



NORTH AND SOUTH

European Social Democracy
in the 1970s

Editors
Alan Granadino,
Carl Marklund
& Johan Strang

RIL

ADE

05-83-77

SAMTIDSHISTORISKA FRÅGOR 43

NORTH AND SOUTH

European Social Democracy
in the 1970s

Editors
Alan Granadino,
Carl Marklund
& Johan Strang



Trycksak
3041 0865

Samtidshistoriska institutet
Södertörns högskola
SE-141 89 Huddinge

shi@sh.se
www.sh.se/shi

© Samtidshistoriska institutet

Cover image: A demonstration in Oporto in April 25,
1983 by Henrique Matos
Cover: Jonathan Robson
Graphic form: Per Lindblom & Jonathan Robson
Printed by: E-print, Stockholm 2021

Samtidshistoriska frågor nr 43
ISSN: 1650-450X
ISBN: 978-91-89615-42-7

Contents

| | |
|----------------------|----|
| Introduction..... | 5 |
| Participants..... | 9 |
| Abbreviations..... | 11 |
| Witness Seminar..... | 13 |
| References..... | 73 |

Introduction

The early phases of the current coronavirus pandemic showed the vulnerability of European societies. Public health systems proved to be underfunded, markets were unable to cope with the demands generated by the pandemic and new views on the perils of globalization have had profound effects on international relations. These issues have been tackled with increasing government intervention and a slow but significant degree of EU coordination. Sometimes, these responses have been interpreted as a revival of social democratic ideas and practices, indicating a return of the strong state and the primacy of politics over economy. However, if social democracy has found new momentum, it has not led to a concerted transnational party movement.

In their response to the current crisis, governments with social democrat representation in the EU (Spain, Portugal, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Czech Republic) have failed to demonstrate any ideological affinity or social democratic solidarity. Instead, the apparent frictions within the EU are reproducing an increasingly visible breach between Northern and Southern Europe that is visible also within the social democratic movement itself. The European debt crisis of 2008, the migration crisis of 2015 and the recent negotiations on a Covid-19 rescue package have reinforced the idea that Europe at large has not been able to successfully bridge the structural and cultural differences between North and South. As a consequence, essentialist and fatalistic narratives assuming a deep disentanglement between the North and the South of Europe are reinforced.

The tension between the national welfare states and transnational solidarity is a recurring theme in the intellectual history of European social democracy. At this point in history, however,

we think that it is important to recall relevant positive examples of entanglement and international solidarity between Northern and Southern Europe, and between Europe as a whole and what today we would call the Global South. An outstanding example occurred during the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s. Transnational solidarity and cooperation helped the socialist parties of Southern Europe to play a relevant role in these transitions. Thus, cooperation between Northern and Southern European social democrats/socialists was an important factor contributing to the establishment of a Western kind of democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece, and to the stabilization of democracy in Italy. This cooperation not only entailed practical aid and ideological support, but also activated productive exchanges on the future of social democracy in view of current challenges, as well as mutual learning between Northern and Southern labour movements. These exchanges, in turn, played into broader debates on the future of the welfare state where Nordic experiences were intensely “modelized” for external as well as internal usage.

In the next pages we explore these episodes from the privileged perspectives of the actors involved in them. Furthermore, we use this multiple perspective to inquire into the transformations that social democracy and Europe at large experienced in the 1970s.

There is an overall agreement in scholarly literature that social democracy was placed on the defensive across Europe as a result of the combined effects of the oil crisis, economic stagflation and neoliberal advances from the mid-1970s onwards, imperiling the welfare state and redistributive policies. As a result, during the 1980s and 1990s, a new kind of social democracy emerged. By embracing third-way politics, it sought to find accommodation with neoliberalism and to cope with the new international post-Cold War order, globalization and the decline of the organized working class in Europe. Social democracy survived electorally, but its ability to enact progressive and egalitarian reform dwindled. The social democratic Nordic welfare states were reinvented as neoliberal competition states, and social democracy in general failed to provide a positive model for Eastern Europe, when these

countries made their transition from communism after the end of the Cold War. Together, all of this has contributed to not only the sharp rise of socioeconomic inequalities, but also the recent emergence of right- and left-wing populism across Europe.

The 1970s was a watershed for Europe and for social democracy. Economic crises, regime changes in Southern Europe, and rising neoliberalism posed challenges and offered opportunities that shaped the end of the 20th century. In order to shed light on the period and on the interactions of Northern and Southern Europe, a group of scholars at the Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn University (Carl Marklund, Norbert Götz, Ylva Waldemarsson) and the Centre for Nordic Studies, University of Helsinki (Alan Granadino, Peter Stadius, Johan Strang) jointly organized a witness seminar on “North and South: Social Democracy in the European 1970s” at Södertörn University on October 15, 2019.

With this witness seminar we also propose a new perspective on these years. Departing from the vantage point of the Nordic and Southern peripheries of Europe and the personal experiences, interpretations and emotions of the actors that contributed in shaping that decade, the witness seminar provides unique access to the European democratic Left’s reflections on its own identity, the idea of socialism and how to achieve it. All of them, Pierre Schori (former International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party), Valdo Spini (former Vice-Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party), Ulf Sundqvist (former Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland), and Jaime Gama (founding member of the Portuguese Socialist Party), developed their political activity in a moment of ideological uncertainty, reflection, and transformation for the democratic Left. Therefore, their recollections, even if they are mediated by the present, are valuable for grasping the mood of this interesting time.

The seminar was recorded by Pontus Juth, after which Alan Granadino and Carl Marklund transcribed and edited the text. The witnesses have read the transcripts and made some minor clarifications and corrections. The audio recording of the seminar

has been transcribed with minimal language editing to reproduce the conversations as accurately as possible. Thus, there are also one or two statements marked with [inaudible]. Notes to personal names, literature, etc., have in some cases been inserted.

Alan Granadino, Tampere University

Carl Marklund, Södertörn University

Johan Strang, University of Helsinki

Participants

Researchers

Alan Granadino, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University.

Carl Marklund, Researcher, Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University.

Ylva Waldemarson, Research Director, Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University.

Witnesses

Jaime Gama, founding member of the Portuguese Socialist Party, Minister of Internal Affairs 1976–1978, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1985, and once again from 1995 to 2002.

Pierre Schori, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party Board 1968, editor *Tiden* 1971–1973, Desk Officer Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1971, Deputy Director Prime Minister's Office 1973–1976, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party 1976–1982.

Valdo Spini, Vice-Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party 1981–1984.

Ulf Sundqvist, Minister of Education 1972–1975, Minister of Trade and Industry between 1979–1981, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland, 1991–1993.

Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|---|
| CENS | Center for Nordic Studies |
| CFDT | Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail |
| CGIL | Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro |
| CISL | Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| FNLA | Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola |
| FRELIMO | Frente de Libertação de Moçambique |
| INF | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty |
| SHI | Samtidshistoriska Institutet |
| MPLA | Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NIEO | New International Economic Order |
| PASOK | Panellínio Sosialistikó Kínima |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| PSI | Partito Socialista Italiano |
| PSIUP | Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria |
| PSOE | Partido Socialista Obrero Español |
| PSU | Parti Socialiste Unifié |
| RDC | République démocratique du Congo |
| ReNEW | Reimagining Norden in an Evolving World |
| SI | Socialist International |
| SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands |
| UGT | Unión General de Trabajadores |
| UIL | Unione Italiana del Lavoro |
| UNITA | União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola |
| UPA | União dos Povos de Angola |
| USO | Unión Sindical Obrera |

Witness Seminar

Ylva Waldemarson

First of all, dear all, thanks for being here with us today. My name is Ylva Waldemarson and as the Director of the Institute of Contemporary History I warmly welcome you to today's witness seminar, with our four witnesses: Pierre Schori, Valdo Spini, Ulf Sundqvist and Jaime Gama. Our witnesses will be soon more properly introduced by Alan Granadino. The Institute of Contemporary History (SHI) has been arranging witness seminars for twenty years now. Witness seminars have been and are a central part in our engagement in creating new sources for contemporary history, and there are several reasons why these seminars are of vital importance. Firstly, it exists to compensate for the gaps in the traditional public written source material. Secondly, political decision making is also influenced by the informal side of politics that takes place outside the rooms where political minutes are written. Thirdly, the conversation with the witnesses not only brings about new information or knowledge, but it also reveals new fields to be researched. But also, and this is an important point, also the conversation between the witnesses is important. It is one thing to remember your political past on your own, but in a witness seminar the memory process partly becomes a joint adventure, which many times helps to awaken memories that otherwise would not have been brought into mind.

To be a witness, as well as to listen to a witness seminar, is certainly to take part in an exciting and often surprising event. Today's witness seminar is the result of a cooperation between Nordforsk and ReNEW, Centre for Nordic Studies at the University of Helsinki and SHI. However, the planning of the seminar is first and foremost the work of Alan Granadino, historian, at this

moment at Tampere University. And thanks to Alan's engagement we have been given the possibility to take part in the most interesting phase of modern political history today. And not the least, this possibility is enabled by our four witnesses and their willingness to share with us their political experience and knowledge. And with these words I will give the word to Alan Granadino who will introduce our witnesses with more detail and, also with some words about the context of this witness seminar. Thank you.

Alan Granadino

Thank you very much Ylva for the introduction to the seminar. First of all, I would like to thank all the co-organizers of this seminar for having made possible the organization of today's event. I am grateful to the professors and researchers from the Institute of Contemporary History, here at Södertörn University, and also from the Center for Nordic Studies at the University of Helsinki.

Now I will introduce myself very briefly. My name, as Ylva just said, is Alan Granadino, I am from Spain and I am a researcher at the Tampere University in Finland. I obtained my PhD at the European University Institute in Florence, where I wrote a dissertation about the role played by European social democracy in the evolution experienced by the Spanish and Portuguese socialist parties during the transitions to democracy in the Iberian Peninsula. I especially focused on the relations of the Iberian parties with the French Socialists and the British Labour movement.

While writing my thesis I realized that the Nordic social democrats were relevant actors in that story, and that at some point I would need to investigate this connection. Furthermore, my experience as a Spanish person living in one of the Nordic countries, in Finland, increased my curiosity and my willingness to connect, or at least explore the connections, between the North and the South of Europe. An aim that was also influenced, and further encouraged, by the perspectives used and the work carried out at the Center for Nordic Studies at the University of Helsinki, with which I made contact when I arrived in Finland.

So, these interests and ideas combined with the interest of the Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn in oral history through witness seminars. And the fact that both Helsinki and Södertörn are partners in the Nordic University Hub called ReNEW (Reimagining Norden in an Evolving World: An Excellence Hub in Research, Education and Public Outreach), provided the right platform and has been key in making the organization of the seminar possible.

Thank you very much and please now let me introduce our distinguished guests here today. Starting from this side, the speakers today will be Jaime Gama, who is one of the founding members of the Portuguese Socialist Party. He was elected deputy to the assembly of the Portuguese Republic in 1975. He served as Minister of Internal Affairs between 1976–1978, and as a Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1985, and once again from 1995 to 2002. Moreover, he served as Minister of State and Minister of National Defence in 1999, and Minister of State from 1999 to 2002. From 2005 to 2011, he was President of the Assembly of the Portuguese Republic.

Then, to his right we have Valdo Spini, who was member of the Italian Socialist Party from 1962 to 1994. In 1972 he entered the Central Committee of the party and by 1976 he had become an elected and full member of the Committee. In 1979 he was elected to the Italian Parliament, and re-elected seven times, if I am correct, until 2008. In 1981 he became Vice Secretary of the Socialist Party, a position that he occupied until 1984. Later, between 1993 and 1994 he served as Italian Minister for the Environment.

Then, to his right we have Ulf Sundqvist, who has been member of the Social Democratic Party of Finland. He was elected to the Finnish Parliament in 1970 and then served as Minister of Education between 1972 and 1975. Later, between 1979 and 1981, he served as Minister for Trade and Industry. In 1991 he was elected Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland, a position that he occupied until 1993.

Finally, we have Pierre Schori, who has been the international secretary of the Swedish Social Democrat Party during the entirety of the 1970s. Pierre Schori was also Secretary General of Sweden's Foreign Ministry between 1982 and 1991,¹ later member of the cabinet between 1994 and 1999 and Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for issues of foreign aid and migration. He has also been a Social Democratic member of the European Parliament, and Sweden's ambassador to the United Nations.

It is a great pleasure for us to have you here today. Please welcome our panel!

Now I give the floor to my colleague Carl Marklund, the chair of this seminar, who will now provide us with a general historical context of the events we are going to discuss today.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much Alan. So, as you can hear Alan is the real expert of the topic for today, so you may wonder what am I doing up here then? Well, my name is Carl Marklund, I am a political scientist and historian and I am working as a researcher here at the Institute of Contemporary History as well as at the Swedish Labour Movement Archives and Library, which is just across the railroad tracks from here.

Alan, then, is in charge of the overall structure of the themes to be discussed today. My role is going to be to moderate the conversation between our witnesses today, to the extent that this will at all be needed, because I know that this is a very tight group. While the Institute of Contemporary History has successfully collaborated with our close international partners before, such as CENS in Helsinki (I would like to show you an example, an output from that collaboration: a book edited by Norbert Götz and Johan Strang)² this is the first time we do this kind of thing, a witness seminar, entirely in English. And we are all very grateful to Alan,

¹ Officially, the title is State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

² Johan Strang & Norbert Götz (eds.), *Nordiskt samarbete i kalla krigets kölvatten. Vittnesseminarium med Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Mats Hellström och Pär Stenbäck* (Stockholm: Samtidshistoriska frågor, 2016).

that he has been the driving force behind today's seminar, and together with his colleagues, such as Peter Stadius and Johan Strang are coming here to us from Helsinki. We are very happy to welcome them here today. Also, my colleague Steffen Werther will be helping us with the technicalities and also with the posing of questions at the last round, the last half hour. We are going to record this, this is part of the set-up of a witness seminar, and again it is Steffen who is providing the technical support.

