"Real Europe" Civilizationism and the Far Right in Eastern Europe

by **Mark Bassin**

From its origins in the interwar period, the European far right has been powerfully attracted by a "Europeanist" or pan-Europeanist vision of supra-national, continent-wide solidarity and unity.[1] Despite this interest in pan-Europeanism, however, there has never been anything resembling a consensus as to what, or indeed where Europe as such is supposed to be. Very much to the contrary, Europe has been conceived by the far right in a wide variety of different forms – as a geopolitical Grossraum, a cultural-historical civilization, or an identitarian "bio-culture" and ethno-race – and its geographical boundaries have been described in a correspondingly diverse array of spatial projections. And not only did the European imaginary evolve through changing historical periods, but there was a multiplicity of far-right Europes at any given time. In the present day, there are at least three separate civilizationist discourses on the far right: one focused on Western Europe, one on Eastern Europe, and one for Russia. While they share significant commonalities, especially the first two, the three are essentially different and incompatible. Indeed, in a pioneering study of far right civilizationism in Europe,

Rogers Brubaker not only confirms these differences but concludes that the East European variant does not represent a genuine example of civilizationism at all.[2]

The perennial appeal of pan-Europeanism exposes a wrinkle in our understanding of the European far right that has never been satisfactorily investigated. It is commonly assumed that far right ideology most fundamentally speaks to and reflects nationalist sentiments – that nationalism, as one expert has succinctly put it, "is the master concept of the radical right."[3] But if this is true, then what are we to make of the supra-nationalist Europeanism just noted? The full scope of the problem comes into sharper focus if we examine the writings of neo-fascist Europeanists of the Cold War, ideologues such as Francis Parkey Yockey, Julius Evola or Jean Thiriart. Not only were they not "nationalist" in a standard sense, they were militantly anti-nationalist, trenchantly opposed to the continued existence of national communities and nation-states, which they argued should all be subsumed into a single greater-European political formation. Yockey memorably declared in 1949 that "The

nations are dead, for Europe is born." while Thiriart 1981 insisted that "the stupid and dangerous theory of nationalities ... should give way to the principle of supranationalism (*supranationalité*).[4]

This national-continental juxtaposition is still a part of the civilizationist Europeanism of the far right today, but now it takes on a new and more complicated twist. Rather than treating the juxtaposition as sort of zero-sum choice between two incommensurable and mutually exclusive alternatives, as did Yockey or Thiriart, today the supranational impulse cohabits peacefully with the traditional nationalist prioritization of the nation as a unique social community and political entity. This cohabitation, moreover, does not depend on the two somehow being kept separated in discrete affectional boxes in order to reduce the obvious ideological tension between them. To the contrary, they are actively conflated and combined, and this combination generates a synergy that is constructive and positive. The present essay will explore the dynamics of this novel juxtaposition and synergy in the example of civilizationist discourse in Eastern Europe – what I will refer to as "Real Europe civilizationism" (REC).

> What is distinctive in the contemporary discourse of REC is the very specific way it projects the two Europes as geographical entities.

Real Europe and Its Others

Civilizationism in Eastern Europe frames itself in terms of a well-established trope of the "two Europes" – one of them liberal, secular and progressive, the other traditionalist, pious and conservative.[5] Liberal Europe is embodied in the political institutions, structures and dogmas of the EU. This Europe is seen as modernist and progressive, believes in the existence of universal values and norms, and pursues an interventionist agenda aimed at reshaping all Europeans in the image of what is disparagingly referred to as "homo Brusellicus."[6] This agenda, REC claims, puts Europe's most valuable social institutions and political traditions under threat. The ethno-cultural integrity of European nations is being diluted by EU-mandated multi-culturalism, traditional gender and family roles are undermined by gay rights and same-sex marriage, and the political sovereignty of nation-states is threatened by the determination of Liberal Europe to enforce its hegemony across the entire continent. The ultimate goal is nothing less than the crea-

tion of a faceless and homogenized superstate, as free as possible from national differences.[7]

