we argue that the salience of animal advocacy within the radical right can be explained by its compatibility with these parties' broader ideological framework. By analysing official documents from the radical right party the Sweden Democrats, we find that its animal advocacy is shaped by an ideological core consisting of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The SD argues, for example, that immigrants are more violent towards animals; that animal cruelty must be strongly punished; and that mistreatment of animals is contrary to the moral intuitions of 'the people'. Rather than only being used instrumentally to denigrate the cultural practices of immigrants, however, the policies reflect a broader commitment to animal well-being. Still, they differ from the egalitarian and rights-based agenda of 'animalist' parties, promoting as they do a paternalistic animal-welfare agenda where compassion is owed to animals not because they are our equals, but rather because they are dependent on us. The findings improve our understanding of the radical right ideology and of how ethical principles in the animal-rights debate are integrated into broader ideological frameworks and translated into party policy.

'I don't think the animals care if their benefactors belong to the Sweden Democrats or to the Left Party' (Richard Jomshof)¹

Introduction

Richard Jomshof, the party secretary of the radical right party the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD), was quite upset when the largest Swedish animal-rights organization *Djurens rätt* decided, at their annual congress in 2018, that SD politicians were not allowed to hold 'positions of trust' within the organization. As a long-standing member, animal-rights defender and dedicated vegetarian, Jomshof immediately left the organization. The chairman of the politically unaffiliated animal-rights organization explained the decision with a fundamental difference in values between the Swedish radical right party and *Djurens rätt*: 'The work for animals is done by humans, and a shared understanding of values is required in order for people to feel welcome and safe in our organization'.² Consequently, the nativism of the SD, expressed in anti-

immigration policies and a critique of multiculturalism, trumped the shared interest in animal advocacy.

In fact, the SD has helped to push through more progressive legislation in the field of animal welfare since its parliamentary breakthrough in 2010. Such examples include a ban on unanaesthetized piglet castration in 2011 and the criminalization of bestiality (sexual activity between human and non-human animals) in 2014. Moreover, in the 2018 annual review of the Swedish parliamentary parties made by *Djurens rätt* itself, the SD emerges as the strongest animal advocate on the right side of the political spectrum.³ The reaction to the ban from the SD leadership was expressed in an opinion piece in one of Sweden's major newspapers: 'Those who ultimately suffer from this are not the active Sweden Democrats, whose engagement is now suffocated, but rather the animals that [*Djurens rätt*] claim they want to help'.⁴

This controversy illustrates the phenomenon of how political forces that are polar opposites in terms of liberal values such as multiculturalism, ecologism and gender equality have a common interest in animal protection.⁵ In recent years, political parties devoted to advancing the rights and welfare of non-human animals⁶ have entered parliamentary assemblies in several European countries.⁷ These 'animalist' parties are no mere single-issue parties; rather they adhere to a broader agenda of progressive egalitarianism, advocating gender equality and defending the rights of sexual and ethnic minorities. At the same time, however, concern for animals is also found at the far right of the ideological spectrum, where these egalitarian visions tend not to be shared. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, several electorally successful radical right parties in Europe are strong proponents of animal welfare. These include parties such as the Italian Northern League, the British National Party, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Danish People's Party and, as we show here, the Sweden Democrats.⁸

While existing research has studied the eco-fascism of the extreme right,⁹ little is known about the role of animal advocacy within the radical right. In this study, we address the puzzle of why radical right parties share much of the animalist parties' concerns for animal well-being, while they share very little of these parties' progressive and egalitarian visions. In so doing, we answer two questions: how does the animal advocacy of the radical right relate to its core ideology; and how does it differ from the animal advocacy of the animalist parties? By answering these questions, we contribute to several bodies of scholarly literatures. First, we show how different ethical principles found in the animal-rights debate are integrated into broader ideological frameworks and translated into concrete party policy.¹⁰ Second, we address the question of whether the radical right engages in animal advocacy selectively only in order to denigrate the cultural practices of immigrants.¹¹ Third, we advance our understanding of the ideological profiles of radical right parties and contribute to the debate on whether these parties can be considered 'single-issue' anti-immigration parties.¹²

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we draw on existing theoretical work to identify a number of analytical categories relating to our two research questions. We then present our research design, justifying the choice of the Swedish case and describing material and methods. This is followed by the analysis, where we map the empirical material across our analytical categories. In the concluding section, finally, we summarize our findings and discuss their implications for future research.

Theoretical framework

The ideology of the radical right

In the first part of this study, we address the question of how the radical right's concern for animals fits within its broader ideology. We follow Cas Mudde in defining the ideology of the radical right in terms of three core concepts: *nativism*, *authoritarianism* and *populism*.¹³ Nativism is 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state'.¹⁴ The nativism of these parties makes them opposed immigration, Islam, and the European Union, and in favour of protecting national values and traditions. It also underlies their 'welfare chauvinism' – i.e. the position that state-funded welfare services should be limited to members of the native group (discussed in more detail below). Authoritarianism, meanwhile, is defined as 'the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely'.¹⁵ This outlook notably relates to questions of law and order, where radical right parties favour an uncompromising approach to combatting crime, as well as a preference for norm-conformity.

Populism, finally, is a contested concept, but for Mudde it is defined as a 'thin' ideology that can be attached to more comprehensive ideologies, and which posits an antagonistic relationship between a virtuous people and a corrupt and politically correct elite.¹⁶ Stated otherwise, populism represents a vision of democracy that calls for the fulfilment of the unmediated will of the people.¹⁷ While parties from all party families may display populist tendencies at times, most of them accept a liberal pluralist conception of democracy: unlike the radical right, they do not view the people as a homogenous entity.

One feature of the radical right that will become crucial when we turn to a comparison with the animalist parties is their preference for socially conservative values.¹⁸ Most radical right parties, for example, are opposed to feminism, state-sponsored gender equality, liberal abortion laws and same-sex marriage or adoption. There is, however, no clear-cut answer as to the ideological source of these conservative values. Mudde argues that the radical right's nativism leads it to favour traditional family values and gender roles.¹⁹ Social psychologists, meanwhile, tend to bundle support for traditional social norms together with conformity and deference to authority, suggesting instead that authoritarianism is the crucial component.²⁰ Opposition to something like gay rights may also have a distinct populist component where, for example, the legalization of same-sex marriage is described as initiated by the politically correct elite in violation of the values of 'common people' and the rights of the 'silent' majority.²¹

Still, some radical right parties have been successful in fitting culturally liberal policies into their core ideological framework. One example of this concerns the coupling of liberal views on gender equality and gay rights with a cultural heritage taken to be at odds with the values held by Muslim immigrants.²² In other words, it entails a reformulation of the nativist ideology, in which Western civilization is pitted against an illiberal foreign culture tolerating discrimination of homosexuals and violence against women. Such changes may be driven, at least in part, by vote-seeking concerns, since many radical right parties in Western Europe have held value conservative positions that are not shared by most of their voters.²³ The more general point, however, is that any policy

proposal advanced by a party must fit within its broader ideological framework. For example, Ennser-Jedenastik and Otjes et al. have shown how the radical right's socio-economic policies are shaped by their nativism, authoritarianism and populism.²⁴ With regard to the radical right parties' concern for animals, then, we expect the following:

Expectation 1: The animal advocacy of the radical right is shaped by its ideological core consisting of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

The radical right and the animalist ideology

Having addressed the relationship between the radical right parties' concern for animals and their own ideology, we turn to the question of how it relates to the ideology of animalist parties. To do so, we draw on the conceptual work of Paul Lucardie, for whom the core concept of the animalist ideology is that of *compassion*.²⁵ Furthermore, he identifies three adjacent concepts that help define this core: 1) the intrinsic value of animals; 2) progressive egalitarianism; and 3) the interdependence of animals, human beings and environment. In the following, we describe each of these three adjacent concepts and formulate expectations about how the radical right's animal advocacy relates to them. This allows us to explore the ways in which the radical right may promote policies similar to those of the animalist parties, but for different reasons.

Starting with the intrinsic value of animals, there are two main theoretical traditions from which to approach this question: *animal-welfare* theory and *animal-rights* theory, stemming from the utilitarian and deontological ethical traditions, respectively.²⁶ The most prominent advocate of the animal-rights position is Tom Regan, who argues that at least some non-human animals have certain moral rights which cannot be violated even for a greater good.²⁷ Such animals, then, have inherent (or intrinsic) value – they are 'subjects-of-a-life' rather than the property of humans. This implies that human use of animals should be abolished, although it does not imply that animals should have the same rights as humans.

The animal-welfare position, by contrast, is not about abolition, but rather about improving the welfare of animals. Although animals do not have rights, they have interests – most notably an interest in the avoidance of suffering. When humans use animals, the benefits they derive must therefore outweigh the costs to the animals. Accordingly, humans should not violate animals' interests for trivial purposes, and they should attempt to minimize 'unnecessary' animal suffering.²⁸ Critics of the animal-welfare position, however, have noted that such a utility calculus can be subject to significant disagreement.²⁹ What is considered 'unnecessary suffering', then, may simply reflect 'a statement about what forms of treatment of [animals] the majority in a society at a given time finds discomforting or distressing'.³⁰ In any case, the use of such a vocabulary indicates an animal-welfare position, where 'intrinsic value' refers not to individual rights, but rather to the idea that animals have interests (however defined) that are worthy of moral concern.³¹

Animalist parties are typically advocates of the rights-based position.³² Because radical right parties are socially and culturally conservative, they value tradition, stability and order. As such, we do not expect their concern for animals to stem from an ambition to abolish all human use of animals – a very radical proposal by conservative standards.

Indeed, psychologists have shown that right-wing authoritarians are more likely to perceive non-exploitive ideologies towards animals (e.g. veganism) as a threat to established cultural norms and beliefs.³³ This does not mean that radical right parties cannot consistently engage in animal advocacy, only that they are likely to do so for other reasons than the animalist parties. For example, conservatives deplore the ways in which modernity and industrialization have perverted man's relationship with animals, and they 'seek to protect animals against the ravages of rationalistic science and technology' such as genetic engineering and factory farming.³⁴ In this vein, we expect the radical right to favour continuity in terms of animal use that has traditionally been a party of society while at the same time improving animal welfare. Consequently, we formulate the following expectation:

Expectation 2: The radical right attributes intrinsic value to animals, but it does so from an animal-welfare position rather than an animal-rights position.

Second, Lucardie describes the concept of progressive egalitarianism as a position advocating the continuous extension of certain basic rights such as life, liberty, integrity or well-being to an ever-growing circle of subjects.³⁵ Viewed as such, the abolition of animal use is the next step in a process where human slavery has already been abolished, and where women have acquired the same basic rights as men. Their progressive egalitarianism leads the animalist parties not only to defend animal rights but also to promote gender equality, equal rights for sexual minorities, and call for an end to discrimination of disadvantaged groups such as the disabled and migrant workers. The animalist parties are driven by the idea of compassion, understood as 'a moral obligation to protect or care for the weakest creatures and give "a voice to the voiceless ones"'.³⁶

Because radical right parties are nativist and socio-culturally conservative, their compassion for animals must have some other source than progressive egalitarianism. The few examples of scholarly literature that address animal advocacy on the right of the ideological spectrum, however, do better at explaining its absence than its presence. For example, liberalism has a somewhat problematic relationship with animals, not only due to its commitment to free-market economy and property rights but also to moral pluralism.³⁷ If someone wishes to eat *foies gras* or watch bull fighting, that is, we should not hinder their pursuit of the good life; concern for animals should be a matter of personal choice rather than something mandated by the state.

Conservatism is in a better position to condemn certain animal uses as immoral – to 'distinguish legitimate from illegitimate pleasures' through the lens of human virtue and vice.³⁸ Indeed, a conservative might view the liberal position as one where the expression of freedom comes at the cost of unacceptable suffering, domination and death.³⁹ Conservative philosopher Roger Scruton, for example, argues that although animals cannot be part of a moral community that recognizes reciprocal rights and duties, humans still owe them moral consideration.⁴⁰ Taking things one step further, Matthew Scully makes a case for 'compassionate conservatism' for animals.⁴¹ Compassionate conservatism has been described as 'a paternalistic and inequalitarian doctrine, which justifies the authority of the "compassionate" regulating the lives of those who are the subjects of their compassion'.⁴² Indeed, Scully's plea for compassion is in stark contrast to that of the animalist parties, since it is based not on an egalitarian outlook, but rather the

idea that human superiority and dominion over the earth comes with certain responsibilities:

Animals are more than ever a test of our character, of mankind's capacity for empathy and for decent, honorable conduct and faithful stewardship. We are called to treat them with kindness, not because they have rights or power or some claim to equality, but in a sense because they don't; because they all stand unequal and powerless before us.⁴³

Scully concludes that the argument in favour of responsible dominion should lead humans to radically reconsider their current treatment of animals. As in the case of the utilitarian argument, however, conservatives could reasonably disagree about the nature and magnitude of the required changes. For example, whereas Scully opposes hunting, Scruton considers the plight of the animal to be outweighed by the 'great accumulation of human delight' that hunting offers.⁴⁴

The inegalitarian nature of compassionate conservatism also means that some groups can be legitimately viewed as more deserving than others; those truly in need are worthy of compassion, whereas those only looking for a free lunch are not.⁴⁵ This aspect ties in with a key feature of the radical right: their welfare chauvinism.⁴⁶ The welfare chauvinist perceives different 'degrees of deservingness' for recipients of welfare services.⁴⁷ For the radical right, this is presented as 'a situation that pits the hardworking natives, the "silent (ethnic) majority" whom they claim to represent, against the allegedly undeserving migrant "other"'.⁴⁸ Transferred to the domain of human-animal relations, this would mean that certain groups of animals are singled out as more worthy of compassion than others. We therefore expect the following:

Expectation 3: The radical right advocates compassion for animals, but it does so on a paternalistic rather than an egalitarian basis.