Before I begin, or we begin, I will also like to say a few words to situate today's conversation in the broader context of the economic and political tensions of the 1970s, and to explain how we hope that today's witnesses can help us understand those tensions better. As Ylva has already mentioned, the purpose of a witness seminar is to get behind the scenes of a complex series of events and processes, but it is also a question of opening up for new avenues of research. There is in fact only so much that can be written down and can be know from archives and news sources. We hope that today's open conversation between key actors in the transformation of European social democracy in general, and the transition to democracy in the Iberian Peninsula in particular, will generate new insights for us as researchers. Insights which can serve as the basis for taking a fresh look at the 1970s, with North-South solidarity and tensions at the forefront of our mind.

By the early 1970s, European social democracy had long struggled not only with Cold War bipolarity and the rise of the decolonizing Global South, it was also confronted by vocal new Left radicals across Europe and the world, sometimes known as the 68-generation. Some of these radicals criticized the Western welfare states for protecting, rather than dismantling capitalism at home. They also criticized the superpowers for their proxy wars across the global south, the persistent poverty and racism in the Global South as well as the risk of new colonialism resulting from bipolar conflict. But they also pointed to how even small and neutral states, such as for example Finland and Sweden, participated in an exploitative world market. Yet, many new left critics also saw great hope in the radicalization of reformist social

democracy, as a more humane alternative to the bipolar Cold War. And perhaps as a true way towards real socialism.

At the same time, by the early 1970s, highly visible leaders of the Global South itself, such as Cuba's Castro, Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, Algeria's Houari Boumédiène, Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and Agostinho Neto of Angola, and many others, revealed and renewed the men of the so-called "Third World." Successful national liberation struggles and shifting market conditions seemed for a while to push the West back, especially after the US withdrawal from Vietnam in the spring of 1973 and the oil crisis later the same year. Prominent Third World leaders called for a non-aligned third position in the bipolar Cold War and a more just world market embodied in the calls for the so-called New International Economic Order, the NIEO. At the same time, it is clear that the competition between the superpowers, the USA, the Soviet Union and China, for influence across the world would not end, as exemplified by the US support for Pinochet's coup against Allende in Chile, also in 1973.

Western European social democratic leaders, such as Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme, but also Trygve Bratteli, Anker Jørgensen and Kalevi Sorsa responded to these inner and outer challenges by reaching out to progressives worldwide in criticizing the superpowers in solidarity with small states and colonized countries across the world. Perhaps most famously, Olof Palme condemned the US Christmas bombing of Hanoi in 1972, on the one hand resulting in a diplomatic freeze between the US and Sweden, on the other, this garnered a lot of praise for Palme and Swedish social democracy, which can be exemplified by this image:

It is important to remember that this solidarity with the Third World also went hand in hand with calls for deeper economic democracy at home, peaceful global development and more self-determination for small states internationally. While in government in Sweden, Austria and West Germany, respectively, Palme, Kreisky and Brandt played key roles in revitalizing the Socialist International (SI) and oversaw its expansion to sister parties in the Global South from the mid-1970s onwards. In some ways, Kreisky, Palme and Sorsa, as leaders of neutral countries, had

more leeway in the bipolar Cold War than Brandt did. To the neutrals, the *détente* of the early 1970s and the rise of the Global South presented a window of opportunity. However, it also posed new risks, since the credibility of social democracy hinged upon its ability to really present an alternative in times of bipolar Cold War struggle, without provoking any of the superpowers unnecessarily.

The so-called Carnation Revolution in Portugal on the 25th of April 1974, brought forth some of the more direct tensions of the 1970s. It was directly caused by the cruel colonial war in the Portuguese colonies, which were some of the last colonies to remain colonized. It also activated a number of critical tensions, as pointed out by the historian and fellow colleague Kjell Östberg in his 2009 biography of Olof Palme.³ It set colonialism against national liberation, it set the North against the South, it set dictatorship against democracy, superpowers against small states, capitalism against socialism, liberal parliamentary democracy against experimental participatory democracy. Developments in Portugal and later Spain meant that European Social Democratic parties had to relate to these tensions and find strategic answers to them. It is this interesting process we are now turning to. Perhaps we will not be able to cover all of these tensions today, but we hope to be able to at least discuss some of them.

But before we get to our first question, I would like just to mention one very important item of today's business proceedings: coffee. At some point during our program, notably around 14:30, we will have a coffee break, and after this we will continue for about another hour. At the end, we will open up for questions from the audience and we will continue until 16:00.

Ok, now I will give the word back to Alan, who will introduce the first theme and the first question as well. Thank you so much.

Alan Granadino

Thank you Carl for the clearly depicted context. Now we would like to focus on one outstanding example of informal trans-

³ Kjell Östberg, *När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969–1986* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2009), pp. 133ff.

national cooperation, such as it was: the Committee of Friendship for Democracy and Socialism in Portugal, created after a meeting of the main European social democrat leaders at Haga castle, outside Stockholm, in 1975, under the auspices of Olof Palme and Willy Brandt in order to discuss democratization together with the leader of the Portuguese socialist party, Mário Soares. The creation of this informal committee is considered to have been very relevant in shaping the strategy of the Portuguese Socialist Party as well as the democratic evolution of the Portuguese Revolution. It was created in the moment of greater radicalization of the revolution, the so-called hot summer, a moment that coincided with the peak of the process of *détente* in Europe; the Conference of European Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Helsinki ended the day before the social democrat meeting in Stockholm. Interested in the promotion of pluralistic democracy in Portugal, and in keeping the political, ideological and geo-strategic equilibrium of the continent, representatives of the Swedish, Finnish, Italian and the Portuguese parties among others participated in this meeting.

So, we would like to ask you, first of all, how were you personally involved in the planning and/or development of this committee? And if you were not involved, how did you perceive such a relevant example of transnational social democrat cooperation?

I think that we could start from that end of the table, with Pierre Schori, please.

Pierre Schori

Thank you. Well, there is a lot to be witness to in this context, and I will answer your question and I will only refer to a chapter I wrote in my book,⁴ which is here, on what I called the Western dictatorships: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. There, in detail, I record our involvement with social democracy – Swedish and friends – since the 1960s, and even before that with Spain... during the Civil War. We could say that what the parties did, we

⁴ Pierre Schori, *Minnet och elden: En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2014), Chapter 7, pp. 323–396.

had an exceptional cooperation between the social democratic parties. Especially within the Nordic group, we had special Nordic meetings of trade unions and party leaders, and then we had the international secretaries who met regularly and so on. Then, we had the Socialist International, which at the time was an efficient organization with its own bulletin. Here is one from the 1970s, which was circulated worldwide, and we also had one in Latin America, I think at least since 1969, where you could exchange information without the internet, between like-minded people.⁵

What we also focused on was very practical cooperation. In the cases of both Portugal and Spain, we developed a system of sending information to opinion makers, in both Portugal and Spain, from Sweden in neutral envelopes or in envelopes of organizations like the Tenants' Association, the Cooperative Movement association of cooperative movement and so on, to specific people. In that way we could inform our friends in Spain and Portugal, who were shut off from information about what was happening in the world, but also, we could inform about the things we wanted to do. So, it was a very efficient system of concrete solidarity. After the revolution in Portugal, we established cooperation between cities and districts. So, we had a map here of Portugal, and there we marked on the map all the Swedish party districts that selected an organisation in the region and that developed a cooperation "people to people", so to say, which worked autonomously from the party leadership, encouraged by its own life. A little bit like how Obama worked in his election campaign, by the way. So that was very important, and during the years, the decades, I had the privilege of being (over twenty years, since 1965) together with Olof Palme in this. And during this time, you develop, of course, a network of utmost importance, which is still existing today, so to say. But this was very important in the situation, in the world described just here, because there was the East-West tension, and that obscured most other things.

⁵ *Socialist Affairs*, published by the SI in London since 1971 and *Boletín del Secretariado Latinoamericano de la Internacional Socialista*, published in Montevideo, beginning in 1956, respectively.

But, therefore, the practical focus of social democracy at the time was the three Western dictatorships. There we had an angle, we had to work against NATO, of course, which was not so interested in the right of our own countries and in the populations of those countries, but we developed a special cooperation which culminated in the Haga meeting. But there are many incidents one could choose to recall, which I will not do here but which I have done in my book:⁶ how, for example, we worked undercover and how we took the very early contacts with Spain and with Portugal at the time. And, also, we developed a special relationship to the outside powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. So, it was Willy Brandt, basically, who had to deal with the Russians and Olof Palme with the Americans. So, we dealt a lot with those and others to tell them about what was happening and what they should do and not do. And we had several conversations between Palme and Kissinger on Portugal and Spain, and he did not at all in the beginning buy our line, namely that you had to include the communists: don't fight them, let them work with the socialists if they want! and vice versa. At the end Kissinger agreed that we were right both in Portugal and Spain. He thought, Kissinger, that Mário Soares was the Kerensky of Portugal and that the military would establish an Algerian kind of dictatorship. We said, that this was wrong, and we had to fight it. And in Spain the same thing, they wanted the Spanish Socialist Party not to work with Comisiones Obreras and others, and we said that they must do it with your support in Spain and Portugal, which Kissinger didn't want at all, but he changed his mind. Actually, he recognised Palme before he died that "you were right, and we were wrong".

So, just before the Haga meeting in August 1975, we had had the Helsinki summit conference, the European security conference in Helsinki in July, and here I have a secret document which I keep in my files, about the conversation between Olof Palme and Henry Kissinger, on July 30. As you know, the United States had recalled their ambassador from Sweden because of Palme's protest against the Hanoi bombings and so on. So,

⁶ Schori, *Minnet och elden*.

Kissinger asked for this meeting with Palme in Helsinki, and then he said: "After Vietnam, what can we quarrel about now?" and then Palme said, "there are several subjects to quarrel about." Then there was silence for a while. Should we continue quarrelling? Not necessarily, Palme said. Kissinger said, how do you see the situation in Portugal? And Palme said that we are going to convene a meeting in Stockholm tomorrow, with all the social democratic top leaders and we don't think yet that the troika in Lisbon will hold and the communists are weak, and they follow the Leninist method of taking over trade unions, the media and so on. But that will fail, because the military are also split. We know that because we have met with them. But, he said, we don't want this to develop into a Prague, because it will end up as Chile, Palme said. "Whose Chile?" said Kissinger, "Allende's or Frei's?". "Pinochet's" said Palme. And then they argued and discussed, and so on. And finally, we said to them that we were going to support the socialists even if they worked with the communists or the military. We would do that. After that, Mário Soares also insisted that we should invite the military; he would call the Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the leading militaries ... to come to Sweden to learn about how the military are integrated into society, and so on. So, they were integrated in the Swedish sauna – in the *bastu* at the Prime Minister's summer place Harpsund and they came, and they were very strange. We took them to the trade union school, these military, and when we entered the restaurant where the students were eating, the students started singing the *Internationale* and Rosa Coutinho and Otero Carvalho were standing flabbergasted like this and one asked the other, "who is the enemy?"

But they were not so convinced that we, we ... they met the Swedish commander in chief and so on. But they said, we will support you. We have two legs in the Portuguese revolution, we have the left leg, which is communist, and the right leg, which is Mário Soares, but anyway we learnt from them, the military, (they learnt a lot from us) but we learnt from them that they had been colonized by those who they were colonizing in Africa. Because they had learnt about Cabral, Neto, and the others when they had

interviewed prisoners taken from the guerrillas, and they had been convinced that they were wrong, that the Portuguese were wrong, and that it was all going down the drain. And they learnt about the struggle and the strength of that struggle, which I of course didn't know before, so therefore they changed their minds in the colonies, and they stopped colonization and started the revolution.

So, the meeting, of course, took place at a moment of tremendous and unique strength for European social democracy at the time. And, I mean, who were there? I mean Bruno Kreisky, Anker Jørgensen, Harold Wilson, Joop den Uyl, Yitzhak Rabin, Trygve Bratteli, Helmut Schmidt, Olof Palme, Kalevi Sorsa, Mitterrand, Bettino Craxi, Reiulf Steen, Willy Brandt, Callaghan, etc. So, we did this division of power to work on those who were not interested or worked against, as we saw, progressive forces in Portugal and Spain.

My first visit – and I will end with this, since I have been asked to have an anecdote ready – was in '69, when I went in, and I... no, my first was in '67 ... that's when it happened, and I received the first list ever made of Portuguese political prisoners by Amnesty International for Portugal. They asked me to take it out, to smuggle it out, from Portugal, and I have all the names of the political prisoners at the time, so I put the list into my underwear and took it out that way. And of course, it became big news that I smuggled secret papers in my underwear. But, we had also a guy with us ... when Mário Soares and the socialists, *Acção Socialista Portuguesa*, had their first meeting, which was an undercover meeting, you could say, in Lisbon in October 1969. Present there was a Swedish journalist, Staffan Heimerson, who I had asked to be there. I kind of smuggled him into the meeting, because it was very clandestine and he, I asked, must not write anything which could compromise the socialists because they were illegal and, of course, any contacts with the African liberation movement was considered an act of treason. But, when I was introduced there in 1969, at the congress, Mário Soares said that the Swedes and the European social democrats do not only help us, they also support the liberation struggles in Africa ... then everybody stood up, and

so on ... Staffan Heimerson wrote about that, and of course there was tremendous angst in Portugal among our friends, and strong reactions from the regime against us, and from our embassy, which was very much integrated with the regime ... and the ambassador also retired there without any taxes to pay, afterwards.⁷ Many of those things we took part in.