The other Europe, by contrast, is the "Real" Europe, and represents the mirror opposite. It is a spiritualized community of values, a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* that draws its inspiration from what it claims to be Europe's genuine political, moral, and cultural traditions. This vision rests on three basic pillars: family, nation-state and Christianity.[8] *Family* stands for traditional domestic hierarchies and received sexual identities and roles; *nation-state* signals the prioritization of the nation as an essentialized ethno-cultural community that has an inviolable right to political sovereignty and to defend its national interests; while *Christianity* provides a civilizational identity that unifies all of Europe's diverse peoples and serves to distinguish them from all other faith-based civilizations.

REC defines itself in terms of a mortal struggle with two hostile "Others," one internal and one external. Internally, the struggle is against the hegemonic pretences of Liberal Europe just noted, in order to resist its attempts to create a hyper-federalized geopolitical Frankenstein that is "godless, freethinking, and gender-bending."[9] Externally, REC is mobilized by a sense of mortal threat it faces from non-European migrants and asylum seekers, in particular those originating from Islamic countries. These apprehensions were fundamentally exacerbated by the immigration crisis of 2015, which served to sharpen perceptions of an active assault by immigrant populations that threatened to overrun Europe both demographically as well as culturally.[10] Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary and one of the leading proponents of REC, declared in that year that "Europe is under invasion," and he warned perilously of "an unprecedented challenge which could crush and bury under itself the form of existence we have known up to now."[11] Immigrants bring with them administrative and demographic burdens, but it is above all what are described as the civilizational values of Islam – extremism, terrorism, misogyny, and sharia law – that are perceived as alien to a Europe "rooted in Christianity", threatening its culture and heritage.[12]

There is nothing entirely new about these twin spectres of liberalism and immigration, which have been

Map over the member countries in the Visegrád group.

tory, for while it is self-evidently European, it is at the same time emphatically non-Western.[17]

Locating Real Europe

So where, exactly, is Real Europe? The answer is not entirely straightforward, complicated by the alternative valorizations of the toponymics in question. On the one hand, the logic of the east-west contrast suggests that Real Europe is the "East European" counterpart to the Western Europe just described. The designation "Eastern Europe," however, is fraught with historical associations of backwardness, provincialism, and oppression that date back centuries but remain fresh from the experience of Soviet domination. Thus, rather than "Eastern Europe", the Real Europe in question is associated with the "Mittleeuropa" or "Central Europe" toponym, which has a more distinguished resonance and – after the hiatus of Europe's Cold War bifurcation – has come back into circulation, often rendered in English as "East Central Europe."[18] The focus here are the four countries – Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – that joined together in the early 1990s to form the Visegrád Group for the purpose of promoting their common interests. Since the mid-2010s, all of these four nations have developed powerful conservative and radical-conservative movements that have reinvigorated an intraregional "normative consensus" based on notions of Europeanness that "diverge from those espoused in Western Europe."[19] The populist far-right governments of Poland and Hungary are the principal drivers of this movement – the PiS politician Adam Andruszkiewicz declared in 2018 that "It is Poland and Hungary that are becoming Real Europe"[20] – but it is the greater regional solidarity of the Visegrád four that gives rise to what has been referred variously to as a revived – and conservative – "Central European Zeitgeist"[21] or, as Brussels might see it, a kind of "Central European awkward squad."[22] The discourse of REC, by and large, is generated within this group.