Third, and finally, we turn to the concept of interdependence between humans, animals and the environment. The animalist parties address this question primarily in terms of material values, such as the detrimental effects that human use of animals has on the environment.⁴⁹ One such example concerns the high levels of greenhouse gases caused by the meat and dairy industries, where some animalist parties advocate higher taxes on animal products. The radical right, by contrast, tends to be sceptical of the climate change agenda, perceiving it as a project driven by a corrupt and cosmopolitan elite, against the interests of 'the people'.⁵⁰

In a comparative study of the Danish People's Party and the British National Party, Forchtner & Kølvråa show that while these radical right parties do not favour efforts to combat climate change, they do advocate protection of the national countryside and landscape.⁵¹ The reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the nativist ideology of the radical right lends itself well to protection of the sovereign territory, whereas climate change is a global problem that requires a transnational solution, which might instead undermine the nation's sovereignty. Furthermore, from a nationalist perspective, nature can also have a strong symbolic value.⁵² This means that

the community's natural environment does not just provide resources allowing us to live and prosper, it constitutes an ecosystem: that is, 'the people' (in its territory) is one element of a larger whole. This fundamental interconnectedness of place, plants and non-human animals, and 'the people' requires profound measures to protect the whole and its parts. [...]

The ecosystem is thus not simply a natural whole, but also includes culture: both aspects have to be protected in order to guarantee its well-being.⁵³

The symbolic value of nature, then, is related to the culture of the nation and the homeland. The perceived duty to protect the environment and animals is motivated by their contribution to the national community in terms of identity, history and tradition. Certain animals or animal husbandry practices, for example, are viewed as intimately tied to the national culture. We therefore expect the following:

Expectation 4: The radical right has an interconnected view of humans, animals and the environment, but not only in terms of material values – it also contains symbolic values related to the national culture.

Research design

Because this study constitutes a first attempt to conceptually map the animal advocacy of the radical right, we focus on a single case. This allows us to prioritize depth over breadth and to lay the ground for future comparative studies.⁵⁴ Our choice of the Sweden Democrats is motivated by three factors. First, although some of the parties that are sometimes classified as radical right are contested members of this party family, this is not the case for the SD, making it appropriate as a point of departure when developing conceptual tools that can later be applied elsewhere.⁵⁵ Still, we acknowledge that there are important differences within this party family – a point to which we return in the concluding section. Second, the SD has politicized the animal issue since the publication of its second party programme in 1994. Since then, animal-welfare policy has had its own heading in the party programmes and has been discussed in the election manifestoes. Third, the public support for animal protection is very strong in Sweden – more so, in fact, than in almost any other European country. Eighty per cent of Swedes agree with the statement that ‘it is very important to protect the welfare of farmed animals’, compared to an EU average of 57%. Furthermore, 93% per cent of Swedes are willing to pay more for products sourced from animal-welfare-friendly production systems, as compared to an EU average of 59%.⁵⁶

The Sweden Democrats formed in 1988 and made its parliamentary breakthrough in the 2010 election, winning 5.7% of the votes. In the subsequent elections, the SD increased its support to 12.9% in 2014 and 17.5% in 2018, establishing itself as the third largest party in the Swedish *Riksdag*. The party’s comparatively late parliamentary breakthrough has been explained in part by its origins in right-wing extremist ideology and milieus.⁵⁷ For much of its first decade in parliament, the SD was treated as a political ‘pariah’ by the other parties, with reference to alleged extremism and a lack of shared basic values. As the party has grown, however, the *cordon sanitaire* erected against it has eroded, and since the 2018 election parts of the mainstream right have opened the door for political cooperation.⁵⁸ The SD has primarily mobilized electoral support through its opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, together with Euroscepticism and welfare chauvinism – issues that reflect its core ideology. Still, as noted above, animal advocacy has been part of official party documents since the mid-1990s.

To analyse the SD’s animal advocacy, we draw on three kinds of documents. First, we make use of the most authoritative statements on official party positions: election

Table 1. Documents analysed.

Type of document	Years covered	N
Election manifestos/party programmes	1988–2020	15
Party magazines		
• <i>SD-Bulletinen</i>	1988–1996	48
• <i>SD-Kuriren</i>	1988–2013	71
• <i>Ung Front</i> (youth wing)	1993–1994	3
Parliamentary motions related to animals	2011–2019	160
Total		298

manifestos and party programmes. These have been published since 1988 and include manifestos for national elections and the European Parliament, as well as programmes of principles and of the party's women's wing. Second, we include the official party magazines *SD-Bulletinen* and *SD-Kuriren*, which have been published since 1988. To these, we add the youth organization magazine *Ung Front*, of which a few issues were published from 1993 to 1995. Third, we have collected all parliamentary motions submitted by the party that concerns animal issues during the period 2011–2019. Although these sum to 160 motions, many have been resubmitted on a yearly basis, meaning that the number of motions with unique content is considerably lower. In total, as summarized in Table 1, our empirical material consists of almost 300 documents. We should emphasize, however, that apart from the parliamentary motions, many of these documents engage only briefly, if at all, with the animal issue. Finally, and less systematically, we also reference the occasional public statement made by senior party representatives.

Because of the variety of the data sources used, we draw on statements from different points in time and from different actors within the party. However, the bulk of the analysis relies on material from a relatively brief period of time (circa 2010–2020) and from core actors within the party (e.g. election manifestos and motions by members of the parliamentary group). Moreover, although the party clearly allows certain actors – such as the women's wing – to profile themselves on animal issues, the fact that the SD is a highly centralized party leads us to view something like the women's manifesto as representative of the party at large.⁵⁹ Most importantly, however, our main goal here is not to answer the specific question of where the SD stands in terms of animal advocacy, but rather the more general question of how animals fit into the radical right ideology.

Because this study constitutes a first attempt to conceptually map the animal advocacy of the radical right, it is largely explorative. We use the theoretical expectations described above as a conceptual framework for structuring our analysis, as shown in Table 2. For each of the two levels of analysis, we have three analytical categories corresponding to our theoretical expectations. These categories are in turn operationalized as political statements about animals. In the analysis, we assess whether or not statements of the kind shown in Table 2 can be found in the empirical material. Due to the explorative nature of the study, our analysis does not include a systematic classification of all empirical statements pertaining to animals; rather, we present a number of examples of how the SD's animal advocacy corresponds to our analytical categories. Although an inductive approach could possibly uncover aspects that we do not address here, we believe a deductive strategy to be appropriate for our goal of mapping how animals fit within

Table 2. Analytical framework.

