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Majority nation-building through language requirements: Minority perspectives from EU27

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Abstract

This study contributes with minority-centred perspectives to the policy trend of imposing majority language requirements on immigrants. With the aim to identify and explore (dis)connections and value conflicts between policies of national minority recognition and immigrant integration, it develops and applies four ideal types of minority-linguistic integration regimes to a mapping of integration and minority language policies in 27 European Union (EU) member states. Most states with recognized minorities are found to exclude national minorities from integration policies. The finding is connected to a discussion that identifies normative tensions between the promotion of national minority languages, the linguistic barriers faced by non-citizen migrants and the asymmetries in how identity and instrumental values are assigned to minority, migrant and majority languages. The study challenges the imposition of language requirements on immigrants and calls for contextually sensitive ways to jointly consider the position of national minorities, majorities, and immigrants in language policies.

KEYWORDS

identity values, immigrant integration, instrumental values, language requirements, national minorities

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1 | INTRODUCTION

Acquiring and demonstrating civic and linguistic knowledge has become a widely employed requirement in immigrant integration policies in Europe. Typically, states encourage and require immigrants to acquire proficiency only in a dominant language, thereby excluding recognized national minority languages¹ from integration policies. The reasoning behind language requirements for immigrants is in research on linguistic justice often normatively connected to non-identity, or instrumental, values, such as economic opportunities, democratic participation or societal unity, whereas the protection of national minority languages is generally motivated through the identity interests of the national minority. In line with the differing underlying motivations behind the policies, immigrant integration and national minority recognition are also treated as separate issues in policy and scholarship, with little consideration for their empirical and normative connections. Investigating such connections, however, enables us both to understand links between minority protection and integration and to challenge the underlying premises of the European policy trend that requires language and civic knowledge from migrants.

One rare instance of scholarly and policy connections between national minority recognition and immigrant integration can be found in relation to substate nations such as Catalonia and Flanders² where local integration policies support minority nation-building and where the minority language has instrumental functions (Patten, 2016, p. 208; Riera-Gil, 2019). In Europe, such contexts have however been characterized as nations without states rather than national minorities (Sasse & Thielemann, 2005)—indeed, most national minorities and migrants in Europe live in states where integration policies reproduce majority nationhood, where minority languages are portrayed as having low instrumental value, and where integration policies do not acknowledge multilingualism. Since research has not engaged with these most common contexts, our understandings of how national minority recognition and immigrant integration policies relate to each other remains limited. Increasing mobilities and the growing focus on linguistic and cultural requirements in integration policies nevertheless have consequences for national minorities and migrants alike, and thereby also for scholarship dealing with integration or minority recognition.

The present study aims to identify and explore (dis)connections and value conflicts between policies of national minority recognition and immigrant integration. In order to find out how recognition and integration are connected on policy level, it asks: *How is national minority recognition acknowledged in integration policies in EU27?* With the aim of extending the empirical findings to normative discussions, it further asks: *What normative tensions are revealed between the policy aims of promoting national minority recognition on the one hand, and immigrant integration on the other?* In order to answer these questions, a literature review is first carried out covering known connections between minority recognition and immigrant integration, after which gaps in prior scholarship are outlined. For the purpose of empirically and conceptually mapping the position of minority recognition in integration policy, four ideal types of minority-linguistic integration regimes are developed. A mapping of integration and minority policies in the 27 member states of the European Union is then carried out in relation to these ideal types, showing that most of the recognized national minorities in Europe are excluded from integration policies that instead promote and require knowledge in majority civics and languages.

In an attempt to understand the empirical disconnection between minority and integration policies, the study takes the majority-dominance of integration policy as a starting point for a discussion of normative tensions. Tensions are identified between the identity and instrumental values in minority recognition and integration, which are discussed in relation to aspects of territoriality and coercion found in current models of minority recognition and integration. The tensions are discussed firstly, from the perspective of national minority recognition, secondly, from the position of immigrant integration, and finally, by connecting majority, migrant, and national minority languages to identity and instrumental values.

The main contribution of the study is to challenge underlying premises behind present-day majority language requirements in integration policy by examining, in different ways, how they relate to recognized minority languages. It does so, firstly, by showing how national minority recognition is largely erased from policies regulating orientation courses and naturalization, secondly, by bringing attention to tensions between the promotion of minority languages

and language-related barriers faced by migrants, and finally, by identifying how identity and instrumental values can be discerned in relation to both majority and minority languages, including 'new', migrant languages. By analytically connecting minority preservation with immigrant integration, which is a core practice of majority nation-building, this study has implications for research on integration and national minority protection alike. Connecting an empirical mapping to normative debates that have discussed these policy strands in separation or in untypically strong contexts of minority recognition furthermore provides a synthesizing approach to the relation between policies of national minority recognition and immigrant integration, useful for scholars approaching questions of language policy, immigrant integration, or minority recognition from different normative starting points.

2 | VALUES AND PRINCIPLES BEHIND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN STATES WITH NATIONAL MINORITIES

Language requirements have become increasingly prevalent in immigration governance in Europe through a body of policies commonly labelled civic integration (Goodman, 2010; Joppke, 2007; Mouritsen et al., 2019). These policies, which closely echo each country's general language politics in terms of which languages are given a central position, primarily regulate the language(s) and value(s) immigrants are to learn by making social or political rights dependent on their acquisition. Such policies can be connected to what in research on linguistic justice is called non-identity, or instrumental values. They include ideals of ensuring communicative efficiency (Réaume, 2000, p. 249), a functioning democracy (Robichaud & De Schutter, 2012), and professional opportunities (Rubio-Marín, 2003, p. 66).