The geographical association of liberal European

standard concerns for the identitarian radical right in Europe since the latter decades of the 20th century.[13] What is distinctive in the contemporary discourse of REC is the very specific way it projects the two Europes as geographical entities, framing them within a familiar model of a Europe split geographically between its western and eastern parts that goes back centuries. While one of the goals of the extension of EU membership to former Soviet block countries in 2004 was precisely to overcome and eliminate this cleavage, the discourse of Real-Europe brings it back to life in a reburnished form, and maps out the two alternative Europes within its spatial parameters.[14] Liberal Europe is identified geographically with Western Europe, liberal secularism is "Western secularism" that a "Western oligarchy" based in Brussels seeks to impose universally, and even its Eurocentrism is really "West-centrism".[15] By a subtle extension, this liberal Western Europe can then be conflated with "the West" more generally, providing a direct connection back to the original Spenglerian prognostication about how the "West" – identified in REC today as Western Europe – is in decline, "committing suicide," and "dying".[16] Needless to say, REC removes itself from this downward trajec-

values with the countries of Western Europe is a significant embellishment of the hostile juxtaposition to Real Europe, insofar as the image of a menacing Other is more effective and compelling when it is materialized and projected on the map as a distinct geographical entity. And despite the taunts about the neo-Spenglerian decline that Western Europe is supposed to be undergoing, the latter is still seen to retain a vigor and hegemonic intent that pose a clear and present danger to the integrity of Real Europe to the east. The West-European powers that control the EU are accused of having sought to impose "foreign rule," indeed even "Western colonialism" on its new member states in the east from the very moment of their accession, and this policy continues unabated. Such attempts to construct a "European empire" on the backs of the eastern countries are manifested today in the universal imposition by Brussels of liberal principles of multi-culturalism and gender fluidity, principles that as we have seen violate Real Europe's indigenous value system.[23] And while it is appreciated that Western Europe faces its own same existential challenge from immigration and "Islamism," one of the primary sources of the immigration problem – the 2015 EU-wide quotas for accepting refugees – is seen as a Western policy engineered in Brussels for the express purpose of weakening Real Europe in the east.

> **The West-European powers that command the EU are accused of having sought to impose 'foreign rule,' indeed even 'Western colonialism' on its new member states.**

Insofar as the principal overland entry points for migrants and refugees seeking entry into Europe run along the EU's south-eastern borders, Real Europe finds itself on the unstable and dangerous frontline of this incursion.[24] This positioning brings with it a special danger, of course, but at the same time it provides a vital positive element of Real Europe imaginary, namely its self-assigned identity as the bearer of a mission or European salvation. Indeed, an awareness of this role is a driving impetus of Real Europe's ethos. The savior/salvation tropes that animate and inspire REC are entangled in an ideological matrix of considerable complexity, the nuances of which are vital for the purposes of this essay. Specifically, they serve to reveal the peculiar conflation of national and supra-national narratives in this particular Europeanist vision and exemplify how the traditional disjunction between these different identity levels is transformed into a harmonious correspondence that fosters a constructive synergy.

A Christian Rampart

The conflation of narratives can be seen in regard to the identities at the center of the discourse. Who are the agents of salvation, or "saviors," and who is the target to be saved? It is out of these questions that the full complexity of REC emerges, for both of these identities are bifurcated between the national and the supranational. On the one hand, it is Real Europe as a collective entity, based on the political geography of the Visegrád group that is seen to provide the critical leadership that can lead the continent as a whole back to the spirit of a genuinely European civilization. From this perspective, the Cold War legacy ceases to be a stigma and serves instead as a positive precedent, for the collective cultural and spiritual resistance to Soviet totalitarianism offered by the countries in question is taken as evidence of their moral righteousness and fortitude. Such virtuous qualities were never matched by the nations of the West, and the implication is that they can be re-mobilized for the purposes of leading the struggle against Europe's enemies in the present day.[25] The establishment of regional cooperation schemes, among them the organization of a intra-regional Visegrád police unit dedicated to the collective management of immigration and border controls, reflects among other things a sense of regional responsibility for the greater European good.[26]