Level of analysis	Analytical category	Operationalization
Core ideology of the radical right	Nativism	Statements referring to differences between native Swedes and non-natives in relation to the treatment of animals
	Authoritarianism	Statements calling for stricter laws and harder punishments for crimes against animals, and for norm conformity in this regard
	Populism	Statements about animals referring to the attributes and opinions of 'the people', in particular as placed in opposition to 'the elite'
Comparison with the animalist ideology	Animal welfare (utilitarianism)	Statements about the need for protecting animals, but which also allow for animal interests to be traded off against human interests
	Compassionate conservatism	Statements conveying compassion for animals, but that also position them as subordinate to humans
	Interdependence (nationalism)	Statements referring to human-animal interdependence, in particular about how animals contribute to the national community in terms of identity, history and tradition

the ideology of the radical right. In pursuing this goal, we add empirical content to key theoretical concepts, and we lay a foundation for future studies.

Analysis

Animal advocacy and the core ideology of the radical right

Although animal advocacy has figured in official SD documents since 1994, the topic has become more elaborated over time. From 1994 to 2002, animal-welfare policies were motivated with the argument that 'the respect for all living beings must be protected'.⁶⁰ Policy-wise, this consisted of a total ban on animal experiments, which in 1999 was modified to permit experiments for the purpose of saving human lives, such as the development of new medicine. The early party programmes also called for higher penalties for animal abuse, and a prohibition of animal ownership for persons who have previously mistreated animals. Moreover, the party favoured support for small-scale animal husbandry rather than large-scale industrial farming.

While the reasons for the party's animal advocacy are stated only briefly in the early party programmes, more detailed reasons are given in other documents. For example, in a 1994 issue of the youth organization magazine it is stated that 'a sense of animals and nature is a characteristic of young patriots', that 'true nationalists never treat animals badly', and that 'it is not a coincidence that there are many vegetarians in nationalist environments'.⁶¹ Mistreatment of animals is considered more common in other countries, tying in with the party's anti-immigration stance: 'When such people come and settle in our country their incomprehension of and disrespect towards animals shows itself here as well.' A connection is made between respect for animals and conceptions of racial and cultural differences: 'Animal cruelty also reflects certain peoples' sadistic and perverse character, as for example the abominable kosher slaughter and its Islamic equivalent, halal.'

Although the animal advocacy is formulated more bluntly in the youth organization magazines, some of the core reasoning remains virtually unchanged. For example, a 2019 motion by Richard Jomshof and others argues that 'maltreatment of animals is undignified in Sweden, where we have high morals in the handling of our animals'.⁶² Another motion argues that animal protection is part of the national culture and identity for many

residents in the Nordic region.⁶³ The women's wing, for which animal advocacy has become something of a profile issue, highlights in its 2020 manifesto how animals are mistreated by people who do not view animals 'with the same kind of respect and concern as we do in Sweden'.⁶⁴ The manifesto also discusses the use of ritual slaughter at some length, with the short-term goal of introducing mandatory consumer information and the long-term goal of banning such procedures. In the party magazine *SD-Kuriren*, Jomshof refers to halal slaughter as 'animal cruelty in the name of multiculturalism' and deplores the fact that the practice has become increasingly common in Sweden due to the large influx of Muslims, many of whom are here 'on completely false grounds'.⁶⁵ This condemnation of ritual slaughter sets the radical right apart from mainstream conservatives, for whom the practice may be as morally acceptable as hunting due to the fact that the animal suffering is a by-product and not the aim in itself.⁶⁶ By emphasizing the ways in which people from other cultures engage in the mistreatment of animals, then, the SD connects animal advocacy with its most important core issue: nativism.

Many documents, such as the 2018 election manifesto, contain animal advocacy related to authoritarianism, most notably in the call for harsher penalties for animal cruelty.⁶⁷ The reasoning behind such proposals is developed in more detail in a 2012 parliamentary motion by Richard Jomshof and the party secretary at the time, Björn Söder.⁶⁸ The motion states that the party's criminal policies aim both at protecting the public and at offering restitution to victims. In keeping with the party's view of violent crimes against humans, and to send a signal about how seriously society views animal cruelty, the motion calls for increasing the minimum and maximum sentencing, and for the introduction of aggravating circumstances for animal cruelty. The same rationales are repeated in another motion, which among other things calls for the creation of a special animal protection unit at the national level in order to enable more efficient crime prevention and prosecution.⁶⁹ The motion also argues that Swedish legislation pertaining to animal protection is fragmented and calls for it to be consolidated into a distinct 'animal protection code' (a proposal found in the election manifesto of 2014, but not 2018).⁷⁰ The women's wing writes in its manifesto that violent crimes have become more vicious, towards humans and animals alike, and that animals such as horses, wild birds and hedgehogs are increasingly tormented and killed for enjoyment.⁷¹ The manifesto also calls for deportation to be part of the default sentencing for the proposed offence of aggravated animal cruelty.

The issue of bestiality is addressed not only as a question of protecting the animals but also as something deviant and contrary to the morals of 'normal' people. The youth magazine, as ever, puts the position most bluntly: 'such sick deviance must not be accepted'.⁷² However, a similar stance has also been expressed by former party secretary Björn Söder, who stated on his blog that 'sexual deviance' such as bestiality and homosexuality 'is not normal and will never be normal'.⁷³

Turning to the populist component, finally, several party documents link the view of animals to the properties of 'the people'. For example, one motion states that 'most Swedes are upset when animals are mistreated. Animal cruelty is not something that is tolerated and that evokes very strong emotions for most of us'.⁷⁴ Another motion argues that the legal framework needs to be reformed so as to better reflect the public's perception about the legal status of animals.⁷⁵ It also contends that 'the common man'

Table 3. Summary of empirical findings (the core ideology of the radical right).

Nativism	Authoritarianism	Populism
Sweden is a country of high morals when it comes to animal welfare.	Cruelty to animals must be met with stronger punishment; deportation should be the default.	The common man would not agree that animals are property like any other.
Animal cruelty is primarily perpetrated by those who do not respect and care for animals the way we do in Sweden (i.e. immigrants).	The police should have a special animal protection unit in the interest of more efficient crime prevention and conviction.	We need to revise animal legislation to better reflect the will of the people.
Ritual slaughter (kosher/halal) is a growing problem in Sweden caused by multiculturalism.	Maltreatment of animals is contrary to societal norms.	The political elite is out of touch with how ordinary people interact with animals.

(*de breda folklagren*) would not agree with the position that animals constitute property like any other. Some of the animal advocacy also has an anti-elitist component. One motion argues, for example, that the political elite is out of touch with ordinary people, failing as it does to acknowledge the societal value of equestrian activities.⁷⁶ Elsewhere, finally, it is claimed that the state earns ‘blood money’ at the cost of ordinary people due to its taxing of veterinary care.⁷⁷ In Table 3, we present a summary of the findings described in this section.

How does the radical right differ from animalist parties?