The preservation of national minority languages is instead linked to identity values that have been connected with autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995), dignity (Van Parijs, 2011), linguistic survival (Taylor, 1994) and cultural inheritance (Réaume, 2000, p. 251). Whereas identity values can be related to efforts to preserve the vitality of national minority languages and instrumental values are commonly used to justify why immigrants are to learn 'the' state language, these sets of values may conflict. In countries with competing nationalisms, or where multiple linguistic and cultural belongings are officially recognized, formulations of linguistic requirements for immigrants may lead to tensions regarding which justificatory values should direct language policy.

Taking Catalonia as an example, Kymlicka has stated that immigrants who choose to learn the nationally dominant Spanish language rather than Catalan do not make a 'neutral' choice, but 'are de facto integrating into the language, institutions and expectations of the dominant group' (Kymlicka, 2011, p. 292), which may counter the identity interests of Catalans. The choice is to a certain extent regulated through the promotion of the Catalan language in integration within the Catalan territory (Carlà, 2018). Pujolar has identified a dichotomy between an instrumental, work-related integration that is expected to take place in Spanish alongside a symbolic, cultural integration expected to take place in the Catalan language (Pujolar, 2010, p. 240). Given the instrumental usefulness of Spanish in Catalonia, but also in Spain and in the many parts of the world that have been colonized by Spanish speakers, the Catalan language may become secondary in processes of integration. A tension can thus be identified between the instrumental, communicative interests of immigrants and possible negative consequences in terms of identity for Catalans in case knowledge in the minority language is not acquired as part of integration.

To some degree, Catalonia can be said to follow the linguistic territoriality principle, according to which a language group decides over public affairs within a territory in only one language to which newcomers are to adapt (De Schutter, 2014, p. 1032; Réaume, 2003, p. 271; Van Parijs, 2010, pp. 183–184). Under the linguistic territoriality principle, the idea according to Van Parijs is to ask persons settling in a territory 'to have the courage and the humility to learn the territory's local language' by imposing a certain degree of coercion (Van Parijs, 2010, p. 183). In substate nations, minorities holding power over integration policy have the possibility of formulating restrictive, or coercive, responses where the territorially dominant minority languages have an important position in integration policy, as described by Parekh:

Many of them also seek the right to control immigration to their region not only from abroad but also from other parts of the country to avoid being outnumbered or marginalised. They want to restrict the linguistic and other choices of immigrant children lest these should over time undermine their way of life (Parekh, 2019, p. 118).

In substate nations where the linguistic territoriality principle is applied, national minority identity concerns have been identified as a factor shaping how immigration is viewed. Following Barker, 'the substate nation's claims to particular cultural or linguistic accommodation from the central state may be weakened if the linguistic balance shifts substantially in favour of speakers of another (majority) state language' (Barker, 2015, p. 25). Recruiting immigrants to learn substate languages may indeed have the function of preserving and revitalizing vulnerable languages (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 523). As Patten (2016, p. 196) has noted, in such contexts the goals of nation-building and minority language preservation do not conflict but rather support each other.

Kymlicka has justified policies that can be characterized as coercive, ensuring minority control over immigration, by stating that historical minorities *should* exercise control over 'volumes' of immigration and terms of integration in order to pressure immigrants into learning the nationally non-dominant minority language in areas with minority dominance (2001, pp. 75–76). Research on immigrant integration carried out on substates, such as Quebec (Barker, 2015; Kymlicka, 2001; Taylor, 1994), the Basque Country (Jeram & Adam, 2015), Wales (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019), Catalonia (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014), Scotland (de Casanova, 2014), Galicia (Bermingham & Higham, 2018), and South Tyrol (Carlà, 2018; Strazzari, 2016), shows how such territories operate to some extent like nation-states in relation to immigration and thereby make nation-state-like requirements on immigrants, albeit not nationally but regionally.

In Quebec, concerns over the future of the French language underpin immigration and integration policy: French speakers are prioritized when accepting immigrants, children are to attend French schools, and (French) integration courses are provided for adults (Barker, 2015, pp. 49; 57; 65). Language courses in Flanders are in Dutch (Jeram & Adam, 2015, p. 242), whereas Catalonia through different measures has promoted the use of the Catalan language in integration (Carlà, 2018; Pujolar, 2010). Some substates are also multilingual, such as the officially trilingual (Italian–German–Ladin) South Tyrol in northern Italy, where a civic integrationist logic ties social rights to knowledge of either German or Italian (Südtiroler Landesverwaltung, 2018), a policy reflecting the competing identities and linguistic separation between the language groups that extend to a restrictive approach to immigrants (Carlà, 2018, p. 1104; 1111). As such, despite the coercive policy, the choice between German or Italian is at least free to be made. Knowledge of the nationally dominant Italian language must nevertheless be demonstrated in order to qualify for national citizenship. Indeed, while many substates exercise control over local language policies on regional level, such as schooling and public services, they do not have full control over citizenship and migration policies (for Wales, see Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 521) that instead fall under the power of the central state. Despite their lack of influence over national level citizenship policy, research shows how substates actively shape local linguistic integration policies.

In contrast to the territoriality principle of substates, a personality principle whereby 'language rights track the persons wherever they find themselves in the state' (De Schutter & Robichaud, 2015, p. 90) can be identified in countries where several languages are constitutionally recognized without this recognition being restricted to a delimited territory. Research on integration in contexts where the personality principle rather than the territoriality principle is applied nevertheless remains marginal. The closest examples can possibly be found in states with multiple recognized national languages, such as Finland, Luxembourg, Malta and Ireland.