I wanted to say also, as we have our valued Italian friends here, is that when the Portuguese produced *Portugal Socialista*, their little leaflet, which we smuggled in thin paper ... and the Spanish *El Socialista*, which we also smuggled in, it was printed in Italy! It was also supported by the French. So, we had a cooperation there.

Alan Granadino

Thank you, thank you very much, Pierre. Before going into other questions – we will ensure there is some interaction later – let's move to Ulf Sundqvist.

Ulf Sundqvist

Thank you. First of all, I have to apologize for my accent. I'll try to be as clear as possible. I am a former cancer patient, and therefore my speech is a bit strange. There is not too much to add to what Pierre Schori has already said. And he was one of, as presented in his opening remarks to us here, the witnesses to what really happened during the time of the Portuguese Revolution or, as we'll see later, the democratization of Spain that continued then in the Western Europe. I would like, for some minutes, to go back to the broader context introduced by Carl. Both in Spain and Greece, there at least symbolically, were really important victories for our movement as well as for the democratic movement in Europe and in the world all together. But they were not isolated phenomena, we were certain about a period of rapid changes, starting already in the late 60s by Vietnam, by the Soviet intervention in Prague, by the developments in Africa and the colonial powers and the warfare in Africa and the change in Latin America.

⁷ Gunnar Dryselius (1907–1982), jurist and diplomat, served as Swedish Ambassador in Lisbon 1964–1970 before retirement.

Until the 60s and 70s, the Socialist International was very much a movement for the Western societies and also a movement that was contained by NATO, very much. But those friends I have been referring to, opened up the situation for a wider political activity, and that was also the time when the Nordic parties, one by one, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian party, but also the others, ended up starting a web of international activities, all together, starting influencing the Socialist International, and playing also a very important role in the development of *détente* in Europe. And I would defend this, if I wasn't wisely for the Conference of European Security and Cooperation, because the third basket of the Helsinki declaration had an impact and indeed had hidden impacts that shouldn't be underestimated. So, I would like to underline the fact that the change of atmosphere in the global political scene also had an impact on the middle powers. You refer to the change in the US attitude. I would like to refer to the change in the Soviet attitude. The Russians had to admit that something had happened after Prague also in their own movement up to the CSCE in Helsinki. And then, the development continued, so I would say that the 1970s, the changes, the democratization of Europe, the crushing of the dictatorships in Western Europe, which was the prelude to the 80s, and to the change after '89, to enter the situation we are in today. Finally, I would say that I was Secretary, Party Secretary of the Finnish [Social Democratic] Party from 1975 to 1981. I was really participating in all the meetings, we are talking here about it, Pierre and I, the meeting on a regular basis most here in the Nordic area as well as other Socialist International meetings. But my own personal experience of the situation in Portugal and in Spain at that time stems already from the student movement. I was Chairman, President, of the Finnish National Union of Students in 1968 and that was about the time that I met the Portuguese Union of Students and was informed about the internal situation there. So, we had a fairly long span on this.

Alan Granadino

Ok, thank you very much. So, now, again the same question to Valdo Spini.

Valdo Spini

Thank you very much. I am very honored and happy to be invited here. Maybe I can start with an anecdote. In 1973, I was responsible for the Florentine federation of the Italian Socialist Party for press and propaganda. Now, I think that one can say communication, better. After the *golpe*, the Chilean *golpe*, the *coup d'état*, we organized as the Florentine federation of the PSI a rally, a manifestation, in which we invited some people of every country who was under dictatorship, and I remember that there were present Mário Soares, Andreas Papandreou, Chilean socialists, Spanish socialists and our two Italian leaders, De Martino,⁸ who was secretary of the Party, and Lombardi,⁹ who was the leader of the left of the Party, and the French, an important one at the time, who was Claude Estier.¹⁰ And I remember very well that Andreas Papandreou ended his speech by quoting Hemingway, “for whom the bell tolls?” Every Italian was very preoccupied with this conclusion, because it was clear that he was saying that Southern Europe, Mediterranean Europe, is under these fascist dictatorships, and maybe you Italians, must be alert to this danger also. In effect, in these years, what we call *strategia della tensione*, the tension strategy, was developed. During this period, many bombs, many people were killed, etc. And most of us attributed this to the right; namely, that in order to create a situation in which the normal process of free and open elections, of democracy could be stopped in order to make way for the neces-

⁸ Francesco De Martino (1907–2002), Italian jurist, politician, lifetime senator (1991–2002) and former Vice President of the Council of Ministers.

⁹ Riccardo Lombardi (1901–1984), Italian politician, represented the Action Party in the Constituent Assembly of Italy from 1946 to 1948 and the Italian Socialist Party in the Chamber of Deputies from 1948 to 1983. In 1980, he was appointed president of the Italian Socialist Party.

¹⁰ Claude Estier (1925–2016), French politician and journalist, deputy of Paris from 1967 to 1968 and again from 1981 to 1986.

sity of some authoritarian intervention. Well, having coordinated that rally, that manifestation, I had the task – not very nice – to say to Mário Soares, “you can speak only eight minutes”, which for a Latin ... maybe for a Nordic is too much ... but, for a Latin it isn’t. But, no ... no ... he accepted, and afterwards he gave me a card – Mário Soares Professor of History of Portugal in Paris, University of Paris – and told me, if you come to Paris come to visit me. Next there was the revolution, and from the very first moment he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. This, I think indicates how deep the danger was at that moment, and how strong the change was, because in 1975 the situation had completely transformed.

Naturally, you can find a reason for every country. For Greece, the war of Cyprus was decisive for the colonels; for Portugal, you have already talked about the colonial wars; for Spain, the death of Franco and the preparations for the transition there. Within this complexity there was a big change, and I must say that the role played by the social democrats, the Socialist International was really very important. I remember that ten years after, more or less, a congress of the Socialist International in Spain, in Madrid,¹¹ at the time the leader of the British Labour Party was the leftist one... help me, the leftist...

Ulf Sundqvist

Michael, Michael Foot.¹²

Valdo Spini

Exactly! And Michael Foot spent all the time reading a book, symbolizing that he was not very much interested. The only thing that he said was this: before 1975, we would have never thought that the majority in Spain and Portugal would be socialist. This was the only concession he made to the congress, which in a sense

¹¹ XV Congress of the Socialist International, Madrid, 12–14 November 1980.

¹² Michael Foot (1913–2010), British journalist and politician who served as Leader of the Labour Party from 1980 to 1983. He was one of the leaders of the left wing of the British Labour Party.

was very important. What had happened? The Socialist International for many years had been halted by the Cold War. The president was a leading and important Austrian, Bruno Pittermann.¹³ But I remember for instance that the socialist, the Italian Socialist Party, was out of the International, because it was more to the left. But also, Allende was out of the International, etc. And in 1976, Willy Brandt became president and, as was said very well by Pierre Schori, was supported by Palme and Kreisky. Palme was particularly important due to his position. They really helped to create the Socialist International, which, for instance, in Italy was much less known, very little known in fact – because on the left the dominant force was the Italian Communist Party, which had no interest in highlighting the role of the Socialist International.

In general, the idea was that the Swedish Social Democratic Party was attached to this slogan: more schools, more hospitals, preschools – and this was seen as something fully integrated within the system. And yet this was also the merit of Palme, but on the Italian left, the real Swedish society was not... in the past there was ... I think this was the real ... in this sense Togliatti was very guilty.¹⁴ He separated the Italian culture of the left from the knowledge of what real social democracy, labour, etc., was. For instance, when a prominent politician and lawyer – Piero Calamandrei – dedicated in 1951 a special number of his monthly review *Il Ponte* to the socialist revolution in Great Britain in 1951,¹⁵ Togliatti said, “Hoho, Mr. Calamandrei thinks that this is socialism.” An impossible dialogue!

With Brandt there was a real solidarity in the Socialist International. Also, with Chile. At my first international, I held no important national position; I was not a member of Parliament.

¹³ Bruno Pittermann (1905–1983), Austrian social democrat politician, served as both the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Austria from 1957 to 1967 and the Vice Chancellor of Austria from 1957 to 1966. From 1964 to 1976, he was president of the Socialist International.

¹⁴ Palmiro Togliatti (1893–1964), Italian politician and leader of the Italian Communist Party from 1927 until his death.

¹⁵ *Il Ponte*, VIII (1952), no. 5–6. See also La proposta Laburista, “Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli”, 6/1997, Giunti editore, Firenze.

All the same, my first international mission was the conference of the Socialist International for Chile in 1979 in Rotterdam. And I can assure you that all the leaders of the Chilean Unidad Popular were present. I think it was also the first time that the widow of Allende accepted to shake hands with Carlos Altamirano.¹⁶ Because she felt that Altamirano, with his extremism, had a negative role in the situation. It was a formidable period for the Socialist International: you can find Peres with the PLO.

What was the American attitude? I think that Pierre Schori has already described Kissinger. I may say that in fact, the attitude of the Democratic Party [of the US] when it came to foreign policy was different. I have a quotation from Arthur Schlesinger, from the 1960s; at that time, there was the center-left coalition in Italy, and about that he says: “if the center-left coalition succeeded in Italy, the alliance between the progressive Catholics and the democratic socialists might offer a model for other nations [...] For Germany after Adenauer, for France after de Gaulle, even for Spain after Franco.”¹⁷ There were also some people in America who thought differently from Kissinger, but at the time it was Kissinger we really had to confront. In this sense, the Socialist International really became something that modified, not completely, but modified the rough East-West confrontation. This was true also in Latin America, with respect to what Brandt tried in Latin America, this was true for what Palme did in Asia, and Kreisky started the first negotiation among Israelis and Palestinians. So, really the Socialist International became a very important organization. For us, Italians, who were a minority force on the left in Italy, and in the 1970s we really were a very minor force – the electoral ratio was 3:1 in the Communist Party’s favor – the reference of the Socialist International was decisive. It

¹⁶ Hortensia Bussi (1914–2009) was the wife of the Chilean president Salvador Allende; Carlos Altamirano (1922–2019), general secretary of the Chilean Socialist Party from 1971 to 1979.

¹⁷ Arthur Schlesinger’s quotation in F. Bello, “Pieraccini alla scoperta dell’America” in *Giovanni Pieraccini nel Socialismo riformista Italiano*, Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli no. 4/2018, Pacini Editore, Pisa, p. 85.

is true, Tito de Morais was in Rome,¹⁸ he printed in Italy his paper, the Portuguese newspaper, he came to Florence to sell it personally, to sell the newspapers, but from another point of view, without this anchorage in a strong Socialist International, it could be very difficult to be a minority on the left in Italy. What we felt was that while we were a minority in Italy, we were the majority in Europe. And this was I think what helped the socialist party to survive while facing the Italian communist party, which was very intelligent with well-prepared members, etc., and which then seemed victorious and all encompassing.

So, I think I'll speak more about this in the next talk about the eighties, but the fact that the Socialist Party was able to survive during the 70s also, I think, permitted the Italian socialist party to contribute to the 80s. So, fortunately, what Papandreou said, "for whom the bell tolls?" was not true. But, in fact, this new Socialist International was very useful, also for us.

Alan Granadino

Thank you very much, Valdo, and now Jaime Gama.

Jaime Gama

Hello everybody. I just want to start with some notions of the political transformation in Portugal, for us to understand what the Socialist Party is. We had during the 19th century a constitutional monarchy, democratic with political parties. Then, in 1910 a republican revolution and its parliament, which existed until 1926, when a military dictatorship was established. Salazar is not someone coming from the far-right wing or from the military, he is a conservative Catholic, that is rescued as Finance Minister

¹⁸ Manuel Tito de Morais (1910–1999), Portuguese politician, forced to exile in Angola by the Estado Novo regime in the 1950s, he later organized exile activities in France, Brazil, Algeria, Switzerland, Italy and West Germany. In Algeria he was the Director of the Junta de Salvação Nacional and, in Geneva in 1964, he founded the Associação Socialista Portuguesa (ASP), which later originated the Socialist Party (PS) in 1973, becoming a Deputy to the Constituent Assembly in 1975 and a Deputy to the Assembly of the Republic in the following year of 1976.

within the military dictatorship and then gets the position of Prime Minister. In 1933, he then establishes a civilian dictatorship and puts the military aside, giving them the higher, though empty, political function, of the President of the Republic. The opposition to this Salazar regime in the first years is basically composed of the republican parties defeated by the *coup d'état*. And then, in 1936, with the civil war in Spain, there began another type of opposition including the communist party. The communist party jumps around a lot, because the communist party was very weak, non-existent in the 20s and beginning of the 30s. It starts jumping up a little during the civil war in Spain. Then comes the Second World War, and then the communist party consolidates a sort of leadership among the intellectuals; there is also the victory over the Nazis, and so on. But in the meantime, the opposition to Salazar from the non-communist perspective moves from the old republican parties, which at that time had aged very much, and a new opposition, a non-communist opposition coming from dissidents of the regime, e.g. former military personnel that had now become dissidents. And then they reunite some people outside the army, the communist party, and thus offer a great challenge to Salazar, for instance the Algarve campaign that occurred due to significant influence among the armed forces. And they were very much feared. I must say that the last resonance of this tendency is in 1961 when guerrillas start in Angola. Overseen by the Americans, there is a sort of internal *coup d'état*, commanded by the Ministry of Defense, that fails, which again comes from the regime. The regime, though, does not want to pursue the war, and thereby seeks a compromise, mediated by the United States, surrounding every transition to independence – Kennedy politics on Africa – and about aid to moderate transitions there. And, so you have room for a non-communist opposition. Then comes the far-left period, with the May '68 crisis and its extension to Portugal: radical Maoist groups, guerrilla groups, terrorist groups, and so on. There is then space to establish some socialist alternative within the opposition, different from the communist party and from the far left. Additionally,

there is the fact that in '64, small groups of socialists reunite and create Portuguese Socialist Action. This is the first step. Nine years later, in 1973, before the revolution, the Portuguese Socialist Action became the Portuguese Socialist Party! We therefore had a political party organized at that time.

