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Value Change

**Related to the Process
of Democratisation
in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia**

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Introduction

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VILMANTĖ LIUBINIENĖ

IS A NEW WORLDVIEW GRADUALLY replacing the one that has dominated in the totalitarian Soviet regime for more than 50 years? The three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have been undergoing tremendous transformations in the sphere of politics, economy and culture. The consequences of this transformation are still taking shape, and elements of the older culture are still widespread, but can any major features of a new pattern be discerned?

Currently, the democratisation process is expected to lead to a reorientation in society. Not only younger but also middle-aged and old people are supposed to espouse new “modern” and “post-modern” values strongly supported by powerful socialisation agents such as media, advertisements, life-style and consumption models streaming from the West. As a result, the system of values will probably undergo considerable change.

In the course of European integration and seeking membership in the European Union, the problem of value change remains very significant if we are to understand the processes of change, not only in the economy, politics, and society in general, but in the minds, outlooks and social behaviour of the people as well. The purpose of these articles is to identify similarities and differences in attitudes, beliefs and value priorities between the three Baltic countries – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – and to suggest historical, economic, social, cultural, and other explanations for the differences.

The Baltic States are included in the World Value Survey, carried out by Ronald Inglehart and his team. The World Value Survey, now covering 65 countries around the world, has been carried out three times since 1981. These worldwide studies provide a basis for making assertions on value change in a global context but also for suggestions on trends towards democratisation and stabilisation of democracy in different parts of the world. Beginning with the

results of Inglehart's work, these articles concern value change and a cross-country comparison of three post-communist countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The background factors discussed in the articles that may be correlated to value preference and value change are economic prosperity, level of education, age/generation and culture.

When analysing the changes occurring in the system of values and speaking about its further developments, it is very important to analyse cross-generational differences. We may hypothetically assume that young people have quite different perceptions of democracy compared to those who grew up and formed their system of values under the Soviet system, or the strata of elderly people who were raised in the surroundings of the first independent republics.¹

The first article, by Fredrika Björklund, *The presence of post-materialist values in the post-Soviet Baltic States*, is an attempt to relate Inglehart's post-materialism thesis to the Baltic context. Three background variables, satisfaction with the economic situation, education, and age are correlated with attitudes considered to feature post-materialism, such as tolerance attitudes, attitude towards environmental protection and gender equality. From the perspective of Inglehart's theory, the results are not so encouraging. Rather, we find that there are few indications of a post-materialist shift. The significance of early

¹ The survey which these studies are based upon is the second data release in a series of survey research conducted at Södertörn university college by the project "Democracy and Social Transition in the Baltic Sea Region". The first survey was carried out in 1999. In 2001, a survey was repeated in the Baltic States and Poland with almost the same question modules. The survey aimed at providing an overview of the character of the social transition, values and attitudes of the respondents in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The sample was a stratified multi-stage sample, which is representative of the totality of the inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania between 18 and 75 years of age. At the first stage of sampling, the sampling points were selected with the assistance of a computer program following the proportionality of population and random principle. At the second stage of sampling, a random route with starting addresses was applied. Starting addresses of route method were selected from a register of inhabitants applying the principle of random choice. The population of the place of residence represented in the sample is as follows: N = 1.114 in Estonia, 1.110 in Latvia and 1.130 in Lithuania.

Following the aim to analyse differences in attitudes, values and beliefs by age, the respondents have been divided into three different age groups. The youngest group comprises the respondents aged 18–29. This group has been raised and has been forming its identity and system of values under the influence of the new democratic developments in the three Baltic countries. In the Lithuanian case this group makes up about 23%, in Latvia 22%, in Estonia 24% of the whole sample. The second group, aged 30–49, represents those people who were raised and educated under the Soviet system, but were young enough to adjust to political, economic and social reforms, if they had possibilities and the will to change their lives. This group comprises 38–40% of the whole sample. Finally, the third group, aged 50–75, constitutes 36–39% of the sample. It represents the views of the older generation. The value system of this group has been formed under different systems and they have found the changes to be the most difficult.

The data have been analysed using SPSS.

socialisation for adoption of post-materialist thinking later in life is fundamental to Inglehart's theory. However, in this study, when considering age we do not find any unambiguous results speaking for a transition to post-materialist values. Neither is the connection, suggested by Inglehart, between post-materialism and democratic attitudes confirmed by this study.

In the second article, *Transformation of Values in the Process of Democratisation*, Vilmantė Liubinienė analyses similarities and differences in attitudes, beliefs and value priorities between the three Baltic countries – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The author analyses such variables as individualism versus collectivism and modernism versus post-modernism relating to the theories of Inglehart. Cross-cultural differences and intergenerational change is analysed using the methodology of Schwartz and Bilsky and period effect is related to the theoretical assumptions of De Graaf and Evans.

Research findings indicate that political, economical and social developments are overwhelming and are leading to the establishment of real democratic states. But the attitudes, beliefs and values of people who have been living under two or three different social system have not changed over ten years. The three countries have many things in common as ex-socialist countries, but there are many differences that might be explained culturally.

Post-materialism and democratic attitudes in the Baltic States

INGLEHART'S THEORY on the relationship between economic growth, value shifts and democratisation, i.e. the post-materialism or post-modernisation thesis, has generated wide interest among scholars in the field of value change. In short, the post-materialism thesis suggests that when basic economic and security needs have been met in societies experiencing industrialisation, the value structure in the population changes in a post-materialist direction. Value preferences defined by survival and material needs are followed by post-materialist value preferences, which primarily concern self-expression and mental well-being. The shift towards post-modern/post-materialist political cultures is conducive to stable democracy. (Inglehart 1997:104) "Societies with a relatively strong sense of subjective well-being are much more likely to be stable democracies than societies characterised by a low sense of well-being" (Inglehart 2000a:226).²

Firstly, Inglehart's theory sets out from a modified version of the idea of a hierarchy of needs; assuming that lower order needs have to be catered to before higher order needs appear on the agenda. Making the hierarchy of needs less behaviourist, Inglehart formulates his theory as a scarcity hypothesis. People tend to give priority to least satisfied needs, but there is no pre-determined order of precedence in needs. In industrialised societies where basic material and physical needs are met, self-realisation, i.e. post-materialist values, is the scarce resource in demand. Secondly, the theory is based on the assumption that individual value structures are formed early in people's lives. The value structure established during formative years tends to be stable during the entire lifetime. The transition

² In essence, in putting economic development as a background variable, Inglehart follows the traditional modernisation theories. (Lipset 1959, Hadenius 1992, Vanhanen, 1990) However, the modernisation theory is qualified by introducing the concept of post-materialism.

to post-materialism depends on early socialisation. Combined with an evolutionistic perspective on economic and industrial development, the outcome is a rather optimistic postulation of a general trend towards post-materialism and democratic stability.

Originally, the post-materialist value structure was measured by using an index constructed on four items. The items concern attitude towards *Order in the nation*, (materialist) *Giving people more say in important political decisions* (post-materialist), *Fighting rising prices* (materialist) and *Protecting freedom of speech* (post-materialist). (Inglehart 1998) The composition of attitudes into an index (which is pretty simple but which we will not go deeper into in this context) gives correlation with attitudes on a range of different issues, such as attitudes towards importance of gender equality, satisfaction with one's life, justifiability of homosexuality, importance of environmental protection, dismissal of state ownership of business and interpersonal trust. Post-materialists tend to score high on these issues. Taking a range of different items into account that correlate with values on the original index, Inglehart introduces a dimension labelled *survival* versus *well-being* (Inglehart 1997) or *self-expression* (Inglehart 1999). By plotting countries according to the *survival* versus *well-being/self-expression* dimension and Freedom House ratings on democratic institutions, Inglehart finds a positive correlation between post-materialist related values and the rating of democratic institutions in countries (Inglehart 2000b:43).³

In the World Value Survey, all of the post-communist states score low on post-materialist values but, among the Baltic States, Lithuania generally ranks below Estonia and Latvia.⁴ Taking economic and material circumstances into consideration this seems to correspond with the post-materialist theory since Lithuania has, for a long period, been the poorest and least industrialised of the three countries. Estonia and Latvia seem to have switched places between the '90-

3 Following Marx and other modernisation theorists maintaining economy to be the driving force behind modernization, Inglehart suggests that economic growth and physical security in advanced industrial societies determined the Post-modern/Post-material shift. After having material needs satisfied, people become inclined to attain satisfaction by meeting mental needs and self-fulfillment (a scarce resource in industrialised societies). However, following Weber, Inglehart also admits that culture is significant, i.e. the post-modern shift in itself might lead to economic stagnation, because economic incentives furthering economic growth decline (Inglehart 1997).

4 The terminology in the field is rather disparate, changing between post-materialist, post-modern, well-being values, self-fulfillment values, etc. From hereon we will simply use the term post-materialist.

