


The Idea of Kosmopolis

History, philosophy and politics of world citizenship



EDITED BY REBECCA LETTEVALL AND MY KLOCKAR LINDER

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Preface

This volume focuses on the concept of *kosmopolis*, and includes research from a variety of disciplines. The aim of the volume is to investigate and illuminate the academy's increasing interest in cosmopolitanism by examining the different angles and perspectives used within both the humanities and the social sciences.

When asked where he came from, the Greek cynic Diogenes of Sinope answered "Kosmopolis". Diogenes' response embraced a radically different way of thinking about individual identity and social belonging than was customary in ancient Greece: Identity was firmly anchored in the topos of the city-state. From this first known use of the term, the concept of *kosmopolis* – of the cosmopolitan as a citizen of the world – developed further, eventually encompassing a variety of meanings. The Stoics used it to express a political and ethical ideal, using it to describe a way of living in the world that would be of universal benefit to humanity. From its inception, then, the cosmopole and the cosmopolitan have had significant utopian dimensions. Subsequent philosophical and historical developments show how the concept is in perpetual change. It is continually being defined, questioned, and redefined, and it continues to speak to our contemporary concerns about emerging world orders and the ethics of living in today's globalized society. *Kosmopolis* is not only an object of historical and philosophical interest, but has also become an ideal for an emerging world order, one with utopian connotations. To study cosmopolitanism is, in other words, not only to investigate it historically or philosophically, but also to view it as an analytical key concept for research attempting to address the future.

After being considered quite outdated for some decades, the latest rebirth of *kosmopolis* started after the decline of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, a period in which some people

believed that the end of history had occurred. Indeed, it seems as if the end of the Cold War allowed for the growth of new ideas, and for the rebirth and redefinition of certain old ones. As a result, an upgrade of what was thought of as *kosmopolis* took place, and the concept developed into cosmopolitanism and the resulting theories of the cosmopolitan. Some of the older meanings of the concept nevertheless remained in use, and are often considered to concur with contemporary cosmopolitanism. Sociologists and political scientists were particularly keen to formulate theories for a new world order using this older concept, while others were using it in its more classic meaning. However, its classic meaning was far from homogeneous.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the beginning of an intensified economic globalization. The liberal idea of a global free market seemed to be closer to realization than ever before, as goods and money could move quite freely across borders. This also coincided with a renewal of political and philosophical interest in cosmopolitan ideals. Even if it has not always been clear in this discussion as to how globalization relates to cosmopolitanism, Ulrich Beck provides some illumination, as he considers economic globalization to be an empirical fact, and cosmopolitanism to be the ability or will to try to act on it. His theory can be regarded as a development of his criticism of modernity, as stated in his early work *Risk Society* (1985).

Sometimes cosmopolitanism and globalization are assumed to mean the same thing, but there are indeed major differences between them, as globalization does not elaborate on the idea of human rights and universal human ideals, characteristics that are usually quite distinctive in cosmopolitanism. While globalization, to a great extent, deals with the development of a free market, cosmopolitanism usually has some connection to the idea of natural rights and universal human rights, ideas that often turn out to be as naïve as the ideas of economic globalization and of unlimited freedom. However, historically there is a quite common use of the concept of cosmopolitanism that is not far removed from the concept of globalization.

If one considers globalization to be an ultraliberal type of ideal, that characteristic can also be seen in the 18th century cosmopolitan, that is, the free individual who is at home everywhere. Nowadays, however, not only globalization but also multiculturalism are related to cosmopolitanism, and are both part of the discourse. Multiculturalism, when examined in relation to cosmopolitanism, raises the question of the relationship between the universal and the particular.

Cosmopolitanism as linked to human rights and the question of rights in general is also relevant to general questions of rights and of legal order. International does not mean cosmopolitan, as the 'inter' signifies something between nations, while 'cosmopolitan' is beyond 'nation'. There have been recent efforts to create cosmopolitan systems of rights, and the relation between international and cosmopolitan is thus one of the issues in *kosmopolis*. The most difficult aspect of cosmopolitanism is perhaps the assumption that it involves a moral attitude. Given the last decade's criticism of universal moral values, not least from a multicultural and postcolonial perspective, these difficulties have become quite obvious, and illustrate how both globalization and the Internet complicate the Enlightenment concept of cosmopolitanism. Electronic communication via the Internet could be viewed as a social description of *kosmopolis*, giving it a totally new dimension.

While the development of contemporary cosmopolitanism, to some extent, has been dominated by sociologists, who see it as a theoretical way of understanding a globalized world characterized by immense migration and broadly available communication technologies, the concept does not have the same meaning in other fields. Within many disciplines *kosmopolis* has not one but several meanings from both the past and the present. It seems as if earlier concepts of its heritage from the Enlightenment as well as from ancient Greece and Rome still remain, although in newer forms.

As a reminder of the historicity of the term 'kosmopolis', we have decided to keep the Greek transcription inspired-spelling *kosmopolis*. This volume contains two main approaches to the concept of *kosmopolis*: one which deals with *kosmopolis* and the cosmopolitan from a historical and philosophical perspective, and one that

places it in a contemporary context, focusing on international law and the global world order. As the chapters will show, the idea of *kosmopolis* or the concept of cosmopolitanism does not follow a straight line throughout history. Still, there are many interesting connections to be made, not only among the different scholarly disciplines, but also between the past and the present.

In the first chapter, *Rebecka Lettevall* gives an introduction to the topic and outlines some of the critical points related to the concept of *kosmopolis*. Using the examples of Fougeret de Monbron and Immanuel Kant, Lettevall shows how the concept can be used in various ways, involving understandings and connotations that radically differ from each other. For Fougeret, cosmopolitanism is an aesthetical approach rather than a moral proposal. Fougeret's idea of himself as a 'citizen of the world' is based on what is already familiar to him: he is a cosmopolitan in his own world, based on European and Christian ways and values. Other cultures, which Fougeret comes in contact with on his travels, are seen as different, or even odd. In contrast to this is Kant, who hardly left his hometown of Königsberg, but who still remains the eternal example of the true cosmopolite. Lettevall argues that in Kant, cosmopolitanism can be understood both as an intellectual experience and a moral attitude. For Kant, being a cosmopolitan is not about travelling and experiencing the Other. Rather, it is about being part of a universal hospitality that surrounds humankind. Kant connects his idea of the cosmopolitan to universal political and international rights, which, in the end, should result in perpetual peace (which is also the English title of one of Kant's famous writings).

In the second chapter, *Hans Ruin* explores cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitan ideal from a historical and philosophical point of view. He goes back to the roots, to what he argues to be the most ancient source on the topic: Heraclitus and his fragments of cosmos and logos. By combining Heraclitus with the Kantian conception of rationality, Ruin argues that the 'often naïve conception of natural right', which is fundamental to the cosmopolitan ideal, can and should be problematized. This is what Ruin claims to be the most significant task for philosophy today: 'to define what it would

mean for man to inhabit the Earth, to become at home in the world' – in short, what it means to be a cosmopolitan. This is an urgent question in the contemporary world, one which is rapidly changing, where former borders and barriers are being torn down at the same time as new ones emerge. As Ruin illustrates, there is a duality in the cosmopolitan ideal and its inheritance. This is also one of Ruin's main points: that there should and must be a certain amount of uncertainty in the meaning of our most central philosophical concepts.

As noted above, one can hardly think of *kosmopolis* and the cosmopolitan ideal without thinking of Immanuel Kant. The Königsberger philosopher and his category of the world citizen (*Weltbürger*) are the topics *Carola Häntsch* addresses in Chapter 3. Häntsch's aim is to problematize Kant's role as the great theorist of moral cosmopolitanism, and to instead show that Kant's uses of the idea of *kosmopolis* and the world citizen are more cautious than most scholars tend to assume. With reference to Josef Simon, Häntsch argues that one of the basic assumptions in Kant's philosophy is the strict distinction between what is moral and what is right. This further leads to a distinction between the moral politician and the political moralist, where the moral politician as a politician bases his politics on the moral as right/law, instead of morality as ethics. Häntsch translates the distinction of 'moral' and 'right' into the distinction of 'own' and 'alien' reason, and argues that this is of major importance in understanding Kant's concept of the world citizen. From the perspective of one's 'own' reason (or cosmopolitan morality), the 'world citizen' requires a point of view above the world, while from the perspective of 'alien' reason, citizens take their place in the world as a fellow citizen.

In Chapter 4, *Andreas Önnarfors* investigates the link between cosmopolitanism and secrecy. Inspired by Reinhart Koselleck's idea of secrecy and publicity as the historical twin pairing of the Enlightenment, Önnarfors traces the roots of enlightened ideas on world citizenship to the normative foundations of freemasonry in the early 18th century. By analyzing and comparing works of André Michel de Ramsay and Christoph Martin Wieland, Önnarfors shows that cosmopolitan values and ideas were formulated

within the framework of secret societies, but that cosmopolitanism at the same time requires no organization, and is a morality that is at least potentially conceivable to all. Public discourse was prepared within the secret, private spheres of 18th century enlightened culture, of which the freemasonry movement is an example, hence supporting Koselleck's thesis.

Jessica Parland-von Essen provides an interesting counterpoint to Öennerfors, as she in Chapter 5 writes about educational practices and cultural strategies within the Swedish nobility during the 18th century. Parland-von Essen argues that these practices and strategies were ways for the nobility to enter cosmopolitan society, and shows how patriotism is to thus be considered not in opposition to the cosmopolitan ideal, but rather as an ideal existing within the idea of the cosmopolitan – universal patriotism. This relationship, however, could sometimes – create conflicts in actual life, particularly when one had to choose between different loyalties. In her comparison of the educations of three females from the nobility during the 18th century, Parland-von Essen shows how the idea of a coherent cosmopolitan culture was fundamental to elite identity, and that similar strategies were used to become part of this culture.

The theme of patriotism is taken up by *David Östlund* in Chapter 6. Östlund examines Jane Addams, who worked on solving social problems among the Chicago immigrants around the turn of the 20th century. Addams found an everyday solidarity among the underprivileged population of the Chicago Slums, one which she claimed to be the seed of modern cosmopolitanism. This was at a time when cosmopolitanism was 'out of date' and issues like race, sex and nationality were on the agenda instead. This new cosmopolitanism was characterized by a mutual respect for differences, and focused on that which unites people from all cultures and countries – cosmopolitan humanitarianism. Addams understood this as a new ethos, a new moral attitude, which she called cosmic patriotism.

Chapters 1-6 address cosmopolitanism from a largely historical or philosophical perspective. *On-Kwok Lai* in Chapter 7, however, places cosmopolitanism into a more contemporary context. Lai investigates how the idea of *kosmopolis* can be understood within

the cyber-information age, where worldwide phenomena such as the growing globalization movement and the explosion of new media all contribute to challenging the way in which we understand the idea of 'world citizenship' from a communication perspective; that is, what it means to be a world citizen, and which actions must be taken in order to reach this ideal. Lai focuses on the global civil society, which he claims to be the new basis of *kosmopolis*, and raises questions about how values such as liberty and democracy must be re-considered in a world that is rapidly coming together through, for instance, trade and the exchange of information. He fears that the social cleavages and divisions between the rich and the poor parts of the world will not necessarily change as a result of globalization, and that the power structures will remain the same.

Within a world that is rapidly coming together as a result of international transactions, the question of international law becomes more and more crucial. How can international law be a useful tool in addressing the new questions and lines of conflict which have emerged during the last few years? This is the topic discussed by *Peter Kemp* in Chapter 8. Kemp identifies three current political problems: the problem of financial globalization, that of intercultural coexistence and that of the physical sustainability of the Earth. He argues that in order to approach these problems, and to be accepted by all people around the globe, international law must undergo a change. Its basis must be cosmopolitan, which implies that people have dual citizenship, one national and one cosmopolitan, and that both must be associated with rights and duties. But even if the two citizenships co-exist, the cosmopolitan ideal must always be superior to the particularities of a single nation or society. Cosmopolitanism is the normative basis which legitimates an international system of law and order, and which legitimates the institutions to uphold this law and order.

In the final chapter *Lena Halldenius* explores what the idea of 'global obligations' actually requires. Halldenius discusses three aspects of modern cosmopolitanism which, she claims, taken together form the backbone of contemporary cosmopolitan philosophy: first, the cosmopolitans' belief that they are members of a global community; second, the moral universalism connected to

cosmopolitanism; and third, the cosmopolitans' support of global or transnational institutions. Halldenus questions the assumption that the third aspect is a consequence of the first two. Instead, she argues that it should be considered 'the primary and distinctive feature of cosmopolitanism, importantly entailing a certain view of justice: justice as dependent on accountable institutions'. As a basis of the idea of an obligation of a global institution, pure universalism is not enough. Something more is needed and can be found in a theory of global justice.

Our hope is that these chapters will continue to inspire investigations and analyses of cosmopolitanism within the social sciences as well as within the humanities. This collection of articles is an offspring of the presentations and discussions from the conference on The Idea of Kosmopolis: Ethics, Politics, and Aesthetics of World Citizenship, which was held at Södertörn University College and the Nobel Museum in Stockholm in 2006. We express our gratitude for the financial support provided by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies and the Nobel Museum.

Rebecka Lettevall

My Klockar Linder

1. The Idea of *Kosmopolis*: Two Kinds of Cosmopolitanism

Rebecka Lettevall

Until relatively recently, cosmopolitanism was considered to be totally out of date. It began to reappear around the time of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, and has become a fairly common concept within several scholarly disciplines. The complicated political processes of internationalism have contributed to the increasing interest in cosmopolitan ideals amongst not only historians and intellectual historians, but also political scientists, philosophers and sociologists. Some plausible causes for this shift in interest are, of course, the above-mentioned end of the Cold War, but also the increasing intensity of globalization in a broad sense. I use globalization here in a manner similar to Ulrich Beck, who instead calls it globalism, referring to economic globalization and the belief in a world market.¹ This fact demands a cosmopolitan world order, as national states are not capable of handling many of the global problems on their own. So cosmopolitanism is a part of our experience, which is a fact we need to accept, consciously or unconsciously.²

Much of this newfound interest in cosmopolitanism has come out of the social sciences even if well-known philosophers like Martha Nussbaum have been greatly involved in the topic as well. But it is a concept which has to be discussed within the human sciences, whose perspective then allows for an awareness of hermeneutical understanding as well as the impact of time, and is very

¹ Beck, Ulrich *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997).

² Beck, Ulrich *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).

illuminating in the case of cosmopolitanism. Placing cosmopolitanism in this temporal and spatial perspective allows for the approach of some aspects of cosmopolitanism that might not otherwise be considered.

In dealing with cosmopolitanism, it becomes apparent that there is a discrepancy between the different ways in which the concept is being used.³ It has been held that this discrepancy implies that cosmopolitanism has no true ideology – there is no centre of cosmopolitanism. It is frequently treated more as an ideal than as a doctrine. Cosmopolitanism is, in some respects, universal but, on the other hand, there are apparent problems with this universalism, as the parts do not seem to have an actual centre. This idea, originally formulated some two thousand years ago, has apparently not been discarded, as it still receives attention from many different perspectives and quarters. It is certainly a topic, or perhaps even a field, which addresses quite a few scholarly disciplines. But even if the idea of *kosmopolis* does not appear to have been discarded, this has not always been the case. During certain periods, cosmopolitanism has been seen as old-fashioned, or as just unrealistic or naïve.

Cosmopolitanism today might actually mean quite a few different things, and sometimes it seems as if certain theorists do not necessarily notice that different trains of thought are being confused. I consider cosmopolitanism today to be dependent, consciously or unconsciously, on the intellectual history of the concept. Depending on history does not mean that the concept has its own life outside of how it is being used. A concept acquires the meaning from its user.⁴ But as human activity is of such disparate

³ Tomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1999, pp. 505–524; Francis Cheneval, *Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung* (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2002); Georg Cavallar, *The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community and Political Justice since Vitoria* (Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2002).

⁴ Reinhard Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006).

character, it is difficult to describe all of its expressions. In the case of cosmopolitanism, there seems to be a certain connection between how the concept is being used today and how it was used during the Enlightenment. When the discussion of cosmopolitanism was recently reborn, as explained above, many discussants referred to Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Voltaire and others, and to the Ancient Stoics. A key to understanding cosmopolitanism today might be found in analyzing the periods when cosmopolitanism was at its pinnacle, not in order to correct today's discussion, but instead to broaden it and to illuminate some of its confusing circumstances.

Roughly speaking, there are two main understandings of the concept of cosmopolitanism today. The same pattern can be noticed in the 18th century. One can be traced to the Stoic idea of *Kosmopolis*, while the other has its background in the Cynics. There is a clear development from a more popular and unreflective use of the term to a growth of a more sophisticated type, without a theoretical attitude. But one has to be cautious, as there also are many similarities between the two. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish one meaning from the other. This development of cosmopolitanism from an apolitical to a political concept occurs in the early 18th century, not surprisingly in close connection with the ideas that were to influence the outbreak of the French Revolution. It is also sometimes said that cosmopolitanism characterizes the Enlightenment in such a way that it can be called a key concept of the period, but this is often said without characterizing cosmopolitanism.⁵ According to Schlereth, the cosmopolitan is characterized by eclecticism, but also by the willingness and even the desire to expose oneself to the unknown. Some people might consider the cosmopolitan to be naïve and selfish, while others would not. However, the point is not whether cosmopolitanism in the 18th century has a true ideology, because that was neither the aim nor the purpose of this use of cosmopolitanism. Rather, Schlereth's point illustrates that more discussion is needed in the case of cosmopolitanism.