The approach of the socialists and the social democrats is conducted through several channels: we had one guy in Italy who had relations with the socialists and with the social democrats, and with a segment of the Christian Democrats. We had someone in Paris who not only had relations with the French socialists, but also with some Nordic socialists. And we had Soares in Portugal, deported to São Tomé, and then coming to Israel, then to Paris, where he contacts many of his French comrades, as well as his contacts in the United States. And it is interesting to see how those mechanisms worked and obviously reinforced our positions. But, one thing is international contacts, while quite another is what is happening in your own country. For instance, you referred very much to ... *détente* as something that influences things in Portugal. However, I consider that the situation in Portugal was not just because of *détente*. What we have to recognize is that the situations in Portugal, or in Greece, or Spain were highly differentiated, and there were reasons in play that had nothing to do with *détente*. So, in Greece there is the case of the defeat of the military against the Turkish operation in Cyprus, and they practically abandoned power and gave power to Karamanlis,¹⁹ to a right-wing moderate democratic political figure. In Portugal, it is not due to the indoctrination of the military, of the Portuguese officers, by the liberation movement. It is more a question of the fatigue of the professional army elements, because the army was conscripted ... it was renovated, it couldn't sustain. But the officers of the army, the professionals, they had two years in combat – one year on the mainland, two years in combat. They [i.e., the Portuguese Armed Forces] were moving the captains above all for their force mission

¹⁹ Konstantinos Karamanlis. He was Prime Minister of Greece (1955–63; 1974–1980) and President of Greece (1980–85 and 1990–95).

in anti-guerrilla combat operations. Great fatigue, and for that there was the question of the *coup d'état*.

Then, the *coup d'état* transforms into a radical revolution, that is a very interesting thing, but is a different thing. The *coup d'état* is made basically by the fatigue of captains and majors with the approval of lieutenant colonels and colonels. And with the collapse of the system of channels, which had been sustained more by the co-optation of the political struggle. The revolution was peaceful because it corresponded to the people's will to stop that thing, because the people could not see what was to gain by pursuing their orientation. But it had nothing to do with democracy, it had nothing to do with the political ambition for the country itself, or for the transformation of the country. It had to be introduced, because when the system fails, you need to construct an alternative system, and for this several inputs must be inserted, in order to have a different system.

Well, here you have obviously the great importance of what happened in Africa. I will tell you one thing that is interesting. More than probably the independence movements in the former Portuguese colonies have never been sufficiently studied, because the great influence on those movements, I must recognize, did not come from the Nordic social democrats. Nordic social democrats come in, say, a third wave, because the first influence, if you can get some interesting influence, culturally, is from the protestant churches. If you go and study the liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies, they are basically related to the influence of two things. One is the communist trend in their several versions – be it Soviet, be it Cuban, be it Chinese – but the non-communist choice, some of them very radical, had a Protestant origin. This is because the Catholic Church was the church of colonial rule, although there were many exceptions, namely the Catholic congregation, and then the Protestants began to insert themselves – something allowed only after the Berlin Conference – that is, present themselves as some alternative to the dominant religious structure that abided by colonial rule. And then, if you want to study the independence movements in Angola, for

instance, you have in the north of Angola, the influence of the Baptist church from the United States, which also influenced a lot of what happened in Congo. The Congo Brazzaville, but basically RDC,²⁰ it is the same trend; they had Baptists and, also indirect sub-protestant churches, not very formal, but very effective among the people, the Kimbangists and others,²¹ who are very strong. They are the base of the UPA, FNLA.²² Then, for MPLA,²³ MPLA is an amalgamation of the Portuguese mainland communists living in Luanda with colored, mulatto,²⁴ people of the Catholic Church, who are also a big segment, and the Protestant main element are the Methodists. The Methodists are the main basis for the MPLA today. The area of influence is the railway corridor of Malanje, where the indoctrination by a famous Methodist priest was very effective.

In the case of Angola, there is an ethnic group that has been highly influenced by the German Lutherans, and who are very present in the north of Namibia. Namibia was under German rule. And, if you want to have the origin of UNITA,²⁵ UNITA is Presbyterian, informal Presbyterian. UNITA was basically created by the Congregationalists from Boston and Toronto, which have a sort of an articulated radical Presbyterianism. UNITA was an ideological fusion of the following elements: a dispute with Rome as the center of sin and a Maoist critique of Rome as the general

²⁰ République démocratique du Congo (RDC), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

²¹ Kimbanguism (French: Kimbanguisme) is a Christian new religious movement professed by the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by His special envoy Simon Kimbangu (French: Église de Jésus Christ sur la Terre par son envoyé spécial Simon Kimbangu) founded by Simon Kimbangu in the Belgian Congo (today the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1921.

²² UPA (União dos Povos de Angola), FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola).

²³ MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola).

²⁴ According to Wikipedia, this a racial classification to refer to people of mixed African and European ancestry, noting that "Its use is considered outdated and offensive, however, some [...] still use the word to refer to themselves." Wikipedia.

²⁵ UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola).

headquarters of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the ideology of UNITA is anti-headquarters, anti-Rome, anti-bourgeois, anti-Luanda, a place of sin. This is why they call themselves the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Total here means the full liberation of Angolans, freeing themselves of the old colonialist mentality through a radical transformation of themselves and the side-lining mulatto culture.

And in Mozambique FRELIMO²⁶ is much a mix of influence from movements in South Africa, also China, and also the influence of a Calvinist inter-denominational seminar. The Calvinists, the Swiss Mission, moved to Mozambique and created there a mission for sustaining the other Protestant congregations; they were fairly minor, creating a sort of study seminar to organize inter-denominational support to those orders. Plus, there were the Catholic priests, those from Ireland and also from Italy, who had missions in several parts of the country, and who educated people for the purposes of a particular political worldview. I shall conclude, immediately, but let me just add this: if we are to have a clear vision of the subject, we must have both the international version of events and the national version, i.e. how things occurred and how at particular moments they coincide with other influences – they are influenced but, also, they influence. It is this area of overlapping concepts that we must study.

Valdo Spini

May I ask a question?

Alan Granadino

Yes, of course.

Valdo Spini

In the American Baptists was there any influence of Martin Luther King?

²⁶ FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique).

Jaime Gama

Not effectively that figure, because it is civic rights and it is a very broad national identity. Martin Luther King is typically North American for the US and is not something that can be transported directly into Africa, according to my opinion.

Alan Granadino

Thank you, thank you very much Jaime Gama, and thank you to all of you.

Now first, before continuing with other questions, would you like to comment on each other ... make some comment or question to each other? We can then continue.

Carl, do you have a question that emerges from what they have now...

Carl Marklund

Yes. Actually, this is fascinating. Thank you so much for this panel presentation. I was thinking, Pierre, you mentioned something about the centrality of the Socialist International's reach out efforts to Portugal, just after the revolution, involving this idea that the communists should be included in the talks about democratization. And I was just wondering, this must have been at a time also when social democracy all over Europe had to conceive of how to relate to tendencies of Eurocommunism, and I guess Mr. Spini, your party must have been one of the most knowledgeable in this respect, so I would just like to hear the panel's opinions about the relations between communists, Eurocommunists, the radicals and social democracy, and how this was somehow amalgamated. Thank you.

Pierre Schori

Well, the Portuguese case, I mean, we accepted of course the socialist view, and their relationship with the communists which was not very hot. What we argued with Kissinger was that Mário Soares was not a communist, that you must support him, and so on. In Spain it was different, I mean, there, there was cooperation

or understanding between the socialists and communists, or communist Comisiones Obreras, or whatever. Especially when Santiago Carrillo came in, and I have a picture here from 1974 in the garden of Régis Debray, a place outside of Paris with Max Gallo, a well-known historian, French historian, and Santiago Carrillo, where he wrote his book *Demain L'Espagne*,²⁷ and we read the proofs over there together and discussed. Felipe González was also consulted, so that was very different. It was more against the American view of anti-communism, and here I would like to add also that when we talk about the Western dictatorships, we must discuss the case about Greece, since there it was even more pronounced because the Americans, the coup in Greece was according to a NATO plan. They specifically told us: we don't want a Soviet beachhead in Europe, and Papandreou was too radical, and so on. But we didn't buy that. Especially in the Nordics, we established solidarity committees for a free Greece, the day after the coup there, both in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. And, also, diplomatically, we pushed the case against torture in Greece and for human rights and took it to The Hague in 1967 – the Nordic countries plus Holland – and pushed out the Colonels – at the last moment, they pulled out themselves, when they realized this. And, also, we initiated, which is another instrument at home, a tourist boycott against travelling to Greece. And at one point in 1966 we had an 85% decrease of Swedish tourists going to Greece, so the opinion was very important to keep alive and by actions in that way too. But for the Americans, Greece was an even more central threat to them than Portugal.

Ulf Sundqvist

I should add that this had at first also to do with the American view on the necessity of cohesion in NATO, a thing which didn't bother us too much, because we had another agenda. And that agenda was, as I told you my introductory remarks, to open up Europe and the world for an active social democratic polity. In

²⁷ Santiago Carrillo, *Demain L'Espagne. Entretiens avec Régis Debray et Max Gallo* (Seuil, 1974).

Finland, a bit different from Sweden, we practiced a leftist propagation at that time. We have had all that in the 1960s, we took in the communists in the government, again, after that experience in the 1940s and 1950s, and very early the situation inside the communist movement, the split of the communist movement, started as you all know after Prague, very much. And then, there was a development and discussion inside the communist movement – one party, one policy – the Soviet line versus the European line and Eurocommunism. But we had something of the same discussion in the Socialist International, and that was us being allowed as members of the SI to have this dialogue ... should we continue, or should we be [unintelligible] from the resolutions of the late 1960s. And the results of that debate – and I think that had a very big impact on the developments in Portugal and Spain – was that each party had to define its own position depending on the national situation. So, we, by that, I would say, strengthened the common ground for social democratic development, politically and analytically. And the final results of that was that the communist party and the communist movement was split altogether. In Finland, one could say that the communist party came to its end in the late 70s. It never recovered, and it was split up finally, long before the Berlin Wall came down. And we had an influence on that development.

Valdo Spini

First of all, I would like to underline what Pierre Schori said about Greece. Greece was a real danger for Italy, because there was this Greek agent who acted – that is practically proven – in the *strategia della tensione*, in this strategy of tension, the tension strategy, which was developed in Italy. So, the solidarity was very strong, everyone knows about it. I must say that as a witness (and I was very young at the time) I spent the Christmas vacation writing a leaflet for Spain in commercial envelopes, with other friends and comrades, naturally. We went to the handicraft fair in Italy, in Florence, and with our label, “Do not buy at the Greek stand,” and then we damaged also the Greek stand. I must say, we damaged it

in order to discourage the Greek stand to be there. There was a very active feeling, very active solidarity.

But the question put now is Eurocommunism. I think everyone of us knows what Eurocommunism is. In fact, the Eurocommunist had this particular situation, which explains its weakness. The party closest, even, to the power, was paradoxically the French one, which allied with the socialists of Mitterrand. In fact, it participated in government afterwards. But the contradiction was that the communists were the most conservative of the three. The most advanced in revisionism of the three was the Spanish one, Santiago Carrillo wrote *Eurocomunismo y Estado*,²⁸ but Felipe González decided that socialists do not make alliances with them. Then, there was the most powerful one, the Italian Communist Party, which was in the majority but not in the government. As you know, in 1976 there was a government support of national solidarity, which was supported by the Italian Communist Party, but it did not participate in the government. Just to understand this, it was the period in which in 1978 Aldo Moro, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, who was the main supporter of the national solidarity alliance, had been assassinated. Berlinguer, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, did not want to test socialism on the electorate and party's grassroots. So, until the end of his life, he maintained that social democracy was something not really advanced. If you read the interview he gave, he said that European socialism does not care about women. This was completely, I think, mistaken. "Care only about people who are organized by unions, but do not care about the people who are outside", etc. All this, it is safe to say, means you cannot become socialist because you don't really deal with everything you say represents a progressive party. This was a real ... I think this was a real failure of Berlinguer because of what happened after: the continuous attention of the communists towards the Catholics and neither the attention to the international socialist movement

²⁸ Santiago Carrillo, "Eurocomunismo" y estado: El "eurocomunismo" como el modelo revolucionario idóneo en los países capitalistas desarrollados (Barcelona: Crítica, 1977).