Much more resonant, however, is the notion of an individual nation as an exemplar that can help restore the genuine moral and civilizational parameters for Europe as a whole. This narrative conflates the symbology of the "nation as saviour" with that of the "nation as martyr," and is the more powerful for its familiarity, having long formed a part of the respective national mythologies of the countries in the region. It takes different forms, the most dominant being the image of the nation as an "Antemurale Christianitatis," a "Christian rampart" or "bulwark" that stands as guardian of the true faith at the front lines of battle, charged with the holy mission

of defending the whole of European civilization against incursions of the infidel assailants.[27] In Hungary, this national mythology has long provided a potent valorization of the country's difficult historical experience. In the 19th century, the ancient legacy of struggle against Tatar and Ottoman invasions was a central theme in the construction of national identity narratives. With the embellishment of the 20th century experience of resistance to Bolshevism and "Asiatic" communism, this cultural memory is effectively re-mobilized by far right civilizationist discourses of the present day.[28] A rather different "nation as holy savior" trope is the notion of Poland as the "Chrystus Narodów", the "Christ of Nations," whose political dismemberment through partition from the late 18th century is represented as a holy national sacrifice that puts Poland in a position to lead the redemption of Christian civilization across Europe.[29] The resonances across the centuries that are associated with this role are immediate and powerful.

The same national-supranational dualism regarding the identity of the savior also characterizes the target of salvation.[30] On the one hand, REC discourse operates on the level of national identity and identifies a particular national group as its primary concern. This national group is projected as a unique and sacred entity, a chosen people occupying a homeland made sacrosanct by God himself. In this connection, Christianity and Christian values, which as we have seen are an essential marker of European civilization in toto, are here nationalized as "national Christianity" or a "Christian-national vision" and are promoted as exclusively national qualities.[31] Christianity acts as "an ethno-nationalistic surrogate religion" that projects the respective nation as a chosen people, a sacred entity inhabiting a correspondingly sacred space.[32] In Hungary, Orbán identifies the national character of Christian culture as "the unifying force of the nation," something that provides "the inner essence and meaning of the state" and has a vital role "in preserving nationhood." The national-supranational ambivalence of this position is clear in his assertion that Hungary is European not because it is a geographical part of Europe but "because we are Christians"[33] Correspondingly, nationalist discourses of the populist leadership in Poland emphasize the centrality of the Christian faith as a feature of the country's unique historical path and its self-understanding as a sovereign nation.[34] The subject to be saved from all of today's threats – to Christian belief, to traditional social roles, or to the integrity of essential-

ized nationhood – is by implication the mythologized Christian nation itself.

But at the same time, REC is manifestly about the salvation of Europe as a whole, a point emphasized by the frequent references of the Polish and Hungarian governments to "saving Europe" from itself.[35] One of the more demonstrative undertakings in this regard was the decision of the Hungarian government in 2015 to defend Europe against the immigrant threat by erecting a border "wall" or barrier fence along country's southern border in 2015. This was a potent contemporary re-enactment of the ancient mission to protect Europe against invaders from the east that are civilizationally and culturally alien – and was necessary in the present day in order, as Orbán put it, "to preserve Europe's Christian values."[36] While the internal threats to European civilization cannot be repulsed in a similar fashion by a physical barrier, the discourse around REC finds other ways to preserve its identity as a defensive bastion. Krzysztof Szczerski, Chief of Staff to the Polish president Andrzej Duda and a key policy architect for the PiS party, expressed a general sentiment of his political cohort in his anticipation that that expatriate Poles living across the EU could have the effect of re-evangelising Europe and bringing it back to Christianity.[37] In 2017 the head of the party Lech Kaczynński described a Pole as "someone who points the way for today's sick Europe toward recovery, the way toward fundamental values...[and] true liberty, the way toward victory and strengthening of our civilization based on Christianity."[38]

As it is deployed in contemporary civilizationist discourse about Real Europe, therefore, the ramparts trope operates in a highly complex variety of ways. Its proponents on the far right present themselves "as working ... to defend *their national 'peoples'* from a series of bad [European] elites and 'dangerous [immigrant] Others' threatening them at national level," while at the same time "doing so to defend *a European 'people'* from [the very same] elites and 'dangerous others' at the continental level."[39]