One reason to distinguish between the two meanings of the concept, as done here, is that the two understandings of cosmopolitan-

⁵ Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Enlightenment Thought*.

ism are still quite important and that, from such a historical perspective, the contemporary discussion will appear clearer. Of course there are good reasons to view cosmopolitanism as one of the key concepts of the Enlightenment. But during this period it was also used for different purposes, and it is possible to see how the concept eventually becomes a part of a theory formulated during the later part of the Enlightenment by Immanuel Kant. From being quite uncritically used, the idea of *kosmopolis* develops into a (at least partly) political theory by the end of the 18th century. This theory has an impact on discussions of globalization and world citizenship even today. I am thus looking at the history of thinking in order to illuminate meanings of the concept that might still influence our understanding of it. History is about actions, performed within a certain time and space. The history of ideas, or intellectual history, is different, as many ideas seem to live on as they continue to be used, while others just vanish, sometimes to be reborn later, perhaps in disguise, but always held by a person. Occasionally, however, a concept like *kosmopolis* can be presupposed to mean the same thing as it always has, just because it sounds nearly the same. But that is not the always case. Ideas change as their context changes, and this fact can also be illuminated by using Hans-Georg Gadamer's idea of *Wirkungsgeschichte*. This is not the same thing as reception history, which, in general, sees the object of a study as more static. The idea of *Wirkungsgeschichte* implies that a concept brings experiences with it. It is tailed by all of its meanings and understandings, and changes over time. According to Gadamer, this change occurs more or less continuously. Reinhart Koselleck believes that concepts underwent more severe changes during the transformation from pre-modern to modern societies around 1750–1850. This interesting theory is sometimes developed further to claim a second such transformation, one caused by the complicated patterns containing the elements of the fall of the Soviet empire, economic globalization, and the intensified situation of communication. More recently, Koselleck has presented the concept of time layers (*Zeitschichten*) as a complementary idea of how changes appear differently depending on the time perspective from which

they are being considered.⁶ Gadamer's as well as Koselleck's models are very illuminating in the case of cosmopolitanism. Let me state that the Koselleck view explains why cosmopolitanism is currently gaining popularity and changing its definitions, and why it changed during the Enlightenment.

One attempt to examine cosmopolitanism has been made by Pauline Kleingeld who, by exploring the German theory of cosmopolitanism in the last decade of the 18th century, has distinguished six different expressions of the idea of cosmopolitanism.⁷ Of course, such distinctions and taxonomies can always be discussed and arranged differently. The categories that she distinguishes include, aside from market cosmopolitanism, the moral cosmopolitans, based on the common value that all human beings belong to the same moral world, even if this does not always imply that all human beings are sage enough to be citizens. Further, she distinguishes two types of political cosmopolitanism. One is defined as 'International Federative cosmopolitanism', that is, cosmopolitanism focused on the world, even if it, in some way, begins with Europe, and the other is defined as cosmopolitan law, referring to the relationship between individuals and states. The fifth type is cultural cosmopolitanism, a variety of moral cosmopolitanism, but concentrating on collectives and cultures rather than on individuals, without being either relativist or ethnocentric. The sixth is romantic cosmopolitanism, referring to the early German romantics and their criticism of individualism and rootlessness. Her example of romantic cosmopolitanism involves Novalis and the type of cosmopolitanism he presents in 'Christenheit oder Europa'.

The cultural cosmopolitan, as defined by Kleingeld, is a person who sees that mankind differs from one another, and also acknowledges that different expressions of humanity are of equal value. A cultural cosmopolitan is neither relativist nor ethnocentric, as she puts it. Kleingeld uses Georg Forster (1754–1794) as a representative of this attitude. Forster described different cultures using un-

⁶ Koselleck, Reinhard, *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006).

⁷ Kleingeld, 'Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany', pp. 505–524.

prejudiced terms, and was interested in systematic investigations rather than in curiosities. His descriptions of other cultures are neither relativist nor ethnocentric. Common humanity is the origin and root of his cosmopolitanism. It is connected to universal moral cosmopolitanism, but focuses on cultures and collectives rather than on individuals.

There are no doubt different types of cosmopolitanism. The question of whether the concept has a centre or not seems to be less relevant. Cosmopolitanism is not an ideology or a certain kind of belief system, as might easily be presumed if one accepts the word form ending with -ism. The question is whether the different types have what Wittgenstein called a family similarity, or if there is a difference in type between them. The assumed similarity might not be as clear as could be expected.

The background of cosmopolitanism

The idea of *kosmopolis* is not new. The term is a compound of the Greek words *kosmos* and *polis*, both expressing some type of order. *Kosmos* is the type of order that can be found in nature, such as the changing seasons or tides, that is, the type of order that people need to be familiar with in order to be successful in agriculture and navigation. *Polis* is the order of society found in administration and irrigation. Originally, *kosmopolis* means the combination of these two, the ability to combine the order of society with the order of nature. This idea also influenced, or perhaps should even be seen as a part of, the natural right theory.

The first known use of the concept seems to be a well-known quotation, where the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope is asked where he is from, and he answers, 'I am a cosmopolitan', that is, he feels at home everywhere.⁸ In any case, this expression is a bit problematic, as its source is found in Diogenes Laertius, who lived long after Diogenes of Sinope (AD 200) and who for obvious reasons never met him. Nonetheless, the expression is a part of the history of the concept, as it is so well known. The meaning of the quotation is

⁸ Diogenes Laertus, Vol II.

difficult to determine, as the phrase can be understood negatively as well as positively. There seems to be no further theory of cosmopolitanism in Cynic thinking apart from this quotation. The idea of *kosmopolis* was further expanded by the Greek and Roman Stoics, who developed it into more of an ethical idea, and included some universalistic claims.⁹ Stoic thinking contains an idea of universal equality beyond any borders, even if the people who actually had the opportunity to live in accordance with Stoic ideals were the elites of society. In addition to the Cynics, Aristotle also had an impact on Stoic thinking, with his view of man as a social being. Within the actual historical and political situation in which he lived, it was not too daring to see not only one's own city-state but also all of humanity as included in *kosmopolis*. *Logos* was within reach for everyone, at least in theory.

The concept of cosmopolitanism was introduced into the modern languages during the Enlightenment, including the terms 'cosmopolitan', 'world citizen', 'Weltbürger', 'Citoyen du monde' and 'världsmedborgare'. The intellectuals of the Enlightenment were in general quite familiar with Greek thought, and even more so with the Roman Stoics. The introduction of the classic term into modern languages also shows how the idea became rooted in a Western tradition. An excellent way to determine how a concept is viewed during a certain period is to look at its formal definitions in encyclopedias. In the great French *Encyclopédie*, *cosmopolite* is defined as:

*un homme, qui n'a point de demeure fixe, ou bien un homme qui n'est étranger nulle part. Il vient de grand monde & grande ville. Comme on demandoit à un ancien philosophe d'où il étoit, il répondit: Je suis Cosmopolite, c'est-à-dire citoyen de l'univers. Je préfère, disoit un autre, ma famille à moi, ma patrie à ma famille, & le genre humain à ma patrie.*¹⁰

⁹ Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–25; Klaus Reich, 'Kant and Greek Ethics', *Mind*, 48 (1939).

¹⁰ *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisoné des sciences des arts et des metiers*, Vol. 4, Nouvelle impression en facsimile de la première édition de 1751–1780 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1988), p. 297.

In this description, it appears as if the cosmopolitan is quite naïve, a person flying above all, unwilling to place his feet on the ground. Such a view also appears in the first use of the concept in printed Swedish: it is in a translation of August Kotzebue's *The Orthenborger Family and its Sufferings*.¹¹ At the end of the novel, the young romantic Wilhelm explains to his uncle that he will join the Army in order to forget his broken heart. He might join any army, even the 'Tartars'. His uncle reminds him that his blood belongs to his fatherland, whereupon Wilhelm answers: 'My father's land? The world is my father's land; I am a cosmopolitan'. The uncle counters: 'You are a fool!' Here the cosmopolitan is described as a naïve person, a fool, worth nothing more than to be spat at. The cosmopolitan is also a coward, as he uses cosmopolitanism in order to escape from practical problems and unhappiness. He does not care about the people who are close to him, nor about the place where he was brought up. This kind of cosmopolitanism is close to a Cynic view, but one which involves a rather common understanding of the Cynic thinking, leaving out any political and anarchistic criticism.

As indicated in the *Stanford Dictionary* (2006), very few cosmopolitans in the Enlightenment defined themselves in the way they were described within the French encyclopedic definition. On the contrary, such a definition turned out to be the critical definition of a cosmopolitan by the non-cosmopolitans.¹² This double meaning of the concept of cosmopolitanism still exists in our own time, for instance, when one type of cosmopolitanism is considered to be an expression of extreme individualism, while the other is a theoretical system with important links to human rights and contemporary political problems.

The concept of cosmopolitanism is apparently of considerable importance within Enlightenment thought. It acquired its impact from the Stoics, and from the Romans in particular. The Stoic cos-

¹¹ August Kotzebue, *Orthenbergska familjens lidande* (Stockholm 1794).

¹² This is one of the distinctions made in Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, 'Cosmopolitanism', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/>. However, one person here is only briefly mentioned.

mopolitanism might be understood as focusing on unity, which implies that humanity is seen as one entire unit. The Cynic type of cosmopolitanism is instead characterized by focusing on differences and discrepancies, and implies an elite perspective. Cynic stoicism includes elements of escaping rather than reflecting on the consequences of a cosmopolitan perspective. The Enlightenment cosmopolitan with certain Cynic characteristics is represented in this chapter by Fougeret de Monbron, while the cosmopolitan with Stoic characteristics is represented by Immanuel Kant.

Fougeret de Monbron

Anyone who is interested in cosmopolitanism sooner or later runs into Fougeret de Monbron and his quite unsystematic travel memories, *Le Cosmopolite*. He has been referred to by scholars interested in the idea of cosmopolitanism in the 18th century.¹³ Fougeret actually acts in a manner which makes him a good target for anyone wanting to criticize cosmopolitan attitude. His view of cosmopolitanism gives the impression of being unreflective, and it might be exaggerating to term it cosmopolitanism, as he does not present a coherent theory. But because he calls himself a cosmopolitan and because his writing is of interest to scholars, there are reasons to examine the type of ideas he has and associates with being a cosmopolitan. What he represents will be called cosmopolitanism here, even if it might be more appropriate to call it a cosmopolitan attitude. His position is quite self-centered, and he has an unsophisticated, liberal, and sometimes anarchistic pose to his surroundings. His actions demonstrate that calling oneself a cosmopolitan is apparently not the same as believing in cosmopolitanism as a universal ethical position. His cosmopolitan attitude might be called an aesthetic approach, and does not have much of a conscious moral basis.

Fougeret's little book is quite unsystematic, consisting of some scattered travel impressions from the world from his point of view.

¹³ Louis Charles Fougeret de Monbron, *Le Cosmopolite ou le Citoyen de Monde* (London 1750).

He tries to place it in a broader context in the beginning by referring to: ‘L’univers est une espèce dont on n’a lu que la première page, quand on n’a vu que son pays’.¹⁴ The author tells us about how he dislikes the narrow-mindedness and stupidity in his homeland, and explains his love for England. Fougeret keeps referring to himself not as a travel writer or journalist, but as a travelling person jotting down his reflections on paper, letting random coincidences govern his journeys.¹⁵ His aim is explicitly not to evaluate or describe manners and culture. Still, that is exactly what he does. His personal boundaries shape what he sees and what he does not see. In addition, when he mentions where he might go, he refers to places that are well known, but that are also considered to be a bit exotic. These places could be Moscow, St Petersburg, Isfahan, or Beijing.

Fougeret thus refers to himself as a cosmopolitan, or a world citizen, as the title of the book says. In what way is he such a person? He serves as a good example of the kind of cosmopolitan who sets the norms for cosmopolitanism according to his own taste. The boundaries are very clear, and coincide with the boundaries of Christianity and Europe. This becomes apparent in his description of ‘Turks and Mohammedans’. It is the differences that are constantly focused on. Turks are harsher on themselves than Europeans are, which is shown in religious traditions like Ramadan. Turks are also brutal fatalists with a cruel system of rights. They have a nice method of disposing of building dimensions, but not when it comes to clothing and music. The way the Turks dress is, according to Fougeret, characterized as against nature, in the respect that it hides the beautiful proportions nature has given to humanity. Fougeret sees it as unnatural to place a short and chubby ideal before one which is tall and slim. With regards to music, there is an admission that tastes might be different; the Turkish music is melancholic and nasal. In his comparison of music, the images are carefully chosen. Some might prefer mustard, others sweets, Fougeret explains. That is also his view on how Turkish music is to be considered in comparison to sweet European music. There are simply different tastes

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

in music, and it is not hard to see how Fougere uses his images: the coarseness of mustard, or the softness of a sweet? Which is to be preferred? When Fougere catches a fever some weeks after leaving Turkey, he believes that he caught it in Oriental Turkey rather than in any of the other places he mentions.

Judging from his actions and deeds, Fougere seems to despise people rather than cherish them. He seems to keep his distance. This is quite clear in his descriptions of the Turks, but also when he meets others, such as Italian women. His view is that Italian is by far the most beautiful language, and Italian opera and churches are also beautiful, especially the Saint Peter's church in Rome. The Spaniards, on the other hand, are portrayed as half savage, which is exemplified not least by their treatment of the colonies.¹⁶ Even more savage, according to Fougere, are the Portuguese, depicted as 'a blend of blacks or mulattos, almost all Jews in their hearts and Christian on the surface!'¹⁷

In any case, Fougere does seem to possess some kind of political awareness. This becomes clear when he speaks about the English. He sees them not only as loving, but also as living in an egalitarian society, which apparently is one of his ideals. All citizens in England have the same privileges, and have the same protection under the law. From this point of view, the English are free.

One important aspect, in his view, involves his initial quote, which says that those who have only seen their paternal country have only read the very first page of a book. This implies that he is interested in seeing more of the world. His view on cosmopolitanism is that it is an attitude. And that attitude is very individualistic. Some would perhaps not call him a cosmopolitan at all, because he permanently uses his own subject as the norm, and notes what is different from his habits without reflecting on himself. He seems to lack an interest in searching for the reasons behind these differences. He does not really care. When it comes to ethics, he seems to have an unreflective view, saying that his own values are the right ones, or at least not to be questioned.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 148. 'Les Portugais sont un mélange de Nègres ou de Mulâtes, presque tous Juifs de coeur & Chrétiens pour la forme!'

Fougeret de Monbron has been discussed here to serve as a good, although somewhat extreme, example of what a person calling himself a cosmopolite during the Enlightenment might mean by that. In the case of Fougeret, it is clear that he does not embrace the ideal of universalism. Rather than seeing what unifies humanity, and what is human in a person, he focuses on the differences, and does so quite uncritically. He does not see that treating someone badly is a threat to humanity as a whole. It is also easy to see that he is a representative of Orientalism and a colonial attitude.¹⁸ At the same time, he does not like being French but instead prefers the freedom on the other side of the Channel. In a way his cosmopolitanism implies escape, from the French, from his roots, and from his origins. His attitude shows that he might have been one of those who was referred to in the French encyclopaedia. He is an example of a person living a way of life that was not uncommon during the Enlightenment and still exists: that which could be termed cosmopolitan. The manner in which he refers to himself as a cosmopolitan is similar to the way the term is used today. A cosmopolitan can still be an unreflective person travelling around the world, using others as a means rather than as an end in themselves.

Kant as a cosmopolitan

For some, calling the Königsberg philosopher Kant a cosmopolitan might appear to be contradictory, as it is widely known that Kant hardly left his native city of Königsberg during his lifetime. In the biographies he is generally considered to be almost a patriot, unwilling to leave the place where he once upon a time, by chance, was born. But if cosmopolitanism in one of its meanings implies physical travel, as in the case of Fougeret, the concept also has a different meaning, in that it can refer to intellectual experiences as well as attitudes. Perhaps Kant's cosmopolitanism is not a developed theory, but it is at least the outline of such a thing. Kant acquired his experience of the physical world and the world outside of Königsberg and Prussia through different media. Of course he

¹⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge, 1978).

read an immense number of journals and books. But he also heard stories and the experiences of travelling friends and visitors from the at-that-time metropolitan old Hanseatic city of Königsberg, strategically placed between East and West, and famous for its university as well as for its commerce.

One of the most important works in regards to Kant's cosmopolitanism is *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795). In this work, Kant outlines a model for perpetual peace, including a model for stable political communication. His ideal is a state organized along the lines of republican ideals, and is very much reminiscent of the ideal of Rousseau. The states are to join themselves into an international federation, with the purpose of allowing for both civilized discussions and eventual solutions concerning matters between political units. This quite formal solution (even if Kant did not develop it himself) was combined with an idea of cosmopolitanism. Yet when Kant discusses cosmopolitanism, he immediately limits the cosmopolitan right to conditions of universal hospitality. Hospitality is the right of a guest, and the guest cannot be treated like the inhabitant. The guest has only rights, while the inhabitant has rights as well as duties. This article is often referred to as a way to protect the colonies from their European colonizers. The most important part of this article is the last paragraph, where it is stated that:

The people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace.¹⁹

This might be developed more thoroughly, but at this point my main intent is to indicate these two very different uses of the concept of cosmopolitanism as represented by Foucher de Monbron

¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, first pub. 1970), pp. 93–131.

and Kant. The quotation above implies that Kant's idea of cosmopolitanism has its centre in the concept of universal human rights, and that its boundaries will be where humanity ends. In this respect, we are all citizens of the world.