... European socialism, I think is, in a certain sense, the son of this attitude. But in any case, something changed. I want to introduce this, I don't know you read this. What changed? The Euromissiles question. Brandt had very much sustained the Italian Socialist Party. But, on the Euromissiles question, there was a difference. Chancellor Schmidt was in favor, but the Italian participation was decisive in order that the Germans could participate. In Italy the socialists were decisive in how the Italian government decided. So, as you know, Willy Brandt was much against the Euromissiles because it seems that this was something which could damage the policy of rapprochement with the East. Every one of us will come to their own judgment about this story ... after all, the zero option was realized. And now Trump denounced it, you know? So, I don't think in this we were mistaken. But we understood that when Willy Brandt went, when he came and visited Rome as president of the Socialist International, he paid tribute by visiting the socialists, but in fact the most important visit was that he went to see Berlinguer.

If you want an anecdote, I was the Vice-Secretary of the PSI for only three years. This is because in 1984 I presented a law – or in fact a proposal for a law – to really make transparent the finances of parties and later of campaigns. After this, the Socialist Party decided that there was no more need for the Vice-Secretary who came from the, from the ... but for this period I was Vice-Secretary, so I have some experience. So, I want to give you an anecdote. In September/October 1981 Brandt arrived in Rome, and naturally we went to dinner. Craxi and Brandt are seated, one neighboring the other. But at a certain moment Craxi made to me so [Spini gesticulates meaning “come here”], to sit at his place, and then he went to the other part of the table. For me, this was a very interesting experience. I was very, very young, so I could ask Brandt about his life, his experience ... I remember very much with emotion this, but this was evident: the communication was no communication. In some part, then, the Socialist International becomes this idea: It is better to plan, or to have as an objective, to keep the big and popularly rooted communist party in our camp

than to sustain the effort of the Italian Socialist Party, becoming stronger with respect to the communists. This was not, I must say, the attitude of the Southern Socialism, neither Soares nor González and by the end not Mitterrand. Mitterrand had an interest in Eurocommunism: to demonstrate that Berlinguer was much better than Marchais.²⁹ This was a domestic interest. “We have the worst communists and let’s see what is the real, good, communist, Berlinguer.” It was true, eh? But it was a domestic interest. But I must say that in this sense we have a difference between North and South. In general, Northern socialists think that the idea was to see how to evolve the Italian Communist Party in order to become in some part, officially or unofficially, a member of the socialist camp, while in general Soares, González, Mitterrand continued to support the Italian Socialist Party. Myself, I have been witness, I was in the socialist delegation because I was preparing my candidature to the succeed Craxi – unfortunately I was defeated, but with many votes – I witnessed the entry of the Italian Communist Party – at the time already the Democratic Left, with Occhetto Secretary³⁰ – in the foundation of the Party of European Socialism, December 1992, if I remember well. Well, we were both founding fathers of this party, Italian socialists and Italian communists, but practically Occhetto and Craxi did not speak to each other. Us, the second rank, the second file, we related to that ... what maybe could be something very important to think about is how the two important parties of the Italian left together were in the European Socialist Party, and that this was a really important event. And yet this meeting between the two parties was played with sufferance and not with enthusiasm. And, but this will open a page of our, about our peculiar particular history which is not the case. I must say that in any case the figure of Palme was

²⁹ Georges Marchais (1920–1997), French politician, head of the French Communist Party (PCF) from 1972 to 1994, and a candidate in the French presidential elections of 1981.

³⁰ Achille Occhetto (1936), Italian politician, served as the last Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) between 1988 and 1991, and the first leader of the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), the parliamentary socialist successor of the PCI, from 1991 to 1994.

very much felt by the Italian socialists. I attended the funeral in a delegation who was led by the Secretary Bettino Craxi, etc. and notwithstanding some differences, the importance of what Palme had done was very, very important. Secondly – I have thirty further seconds – we had tried to open a new space in the unions and at a certain moment we had – this was an important moment – a minority tendency, a socialist trend, within the CGIL,³¹ the leader of the Catholic Union, Pierre Carniti,³² maybe you met him, in the European Parliament (he became a socialist), and then there was a socialist union, the UIL.³³ And given the fact that the socialists were very interested also in modifying the union in Italy we were very interested in the Meidner plan. I must say that we were closer culturally to Rosanvallon, the socialism *autogestionnaire*.³⁴ But we had tried to change the tradition of the communist majority in the union, just putting this new issue for debate, as you had done in Sweden. I think that this is also very important to discuss among us. This stage the Nordics, especially, have achieved, in order to modify and renew the traditional attitude of the unions.

Alan Granadino

Yes, thank you very much. And now, just in order to follow the program, we are now going to have our coffee break of between 15 to 20 minutes and then the next set of questions links very well and connects with the issue that we were talking about right now. So, we will start with Jaime Gama, so that you will have the opportunity to answer to these questions and then we will pass to the second part of our discussion in 15-20 minutes. Thank you.

³¹ CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro).

³² Pierre Carniti (1936–2018), Italian politician and trade unionist, General Secretary of CISL between 1979 and 1985.

³³ UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro).

³⁴ See for example Pierre Rosanvallon, *L'âge de l'autogestion* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976).

Carl Marklund

Perfect, and the coffee is outside here, now it's coming! And in the meantime, I will show a couple of pictures from the action of the day, ok?

Alan Granadino

In the first half of the 1970s there was a combination of factors that opened possibilities and posed challenges to European Social Democrats. At the economic level, the first post-war international crisis began in 1973. At that time, Social democrats gained power, or were in coalition governments, in several European countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg), and Socialists emerged as relevant forces in the democratizing countries of Southern Europe. So, social democrats coincided in power in a context that opened possibilities for political and ideological innovation, while at the same time it was hostile to pursue the social democratic economic policies characteristic of the post-war period (the redistribution of wealth provided by capitalist growth). Today, it is recognized that this decade supposed a transition period in which collective-oriented socio-economic interests and welfare policies were increasingly replaced by more individually oriented and neo-liberal policies.

One of the several attempts to give an answer to this dilemma was the creation of the Conferences of the Southern European Socialist parties, between 1976 and 1982. These conferences were promoted by the French socialist party, and the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian socialists also participated. They were a platform for debating economic proposals, foreign policy and the relations between socialists and communists in Europe. The first of these conferences was interpreted as a schism, as a rupture, between Southern European Socialism as represented by the French party, and Northern European Social Democracy as represented at that time by the German Social Democratic Party.

The fact that the relations between socialists and communists were the main issue dividing Northern European social demo-

cracy and Southern European socialism has overshadowed the economic proposals and the different conceptions of democracy exposed in these conferences. At the core was the issue of *auto-gestion/autogestão* or workers' self-management, a characteristic of Southern European socialism in the 1970s. This, however, did not seem to be too far away from the economic or industrial democracy proposed by the Swedish and Finnish social democrats at that time.

We are interested in knowing more about North-South connections, as well as North-North or South-South connections regarding these issues. We would like to ask you were there debates within, among your parties, sorry, on the following issues: first, the relations between socialists and communists; second the different understandings of democracy and third economic responses to the economic crisis? And we can now start with Jaime Gama, since we had ended with him in the previous session.

Jaime Gama

These questions you have are amazing. I shall think from my Portuguese perspective, because for instance, I never felt that there was a split among the socialists and social democrats. I can admit that this was a creation for some purpose, namely for counterbalancing the German influence in the mind of the French party leaders who created it. Because the French party, you know the history, it comes out of the Second World War in a difficult position. Then, the Algerian War, after that the May 68 crisis. And Mitterrand, a man from the right wing, and later from the far-right wing, comes with a fundamental strategy of becoming president of the Republic. And for that he instrumentalizes the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the left radicals. And the strategy of the *union de la gauche*, the strategy of the common program, is something that is created for paving the way for a presidential candidacy. When we look to what happened after, what was the result? Once Mitterrand had been elected president, he dropped those policies, he had a first Prime Minister that was a very moderate person inside the socialist party, Pierre Mauroy,

who conducts a nationalization policy that Mitterrand must abandon and radically change if he wants to ensure his second mandate as president. Internal debate within the French socialists is something that deserves to be studied, because basically they had three tendencies: Mitterrand himself, CERES on the far left (speaking of revolution and nationalization, and so on), and Rocard, who was a Christian, a protestant, coming from the Delors³⁵ tradition; he was a left wing Christian democrat in a broad sense, but felt the need to compensate that with a vague notion of *autogestion*, which is very much inspired in CFDT, as you said, by Pierre Rosanvallon ... now he is one of the strategists of Macron ...; they needed to use those words ... let us say, there was a rhetorical dispute about words, but words that had a vague meaning. The problem in the Portuguese revolution was that we had been placed at the core of those debates, because they were saying: ah those guys in Portugal are becoming too much on the right, because they denied making coalitions with the communists and because they also denied the conceptual trends we are innovating here! And I must recognize that one of the factors of that was the newspaper *Le Monde*, from whom in Portugal we received as a correspondent Dominique Pouchin, former Trotskyist, who infuriated everybody in these debates with absurd versions about what was happening. Mitterrand himself always kept the correct approach ... and also Rocard, because Rocard, whether he did or did not have problems with Portugal, was internally having Mitterrand deny all of this ... Rocard was to have a bigger position among the socialists. What was important for us was sustaining a big front of socialists, social democrats, labour parties that could, let us say, recognize the central merit of our own line, and overcoming that internal quarrel within the French socialists, which had no effect practically, because Mitterrand and Rocard were very much strongly in favor of our line. The other guys on the CERES side, namely Chevènement, who, before becoming a full nationalist, also evolved; but that was that. But this international

³⁵ Jacques Delors (1925–), President of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995, member of the French Socialist Party.

approach was also very important for avoiding some temptations regarding the Portuguese revolution, because, in the moment of that sudden revolution, we never clarified this, and there could have been some NATO temptation to act. Now recently, some very interesting archives in Spain have been published that mention that the then Prime Minister Arias Navarro wanted to invade Portugal and that it was Franco himself that said no. He thought that communism will never take power in Portugal, they are so much more conservative for having communism as a political power system. So, there was no Spanish invasion. But for instance, the French authorities, the former police, the secret police in Portugal, had very strong relations with the Second³⁶ police, with Marenches³⁷ and those guys. They had contacts to exchange information about the wars in Africa, even, and there was even a temptation to have radical, disturbing, far right terrorist groups acting, but they were moderated, never amounting to anything big, but it was still the case. Another case was the separatist movement in the Azores archipelago, which had backing from American groups. It was also something we very much feared. And for that it was obviously necessary to reunite with national platforms in order to concentrate support for a peaceful transition. I must tell you that the Socialist Party was not prepared in 1974 to be a ruling party and was not prepared to dispute a majority. It had been created in 1964. Salazar goes down in 1968 and then comes Caetano, a smoother dictator; in 1969 there are the elections. We run as socialists in three districts, while in the other eighteen we are part of broader coalitions. In those districts, as Pierre Schori referred to, the mission of the Socialist International was present. In the three districts where we had bad results, we came behind the broader coalition of the opposition. And Soares was very much traumatized by that. At the time we could not say what our results would be in a democracy, or after

³⁶ Deuxième Bureau, colloquial name for the French Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage.

³⁷ Alexander de Marenches (1921–1995), was a French Military officer that was director of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage.

having toppled the regime. We had no occasion to measure, and on the one occasion we had, we received bad results. Our clear mission was to concentrate in organizing a party that could win elections, and when it lost to a very radical push by the segment of the military on the radical left, the Communist Party, the far left, we said: first, we must divide the armed forces, split the armed forces, the moderates and the radicals, and we must work inside the armed forces and the security forces to have that split. And secondly, we must make demonstrations, popular demonstrations in all the cities, and never lose the capacity to organize big demonstrations in the major cities. We needed to organize demonstrations in the main cities, because it was through those that we could push the moderate military to control the left-wing military.

Nowadays there is the Georges Soros foundation³⁸ that organizes courses for many disturbing themes and for training this sort of destabilization, and so on. We organized it with no course, we organized our own teaching and our own capacity, but we had to organize. One further thing was important. We had in Portugal an excellent American ambassador.³⁹ He was a Republican; Nixon was falling and was replaced with Gerald Ford. The ambassador they sent to Portugal was a moderate republican with great experience in CIA operations. Finally, he had been CIA Director and so ... but he could speak Portuguese because he had been in Brazil. He was not the ambassador, I would say, like in some of your countries, out of mind. He was a guy of real political feelings and he immediately detected where to insert oneself in order to counterbalance the radical revolution, not through external intervention but through internal movements and political activity. He was quite heterodox vis-a-vis the central headquarters in the State Department and so, because they were living in Washington and he was living in the country, and he, having the capacity to speak the language ... it is very important for a diplomat to understand the country, otherwise he is completely

³⁸ Open Society Foundations.

³⁹ Frank Charles Carlucci (1930–2018) served in this position from 1974 until 1977.

blind ... and, yes, that was correct, that was important. Then there was also Gerald Ford's capacity to have open contact with Helmut Schmidt, because, I must say, while the Socialist International is very important, at that moment Brandt was not in government. There were therefore two leaderships. But at the time there were influential Prime Ministers: Schmidt, Brandt is out ... Schmidt, Callaghan, Olof Palme is important ... but, I must say, Olof Palme is the one who comes from a third way, not economically but internationally, because Sweden was not a NATO country and being neutral it had a different approach to international problems, which, in this case is important but not a crucial factor. The real factors are countries like Germany, UK, France, the interrogation of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Chirac as Prime Minister, the guy of African operations,⁴⁰ they only accepted normalization when normalization was achieved, but they were betting more in destabilizing small entities and small groups. It was a real problem. Spain at that time was starting to change, but only afterwards. And I hope that the only effective contribution of the Portuguese revolution towards Spain was that it convinced the ruling powers of Francoism to anticipate a change that could be controlled by themselves, rather than to have a thing like what was happening in Portugal. For it would have been horrible in Spain, owing to the expanse of the country and due to the hard, fighting mentality of the people.