Sleeping with the Enemy

Why is it that far-right populist leaders promote a discourse in which the appeal to traditional nationalist attachments is complicated by setting it alongside a structurally similar appeal for allegiance to a supranational entity? While there are certainly various factors at play, I would suggest that one of the more salient relates

Identitarians in Scotland in 2019. Brexit became a litmus test for the solidarity between the far-right parties across Europe.

to the particular constellation of political attachments and sentiments that are embraced by electorates and leaders alike in the region in the present day. Despite the perennial and undeniably strong appeal of nationalism and the sovereigntist defence of the nation-state, it is nonetheless a fact that many of the structures and operations of the EU remain extremely popular in the region. The electorate, it turns out, highly appreciates the privileges and freedoms – to say nothing of the funding – that membership provides.

An indicative case in point is the guarantee of free movement within the Schengen scheme. This arrangement enjoys such wide-spread support that its defence was used prominently to justify the erection of a fence along Hungary's southern border. Along with his call to block the in-flow of migrants in order to save Christianity, Orbán also emphasized the more practical intention to "save Schengen" and preserve "free movement inside the European Union." Leaders of other East European countries echoed the point. [40] Polling consistently shows popular support for EU membership in Eastern Europe to be among the highest in the Union, with approval levels measured in late 2019 at 84% for Poland, 70% for Slovakia, and 67% for Hungary.[41] Given this particular constellation of political sentiment, Kazharski's conclusion that the political leaders in Eastern Europe – despite their principled denunciations of a Godless and gender-bending oligarchy in Brussels – still "remain locked into European supranationalism" as a "precondi-

tion of their political survival" seems entirely logical.[42]

But it is not only the electorate in Eastern Europe that today discovers its inner appreciation for the EU. As the political parties of the far right have become increasingly popular and influential domestically, their position within the European Parliament has been correspondingly enhanced – much augmented by the increasing sophistication of their trans-national connections and cooperation.[43] And as they become more powerful in the parliamentary framework of European political organization, the latter becomes more useful for them, to the extent that the political elites – rather like their voters – increasingly recognize their own stake in being a part of it.

The great litmus test came in 2016, with the UK referendum on EU membership. In this exercise, the far-right parties in Eastern Europe might have been expected to demonstrate their solidarity with the cultural nationalism and nation-state sovereignism of their sister parties in Britain: UKIP and the BNP. In the event, however, they opted instead for EU solidarity, and indeed did so in emphatic terms. "Brexit is obviously a very bad event," judged Jarosław Kaczyński, and he assured his compatriots that whatever the outcome of the poll in the UK, "Poland's place is in the EU." For its part, the Hungarian government went so far as to publish a page-long advertisement in the conservative London newspaper *The Daily Mail* urging the Brits to vote remain, and offered what it apparently imagined to be a reassuring message that "Hungary is proud to stand with you as member of the European Union."[44] Since the catharsis of the Brexit victory, the far right parties have taken care to tighten up their terminology in order to distance themselves from it, rebranding their own "Euroscepticism" as "EuroRealism" and explicitly disavowing the secessionist "Eurorejectism" opted for by the British electorate.[45] The Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki subsequently described the EU in strikingly generous terms as "a great success," and both Hungary and Poland have given their support to precisely those EU-wide policies – notably the creation of a European Army – that had galvanized such widespread opposition to Europe in the UK.[46]