Having established how the SD’s animal advocacy relates to the three components of its core ideology, we turn now to the question of how it differs from that of the animalist parties. The SD’s website establishes that the party’s animal-welfare agenda is derived from the basic premise that animals have unique intrinsic value.⁷⁸ The same formulation is also used in many of the parliamentary motions. However, unlike the animalist parties, the SD predominantly advocates animal welfare, as opposed to animal rights. This is indicated, for example, by the calls for preventing ‘unnecessary’ animal suffering found throughout most of the documents, including the most recent election manifesto and programme of principles.⁷⁹ The SD takes a distinctly utilitarian approach in its attempts to strike a balance between animal welfare on the one hand, and the competitiveness of Swedish farmers on the other. This is a recurring theme in the manifestos, and one of the motions making a case for increased animal-welfare ambitions at the same time argues that these need to be considered in a ‘cost-benefit analysis’.⁸⁰ The same motion also states that opposition to animal testing is not only motivated by animal welfare – such testing is also costly and inefficient.

Although the SD’s actual policy proposals are characterized by an animal-welfare perspective, then, there are certain ambiguities. Some of these are primarily of the linguistic kind, such as when the term ‘animal rights’ is used to describe a proposal that actually pertains to animal welfare. For example, stating that animals ‘have a right’ to be treated in accordance with current animal-welfare legislation is not the same as arguing that (some) animals have (some) basic rights. Several of the motions argue that animals should be able to exercise their natural behaviour. This is mandated by the Swedish Animal Welfare Act,⁸¹ and the motions therefore raise concerns that this requirement is not being met. Such motions include, for example, bans on the use of

undomesticated animals in circuses and zoos, and improved standards for mink farms.⁸² The substantively strongest animals-rights statement, recurring in some of the motions and found in the women's wing manifesto, calls for a state inquiry into the question of how the legal status of animals can be strengthened.⁸³ Such an inquiry is motivated by the fact that in the event of animal cruelty, the animal is considered property rather than a victim. This is perceived as especially problematic in the case of companion animals, which constitute 'both property and a beloved family member'.

Raising the issue of legal status blurs the line between the animal-welfare perspective and the rights-based position of the animalist parties. However, important differences with the animalists remain. First, the question about legal status lacks the salience – and, possibly, intra-party consensus – for it to figure in the most important documents: election manifestos and programmes of principle⁸⁴; these speak of 'respect' for animals but reiterate the idea of reducing 'unnecessary' suffering. Second, an inquiry into the topic is a modest proposal in comparison with the animalist call for equal basic rights for all animals. Third, the SD raises the issue of legal status by singling out certain categories of animals as more worthy of consideration, such as the status of companion animal or service animal.⁸⁵

In terms of our conceptual categories, such differentiation is one indication that the radical right approaches animals not from the perspective of progressive egalitarianism (as do the animalists), but rather from the perspective of compassionate conservatism. Recall that the latter is a paternalistic doctrine where the compassionate regulate the lives of those who are the subjects of their compassion, and where some may be deemed more worthy of compassion than others. While the animalists advocate the right to life and liberty for all animals, the SD expresses 'concern', 'respect' and 'compassion', but without the egalitarian component; a hierarchy remains between humans and animals, between the compassionate and their subjects. A recurring phrase in the motions states that 'the animals cannot speak for themselves, which makes them dependent upon humans and our benevolence'.⁸⁶ Here, benevolence rather than equality or rights is the crucial component. Moreover, the programmes of principle state that the SD 'views animal welfare as a measurement of how well developed a society is'.⁸⁷ In other words, animal-welfare agendas say something about humans, rather than about animals: caring for animals is the decent thing to do in a civilized society, not because they are our equals but because they are dependent upon us.⁸⁸ In the same vein, the programmes of principle speak of exercising responsible stewardship over nature.

This takes us, finally, to the third concept: the interdependence between humans, animals and the environment. As stated on the SD's website, its goal is 'to create a society where humans and animals can live together in harmony and in proximity to each other'.⁸⁹ Like the animalists, the SD expresses interdependence partly in material terms, such as referring in the programmes of principle to our essential need for food, water and oxygen.⁹⁰ The 2019 EU manifesto calls attention to how low animal-welfare standards result in the spread of disease.⁹¹ The motions note, for example, the link between livestock farming and the use of antibiotics or the fact that 'animal health, growth, and production is intimately connected'.⁹² With few exceptions, the SD makes no connection between livestock and climate change.⁹³ The material dimension focuses on the local rather than the global environment, such as how biodiversity is affected by

Table 4. Summary of empirical findings (comparison with the animalist ideology).

Animal welfare (utilitarianism)	Compassionate conservatism	Interdependence (nationalism)
The basic premise of animal protection is to safeguard the animals' intrinsic value.	Animals cannot speak for themselves, making them dependent on our compassion.	Man is a part of nature and cannot exist without it; it fulfils not only material but also symbolic needs.
Unnecessary animal suffering should be prevented (ergo, necessary suffering is acceptable).	Animals should be treated with respect; we should exercise responsible stewardship.	Agriculture and animal husbandry is a prerequisite for preserving the Swedish cultural heritage.
There is a conflict of interest between Swedish animal welfare and international competitiveness; a cost-benefit analysis is needed.	Companion animals, who are both property and beloved family members, are particularly worthy of compassion.	The goal is a society where humans and animals can live together in harmony.

the introduction of wind turbines and hydropower dams, or by changes in farming practices or predator populations.⁹⁴

In addition to the material dimension shared by the animalists, the SD also expresses a strong symbolic dimension of interdependence. This is most notably expressed in the party's commitment to protecting the cultural heritage of the Swedish countryside. This is particularly explicit in one of the motions expressing concerns about how the cultural heritage is threatened by the transition from traditional to industrial varieties of animal husbandry.⁹⁵ Many detrimental effects are identified, such as the disappearance of open pastures and of locally adapted 'landrace breeds' (*lantraser*). Also threatened are traditional 'mountain farms' (*fäbodvallar*) which, having produced unique cultural expressions in terms of cooking, music and traditions, are considered an essential part of the Swedish historical identity. As modern farming increasingly takes place in an industrial setting, the motion cautions, 'the Sweden that many so vividly portray when they proudly describe their homeland [...] may be gone in a few decades'. This symbolic dimension, then, gives the view of human/animal interdependence a distinct nationalist component that sets the radical right apart from the animalists. In Table 4, we present a summary of the findings described in this section.

Conclusions and discussion

In this study, we have shown how the radical right's animal advocacy is shaped by its core ideology consisting of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. To do so, we have analysed the party manifestos, programmes, magazines and parliamentary motions of the radical right party the Sweden Democrats. Our analysis shows that the SD relates its animal advocacy to its nativism in multiple ways: it argues that Sweden is a country of high morals when it comes to animal welfare, it links immigration to an increased prevalence of animal cruelty (e.g. due to halal slaughter), and contends that non-Swedes do not share Swedes' compassion for animals. In terms of authoritarianism, the SD calls for stricter laws, stronger punishment (including deportation), and increased resources for the police to prevent and prosecute violence towards animals. The party's animal advocacy also has a populist component, with arguments about the views of 'the common man' and about how animal legislation needs to be reformed so as to better reflect the will of the people.