Valdo Spini

Viva la muerte.

Alan Granadino

Thank you very much, this is excellent. We are now focused very much on the Portuguese revolution and have had this Portuguese perspective and perceptions on the issues we are talking about; it is very interesting. But could we now continue with Ulf Sundqvist?

⁴⁰ Jacques Foccart (1913–1997), French businessman and politician, served as a chief adviser to French presidents on African affairs.

Ulf Sundqvist

We are still talking about your questions?

Alan Granadino

Yes.

Ulf Sundqvist

Yes, first of all I think that Jaime here made a very good point. We were preoccupied in our international affairs to change the world and change Europe, building peace, integration, etc. But I am talking on behalf of the Finnish party and I think also partly on behalf of the whole Nordic group that we could not have and did not have any ambitions to go in and participate in both sides of social democracy, which finally since emerged in Portugal or Spain, not to talk about Italy or France. We were like-minded, much more than today's social democrats. We were stronger than the parties are today, far stronger. But we were not right. Every party had to start living its own transformation based on the domestic structure and political realities. Every party was from time to time engaged in internal discussions, internal debates and internal power struggles. And in Spain, on the brink of change, the major debate was the exterior-interior debate, which finally brought Felipe González to power. All the parties had about the same ... and therefore I doubt the definition of the southern route versus the northern route.

Now I tell you a joke, or an anecdote I already told during lunch at my part of the table. Willy Brandt was the chairman, or the president of the Socialist International in Geneva. As you said, he was then out of government. He put his whole strength in the Socialist International. Germany was led by Helmut Schmidt, and on top of international matters, the congress of the Socialist International discussed also the economic situation in Europe and the world. All the leaders were actively participating in that debate, and then intervened Helmut Schmidt. In a very harsh intervention, he said that: You think that you [unintelligible] to the inflation policy; I tell you that ... no more inflation we should have

a strong economic policy based on the [unintelligible]. The same night, the Senegalese party led by President Leopold Senghor had organized a fancy event because they were accepted as members of the Socialist International. After the event we went back to the hotel, Pentti Väänänen, the then upcoming Secretary General of the SI and I. Pentti was International Secretary at the Finnish Party, we entered the bus and we saw that back in the bus sat Bruno Kreisky of the Austrian group, and we entered, he noticed me. He said, in Swedish, *"Hör du Sundqvist, hörde du den där Schmidt, den där inbilske apan, komma hit och lära oss ekonomisk politik?"* "Did you hear that Helmut Schmidt in the debate, that arrogant monkey, coming here and teaching us how to make economic policy?" That was the debate between the Austrian and German chancellors and party leaders. So, I mean, this was the reality that seemed to be decisive in changing the world and changing Europe ... and to understand the present Europe, as it is today. That's it.

Alan Granadino

Thank you very much. Now we will go on with Pierre Schori.

Pierre Schori

Well, I have forgotten what the question was. But ok.

Alan Granadino

Do you want me to...?

Pierre Schori

No, no, I see. The only thing I can say is that I believe from 1975 up to 1985 the social democratic influence was very great, and our greatest achievement was to support the Portuguese, the Spanish socialists and in the Greek case the democrats, Papandreou... That was the most successful foreign policy, coordinated foreign policy we had, under strong leaders like Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, Kreisky and the others. Speaking of what you said here, Ulf, about when Brandt was going to be proposed the chairperson of the

Socialist International, Mitterrand was against that. And he said in a conversation we had, but *c'est un Allemand!*, "It's a German!" and I said to Mitterrand, no, he is not a German, you sound like my father. My father hated the Germans because the Italians had bombed his little hotel in Menton, on the border, and the only thing the Italians did ... just drop the bomb by mistake and a little bit more... I always told my father, I always said to him: Willy Brandt is a German, a good example, and I said so to Mitterrand when he said he was a German. I said no, he is a European. And, with his background.

Also, after that, I mean also during that period, we had, for instance, the INF,⁴¹ which was benched here, which was supported by a great popular movement also in Europe to fight a new generation of nuclear arms in Europe and there was Willy Brandt with *Ostpolitik* and Palme with common security and so on. The International played a role in all this, in all the associated parties. But after that we were in decline and we had a new situation, and maybe we will discuss that. But also two examples: Mitterrand, when his party were about to win, for the first time returning to government, he organized ... he invited the Swedish party to ... a seminar in Chantilly, in a castle in Chantilly, where he was with his old party leadership and future ministers, as they thought, and he wanted to know how to govern. He asked: how do we govern? They had absolutely no idea, they had no memory of it, no institutionalized memory because they had been in opposition for so long, and we discussed that, of course. I put only one question in that meeting to Mitterrand. I said France is a great arms exporter, are you going to change that? He never answered.

The other example I have was when Felipe [González] just came into power, and he asked Olof Palme: what shall I do, how should I handle my Minister of Finance? Because the Minister of Finance is so decisive for our success internally, and he is a very strong person, he wants to have the whole budget, and demands discipline and so on. "How do you deal with your Minister of

⁴¹ The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) under negotiation in 1981–1983 and 1985–1987.

Finance?," Felipe asked Olof. And then, Palme said, "well, you agree with your Minister of Finance for 98%, you support him hard on the 98%, but the rest 2% you keep to negotiate with different ministries." And for that, Felipe gave Palme his old personal copy of *Don Quijote*.

I don't think that I have so much to add on this. I think that what happened after 1985, we had two important things, Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and Delors became president of the Commission. And Delors had been interviewed, every leader in the EC at that time, and he said, do you want to have a common currency, do you want to have common defense, or an internal market? And he found that only around the market, the internal market, there was consensus, so that is that way. Then we have, I mean, great creative leaders, and on the other side Gorbachev, of course, so after that came our decline. Why was there a decline? We could discuss it perhaps in another seminar?

Alan Granadino

Thanks. Thank you very much. Now time for Valdo Spini. Do you need me to refresh the question?

Valdo Spini

Maybe I can give a contribution to explain why you posed these questions. The effect is this, you remember in the election in 1968, in France, the socialist party by themselves received only something little more than five percent, the Defferre⁴² candidate. While in the previous presidential election with the *unité de la gauche* Mitterrand forced de Gaulle to the second round.⁴³ And so, there was an idea, in France, that we have been able to grow again from five percent to a bigger percentage because we had the strategy of the *unité de la gauche*, the unity of the left, an alliance. Naturally, this was possible in France because they had a particular electoral

⁴² Gaston Defferre (1910–1986), socialist mayor of Marseille between 1953 and 1986, Minister of Overseas Territories (1956–1957) and Minister of Interior (1981–1984). He was the socialist candidate for the French presidential elections in 1969.

⁴³ Actually, it was Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

system. The ‘two rounds’ electoral system, the presidential electoral system. One of the merits of Mitterrand, the Secretary of the socialist party, was to say to the socialists: in the past, we change district by district, we decided who is the most likely candidate to be elected to the second round; maybe a socialist, even if they did not receive more votes than the communists, etc. Mitterrand decided that whoever received the highest number of votes in the first round would go to the second. And this forced the socialist party to act, to work. So, I think that these meetings were made in order to say there is a recipe, an example, the French one, for weak parties to follow, such as in the Mediterranean Europe ... this is a kind of example that you can adopt. I remember that with other students, friends, I came to the Hotel de la Jeunesse in Grenoble to see the congress of Grenoble, the second after Epinay. We were convinced that also in Italy, we had to do the same as in France. We had to engage in a strategy of left unity. It was the only way to make the socialist party grow in our countries. But this, I think, was a very short period, and I must say that the leader of the Italian Socialist Party who most dealt with international affairs was the Vice-Secretary Bettino Craxi, because the General Secretary, De Martino, I don’t know if somebody remembers him, used to work in politics from Tuesday to Thursday; from Friday he was a distinguished historian of Roman right, Roman law, and he passed his weekends by writing very interesting books about Roman law. And so, Craxi had a free rein to represent the Italian Socialist Party in all these meetings and he kept a very clear position: I am against “olive socialism.” The idea of olive socialism was the socialism for the countries in which there are olives, no? The south. This was the image. In France, in Portugal, in Spain in Italy, we have olives, so I am against the olive’s party.

For us, the real point of reference was Brandt. What I remember, I must say, and this can be interesting, is that in 1975 and 1976, we initiated a new activity of inviting during electoral campaigns the likes of Felipe González, François Mitterrand, etc., to speak at our electoral manifestations. Naturally, we invited the Latin ones because it was easier for the Italian public to under-

stand. More or less – you understand French, more or less – you understand Spanish. But I remember having been responsible for press and propaganda at the Florentine federation of the PSI; we invited Mitterrand and we had the Piazza della Signoria completely full, which was not so easy for us without Mitterrand. But we started this custom of making these invitations, and this was beautiful, I think, for the Italian public because it was an education about Europe, about international communication, etc. So, I don't think that, maybe for us more on the left, Mitterrand was the reference, but for the party as such the reference was Brandt, and this was the case until the discussion about the INF, the Euro-missiles. What really was decisive for Portugal and Spain was the aid of all the European countries, and especially of the northern countries, so I don't think that there were really possibilities to... there was the, so to say, the French model that maybe you could adopt, but in reality, the French model was connected to the Gaullist institution. Mitterrand was very able, but he was the most coherent center-left politician against the reform of de Gaulle. He turned all the friends speaking against *le pouvoir personnel*, and then he was the most able to utilize it: he was president for thirteen years!⁴⁴

Last thing, why in Italy are we in such a bad situation... *perché siamo ridotti così*? “Why we are so [reduced] now?” But maybe we can have another roundtable and every one of us can give a contribution.

Jaime Gama

May I add a small, very small point?

Carl Marklund: Thank you very much. Pierre has already explained that he would like to say something, so Pierre, and Jaime and then I think it will be time for us to open up the floor for questions from the audience. So please Pierre and then Jaime.

⁴⁴ François Mitterrand (1916–1996) was President between May 1981 and May 1995.

Pierre Schori

Speaking of the French socialists, I had as a house guest one summer Régis Debray and his wife, Elizabeth [Burgos] at the time, and my wife, who is a social worker, took him to a place where she worked. It was an integrated house for aged people, kindergarten, library, hospital and school. And we went around looking at it... and then he came back and said, Pierre, *mais c'est ça le socialisme*. "This is socialism." And when I visited him again in Paris, with Max Gallo and others, he started out by saying to the other French people present: "I have seen socialism." So, that is a little bit of the essence of the practicality of socialism: good quality of life.

Carl Marklund

Please Jaime.

Jaime Gama

Just to remember one thing. When coming to this conference, I made an inventory in my personal library. I used to expel and annihilate what I consider just paper, and not the fundamental things that I preserve in my library. What are the three books that from a doctrinal point of view I kept for survival? Two German ones: the *Bad Godesberg* programme of 1959, and the SPD framework for orientation 1985, which had been approved in 1975.⁴⁵ And, also, the programme of the Swedish social democratic party of 1975. These documents were important for, let's say, fixing a doctrinal framework for the Portuguese Socialist Party.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much. This is really a very fascinating topic that we are entering in at this moment. I think that we can all conclude that the 1970s, as seen from the perspectives we have adopted here today, was a time of contest between progressives, and it was also an era of experiments between progressives. And I think that in this context we are also seeing the validation of various types of

⁴⁵ *Bad Godesberg* programme (1959); SPD framework for orientation 1985 (1975).

socio-economic models, the Swedish model being presented to the Portuguese in a sense through this very massive Portugal campaign, for example, that Pierre mentioned initially, but also the experimentation, the looking for new solutions, middle ways and ways of combining radicalism and social goals with a complicated reality where capitalism is definitely in place. And with those words, I think that I will now open up the floor and I already have one question. And, before you pose your question you will have to say your name, so that we can record that. And, also, I wanted to say something, that Pierre has actually a book on sale. It costs 100 Crowns and we can deal with the merchandise a little bit later. So, now I will have to use my right hand to take down names of the people who are in line, and I will start with Gunnar, please.

Gunnar Lassinantti

My name is Gunnar Lassinantti. If this is a part of a research project, maybe I could add slightly, briefly the inner perspective to Pierre's presentation. I was actively involved and the whole movement, was very active. Gunnar Stenarv was the International Secretary of the Social Democratic Youth Organization, and afterwards he replaced Pierre as International Secretary of the party. Briefly, Spain: We had two committees, in Uppsala and Stockholm, social democratic committees to support the building up of democracy, the restoration of democracy. In the late 1960s, I was treasurer in Uppsala, we were rather pessimistic. Could we ever say in Spain, it was some ... almost a similar discussion to Soviet Union at that time. But then we informed, and we collected money, and some years later the situation became much better when Pierre Schori was restored and Franco's death came closer. Pierre has already told about this.