Conclusion

The civilizationist narrative of a Real Europe in Eastern Europe can be seen at least in part as an ideological response to the various countervailing tendencies and pressures identified in this essay. Effectively, it reflects the intricate dialectic between rejection and appropriation of the European project, a dynamic that has been in gestation really since the accession of the Visegrád countries in mid-2004 and comes now to fruition in the ideological form of REC. The point is not to reject, dismantle, or secede from the EU but rather to redesign it from the bottom up, remodel its basic principles and restructure key aspects of its operations. All of this is to be accomplished from within the EU itself, by genuine Europeans committed to the principle of European unity.[47] Here, for both Orbán and Kaczyński, are real fruits of Brexit. They are neither the actual destruction of the EU nor the enhanced legitimation of popular opposition to membership in it, but rather precisely the opposite: the creation of "a fantastic opportunity" and "historical cultural moment" for them to embark on a "cultural counter-revolution". The goal is to overhaul both the EU's underlying philosophy as well as its modus operandi, in the spirit of the same illiberalism that inspires their domestic political programs.[48] Their own particular projection of REC described in this essay is thus an attempt to incorporate and combine the disparate impulses that drive the political world in which they operate, in which the clear support for nation-state-based identities and interests sits awkwardly alongside a similarly clear commitment to a supranational formation, legitimated and indeed consecrated in the form of a traditionalist and values-based civilization. ●

References

1   Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, *L'Europe de l'extrême droite de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1991); Adelheid Zinell, *Europa-Konzeptionen der Neuen Rechten: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Frankreichs, Italiens und Belgiens* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007); Roger Griffin, "Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order, 1922–1992," in *A Fascist Century. Essays by Roger Griffin*, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), 132–180 ; Andrea Mammone, *Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Irina Knyazeva, *Europavorstellungen der Konservativen Revolution* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2017).

2   Rogers Brubaker, "Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 8 (2017): 1191–1226.

3   Tamir Bar-On, "The Radical Right and Nationalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, ed. Jens Rydgren (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 17–41, here 17–18.

4   Francis Parker Yockey, *The Proclamation of London [1949]* (Shamley Green/Indianapolis: Palingenesis Project, 2012), accessed May 18, 2015; Jean Thiriart, "L'Empire Euro-Soviétique de Vladivostock à Dublin, avant-project [1981]," in *L'Empire Euro-Soviétique de Vladivostock à Dublin* (Nantes: Arg Magna, 2018), 51–86, here 66.

5   Glenn W Olsen, "The Two Europes," *European Legacy* 14, no. 2 (2009): 133–148; Ingrid Hudabiunigg, "Contested Identities: Miroslav Krleža's Two Europes versus the Notion of Europe's Edge," in *Contesting Europe's Eastern Rim: Cultural Identities in Public Discourse*, ed. Ljiljana Saric, et al. (Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2010), 173–187.

6   Ramona Coman and Cécile Leconte, "Contesting EU authority in the name of European identity: the new clothes of the sovereignty discourse in Central Europe," *Journal of European Integration* 41, no. 7 (2019): 855–870, here 862.

7   Christopher Bridge, "Orbán's Hungary: The othering of liberal Western Europe," in *Representing the Other in European Media Discourses*, ed. Jan Chovanec and Katarzyna Molek-Kozakowska (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2017), 25–54: 36; Coman and Leconte, "Contesting EU authority in the name of European identity: the new clothes of the sovereignty discourse in Central Europe": 862.

8   Neil Buckley and Henry Foy, "The Visegrad four: Brussels eastern critics," *Financial Times* (August 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e99d3b12-6b96-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f, accessed July 1, 2021.

9   Jeffrey Haynes, *From Huntington to Trump: Thirty years of the clash of civilizations* (Lanham MD: Lexington, 2019): 192–193.

10   Sabine Volk, "Speaking for "the European people"? How the transnational alliance Fortress Europe constructs a populist counter-narrative to European integration," *Politique europeenne*, no. 4 (2019): 120–149, here 129–130.

11   Cited in Jacques Rupnik, "The specter haunting Europe: Surging illiberalism in the east," *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 4 (2016): 77–87, here 83.