We have also explored the question of why radical right parties share much of 'animalist' parties' concerns for animal well-being, while they share very little of these parties' progressive and egalitarian visions. While the animalists promote an animal-rights agenda and the abolition of human use of animals, the SD promotes animal welfare and the minimization of 'unnecessary' suffering. Contrary to the animal-rights view, the party makes utilitarian arguments about how to balance animal welfare and the competitiveness of Swedish farmers. Furthermore, rather than wishing to include animals in an ever-growing circle of basic rights, the SD approaches animals from the perspective of 'compassionate conservatism': we should care for animals not because they are our equals but rather because they are dependent on us, and some animals, such as pets, are more worthy of consideration than others. Finally, unlike the animalists, the SD considers human/animal interdependence not only in material terms but also in terms of its symbolic values: traditional animals and farming practices are a crucial part of the Swedish cultural heritage and therefore merit protection.

In conclusion, the animal-welfare policies promoted by the SD are shaped by its core ideology, and so are the ways in which these policies differ from those rooted in the animalist ideology. The protection of national values and traditions, the local countryside, and Swedish farmers is very much in line with the party's nativism. The inequalities of the SD's compassion for animals also has an analogy in its welfare chauvinism, according to which some recipients of welfare services are viewed as more deserving than others. The SD clearly uses animal issues as 'a measuring stick that operates to signify white/Western cultures as uniquely humane and civilized while stigmatizing minorities/non-Western cultures as backward or barbaric'.⁹⁶ However, the party also opposes certain majority practices, such as unanaesthetized piglet castration and the keeping of wild animals in zoos and circuses. In other words, its animal advocacy is not only used instrumentally, as a pretext to denigrate immigrants, but also reflects a broader commitment to animal welfare.

Although voter concern for animals can be found across the political spectrum,⁹⁷ compatibility with the broader ideological framework is necessary for the issue to become salient for political parties.⁹⁸ Such compatibility, we would argue, explains why the radical right is the strongest advocate of animal welfare on the right (in Sweden and potentially elsewhere). Whereas liberal parties are committed to moral pluralism, the radical right is more likely to hold certain things to be contrary to the moral intuitions of 'the people', and therefore worthy of proscription. As compared to mainstream conservative parties, moreover, the radical right is less committed to economic liberalism. It is therefore more inclined towards regulation and faces less of a trade-off between property rights and the intrinsic worth of animals. A further exploration of the variation in right-wing support for animal protection could prove a useful agenda for future research.

This study constitutes a first attempt to conceptually map the animal advocacy of the radical right. For this reason, we have focused on a single case, but the conclusions have broader theoretical relevance. We encourage future research to study the ways in which animal advocacy differs between parties in the radical right family. Although this family is not necessarily more heterogeneous than other party families,⁹⁹ the parties therein differ, for example, in terms of their degree of social conservatism or support for economic liberalism. Similarly, the role and salience of animal advocacy in present day

radical right party ideology appears to differ. The Danish People's Party, which has served as an inspiration for the SD in several respects, has a broad profile on animal rights, including a website dedicated entirely to animals.¹⁰⁰ The Norwegian Progress Party and the Freedom Party of Austria similarly promote animal protection, whereas for others, such as the Finns Party, this issue is less important. Future research should explore such differences in the content and salience of radical right animal advocacy, as well as the relationship between the parties' policy positions and their broader ideology of nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

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Notes

1. Richard Jomshof, interviewed in T. Mossige-Norheim, 'SD-politiker får inte ha ledande positioner i Djurens rätt', *Sveriges Radio* (15 January 2018).
2. Benny Andersson, interviewed in Mossige-Norheim, *ibid*.
3. 'Granskning av partiernas djurpolitik 2014–2018', *Djurens Rätt* (2018), available at <https://www.djurensratt.se/val2018/granskning2014-2018> (accessed 31 March 2021).
4. R. Jomshof and M. Kinnunen, 'Varför diskriminerar Djurens rätt oss i SD?', *Aftonbladet* (26 January 2018).
5. The phenomenon of polar opposites sometimes supporting similar policies can be found on other issues as well. For example, far-right and far-left parties both tend to hold Eurosceptic views, but for different reasons: the former views the EU as a threat to national self-determination, and the latter considers it to be a market-liberal project (N. Brack, 'Towards a unified anti-Europe narrative on the right and left? The challenge of Euroscepticism in the 2019 European elections', *Research & Politics*, 7 (2020), pp. 1–8; E. J. van Elsas et al., 'United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens', *West European Politics*, 39 (2016), pp. 1181–204).
6. For simplicity, we refer to 'non-human animals' simply as 'animals' throughout the remainder of this article.
7. P. Lucardie, 'Animalism: a nascent ideology? Exploring the ideas of animal advocacy parties', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 25 (2020), pp. 212–227; M. Morini, 'Animals first! The rise of animal advocacy parties in the EU: a new party family', *Contemporary Politics*, 24 (2018), pp. 418–435.
8. N. Bertuzzi, 'The Italian Animal Advocacy Archipelago and the Four Animalisms', *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*, 11 (2018), pp. 865–890; Morini, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7; K. Voss, 'The Ecological Component of the Ideology and Legislative Activity of the Freedom Party of Austria', in B. Forchtner (Ed.) *The Far Right and the Environment: Politics, Discourse and Communication* (New York: Routledge, 2020); P. Staudenmaier, 'Ambiguities of Animal Rights', *Institute for Social Ecology* (2005), retrieved from <https://social-ecology.org/wp/2005/01/ambiguities-of-animal-rights>.
9. See e.g. A. Arluke and B. Sax, 'Understanding Nazi Animal Protection and the Holocaust', *Anthrozoös*, 5 (1992), pp. 6–31; M. Darwish, *Green neo-Nazism: Examining the intersection of masculinity, far-right extremism and environmentalism in the Nordic Resistance Movement* (Doctoral thesis, University of Oslo, 2018); B. Forchtner, 'Nation, nature,