Kant's argument for cosmopolitanism references the shape of the earth as an example. That it is shaped like a globe means that people can spread all over it to finally meet again, after a certain amount of time. Even Nature is involved in this, as Nature has what Kant calls a secret, hidden plan for humanity. In the beginning of history everyone, according to Kant, had the same right to the earth as everyone else. In cosmopolitanism, we can see the consequences of that. Because of this original cosmopolitan right, there is still, in principle, a right to be everywhere, regardless of who you are. But as things developed over history, the right to hospitality is all that is left of this.

According to Kant's cosmopolitanism, every human being has the same value, on the basis of being a human. He explicitly includes all humans, not only Europeans. He argues that a violation of a person's right is a violation of humanity in general.²⁰ But his cosmopolitanism is still quite restricted. It has its greatest value in the case of human rights. When it comes to people's freedom to remain where they want on Earth, cosmopolitanism is very restricted. It can only be seen as a general hospitality, according to Kant. And even this hospitality is restricted. It means that a person could visit any place without being treated with hostility, and expect to be treated kindly, but it cannot be compared to a guest's right, but instead to a visitor's right. While the former might imply that the person would be given almost the same rights as the host, the latter involves only the right to visit for a short time. This is at the same time Kant's criticism of European colonialism, in which he quite briefly mentions the violations of human rights that regularly occurred.²¹ Kant criticizes the way the inhabitants in the colo-

²⁰ Kant, *Akademieausgabe*, Vol. 8, (Zum ewigen Frieden), p. 359.

²¹ Kant's criticism of European colonialism was radical, and was based on the theory of human rights. At the same time, he is disparaging of non-Europeans in his anthropology and geography lectures, a fact that was highlighted some years ago by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze in *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*

nies are treated as a means and not as an end. The reason for claiming human rights is that human beings as such are gifted with reason, which brings with it the ability to choose between good and bad. This is the same for all humans, whether they are Europeans, Indians, or Africans. There are some contradictions in this, however. Kant claims the cosmopolitan right; there is no doubt about that. But, at the same time, he seems to imply that humans could be divided into different races. In the 1990s Kant was considered to be a racist at the same time as he was a cosmopolitan, a circumstance that led to an intense and ongoing discussion.²²

The hospitality right aims at creating new and peaceful connections between different parts of the world based on universal rights, a condition that, in the long run, will be a necessary qualification for a world republic. Such a global republic might be Kant's final goal – it is difficult to grasp what he really means, and it is complicated by the fact that at times he is concerned with the theoretical perspective, and at times with the practical.

Is Kant claiming a theory of cosmopolitanism? I would instead term it an outline of a theory. The idea of cosmopolitanism, like Kant's idea of peace, is firmly rooted as a part of his philosophical system. Therefore it can be said to be at least an outline of a theory. Also it can be said to have its centre in universal human rights that are moral, but also seem to be more political than they had been earlier.

Conclusion

I have assumed that the multifaceted discussion on cosmopolitanism today, as well as some of the misunderstandings in that discussion, can be analyzed by referencing a history of the use of the concept during the Enlightenment. The reason behind this was that many of the discussions today refer to Enlightenment cosmopol-

(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). This, however, does not detract from the fact that all humans have human rights, according to Kant.

²² See *ibid.*, but also Robert Bernasconi, *Race* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001) and Thomas E. Hill, *Respect, Pluralism and Justice: Kantian Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

itanism. Therefore, that period has a certain relevance. In the same way, many of the Enlightenment philosophers referred to the Roman and Greek Stoics in their theories. And it is there we find the outlines for formal Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism. These can be used as outlines for understanding and clarifying the discussion of cosmopolitanism today. The idea is not to claim that there should be some kind of 'true' cosmopolitanism, but to instead illuminate some of the ongoing discussions.

Cosmopolitanism is indeed one of the key concepts of the Enlightenment. The mere fact that this is the period when it began to appear in the modern languages clearly shows this. What is less clear is what it actually means. What is 18th century cosmopolitanism? I have tried to give examples of two quite disparate definitions. I also have tried to show that there was a development of these definitions during the Enlightenment. But such a development can only be claimed to be quite slight. Cosmopolitanism was not, and still is not, a well-formulated theory with a clear centre. The more unreflective understanding of cosmopolitanism, as Fougeret indicates, still exists today. Even if that has not been the focus of this chapter, it will not be difficult for any of us to imagine such examples. People in power, or elites, still travel, and now and then consider the unknown, or their opposites, to be inferior, and refuse to reconsider their own values and experiences. This is indeed an uncosmopolitan attitude. But the Kantian cosmopolitanism also exists, a theoretical approach based on a theory of universal human rights. This type of thinking also has a background in Enlightenment thinking, including the problem of hospitality that Kant himself focused upon. But at the same time, the other meanings of the concept lived on. The Cynic cosmopolitanism represented by Fougeret can be found today, for example, in what Zygmund Bauman calls 'the tourist'. Stoic cosmopolitanism, represented by Kant, can also be seen within many different contexts, such as the ideals of the United Nations and the struggle for human rights. The continuity of these ideas can show us that there are problems with these universalistic Enlightenment ideas when it comes to real dialogues. It can perhaps be claimed that the connec-

tion between Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism is such that it is impossible to discard one without the other.

How fair is it to compare Fougeret with Kant? Fougeret is perhaps only using a fashionable word from his time in order to fill it with his own dreams. He had the opportunity to travel and to explore different parts of the physical world. Kant, on the other hand, constructed an entire theory of how cosmopolitanism might be the leading concept of the world, without ever leaving Königsberg. Kant's experiences of the world outside Königsberg came from his thinking, which was stimulated by talking and reading. His knowledge of other cultures and of the geography in other parts of the world was always mediated. Apparently the physical experience of *kosmopolis* is not necessary in order to understand it. Perhaps it is easier to grasp if you have not in fact travelled around the world. Perhaps humanity has to be seen from the perspective of the sage from Königsberg in order to approach an understanding of a cosmopolitan point of view. As is often the case, ideals are easier to believe in if they are not confronted with too much harsh reality, and with humans made of flesh and blood. That is probably the largest difference between Enlightenment cosmopolitan theory and the theory of today. All of the consequences arising from economic globalization, be they cultural, political or social, make it rather impossible to struggle with cosmopolitan ideals and at the same time ignore the problem of hospitality. Awareness of the history and of the different meanings of the concept might open the way for new insights into our own *kosmos*.

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2. Belonging to the Whole: Critical and ‘Heraclitical’ Notes on the Ideal of Cosmopolitanism¹

Hans Ruin

Helios neos eph’hemerei estin (The sun is new every day),
Heraclitus, B6

What is the *cosmos*? And what could it mean to belong or stem from it as its *polites*, its citizen? This is the question posed to us by the very configuration of the word: cosmopolite, and the cosmopolitical. Who is the cosmopolite? Do we know this figure? Does he or she exist? Has he ever existed? Or are we, in fact, all of us such beings? But do we not indeed know very well what this is all about? For the ideal of cosmopolitanism, of world citizenship, and of global politics, would seem today to confront us with a greater urgency than ever. In a world which is rapidly coming together through trade, transaction, and exchange of information, the emergence of something like a global community, and thus of a global ethical and political responsibility, is a living reality. The globalization predicted as a consequence of capitalism by Marx and the growth of a global political community anticipated by Kant as the natural destiny of mankind following the growth of international trade, and also promoted by him as the logical extension of his universalist ethics, are today an evolving reality. Following the disastrous experience of global warfare in the two world wars, the

¹ The present text was written as part of the research project ‘Det främmande och det egna – Bildningstankens förvandling och aktualitet’, funded by Vetenskapsrådet (The Swedish Research Council).

community of nations agreed on the creation of the first legal structures for the execution of global justice for so-called crimes against humanity, enacted by international tribunals. And through the creation of the global political forum of the United Nations, it was also possible to charter something like global ethico-political principles, in the form of the declaration of human rights. The growing awareness of the gross injustice in the distribution of goods around the Earth, and not least the recently recognized threat of humanly induced global climatic changes, also point to global politics, to a political responsibility for the cosmos as a whole, and to a new class of global political functionaries. In this very real sense it would seem that we are indeed living through the creation, for the first time in history, of what would seem to be the final realization of the ideal once formulated in ancient Greece, at a time when the world was only partially known and inhabited, namely the ideal of the *cosmopolites*, the citizen of the world. As if indeed this was our destiny.

But precisely at this point, when the initial and initializing words seem to reach their culmination, it is more important than ever to go back and listen to their older, original meaning. This is important not only for reasons of historical interest, but also for the possibility of maintaining a philosophical, reflective relation to what is taking place in the name of these words today. For just as language enables us to think and grasp that which is, it also guides us, and often in ways of which we are scarcely aware. To reflect philosophically on the word *cosmopolites* is also of special importance, since its very coinage is so intimately associated with philosophy itself, with the birth of its peculiar ethos and orientation. In confronting this word, philosophy also, inevitably, confronts itself and its own spiritual and intellectual heritage. But this heritage is not one, it is not singular and unitary, but is instead ambiguous from its very inception.

In historical studies on the emergence and growth of the cosmopolitan ideal, it is often stressed that it constitutes a change in mentality which stems from social changes. In times of increased travel and commerce, and of imperial politics, the cosmopolite appears as

a role to be assumed.² In this respect, the gradual weakening of the Greek city states in antiquity in favour of the imperial and multicultural situation in the Alexandrian and later Roman Empires, could seem to mirror the present situation, in which again the cosmopolite emerges as an ideal at a time when the nation state is weakening. In its everyday positive connotation, the cosmopolite today often signifies somebody who is seemingly at home everywhere, who has cultivated his humanity to the point where ‘nothing human is unfamiliar’ to him, to recall the saying of Terence, and of later humanists. As such, the cosmopolitical is also a metaphysical concept, for it designates the nature of being, the nature of man and of man’s place within being as a whole. And as such it remains question worthy, in need of our continued reflection, not least in order to preserve the implicit possibilities of the ideal itself. For the cosmopolitical contains in itself an ambiguous heritage. On the one hand, it implies a totalizing and unificatory discourse, stemming from a conception of rationality as one (divine) order; on the other hand, it points towards a questioning of all limiting orders, a willingness to go beyond the confines of the particular community, the particular nation, in an opening up towards the world at large. The cosmopolite is the one who aspires for the community of men at large, and to thus transcend what is immediately familiar in favor of the new and the unexpected, as well as the unexpected in oneself. When cosmopolitanism is recalled today, it can therefore function as a call for adaptation, for unification and standardization, as a subjection to a universal principle. But at the same time it can imply a belonging to the whole as an openness to what is not limited, and to a difference that can never be mastered, for it is a difference that is part of the individual self. This dual aspect of the heritage of cosmopolitanism also has its counterpart in the different conceptions of liberalism, as well as that of education, of *Bildung*.³

² For a recent good summary of the historical arguments concerning the emergence of this ideal and also its relation to religion as political identity, see Ingrid Saelid Gilhus, ‘The Role of Religion in Cosmopolitan Culture’, in K. Almqvist & E. Wallrup (eds.), *Cosmopolitanism: Perspective from the Engelsberg Seminar* 2003 (Stockholm, 2006).

³ The question of *Bildung*, *paideia*, education or formation can be traced alongside that of the cosmopolitical throughout its history. For to learn the foreign, to

Taking the thought of the cosmopolitical in such a direction will at first seem to remove it far from its ancient, Stoic sources, in which the very idea of the cosmopolitical seems to be essentially linked to a conception of the universe as arranged and guided by a divine and rational order. But in order to investigate this notion of a more original experience of difference in unity, I will focus partly on what is arguably the most ancient source of the Stoic conception of a cosmic order or *logos*, namely the pre-socratic thinker Heraclitus and the fragments which mention *cosmos* and *logos*. For in these scattered remains, written around 500 BC and preserved only partially in later, secondary sources, we find several remarkable formulations that in themselves make problematic the standard understanding of Stoic cosmology, as well as its subsequent tradition. Indeed, here we find what is arguable the first preserved example of a philosophical use and understanding of the very concept of “cosmos”.

As we shall see, the discourse of cosmopolitanism is from the outset a discourse on the discursive itself, on *logos*, *ratio*, and *reason*, what reason is, where reason is, and what the moral and political implications of reason are. But since *logos* is what defines man, at least according to the famous definition by Aristotle, that man is the *zoon logon echon*, the ‘animal with reason’, it is ultimately a discourse on man, and on the natural fate of man. In going back to the earliest sources of the Stoic, and thus also of the Kantian conception of rationality, I also want to show how we can and should problematize the often naïve conception of natural right which lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan ideal. It has to do with the nature of that *measure* in things and in life which reason seeks, and which it at the same time creates, and the living ambiguity of which it is so difficult to accept. By going back to this fundamental philosophical issue, we can hopefully find resources for the articulation of a more free relation to the contemporary problem of ‘world order’ or cos-

become acquainted with what is not one’s own, and to learn to recognize one’s own in what is apparently foreign are part of the formation of a cosmopolitical being. This correlation between cosmopolitanism and education is discussed in detail in Peter Kemp’s excellent book *Världsmedborgaren. Politisk och pedagogisk filosofi för det 21 århundradet*, trans. J. Retzlaff (Göteborg, 2005).

mic logos, in which the apparent alternatives of an authoritarian imperialistic world order and an empty ideal of global justice often seem to constitute the horizon. For one of the most pertinent tasks for philosophy today is to define what it would mean for man to belong to and inhabit the Earth, and to belong to the world as a whole.

In the word *cosmopolites* we encounter the fusion of two Greek words, *cosmos* and *polites*. The second of these, of which I will speak later, is certainly not philosophically innocent in this particular configuration, but its translation does not appear to be a problem, as we render it as *citizen*, *civitas*, a member of a city or state. With *cosmos* it is different. It has become a basic word in most Western languages, as in cosmology, cosmogony, cosmic and cosmos. As such it is a synonym for what we also speak of as the *universe* (from the Latin *universum*, that which has ‘turned into one’). Its linguistic origin can be traced to the verb *cosmeo*, which in Homer depicts the arranging and ordering of things and people, e.g., in an army. In the *Iliad* we thus also find the noun *kosmetor*, referring to a commander or chief. As a noun in Homeric Greek, *cosmos* means both an order and what is done in an orderly, duly fashion, but also an adornment or ornament (cf. in this respect the other axis of the modern appropriation of the word in ‘cosmetics’). What we do not find in Homer, however, is the use of *cosmos* in its later ‘universal’ sense, as a designation of the totality of what is. When speaking of the surrounding, total element of life, Homer will instead speak of the Earth (*gaia*) and the heavens (*houranos*).

It is a noteworthy fact that the sense of *cosmos*, which we are tracing here, has not been found by the lexicographers in sources outside those classified as philosophical. In other words, it is as a philosopheme that it first emerges, a linguistic invention which is simultaneous with the birth of what is eventually recognized as philosophy. In the chapter on Pythagoras in Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (written in the third century AD), Pythagoras is said to have been the ‘first to call heaven (*ton houranon*) the cosmos’, though he also mentions other suggestions

that have been made, such as Parmenides and Hesiod.⁴ From Pythagoras we have no remaining texts, only sayings and legends reported by other writers. In the preserved fragments of Parmenides' poem, by the subsequent tradition entitled *On Nature*, there is indeed a mention of a *cosmos*, an *order* according to which beings are united and separated.⁵ But supposedly somewhat before this occurrence of the word we have the remarkable fragment from Heraclitus (no. 30 in the Diels-Kranz edition, which does not seem to have been known by Diogenes Laertius): 'This *cosmos*, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire everliving, kindled in measures and in measures going out'.⁶ This is the oldest known preserved example of the very word *cosmos* as a designation of the whole of being. In the Heraclitean text we encounter the word as it reaches out for a totality, to touch the whole in its evasive nature. The way Heraclitus uses it here is truly remarkable, as he forges a metaphor for the totality of being out of that which is ordered and arranged, and at the same time twice short-circuits its implied meaning. First, he does so by refusing to recognize an ordering agent, since neither god nor man made or shaped it; secondly, by negating its stability, since it is equated with fire and life, a *pur aizoon*. A century later we can see in Plato's *Timaeus* how *cosmos* has become an established term in a philosophical discourse on the whole and its origin.⁷ But for Plato, the image of the world as *cosmos* is developed in terms of a creator and designer, an original cause in the form of a craftsman, carpen-

⁴ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol. II, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, 1925), p. 365.

⁵ Fragment no. B4, in Diels, H. A. and Kranz, W. (eds.) *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Vol. 1 (Hildesheim, 1989), p. 232.