'93 and the '95-'98 World Value Surveys. In the former survey Latvia scores lower than Estonia while in the latter Estonia scores lowest.⁵

Actually, measured by GDP per capita Estonia is the wealthiest of the three countries, although the differences are not very large. Estonia's per capita GDP for 2000 was \$ 10,000, Latvia's \$7,200 and Lithuania's \$7,300. Growth rate in the year 2000 for Estonia was 6.4%, for Latvia 5.5% and Lithuania 2.9%. Another frequently used measure of wealth is life expectancy at birth. Here also the difference between the countries speaks slightly in favour of Estonia, 69.73 years, followed by Lithuania, 69.2 years, and Latvia, 68.7 years.⁶

The present study is a cross-country comparison between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These countries do not belong to the advanced industrial societies referred to as mature; ripe for post-materialism to occur. Do we, however, find any substantial tendencies towards post-materialism in these countries? Is there any difference between these countries in terms of the occurrence of post-materialist attitudes? The argument for posing the latter question is that there has been a difference between the countries in terms of relative economic success during the last ten years. This is a very short period speaking in terms of value structure changes, but at least we may expect to find that differences between the countries do not contradict the post-materialism thesis. That is, if there are differences between value patterns in these countries, they ought to go in a specific direction. If post-materialist values occur, they should be most frequent in Estonia and not in Lithuania. The subsequent question being, is post-materialism conducive to democratic attitudes in the Baltic context?

Previous studies on post-materialist values in post-Soviet and post-communist societies suggest rather heterogeneous results. Gibson and Duch (1993) find a post-materialist value-orientation in Soviet mass politics during the '80s. Inglehart and Siemienka (1988) claim a post-materialist tendency in value preferences among the population in Poland. Also, studies on value change in the Czech Republic confirm the suggestion of a post-Soviet value turn in Eastern Europe (Řeháková 2001). In a study comparing Sweden, Estonia and Latvia (Gooch 1995) the author presents a highly sceptical analysis arguing only a weak

⁵ This fact might be caused by a difference in the variables that constitute the dimensions in the two studies. Such a difference is indicated by the fact that Inglehart uses different labels of the dimension survival versus well-being alternatively survival versus self-expression.

⁶ Cia World Factbook 2001.

significance of post-materialist values in the latter countries. Gooch studies the correlation between post-materialist values and environmental concerns, which he finds very weak. According to the study, the frequency of post-materialist values is extremely low in Estonia and Latvia.

Indeed, Inglehart's post-materialist theory has been the subject of considerable criticism from other scholars. For example, Davis (2000) and Davis & Davenport (1999) present a strong criticism of Inglehart's method. It concerns the aggregation of survey data to a national level without first determining how the results correspond to behaviour on the individual respondent level. (Davis 2000:456) Following Inglehart's hypothesis that materialists and post-materialists possess distinct and different attitudes towards values such as political tolerance, racial questions, environment and participatory norms, Davis found that on the individual level only two issues, egalitarianism and political efficacy, support the hypothesis. Davis questions the validity of the materialist versus post-materialist index and the suggestion of a monotonic difference between materialists, mixed and post-materialists. The classification is invalid as a value system predictor on the individual level (Davis 2000). Haller (2002) argues that Inglehart is unaware of the distinction between macro and micro levels in his analysis.

Principally Davis' critique concerns general problems with multi-item indicators. In constructing indexes there is always a risk of losing important information that might alter the outcome of the analysis.⁷ In this article no indexed variables are used in order to avoid this problem.

Clarke et al (1999) question the suggested shift from materialism to post-materialist values in Western European states. They argue that post-materialist values are in fact often highly sensitive to the current economic and social situation and not an indication of stable value trends. Gooch (1995) and Eckersley (1989) have made similar remarks on current problem sensitivity concerning interest in environmental issues. This is indeed a sort of criticism affecting the possibility to use the existence of post-materialist values as a predictor of the stable alteration of value systems. In any case, before rejecting the theory on these grounds an exhaustive discussion on what should be considered as a proper time-period for measuring trends is needed. Smaller or larger fluctuation in values will always be expected.

⁷ For Inglehart's response to Davis' and interrelated critique, see for example Inglehart and Abramson (1999).

Alternative factors, beyond the satisfaction of economic and physical security needs, have been put forward to explain the occurrence of post-materialism. Education is the most frequent independent variable that has been suggested to account for variation in people's attitudes towards post-materialism. Duch and Taylor (1993) argue that the level of education tends to be a more interesting variable than economic development and material prosperity in studying the occurrence of suggested post-materialist values. If this is the case, the scarcity hypothesis does not hold, and in fact the term post-materialism may not be adequate at all. There is no such thing as a post-materialist stage, even though we might discern non-materialist values. In this study education is held to be one variable explaining differences in values.

Despite the objections that it has raised, it still remains a fact that the post-materialism thesis is a powerful theory that can generate fruitful hypotheses in different fields of value studies. It is very useful as a point of departure both in empirical studies and in the generation of theory on different levels.

Variables considered in the study

The present study is based on the Baltic Survey 2001 conducted at Södertörn University College.⁸ Initially, the correspondence in general between Inglehart's theory and the Baltic Survey is discussed. If there is any tendency in the post-materialist direction, we assume that Estonia presents the highest frequencies. Also, assuming that we do find such differences, we expect the highest frequencies of support for democratic institutions in Estonia.

Since we do not have access to Inglehart's original index variables in our study, some of the variables argued by Inglehart to be part of the post-materialist dimension are used. Attitudes towards *abortion*, *homosexuality*, *divorce* and *suicide*, i.e. moral attitudes and tolerance, are measures of the extent of post-materialist related thinking among respondents. As additional indicators of post-materialist value preferences, we also consider attitudes towards *gender equality* and *environmental concerns*. Support for democracy is defined as *trust in democratic political institutions*. In addition we also note the degree of *interpersonal trust*, a factor that is frequently assumed to correlate with trust in democracy.

⁸ Baltic Survey, Södertörn Survey Series No. 2, 2001. See the introduction for details on the survey.

The main interest of this study is to determine whether economic prosperity on the individual level correlates with specific value preferences that promote support for democracy. Inglehart's theory concerns the correspondence between the national economic situation and democratic performance on the national level, thus understanding post-materialist value transition on the individual level as an intermediate variable. Economic situation and democratic performance are variables referring to the state level rather than to the individual. However, it is essential to find out whether more prosperous people, or more economically satisfied persons, in the three countries are actually less moralist and more tolerant, i.e. more post-materialist than less prosperous persons. If they are, does it follow that the former trust in democracy more than the latter? The background variable we use is *satisfaction with one's own household's economy*.

Moreover, *level of education* is introduced as an alternative independent variable to satisfaction with one's own household's economy accounting for a liberal attitude on moral and tolerance issues and democratic attitudes. Lastly, the *age-variable* is introduced in order to make some preliminary suggestions about future tendencies, but also in order to discuss in the Baltic context the reliability of Inglehart's thesis on early socialisation.

Cross-national comparison between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Inglehart's theory is intended to be used in world-wide studies. It may thus be questioned whether it is suitable for a limited study of three countries, which are neighbours and rather similar to each other. However, initially we assumed that according to Inglehart's thesis we would expect to find a tendency towards higher frequency of post-materialist values, more trust in democratic political institution and more interpersonal trust in Estonia than in the other two countries. If democratic attitudes and post-materialist thinking go with economic development, Estonia ought to be proceeding most rapidly towards a stable democracy. Actually, comparing the figures of the Baltic Data survey with the World Value Survey, we find tendencies in the former that correspond fairly well with the latter in ranking the countries.

According to the Baltic survey, there are certain differences between the countries possibly forming a pattern. (Table 1) Although trust in general has been rather low during the post-Soviet period (Steen 1996, Rose & Maley 1994) we find that respondents in Estonia, on a graded scale from zero to ten, on average give higher scores for trust in political institutions than respondents in the other two

countries. Respondents in Estonia seem to have higher trust in the government, in the parliament and in political parties. Respondents in Estonia also have more trust in courts; essential to a state governed by law, and also higher trust in the police. That trust in democratic political institutions is stronger in Estonia than in the other Baltic States is confirmed by studies by Rose, whose findings point in the same direction (Rose 1997).

Trust in the president as an institution gives a somewhat different picture. Latvia scores slightly above Estonia, but Lithuania lags slightly behind the other two. However, this variable is very sensitive to the popularity of the person presently holding the office. Latvia has during the last years had an extremely popular president. Perhaps contrary to expectations, respondents in Lithuania seem to have more trust in the press than respondents in the other two countries. But this is also confirmed by other studies. The fact that trust in the police generally is higher than trust in political institutions says something about how low the relative trust in democratic political institutions actually is. Higher relative scores for the police may be interpreted as an indicator of a more authoritarian value pattern. Also, trust in the police is probably a variable that is very sensitive to crime rates and current events.

Table 1. Trust in democratic political institutions
How great is your personal trust in each of these institutions?

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
President	6.6	1062	6.7	1059	5.3	1046
Government	4.2	1066	4.1	1072	3.7	1053
Parliament	4.1	1056	3.7	1071	3.3	1046
Political parties	3.5	1016	3.2	1042	2.9	1014
Courts	5.8	1037	5.0	998	4.0	997
Police	5.3	1086	5.0	1051	4.1	1042
Press	6.0	1087	6.1	1067	7.1	1063

Mean on scale 0–10 (have no trust at all – have greatest trust)

Estonian respondents show the highest trust in democratic political institutions but they also seem to have a more widespread interpersonal trust (table 2). Interpersonal trust has been used as one of the main indicators of a well-functioning civil society and a stable democracy. Although the differences between the figures are not large, putting this variable side by side with the figures

on trust in democratic political institutions above, we discern a pattern that corresponds to what we would expect given Inglehart's thesis, and indeed, from modernisation theories in general.

Table 2. Interpersonal trust

In general, do you think one can trust most people or do you think one cannot be careful enough when dealing with other people?

Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
4.4	1107	4.0	1085	3.9	1099

Mean on scale 0–10 (one cannot be careful enough–one can trust most people)

Moreover, there are differences between the countries on variables related to morality and tolerance (table 3). According to Inglehart a liberal, more tolerant attitude is supposed to be more post-materialist. Prejudices and norm-conforming attitudes belong to the society oriented towards material security. In the post-materialist context people should have a more open-minded outlook on different ways of living and different choices in life.

Table 3. Morals and tolerance

To what extent do you think that the following phenomena can be justified?

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Abortion	5.3	1041	4.7	1003	4.1	1011
Homosexuality	2.8	1013	1.9	1012	2.2	972
Suicide	2.1	1031	2.1	1012	1.8	1045
Divorce	6.3	1066	5.8	1035	5.2	1052

Mean on scale 0–10 (not justifiable – always justifiable)

Estonian respondents, to a greater extent than the respondents in the other two countries, think that abortion is justifiable. Estonians have a more tolerant attitude towards homosexuality than respondents in Latvia and Lithuania. Also on divorce Estonian respondents seem to be more liberal. This follows a pattern we could expect. With regard to suicide, Estonian and Latvian respondents possibly seem to be more liberal than Lithuanians.

A liberal attitude towards the issues listed above tends to correlate negatively with religiosity. Noting that the population in Estonia is far more secularised than either the Latvian or the Lithuanian the figures on abortion and homosexuality are not unexpected. Indeed we could have expected even larger differences. Just 34 percent of Estonian respondents consider themselves to be religious persons compared with Latvian, 68 percent, and Lithuanian respondents, 79 percent. Interestingly, in Latvia and Lithuania there is a correlation between strength in religiosity and a liberal attitude on the moral and tolerance issues, but in Estonia no significant correlation is found.⁹ This may be explained both by degree of secularisation in society and type of predominant denomination. The Catholic Church is supposed to be most authoritative on norm-conforming attitudes. The vast majority of Lithuanians are Catholics. In Latvia the affiliations are divided almost equally among Russian-orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran. In Estonia non-believers are the largest group followed by Lutherans and Russian-orthodox believers. Just a small percentage belong to the Catholic Church.

Table 4. Gender equality and environmental issues

How important do you personally consider it to bring about improvements in the following areas?

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Equality between women and men	6.6	1062	6.5	1023	6.3	1021
Environmental problems	8.2	1076	7.9	1065	7.9	1036

Mean on scale 0–10 (not at all important – very important)

According to Inglehart a positive attitude towards equality between men and women and care for environmental issues correlate with the post-materialist position. Although the differences between the countries are not large, we can see that the pattern suggested is upheld (table 4). Equality between women and men and environmental problems seem to be slightly more deeply rooted as important

⁹ Latvia: Abortion .176** Homosexuality .136** Suicide .138** Divorce .154** Lithuania: Abortion .198** Homosexuality .161** Suicide .087** Divorce .112** (*Significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed, **Significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed)

issues among Estonian respondents than among respondents in the other two countries.

The brief cross-national comparison above shows that Inglehart's scheme is applicable to the internal ranking between the Baltic States. Even though none of the Baltic States are advanced industrialised societies we find tendencies in our data suggesting that post-materialist values and democratic trust are most prevalent in Estonia, the most prosperous society. We find post-materialist positions, on issues of morals and tolerance and also on attitudes towards gender equality and environmental protection, to a greater extent in Estonia than in the other two countries. We also find more extended trust in democratic political institutions among Estonian respondents than among respondents in the other two countries. Interpersonal trust also seems to be more widespread among Estonian respondents than among the others.

Satisfaction with economic situation on an individual level, post-materialism and trust in democracy

The main interest in this article is to see whether the pattern above actually corresponds with correlations on the individual level and thereby confirms the post-materialist suggestion. The national level independent variable of material need satisfaction in Inglehart's theory will be replaced by an independent variable on an individual level, measuring degree of satisfaction with the economic situation. Indeed a result that there is no correlation between the individual level economic situation and liberal attitudes on moral and tolerance issues would be remarkable given the figures on the national level. Following the suggestion on the link between post-materialist values and democratic conviction, it is also of interest to see if satisfaction with economic situation makes people more likely to have trust in democratic institutions. Instead of people's actual income level we chose satisfaction with one's own household's economy as the background variable. This variable is more appropriate in the post-materialist context than people's objective income levels. It is the experience of satisfied needs that determines the occurrence of post-materialist values. Having scrutinised the national level tendencies we will now proceed to the individual level to see if there is any correlation between individual economic satisfaction and the variables discussed above.

Table 5. Satisfaction with one's own household's economic situation
As far as your household is concerned, overall, how do you rate its economic situation today? (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Very satisfactory	5.1	1.9	0.8
Fairly satisfactory	52.3	46.9	45.5
Fairly unsatisfactory	33.7	37.5	39.8
Very unsatisfactory	8.9	13.7	13.9
N	1110	1093	1065

From table 5 we conclude that respondents in Estonia seem to be more satisfied with their household's economic situation than respondents in the other two countries. A higher percentage of Estonian respondents (57 percent) than respondents in Latvia (50 percent) and in Lithuania (46 percent) think that their situation is very satisfactory or fairly satisfactory.

When correlating satisfaction with one's own household's economy with variables for suggested post-materialism values, there are two possible outcomes. Firstly, we may find no correlation on the individual level. This outcome would indicate that there are other factors more important than economic prosperity for explaining a liberal attitude on moral and tolerance issues; i.e. the post-materialist thesis would not be supported on the individual level. Secondly, we may find a correlation between satisfaction with the household's economy and the values investigated, at least in one of the respondent groups, i.e. the Estonian, which according to the figures above has advanced farthest towards post-materialism. If liberal and tolerant tendencies in the Estonian data should be ascribed to a higher degree of material need satisfaction in the Estonian society compared to the other two societies, these tendencies should also be confirmed on the individual level. If this is the case, this outcome would be regarded as supporting the hypothesis that Inglehart's theory is applicable on the internal ranking between the Baltic States.

Actually, we see almost no correlations between satisfaction with one's own household's economy and suggested post-materialist values; such as position on abortion, homosexuality, suicide and divorce. Neither do we find differences in attitudes towards gender equality and environmental protection between groups related to economic satisfaction.¹⁰

¹⁰ The only correlations we find is a weak negative one concerning attitude towards abortion in Lithuania

Table 6. Satisfaction with one's own household's economic situation and Trust in democratic political institutions (Pearson's corr)

Satisfact. with househ. economy	Trust in democratic political institutions						
	Pres.	Gov.	Parl.	Pol. part.	Courts	Police	Press
Estonia	.111**	.176**	.145**	.100**	.122**	.127**	–
Latvia	–	.075*	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	.144**	.112**	.115**	–	.099**	.071*	–

*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

On the other hand, from the table above (table 6) we learn that trust in democratic political institutions¹¹ is correlated with satisfaction with one's own household's economy¹² on the individual level. If we exclude trust in the president, which was discussed above as a rather tricky variable when measuring trust in democratic political institutions, we generally find the strongest, although not overwhelming, correlations in the Estonian case. Also in the Lithuanian case we find that satisfaction with one's own household's economy makes you more likely to have trust in political institutions. But in the Latvian case we find almost no correlation at all.

On interpersonal trust we find almost the same pattern (table 7). There is a slight correlation making it more likely for Estonians satisfied with their household's economy to have more interpersonal trust (.082*). Also in Lithuania there is a correlation, (.104**), but in the Latvian case we find none. (*Significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed, **Significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed.)

Initially we expected certain correlations on the individual level between the background factor satisfaction with one's own household's economy and the two

(-.098**) and Estonia (-.080*), a weak correlation between attitude to suicide and satisfaction with household's economy in Estonia (-.077*) and a weak correlation concerning homosexuality in Latvia (.087**). The only figures that make sense here are probably the figures on attitude towards abortion in Lithuania and Estonia. In Lithuania and Estonia respondents are more likely to think that abortion is justifiable if he/she is unsatisfied with his/her household's economy. Probably these figures reflect the hard facts of life when not having the income needed to raise a child, rather than any post-materialist dimension.

¹¹ Before correlating the variables, the 11 position scale has been reduced to two values. Position 5, the one in the middle, has been understood as equivalent to "don't know" and has been excluded.

¹² Before correlating the values on the variable Satisfaction with household economy, the four values are merged into two values: Satisfied and Unsatisfied.

dependent variables post-materialist values and trust in democratic institutions, at least in Estonia. The results only half fulfil the expectation. Furthermore they actually suggest that there is no link between liberal attitudes towards moral and tolerance issues and democratic trust. Before discussing this issue further we will examine how the level of education correlates with post-materialism and democratic trust. It is interesting to see whether level of education affects the link between satisfaction with one's own household's economy and trust in democratic institution and also whether there is any correlation between education and post-materialist values.

Satisfaction with economic situation and education

What happens if *level of education* is brought in? Maybe correlations between suggested post-materialist values and satisfaction with the economic situation just reflect the fact that people with higher education have higher salaries. Then satisfaction is not the ultimate independent variable. Trust in democracy may be the outcome of higher education rather than income. Level of education might be the reasonable background variable to democratic and post-materialist values.