12   Robert Mackey, "Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants Must be Blocked 'to Keep Europe Christian'," *New York Times* (September 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungarian-leader-rebuked-for-saying-muslim-migrants-must-be-blocked-to-keep-europe-christian.html, accessed July 1, 2021; Aliaksei Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'? The rise of the radical right and the contestation of identities in Slovakia and the Visegrad Four," *Geopolitics* vol. 23, no. 4 (2018): 754–780, here 769. Haynes, *From Huntington to Trump*: 177–178, 182, 192–193.

13   José Pedro Zúquete, *The Identitarians: The Movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Pess, 2018).

14   Buckley and Foy, "The Visegrad four: Brussels eastern critics"; Levintova/coury poland 2020: 1187.

15   Steven Erlanger and Marc Santora, "Poland's Nationalism Threatens Europe's Values, and Cohesion," *New York Times* (February 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/world/europe/poland-european-union.html, accessed June 30, 2021; Manuela Caiani and Manès Weisskircher, "How many 'Europes'?: Left-wing and right-wing social movements and their visions of Europe," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary European Social Movements*, ed. Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Ramón A. Feenstra (London: Routledge, 2019), 30–45, here 36; Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, "Internal colonization," *ECHOES (Euro-*

Essay

pean Colonial Heritage Modalities in Entangled Cities) (2018), https://keywordsechoes.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Keywords-Echoes-Ma%C5%82gorzata-G%C5%82owacka-Grajper-Internal-Colonisation-2018.pdf, accessed August 9, 2021.

16 Viktor Gield and Norbert Pap, "The 'Christian fortress of Hungary': The anatomy of the migration crisis in Hungary," *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, no. 19 (2016): 133–150, here 137–138; Minda Holm and Vibeke Schou Tjalve, "Visions of an Illiberal World Order? The National Right in Europe, Russia and the US," *NUPI Policy Note* 1 (2018), https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Visions-of-an-Illiberal-World-Order-The-National-Right-in-Europe-Russia-and-the-US, accessed July 1, 2021.

17 Bridge, "Orbán's Hungary": 43–45.

18 Péter Balogh, "The Revival of 'Central Europe' among Hungarian Political Elites: Its Meaning and Geopolitical Implications," *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no. 3 (2017): 191–202

19 Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'?": 771–773

20 Cited in Paul Srodecki, "Concluding Thoughts on Central and Eastern European Bulwark Rhetoric in the Twenty-First Century," in *Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism*, ed. Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kircher (New York: Berghahn, 2019), 374–395: here 379.

21 Rupnik, "The specter haunting Europe": 83.

22 Buckley and Foy, "The Visegrad four: Brussels eastern critics".

23 "Eastern Europeans Begin to Grow Tired of Western Colonialism," *Visegrad Post* (SEPTEMBER 14, 2017), https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/09/14/eastern-europeans-begin-to-grow-tired-of-western-colonialism/, accessed August 9, 2021; Katya Adler, "Visegrad: The Clash of the Euro Visions," *BBC News* (30 January 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42868599, accessed August 9, 2021; Brubaker, "Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective", here 1208; Magdalena Góra and Katarzyna Zielińska, "Competing Visions: Discursive Articulations of Polish and European Identity after the Eastern Enlargement of the EU," *East European Politics and Societies* 33, no. 2 (2019): 331–356: 336; Bridge, "Orbán's Hungary": 36.

24 Haynes, *From Huntington to Trump*: 176.

25 Rupnik, "The specter haunting Europe": 84.

26 "V4 To Jointly Buy Police Equipment," *REMIX News* (November 22, 2019), https://rmx.news/article/the-v4-to-jointly-buy-police-equipment/, accessed August 9, 2021; Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'?": 771–772.

27 Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kircher, eds., *Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism* (New York: Berghahn, 2019).

28 Mackey, "Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants Must be Blocked 'to Keep Europe Christian'"; Péter Balogh, "Clashing Geopolitical Self-Images? The Strange Co-Existence of Christian Bulwark and Eurasianism (Turanism) in Hungary," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* (2020): 1–27, here 5, 21.