In Finland, where Swedish (5.3% native speakers) and Finnish (87.6% native speakers) are equally recognized as national languages, immigrants have the right to choose between Finnish or Swedish as the language of integration and can demonstrate the language knowledge needed for naturalization in either of the languages. Even though a territorial element can be identified in the municipality-based legislation with regard to orientation courses, the right to naturalize in Swedish or Finnish applies throughout the country. The provision of language courses in Swedish is

nevertheless demonstrated to be lacking not only in the big, majority-Finnish speaking cities where most migrants reside (Carlsson, 2017) but also in Swedish majority municipalities where Swedish is the everyday language (Pöyhönen & Simp, 2021). Given the strong legislation, the Swedish-speaking minority has nevertheless actively pushed for better implementation of the right of choosing Swedish as the language of integration. The actions are partly motivated by fears of a decline in the position of Swedish were all migrants to learn Finnish only (Carlsson, 2017).

In officially trilingual Luxembourg, the main languages are treated differently on the policy level. Since 2008, immigrants need to demonstrate knowledge of the national language Luxembourgish, which was recognized in 1984, even though French and German are also administrative languages and can be considered to have high instrumental value. While Luxembourgish is seen as the 'core' national language in the trilingual nation (Horner, 2009, p. 160), concerns about the language becoming endangered form a widely present discourse (Kremer, 2017, p. 27). Hence, even when a language is officially viewed as (co)national rather than subnational, identity interests can be identified as central when determining the language of integration.

In countries where the global lingua franca English is widely spoken, policies relating to integration and language take on an additional dimension since many immigrants already know English or may prefer to learn it over lesser spoken alternatives. Ireland and Malta have both been colonized by Britain, which has resulted in the domination of the English language in the Irish case, and its widespread use in the Maltese.³ Neither country, however, conditions citizenship acquisition with a language requirement that would promote the other national language over English. Ireland, where Irish is the first official language, has no language requirement for naturalization and Malta requires knowledge of either Maltese or English.⁴ Immigrants learning Irish in English-dominated Ireland have nevertheless found knowledge of Irish to facilitate access to economic possibilities, local acceptance, and even to counter xenophobia (McCubbin, 2010, p. 466). McCubbin further states that the utility of minority languages is often overlooked due to essentialist views on the part of majority society that see the boundaries of the language community as fixed and defined in ethnic terms (McCubbin, 2010, p. 460). On Malta, where Maltese and English are co-official and used in parallel in the educational system, the Maltese language has been perceived by some immigrant students as an obstacle and immobilizer, while others saw it as an enabling factor for mobility (Micallef Cann & Spiteri, 2014, p. 15). Instrumental functions could therefore be identified alongside identity values in relation to smaller languages in countries where English dominates or is widely used, despite the uncontested instrumental usefulness of English.

In the contexts hitherto discussed, namely, Catalonia, Quebec, Flanders, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta and Ireland, a strong linguistic recognition enables language requirements to be inclusive of minoritized languages or even to exclusively promote them. Substate nations applying the territoriality principle have been shown to hold power over the contents of integration policy on the local level, leading to a minority language presence in integration. In constitutionally multilingual states where languages may *de facto* be minoritized but are seen and recognized as (co-) national languages and carriers of national identity, research shows how minority languages are also present in national level policies such as naturalization. Also, all languages in the cases of strong recognition discussed thus far can be said to hold both identity and instrumental values.

Most linguistic minorities and most immigrants in Europe nevertheless live in territories without linguistically or ethnically formed federal arrangements,⁵ where minority languages are not in a dominant position and thus not 'queen of a territory' (Van Parijs, 2010, p. 182), nor recognized as co-national in the constitution. While we know that Dutch in Belgium, Swedish in Finland and Catalan in Spain have a presence in integration policy, there is little research about the position of most of the recognized national minority languages in Europe, such as Slovenian in Austria, Frisian in the Netherlands, Hungarian in Slovakia, Sámi in Finland or Sweden, or Turkish in Romania, in integration policies. Such belongings remain marginalized in research on integration, both in empirical and normative work.

By disregarding national minority recognition, policies of integration risk contributing to majority domination, while immigrants may be confronted with linguistic policies that do not reflect their linguistic reality. Traditionally spoken national minority languages are not only marginal in language policies regulating citizenship but they have

also become part of a richer linguistic landscape characterized by mobility, which awakens new questions in relation to the forms and functions of present-day minority recognition and integration policies. The domination of substate contexts in prior research on integration and minority protection does not only fail to address weaker contexts of recognition but also struggles to take into account complexities inherent with mobility and hybridity. Indeed, De Schutter states that the convergence of territory and language is an exception (De Schutter, 2007, p. 15) and criticizes the monolingual territoriality principle as unfit for multilingual realities, while calling for pluralism and a recognition of multiple languages rather than only one (De Schutter, 2020). Hence, adding minority contexts that involve neither substate nor co-national recognition to the research field enables a reimagining of minority protection and integration in ways that acknowledge the wide range of national belongings in contemporary Europe while challenging the majority-centredness of present-day policies.

In the following, ideal types are developed and connected to a policy mapping that firstly provides additional ways to conceptualize connections between national minority recognition and immigrant integration, and secondly demonstrates the rarity of integration policy that acknowledges national minority recognition.