⁶ Cf., Charles Kahn's edition of the Heraclitean fragments, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 45. In only one other fragment out of the hundred and twenty preserved fragments is there a mention of the *cosmos*, in no. 124, which reads 'among that which is randomly dispersed, the *cosmos* is the most beautiful'. Its authenticity is, however, more uncertain. For my own more detailed commentary on these and the other fragments, see Herakleitos, *Fragment* (Lund, 1997).

⁷ When *Timaeus* introduces his theme of the origin of the world, with which the subsequent dialogue is concerned, he says: 'when it comes to the heavens (houranos) or the *cosmos*, or if some other name may be appropriate...' *Timaeus* 27a.

ter or simply maker, metaphors which are all mentioned in *Ti-maeus*. In the Heraclitean image, however, there is no agent, no origin, but a *cosmos* which lives in perpetual transformation and self-consumption, which emerges and withdraws, according to a measure, a *metron*.

It is from this point in intellectual history that we have a *cosmology*, in the sense of a *logos* of the *cosmos*, a discourse on that which is designated by this name. But what *is* the *cosmos*? How can we answer this question outside the space which the word itself establishes? The word indicates all that is in the image of an *order*, the nature and principle of which it sets up as the task for understanding to explore, to contemplate, and to live by. For this is the second seminal inheritance from Heraclitus to subsequent thought, that this *cosmos* has a measure and an order, as a *metron*, but more importantly as a *logos*, as what speaks and can be spoken of, as what thinks and can be thought. The first lines from his only partially preserved text read: ‘Although this *logos* holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to pass in accordance with this *logos*, men are like the untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep’. And this is then followed by another remark on the *logos*, listed as fragment 2: ‘Although the *logos* is shared, most men live as though their thinking were a private possession’. All things come to pass according to a *logos*, a *logos* which holds and which is common to all, but which nevertheless, and perhaps precisely for this reason, is by no means apparent, but hidden from view, inaccessible, even to those who have a share in it, who themselves belong to it.

The *cosmos* is possible to know, in the sense of bringing it to articulation, to bring out the articulation which already from the outset characterizes it. And this articulation is something which characterizes man himself, although he may not have access to it. Can it be fully grasped and mastered? And what would a mastery of it amount to? In two of the fragments, a correlation is suggested between the *logos* and the soul, the *psuche*, of which it is said that to

it ‘belongs a logos that grows itself’ (B115) and also that ‘the limits of this *psuche* will not be found, so deep is its *logos*’ (B45). But the logos is not a personal possession, but what resonates from within the cosmos itself, as when he says in another seminal fragment: ‘it is wise, not listening to me, but to the *logos*, and to agree that all things are one’. Here the *logos* is what speaks of and lets man discover the hidden unity of all things. But this unity is what lives only in and through diversity, as the beautiful fragment 51 declares: ‘they do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself: it is an attunement turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre’.

In speaking of this order, in speaking to and at the same time from within this order, and thus permitting the words to touch and reveal its evanescent nature – a nature which in another fragment it is said that ‘it loves to hide’ – can thinking hence be true to its calling. What is this *logos* of which Heraclitus speaks? It is a word never before used in this sense. Some generations later it, too, has become an established philosopheme, as in Aristotle’s aforementioned famous definition of man as the *zoon logon echon*, the animal with *logos*, often translated as ‘reason’, sometimes as ‘speech’. But instead of readily jumping to what is familiar, or what would rather appear to make it familiar, the point of these reflections on the origin of some of our key philosophical terms is to leave room for a certain uncertainty and indecidability as to their exact meaning and significance. For the familiarity of the term easily overshadows the underlying uncertainty and unfamiliarity of the matter. The Heraclitean *logos* distances itself from what is *idion*, private, as well as from the many, *polloi*, reaching instead for the shared and common, and unitary, *xunon*, *koinon*, and *hen*. And yet the common for which it reaches is not to be found among what is generally recognized as the common. For this is precisely what must be questioned and in the end disregarded. Only the one who expects will ‘find the unexpected, which in itself is untraceable and aporetic’, as Heraclitus says in fragment B18. Its projected community is thus not an existing community, but a community always in the making, the emergence of which presupposes the transcendence of common reason. To its ethos belongs even the prepared-

ness to sacrifice what can be considered as a false and limited community, in favour of a community of *logos*. The point becomes accentuated in the case of Heraclitus personally, who, according to legend, was the inheritor of the throne, but who relinquished it to his brother for a philosophical life.

What then is the relevance of these remarks on the Heraclitean fragments for the contemporary issue of cosmopolitanism? The appearance of *cosmos* as a philosopheme is simultaneous with the emergence of the philosopher himself, as the individual who has made it a task to understand and discern a *logos* of this *cosmos*, of nature, and of life, as a commitment to the growth and development of the *logos* that man carries within himself. Furthermore, the community and universality for which he aspires are not the immediate universality of the world, but a hidden universality in the making. To commit oneself to this universality requires a dual movement, to move beyond the common thoughts and practices of men, and at the same time to seek inside oneself, not for what is private, but instead for the hidden common word, thought or reason, for a *logos* which is accessible only for those who are able to follow their own way.

Here the emergence and nature of this ethos from the particular viewpoint of the Heraclitean fragments have been outlined. Within our present context this choice is not incidental, since Heraclitus was among the most important predecessors to the formation of the general cosmology of the Stoic school of thought, within which the explicit ideal of the philosopher as a *cosmopolites* is eventually articulated. This tradition is initiated with the teaching and writings of Zeno of Citium around 300 BC. For him and his followers, it was a central part of their doctrine that the *cosmos* is permeated by a divine *logos*, as a fate in which man also has a share, and in accordance with which he must try to live his life. In the scholarship on the early Greek philosophers it was often noted that the Stoics, in their reception of Heraclitus, while paying tribute to his thought, nevertheless deviated from his understanding of the *logos* of the *cosmos*, not least in their conception of a periodically recurring cosmic conflagration. But this is of minor importance here. The point of tracing the Stoic conception of the *cosmos* and its *logos*

back to their own oldest source is to open up the possibility of an interpretation of this conception which displays both the fecundity and the ambiguity of this idea in a way that is lost in the standard accounts, both in regard to what the *cosmos* is and what it can mean to live by its inherent *logos*. For it is precisely the meaning of this that is at stake when we turn to the metaphor of being a citizen of this *cosmos*, i.e., its *polites*.

In the aforementioned *Lives of Philosophers* Diogenes Laertius also tells the story of how Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 400–325 BC), who was the teacher of Zeno, when asked from where or whence (*pothen eie*) he was, simply responded: *kosmopolites*, a citizen of the world.⁸ The story, if authentic, is commonly recognized as the first coinage of the not so frequently used word. How should we interpret this gesture, this configuration of thought, whereby a man describes himself as a citizen, not of any particular city, but of the *cosmos* as such? First, we can ask what is a *polites*? What does it mean to be a citizen? It means to be a recognized member of a community, a subject under the law, with duties and responsibilities, normally to pay taxes and to participate in the defence of the community, with the right to protection from violence and theft, and in democratic states to participate in the decision-making through the vote. In Aristotle's *Politika*, written around the same time as Diogenes' declaration, the citizen is explicitly defined as 'the one who participates in the decisions and rulings (*kriseos kai arches*) of the state' (1275a). A citizen, a *polites*, is thus by definition a member of a city or state, a *polis*, an organized community, regulated by laws. The law is what defines and surrounds the city, like its wall, to again use an image from Heraclitus, who in one fragment speaks of how the people must 'fight for the law as for the city wall'.⁹ A citizenship is most often something which is not chosen, but into which a human being is born, and by means of which he comes to know and recognize himself, as a member of this or that community or nationality. It is by virtue of having citizenship that this being can make his living, since citizenship is most often connected to the right of employment and of practicing

⁸ Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol. II, p. 65.

⁹ *Fragment* DK 44.

a trade. It is also by virtue of being a citizen that a person can move around the Earth, for it is as a citizen that one is granted the documents needed for travel, and for entry into other communities. He who is not a citizen in a particular *polis* will be received with suspicion in every other community, if he is received at all. As an inheritance from the ancient practice of hospitality to strangers, the right of the stateless to seek refuge in a state, we have today's international legal framework for how to deal with refugees, a right which was also emphasized in Kant's outline of a cosmopolitical order, and which was taken up in the contemporary debates, notably by Derrida.¹⁰

When the Cynic and Stoic thinkers describe their humanity in terms of cosmic citizenship they are speaking metaphorically, in a way which is not philosophically innocent. In its negative aspect it emphasizes that man is not restricted to belonging to this or that community. But to be human is to be a part of the world at large, and to relate to all that is, as one total horizon. But this is not to be a citizen in the strict sense. For there is no such city or state to belong to. In Aristotle's *Politika* we also find the famous definition of man as not only an animal with reason, but as the 'political animal' (*politikon zoon*). For as Aristotle writes, the one who by his nature (and not simply by chance) does not belong to a state, who is *apolis*, is wretched (*phaulos*), but possibly also something greater than man (*kreitton he antropos*)! In referring to that which is more or greater than man, Aristotle could be said to open a space for the transcendence of the space of local citizenship, yet still clearly marking that this is something that is beyond the essence and telos of man.¹¹ To be part of a community is to be human, even though the precise nature of this community can be very different, as Aristotle's own detailed catalogue of forms of statehood explores.

The coinage of the term *cosmopolites* is metaphorical. It relies on the colloquial sense of citizenship as codified, e.g., by Aristotle,

¹⁰ See Derrida, *Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!* (Paris, 1997).

¹¹ It is to this argument that Nietzsche will later respond, in an aphorism in *Götzen-Dämmerung*, where he writes that 'To live alone one must be an animal or a god – says Aristotle. There is yet a third case: one must be both – a philosopher', in *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Vol. 6, p. 59, Eng. trans. R. J. Hollingdale, in *Twilight of the Idols* (London, 1968), p. 23.

as a person taking part in decisions and rulings of the city or community, as a responsible and free agent, not just as a passive participant. As we have seen, already the metaphorical designation of the totality of being as *cosmos*, as a humanly well-organized whole, even as an organization, in a sense anticipates the possibility of thinking of the participant in this totality as a member of a community. But as a *cosmos* understood in the Heraclitean sense, created by no one, an ever-living fiery life, it is clearly not a totality to which man belongs as being under an organized rule and ruler. Rather, it is an abysmal space where the pulse of life and death comes to pass interchangeably, and in relation to which man can seek to know and think its measures as well as his own. By forging the very metaphor *cosmopolites*, Diogenes of Sinope also affects the very understanding of what this cosmos is. One can say that he humanizes it, by making it into an anthropocentric figure, through which it obtains something of the character of an overruling political body. It is thus an ambiguous philosophical gesture. The purpose is to give word to the sense in which the man of reason, of *logos*, the philosopher, finds his belonging in a contemplation of the whole. For obviously there is no universal political community to join. Outside the city states there is no rule of law, no *cosmos* in the conventional sense. The organized states are the *cosmoi*, the orderings. Yet the one who has opened his eyes and ears in understanding will hear another voice, another calling, and he will see the patterns which characterize the whole. In regard to this overarching cosmos he has no saying, no vote, and he cannot regulate its development. And there is no one there to recognize him and grant him the privileges which he could expect as a citizen. In relation to the cosmos, he is without rights and without influence. Supposing we apply Aristotle's political terms more strictly, the *cosmopolites* would thus appear rather as a wretched *apolis*, an individual without community. But what then is this community in the making, this other non-political community? Is it the community of philosophy, in the sense of reason's open and uncertain search for the logos of that which is, for its tales and its measures? And who are its members? The educated? Who can justly claim citizenship of this order? Or is it an order open to all who show themselves

committed to its cause and its task? Those who are prepared to expect the unexpected?

The ambiguous nature of the metaphor of the political relation to the *cosmos*, which, in a sense, equates the man of reason with a citizen in the whole of being, is brought out in a sharper and, for the future discussion, more decisive way by the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. In Marcus we find the philosopher and politician in one person. Particularly noteworthy from the present argument is that he is also one of our more important sources for the knowledge of Heraclitus, since it is in his *Meditations*, written in Greek, that several of the fragments have been quoted and thus preserved. So, e.g., it is Marcus who in referring to Heraclitus speaks of ‘the *logos* which rules everything, and which men continuously have a dealing with, and from which they nevertheless take their distance’.¹² In the most important passage in *Meditations* for the development of the philosophical sense of the very image of the *cosmopolites*, Marcus writes as follows, organizing his thoughts in the form of a logical deduction: ‘If the capacity for thought is common to all [again an implicit reference to Heraclitus] then so is reason, through which we are rational, something common to all. If this is the case, then we also have in common the inner voice, which tells us what to do and not to do. If this is the case, then we also have a common law. Supposing this, we are all citizens in a common state (*cosmopolites*); and again supposing this, the world (*cosmos*) as a whole can be looked upon as one state. And from this state we also have our capacity for thought, our reason and the law’.¹³

The ambiguity of the voice that speaks here is remarkable. Marcus was at this point writing from the most powerful political position in his world, as Emperor of Rome. His reference to a shared law, rooted in a divinely inspired rationalism, is an imperial voice. Yet in his beautiful, and humble Stoic call for temperance and reflection, he is far removed from demagogy. The ethos for which he here speaks is one of freedom, independence and self-sufficiency, of *autarkeia*, so central to many of the ancient philosophical

¹² The fragment is no. B 72, and is found in Book 4, Section 46 of *Meditations*. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, Book 4, §4 (London, 1997).

¹³ *Ibid.*

schools, and for Stoicism in particular. The genuine philosopher bows to no one, not even to the emperor, for he is equal to everyone, as in the famous story from *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* of the encounter between Diogenes of Sinope and Alexander the Great, where the emperor offered to satisfy his wishes, upon which Diogenes is said to have replied: 'stand out of my light'.¹⁴ Another important source for Marcus was the slave Epictetus, who one century earlier developed his own radical version of Stoic ethics, as preserved by his pupil Arrianus in the *Manual*, where the supreme goal of life is said to be the achievement of freedom, not to become general, senator or consul, but to become free. And the way to this freedom is to disregard everything that does not depend on ourselves.¹⁵ Stoicism could therefore become a philosophy for both emperors and slaves, for it seeks to articulate a universal predicament of man, under which everyone lives. This general predicament is the divine order and a destiny, the recognition of and compliance which constitutes a route to a harmonious life.

The philosophical proximity between Stoicism and Christianity is apparent, and partly explains the success of Christianity among the educated Romans. In the Gospel of John, the working of God is captured in the same terms as the Stoic world order, in terms of the *logos*. It is from the point of view of this proximity that we can also again observe the fundamental ambiguity of the Stoic cosmopolitical attitude. On the one hand, it designates a refusal of any particular inheritance, the insistence on the unbounded character of the free person. To say that one is a *cosmopolites* is then to say that one comes from nowhere in particular and from everywhere. It refuses the limit of a particular confinement. Diogenes of Sinope represents the figure over whom no one can rule, for he rules himself through his developed virtues. He recognizes no command, and he can live this refusal, for he has nothing to lose, no property, no belongings. He stands before the world in his naked humanity and cannot be

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 41. According to another ancient legend, Alexander himself is said to have declared that 'had I not been Alexander, I should have liked to be Diogenes'. Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁵ Epictetus, *The Encheiridion and Its Three Christian Adaptions*, §19 (Leiden, 1999).

threatened, for he endures fate as the supreme order. The other side of the ideal becomes most visible in Marcus, where the cosmopolitical is directly connected with the idea of a given divine moral and political law of the Earth. The virtuous man will be able to access this law by means of his own reason, the divine element in himself. This law is there from the beginning, and it can also ideally become the law of the universe, or at least of the empire. Here the cosmopolitical understanding of a divine law of the world fuses and blends with the possible practice of an imperial or imperialistic legislation, to shape the cosmopolitical ideology into a potential political empire as well. It is this same tension that we can trace as an inheritance in and from Christianity; between cosmopolitanism as the ascetic recognition of a divine order, manifested as a fate to contemplate and with which to comply, and the order as also a task to accomplish in the form of universal legislation, as the human accomplishment of God's rule on Earth. This ambiguity will continue to characterize liberalism in its modern Kantian and post-Kantian shape as well.

As a last point in this collection of remarks on the ambiguity of the cosmopolitical, I want to call upon another, more modern Heraclitean, namely Hegel, who in his lectures on the history of philosophy once wrote: 'that there is not a single line by Heraclitus that I have not taken up in my logic'.¹⁶ Hegel is not a thinker of *cosmopolites* or of the *Weltbürger*, but in the third part of *Philosophy of Right*, dealing with ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), there is a fascinating remark on the cosmopolitical, which in passing brings together several of the themes touched upon so far. There, he writes: 'It is part of education (*Bildung*), of thinking as consciousness of the individual in the form of universality, that I am apprehended as a universal person, in which *all* are identical. A human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc. This consciousness, which is the aim of thought, is of infinite importance, and it is in-

¹⁶ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1940), p. 328.

adequate only if it adopts a fixed position – for example, as cosmopolitanism – in opposition to the concrete life of the state'.¹⁷

Unlike Kant, and partly in open opposition to his political philosophy, Hegel never affirmed the possibility of a global political federation of states. The idea and concept of cosmopolitanism is not a living category in his thought. But in this short passage he brings together several key elements for a philosophical analysis of the cosmopolitical. First of all, the passage speaks of the growth of a universality as a process of formation or education, of *Bildung*. The individual subject grows into a recognition of itself, conjunctly with a recognition of others as universal. The recognition that 'all are identical' under the most general heading of 'humanity' or 'human being' is not a given fact on the basis of which a moral or political theory is deduced, but instead a growing realization of thinking itself. Thus, there is a teleological destiny of rationality, which comes to maturation in the process of seeing itself mirrored in all others, as instantiations of the same. For Hegel, the *logos* is not a fixed entity, but a growing, evolving reality, in conjunction with the development of humanity itself.