We have to remember that in the post-Soviet states the correlation between education and income level is not as straightforward as it is in western countries. Well-educated people frequently have low incomes in the administration and education sector. Therefore, we don't find a high correlation between education and satisfaction with one's own household's economy. The figures are lowest for Estonia (.127**) and highest for Lithuania (.226**) with Latvia in between (.201**) This probably reflects the fact that Estonia has gone farthest towards developing a market economy, providing opportunities for enterprising and adaptive people but excluding people with an education belonging to the old society.

Actually we find very small correlations between trust in democratic political institutions and education. The only correlations we find concern trust for government, parliament and the courts in Estonia. The higher the level of education acquired¹³, the more likely the respondent is to have higher trust in government (.095*), parliament (.087*) and the courts (.100*). With regard to level of education in Estonia, the correlation between satisfaction with the economy and trust in these institutions remains, although it weakens slightly. In

¹³ Before correlating, education level is ordered into three categories (Primary school incomplete or complete, Secondary school or Secondary professional school and University level).

Latvia and Lithuania we find no correlation between education and trust in democratic political institutions. So, satisfaction with one's economic situation is likely to increase trust for democratic political institutions, irrespective of the level of education. This holds for Estonia and Lithuania.

Interpersonal trust and education on the other hand give some correlation in all three countries, Estonia (.179**) Latvia (.133**) and Lithuania (.124**). When controlling for education the correlation between satisfaction with one's own household's economy and interpersonal trust disappears in Estonia and almost disappears in Lithuania (.078*).

Concerning morals and tolerance there are correlations between *education* and attitude towards abortion, homosexuality, divorce and suicide. A liberal attitude on moral and tolerance¹⁴ issues is positively correlated to level of education (table 7). In all three countries respondents are more likely to think that abortion and homosexuality are justifiable the higher their level of education. Attitude towards divorce is correlated with education level in Latvia and Lithuania, i.e. the two countries where religious persuasion can be expected to lead to a disapproval of a liberal attitude on this matter. A positive attitude towards gender equality and environmental protection are, on the other hand, not linked to level of education in any of the countries.

Table 7. Level of education and Morals and tolerance (Pearson's corr)

Education	Morals and tolerance			
	Abortion	Homosexuality	Suicide	Divorce
Estonia	.165**	.108*	.110**	–
Latvia	.168**	.165**	–	.151**
Lithuania	.156**	.176**	–	.150**

*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Satisfaction with one's own household's economy correlates with trust in democratic political institutions. Education correlates with suggested post-materialist values. Education and economic satisfaction are only weakly linked to

¹⁴ Before correlating, the 11 position scale has been reduced to two values. Position 5, the one in the middle, has been understood as equivalent to "don't know" and has been excluded.

each other. This suggests that trust in democratic institutions and liberal attitudes towards moral and tolerance issues are not correlated and depend on various background phenomena. A correlation matrix substantiates that trust in democratic political institutions and values suggested as post-materialist do not co-vary. In all three countries we find high correlations between trust in the different institutions. For example if a respondent trusts the government institution, he/she is also more likely to trust the president, the parliament, the courts, the press, the police and political parties. If a respondent has a liberal attitude on one of the moral and tolerance variables he/she is also more likely to have a liberal attitude towards other issues. However, trust in either of the political institutions is not positively correlated to liberal attitudes on morals and tolerance. In some cases the correlation is actually negative, as for example trust in parliament and liberal attitude towards abortion in Lithuania. (See Appendix 1)

A factor analysis confirms that there are different dimensions, one dimension for trust in democratic institutions and one for morals and tolerance, in all three countries. (See Appendix 2) Interpersonal trust and attitude towards gender equality and environmental protection do not seem to belong to any of these dimensions.

Age, post-materialist values and trust in democracy

The data has been broken into three age groups 18–29, 30–49 and 50–75 years. The youngest group, 18–29 years, consists of people who have experienced the post-Soviet, democratic society as relatively young and formative persons. The middle group, 30–49 years, consists of people who have lived the major part of their lives during the Soviet period. They were educated in the communist system and their lives were settled before the liberation of the Baltic States. The oldest group consists of people who experienced the independence period of the '20s and '30s from their childhood, or at least have grown up in a society with the democratic independence period in fresh memory.

It is important to note that we cannot make any distinction between age group influence and generation influence from our material. In order to do that a repeated study carried out on more than one occasion would be needed. Still it is possible from our study to draw conclusions that support or invalidate Inglehart's early socialisation thesis concerning post-materialist values.

In the three Baltic States we find differences in attitudes between the different age groups. But there are also issues where we find no difference although one

might have been expected. Concerning satisfaction with one's own household's economy we find a difference between the age groups but also a difference between countries when comparing by age (table 8).

Table 8. Age and Satisfaction with one's own household's economic situation
As far as your household is concerned, overall, how do you rate its economic situation today? (percent very satisfactory and fairly satisfactory)

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
18-29	67	267	64	240	61	244
30-49	54	437	50	435	48	399
50-75	54	405	38	418	36	421
N	1109		1093		1064	

The youngest group is the most satisfied¹⁵ in all three countries. 67 % of Estonian respondents, 64 % of Latvian respondents and 61 % of Lithuanian respondents aged 18-29 years are satisfied with the economic situation of their household. The youngest groups are more satisfied than the older groups in all three states. According to the post-materialist thesis the youngest group should be the one least concerned about their economic situation. Also, we might expect young people in Estonia to be those least concerned compared with young people in Latvia and Lithuania. The differences between the percentage figures are small, but nevertheless, they point in a direction that rather substantiates than contradicts this hypothesis.

We find that the oldest groups in Latvia and Lithuania are the least satisfied. Only 38 % of Latvian and 36 % of Lithuanian respondents aged 50-75 are satisfied with their economic situation. Taking current living standards into consideration this is not surprising. Old people in transition societies have the most modest living conditions. They are too old to adapt to the demands of market economy and to restart a professional career. There is no functioning welfare state to take care of old people in need. From this point of view the rather small variance in the Estonian figures is conspicuous.

¹⁵ Very satisfactory and fairly satisfactory.

On none of the variables measuring trust in democratic political institutions do we find any significant differences¹⁶ between age groups in any of the countries.¹⁷ Concerning interpersonal trust there are significant differences in only one country. In Latvia, the youngest group is more trusting than the two older and especially than the oldest one.

In attitudes towards moral and tolerance issues, on the other hand, we find differences, which might be expected and also are in accordance with the early socialisation thesis, according to which the young are the fore-runners in the post-materialist transition (table 9). In all three countries the oldest category seems to be less tolerant and more moralistic than the other two categories. The two youngest categories are more tolerant and less moralistic. But we also see that the pattern is ambiguous, and in some cases the scores are lower for the youngest category than for the middle category, viz., concerning attitude towards abortion in all three countries and possibly attitude to divorce in Latvia and Lithuania; the youngest group is less accepting than the middle-age group. Actually in Latvia and Lithuania the most conspicuous differences are between the two youngest groups and the oldest, which are considerably less broad-minded.¹⁸

It is also notable that the young in Estonia generally are the more tolerant, while the oldest groups in Latvia and Lithuania are the least tolerant and most moralistic. But if comparing with the eldest in Latvia and Lithuania even the oldest group in Estonia seems to be catching up fairly well. That is, we have both an age dimension and a country dimension on these variables. From this we can tell that our age categories probably do not simply concern age or generational attitudes, there is a cultural, cohort aspect involved meaning that people have cultural and social experiences determining their attitudes in different stages of life in our three societies. It would be reasonable to assume that the extent of religiosity in the Latvian and Lithuanian societies is an explaining factor. In these countries religion is far more important than in Estonia. The oldest are frequently more religious and thus more moralistic. Still we cannot say anything as to whether age group is an age or a generation variable.

¹⁶ Because our age groups are categories on the nominal scale level we have in measuring the significance of differences used Pearson Chi-square.

¹⁷ Exceptions: In Latvia, concerning trust in political parties, we find a small difference between age groups, and in Latvia and Lithuania concerning trust in courts.

¹⁸ With regard to attitudes towards suicide, we find no significant differences between age groups in the three countries.

Table 9. Age and Morals and tolerance

Can be justified: abortion

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	%**	N	%*	N	%*	N
18-29	57	191	52	169	49	173
30-49	63	304	55	271	51	307
50-75	49	265	39	287	24	334
N		760		727		814

Can be justified: homosexuality

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	%*	N	%*	N	%*	N
18-29	37	190	23	193	28	174
30-49	23	313	16	349	16	330
50-75	10	338	3	356	4	345
N		841		898		849

Can be justified: divorce

	Estonia		Latvia		Lithuania	
	%	N	%*	N	%*	N
18-29	80	191	73	164	65	176
30-49	77	300	75	252	66	296
50-75	71	269	58	265	41	307
N		760		681		779

Percent on value 6-10 on scale not justifiable-always justifiable, 0-10.

A possible conclusion concerning the study of differences between age groups in the three countries is that rather than the young leading the post-materialist changeover, the oldest are lagging behind in being more moralistic and less tolerant, especially in the Latvian and the Lithuanian cases. In Estonia we should expect the early socialisation thesis to be most valid, because in this country we possibly have the clearest preconditions for post-materialist thinking. But, comparing with the other countries it seems that in Estonia also the elderly are relatively tolerant and less moralistic. Whether this has anything to do with the post-materialist dimension is highly questionable.