3 | IDEAL TYPES OF MINORITY-LINGUISTIC IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION REGIMES

As a step towards gaining an increased understanding of both the empirical connections between policies of national minority recognition and immigrant integration and related normative tensions, four ideal types were constructed exemplifying how different minority-linguistic integration regimes can be conceptualized. The four ideal types were derived by combining the previous research overview with policies, legislation, reports and constitutions from 27 EU countries, all states that to varying degrees are immigrant-receiving and have a national minority presence. The constitutional recognition of minority languages, the provision of orientation courses in minority languages and the acknowledgement of minority languages in naturalization are the main components of the ideal types.⁶

Naturalization is here seen as the highest level of formal national inclusion, which with few exceptions is made conditional on some form of linguistic or civic knowledge. Recognition of minority languages in naturalization is therefore the strongest determiner of minority language presence in integration policy. Orientation courses provided to immigrants are included as a criterion since they reflect the core civics and language(s) that the state wishes to convey to the newly arrived. The constitutional recognition of minority languages shows to what degree minorities are recognized in their own right, regardless of their connection with integration policy. It can be seen to reflect the official position of minority languages in the state and is thereby also of importance when conceptualizing ideal types of minority recognition in integration policies (Figure 1).

The co-constitutional⁷ ideal type would recognize the minority in the constitution, while orientation courses are also provided in the minority language and the language requirement for citizenship is fulfilled by demonstrating knowledge in the minority language (if language knowledge is required). In the territorial type, the minority has constitutional recognition, courses in the minority language are provided, but demonstrating knowledge in a minority language is not enough to comply with the linguistic criteria for citizenship. The majoritarian type does constitutionally recognize the minority, but neither provides language courses in minority languages nor recognizes such languages when issuing citizenship. The exclusionary type does not provide constitutional recognition,⁸ does not offer orientation courses in minority languages, nor does it recognize minority languages in naturalization. Each of the ideal types identified can thereby also be placed on a scale showing their grade of minority recognition and their grade of minority language presence in integration policy.

Figure 2 shows that the presence of minority languages in integration policy and the grade of minority recognition are connected. According to the division into ideal types, the co-constitutional type has the strongest grade of minority recognition and the strongest presence of minority language(s) in integration policy, while the exclusionary type has the weakest minority recognition and minority-linguistic presence. In order to get an overview of the

Ideal Type	Recognition of minority in constitution	Provision of orientation courses in minority language	Knowledge in minority language sufficient for naturalization
Co-constitutional	+	+	+
Territorial	+	+	-
Majoritarian	+	-	-
Exclusionary	-	-	-

FIGURE 1 Criteria of minority language recognition for determining ideal types




FIGURE 2 Grades of minority language recognition in minority-linguistic immigrant integration regimes

prevalence of different regimes in the EU, a mapping of minority language presence in integration policies following the criteria listed in Figure 1 was carried out by going through each country's constitution, regulations on orientation courses, and naturalization legislation.

In order to acknowledge exclusionary processes in minority (non)recognition that are not visible when assessing the constitutions, the ratification of the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was added to the constitutional criterion in its operationalization. Furthermore, for those countries that do not have language requirements for citizenship, categorization was primarily made according to the constitutional recognition of the minoritized language. For instance, Ireland has the minoritized Irish language as the first official language, which places it among co-constitutional countries even though English is the main language of orientation courses provided. Sweden qualifies as the majoritarian type since it recognizes Swedish as the main language, leaving the five national minority languages with weaker recognition.

The countries used in the mapping were paired with the most suitable ideal type, while acknowledging that not all the empirical cases fully correspond to any ideal type and that the types may in some cases overlap. One such example is Belgium, which was categorized as territorial rather than co-constitutional due to the strong territorial division between the country's two main nations that commonly places it among substate nations in the literature.

Out of 27 countries, we can describe four as co-constitutional, where the majority and minority language(s) are equally recognized in the constitution and, when applicable, also in orientation courses and naturalization. This concerns Finland with respect to Finnish and Swedish, Luxembourg with respect to Luxembourgish,¹² Malta regarding Maltese and English, and Ireland regarding Irish and in part English. Three countries can be classified as belonging to the territorial regime, where minority languages are acknowledged in orientation courses (all on substate level) yet in order to be naturalized, knowledge of the majority language is required (Spain with regard to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, and Italy regarding South Tyrol), with the exception of Belgium.⁷ Fifteen are then majoritarian, including Hungary (and several other countries) in relation to Romani, Sweden in relation to the Indigenous Sámi,¹³ Germany in relation to Danish, and Cyprus in relation to Turkish. The majoritarian regime does not extend national

TABLE 1 Mapping of minority languages in integration policies, EU27

	Constitutional recognition of minority language(s) and/or ratification of ECRML	Minority languages used in orientation courses for immigrants	Minority language sufficient for fulfilling language requirements for naturalization	Ideal type
Austria	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Belgium	+	+	+	Territorial
Bulgaria	–	–	–	Exclusionary
Croatia	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Cyprus	+	–	No language requirement	Majoritarian ⁹
Czechia	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Denmark	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Estonia	–	–	–	Exclusionary
Finland	+	+	+	Co-constitutional
France	–	–	–	Exclusionary
Germany	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Greece	+	–	–	Majoritarian ¹⁰
Hungary	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Ireland	+	–	No language requirement	Co-constitutional
Italy	+	+	–	Territorial
Latvia	–	–	–	Exclusionary
Lithuania	–	–	–	Exclusionary
Luxembourg	+	+	+	Co-constitutional
Malta	+	+	+	Co-constitutional
Netherlands	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Poland	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Portugal	–	–	–	Majoritarian ¹¹
Romania	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Slovakia	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Slovenia	+	–	–	Majoritarian
Spain	+	+	–	Territorial
Sweden	+	–	No language requirement	Majoritarian

minority recognition to naturalization policy or orientation courses. Finally, five countries are exclusionary, where the minority is recognized neither constitutionally, nor in naturalization, nor in orientation courses. The main groups faced with exclusionary policies are Russian speakers in the Baltic countries, Turkish speakers in Bulgaria and all national minorities in France, including Catalan, Breton and Alsatian speakers.