Philosophy could be portrayed as the struggle to reach, by means of reason, a comprehension of the real. In Hegel's formulation, it is the task of giving the implicit rationality of reality a rational form, and thereby, as he writes elsewhere in the *Philosophy of Right*, 'to appear justified to free thinking'.¹⁸ This is his understanding of what it would mean to unearth the hidden *logos* of the *cosmos*, to bring the rational principle out in the open, in and through understanding itself. Philosophy is a work accomplished by the human spirit, which ideally brings it into harmony with the world as it is and appears, but also with the fate of humanity as such. In this declaration Hegel gives voice to a central inheritance of the whole philosophical adventure, namely that through the practice of rational reflection and thought, the individual human being comes to recognize the generality and universality of his predicament as a rational creature, beyond the confines of temporal, cultural, political, and

¹⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), p. 240; *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), p. 360.

¹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, p. 11.

religious belongings. And in this process it is not only a question of grasping a universal truth, but of becoming, oneself, this universality.

Man is the 'rational animal', the animal equipped with reason and speech, with *logos*. But what is *reason*? What is this something which presumably defines us, and yet which always remains to develop, to cultivate, to bring to its fulfilment? And what does its self-fulfilment imply in terms of moral and political consequences? For Kant, the rationality of man designates an inherent and natural teleology, a movement towards a different order, a universal order. This is the central thesis of his treatise on universal history from the cosmopolitan viewpoint. In its fifth thesis, it is stated that the 'achievement of a universal civic society' is both the greatest problem for the human race, and also the task which nature has given him.¹⁹ Hegel would agree to a certain point, even though in his politics he did not want to speculate beyond the nation state and specific cultures, which he continued to see as the living agents of a universalization. What, then, does he mean when he discards cosmopolitanism as a fixed position? In the German original text the expression is somewhat more lucid. For here it is clear that what he affirms in this development is the development of a universal, communal spirit of mutual recognition of men as all instances of the universal (*allgemeine*) person. This is for Hegel what education, *Bildung*, ultimately amounts to: to see the other as identical to oneself. As such, it is a pivotal step in the development of consciousness, indeed one of 'infinite importance'. But its significance is lost, he seems to say, when it is codified in a specific political position, as in opposition to the nation state. Cosmopolitanism is thus interpreted in the sense of a political ideology which opposes the nation state. But for Hegel the growth of the universal consciousness is not dependent on the abolishment of the nation state, which in itself has its own logic of development and importance. Thus it is not in refusing the universality of the claim that he opposes cosmopolitanism, but rather that the underlying significance

¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View', in *Kant: On History*, ed. and trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1963), p. 16.

of its ethos is not dependent on the realization of a specific political goal.

Perhaps we can say that for Hegel, the (historically unlikely) construction of a world-state would not imply the fulfillment of the genuine inheritance of the Stoic cosmopolitical ideal from Marcus, for this, too, would be a particularity of another order. To live the life of the logos in Hegel's understanding is to expose oneself to a universalization which grows in and through the individual as it reaches its maturation, and thus its inner teleology. When Hegel renounces cosmopolitanism as a label for this movement of individual consciousness towards its universal *telos*, he could thus be interpreted as renouncing the metaphor of the *polites* as a way to describe man's relation to the universal and to the whole. Becoming part of a universal logos in Hegel's sense is not ultimately a political event, for the political will always remain bound to a specific state and culture. The consequence of the extraordinary rationalistic vision of Hegel is not the universal empire, but an open and, in the end, undecidable programme of a continued historical dialectic on the political level. At the same time, the completion of spirit would seem to indicate that at a level of philosophical insight and understanding, the inherent logos of the cosmos can come to its expression and articulation in the form of philosophy itself. In this respect, Hegel is a true inheritor of the Stoic tradition and its programme for a rational reconciliation with a cosmic historical destiny. And as such I think it is fair to conclude that he also could be read as a modern interpreter of what the open, metaphorical ideal of the philosophical ethos of the *cosmopolites* implies, indeed as its most extreme expression. For it is in Hegel's philosophy, more consistently than perhaps in any other modern system of thought, that the universalization of the spirit in accordance with the inherent logos of the cosmos is accentuated as the very goal of the philosophical formative journey, its *Bildung*.

It is also at this point that we can return, in conclusion, to the Heraclitean source, and allow its questions to resonate. An ever-recurrent theme in post-Hegelian philosophy has been the questioning of its totalizing and implicitly totalitarian implications. If the universalization of spirit is indeed its destiny, then it would seem

that Hegelian metaphysics also has as its destiny the cancellation or sublation (*Aufhebung*) of the individual, in favor of its general essence. This was the critique already voiced by Kierkegaard, and it has been repeated in many versions and from many perspectives in 20th century philosophy, not least in critical theory and in hermeneutic philosophy. But from Heraclitus and the oldest source of Stoic rationalism we have the impetus to also think of this unity as a unity in difference, as differing in itself. Furthermore, we have the impetus to think of the projected universal community as a community of dissent, and as such as a community always to come. And perhaps most importantly, we find the trace of a thought of a singularity, which is not the individual as an enclosed sphere, as a ‘private possession’, as separate from the communal, but as a singular route to the community always in the making, as that which can only be found ‘in search of myself’, to repeat some of the fragments quoted earlier. The ethos appropriate for this latent logos is not one of adaptation to what is general, but one that is prepared to meet the unexpected, that which is ‘untraceable and aporetic’, in other words, that to which no known and established routes lead. To be a *cosmopolites* in this sense is not to affirm the given community, but to remain vigilant in the free and singular search for what shows itself as uniting.

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3. The World Citizen from the Perspective of Alien Reason: Notes on Kant's Category of the *Weltbürger* according to Josef Simon

Carola Häntsch

How do we understand the idea of *kosmopolis* and the concept of the 'world citizen'?

I would like to begin my discussion with some brief remarks concerning our contemporary understanding of the idea of *kosmopolis* and the concept of the world citizen. Very often the concept of the world citizen signifies an inhabitant of a 'world society' or 'world republic'. This world republic guarantees a worldwide and perpetual peace – it is understood as an ideal goal of history and should be reached by all means. Cosmopolitan theorizing started already in ancient philosophy; an important historical break in the development of those theories seems to be the *Declaration of Human Rights* from 1789.

Systematically, we can differentiate between 'moral', 'political', 'cultural' and 'economic cosmopolitanism'. 'Moral cosmopolitanism' in its different modes regards the question of the cosmopolitan duties of a human being to all human beings in general. It is based on a concept of humanity (as universal human community) in the sense of traditional anthropology. 'Political cosmopolitanism' ana-

lyzes the institutions and mechanisms which help to realize a society or a state of ‘world citizens’. ‘Cultural cosmopolitanism’ again stresses the diversity of the cultural contexts in which the members of different nations, regions or civilizations are involved without going back to national structures or levels of culture. Last but not least, ‘economic cosmopolitanism’ means the international networking of (former national) economies, analyzed already by Marx and a main aspect of the process we today call ‘globalization’.¹

How are these theories linked to Kant? Usually Kant’s philosophical view of the world citizen and the right of the world citizen is seen as one of the most important theories concerning this subject in the period of Enlightenment. Very often Kant is understood as a philosopher who declared the world citizen as the goal of his philosophy. According to this interpretation, Kant developed a ‘cosmopolitan theory of ethics’. Kant is interpreted as a theorist of a universal ethical community that derives its general rules of acting from a common reason. We can find such an interpretation of Kant, for example, in the following definition of the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’: ‘According to Kant, all rational beings are members in a single (ethical) community. (They are analogous to citizens in the political [republican] sense in that they share the characteristics of freedom, equality and independence, and that they give themselves the law.) Their common laws, however, are the laws of ethics, grounded in reason’.²

Of course, we can find the concept of the world citizen in Kant’s philosophy in prominent places, like the idea of a republic of world citizens and in some way also as an aim of history (providence of nature).³ Nevertheless, in the following paragraphs it will be shown

¹ See <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/>: Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

² Ibid.

³ ‘For my own part, I put my trust in the theory of what the relationships between men and states ought to be according to the principle of right. It recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal federal state may be inaugurated, so that we should therefore assume that it is possible (in praxi). I likewise rely (in subsidium) upon the very nature of things to force men to do what they do not willingly choose (fata vilentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt)’. Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*,

that Kant uses the idea of the *kosmopolis* much more carefully than usually presupposed, and that he stresses possibly very different aspects of a world citizen than that of being a member of a ‘ethical community’. Not only post-modern philosophy at the end of the 20th century warned of being careful when dealing with the demands of common validity in thinking and acting. The experiences of contemporary ethical war rhetoric (good/bad distinctions) also make the dangers of morals clear.

Especially as a citizen of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), I have another problem of a more general nature with the concept of cosmopolitanism. These ‘-isms’ remind me very strongly of the ideological deformations of thinking during the Cold War period. That is why I prefer to use the concept of *kosmopolis* or the cosmopolitan in my chapter.

What can we learn today from Kant about the concept of world citizen? In this chapter it is argued that – if Kant speaks about the world citizen – he uses this concept, on the one hand, more in the sense of a regulative idea than in the sense of a concrete utopia, but, on the other hand, he uses it simply in a very pragmatic way. Two aspects of the Kantian term of world citizen are to be stressed:

First, for Kant the world citizen is, first and foremost, the fellow citizen, who takes his point of view *in* the world and does not have an Archimedean position *above* other points of view. In this understanding of world citizen a theoretical, (and the same time) ethical-practical and aesthetical dimension are included.

Secondly, when Kant speaks about the world citizen in the political sense of a member of a world republic, he is mainly interested in the juridical dimension of a civil constitution, which largely differs from the natural law. In this context it is not the question of an *ethical* category, but a question of the *right* of the world citizen.

p. 92; see also *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* [1784].

The difference between ‘own’ and ‘alien reason’ as a basic distinction of the philosophy of Kant

During the 19th and 20th centuries several systems in the philosophy of science, ethics and politics were developed based on Kant’s philosophy, starting from the Neo-Kantian theory of recognition up to the *Theory of Justice* by John Rawls. At the end of the 20th century, under the influence of the so-called post-modern French philosophy, which, to a large extent, refers to Kant, we can find a new way of reading Kant. In Germany this has been developed, above all, by Josef Simon (b. 1930), Professor Emeritus at the University of Bonn.

In 1989, Simon published a book on the *Philosophy of Sign*, which was translated into English in 1995.⁴ The book took its inspiration, among others, from Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Peirce and Wittgenstein, and starts from a non-ontological concept of sign and presupposes in a very radical way individuality and temporality as decisive starting points of philosophy. In the traditional metaphysical sense we use signs for ‘something’, for ‘things’ behind those signs. In the perspective of the philosophy of signs everything can become a sign, if it is not understood without questions. As soon as questions arrive concerning the meaning of ‘something’, we must find other signs which can make the meaning clearer, but we will not reach the thing behind the signs. Nietzsche puts it in the following way: things and their history are nothing else than ‘continuing series of signs of ever new interpretations’ (‘fortgesetzte Zeichenketten von immer neuen Interpretationen und Zurechtmachungen’). According to Simon, the other individual can also be understood as a sign. Other individuals use other signs; they understand my own signs in a different and probably strange or peculiar way.

In 2004, Simon’s book *Kant. Die fremde Vernunft und die Sprache der Philosophie* [Kant: Alien Reason and the Language of

⁴ Josef Simon, *Philosophie des Zeichens* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1989; English trans. *Philosophy of Sign*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995; Spanish trans. *Filosofía del signo*, Madrid: Gredos, 1998).

Philosophy] was published.⁵ This book sums up Simon's excitingly new interpretation of Kant's philosophy. One of the main starting points of this reconsideration is the difference between own and alien reason, which Kant uses already in his work *Träume eines Geistersehers* [Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, 1766] and again in his last books and writings. This difference between own and alien reason belongs to the basic assumptions of Kant's philosophy, and is as important as the distinctions between a priori and a posteriori or between noumenon and phenomenon. The rediscovering of this basic distinction between own and alien reason calls into question the various attempts of, for example, Jürgen Habermas and his followers to interpret Kant as a theoretician of common reason, and to derive from this a common ethics and other norms. Regarding this, one has to reconsider that Kant is not the philosopher but the *critic* of pure reason.

There is no doubt that Kant speaks about common reason of human beings, but as a reason in which every individual has their own voice. In Kant's work, alien reason is thus integrated into the concept of reason. This alien reason tries to find an orientation in the world from its point of view and it is not always comprehensible, without mediation, as reasonable. Whether this mediation is successful, we will see later. In the words of Simon himself: 'That is why the aesthetic difference between persons which cannot be embraced in common concepts (*conceptus communis*) and which has its place "under" the lowest concept of "the" human being becomes the main topic of philosophy'.⁶ Starting from these assumptions, we can understand reason/rationality only in a communicative way. I will come back to the consequences of this difference for the understanding of the world citizen.

⁵ Josef Simon, *Kant. Die fremde Vernunft und die Sprache der Philosophie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2003).

⁶ Ibid. VII: 'Die nicht in gemeinsame Begriffe (*conceptus communis*) zu fassende (ästhetische) Differenz der Personen unterhalb des untersten Begriffs von 'dem' Menschen wird damit zur Sache und zur eigentlichen Hauptsache der Philosophie'.

The difference between ethics and right as a basic distinction in Kant's philosophy

Let me first take a brief look at a second decisive distinction of Kant, which has not been realized by the philosophical consciousness in this way until now. But, according to Simon, the strict distinction between ethics and right also belongs to the basic assumptions of Kant's philosophy.

Kant describes and develops this difference in a very illustrative way in *Perpetual Peace*.⁷ There he speaks about the 'moral politician' ('moralischer Politiker') on the one hand, and the 'political moralist' ('politischer Moralist') on the other hand. Kant takes the side of the moral politician.

A second distinction follows between 'moral in the first sense (as ethics)' – of which the main aspect is 'love for the human being' ('Menschenliebe') – and 'moral in the second meaning (as right)', of which the main aspect is respect for the right of the human being.

According to Kant, politics uses one or the other dimension of ethics while realizing its aims. He calls this 'Zweizüngigkeit der Politik in Ansehung der Moral' ('the forked-tongued nature of politics in view of ethics'). It is not so much a problem to accept moral in the first sense (love of the human being), because this is a possibility to give up the right of the human being. Politics has much more problems with moral in the second sense.⁸ But, for Kant moral in the second sense (as right) is the decisive dimension for constructing the sphere of politics. He understands the moral politician as a politician who bases his politics on the right/ law.

My assumption is that both distinctions – own and alien reason, moral and right – are very important for the understanding of Kant's concept of the world citizen (please see the table below).

⁷ Immanuel Kant, 'Zum ewigen Frieden', in Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), *Immanuel Kant: Werke in zwölf Bänden*, Vol. XI (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977) pp. 228–251.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

Moral politician	Political moralist
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizes their politics in a way that goes together with ethics. (nimmt die Prinzipien der Staatsklugheit so, 'daß sie mit der Moral zusammen bestehen können'.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creates an ethics which is useful for their politics. (schmiedet sich eine Moral so, 'wie es der Vorteil des Staatsmannes sich zuträglich findet'.)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principle: starts from the formal principle of practical reason: <i>Handle so daß du wollen kannst, deine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden (der Zweck mag sein, welcher er wolle).</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principle: starts from the material principle of practical reason.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Realizes eternal peace as a result of the recognition of duty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Realizes eternal peace as a physical good by using the mechanism of nature.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moral task Problem of state wisdom (Staats-Weisheitsproblem) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Artificial task Problem of state prudence (Staats-Klugheitsproblem)
<p>Basic assumption of moral politics, based on duty: the people shall organize themselves in a state with respect to the <i>juridical</i> concepts of freedom and equality.</p>	

The world citizen as fellow citizen – on Kant's concept of the *Weltbürger*

In his 'Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht' [Anthropology in Pragmatic Concern] (1798) Kant explains the pragmatic knowledge of the human being ('pragmatische Menschenkenntnis'). Pragmatic knowledge of the human being regards the question as to what this human being as a freely acting being can, should and does make of

himself ('was der Mensch als freihandelndes Wesen aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll'). According to Kant, this is the recognition of the human being as a world citizen ('Erkenntnis des Menschen als Weltbürgers'). He makes an explicit distinction between this pragmatic knowledge and physiological knowledge, which aims to investigate what nature makes out of the human being.⁹

Kant starts from the observation of three kinds of egoism. Defining its position in the world, the human being shows the 'egoism of reason' (or logical egoism), the 'egoism of taste' (or aesthetic egoism) and the 'egoism of practical interest' (moral egoism).