If Inglehart's thesis about early socialisation is correct, we would expect that people most satisfied with their economic situation, within the youngest age

group, would be more tolerant and liberal on moral issues than the rest of the group. Although Inglehart's satisfaction variable is a cultural, i.e. an aggregate level, variable not necessarily an individual quality, it would certainly be remarkable if satisfaction was not correlated with a liberal attitude within the youngest group. We expect that among the most satisfied (very satisfactory and fairly satisfactory) within the youngest group we should find the highest frequency of liberal attitudes. Actually this is not the case. When making a partial analysis of only the most satisfied in the youngest group we find that this expectation is hardly met. Only on attitude to homosexuality in Latvia and Lithuania do we find a more tolerant attitude (30 and 37 % respectively) among the most economically satisfied in the 18–29 years group than among the total of respondents in this group. On the other variables, in all three countries, separating the most satisfied within the youngest group does not effect the figures or in some cases gives small changes contradicting the hypothesis.

We find that when controlling for satisfaction with one's own household's economy the correlation between age and liberal attitudes is not much affected and is actually strengthened a bit in some cases (table 10).

Table 10. Age and Morals and tolerance (A)
Controlling for satisfaction with one's own household's economy (B)

Education	Morals and tolerance					
	Abortion		Homosexuality		Divorce	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
Estonia	.075**	.085*	.254**	.253**	.082*	.083*
Latvia	.112**	.121**	.245**	.233**	.136**	.133**
Lithuania	.224**	.261**	.261**	.276**	.202**	.232**

*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Thus, age seems to explain the variation in attitude independent of opinion on one's own economy. Even though younger people are more liberal in their opinions, socialisation into new kinds of thinking does not seem to have much to do with satisfaction in terms of economic conditions. Thus, the analysis above does not support the post-materialist early socialisation hypothesis.

Concerning attitude towards environmental problems and gender equality there are no significant differences between age groups in any of the countries.

Concluding remarks

In our study the post-materialist thesis is not supported on the individual level. Values that are considered to be post-materialist seem to be correlated primarily with education. On the other hand there is an independent correlation between satisfaction with economic situation and trust in political institutions.

Probably, the fact that people who are more economically satisfied have more trust in democratic political institutions in Estonia and Lithuania first of all reflects the fact that they have more reason to be content with the present situation. The more one gains from the transition to democracy, the more satisfied and trusting one will be. This indication is probably not so promising for democracy, because it might mean that we are far from a stable democratic situation. Still Latvia is a deviant case; respondents rather satisfied with their economic situation seem to be as distrusting as people not satisfied. Maybe this can be explained by factors not taken into account in this study. For example, Latvia is the Baltic state that suffers most from ethnic tensions between Russians and the titular nation. Also, ethnic tensions leading to nationalistic attitudes may be a threat to democratic development and may give rise to sceptical attitudes towards democratic institutions, which are supposed to be neutral with regard to ethnic affiliations. (Offe 1996)

Indeed, it is interesting, and possibly also to be expected that a liberal attitude towards homosexuality, divorce and abortion is correlated with age but the suggestion that this has to do with a transition to post-materialism on the individual level is hardly confirmed in this study of the Baltic States.

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Transformation of values in the process of democratisation

TRANSFORMATION OF VALUES is a very significant indicator of change in the process of democratisation. In order to analyse this issue, the relationship of individualism versus collectivism, modernism versus postmodernism, cross-cultural differences, intergenerational change and period effect have been researched.

To analyse the value change in relation to the processes of democratisation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, cross-generational differences have been taken into consideration. The image of the new generation, post-Soviet youth, is under a continuous process of development. Post-Soviet youth as a social group and their beliefs, attitudes, system of values have not been sufficiently researched. As previous research in the field indicates, (Liubiniene, 1998) the strata of old “pre-Soviet” intelligentsia have also been very important in organising the “silent” resistance against the Soviet rule and keeping the customs and traditions alive. It was the key aspect of socialisation, at least in Lithuania, leading finally to the awakening of the nation and the “singing revolution”. As a consequence “cultural reproduction” persisted through several generations. The key aspect of cultural reproduction, as pointed out by Schöpflin (2000:15), is that it establishes the means by which communities seek to keep themselves in being. Ethnicity, according to Bourdieu (1993), is about cultural reproduction.

Cultural or country differences are also very important, and should be taken into account. However all three countries have shared experience of the Soviet period, and this should also be considered. Cultural distinctions are based on deeply-rooted values which, in turn, according to Hofstede’s theory (1980), can be delineated along five fundamental dimensions: power distance, individualism versus collectivism, femininity versus masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.

To analyse the effect of the age variable on value change, some key

assumptions of Inglehart's theory (1990, 1997b, 2000) have been used. The theoretical elaborations of De Graaf and Evans (1996) have been followed to analyse the period effect. For country differences the theoretical model of Inglehart (1995, 1997a) has been tested.

Individualism versus collectivism

Such theorists as Rokeach (1973), Williams (1968) and Kluckhohn (1951) view values as the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people, including oneself and events. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987:556) define values as concepts or beliefs that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance.

In carrying out the research of the system of universal values, we applied the theory and methodological approach of Schwartz and Bilsky (1987). This theory defines the content and the structure of values and, following strict motivation, distinguishes those values that are important to the people of any culture. Schwartz's survey instrument contains ten motivational value types that have been found in most of the cultures studied: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, traditions, conformity and security. According to the theory of Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), values may serve the interests of the individual and/or of some collective. Individualism/collectivism is the main dimension on which it is possible to distinguish values both on a societal level (Hofstede, 1980; Mead, 1967) and on an individual level (Schwartz 1989; Triandis, 1987). According to Hofstede (1980), societies differ basically depending on how their members value individualism or collectivism. Lekevičius (1991) writes that the twentieth century saw the division of the world into two large camps – the West and the East, in one of which the priority was given to individualism and in the other to collectivism. The collectivism of the totalitarian period left a deep imprint on the minds of the people of Lithuania.

To test the relationship between collective and individual types of values, two new variables labelled "individualism" and "collectivism" were constructed. Individualism was measured by adding the following value types: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction. The collectivism variable was composed of universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security.

Intergenerational change

Inglehart bases the theory of intergenerational value change on two key hypotheses. First, the scarcity hypothesis: “An individual’s priorities reflect the socio-economic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply”. Second, the socialisation hypothesis: “The relationship between socio-economic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years” (Inglehart, 1990:68). The combination of these two basic hypotheses and the assumption of increasing material prosperity are, in Inglehart’s view, the core of value change. The thesis refers both to individual (needs and values) and societal (economic development) factors. Early socialisation, according to Inglehart (1997:34), seems to carry greater weight than later socialisation. This, of course, does not imply that no change occurs during adult years. Nevertheless, human development seems to be far more rapid during the pre-adult years than afterward, thus leading to the conclusion that basic personality change decreases sharply after one reaches adulthood. Fundamental value change takes place gradually; it occurs largely as a younger generation replaces an older one in the adult population of a society. Thus, the cohort or generational effect is associated with the year of birth and concerns all events that one generation has experienced and that other generations have not.

Cultural theory implies that a culture cannot be changed overnight. Furthermore, when basic cultural change does occur, it will take place more rapidly among younger groups where it does not need to overcome the resistance of inconsistent early learning, than among older ones, resulting in intergenerational differences. An awareness of the fact that deep-rooted values are not easily changed is essential to any realistic and effective program for social change (Inglehart, 1997:19).

Modern and post-modern values

Modernisation theorists, from Karl Marx to Max Weber and Daniel Bell, have argued that economic development changes the world in ways that erode traditional values, bring about a decline of religion, parochialism and cultural differences. Another major body of literature presents a seemingly incompatible view. Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the world is divided into eight or nine major civilisations based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries

– and that the conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilisations. Similarly, Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) argue that cultural traditions are remarkably durable and shape the political and economic behaviour of their societies today. Evidence from the World Values Survey, Inglehart (2000:23), indicates that both claims are true. Economic development is linked to patterns of predictable changes away from absolute social norms, toward increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and post-modern values. But culture is path dependent. The fact that a society was historically Protestant or Orthodox, Islamic, or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist when we control for the effects of economic development. These cultural differences are closely linked to a number of important social phenomena, from fertility rates to legislation concerning sexual minorities.

Analysing the distinction between materialism and post-materialism, Inglehart's theory predicts that a new worldview reflects a shift in what people want out of life. It transforms basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family and sexual behaviour. Thus, the process of economic development leads to two successive trajectories: modernisation and post-modernisation. Both are strongly linked to economic development, but post-modernisation represents a later stage of development involving very different beliefs from those that characterise modernisation. These belief systems are not mere consequences of economic or social changes, but they shape and are shaped by socioeconomic conditions, in a reciprocal fashion (Inglehart, 1997:8). Postmodernism is the rise of new values and lifestyles, with greater tolerance of ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual choice concerning the kind of life one wants to lead (Inglehart 1997:23). The best documented example of the rise of new values is the intergenerational shift from materialist to post-materialist value priorities that seems to be taking place throughout advanced industrial society; but the rise of new values and lifestyles takes place across many other aspects of life, from sexual orientation to religion (Inglehart, 1997:25).

In post-modern society the emphasis on economic achievement gives way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of life. Individual choice of lifestyles and individual self-expression come into focus. Thus, a shift from materialist values, emphasising economic and physical security, occurs towards post materialist values, emphasising individual self-expression and quality of life.