29 Jan Darasz, "The History Men," in *Poland's Memory Wars: Essays on Illiberalism*, ed. Jo Harper (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2018), 131–159, here 133, Marysia H Galbraith, *Being and becoming European in Poland: European integration and self-identity* (London: Anthem Press, 2015): 196; Srodecki, "Concluding Thoughts": 379.

30 Rupnik, "The specter haunting Europe": 84, 83.

31 Haynes, *From Huntington to Trump*: 192.

32 Zoltán Ádám and András Bozóki, "State and faith: Right-wing populism and nationalized religion in Hungary," *Intersections*.

East European Journal of Society and Politics 2, no. 1 (2016): 98–122, here 113, 115; Frank Furedi, *Populism and the European culture wars: the conflict of values between Hungary and the EU* (London: Routledge, 2018): 56; Liz Fekete, "Hungary: power, punishment and the 'Christian-national idea'," *Race & Class* 57, no. 4 (2016): 39–53.

33 Cited in Eva S. Balogh, "Viktor Orban and the Christian-National Idea," *Hungarian Spectrum* (2015), https://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/09/22/viktor-orban-and-the-christian-national-idea/, accessed July 1, 2021.

34 Góra and Zielińska, "Competing Visions", here 335; Rupnik, "The specter haunting Europe": 81.

35 Holm and Schou Tjalve, "Visions of an Illiberal World Order?": 6.

36 Haynes, *From Huntington to Trump*: 188; Gield and Pap, "The 'Christian fortress of Hungary'": 141, 145; Buckley and Foy, "The Visegrad four: Brussels eastern critics".

37 David Cadier and Kacper Szulecki, "Populism, historical discourse and foreign policy: the case of Poland's Law and Justice government," *International Politics* 57, no. 6 (2020): 990–1011, here 999.

38 Cited in Srodecki, "Concluding Thoughts": 382.

39 Duncan McDonnell and Annika Werner, *International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020): 218, emphasis added.

40 Cited in Raheem Kassam, "Viktor Orbán: 'All the Terrorists Are Basically Migrants'," *Middle East Forum*, (November 23, 2015), https://www.meforum.org/5643/orban-terrorists-migrants, accessed July 20, 2021; Gield and Pap, "The 'Christian fortress of Hungary'": 142.

41 Richard Wike et al., "The European Union," *Pew Research Center* (October 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/the-european-union/, accessed August 9, 2021.

42 Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'?": 771.

43 McDonnell and Werner, *International Populism*: 197, 207.

44 Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'?": 774; Holm and Schou Tjalve, "Visions of an Illiberal World Order?": 8; Annabelle Chapman, "Poland's Leadership Doesn't Need 'Polexit' – It Can Undermine the EU From Within," *Guardian*, (March 10, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/mar/10/poland-polexit-eu-rightwing-law-justice-party-judiciary, accessed August 9, 2021; "Orbán on Brexit: 'There Is Life Outside of the EU'," *Hungary Today*, accessed February 3, 2020, https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-on-brexit-there-is-life-outside-of-the-eu/, accessed August 9, 2021.

45 Góra and Zielińska, "Competing Visions": 339; Buckley and Foy, "The Visegrad four: Brussels eastern critics".

46 Holm and Schou Tjalve, "Visions of an Illiberal World Order?": 8; "Czechs and Hungarians Call For EU Army Amid Security Worries," *BBC News* (August 26, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37196802, accessed August 9, 2021; "We Need To Establish a European Army," (July 23, 2016), https://miniszterelnok.hu/we-need-to-establish-a-european-army/, accessed August 9, 2021.

47 McDonnell and Werner, *International Populism*: 221–223; Kazharski, "The end of 'Central Europe'?": 774.

48 Henry Foy and Neil Buckley, "Orban and Kaczynski vow 'cultural counter-revolution' to reform EU," *Financial Times* (September 7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a, accessed July 1, 2021; McDonnell and Werner, *International Populism*: 217.