- purity: extreme-right biodiversity in Germany', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 53 (2019), pp. 285–301.
10. For a primer on the animal-rights debate, see e.g. G. Francione and R. Garner, *The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?* (New York: Columbia University, 2010). For the question of how different ethical principles are translated into concrete party policy, see P. Chaney, 'Public Policy for Non-humans: Exploring UK State-wide Parties' Formative Policy Record on Animal Welfare, 1979–2010', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67 (2014), pp. 907–934; R. Garner, 'Animal protection and legislators in Britain and the United States', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 5 (1999), pp. 92–114.
 11. W. Kymlicka and S. Donaldson, 'Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 45 (2014), pp. 116–135.
 12. On the ideological profiles of radical right parties, see C. Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On the single-issue party thesis, see e.g. G. Erlingsson, K. Vernby and R. Öhrvall, 'The single-issue party thesis and the Sweden Democrats' *Acta Politica*, 49 (2014), pp. 196–216.
 13. Throughout this article, we draw on the conceptual work of Cas Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12. Instead of using the label 'populist radical right', however, we refer to this party family only as the 'radical right'. We do so partly for the sake of simplicity, but also because the radical version of right-wing politics championed by these parties is their most defining feature – not their populism. For this latter argument, see J. Rydgren, 'The Radical Right: An Introduction', in J. Rydgren (Ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
 14. Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 22.
 15. Mudde, *ibid.*, p. 23.
 16. Mudde, *ibid.*, p. 23; see also M. Canovan, 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies*, 47 (1999), pp. 2–16; C. Mudde 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39 (2004), pp. 542–563; B. Stanley, 'The thin ideology of populism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13 (2008), pp. 95–110.
 17. D. Caramani, 'Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government', *American Political Science Review*, 111 (2017), pp. 54–67.
 18. A. Backlund and A.-C. Jungar, 'Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe' *Representation*, 55 (2019), pp. 393–413.
 19. Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, pp. 67–78.
 20. The right-wing authoritarian (RWA) personality type was first developed by B. Altemeyer, *Right-wing authoritarianism* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1981). Recent research has turned towards a more multidimensional RWA construct (see e.g. J. Duckitt and B. Bizumic, 'Multidimensionality of right-wing authoritarian attitudes: Authoritarianism-conservatism-traditionalism', *Political Psychology*, 34 (2013), pp. 841–862). Federico et al. find two such dimensions – authoritarian deference and support for traditionalism – to be more strongly related for individuals with a high level of political expertise, which should be true of party elites (C. M. Federico et al., 'Expertise and the Ideological Consequences of the Authoritarian Predisposition', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 75 (2011), pp. 686–708).
 21. A.-C. Jungar and E. Edenborg, 'Homonationalism in the Nordic Region: PRR Parties and LGBTQ Rights', presented at the XXV World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Brisbane (2018).
 22. T. Akkerman, 'Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: The exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10 (2005), pp. 337–354; T. Akkerman, 'Gender and the radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis of policy agendas', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 49 (2015), pp. 37–60; H.-G. Betz and S. Meret, 'Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43(2009), pp. 313–334; W. De Koster et al., 'Progressiveness and the New Right: The Electoral Relevance of Culturally Progressive

- Values in the Netherlands', *West European Politics*, 37 (2014), pp. 584–604.; Kymlicka and Donaldson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11.
23. Backlund and Jungar, *op. cit.*, Ref. 18.
 24. L. Ennser-Jedenastik, 'A Welfare State for Whom? A Group-based Account of the Austrian Freedom Party's Social Policy Profile', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 22 (2016), pp. 409–427; S. Otjes et al., 'It's not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 24 (2018), pp. 270–290.
 25. Lucardie, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7.
 26. Although Robert Garner objects to equating the animal-welfare position with utilitarianism, Gary Francione finds the two very much alike because 'both permit all animal interests to be traded away if the consequences of doing so will "outweigh" the consequences of protecting animal interests' (R. Garner, 'A Defense of a Broad Animal Protectionism', in Francione and Garner, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10., pp. 108–112; G. Francione, 'Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance', *Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals*, 13 (2003), p. 2).
 27. T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, revised edition).
 28. For an overview of the animal-welfare position, see e.g. Garner, 'A Defense of a Broad Animal Protectionism', in Francione and Garner, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10, pp. 103–174).
 29. G. Francione, 'Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism', *op. cit.*, Ref. 26, p. 22. Radical utilitarians such as Peter Singer argue that utilitarian principles should lead humans to discontinue most of their use of animals (P. Singer, *Animal liberation: a new ethics for our treatment of animals* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009, revised edition), pp. 20–22). As Garner points out, however, Singer is not representative of the animal-welfare movement because he denies that animals *and* humans have rights (Garner, *ibid.*, p. 110).
 30. Kymlicka and Donaldson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, p. 127.
 31. I.e. animal interests should be included in the utility calculus. For a discussion about the meaning of 'intrinsic value' in the utilitarian tradition, see, e.g. Regan, *op. cit.*, Ref. 27, pp. 142–143. Note also that if intrinsic value is defined in terms of individual rights, it is quite incompatible with a welfarist approach, because such rights cannot be traded away regardless of the benefits others may enjoy by so doing.
 32. Lucardie, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7, p. 214.
 33. K. Dhont and G. Hodson, 'Why do right-wing adherents engage in more animal exploitation and meat consumption?', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 64 (2014), pp. 12–17.
 34. R. Garner, 'Political ideologies and the moral status of animals', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 8 (2003), p. 243. For a conservative proponent of this view, see J. Gray, *Straw dogs: Thoughts on humans and other animals*. (London: Granta, 2002).
 35. Lucardie, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7, p. 215.
 36. Lucardie, *ibid.*, p. 216.
 37. Garner, 'Political ideologies and the moral status of animals', *op. cit.*, Ref. 34, p. 238; Garner, 'A Defense of a Broad Animal Protectionism', *op. cit.*, Ref. 28., pp. 147–153).
 38. R. Scruton, *Animal Rights and Wrongs* (London: Demos, 1998), pp. 84–85.
 39. J. A. Shields, 'Fighting Liberalism's Excesses: Moral Crusades During the Reagan Revolution', *Journal of Policy History*, 26 (2014), p. 104.
 40. Scruton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 38, p. 86.
 41. M. Scully, 'Fear Factories. The case for compassionate conservatism – for animals', *The American Conservative* (23 May 2005), retrieved from <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/fear-factories>.
 42. B. Pilbeam, 'The Tragedy of Compassionate Conservatism', *Journal of American Studies*, 44 (2010), p. 252.
 43. M. Scully, *Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003), p. 15.
 44. Scruton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 38, p. 83.