Period effect

The other group of scientists (De Graaf; Evans, 1996) have tried to prove that value change appears to be related to non-economic factors, such as education and severity of wartime experience. Thus, they have placed emphasis on the period effect, which concerns those events that effect all generations equally and at the same point in time. De Graaf and Evans (1996) point out that only generation and period effects can account for the relationship between the year of birth and post-materialism.

Indicators of post-material values can also be thought of as measuring a dimension of liberal values relating to commitment to democratic norms involving freedom of speech, tolerance, and concern about ideas and individual rights (Duch; Taylor, 1993). Liberal values are associated with the level of education. This might lead to the supposition that the more educated the respondents, the more liberal their attitudes and beliefs should be. Furthermore, the liberal values are likely to be transmitted from parents to children.

The West has had a very different experience from Central and Eastern Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe the meanings attached to life experiences are different and sometimes difficult to understand for Westerners. What they hear and see is translated into their own thinking patterns and own experiences. Schöpflin (2000:31) points out, that Western thought and speech styles are described by Westerners as pragmatic, professional, future-orientated and not structured by explicit value judgments, as “rational”. Post-communists, on the other hand, are seen as relying heavily on history, on pathos, on a sense of resentment and injustice. Specific historical, cultural and sociological circumstances have given rise to these responses. Central and Eastern Europeans respond in this way because for them fear for the cultural reproduction and survival of their communities is a real and authentic experience (Schöpflin, 2000:32). Westerners did not have to experience this reality.

A very important factor is the culture shock that most of the people have experienced after the fall of the Soviet totalitarian regime. Democratisation has brought not only political and economic reforms, it has also opened the borders to numerous cultural influences, bringing many new problems into focus. Paradoxically, many people living in the same country have experienced nothing more than culture shock as the result of global influences. Many people have felt lost and isolated, unsure of how to act and sometimes frightened – a consequence

of being outside the symbolic web of the previous Soviet culture that had joined individuals in social life.

Psychologically, according to Marx (2000:7), we have to deal with three levels of culture shock. The culture shock triangle is composed of emotions, thinking and acquiring new social skills and identity. Many factors, such as European integration, the process of globalisation and increasing mobility bring intercultural learning into focus. The culture shock triangle (Marx, 2000:7) provides concrete steps in dealing with culture shock, from balancing one's emotions to developing effective social behaviour.

Country effect

Attitudes, orientations, emotions and expressions differ strongly among people from one nation to the other. These differences are fundamentally cultural.

Historically, the Roman Catholic Church was the prototype of a hierarchical, centrally controlled institution; Protestant churches were relatively decentralised and more open to local control. The impact of living in a society that was historically shaped by once powerful Catholic or Protestant institutions persists today, shaping everyone – Protestant, Catholic or other – who is socialised into a given nation's culture.

But religion, argues Inglehart (2000:32), is not the only factor shaping cultural zones. A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. One of the most important historical events of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of a communist empire that once ruled a third of the world's population. Communism has left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, historically being part of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Church in Europe, fall within a communist influenced zone.

Societies with a common cultural heritage generally fall into common clusters. However, their positions also reflect their level of economic development, their occupational structure, their religion, the experience of communist rule, their colonial heritage and other major historical influences (Inglehart, 2000:35).

Analysis and discussion

The question about values, included in the survey "Baltic Barometer – 2001", follows Schwartz and Bilsky's formulation. The difference is that instead of 56 categories in a full version, there are only 10 values enclosed. Thus, it becomes

very difficult to present the full picture of value rating in three Baltic countries. Nevertheless, following the methodology of Schwartz and Bilsky, we will try to discuss some tendencies, even though the list of variables is very short. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990, 1992) have developed the theory of universal values and have empirically tested it in 40 countries. The aim was to test whether the given values indicate individualism or collectivism. According to their theory, a high score prescribed to wealth would be in favour of power; self-fulfilment and being influential would support achievement; varied life and social life – stimulation. Power, achievement and stimulation are the components of individualism. Collectivism is represented by the emphasis placed on universalism (world peace, social justice), conformity (honouring of parents, self-discipline) and security (family health). The results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Means of values by age in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Country:	Lithuania			Latvia			Estonia		
Age:	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75
Values:									
Family health	9.74	9.84	9.81	9.69	9.71	9.75	9.44	9.66	9.67
World peace	9.4	9.62	9.57	9.31	9.62	9.68	9.03	9.22	9.38
Honouring of parent	9.39	9.47	9.59	9.02	9.33	9.45	9.1	9.22	9.56
Social justice	9.13	9.18	8.91	8.71	8.88	9.02	8.49	8.72	9.03
Social life (friends)	9.05	8.83	8.18	8.94	8.4	7.99	8.89	8.68	8.3
Wealth (money)	8.88	8.78	8.43	7.61	7.24	6.43	7.41	7.37	7.18
Self-fulfilment	8.7	8.48	6.53	8.66	8.2	6.91	8.84	8.49	8.02
Self-discipline	8.63	8.89	8.39	7.74	7.79	8.09	7.57	7.84	8.22
A varied life	8.53	8.02	6.98	8.07	7.27	6.09	8.41	7.92	7.25
Being influential	7.12	6.72	5.92	6.83	5.82	5.2	6.41	5.66	5.83
N	268	430	438	241	436	424	268	439	407

Regardless of age, family health is considered to be the most important value in all the three Baltic countries. Taken together with world at peace (free from war and conflict) as well as honouring of parents and older people, it leads the top of the list. A high score for these values might indicate that people in the Baltic

States are still in great need of security guarantees. Security, taken in a broad sense, ranges from political to economic to the security of a well-developed health care system. All these issues are very important in the newly developing democracies and thus they are reflected in the attitudes towards values. There is no significant difference in the support for these values in Lithuania, whereas in Estonia and particularly in Latvia the older generation tends to put an even greater emphasis on the importance of world peace and the honouring of parents. Social justice is the fourth-ranked value in support of collectivism. The older respondents in Estonia and Latvia are much more likely to attach value to social justice than the younger respondents, whereas in Lithuania the opposite is the case. The young are more likely than the old to be concerned about social justice. The same tendency could be observed when analysing the value of self-discipline. Does this mean that the young generation in Lithuania is more conformist and is more likely to support collective types of values in comparison to the young of Latvia and Estonia? The answer might be in the affirmative because of specific cultural differences between the countries. A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. In this case, we could make an assumption that religion has been a very important factor in shaping different cultural zones. The impact of living in a society that has been shaped by a once powerful Catholic Church (Lithuania) or Protestant Church (Latvia, Estonia) or other – has a great effect on socialisation and value acquisition in a given nation's culture. Thus, religion might be considered as a dividing line between Lithuania and the other two countries.

Values in favour of individualism are likely to be rated lower in all three countries (with the exception of self-discipline, which scored lowest among collectivism values). But here, the age effect could be analysed, as the difference in evaluation due to age is important in all the three countries. The young, regardless of country, put greater value on wealth (money), which is supposed to mean power, social life (friends), varied life, self-fulfilment and being influential.

The emphasis put on power, achievement and a stimulating life brings the young generation of the Baltic States closer to their counterparts in many western democracies. This might indicate that the value system of the young is changing much more rapidly than the value system of old people. Age in this case could be regarded as the indicator of change. In the Information Age, due to new technologies and ideas that are spreading globally at an enormous speed, the young become a privileged group and acquire many things in common globally,

including similar values, which makes them different from older generations.

Similar tendencies could be observed when analysing the evaluation of another set of variables, which provides the answer to the question “what makes a good citizen?” Respondents had to answer how important the phenomena listed in Table 2 are for a good citizen.

Table 2. Means of evaluation by age of “a good citizen” in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Country:	Lithuania			Latvia			Estonia		
Age:	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75
A good citizen is:									
To learn the national language	9.28	9.27	9.19	9.12	9.21	9.37	9.03	9.0	8.99
To take personal responsibility	8.54	8.56	7.82	8.69	9.22	8.79	8.99	9.28	9.17
To obey laws and regulations	8.58	8.71	8.99	8.78	8.93	9.24	8.81	8.81	9.01
To pay taxes	8.33	8.34	8.86	8.0	8.4	9.18	8.26	8.44	8.86
To stay informed about what goes on	8.53	8.65	8.39	8.31	8.56	8.59	8.2	8.17	8.43
To treat minorities as other inhabitants	8.33	8.83	8.41	7.99	8.38	8.6	8.11	8.3	8.24
To vote in public elections	8.09	8.13	8.42	7.61	7.87	8.53	7.45	7.31	7.54
To show solidarity with people	7.04	7.39	7.49	7.47	7.6	8.09	7.3	7.31	7.79
To do military service	6.67	7.62	8.18	6.77	7.55	8.46	7.21	7.97	8.41
To influence political decisions	5.95	6.51	6.36	6.1	6.25	6.48	5.74	5.99	6.21
To be ready to break a law	6.14	6.68	5.95	5.83	5.76	5.11	5.49	5.52	4.96
N	268	430	438	241	436	424	268	439	407

The most significant age-related differences are observed in the Latvian sample. It could be explained both by period and by generational effect. The young in Latvia are less likely than the old to emphasise the importance of learning the national language, taking personal responsibility, obeying laws and regulations and treating minorities as other inhabitants. The older respondents are much more likely to pay taxes, to vote in public elections, to show solidarity with people who are worse off and to be favourably disposed to military service than the younger respondents. The young in Latvia and Lithuania are more likely to be ready to break the law when one's conscience demands it. The young in Lithuania (aged 18–29), contrary to the other countries, are more apt to take personal responsibility. A higher score on responsibility taken together with a higher ranking of social justice discussed previously might lead to the conclusion that some of the discrepancies could be explained by taking into account differences between the countries. But similar to other countries, the young in Lithuania are less concerned about doing military service and obeying laws and regulations. In the Estonian case, the young are less likely to pay taxes, to show solidarity with people who are worse off, to be favourably disposed to military service and to find it important to influence political decisions.