The logical egoist is not willing to check or to test his judgments with the help of the reason of others, which, according to Kant, is an essential presupposition for achieving correct judgments. The aesthetic egoist is satisfied with his own taste – but, according to Kant, the beautiful is connected with a collective imagination of a common pleasure. The moral egoist connects every aim only with his own interest (er schränkt 'alle Zwecke auf sich selbst' ein) and aims at happiness instead of duty.¹⁰

According to Kant, the counter-position to these kinds of egoism can only be pluralism, meaning: not to see oneself as having all the world inside, but to see oneself as a pure world citizen and to act in this way ('die Denkungsart: sich nicht als die ganze Welt in seinem Selbst befassend, sondern als einen bloßen Weltbürger zu betrachten und zu verhalten').¹¹

What does this mean? The counter-position of the world citizen against the modes of egoism is the position of communicative rationality, i.e., regarding my own reason the recognition of an alien reason or, in other words, the recognition of the plurality of perspectives and interpretations of the world.

At the same time, this recognition also means a connection between theoretical and the higher practical thinking. The common duty of showing respect to all other human beings implies the duty

⁹ Immanuel Kant, 'Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in *ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 399.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 409–410.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

to respect the other human being's logical use of their reason, even if we are not able to understand him. But Kant also criticizes the moral egoism in judgements about the actions of other people, including their reasonable actions (*Verstandes-Handlungen*).

The world citizen, according to Kant, is he or she who respects the perspective of the other in their absolute otherness, at a theoretical level (in knowledge/defining and interpretation of concepts), at an ethical level (Kant speaks about the strangeness/alienness of happiness) and at the level of taste. In *Critique of Judgement* Kant called this way of accepting alien interpretations of the world an 'extended way of thinking' (*erweiterte Denkungsart*) or the capability of including the position of the other (at least to try) in order to reach an 'own common' point of view.¹²

From this perspective, we should understand that it is rather impossible to base a cosmopolitan ethics in the sense of universal moral norms on Kant. The universal moment in Kantian ethics is just the unlimited recognition of the alien individuality, the recognition of the freedom of the individual and its individual responsibility for the own maxims of judging and acting. In the words of Simon: 'According to Kant this is the responsibility of the human being towards "mankind in every person" and in this sense also towards oneself and one's relation to other people. The human being should take into consideration that he/she is the other of the others and nobody has a higher point of view'.¹³

In order to formulate universal rules, someone needs an Archimedean point of view, from which he can comprehend himself as having all the world inside ('sich als die ganze Welt in seinem Selbst befassend verstehen'). The world citizen from the perspective of a cosmopolitan ethics explicitly requires a point of view above the world. He will be excluded from the world of his fellow citizens. The world citizen from the perspective of alien reason, on the other hand, is, first and foremost, the fellow citizen in the

¹² Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in *ibid.*, Vol. X, pp. 225–226.

¹³ J. Simon, Kant. ..., VII: 'Nach Kant ist das die Verantwortung des Menschen gegenüber der "Menschheit in jeder Person" und insofern auch gegenüber sich selbst und seinem Verhältnis zu anderen. Er soll bedenken, dass er der andere der anderen ist und keiner einen übergeordneten Standpunkt hat'.

world. With Kant it becomes an essential feature of the world citizen that he shares this inside perspective with all his fellow citizens: that he is a ‘mere world citizen’ (*‘ein bloßer Weltbürger’*).

International law as a condition of the possibility of the idea of *Kosmopolis*

So if it is not moral in the first sense (as ethics = love of the human being), which guarantees the order or the function of a global community, only moral in the second (legal) sense, is able to meet this target. That is why, according to Kant, only international law – a world citizen law – can be the condition of the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. The society of world citizens can be based only on law. Only the right as the quintessence of the conditions, under which the arbitrariness of the one can be united with the arbitrariness of the other with the help of a common law of freedom (*‘Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des anderen nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann’*) can give normative rules of acting.¹⁴

In this context, Kant explicitly speaks about the ‘world citizen law’:

The rational idea, as discussed above, of a peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international community of all those of the earth’s peoples who can enter into active relations with one another, is not a philanthropic principle of ethics, but a principle of *right*. [---] This right, in so far as it affords the prospect that all nations may unite for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the intercourse they may have with one another, may be termed *cosmopolitan* (*ius cosmopoliticum*).¹⁵

In the same way Kant stresses in *Perpetual Peace* (3. definite article):

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, in Weischedel (ed.), *I. Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden*, Vol. VIII, p. 337.

¹⁵ Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 172.

Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality. As in the foregoing articles, we are here concerned not with philanthropy, but with right. In this context, hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory.¹⁶

So if we come to a conclusion at this point, we may say: according to Kant, the idea of *kosmopolis* has three dimensions: *first*, the ethical dimension covers the duty of unlimited recognition of the alienness of the other individual beyond every concept of 'the human being'. *Secondly*, the political dimension consists of the orientation towards international law and institutions for its enforcement in order to guarantee the freedom of the individual. It includes a permanent dialogue between the different doctrines of philosophy of right and conceptions and norms of the positive law. *Thirdly*, if the freedom of the individual is ensured by law, there will also be space for the aesthetic dimension: the pleasure of alienness (*Lust an der Fremdheit*).

'World citizen law' – 'Human right(s)'

I would like to finish my discussion with a brief remark concerning the relation between world citizen law and human right. These two concepts are not identical. According to Kant, there can only be one human right in the sense of a natural right of every human being: the right to right, the right to live in a community ruled by law (i.e. a civil constitution).

Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit von eines Anderen nöthigender Willkür), sofern sie mit jedes Anderen Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann, ist dieses einzige, ursprüngliche, jedem Menschen kraft seiner Menschheit zustehende Recht.¹⁷

Simon speaks in this context about a human right to world citizen law (as a common and powerful right of the peoples – *Völkerrecht*,

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁷ Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, in Weischedel (ed.), *I. Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden*, Vol. VIII, p. 345.

i.e., there are also the institutions which are able to enact laws). As long as this does not exist, we can only try to keep the three existing forms in balance, in order to keep the hope alive that under the limited horizons of political action a common world citizen law can eventually arise.

At the moment, we have law systems at different levels: national law (*Staatsrecht* in the Kantian sense), juridical structures between different nations and states (e.g. European right, which is *Völkerrecht* in the Kantian sense) and elementary forms of international law (*Völkerstaatsrecht* = *Weltbürgerrecht*, e.g., UN Convention of Human Rights). And we have the confrontation between so-called human rights, which are a European invention, and the system of rights within the Islamic world, both formulated in the light of different religious and ethical traditions.

So the only way towards a ‘republic of world citizens’ can be to develop a common law *bottom up* and *step-by-step*, through permanent and arduous dialogue – an illustrative example of this process is the discussion on European rights and a European Constitution. A very important condition for this process is to create a juridical framework for a global discourse on rights.

The practical reality of a world republic, therefore, cannot be put into effect ‘in principle’, but only *step-by-step*. On the one hand, this is just what Kant means when he speaks about ‘pragmatic concern’: improving the situation as much as possible. Nevertheless, we have to work towards or in Kant’s words:

There shall be no war [...] /f/or war is not the way in which anyone should pursue his rights. Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not, or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our theoretical judgement if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts towards realizing it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively). By working towards this end, we may hope to terminate the disastrous practice of war, which up till now has been the main object to which all states, without exception, have accommodated their international institu-

tions. And even if the fulfilment of this pacific intention were forever to remain a pious hope, we should still not be deceiving ourselves if we made it our maxim to work unceasingly towards it, for it is our duty to do so.¹⁸

Let's do it.

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¹⁸ Ibid., p. 174.

4. Cosmopolitanism and what is “Secret”: Two Sides of Enlightened Ideas concerning World Citizenship

Andreas Önnersfors

This chapter investigates the links between cosmopolitanism and secrecy. According to the classical definition of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006), the secret and the public constitute a major dichotomy of the Enlightenment.¹ Koselleck claims that within the ‘secret’, private spheres of Enlightenment significant elements of the forthcoming secular modernization of society were already being practiced. Secret societies, clubs, drawing rooms and coffeehouses thus constitute the vanguard of bourgeois emancipation during the 18th century. This secrecy was necessary in order to prepare for the revolution of public engagement and the creation of a public sphere of discourse.

In my chapter, I try to trace the roots of enlightened ideas on world citizenship back to the normative foundations of freemasonry that were formulated in the 1720s and 1730s. Freemasonry saw itself as an heir to an esoteric tradition: the ideology and symbolic practice of it is said to have been communicated at all times and in all cultures, and its symbolic language was said to be universally comprehensible. The organization spread transnationally; within the ideal of the brotherhood is a universal solidarity. Fifty years later, on the eve of the French Revolution, the potential link be-

¹ On the relationship between what is secret and publicity, see Reinhart Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt* (Freiburg i. Br. 1959, 2nd edition, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 49–81.

tween cosmopolitanism and secrecy was discussed in a totally different public surrounding. Claims were made that cosmopolitanism is not a secret, and that it is not possible to organize it formally like, for instance, a secret society.

The texts investigated seem to prove Koselleck's theory. The public debate can claim a public accessibility of a concept. Within freemasonry, cosmopolitan ideas were formulated and practiced very early on, but these ideas were a part of a joint European sociability that remained closed for those who were not initiated into it, whereas five decades later the field was open for public deliberation, with cosmopolitanism now occupying a political dimension in the liberation process of the bourgeois.

Freemasonry and its cosmopolitan values

The political discourse of the 17th century was dominated by an aggressive dichotomy between the two branches of West European Christian belief, Catholicism and Protestantism. During the negotiations that led to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, however, theories of natural law had an important impact upon the concepts of European space that were predominant at least until the Vienna Congress in 1815. One basic element of political theory was the European territorial state, with its right of self-determination and independence. Along with that line of ideas, it had to be explained intellectually how and why European states could differ from each other. Self-determination becomes explanatory only when it is based upon *difference*, and difference (to make any distinction between the qualities of the One and the significant Other) is a key element of identity and identification.

Unlike such concepts and ideas, counter-concepts evolved during the age of Enlightenment, all containing the basic ingredient *similarity*, or rather *égalité*. Their general idea was that human beings without difference are receptive to one all-embracing moral message, and that many branches of religions and philosophies lead back to one single and uncorrupted source of knowledge of the true divine, *prisca teologia*. In 1717, four freemason lodges in London

announced the establishment of a Grand Lodge. The organizational and ideological roots of freemasonry in Europe, prior to that event are not clear, but could date back to the 17th century or even earlier. In 1723, the Presbyterian minister James Anderson (1679–1739) published a book of constitutions, which was a mythical history of freemasonry as well as detailing its rules and regulations. The *Constitutions* can be regarded as a construction of a mythical and heroic past, as a narrative that construes a consistent history back to the childhood of man, as it stresses that this knowledge was passed on in all traditions and times, codified within the symbolic language of freemasonry. One of the last paragraphs reads:

In short, it would require many large Volumes to contain the many splendid Instances of the *mighty Influence* of Masonry from the Creation, in every Age, and in every Nation, as could be collected from Historians and Travellers [...]²

Le monde entier n'est qu'une grande république... – Ramsay's 1736 'Oration'

If the early concepts of autonomous territorial states are based upon mutual excluding qualities, the concept of freemasonry implies a mutual integration of mankind under a joint ideological roof. This cosmopolitan approach becomes perfectly clear in an oration held at a lodge meeting in Paris in 1736 by the Scottish nobleman André Michel de Ramsay (1686–1743). Like Anderson, in his *Discours* he dates the origin of freemasonry back to pre-historical and biblical times. But Ramsay links the narration about the Temple of Solomon from the Book of Kings in the Old Testament with the Chivalric Orders of the Crusades. Scotland was the cradle of modern freemasonry, Ramsay claimed, and its true secrets were kept there. But it is rather surprising that cosmopolitan ideas were formulated in the context of a society that is regarded as one of the most secre-

² Quotation from the 1734 Benjamin Franklin edition of the *Constitutions of the Free-Masons*, accessible online, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/25/> p. 41f.

tive, mysterious and even esoteric during the Enlightenment. Where is the connection between cosmopolitanism and secrecy? Did secrecy pave the way for the later popularity of cosmopolitanism among European elites?

First of all, Ramsay rejects the ability of political rulers to establish enduring institutions for the benefit of mankind as a whole:

Lycurgus, Solon, Numa and all the other political legislators never could make their institutions last long; however wise their laws may have been, they could not spread to all countries and throughout the centuries. As they only had in view victories and conquests, military violence and the raising of one people above another, they could not become universal, nor could they suit the genius and the interests of all nations, they were not founded on philanthropy. Ill-understood love of one's homeland, carried to excess, would often destroy in these warlike republics the general love of mankind.³

To use a modern term, good governance, in Ramsay's view, is comprised of long-lasting institutions, wise laws, and order that are spread to all countries, and survive from generation to generation. The focus of good governance occurs on a global scale, involving universalism and an attempt to fit the genius and interest of all nations. To establish good governance requires moral qualities, philanthropy, and a general love of mankind. A 'failed state' is based on military aggression, the violent expansion of its territory, a striving for hegemony, and an ill-understood patriotism. In Ramsay's view, each nation has its own genius and its own interests. However, in the subsequent part of the text it becomes perfectly clear that these differences do not constitute a definite dividing line:

³ André Michel de Ramsay, ms 1213 Bibliothèque Municipale de Toulouse, in Georges Lamoine (ed.), *Discours prononcé à la réception des Francs-Maçons* (Toulouse: Éd SNES, 1999), pp. 38–45. The translation into English quoted is Georges Lamoine, 'The Chevalier de Ramsay's Oration 1736–37', *Ars Quatuor Coronatum*, Vol. 114 (2002), pp. 230–233. For a free French version of the text, see also: http://misraim.free.fr/textes/discours_Ramsay.pdf#search=%22%22André%20Michel%20de%20Ramsay%22%22 and <http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/bernheimfr.html> for a selection of brilliant texts on Ramsay and his oration.

Men are not essentially distinguished by the difference of the languages they speak, of the clothes they wear, of the countries they occupy, or the dignities with which they are adorned. The whole world is but a vast republic, each nation of which is but a family, and each particular person but a child.⁴

The idea of a global republic is combined with the metaphor of the particular nation as a human subject – or rather, in this case, a collective subject, a family. ‘Personification of the state’, write the authors of *Organising European Space* (2003), ‘is a basic metaphor, which guides our thinking about international relations’.⁵ Each individual is regarded as a child of the national family. Thus, there seem only to be three levels when moving from the local to the global: the individual, the collective, and the universal collective. Ramsay goes on that it ‘was to revive and take up again these ancient maxims borrowed from nature’ that freemasonry was established. The goal is to unite men of an enlightened mind so that

the interest of the Fraternity becomes that of mankind, where all nations can borrow sound knowledge, and where all the subjects of the different kingdoms may conspire without envy [the French original has “conspirer sans jalousie”, however “conspire” has a rather negative connotation in English, perhaps “cooperate with the same spirit” would fit better], live without discord and cherish one another without renouncing one’s homeland.⁶

Ramsay is of the opinion that the ‘ancient maxims’ of philanthropic cosmopolitanism are based upon ‘nature’ (a typical figure in the context of the debate on natural law and human rights of the period) and that they have declined or even disappeared. He does not specify further in what ancient period they were alive, but he might be referring to ideas of a golden age, when mankind still was pure, perhaps before the Fall of Man. The potential return of the Golden Age is a distinctive feature of Utopian thought – thus Ramsay sees freemasonry as a vehicle in order to realize a latent Utopian poten-

⁴ Lamoine, *Discours prononcé à la réception des Francs-Maçons*, p. 230.

⁵ Christer Jönsson, Sven Tägil, Gunnar Törnqvist, *Organizing European Space* (London: Sage, 2003), p. 14.

⁶ Lamoine, *ibid*, p. 230.

tial among his contemporaries. Once this is realized, all nations can then ‘borrow knowledge’ from each other, a very interesting statement that will be developed further below. In this paragraph, the nation/family has evolved into a more political unit yet again: the kingdom. And, although cooperation between the different people is the ultimate goal, this does not imply renouncing the ‘homeland’.