The mapping has two major limitations. Firstly, the results of the mapping are based on written policies rather than actual implementation of integration policies, other language policies, or sociolinguistic realities. Hence, it does not unravel whether a language is used in everyday life or not, nor does it reflect how inclusive a society is to immigrants. Secondly, only the strongest linguistic protection is considered. Thereby, it does not address the many

minority languages, for example, in co-constitutional regimes that may have weak protection or no protection at all. Finland's co-constitutionality applies to Swedish, not to Sámi or Russian, Spain's territoriality applies among others to Catalan and Basque, not Romani or Leonese.

Even taking into account its limitations, the results of the policy mapping show how states through orientation courses and naturalization requirements perform gatekeeping acts that both regulate migrants' access to citizenship and reproduce majority-centred narratives of nationhood. Even strongly recognized minority languages are rarely included in immigrant integration policy. The sole instances of minority-linguistic presence in integration policy can be found in countries where a minority is recognized as co-national (here corresponding to the co-constitutional type) or has political control over a substate nation (here corresponding to the territorial type), which reflects the cases dealt with in prior scholarship. In these states, minorities have full constitutional rights and/or territorially bound rights, usually including political influence. Exclusionary states fulfil none of the criteria in policy, which, given their reluctance to officially recognize minorities, could be expected. What is remarkable is that the regime proven to be the most common, namely, the majoritarian, under which most recognized national minorities live, does not translate minority recognition into a more pluralist integration policy. Most countries *with* minority recognition thus exclude minority languages altogether from immigrant integration policies.

What stands out in the conceptual and empirical mapping carried out is the disconnection between minority recognition and integration policy in majoritarian regimes. The misrecognition of recognized minorities in an important policy of nation-building has implications for empirical realities, scholarship and normative questions regarding integration in states with national minorities. In the following sections, normative tensions are identified and discussed in relation to the four regimes identified. This is done, firstly, from a perspective that centres the goals of national minority recognition; secondly, from a perspective where the goals of immigrant integration are foregrounded; and finally, from a perspective that identifies commonalities between national minority recognition and immigrant integration.

4 | MINORITY LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS A DUTY OF CITIZENSHIP?

As has been established, integration policies largely reproduce majority nationhood. Even though such policies are often taken for granted and seen as serving instrumental values important for society, they require active policy-making that often takes coercive forms. As shown in Table 1, most EU member states require knowledge of the majority language and/or civics for naturalization, which exemplifies a coercive measure in the promotion of majority identity markers that may stand in contrast to minority preservationist goals. Extending the coercive measures to minority languages whose instrumental functions are less clear than those of majority languages (Robichaud & De Schutter, 2012, p. 124), would nevertheless differ in terms of both its possibilities and its consequences when compared with majority language requirements.

Research on substate nations has shown how some substate minority groups have exercised political agency by imposing linguistic requirements on immigrants in minority languages with clear instrumental value, such as French in Quebec. In majoritarian regimes where the majority language may be the one with a clearer instrumental value throughout the country, such policies are more difficult to justify. Linking knowledge of minority languages to social rights, residency or citizenship, would nevertheless lead to more people learning the minority language and thereby raise its position in society. Hence, minority-preservationist goals would be supported.

According to Van Parijs (2010, p. 188), coercive measures decided on by the state may reduce tensions between people in areas where minority languages are regularly spoken, since responsibility for the language 'choice' is lifted from the individual to the legislative level. Such measures could nevertheless also risk leading to additional tensions, especially if the minority languages are perceived to have low instrumental value. If the minority is small and legislation requires public services to be provided in the minority language, bringing about majority involvement through coercion may nevertheless be required. As Réaume (2000, p. 268) puts it, 'the state might well be faced with coercing members of the majority to become fluent in the language of the minority in order to be able to provide the

necessary services'. She thereby refers to a purely instrumental, state-initiated rationale for language learning, with the purpose of ensuring compliance with the law. In contrast, Rubio-Marín (2003, p. 79) brings up 'a duty to learn a second language for the sake of ensuring cultural empathy'. In so doing, she raises this duty above mere instrumental considerations, while still keeping its coercive dimension.

Whereas minority languages may need political help to thrive under the pressures of majority nation-building, the kind and degree of minoritization varies in different contexts. In colonized, Indigenous contexts where an unjust appropriation of territory has resulted in the language's weakened position, many would argue that past violence gives rise to a strong normative duty of preservation. For example, Albury (2015, p. 316) states that 'indigenous language acquisition is a duty of citizenship—not ethnicity—and the non-indigenous majority holds a moral responsibility to help revitalize the languages its ancestors jeopardized'. Even though the ancestors' responsibility at first hand refers to the settled majority population rather than recently arrived immigrants, scholars have shown that immigration into Indigenous territory too may bolster colonial practices (Saranillio, 2013). Indeed, Jeff Corntassel states that moving to colonized Indigenous territory can be said to carry responsibilities that go beyond a simple acknowledgement of their lands (Snelgrove et al., 2014, p. 4).

Even though the instrumental motivation for learning Indigenous languages would be low for most people, maintaining the domination of the majority language on Indigenous territory may perpetuate ongoing colonial structures. Merely acquiring knowledge, be it linguistic or historical, does however not mend past and present systemic injustice stemming from colonialism. Majority states nevertheless tend to promote a majority-centred integration without substantially acknowledging Indigenous belongings, which creates a tension with regard to the rights of Indigenous peoples to preserve and revitalize their cultures and languages.

Applying the linguistic territoriality principle and its monolingual coercive policies to colonized or other contexts where the original languages have been weakened over centuries and are thereby also absent from integration policy, reveals complexities. Language policies in Ireland have been shaped by a centuries-long colonial relationship with England, even if Ireland is today a sovereign nation-state in which Irish is the first official language. The Irish language, heavily minoritized under the impact of English, is viewed in dominant public discourses as irrelevant for modern life and thereby also for immigrants (McCubbin, 2010, p. 472). The weak position of the language in society, despite its strong official status and far-reaching revitalization efforts, may make monolingual policies redundant with regard to immigrant integration.