The analysis of age-related differences points to the gap between the attitudes of those over 50, and those under 30 years of age. Here we could discuss the process of intergenerational change. The analysis of the next group of variables (Table 3) could well lead to more empirical evidence.

Table 3. Means of justification of the following social phenomena by age in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Country:	Lithuania			Latvia			Estonia		
Age:	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75
Phenomena: Euthanasia	6.53	6.8	4.73	5.57	5.42	3.92	6.0	5.78	4.86
Divorce	5.78	5.78	4.21	6.04	6.05	5.34	6.7	6.43	5.96
Abortion	4.81	4.83	2.80	4.82	5.11	4.3	5.21	5.66	4.82
Avoiding fares on public transport	3.72	3.27	1.97	5.1	3.94	2.44	4.66	3.73	2.58
Homosexuality	3.66	2.38	0.97	3.05	2.18	0.91	4.08	3.03	1.74
Prostitution	3.38	3.23	1.44	2.96	3.23	1.54	3.65	3.13	1.77
Buying stolen goods	2.14	1.33	0.83	2.53	1.38	0.69	2.18	1.3	0.83
Suicide	1.97	2.04	1.43	2.38	2.23	1.76	2.5	2.33	1.66
Accepting bribes	1.8	1.63	0.82	1.58	1.1	0.69	1.74	1.33	0.78
Claiming social benefits	1.82	1.48	1.2	2.89	1.98	1.27	2.56	1.61	1.19
N	268	430	438	241	436	424	268	439	407

Age-related differences were found when analysing attitudes towards the phenomena listed in Table 3. This could be explained by the fact that the Baltic States belong to the cluster of post-Soviet countries. The existence of phenomena such as “homosexuality” or “prostitution” was denied in the Soviet Union. Only with the arrival of democracy did it become possible to openly discuss the problems related to homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, euthanasia or suicide. These issues were first raised by the media. Thus, the opening of borders and the advancement of democracy have revealed many problems that have never before been discussed openly. The discussions revealed a high degree of intolerance towards these phenomena, which had been ignored for such a long time. This lack of tolerance is the main characteristic feature of the old generation. Tolerance is fostered through understanding. But it is much more difficult to adjust to a new set of values in the older age group and we may assume that it is impossible to remain objective if one has no wish to accept the influences of other cultures and their way of life without passing a personal judgement on it.

The young could be characterised as more tolerant, as the process of

socialisation and value formation of the young has already been taking form during the development of democracy. Their attitudes may be still different from the attitudes of western youth, but they are much more tolerant than their parents and grandparents.

The rise of new values and lifestyles, with greater tolerance of ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual lifestyle choice is the indicator of value change towards postmodernism (according to Inglehart). So in that sense, the young should be much more post-modern than the older generations.

On the other hand, the older generation having expressed their negative attitude towards purchasing stolen goods, accepting bribes, claiming social benefits and avoiding fares on public transport, reveal that they put greater emphasis on honesty, fairness and fair play. It is a reflection of a system of values, which supposedly has been formed under the strong influence of religious mores and other traditional beliefs. It might seem strange, but those who are in real need of social support (e.g. retired people), decline the claiming of social benefits or avoiding fares on public transport.

Table 4. Personal trust in social institutions by age in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Country:	Lithuania			Latvia			Estonia		
Age:	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75	18-29	30-49	50-75
Institutions:									
Hospitals	6.49	6.23	6.94	7.04	6.39	7.05	6.83	6.3	7.12
The churches	6.28	6.81	7.65	7.16	7.22	7.96	6.6	6.49	7.57
Private enterprises	6.31	5.67	5.2	5.81	4.96	4.68	5.65	5.08	5.02
Universities	7.13	7.0	6.98	7.58	7.29	7.54	7.9	7.74	7.98
Central bank	6.2	5.53	4.91	6.47	5.99	5.8	6.74	6.4	6.38
Press (newspapers)	6.9	7.1	7.1	6.24	6.0	6.18	5.92	5.84	6.19
Television, Radio	6.92	7.09	7.17	6.5	6.14	6.4	6.41	6.15	6.59
Trade unions	4.72	4.79	4.53	5.07	4.86	4.75	5.43	5.14	5.51
National military	5.41	5.6	5.62	5.34	5.35	6.16	6.23	6.45	7.05
President	5.25	5.5	5.22	6.22	6.53	7.08	6.55	6.53	6.73
Government	3.82	3.76	3.62	3.87	4.11	4.09	4.27	4.25	4.15
Parliament	3.53	3.2	3.27	3.67	3.7	3.66	4.08	4.02	4.07
Political parties	3.03	2.97	2.7	3.59	3.23	2.82	3.75	3.57	3.36
Election administr.	5.53	5.7	5.05	5.17	5.59	5.94	5.61	5.97	5.87
Courts	4.53	4.05	3.6	5.62	4.96	4.67	5.97	5.65	5.81
Police	4.34	3.99	4.13	5.12	4.85	5.09	5.31	5.19	5.47
N	268	430	438	241	436	424	268	439	407

The analysis of trust in social institutions has revealed some tendencies similar to those discussed previously. Some of the social institutions included in the list represent new democratic developments (central bank, private enterprises). Others have undergone many reforms to become democratic (press, television, universities, courts). Some have been re-established from the past (president, the church), others have a new substance but the old name (political parties, trade unions, government).

The older respondents are likely to have more trust in hospitals, the church and the national military, whereas the young generation put more trust in new democratic institutions. The young have more trust in the central bank, private

enterprises and courts. This might lead to the supposition that the transformation of values towards individualism and post-modernism brings more trust in democratic institutions.

There is no difference between the attitudes of the old and the young towards trust in the press (ranked the highest in Lithuania), and universities (ranked the highest in Estonia and Latvia). This could lead to the conclusion that education and mass media are considered to be the most democratic institutions by the survey respondents. Television and radio act as agents of socialisation and even among old people the influence of TV is overwhelming. Yet it has not been able to change the view of the elderly people (towards homosexuality) as their attitudes have been formed in their youth and are not likely to change so quickly. Education is seen as a very important factor by all the respondents, which might indicate that due to intergenerational change, liberal viewpoints might replace the conservative ones with time.

Conclusions

The modern welfare state is the goal of the three Baltic States. Political, economic and social progress has been overwhelming and has led to the establishment of real democratic states. But the attitudes, beliefs and values of people who have been living under two or three different social systems cannot be changed in only 10 years. Thus, age is a very important variable in the analysis of cultural changes, i.e., changes that are taking place in people's attitudes, beliefs and value systems. The analysis of attitudes towards many different social developments by age in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has revealed some general tendencies:

1. We could observe significant age-related differences that have occurred due to both the generational effect and the period factor.
2. Despite different historical-cultural heritage and religion, the young tend to be more liberal. The old tend to maintain more conservative views. The Soviet period has left a deep imprint on the attitudes, beliefs and value systems of the people who were raised under that system. Lack of tolerance towards different social groups is a relic of that closed society.
3. The process of intergenerational change is leading to more modern perspectives and developments. Transformation of values leading towards individualism and postmodernism brings more trust in democratic institutions. Thus, the young have a greater trust in new democratic institutions than old people.

Still, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia belong to the group of countries where the system of social security is in the process of development. People need to protect themselves against basic hardships. The younger generation grew up in comparatively better conditions (in terms of welfare and security) than did the older generations. This should account for attitudinal and behavioural changes between generations.

The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the hypothesis about the traditional values being deeply rooted among elderly people is true. The young are more open to change, and their value system is a representation of more liberal attitudes. Still, we can scarcely talk about the formation of post-materialist attitudes, even among the young, as there is a deep imprint of the totalitarian period in the minds of the young as well. Only with the passage of time, further economic and social development, and intergenerational change might we finally come to the transformation of values towards post-materialism.