Parallel to Anderson, Ramsay subsequently constructs a historical basis for his cosmopolitan approach to freemasonry, calling the Crusaders of the Middle Ages its ‘ancestors’:

Our ancestors, the Crusaders, gathered from all parts of Christendom in the Holy Land, wanted to unite thus in an only Fraternity the subjects of all nations [...] with the aim to “form in the course of time a spiritual nation where, without departing from the various duties which the difference between the States demands, a new people will be created who, getting from several nations, will cement them in a way by the bonds of Virtue and Science.”⁷

This claim is an extraordinary interpretation of the ambitions of the Crusades. Ramsay formulates an ultimate goal: to unite subjects of all nations into one fraternity, to create a new people within a spiritual, universal nation. Most certainly, the vision is not a world republic in the political sense, but rather an ‘imagined community’ on a global scale. The aim is not to depart from the duties that each separate state demands of its subjects; however, it would be rather unlikely to think that such subjects united in a spiritual global fraternity would organize warfare against each other. Rather the opposite is the case: a common morality and science will unite the ‘new people’. Ramsay terms this morality ‘the Theology of the heart’, a term whose origin may be located in the context of Protestant pietism. But – in parallel with Anderson’s *Constitutions* – he also constructs a line back to the ‘feasts of Ceres in Eleusis [...] of Isis in Egypt, of Minerva in Athens, of Urania with the Phoenicians, and Diana in Scythia’ that ‘are all related to our solemnities’. A common source of the celebration of mysteries is described, and there is a similarity between all traditions ‘where several remnants of the ancient religions of Noah and the Patriarchs can be found’. But just

⁷ Ibid.

a few paragraphs later, the universality of the esoteric mysterious is transformed into a universality of exoteric knowledge in an encyclopaedic and enlightened spirit. Ramsay writes:

All Grand Masters in Germany, England, Italy and throughout Europe, exhort all scholars in the Fraternity to unite together in order to supply the material towards a universal dictionary of all liberal arts and all useful sciences [...] there will be explained, not only technical words and their etymologies, but moreover the history of particular sciences and arts, their great principle and manner of working. The lights of all nations will thus be united in a single work that will serve as a general store and universal Library of what is beautiful and great in the natural sciences and all the noble arts. This work will increase in each century along with the increase of the Enlightenment: a noble emulation will be spread together with a taste for *belles-lettres* and fine arts throughout the whole of Europe.⁸

Ramsay's ideas on world citizenship might be interpreted as the following: in his view, the concord between human beings is rooted in the natural state of man. When political leadership interfered in this state of nature by means of aggressive and coercive expansion, the true unanimity between humans was lost. There is also an idea of an all-embracing morality that can be experienced by everybody. Freemasonry aims at a revival of the true state of nature, and works with the same ambitions as its historical ancestors, the Crusaders, to create a new people who embrace a universal solidarity. The roots of this universal solidarity are not only found in a common spiritual/mythical past, but also in the intellectual challenges of the future: to collect and to disseminate knowledge for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In the definitions established by Pauline Kleingeld, Ramsay's oration unites several different varieties of cosmopolitanism.⁹ Without doubt, we find in it the conviction 'that all human beings are members of a single moral community and

⁸ Ibid., p. 232.

⁹ Pauline Kleingeld, 'Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1999, pp. 505–524, where she makes the distinction between moral, political, and legal reform and cultural, economic, and romantic cosmopolitanisms.

that they have moral obligations to all other human beings regardless of their nationality, language, religions, customs etc' (moral cosmopolitanism).¹⁰ When it comes to ideas of a world state, Ramsay does not go so far as to advocate a certain model, although he talks about the whole world as a 'vast republic'. However, it is clear that in his view, states that use military power to suppress others are 'failed states'. They do not represent the true natural state of mankind. The universal level of a world state is described as a 'spiritual nation' only, with no political obligations. In this sense, Ramsay is perhaps already very close to romantic cosmopolitanism in Novalis' style, as he also stresses philanthropy, moral bonds, a shared faith, and a 'general love of mankind'. Romantic cosmopolitanism is fulfilled in the fraternity. Even more striking are the parallels between Ramsay and Novalis, because both refer back to the Middle Ages in Europe. Novalis stresses, however, the unity between the political ruler and religion within Europe. Ramsay makes a link with the Crusades, where chivalric and religious orders – outside Europe – could experience transnational similarity and unity when encountering the significant 'oriental' Other. Although Ramsay does not mention anything about a legal frame which keeps the inhabitants of the world republic together, we can assume that he is convinced of the existence of a universal concept of human rights based upon the idea of the true state of nature.

In a sense, Ramsay defends the universal right of each nation to maintain its diversity, and thus he represents 'cultural cosmopolitanism'. Although languages, geography, clothes, and customs do not essentially differentiate people, they still are separate families. They represent different kingdoms, and they have duties that are a result of the demands of those states. The 'new people' are thus not created as a totally new design of mankind, but instead by a joint imagination, the universal 'spiritual nation' that serves as the ideological roof of a compartmentalized building where different families can live in harmony together without being forced to relinquish all differences between them. In his oration, Ramsay does not mention anything about the necessity of free trade between people. However, he adds a distinct trait to his ideas on universality by

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 507.

stressing the importance of the free transfer of knowledge. When Ramsay states that ‘all nations may borrow sound knowledge’ (‘toutes les nations peuvent puiser des connoissances solides’), he apparently refers to his encyclopaedic ideas of a ‘universal dictionary of all liberal arts and useful sciences’ (‘Dictionnaire universel de tous les arts liberaux, et de toutes sciences utiles’). And it is the bond of Science, along with that of Virtue, that will cement the ‘new people’. Hence, we might identify a new category of cosmopolitanism, involving the idea that knowledge should be freely transferred and disseminated among mankind for the benefit of all.

How did these cosmopolitan ideas become part of the values of a society that initiates its members in secret ceremonies, and that is known for the vast use of secret symbols? How compatible are extroverted ideas of a world community with the introverted secrecy of a restricted group? To address this question, we need to perhaps look at the tradition of Western esotericism. It has often been assumed that irrational mysticism is incompatible with the project of rational modernization and the Enlightenment, but it may also be the case that these two currents in Western thought borrow ideas from each other. Does secrecy manifest itself in the rituals and symbols of freemasonry or does it perhaps mirror an approach to establish a universally comprehensible language? Alexander Roob writes about the puzzle pictures and linguistic riddles in alchemy and mysticism:

The tendency towards arcane language in “obscure speeches”, in numbers and in enigmatic pictures, is explained by a profound scepticism about the expressive possibilities of literal language, subjected to Babylonian corruption, which holds the Holy Spirit fettered in its grammatical bonds. The prehistoric knowledge, the *prisca sapientia* that was directly revealed to Adam and Moses by God, and which was handed down in a long, elite chain of tradition, had to be preserved in such a way that it was protected against the abuse if the profane. To this end, Hermes Trismegistus, who

like Zoroaster, Pythagoras and Plato, was seen as a major link in this hermetic chain, developed hieroglyphs.¹¹

In his *Oration*, Ramsay expresses this idea of a universal language for the initiated in the following words:

We have our own secrets: they are figurative signs and sacred words which make up a language, now dumb, now very eloquent, to communicate at a very great distance, and in order to greet our Brethren whatever their language, or country.

Regardless of country or origin, freemasonry has established a universal language of its own, communicated through secrets. But its ambition is still to contribute to the perfection of mankind as a whole, through the dissemination and the transfer of knowledge.

Christoph Martin Wieland and ‘Das Geheimnis des Kosmopolitenordens’

Are there other ways to combine cosmopolitanism and secrecy? Fifty years after Ramsay’s oration, in 1788, on the eve of the French Revolution, the German Enlightenment writer and editor Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813) published his prominent essay ‘Das Geheimnis des Kosmopolitenordens’ (1788) [The Secret of the Order of Cosmopolitans]. The general message of the text, published in his journal *Der Teutsche Merkur*, is that cosmopolitans/cosmopolitanism need neither a secrecy nor an Order. This is in line with Wieland’s repeated attack on secret societies and Orders for their concealment. However, it is astonishing that Wieland’s and Ramsay’s views of world citizenship correspond to a large extent. It is even difficult to imagine that Wieland had not read Ramsay’s oration prior to his essay when looking at the following key passage:

¹¹ Alexander Roob, *Alchemy & Mysticism: The Hermetic Cabinet* (Köln: Taschen, 2005), p. 9.

Cosmopolitans carry their name (citizens of the world) in its virtual and most eminent sense. They regard all people of the globe as the same branch of one and the same family, and the universe as a state were they are citizens together with uncountable other reasonable beings, in order to – under general Laws of Nature – promote the perfection of the Whole, each of them according to his particular species and manner industrious for its own prosperity.¹²

In Ramsay's oration, the world is seen as a 'Grande République', with the nations as families and the individuals as children. Wieland expands this vision even further, to a truly universal scale. The cosmos is a state that is inhabited by reasonable beings, fellow-citizens, who are ruled by the laws of nature. Each of these beings is promoting the perfection of the whole while being involved in the augmentation of their own wealth. Ramsay and Wieland are both referring to natural law in their formulations of the cosmopolitan ideal. The mutually integrating approaches between the citizens of the universe are not based upon territory or concepts of territoriality, but instead upon an imagined community, or rather a sense of unity.

Wieland's text on the secret of the Order of Cosmopolitans contained in *Der Teutsche Merkur* is divided into three parts. In the introduction, he recapitulates the content of the novel *Geschichte der Abderiten* [History of the Abderites], which was published as a series of articles fourteen years earlier.¹³ The second part of the essay deals with the 'secrets' themselves, whereas the third part is

¹² Christoph Martin Wieland, 'Das Geheimniß des Kosmopolitenordens', *Der Teutsche Merkur*, Weimar, August 1788, pp. 97–115, the quotation is on p. 107: 'Die Kosmopoliten führen ihren Nahmen (*Weltbürger*) in der eigentlichen und eminentesten Bedeutung. Sie betrachten alle Völker des Erdbodens als eben so viele Zweige einer einzigen Familie, und das Universum als einen Staat, worin sie mit anderen unzähligen andern vernünftigen Wesen Bürger sind, um unter allgemeinen Naturgesetzen die Vollkommenheit des Ganzen zu befördern, indem jedes nach seiner besondern Art und Weise für seinen eigenen Wohlstand geschäftig ist'.

¹³ *History of the Abderites*, trans. Max Dufner (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1993). See also the web page <http://lehigh.edu/library/lup/Book-Pages/DufnHist.htm?Literature> [accessed 04/09/2006].

devoted to the political foundations of the cosmopolitans and their relationship to society. Since the days of the Abderites, the ‘invisible society’ of cosmopolitans has existed for thousands of years, Wieland claims. And true cosmopolitans never would organize themselves in the traditional way. Their ‘invisibility is a result of the nature of the thing’. From the moment a cosmopolitan enters another secret society, he ceases to be a cosmopolitan. Hence, it is not possible to establish a society of cosmopolitans, and Wieland attacks those who had claimed to represent such an organization and their secrets (which apparently had been the case). Thus, in the name of the Order, Wieland now aims to reveal the secrets of the cosmopolitans so that no one else can claim to represent them.

Can cosmopolitanism be organized?

Wieland places quite a bit of effort into explaining the differences between ‘real’ secret organizations and the secrecy of the cosmopolitans. Secret Orders are only secret because they want to be. The only secret of the cosmopolitans is constituted by the ignorance of the masses. There will always be people who – regardless of how open the revelation of the cosmopolitan message is – still would not understand its message. And it is this inability to understand which creates its only ‘secret’. Unlike secret Orders, it is not possible to be initiated into or instructed about cosmopolitanism: ‘you are in their society, because you are a cosmopolitan. You are born to be it, and any instruction will not contribute to that more than nutrition and movement contributes to the growth of the animal body [...]’.

Wieland criticizes secret societies for their habit of demanding that members take an oath which is unknown to the authorities of the country in question. In doing so, Wieland places himself into a very long tradition of anti-Masonic literature. Beginning with the first revealing articles and texts published on freemasonry in the 1720s and 1730s, this argument against freemasonry was mentioned over and over again. How can government authorities be sure that members of secret societies will not conspire against them

if their secret obligations remain unknown? On the other hand, to be a cosmopolite requires no oath. There is no need to hide secrets, or to make a secret out of cosmopolitan principles and ambitions. All humans and, in fact, all beings are regarded as parts of the same universal community. However, human beings neither play the most important role nor are subjected to an arbitrary fate. They are not a blind tool of foreign powers, but as intellectual beings, are instead enabled to use their will and mind in order to have an impact upon the surrounding world.

From this general anti-deterministic position, Wieland derives a dual principle: to leave aside what human spirit cannot influence upon and instead to focus upon what can be changed by reason and will. The former principle has close connections to Epicurean teaching, where one of the main principles is to remain unimpressed by what we can neither perceive nor affect. The latter principle reflects the duty of ‘utmost perfection’, explicitly mentioned by Wieland. Each human being has received a gift from nature and it is up to the surrounding conditions to promote the development and refinement of those unique qualities. There is no excuse for not trying to improve upon those gifts. These are the foundations of cosmopolitan virtues, and from here it is possible to make a distinction between ‘world dwellers’ and ‘world citizens’. World dwellers are passive – on the same level as animals. The world citizen, on the other hand, is the one who tries to improve his usefulness in order to contribute to the best of the ‘grand city of God’.

Cosmopolitans acknowledge no other superiors than *necessity* and the *law of nature*. Wieland mentions here ‘the highest governor of the universe’, a terminology that is closely connected to that in freemasonry, where a ‘Great Architect of the Universe’ is often referred to as the Supreme Being who has created the world.¹⁴ But besides this subordination under the highest governor of the universe, among cosmopolitans only rules complete equality. Authority and instructions are only taken from nature, and there are no

¹⁴ See Charles Porset, ‘Grand Architecte de l’Univers’, *Encyclopédie de la Franc-Maçonnerie* (Paris: Librairie générale française, 2000), pp. 345–347. See also the formulation in the very first sentence of the Constitutions of Freemasons, quoted already above.

other degrees than the different steps of capability and inner moral righteousness. There is no agenda to revive a long-time defunct Order, to unite churches, or to reform the world according to their minds. Cosmopolitans do not constitute a state within a state; they do not require a constitution, or superiors, or secret chancellery, or joint finances. Without the use of any secret signs, a close unity is nevertheless formed. The entire secret lies in an affiliation that is in force universally: ‘A certain natural relationship and sympathy, that expresses itself in the whole universe among very similar beings, and in the spiritual bond, with which truth, benevolence and purity of the heart chains together noble human beings’. This idea is reminiscent of Goethe’s thoughts on elective affinities between humans who attract each other (*Wahlverwandschaften*, 1809). As the goal of the Order of Cosmopolitans is self-evident, there is no need to call for any synods or convents where this goal has to be negotiated. Only one formula is needed to summarize the main ambition of cosmopolitans: ‘to diminish the totality of evil that suppresses mankind as much as possible (without creating any malevolence themselves) and to augment the total of good in the world in accordingly to their best capacity’.

After this formulation of a cosmopolitan code of conduct, Wieland in the second chapter of *Das Geheimnis des Kosmopolitenordens* discusses the political principles of the cosmopolitans and their relation to the civic society. A good cosmopolitan is a quiet citizen. They never use violence to achieve their goals and never take part in any conspiracy, uprising, civil war, revolution, or regicide. The only weapon of resistance allowed is reason, which also constitutes the only form of government. In the conflicts between different parties of the state, the cosmopolitan has to remain neutral and impartial. However, there are reasons to choose sides, for instance, when one party is threatened by suppression, or when the other party treats it inhumanely. A cosmopolitan thus never disturbs the public peace, and remains within the legal framework of the state he happens to inhabit. However, ‘republican enthusiasm’ is also irreconcilable with cosmopolitanism.

All types of patrimony are foreign to the cosmopolitan: ‘What among the ancient Greeks and the proud citizens of that town that

thought to have been founded in order to rule the world [Rome], was called patrimony, is a passion incompatible with the basic concepts of cosmopolitans. No Roman could have been a cosmopolite, no cosmopolite could have been a Roman’.

Here again, the parallels with Ramsay’s *Oration* are most intriguing. As we remember, in the very introduction to his speech he rejects the ‘ill-understood love of one’s homeland’ which destroyed ‘the general love of mankind’. Even more obvious is the similarity when it comes to the rejection of hegemony. In Wieland’s words, it is wrong to ‘build the prosperity, glory and grandeur of the fatherland upon intentional over-favouring and suppression of other states’. Ramsay speaks of the ‘raising of one people above another’.

In a general exposé, Wieland ascribes reason as the main element in the formation of the superiority of European culture. However, the progress of culture and science was not followed by the progress of governance: ‘the supreme of all arts, the royal art to put people by means of legislation and governmental administration in the state of higher felicity’. The term ‘royal art’ is heavily involved in the sphere of freemasonry. Known as ‘ars regia’, it is not only a synonym for alchemy. Within the Masonic context, ‘royal art’ is used to describe the essence of Masonic ideology, as already described in the introduction to this essay.¹⁵ Wieland’s use of the term was not meant to defend any real ‘royal’ rights or powers. Subsequently, he ardently proposes that a civic society needs to liberate itself from the last vestiges of the ‘barbarian constitution’, where there are no clear limits between the rights of the ‘nation’ and the rights of the ‘throne’. He then attacks arbitrariness in legislation and jurisdiction, and defends the right of personal property, honour, freedom, and life of the citizens. There will come a revolution, says Wieland, but not a revolution that sets fire to Europe. It will be a revolution of reason, one which has the power to instruct humans about their true interest, their rights and duties, and the purpose of their existence.

¹⁵ See Eric Saunier, ‘Art Royal’, *Encyclopédie de la Franc-Maçonnerie*, pp. 47–48.

From this analysis, it becomes clear that cosmopolitans consider all existing governments as mere ‘scaffolds for the erection of the eternally existing temple of general felicity’. Here again, Wieland employs a terminology widely used within freemasonry, where architectural metaphors described the purpose of the society.¹⁶ Subsequently, Wieland elaborates in a very long passage on the concept of freedom as an integral part of all human development, and which was suppressed by despotism. The establishment of a constitution based upon reason will be accelerated by ‘the utmost spread of basic truths, publicity of facts, observations, discoveries, investigations, suggestions of improvements, warnings of negative consequences’. Hence, cosmopolitans regard freedom of the press as the true ‘Palladium of humanity’ and the last part of Wieland’s treatise is dedicated to explaining how true journalistic freedom should be organized in a well-civilized state. His ambition is encyclopaedic in essence, and elaborates upon what Ramsay already stated in his *Oration*: one of the main principles of the Masonic fraternity was to enable that ‘all nations can borrow sound knowledge’ from each other. There is a duty of mutual assistance regarding knowledge. Ramsay proposed a ‘universal dictionary of all liberal arts and all useful sciences’ that united ‘the lights of all nations [...] in a single work’. He would also have perhaps argued for the freedom of the press, but, at the end of the 1730s, the press in Europe was still not as developed as it would be fifty years later.