Colonized contexts, such as the Irish, or other minority contexts with multiple languages spoken with different degrees of vitality, infuse the underpinnings of integration policy with complexity. As De Schutter notes, '[t]he cultural world we inhabit is imbued with multiculturalism, multilingualism, and linguistic opacity. It is always characterized by vague boundaries, grey zones, minorities within minorities, bi- and multilingualism, and so on' (De Schutter, 2007, p. 15). Hence, existing policy models struggle to capture the complexities of the pluralistic and hybrid realities lived by many minorities and migrants.

From the perspective of minority protection, some degree of coercion may be desirable in integration policy, especially if the majority language has strong instrumental value. Coercion could be legitimized on the basis that all inhabitants have a minimum responsibility of at least acknowledging that they inhabit a state with a minority presence, or when applicable, reside on minority or Indigenous territory. Such a regime would be in line with Rubio-Marín's (2003, p. 79) argument that majorities have a duty to learn a minority language for reasons of cultural empathy, and also with Albury's (2015, p. 316) claim that Indigenous language acquisition for the majority population is part of the duties of being a citizen. Coercive policies may nevertheless be challenging to actually implement given that many minority groups, in contrast to the relatively wealthy substate minorities in Europe, live in areas of declining socioeconomic importance:

[N]ew speakers as a result of migration represent a relatively rare minority language new speaker profile, as the economic and social processes which contributed to the language's minorisation mean that

minority language communities tend to be sites of out-migration rather than in-migration. (Murchadha et al., 2018, p. 14)

Processes of in-country mobility and urbanization, multilingualism and grey zones, as well as shifts in linguistic environments affect both migrant and minority communities. Since the state, by recognizing historically present minorities, has made concessions to the idea of the dominant majority language being the sole language counted as 'national', models of minority recognition should be mindful of tensions related to mobility, language preservation and policies of integration. As shown in the mapping of EU27, however, policies are still far from such a situation.

To conclude, the above discussion has identified normative justifications behind majority-centred integration policies on the one hand and minority recognition on the other and shown that a tension exists between the two. Coercive, territorially based minority language policies may create tensions in relation to multilingualism and mobility, and in relation to languages that have few speakers and are of low instrumental value. Even though coercion may strengthen the position of minority languages, such concerns would have implications for immigrants in particular. The focus in the following is therefore shifted to perspectives focusing on immigrant integration.

5 | MINORITY LANGUAGES AS BARRIERS AND PATHWAYS INTO SOCIETY

Integration is a contested concept, which often means assimilation rather than mutual adaptation (Grzymala-Kazłowska & Phillimore, 2018, p. 181). The linguistic and cultural requirements in integration policies, as can be seen in Table 1, largely demand knowledge in the dominant culture(s) and language(s). An exception is co-constitutional or territorial regimes where minoritized languages are also present in integration policies. The premise that immigrants are to adopt the language(s) of the host nation is widely accepted and has generally not been contested either by citizens or by immigrants (Kymlicka & Patten, 2003, p. 6).

Immigrants are therefore faced with an expectation to adapt to national and local linguistic policies, regardless of whether these policies require knowledge of majority or minority languages. Even though both national minorities and immigrants are subject to various processes of domination and integration through their minoritized position in the nation-state, a power differential between the two groups can be identified. 'Old' minorities tend to be accepted into national narratives in a way that 'new' minorities are not (Crepaz, 2016, p. 204), and usually hold citizenship, while non-citizen migrants are subject to naturalization policies for acquiring it.¹⁴

Language has become a key control mechanism when granting formal citizenship, as we see in Table 1 where only three out of 27 EU countries do not make citizenship conditional on language skills. Since the formal rights of non-citizens are tied to language and civics, immigrants are, according to Larin (2019, p. 9), left 'in the bizarre position of being the only people whose membership depends on the performance of the receiving majority's self-representation'. In the present context, this means that knowledge of the official language and related civic knowledge determined by the majority nation regulate core aspects of formal citizenship, such as participatory rights and protection from deportation.

As previously mentioned, if minority languages were to be added to the equation of integration requirements in a state that already requires learning the majority language, it would result in additional burdens being placed on immigrants who may not wish to get involved in complex minority-majority relations. Kymlicka argues in relation to minority nationalist contestations in the UK that:

[I]mmigrants often have no desire to be dragged into these old battles. Many of them left countries with destabilizing ethnic/sectarian conflicts, and they did not come to Britain to become foot soldiers in someone else's identity conflicts (Kymlicka, 2011, p. 291)

In addition to the possible uninterest in local identity struggles, many migrants are faced with structural barriers in European societies. Nuhoglu Soysal (2011, p. 311) states that integration talk in Europe 'is a hollowed out project because it is not attentive to the structural disadvantages and discriminatory practices that disproportionately affect ethnic, religious minorities and immigrant populations, in education or otherwise'. Hence, putting barriers consisting of linguistic or civic requirements on rights of residency, voting and the right to unite with one's family adds to the structural barriers facing migrant non-citizens in society.

Persons who have immigrated in adult age into a minority context but later need or wish to move to a different part of the country may have to learn a new language in order to do so. In linguistically heterogeneous countries, language indeed has a bordering function, in which 'some communities may benefit more from a *de facto* thicker linguistic frontier limiting some forms of mobility' (Robichaud & De Schutter, 2012, p. 131). Possible barriers to mobility are strongest where the language is territorially concentrated, and coercion is applied.