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Appendix 1 Estonia

		Trust presi- dent	Trust gov- ern- ment	Trust in parli- ament	Trust in court	Trust in police	Trust in press	Trust in pol parties	Inter- pers onal trust	Abor- tion	Homo- sexu- ality	Divor- ce	Sui- cide	Gen- der equi- lity	Envi- ron- ment
Trust president	Pearson Correlation	1	.510	.437	.429	.343	.261	.270	.136	-.085	.061	-.022	.011	-.050	.075
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.035	.115	.580	.757	.201	.037
	N	890	694	700	693	718	686	668	722	616	674	627	727	657	784
Trust government	Pearson Correlation		1	.819	.393	.380	.214	.644	.189	-.120	.093	-.032	.032	-.010	.019
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.020	.446	.424	.799	.602
	N		813	735	627	652	616	654	677	562	623	561	647	611	727
Trust in parliament	Pearson Correlation			1	.365	.386	.189	.686	.203	-.091	.070	-.078	.008	-.017	.061
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.079	.061	.832	.668	.097	.097
	N			823	637	659	628	670	679	572	630	573	656	621	740
Trust in courts	Pearson Correlation				1	.589	.367	.269	.144	-.028	.052	-.001	-.036	-.018	.048
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.000	.000	.000	.000	.509	.197	.986	.359	.653	.196
	N				813	687	631	599	665	568	620	585	653	616	735
Trust in police	Pearson Correlation					1	.290	.316	.217	-.026	.020	-.016	-.001	.087	.053
	Sig. (2-tailed)						.000	.000	.000	.519	.616	.686	.982	.029	.143
	N					858	674	624	708	599	641	610	687	632	761
Trust in press	Pearson Correlation						1	.232	.132	-.049	-.055	.060	.010	.020	-.007
	Sig. (2-tailed)							.000	.001	.243	.169	.152	.801	.612	.853
	N						820	599	671	570	628	574	676	617	731
Trust in pol parties	Pearson Correlation							1	.122	-.117	.042	-.035	.038	.025	-.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)								.002	.006	.304	.415	.335	.547	.784
	N							795	656	538	591	551	634	586	708
Interpersonal trust	Pearson Correlation								1	-.015	.073	.044	.072	-.065	.040
	Sig. (2-tailed)									.709	.056	.272	.053	.097	.258
	N								900	618	687	625	717	649	793
Abortion	Pearson Correlation									1	.387	.596	.241	.072	-.005
	Sig. (2-tailed)										.000	.000	.000	.083	.902
	N									760	627	593	647	574	678
Homosexuality	Pearson Correlation										1	.306	.408	-.035	-.034
	Sig. (2-tailed)											.000	.000	.379	.355
	N										841	590	736	632	743
Divorce	Pearson Correlation											1	.221	.011	-.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)												.000	.798	.177
	N											760	619	579	673
Suicide	Pearson Correlation												1	-.083	-.044
	Sig. (2-tailed)													.032	.216
	N												887	667	785
Gender equality	Pearson Correlation													1	.197
	Sig. (2-tailed)														.000
	N													810	743
Environment	Pearson Correlation														1
	Sig. (2-tailed)														
	N														978

Latvia

		Trust presi- dent	Trust gov- ern- ment	Trust in parli- ament	Trust in court	Trust in police	Trust in press	Trust in pol parties	Inter- pers- onal trust	Abor- tion	Homo- sexu- ality	Div- orce	Sui- cide	Gen- der equa- lity	Envi- ron- ment
Trust president	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 887	.408 .696	.318 .681	.256 .624	.274 .660	.396 .642	.209 .688	-.019 .734	-.012 .600	.061 .730	-.025 .559	-.007 .846	.122 .685	.022 .780
Trust government	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N		1 804	.920 .727	.480 .569	.476 .590	.298 .575	.639 .654	.146 .671	-.054 .530	.018 .641	-.035 .434	.006 .887	.030 .459	.065 .085
Trust in parliament	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N			1 807	.487 .578	.469 .587	.256 .574	.722 .684	.139 .666	-.068 .532	-.006 .654	-.071 .511	-.064 .639	.044 .624	.072 .702
Trust in courts	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N				1 748	.728 .619	.315 .551	.401 .581	.092 .610	.015 .503	.075 .612	-.001 .483	-.009 .604	.116 .574	.062 .659
Trust in police	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N					1 789	.300 .580	.333 .605	.066 .649	-.040 .523	.066 .642	-.063 .509	-.057 .626	.036 .613	.018 .691
Trust in press	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N						1 771	.219 .587	.008 .629	.070 .525	.029 .625	.027 .495	-.018 .619	.076 .592	.031 .682
Trust in pol parties	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N							1 821	.022 .672	-.009 .549	.077 .665	-.032 .524	-.029 .653	.091 .628	.055 .719
Interper- sonal trust	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N								1 894	.020 .598	.066 .731	.040 .556	-.030 .723	-.052 .672	.056 .778
Abortion	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N									1 726	.334 .627	.537 .610	.300 .610	.036 .558	-.082 .643
Homosexuality	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N										1 898	.284 .771	.267 .771	-.018 .684	.024 .788
Divorce	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N											1 681	.288 .571	-.026 .601	
Suicide	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N												1 878	-.107 .668	
Gender quality	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N													1 827	.357 .738
Environment	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N														1 961

Lithuania

		Trust presi- dent	Trust gov- ern- ment	Trust in parli- ament	Trust in court	Trust in police	Trust in press	Trust in pol parties	Inter- pers- onal trust	Abor- tion	Homo- sexu- ality	Div- orce	Sui- cide	Gen- der equa- rity	Envi- ron- ment
Trust president	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 783	.635 .000 656	.515 .000 639	.404 .000 601	.364 .000 627	.330 .000 656	.312 .000 613	.169 .000 630	-.072 .080 590	.001 .981 609	.049 .244 559	.030 .443 658	-.042 .299 608	-.042 .287 629
Trust government	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N		1 816	.832 .000 739	.482 .000 636	.434 .000 653	.220 .000 689	.589 .000 681	.218 .000 650	-.065 .048 610	-.008 .913 637	.079 .054 589	.064 .099 675	-.016 .689 646	-.082 .035 668
Trust in parliament	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N			1 826	.460 .000 645	.435 .000 655	.195 .000 695	.718 .000 716	.201 .000 639	-.079 .000 626	-.004 .000 641	.035 .102 591	.063 .102 687	-.004 .916 656	-.061 .116 673
Trust in courts	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N				1 792	.722 .000 690	.246 .000 676	.362 .000 646	.210 .000 627	.011 .791 588	.054 .180 620	.061 .151 551	.077 .048 668	-.049 .222 615	-.021 .596 639
Trust in police	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N					1 822	.273 .000 695	.323 .000 654	.199 .000 640	.004 .928 604	.065 .104 634	.068 .106 574	.094 .013 691	-.051 .200 643	-.006 .871 656
Trust in press	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N						1 899	.118 .002 697	.074 .051 701	-.006 .873 644	-.085 .027 676	.070 .080 627	.038 .298 755	.000 .999 701	-.016 .675 733
Trust in pol parties	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N							1 821	.166 .000 635	-.068 .093 607	-.004 .928 642	.024 .561 588	-.049 .199 683	.026 .505 641	-.014 .718 666
Interper- sonal trust	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N								1 860	.107 .007 631	.144 .020 653	.095 .523 607	.024 .002 718	-.122 .002 660	-.016 .665 696
Abortion	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N									1 814	.376 .688 619	.588 .000 619	.289 .000 718	-.146 .000 639	-.078 .043 667
Homosexuality	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N										1 850	.300 .000 651	.342 .000 763	-.057 .142 666	.014 .705 702
Divorce	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N											1 780	.328 .000 695	-.138 .001 614	-.076 .056 641
Suicide	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N												1 940	-.041 .271 726	.064 .073 779
Gender quality	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N													1 875	.359 .000 733
Environment	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N														1 913

Appendix 2
Estonia

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Trust president	.565		.186		-.187
Trust government	.828		-.127	.134	-.107
Trust in parliament	.833		-.185	.139	-.260
Trust in courts	.559		.183	-.171	.165
Trust in pol parties	.789	.166	-.216		
Trust in police	.579		.192		
Trust in press	.603		.190	-.195	.217
Interpersonal trust	.352	.208		-.122	.266
Abortion	-.212	.759	.290		-.276
Homosexuality		.668	-.474	.172	.210
Divorce	-.154	.763	.385		
Suicide		.475	-.259		.178
Gender equality	.114	-.138	.236	.654	
Environment	.120	-.172	.333	.208	.262

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

(Attempted to extract 5 factors. More than 25 iterations required. (Convergence=,009).
Extraction was terminated.)

Lithuania

	Factor		
	1	2	3
Trust in president	.682	.106	-.101
Trust in government	.853		
Trust in parliament	.905	-.112	.215
Trust in courts	.748		-.123
Trust in police	.796		-.188
Trust in press	.427		-.102
Trust in pol parties	.785		.185
Intersonal trust	.430	.126	-.274
Abortion	-.132	.786	
Homosexuality		.616	
Divorce		.681	.180
Suicide		.475	
Gender equality	.106		.539
Environment	.139		.357

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

(3 factors extracted. 12 iterations required.)

Latvia

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Trust in president	.369	.114	-.131		-.205
Trust in government	.924			-.236	
Trust in parliament	.931			-.338	
Trust in courts	.698			.445	
Trust in police	.696			.532	
Trust in press	.474	.170	-.117		-.179
Trust in pol parties	.916			-.255	
Interpersonal trust	.277		.158	.173	.576
Abortion		.757			
Homosexuality		.361			.164
Divorce	-.181	.758		.113	-.180
Suicide	-.146	.425	.161	-.103	.118
Gender quality	.198	-.141	.556	.240	-.102
Environment	.158		.730	-.181	-.100

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

(Attempted to extract 5 factors. More than 25 iterations required. (Convergence=.005).
Extraction was terminated.)

Value Change

Related to the Process of Democratisation
in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

HOW HAVE PEOPLE in the three Baltic states changed after the fall of the Soviet Union? Do they trust the new political institutions? How do they look upon gender equality, homosexuality or abortion? What differences are there between the three countries, and how can they be explained? These are some of the questions addressed in this report. The analyses are based on data from a series of surveys carried out as part of the research project "Democracy and Social Transition in the Baltic Sea Region" at Södertörns högskola (University College).