In the case of Greece, we had a multi-party support committee, we had also social democratic support work, and many students came after the military coup to, particularly to Stockholm and Uppsala, and they established a Greek Social Democratic Party, which we cooperated with. They informed us, Andreas Papan-dreou, when he was released, he came several times to Uppsala to

inform us. And many of these persons became then active in the PASOK and moved back to Greece afterwards. Portugal: occasionally I came to Portugal in, rather early in 1974, after there had been rumors of a coup attempt. And the social democratic movement asked for study material, for studies in circles all around the country, and I was asked to write the text. But very interesting was that the party decided that, Pierre has told about the central context. But additionally, all regions, party districts in Sweden got their own partner districts in Portugal. And we had a quite active cooperation let's say five, six years, in some cases even longer. And I was back then in North Sweden and one of my positions was as international leader of the Social Democratic Party there, and since we were the most socialist part of Sweden, we were given the most socialist district in Portugal, which was Southern Alentejo, the Beja region. That was from 1975 onwards, and I paid some five visits, and I also brought a delegation of forty persons with me once. And we studied, we invited persons from Beja region to study our movement and our condition. And this was a very good example of cooperation, solidarity work based on the regional level. Now we are lacking such cooperation. Instead most of the solidarity works goes through projects within the framework of the Swedish International Development Authority.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much and Gunnar's question can also open up for the question of what we can learn from these experiences, and here we have the next question.

Jan Olsson

I doubt I have so much a question. I belong to this, Carl you said it, this experimental group of the 1970s doing some practical works, as well, because I was International Secretary of the Metal Workers' Union, one of the largest Swedish unions. First a few points on what you are doing, maybe should do in the project, is, because I floated around as an International Secretary, I floated around, among others southern European countries, and you

should look at the dynamics of the social democratic party, that is, not only in the social democratic party, but also in the social movements. You had [anti-]nuclear movements, disarmament movements, you had other movements coming up, then you had big, big, major social democratic, I should put it like that in Sweden, cooperatives and trade unions, and then you had the small – I call them small socialist parties or small socialist- social democratic parties – just take an example, Rocard's PSU, Rocard in France, PSIUP⁴⁶ in Italy, you had the – Alan correct me if I am wrong – the Spanish Socialist Party, which was led by Quique Barón, Eugenio Royo, and some other people that became leaders of the PSOE afterwards, and then you have of course the Communist Party. I just take an example: I had to work with them, I had to work with all of those five or four elements. Italy is an example. I was in trade unions, International Secretary, who should I have contact with? And then you met, you had your three big unions, you had your largest union, which was dominated by the communists, a few socialist there in order to have some hostages within it, and then you had the Christian Democrat, that important Christian Democrat, and you had, well...

What you said was quite interesting, you said: We wanted to have a united left in the 1970s, and you had it in one way in the trade unions during a few, few years, when you had Trentin,⁴⁷ Benvenuto⁴⁸ and Carniti, who you mentioned, as the leaders who could possibly spread such a movement. I stop. You had Spain, I mean Spain, where you had, I was guided by my feelings and I liked it of course, the *autogestion*, CFDT in France and so on, and so forth, and I was very much a supporter of USO which was a small trade union in [Spain], but it competed with the UGT. But at one moment, I mean, the Germans came in and said, you should merge, you two unions, UGT and USO, and don't stop us from that process, so we had to back a little when it came to the

⁴⁶ Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria.

⁴⁷ Bruno Trentin (1926–2007), General Secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labour from 1988 to 1994.

⁴⁸ Giorgio Benvenuto (1937–), General Secretary of the Italian Labour Union from 1976 to 1992, General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party in 1993.

trade union situation in Spain. I stop. This is not a question.
[Applause.]

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much, it's an excellent insight. I will now collect two more questions and then I will let the panel respond, and then we will see if we have any time for any further questions. Thank you.

Anita Fredegård

Yes, my name is Anita Fredegård and I am member of the Social Democratic Party also. Yes, I have a few reflections, questions. First of all, I will say to you, I think it was you Spini, you said in Italy, Berlinguer⁴⁹ said that the social democrats or the left they treated, they cared more for the workers than to cooperate with women, and that unfortunately applies to a certain extent today. We just had an affair here in Sweden, it was not the social democrats, they are a little bit better, but anyway, one woman in the parliament,⁵⁰ she is from the former Communist Party, the Left Party,⁵¹ she worked a lot with young women in the suburbs and to prevent honor murder and such, and she has been accused by the left party of being a racist and so on, but it's getting better I think. And then also I ... was thinking about ... *just det*... And also, today, in Sweden, we do not fully cooperate with the former Communist Left Party. They are still, as far as I know, not a member of the Executive Foreign Committee, where the King is the Chairman,⁵² and also not in the EU Committee.⁵³ Isn't it, nah, I don't know, maybe you know, is it due to the Parliament, or is it

⁴⁹ Enrico Berlinguer (1922–1984), General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (1972–1984).

⁵⁰ Probably referring to Amineh Kakabaveh.

⁵¹ Vänsterpartiet.

⁵² This refers to the *Utrikesnämnden*, officially translated as the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Left Party joined the Foreign Affairs Committee for the first time in 1994, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but had previously been excluded.

⁵³ This refers to the *EU-nämnden*, officially translated as the Committee on European Union Affairs, where the Left Party has been represented consecutively since the Committee's inception in 1995.

the King, it is not in our Constitution? And, also my third ... is then. I am happy that you were here today, because as I see it in Europe, Spain and Portugal now have the strongest left movements. If you see the other countries, in Hungary and in Poland, they have gone backwards, and the right-wing is ... and in Austria, also here in Sweden I can sense the right-wing. So, how ... this is interesting to the whole floor ... why do you think the movement, the left movement – the socialists and the communists, or the former communists – are so strong in the Iberian Peninsula today?

Carl Marklund

And now, I will give the word here to Andreas...

Andreas Mørkved Hellenes

Thank you. My name is Andreas Mørkved Hellenes, I am a historian at Aarhus University. My question to you all concerns the role of language and, sort of, was there officially and unofficially a language of the international, of international socialism? Because when I listen to you, we heard examples such as Mitterrand coming to Italy to take part in election campaigns, I know that Brandt came to Norway before the European referendum in 1972, I have seen in my own research that Palme participated in French talk shows, so there is this sort of multilingual international. At least it seems to be a multilingual internationalism, which is very different from, sort of, I mean, we do this today here in English and can one talk about... Is this a Europe before, sort of, the English-language domination? And I think it is interesting because of two things, and one is that the open communication, what we talked about, politicians crossing borders and, yeah, taking part in electoral campaigns, talk shows, etc., exchanging information in that way, and also the internal communication and, sort of, the sociability of politicians and a sense of a shared culture, so that's something I would be curious to hear some more about. Thank you.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much, and now over to the panel. I think we can start with Pierre maybe? Would you like to give a response to some of these questions?

Pierre Schori

The last one I did not fully understand.

Carl Marklund

Andreas has a chance to clarify...

Alan Granadino

No, it has to be recorded so... I think it would be better.

Andreas M. Hellenes

So, my question was which languages did people use when they met?

Pierre Schori

Ok, that's different.

Carl Marklund

Ok, clear! Very clear. So... please.

Pierre Schori

If you were in a meeting with a French socialist, like Mollet,⁵⁴ who was a teacher of English, he insisted upon speaking French, because he was also Minister for *la Francophonie*. But, I mean, with Brandt, it was easy for us in the Nordic countries because he spoke Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, etc. But we didn't have many interpreters internally, it was mainly English, I would say at the time. It was not a big question, I mean.

⁵⁴ Guy Mollet (1905–1975), leader of the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) from 1946 to 1969, Prime Minister of France between 1956 and 1957.

Jan Olsson

What about the party international sectors?

Pierre Schori

Yeah, that's different. We haven't talked about that, but the Socialist International was an international of the international sectors. They were the ones meeting, preparing the meetings, the agendas, I mean. In the absence of leaders, when they had to deal with internal matters, they were representing the leaders, so we had a great time.

Carl Marklund

So, the language issue must perhaps have looked a bit different from the Southern side.

Ulf Sundqvist

Yes, thank you for the questions and for the discussion. We are here in a historically situated framework and therefore first we are back in the 70s and 80s. But, for my part, I would like to conclude by taking us back to the present situation. Now we are, everybody, betting on what will happen in London in the nights ahead, what will be the outcome of Brexit? As it seems now, and if Brexit happens, which I hope will not be the case, then it will have a very negative impact on most of the themes that we have been discussing here now. We will, in such an event, have to start the European work once again and of course we will also have a double impact, in many respects. I am not going into the analysis of how we have arrived here, but for answering this here, we have been talking about leadership, we have been talking about visions and about utopias, these are things we are in today: to try to understand. And I am sorry to say this, but this is also true for the social democratic movement. Had we had a stronger position in Britain today we might be somewhere else, vis-à-vis Brexit. So, my point is that the fight is not over. It will continue. Thank you.

Carl Marklund

Please Valdo.

Valdo Spini

Yes, this is a very sophisticated question, because you can interpret the question in many ways. From the point of view of the language, of the words, or from the political point of view. From the political point of view, maybe I have an answer. What was our common language? Europe. Because the people together talked about Europe. This I think was an immediate message. We are here because we want a European fight for socialism and for a social democratic solution, etc. From the point of view of language, for instance, we, I must avoid, I must confess, we imported something. For instance, one piece of our reconstruction – of the Italian Socialist Party *il progetto socialista* – I must admit was inspired by the French *le projet socialiste*. We talked about women, we imported the women quota, how do you say...?

Anita Fredegård

From Sweden.

Valdo Spini

And there are some who are enthusiasts about this, some who are not, but in any case, in the tradition, in the old Italian Socialist Party, women were very rare. With the quota system their numbers increased. So, on this, there was also some practical exchange of experiences that circulated around Europe. But to your question I will answer ... the answer is “Europe.” And I thank the trade unionist who was responsible for the foreign affairs in the metal workers,⁵⁵ the most important one, the most important piece of the union. In fact, when in Italy, we had some a period when it was not possible to have communists in government for international relations, the center-left government dealt with many laws and many questions with the unitary union. This was an indirect way to talk with the communists also.

⁵⁵ Probably refers to Jan Olsson.

And, really, I think that this season of Italian trade unionism was very beautiful, was very good. Lama,⁵⁶ Carniti and Benvenuto ... the only survivor is Benvenuto, he is in good health, so you can write to him and communicate. And this was very, very important, also in the years of the strategy of the tension during which time we were able to put people in the squares, to react and help build a big movement.

This unitary trend ended in 1984. When Craxi was Prime Minister, he decided to fight against the high ... the very high inflation we had, with a *decreto*, an Act of Government which took immediate effect: to freeze the indemnization [compensation] that the workers had in experiencing high inflation, and that alimented another inflation. And on this issue the Catholics agreed, the socialists agreed, but the communists did not agree. Now we can say that the communist leader of the union, Lama, was not against ... it was Berlinguer who opposed it. And this has been a breaking point in this very interesting politics, which was a reformist era, the advanced reformist politics of the united union in Italy. But the CGIL-CISL-UIL, these unions were united, and this was very, very important... so thank you for having brought the issue up.

Carl Marklund

Please Jaime.

Jaime Gama

Well, as far as the language, spoken language, obviously it is English, because it is one factor that can establish global contact. We can have other languages for regional or bilateral purpose, but if you want to be wider... at least until the moment when we will adopt the Mandarin as language for all of us. But it's English. Regarding the Socialist International, well it is not properly an organization, it's more a minimal club than an organization, we must abide by that rule. And it was important, it is important, I

⁵⁶ Luciano Lama (1921–1996), General Secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labour from 1970 to 1986.

must say it was important, in Europe. It [i.e., the Socialist International] was not so important in the enlargement of Europe (and with the accession of Eastern European countries), because social democrats that had been identified were the technocratic segments of the communist party, and not really endogenous social democrats. That created an important situation in the years that came after. Also, the experiences of Latin America and Africa, were not very successful, and if we nowadays go – if there is anyone who goes at least to the parties, the member parties of the Socialist International – it is no longer a high standard, I would say, in discussion. The company is not good for moving forwards and above all for believers. This is a problem. Enlargement was interesting, intelligent in the moment, but the ongoing tendency was not very positive, and I consider that one day we will come to a moment when things will be redrafted. Also, a further problem is the fact that from the time of Jacques Delors the European Union has not had a chairman of the Commission that belongs to this current, and I don't know if there will be an opportunity in the future. Well, I must recognize that the fact that the Portuguese socialists are number one in percent I would say is a pity, it is not a merit of the Portuguese socialists, but a problem with the others. Not only our competitors in my home country, but for my fellow partners in other countries. People do not have great expectations nowadays about politics, but there is a minimum that must be performed. But I must consider that political parties also must adapt to new communication systems, to digital systems, to a new mentality, and try to transform what our organizations created based on the written press model to a more advanced platform. The old idea you referred to, of social democrats in Sweden being not only a party but a movement, that's very correct, but not in the manner it was performed in the past. Probably a new approach is needed, conducting substantive messages through distinguished platforms to go direct to the people in a more modern communicational approach. That's also a change that political currents must undertake in order to get support from the electorate, because the political landscape has totally changed; you

have people, groups, that are disrupting the traditional political system, we must counter them, and perform using some of those techniques in the appropriate manner for transmitting sound ideas. And, also, it is important to have ideas, because there is no politics without an idea.

Carl Marklund

No politics without ideas. And I think that these are fantastic words from the panel. I just wanted to open up for a last question from Monica Quirico, who will probably ask a future-oriented question.