Territorially concentrated languages may nevertheless also exist in exclusionary regimes where a language is widely spoken despite its weak position in official policy, such as in the Estonian city of Narva where Russian dominates. Community borders can also be fluid in relation to place and territory, creating divisions between groups residing in the same localities in majoritarian regimes too. As Table 1 and Figure 3 show, policy does not strive to make minority languages accessible for migrants, nor make them part of the official narrative of which language(s) newcomers are to learn to qualify as citizens.

Even though languages may have a bordering function, prior linguistic knowledge may also make it easier to gain knowledge in a minority language rather than the dominant language. For instance, Galician can be assumed to be easier for Portuguese speakers to learn than Spanish, Swedish will be easier for English speakers than Finnish, and Dutch will be easier to German speakers than French. In Finland, which has a co-constitutional regime, the possibility




FIGURE 3 EU27 according to ideal types of minority-linguistic immigrant integration regimes

to be naturalized by demonstrating knowledge of Indo-European Swedish has indeed provided a quicker path to citizenship among some immigrants who find it easier to learn than Finnish (Creutz & Helander, 2012, p. 123).

Access to education in minority languages may nevertheless be limited. It has been demonstrated how in both Wales and Galicia it is challenging for immigrants to access appropriate education in Welsh or Galician (Bermingham & Higham, 2018, p. 403) and in Finland the right to attend orientation courses in Swedish has been ill implemented (Creutz & Helander, 2012). When the possibilities exist, we can nevertheless see that some migrants opt for the minority language, without any coercion. If the language is not recognized in integration policy, knowledge in the majority language may have to be demonstrated during orientation courses or for naturalization, which puts an additional burden on migrants operating in a recognized minority language.

The major tension identified between minority protection and immigrant integration thus relates to the barriers migrants face in society. Additional linguistic requirements for the sake of minority language preservation can have exclusionary consequences for migrants, which should be thoroughly considered when discussing the role migrants may have in maintaining the vitality of minority languages. At the same time, even though adopting minority belongings in some cases may provide an easier way into society and thereby can be connected to instrumental values, state support for migrants to 'integrate into a minority' is scarce. In the following section, the binaries between identity and instrumental values are further challenged by discussing them in relation to majority, minority and migrant languages.

6 | IDENTITY AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUES OF MINORITY, MIGRANT, AND MAJORITY LANGUAGES

The main tensions hitherto identified relate to the preservationist aims of minority policies guided by identity values, and immigrant integration policies connected to instrumental values. By acknowledging the instrumental values of minority languages, which have been found to be understudied (Riera-Gil, 2019, p. 192), the tensions can be bridged. Immigrants may have a strong motivation to learn minoritized substate languages in order, for instance, to secure employment, such as in Galicia where Galician knowledge is important within the civil service (Bermingham & Higham, 2018, p. 399). In such cases, potential value conflicts are reconciled in the sense that the instrumental interests of integration policy, relating to economic and communicative values, simultaneously serve the identity interests of minority policy aiming for the vitality of the minority language. As has been previously noted, this applies mainly to substate nations.

Apart from instrumental interests, a minority language can also have identity value for immigrants. Irish-speaking immigrants both inside and outside the *Gaeltacht*¹⁵ have been shown to identify as 'members of the Gaelic ethno-culture' (McCubbin, 2010, p. 467). As such, the preconception that immigrant language acquisition is driven only by instrumental, non-identity values and that territoriality is required for such a process to operate can be challenged. Irish-speakers outside of *Gaeltacht* can be said to enjoy something akin to the personality principle, where language rights follow the individual rather than being territorially defined. However, the Irish case is rather exceptional, with extensive state revitalization efforts in which tens of thousands of pupils attend Irish-medium schools, and where the language is a carrier of core national identity. It nevertheless shows that the divide between identity and instrumental values is not clear-cut.

So far, we have associated identity values with minority languages. Majority language policy and thereby majority-led integration policy can be read as statements on who counts as 'us'—in other words such policies are not purely driven by instrumental reasons but also reflect identity values. If the purpose of language requirements were to ensure employability, Turkish could be required in Berlin, Arabic in Paris, or German in Las Palmas, even for the majority population. Such a suggestion could nevertheless be expected to awaken fierce opposition in present-day Europe, which indicates that the identity values of the majority nation sometimes override the instrumental values of other languages. For instance, the instrumental use of Russian in Latvia or Estonia is not something that is

identifiable in the policies here investigated. Furthermore, Patten (2016, p. 195) states that some majority nations, such as Denmark or the Netherlands, think of themselves as being speakers of vulnerable minority languages when contrasting their national languages to English. Such ideas can be expected to spill over to how integration requirements are formulated. The coercive nature of majority language requirements is therefore not merely guided by instrumental factors but can be connected to majority identity interests.

The different support given to majority, migrant, and minority languages may have negative consequences for speakers of less recognized languages. As Robichaud and De Schutter (2012, p. 136) state, '[i]f a language is not equally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members are negatively affected'. There is no reason to expect that this should apply only to national minorities—the identity interests of migrants are not negatable just because they are not (yet) seen as part of what counts as national. May (2017, p. 14) claims that, particularly in relation to languages with a large number of speakers in a state, it would 'be unreasonable not to provide some level of state services and activity in that language'. Present policies for the linguistic accommodation of migrants have nevertheless, according to Bauböck (2015, p. 218), the purpose of facilitating communication and language shift rather than paying equal respect to migrant identities. In addition to the injustice of not recognizing at least large migrant languages, the division between migrant and minority languages is also not straightforward. As Patten (2016, p. 273) points out, there are 'no reasons to expect that all cases will sort neatly into immigrants with weak claims and national minorities with strong ones'.