45. Pilbeam, *op. cit.*, Ref. 42, p. 267.
46. Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 20.
47. M. B. Jørgensen and T. L. Thomsen, 'Deservingness in the Danish context: Welfare chauvinism in times of crisis', *Critical Social Policy*, 36 (2016), pp. 330–351; M. B. Petersen et al., 'Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic', *European Journal of Political Research*, 50 (2011), pp. 24–52.
48. O. C. Norocel, 'Populist radical right protectors of the folkhem: Welfare chauvinism in Sweden', *Critical Social Policy*, 36 (2016), p. 373.
49. Lucardie, *op. cit.*, Ref. 7, p. 216.
50. M. Lockwood, 'Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: Exploring the linkages', *Environmental Politics*, 27 (2018), pp. 712–732; K. M. Jylhä et al., 'Climate change denial among radical right-wing supporters', *Sustainability*, 12 (2019), 10 226.
51. B. Forchtner and C. Kølvrå, 'The Nature of Nationalism: Populist Radical Right Parties on Countryside and Climate', *Nature and Culture*, 10 (2015), pp. 199–224.
52. J. Olsen, *Nature and Nationalism: Right-wing Ecology and the Politics of Identity in Contemporary Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
53. B. Forchtner, 'Nation, nature, purity: Extreme-right biodiversity in Germany', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 53 (2019), p. 287. There is a linkage between present eco-fascism and historical national-socialist beliefs, where the people is viewed as one with its nature and land. The protection of the national identity and racial purity goes hand in hand with protecting the purity of the land. For example, the alt-right in the USA and neo-Nazis in Europe have increasingly tapped into issues of national sustainability, biodiversity, animal rights, and vegetarianism (see e.g. D. Rueda, 'Neocofascism: The Example of the United States', *Journal for the Study of Radicalism*, 14 (2020), pp. 95–126. E. Szenes, 'Neo-Nazi environmentalism: The linguistic construction of ecofascism in a Nordic Resistance Movement manifesto', *Journal for Deradicalization*, 27 (2021), pp. 146–192; B. Taylor, 'Alt-right ecology: Ecofascism and far-right environmentalism in the United States', in B. Forchtner (Ed.) *The Far Right and the Environment*, *op. cit.* Ref. 7).
54. cf. Ennser-Jedenastik, *op. cit.*, Ref. 24.
55. Among the many studies that refer to the Sweden Democrats as a (populist) radical right party are e.g. J. Rydgren, 'Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 25 (2002), pp. 27–56; Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, p. 307; D. Art, *Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); M. Minkenberg, 'From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21 (2013), pp. 5–24. Adjacent party families that are sometimes conflated with the radical right include, for example, neoliberal populists, which lack the nativism of the radical right, and the non-populist extreme right, which lacks commitment to procedural democracy (Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12, ch. 2).
56. Measured in the Eurobarometer 84.4 (2015), Sweden scores highest out of all EU countries in terms of willingness to pay more for animal friendly products, and is surpassed only by Cyprus (86%) in terms of the importance of animal welfare (GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6644, data file version 4.0.0, retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13294>).
57. J. Rydgren and S. van der Meiden, 'The radical right and the end of Swedish exceptionalism', *European Political Science*, 18 (2019), pp. 439–455.
58. A. Backlund, *Isolating the Radical Right: Coalition Formation and Policy Adaptation in Sweden* (Doctoral thesis, Södertörn University, Stockholm, 2020), retrieved from <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-42249>.
59. For the argument about the SD being highly centralized, see A.-C. Jungar, 'The Sweden Democrats', in R. Heinisch and O. Mazzoleni (Eds.) *Understanding Populist Party Organization* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 189–219.

60. Sverigedemokraternas partiprogram (1994), p. 10; Sverigedemokraternas partiprogram (1996), p. 11; Sverigedemokraternas partiprogram (1999), p. 14; Sverigedemokraternas partiprogram (2002), pp. 13–14.
61. *Ung Front*, 1994/3.
62. Motion 2019/20:3217, 'Grovt djurplågeri och djurplågeri mot tjänstedjur', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
63. Motion 2012/13:U17, 'Nordiska rådets svenska delegations berättelse om verksamheten under 2012', *Sveriges riksdag* (2012).
64. SD-kvinnor – Politik för kvinnor av kvinnor (2020), p. 17.
65. *SD-Kuriren* 2007/73, p. 5; 2008/78, p. 5.
66. Scruton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 38, p. 95.
67. Sverigedemokraternas valmanifest (2018), p. 24.
68. Motion 2012/13:Ju313, 'Höjt maxstraff för djurplågeri', *Sveriges riksdag* (2012).
69. Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
70. Sverigedemokraternas valmanifest (2014), p. 17.
71. SD-kvinnor – Politik för kvinnor av kvinnor (2020), pp. 17–18.
72. *Ung Front*, 1994/3.
73. A. Dalsbro, 'SD:s partisekretare till attack mot homosexualitet', *Expo* (2 August 2007), retrieved from <https://expo.se/2007/08/sds-partisekretare-till-attack-mot-homosexualitet>.
74. Motion 2019/20:2688, 'Nationell djurskyddspolis', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
75. Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
76. Motion 2016/17:1346, 'Hästar för alla', *Sveriges riksdag* (2016).
77. Motion 2016/17:1355, 'Slopad moms på djursjukvård', *Sveriges riksdag* (2016).
78. 'A till Ö', available at <https://sd.se/a-o> (accessed 31 March 2021).
79. Sverigedemokraternas valmanifest (2018), p. 24; Sverigedemokraternas principprogram (2019), pp. 19, 26.
80. Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
81. The requirement that animals should be able to exercise their natural behaviour is mandated by chapter 2 § 2 of the Swedish Animal Welfare Act.
82. Motion 2017/18:3886, 'För ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2017); Motion 2016/17:2390, 'Förbud mot delfinarier', *Sveriges riksdag* (2016); Motion 2019/20:3199, 'Förbud mot valar i fångenskap', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019); Motion 2017/18:2385, 'Skärpta regler för svensk minknäring', *Sveriges riksdag* (2017).
83. See e.g. Motion 2016/17:3300, 'För ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2016); Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
84. cf. Chaney, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10.
85. Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019); Motion 2019/20:3217, 'Grovt djurplågeri och djurplågeri mot tjänstedjur', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019). Such behaviour is consistent with the empirical finding that human concern for animals tends to be affected by the animals' traits, such as whether or not they are beneficial to human interests, aesthetically appealing, etc. (see J. A. Serpell, 'Factors influencing human attitudes to animals and their welfare', *Animal welfare*, 13 (2004), pp. 145–151). Note also that the animal-rights literature does contain attempts at more differentiated and relational theories (see e.g. S. Donaldson and W. Kymlicka, *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 11–14).
86. See e.g. Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
87. Sverigedemokraternas principprogram (2011), p. 31; Sverigedemokraternas principprogram (2019), p. 26.
88. cf. Scully, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40.
89. 'Ett riktigt djurskydd', available at <https://sd.se/vad-vi-vill/djurskyddspolitik> (accessed 31 March 2021).
90. Sverigedemokraternas principprogram (2011), p. 30; Sverigedemokraternas principprogram (2019), p. 26.
91. Sverigedemokraternas valplattform Europaparlamentsvalet (2019), p. 24.

92. Motion 2019/20:952, 'Ursprungsmärkning av animaliska produkter inom restaurangbranschen', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019); Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019).
93. For one of the exceptions, see Motion 2014/15:2667, 'Forskning om odlat kött', *Sveriges riksdag* (2014).
94. *Sverigedemokraternas principprogram* (2019), p. 25; Motion 2019/20:602, 'Ett stärkt djurskydd', *Sveriges riksdag* (2019); Motion 2013/14:MJ204, 'Lokal folkomröstning om vargen', *Sveriges riksdag* (2013).
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96. Kymlicka and Donaldson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, p. 121; see also H. Lelieveldt, 'Do Political Parties Instrumentalize Animal Rights? A Comparison of Votes and Arguments in Two Parliamentary Debates', in L. Cordeiro-Rodrigues and L. Mitchell (Eds) *Animals, Race, and Multiculturalism* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017).
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