Monica Quirico

Yes, indeed. You have talked about new communication forms, etc. but you all and the public as well have reminded us of the double pillar of social democracy: on the one hand, state intervention and on the other social movements in the Nordic countries and a tradition of self-government, self-organization in the history of the socialist party. Today we have neoliberalism that has been embraced by social democracy as well and that is also in crisis, we have populism, that is a mass movement in many countries, we have also in Italy at least and in Greece, I think, fascists mobilizing people in deprived districts. So, I wonder is there anything from the history of social democracy that can be recovered in order to face such challenges?

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much. Over to the panel.

Pierre Schori

That's a new panel.

Carl Marklund

Pierre suggested we could have a new panel on this topic and actually that's a very attractive proposition, but is very rare that we manage to get these four fantastic panelists into one place, so

if you feel that you are interested in taking up the question that Monica posed we still have a few more minutes to do so. Thank you. Please Jaime.

Jaime Gama

If I can summarize, the positive global message from social democracy, is first abiding by the interests of the people, meaning by that abiding by the common interest of the republic, of public affairs. This is very sound, and the idea is not to have people equal at the end, but to give the people conditions to compete, to self-educate, to promote and to pursue an autonomous life. This is one point. The other point, a big, big historical message of social democracy is that social democracy is a split from dictatorship, from totalitarianism, and in that sense social democracy is a common route for freedom; freedom of speech, freedom of research, and freedom in the sense of creation by humankind, of uses, and this is a very big compact for forever not only for the past, not only for the future.

Valdo Spini

I share entirely what was said by President Gama, so I shan't repeat it. I have two simple things. After the fall of the wall in Berlin, it seems that the world was characterized by two main forces: neoliberalism, rough liberalism, from the other side social democracy or solidarity in some way, the American Democratic Party, etc. What happened, that now we are three, we are no more two. We have the sovereignist, or populist, that means that the left has lost part of its electorate, the popular electorate. Trump won in the United States because he gained in the blue-collar states. There are entire towns in France who were socialist who became *Lepeniste*. So, the game now is at three. The problem is that probably many parts of the socialists, social democrats had a too optimistic idea of globalization. Globalization has increased the condition of hundreds of millions of people in South-East Asia, in other parts of the world, but the idea was that globalization would have made better also the condition of the workers in advanced,

developed societies. More condition and more power. And this does not happen. In many areas of the most developed world the condition of workers, because of replacement of our firms have not become better. So, now the game is at three and no more at two, no? Liberals against social democrats, but liberals, social democrats and the new right sovereignists and populists. The problem is that, how if we and how can we be able to regain what we have lost, eh? Of the social part, but this is the new partner. The last thing I say is, the situation of the Socialist International is very poor now, there are also problems of personal history, no? What happened in Greece, etc. But I don't think we can suffer any more the situation. With this American policy, with this Trump policy there is a big space for socialism. So, maybe let us choose some foundations around the world, put them together and ask for a big change in the Socialist International. Thank you.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much. And, Pierre is actually back in the game. Please.

Pierre Schori

Globalization has been the Wild West and has favored people with power, economic power. Eighty percent of growth over the last years has gone to a few percent and a lot of that money has gone into tax havens, taking away money from economic growth for reforms, social justice; instead we have inequalities, the one percent against the ninety-nine percent. And I would say that we need two guiding terms: one is *inclusion*, we must have inclusion, everybody not for the few but for the many. And we need fair distribution, *fair distribution*. Inclusion and fair distribution. And, also, finally, we need a *Magna Carta* for... against hate news, fake news and hate news for the internet, regulation for the internet, so that things won't work in favor of fake news and hate news.

Carl Marklund

And now over to Ulf. Thank you.

Ulf Sundqvist

I just continue ... I am of the same opinion, but I would say this ... that's why political work is tough, and it's over there where the decisions are taken. Now we are here in the Nordic area, we say that we are the most integrated part of the world. Where are we, as Nordic countries, or Nordic parties, in relation to the real decision-making in Europe? Not to talk about the decision-making globally. Five Nordic countries, five currencies, five economic policies, we are the [unintelligible]. Without getting together and making sounder policy we cannot achieve anything other than that.

Carl Marklund

Thank you so much. We are ending on a mixed, hopeful negative note, to say the least, but I think that this has given us enough good thoughts for assessing what we can learn from the 1970s and handling the complex tensions that defined that era. Thank you so much to our four panelists and thank you to all of you who came here. Thank you. [Applause.]

References

- Bello, Francesco, "Pieraccini alla scoperta dell'America" in *Giovanni Pieraccini nel Socialismo riformista Italiano* (Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli n. 4/, Pisa: Pacini Editore, 2018).
- Carrillo, Santiago, *Demain L'Espagne. Entretiens avec Régis Debray et Max Gallo* (Paris: Seuil, 1974).
- Carrillo, Santiago, "Eurocomunismo" y estado: *El "eurocomunismo" como el modelo revolucionario idóneo en los países capitalistas desarrollados* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1977).
- Rosanvallon, Pierre, *L'âge de l'autogestion* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976).
- Schori, Pierre, *Minnet och elden: En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2014).
- Strang, Johan & Norbert Götz (eds.). *Nordiskt samarbete i kalla krigets kölvatten. Vittnesseminarium med Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Mats Hellström och Pär Stenbäck* (Stockholm: Samtidshistoriska frågor, 2016).
- Östberg, Kjell, *När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969–1986*. (Stockholm: Leopard, 2009).

Samtidshistoriska frågor

This series is published by The Institute of Contemporary History (Samtidshistoriska institutet). The series summarizes and discusses important historical events and contemporary issues. Edited transcripts from witness seminars, new research from the university's academic staff as well as conference reports are published as part of the series. Information about the series:

https://bibl.sh.se/skriftserier/hogskolans_skriftserier/Default.aspx?serie=12&.

Most of the titles in the series can be downloaded in full text, free of charge, from the Digital Science Archive, DiVA, <http://www.diva-portal.se>.

Some of the titles in the series have been published in collaboration with CBEES (Center for Baltic and Eastern European Studies) at Södertörn University. Responsible for the work with the publication series is Associate Professor Carl Marklund, carl.marklund@sh.se.


Publication series

1. *Olof Palme i sin tid*. Ed. Kjell Östberg (2001).
2. *Kvinnorörelsen och '68*. Ed. Elisabeth Elgán (2001).
3. *Riv alla murar! Vittnesseminarier om sexliberalismen och om Pocket-tidningen R*. Ed. Lena Lennerhed (2002).
4. *Löntagarfonderna – en missad möjlighet?* Ed. Lars Ekdahl (2002).
5. *Dagens Nyheter: Minnesseminarium över Sven-Erik Larsson. Vittnesseminarium om DN och '68*. Ed. Alf W. Johansson (2003).
6. *Kvinnorna skall göra det! Den kvinnliga medborgarskolan på Fogelstad – som idé, text och historia*. Eds. Ebba Witt Brattström & Lena Lennerhed (2003).

7. *Moderaterna, marknaden och makten – svensk högerpolitik under avregleringens tid, 1976–1991.* Torbjörn Nilsson (2003).
8. *Upprorers estetik. Vittnesseminarier om kulturens politisering under 1960- och 1970-talet.* Ed. Lena Lennerhed (2005).
9. *Revolution på svenska – ett vittnesseminarium om jämställdhetens institutionalisering, politisering och expansion 1972–1976.* Ed. Anja Hirdman (2005).
10. *En högskola av ny typ? Två seminarier kring Södertörns högskolas tillkomst och utveckling.* Eds. Mari Gerdin & Kjell Östberg (2006).
11. *Hur rysk är den svenska kommunismen? Fyra bidrag om kommunism, nationalism och etnicitet.* Eds. Mari Gerdin & Kjell Östberg (2006).
12. *Ropen skalla – daghem åt alla! Vittnesseminarium om daghemskampen på 70-talet.* Eds. Mari Gerdin & Kajsa Ohrlander (2007).
13. *Makten i kanslihuset. Vittnesseminarium 16 maj 2006.* Eds. Emma Isaksson & Torbjörn Nilsson (2007).
14. *Partnerskapslagen – ett vittnesseminarium om partnerskapslagens tillkomst.* Eds. Emma Isaksson & Lena Lennerhed (2007).
15. *Vägar till makten – statsrådets och statssekreterarnas karriärvägar.* Anders Ivarsson Westerberg & Cajsa Niemann (2007).
16. *Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse. Två vittnesseminarier om storpolitik kring Östersjön 1991–1994.* Eds. Thomas Lundén & Torbjörn Nilsson (2008).
17. *Makten och trafiken i Stadshuset. Två vittnesseminarier om Stockholms kommunalpolitik.* Ed. Torbjörn Nilsson (2009).
18. *Norden runt i tvåhundra år. Jämförande studier om liberalism, konservatism och historiska myter.* Torbjörn Nilsson (2010).
19. *1989 med svenska ögon. Vittnesseminarium om Östeuropas omvandling.* Eds. Torbjörn Nilsson & Thomas Lundén (2010).
20. *Statsminister Göran Persson i samtal med Erik Fichtelius (1996–2006).* Ed. Werner Schmidt (2011).
21. *Bortom rösträtten. Politik, kön och medborgarskap i Norden.* Eds. Lenita Freidenwall & Josefin Rönnbäck (2011).
22. *Borgerlig fyrklöver intog Rosenbad – regeringsskiftet 1991.* Eds. Torbjörn Nilsson & Anders Ivarsson Westerberg (2011).
23. *Rivstart för Sverige – Alliansen och maktskiftet 2006.* Eds. Fredrik Eriksson & Anders Ivarsson Westerberg (2012).

24. *Det började i Polen – Sverige och Solidaritet 1980–1981*. Ed. Fredrik Eriksson (2013).
25. *Förnyelse eller förfall? Svenska försvaret efter kalla kriget*. Ed. Fredrik Eriksson (2013).
26. *Staten och granskningssamhället*. Eds. Bengt Jacobsson & Anders Ivarsson Westerberg (2013).
27. *Almedalen – varför är vi här? Så skapades en politikens marknadsplats – Ett vittnesseminarium om Almedalsveckan som politisk arena*. Ed. Kjell Östberg (2013).
28. *Anarkosyndikalismens återkomst i Spanien. SACs samarbete med CNT under övergången från diktatur till demokrati*. Ed. Per Lindblom (2014).
29. *När blev världen marknad? Vittnesseminarium i Almedalen*. Ed. Kristina Abiala (2014).
30. *Brinner ”förorten”? Om sociala konflikter i Botkyrka och Huddinge*. Ed. Kristina Abiala (2014).
31. *Sea of Identities: A Century of Baltic and East European Experiences with Nationality, Class, and Gender*. Ed. Norbert Götz (2014).
32. *När räntan gick i taket: Vittnesseminarium om valutakrisen 1992*. Ed. Cecilia Åse (2015).
33. *Nordiskt samarbete i kalla krigets kölvatten. Vittnesseminarium med Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Mats Hellström och Pär Stenbäck*. Eds. Johan Strang & Norbert Götz (2016).
34. *Solidariteten med Chile 1973–1989*. Eds. Yulia Gradszkova & Monica Quirico (2016).
35. *25 år av skolreformer – hur började det? Vittnesseminarium om skolans kommunalisering och friskolereformen*. Ed. Johanna Ringarp (2017).
36. *Levande campus: Utmaningar och möjligheter för Södertörns högskola i den nya regionala stadskärnan i Flemingsberg*. Eds. Johanna Ringarp & Håkan Forsell (2017).
37. *Utbildningsvetenskap: Vittnesseminarium om ett vetenskapsområdes uppkomst, utveckling och samtida utmaningar*. Eds. Anders Burman, Daniel Lövheim & Johanna Ringarp (2018).
38. *Pontus Hultén på Moderna Museet: Vittnesseminarium på Södertörns högskola, 26 april 2017*. Ed. Charlotte Bydler, Andreas Gedin & Johanna Ringarp (2018).

39. *AIDS i Sverige: Hiv epidemin och rörelserna*. Eds. Kjell Östberg & Lena Lennerhed (2019).
40. *Romerna och skolplikten: Hot eller möjlighet?* Ed. Håkan Blomqvist (2020).
41. *Sweden in Solidarity, Museums in Exile: The Chilean Resistance Museum in Solidarity with Salvador. Allende and the International Art Exhibition for Palestine*. Ed. Charlotte Bydler (2022).
42. *Kamp mot droger: En bok om Förbundet mot droger*. Kjell Östberg (2019).
43. *North and South: Social Democracy in the European 1970s*. Eds. Alan Granadino, Carl Marklund & Johan Strang (2021).



The 1970s was a watershed for Europe and for social democracy. Economic crises, regime changes in Southern Europe, and rising neoliberalism posed challenges and offered opportunities that shaped the end of the 20th century.

In a witness seminar organized by the Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University, and the Centre for Nordic Studies, University of Helsinki, four social democrats shed light on the period and on the interactions of Northern and Southern Europe.

Participants included: Pierre Schori (former international secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party), Valdo Spini (former vice-secretary of the Italian Socialist Party), Ulf Sundqvist (former chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland), and Jaime Gama (founding member of the Portuguese Socialist Party).

Södertörns högskola | Library, SE 141 89 Huddinge | publications@sh.se



SÖDERTÖRN UNIVERSITY | STOCKHOLM
sh.se



REIMAGINING NORDEN
IN AN EVOLVING WORLD



UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI
CENS - CENTRE FOR NORDIC STUDIES