If few minority languages could be identified in the integration policies of Table 1, the inclusion of migrant languages in policies gatekeeping citizenship rights seems highly unrealistic. As stated above, majority identity values play a role in integration policies. Recognized or non-recognized national minority languages can therefore clash not only with instrumental values but with majority identity values. These identity values could be expected to be even more accentuated in relation to languages associated with migration in Europe, such as Arabic, as well as English which is not only a language mastered by many migrants but also a global lingua franca portrayed as a threat to smaller languages.

Even though instrumental values are commonly connected with majority languages and identity values with minority languages, we have here seen how identity and instrumental values can be discerned in relation to both minority and majority languages, but also in relation to migrant ones. Thereby, the dichotomy can be challenged and commonalities can be identified between the categories, despite the power differences that determine how languages are awarded belonging in public space. In particular minority recognition and the integration-related needs of some migrants are ill reflected in present policies that promote monolingualism and majority nation-building.

7 | CONCLUSION

By investigating connections and tensions between national minority recognition and immigrant integration policy, this study has contributed with novel, minority-centred perspectives to the study of language requirements in immigrant integration. It has developed four minority-linguistic ideal types that were applied to a policy mapping of 27 member states of the European Union, empirically establishing that connections between national minority policy and immigrant integration policy are exceptional. The most common form of minority recognition, prevalent in majoritarian regimes, was found to not lead to any impact on integration policies. Hence, national minorities were shown to be largely erased from the formal language requirements states put on immigrants, and thereby from a key policy of nation-building. By discussing selected examples from the policy mapping, the study has problematized the imposition of coercive linguistic integration requirements for the sake of minority preservation. Even though coercion may lead to more people learning a minority language, requiring non-citizen migrants to learn minority languages for the sake of their preservation would create additional societal barriers for migrants. At the same time, if minority languages are not acknowledged in naturalization, migrants who live in a minority-linguistic context may be excluded from acquiring formal citizenship. The weak societal position of minority languages was further linked to a discussion on how minority, migrant and majority languages are assigned instrumental and identity values, and thereby

importance in integration, in asymmetric ways. The study raised how identity interests related to the majority nation may prevent the use of instrumentally useful minority and migrant languages and hinder the recognition of above all migrant languages. Such asymmetries are ultimately reflections of who is—and who is not—awarded belonging in the nation-state.

The study has challenged, firstly, the majority-centredness of state-led integration policy, secondly, the foundation of coercive and territorially based language policies in the context of integration and multilingualism, and finally, the underlying assumptions behind how instrumental or identity values are assigned to specific categories of languages. Rather than imposing coercive measures on non-citizen migrants or excluding minority languages from integration policies, the study has raised the majority states' responsibility in providing appropriate conditions for minority-linguistic maintenance in ways that involve majorities, minorities and migrants in contextually mindful ways. By making the tensions behind policies of minority recognition and immigrant integration visible, the study has implications for normative and empirical research on (majority) language requirements and for inquiries dealing with connections between national minority policy and integration. The study calls for investigations that jointly consider the aims and values behind minority preservation, immigrant integration, and majority nation-building, as a path towards integration policies mindful of migrant and minority perspectives rather than those of majority nation-building alone.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ A national minority language is here defined as a nationally non-dominant language with a long historical presence within the territories of the current nation-state. The definition includes minoritized official languages and Indigenous languages. Minority recognition is here viewed as a (limited) means of minority protection.
- ² Dutch is not a minority language in Belgium, yet it can be said to be nationally non-dominant.
- ³ Maltese is as such not a minority language in Malta due to its wide use in society. However, given the strong position of English in Malta and its clear dominance globally, Maltese is in this study described as minoritized.
- ⁴ In the Citizenship Act, not explicitly in naturalization.
- ⁵ Namely outside of substates such as Catalonia, Flanders, South Tyrol or the Basque Country.
- ⁶ The material consists of constitutions and/or related legislation determining a state's official language(s) and recognized minorities, including (non)ratification of the ECRML; legislation and course websites on language/civic orientation courses; naturalization legislation of 27 EU member states.
- ⁷ While the co-constitutional and territorial types overlap in some cases beyond the empirical scope of this study, such as Quebec and Switzerland, or Belgium in the present study, such cases are categorized as territorial due to the strongly regional character of language policy.
- ⁸ When considering only constitutional recognition, only France qualifies as exclusionary. In operationalizing the ideal type, however, non-ratification of the ECRML was also taken into account for fulfilling the constitutional criterion, as non-ratification in several cases reflects an aim to exclude large minority populations from recognition.
- ⁹ As Turkish is not recognized in integration policy, Cyprus is categorized as majoritarian rather than territorial despite being an ethnically divided country.
- ¹⁰ Even though Greece has not ratified the ECRML, the Lausanne Treaty recognizes the Turkish minority, which is why Greece is counted as majoritarian.

- ¹¹ Portugal has no other national minorities than Roma, among whom very few speak Romani. Even though the non-ratification of the ECRML indicates an exclusionary act towards the minority, Portugal is classified as majoritarian due to the comparably weak exclusion when contrasting to states here categorized as exclusionary.
- ¹² When regarding Luxembourgish as a minoritized language in contrast to the official, dominant French and German.
- ¹³ Sweden does apply some degree of territoriality to the Sámi. While many majoritarian regimes do so, the territorially based governance of majoritarian regimes is weaker than in substate nations, and minority territories in majoritarian contexts generally enjoy only weak political influence on municipal level or are minoritized also in the recognized minority territories.
- ¹⁴ Acknowledging exceptions, especially with regard to Roma but also some Russian speakers in the Baltic states.
- ¹⁵ Primarily Irish-speaking region.

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