Why an order of cosmopolitans?

These two chapters constitute the content of Wieland’s *Das Geheimniß des Kosmopolitenordens*. A continuation that was announced at the end of the second part was never published, and was perhaps never written at all. However, Wieland subsequently, despite the horrors of the French Revolution that he strongly rejected, discussed cosmopolitan topics in his writings. However, it is interesting to pose the question as to why Wieland used a description of

¹⁶ See Vladimir Biaggi, ‘Temple’, *Encyclopédie de la Franc-Maçonnerie*, pp. 850–852.

a non-existent or at least invisible Order as a framework for his ideas on cosmopolitanism. I suggest the following possible reasons.

Within secret societies (such as freemasonry) during the 18th century there was a development of ideas on human equality, a principal need for universal solidarity, charity and welfare, dissemination of knowledge, and the introduction of sound principles of government. This general ideological framework comprised the often-cited ‘augmentation of felicity’ or ‘pursuit of happiness’ for mankind in the sense of the US constitution. Hence, through a joint European sociability, a cosmopolitan community was created, yet *open only for the initiated* and *practiced only in privacy*. Although many ideas of the modern civic society were tried out in the framework of secret societies such as freemasonry (passports, membership records and payment of fees/taxes, democratic voting, etc.), there was never a direct adoption of those principles in society as a whole. Wieland surely saw a need for that (he wanted the royal art to be extended to the field of governance) and thus he needed to attack the internal preoccupation of the Orders with themselves and their ‘private’ matters. Wieland thus rejected the secrecy within the act of initiation, and he states that cosmopolitan values should be accessible to all (aside from the ignorant Abderites) and should be promoted in public. Another important aspect of the rejection of secrecy within initiatory societies is the habit of taking an oath, the content of which remains unknown to the outside world, especially governments.

Secret societies and Orders were widely discussed in the 18th century European press. The 1780s in particular contained many features that Wieland could draw upon. Already the words *secret* and *Order* were constantly found in the press. One of the reasons was that a Masonic system called the *Strict Observance* (SO) had spread throughout Europe between 1754 and 1782.¹⁷ The SO

¹⁷ For an introduction to the topic, see René Le Forestiers (1st edition 1970, 3rd 2003) *Die templerische und okkultistische Freimaurerei im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Teil 1 (und 2), *Die Strikte Observanz*, 1987. 1999 wurden die Rituale des hohen Ordens vom heiligen Tempel zu Jerusalem, auch Strikte Observanz genannt aus dem Jahr 1764 vom ersten bis zum 7. Grad publiziert. See also Alain Bernheim’s papers on the SO <http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/bernheimfr.html> [accessed 01/10/2006].

claimed that it had inherited the right to re-establish the defunct Order of the Knights Templars, and thus founded provinces and chapters in many European countries. Around 1,600 members belonged to the Inner Circle of Knights, including many prominent people from high nobility or royal families, well-known writers, academics, etc. The leader of the SO also claimed that he had received his instructions from a group of ‘secret superiors’ the names of whom he was unable to reveal. Within the framework of the SO some of the most utopian and most irrational traits of enlightened culture can be found. On the one hand, the knights of the SO worked to realize certain groundbreaking innovations such as an all-European pension fund, financed by the contribution of its members and by investments in industrial production. On the other hand, mysticism and alchemy flourished as, for instance, in 1767, the supposed ‘Clerical branch’ of the Order revealed its existence and started to practice a very esoteric interpretation of Christianity. The involvement of a substantial part of especially the German working elite in the SO was repeatedly discussed. In 1782, a convent was established in Wilhelmsbad that abolished the supposed connection to the Knights Templars. And in the aftermath of this event, several books were published, such as *St. Nicaise* (1786) and *Anti-St. Nicaise* (1786–1788), *Versuch über die Beschuldigungen, welche dem Tempelherrenorden gemacht worden, und über dessen Geheimniß* (1788), or *Noch etwas über Geheime Gesellschaften im protestantischen Deutschland* (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, 1786). It was also during this time that the famous Order of *Illuminati* began to be active in Germany, dedicated to a rational reform of society, with ‘Count Cagliostro’ hypnotizing the educated drawing rooms of Europe with his ‘egyptomanian’ metaphysical science. Secrecy, whether involving rationality or irrationality, was always on the agenda. Orders, their history, and their organizations were discussed and questioned. With this context as a background, a semantic field was laid open for use by a mind like Wieland’s. It was easy to make references to a general discourse of the time and, as we have seen already, there are plenty. Especially when Wieland talks about the qualities of true cosmopolitans, he uses well-established terminology from the discourse of secret societies such as ‘war-

rant', 'instruction', 'degrees', 'secret plan', 'secret connections', 'defunct Order', 'unification of churches', 'common interest of an Order', 'honourable supreme', 'secret chancellery', 'common treasure', 'Shibboleth' and certain 'signs'.

In the preface to his treatise, Wieland describes how a person who was raising funds believed the Order of Cosmopolitans was real when he addressed his request to them. This already seemed to prove their existence, Wieland writes satirically, and it fuelled misuse by others. 'Pseudo-cosmopolitans' now seized the name for their purposes, and awarded themselves the cosmopolitan title. They believed that being a cosmopolitan meant achieving the 'Imperium orbis'. However, to be a cosmopolitan is not a label, and requires no organization: 'the *invisibility* of cosmopolitans follows from the nature of the thing [my Italics]'. However, the misuse of the word and of the pretend organization forces Wieland to both explain and reveal its real purposes. 'Invisibility' is a concept that had been used in several contexts, and is interesting to elaborate upon further. Jesus is known as the 'representation of the invisible God' and the 'invisible church', and *Ecclesia invisibilis* is the universal Christian community as a whole, united through its shared faith. The article on 'Unsichtbare Kirche' in *Zedlers'* aforementioned encyclopaedia states that:

all humans [that accept the revelation of the Bible] are not only united with Christ, but also mutually with each other, and hence they are parts of the same society. Secondly, because this union in essence is an inner and spiritual, and hence is not perceivable with the eyes, the society is called an invisible church, even if the people who constitute the same are visible and their community with Christ and each other must be perceivable through their actions. Thirdly that the invisible church in the society of all believers or true Christians exists on the whole surface of the world [...]¹⁸

This definition of an invisible global community sounds much like Wieland. Invisibility is a prerequisite of cosmopolitanism; any attempts to make the organization visible will corrupt its essence. The concept of the invisible church as a representation of true and

¹⁸ *Zedlers Universallexicon*, Vol. 49, pp. 1020–1021.

universal Christianity was widespread in Protestant theology. The predecessor of the Royal Society was called the 'Invisible College', because as it is stated in Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1626) a college, the Salomon's house, is devoted to the exploration of new knowledge. Today, we can see a revival of the term Invisible College to describe non-governmental, non-profit organizations devoted to the free dissemination of knowledge: 'The Invisible College refers mainly to the intrinsic ideology of the free transfer of thought and technical expertise, usually carried out without the establishment of designated facilities or authority structure, spread by a loosely connected system of word-of-mouth referral or localized bulletin-board system, and supported through barter (i.e. trade of knowledge or services) or apprenticeship'.¹⁹ In the 2006 Swedish election campaign, an 'invisible party' carried out political actions. On its website the party explains that there is an 'invisible community of class', 'all we did was to say what previously was invisible, and now will become invisible again'. The negative aspects of capitalism had been brought out during this campaign, but this was also 'the greatest limitation, because when the invisible is presented in light and made visible, it at the same time is disarmed. It is turned into politics [...]'.²⁰

Invisibility has thus become a term that has developed from a sacred connotation in Christianity to a part of pre-Enlightenment science (perhaps the essence of the likewise invisible Republic of the Learned) and an ingredient of cosmopolitanism. In a post-modern context, the term has returned as a label for spontaneous political action. And it is the principle of invisibility Wieland defends and claims as the invisible Order of Cosmopolitans, whose secrets have to be understood without making them visible.

¹⁹ See http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Invisible_College&printable=yes

²⁰ Translated from the party's website, <http://www.osynligapartiet.se>.

Summary

This article deals with the relationship between secrecy and cosmopolitanism within the discourse of the 18th century. In the first part, the affinity between freemasonry and cosmopolitanism is investigated. The 1736 ‘Oration’ of André Michel de Ramsay is analyzed and discussed as an example of a very early statement of cosmopolitan values within the framework of secret societies. In the second part, the famous work of Christoph Martin Wieland on the secrets of the Order of Cosmopolitans (‘Das Geheimnis des Kosmopolitenordens’, 1788) is presented and discussed. Wieland uses the terminology and treatment of the topic within the context of an intensive debate on secret societies and Orders on the eve of the French Revolution. In his ‘secret’, Wieland reveals that cosmopolitanism requires no organization, and that it is a morality potentially conceivable by all. The comparison between Ramsay and Wieland can be interpreted as proof of Koselleck’s idea that secrecy and the public constitute a dichotomy within Enlightenment thought and that the resulting public discourse was prepared within the secret, private spheres of 18th century enlightened culture.

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5. Cosmopolitanism in Swedish Nobility in the 18th Century: Educational Practices and Cultural Strategies in the Intersection of Patriotism and *le Grand Monde*

Jessica Parland-von Essen

After the death of the warrior King Charles XII and the collapse of Sweden as a Great Power after the Great Nordic War, the power of the weakened monarchs was seized by the nobility, and the country entered the so-called age of freedom. This period of Swedish history covers the years from 1719 to the coup of Gustavus III in 1772. The nobility had been deprived of its strength during the long and costly war at the beginning of the century, and it soon became largely dependent on foreign subsidies, especially from France. The importance of France, during the 18th century especially the elite in Paris and Versailles, was indisputable, both politically and culturally. The French language was not only the language of diplomacy, but also became a lingua franca of all elites and of those who wanted to claim citizenship in the *république de lettres*. The Swedish, and also, e.g., the Russian, nobility was swift to adapt these cultural signs of elitism. It was not only a question of language. The nobility also copied fashion and manners, and theatre and literary practices with impressive speed. Soon the nobility had (at least) two mother tongues, since children were taught French during their first years. The aristocracy even began to speak about France as their second country. Many Swedish young men went to France to serve as officers in the *Royal Suédois*, a Swedish regiment serving

the French king, and lived there for years. In the mid-18th century, serving 'Le Roy' in a letter actually referred to the French king. When serving Sweden, one was simply serving the fatherland.¹

This loyalty to the French king was an expression of a universal patriotism, and the culture of the nobility was not a manifestation of treachery to one's country, but something else. It was a statement of superiority, a strategy of a threatened elite to claim membership within a cosmopolitan fellowship of nobility. And nobility implied superior virtue, including patriotism. But even if these values were not, in this culture, opposites per se, but instead parallels, they could sometimes create conflicts in actual life. The noble cultural cosmopolitanism and way of life resulted in situations where choices had to be made between different loyalties. Part of the core of Swedish patriotism, besides loyalty to the other traditions of the fathers, was Protestant conviction. The monarch of Sweden was weak, and could easily be overridden by the noble families, and their own interests could therefore be associated with the interests of the fatherland. These elements of patriotism became distinctive and important during this century. The great influences of French culture, politics, and money on Swedish politics did not pass unnoticed in Stockholm, and there was heavy criticism, even within the nobility. Despite this, the strong French influence continued during the reign of Gustavus III until his death in 1792.

Similar trends in the culture of nobility can also be found in other European countries during this period of time. Even if the monarch was strong, as in Russia, the privileged position of the nobility created tensions within these societies. French culture was adapted all over Europe by the noble elite as a way of creating a distinction and of excluding a growing number of well-educated and wealthy people whom in France were called the third state. An important part of this culture was, of course, its regeneration. Educational practices are revealing, especially when studying highly exclusive and aesthetically defined cultures like the noble culture of the late 18th century.

¹ See Charlotta Wolff, *Vänskap och makt. Den svenska politiska eliten och upplysningstidens Frankrike* (Helsingfors, 2004). Wolff has studied the Swedes living in Paris and presents illustrative examples, esp. pp. 285–334.

Aesthetics was perceived to be almost equivalent to ethics. The important virtues were closely linked to outer signs of nobility. The sword, fine clothes and graceful polite behaviour were directly connected with and dependent on noble virtues in a strictly hierarchic society. The exclusive elite culture masked its norms and rules in politeness and gallantry. It considered outer signs of social conditions inseparable from inner virtue, and it was therefore possible to argue for political and economic privileges by adapting certain tastes and manners. Thus, sign and meaning were fixed, non-negotiable, and non-arbitrary. On the other hand, this firm relationship eventually resulted in an obsession with the outer signs, the look of things, which again turned things on their head. This development was augmented by trends in philosophy and educational methods during the 18th century. Writers like Condillac, inspired by John Locke, explained that the mind as well as the character were mostly created by impressions. The outer world modelled the soul and the personality, while experience formed the inside and thus signs created meaning. The famous Madame de Genlis strongly recommended using theatre as a method of character building.² Learning virtuous lines by heart and performing exemplary moral behaviour in plays inevitably, she thought, resulted in good morale. Etiquette was not only nice, it was also educational. Enhancing one's personal sensibility for the fine arts and adapting a graceful appearance came to be considered central purposes of education. In the end, this obsession with signs opened up for the concepts of play and performance in everyday life.³ The noble life within the Swedish court was consequently filled with theatre plays, games, and masquerades as in so many other European courts of the time.

The education of boys and girls was, of course, different during this period. The boys were trained for the military, and they also

² Madame de Genlis, *Théâtre à l'usage de jeunes personnes* Tome premier (Paris, 1785), pp. ix–x. See also Chantal Thomas, ““Ce-pays-là” Introduction to Madame de Genlis’, *De l’esprit des étiquettes de l’ancienne cour et des usages du monde de ce temps* (Mercure de France, 1996), p. 8.

³ Juri Lotman has made a very elusive analysis of this culture in his book *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture* (New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), see esp. pp. 54–62 and 258–259.

had to be taught, for instance, rhetoric and Latin to be able to be competent representatives of their families in politics. But they also had to be different from the sons of the priests and other learned men, condescendingly called pedants. So, the sons of the nobility had to transcend the civilization they – due to a lack of their own elite schools in Sweden – had to receive at the universities. They consequently received tuition in dancing, music, and of course, French. Finally, if it was possible to arrange, they had to leave for a Grand Tour or perhaps some period of service in the *Royal Suèdois* or some other foreign regiment. There they would be able to refine their manners, make valuable contacts and also, if possible, earn military degrees as a result of fighting in battles.

The girls evidently received a different kind of education from their brothers. Although the cultural aims of the upbringing of girls were similar to those of boys, the practice of raising girls was less influenced by classical humanistic tradition, at least concerning form. Still, it would be a mistake to think of their education as unimportant. On the contrary, they were, to an increasing degree, considered important carriers of the special character and superiority of the nobility. The interest of the Enlightenment in educational questions influenced the Swedish nobility in underlining the importance of women as mothers. Furthermore, one should not underestimate the personal interest of parents in their children and their happiness. Poor young men of the nobility were often tempted to marry rich and well-educated bourgeois girls. As it was important to get married for networking, independence, and status, it was an adequate reaction of the women, and of fathers as well as brothers, to claim that the noble women were superior in their qualities to their bourgeois rivals. This required commitment to their education.

In 1777, the Swedish count Fredrik Sparre wrote in his diary about the education of his daughters. He was troubled by the circumstances in which he was to raise them. Being a widower he had made the decision to take his daughters out of boarding school in Stockholm, and bring them to his house in the countryside. He concluded that ‘the most important duty of parents is to live with their

children and that this also was in the best interest of the children'.⁴ Under the care of Madame de Chantillon in the city, the girls had learnt French, history, arithmetic, music, declamation, and to read and dance. This education seems to have been an ordinary education for the daughters of the nobility during this period in the north-eastern parts of Europe.

Unity and exclusiveness of culture were of great importance to the continued influence of this elite. Classical virtues were an important cultural argument for a continued privileged position. The delicate and ambitious *honnête homme* was expected to constantly strive for a greater perfection as a Christian. On the other hand, the great importance attached to aesthetics – etiquette and taste – made an individual variation of the contents of an education possible. This is why education consisted mainly of aesthetic studies; girls studied music, dancing, fine arts, epistolary skills and also the art of polite conversation. There was also a demand for enlightenment,⁵ and it was often possible to aspire to personal political and social ambitions, which made competition in all skills necessary for the daughters as well.

Schools and their classical teachings were not meant for girls and their education often took place in their homes, with private teachers. Teaching girls was not regulated, nor were its aims formulated in official documents. It was an exclusive, secretive, private business of the nobility. Few things were written at all, especially not rules or norms. Literary sources for this kind of education can instead be found in, for instance, the works of Madame Le Prince de Beaumont, Madame d'Épinay, Madame de Genlis and Charles Rollin. A use of French language and literature was an im-

⁴ Fredric Sparre's diary 1777, Ericsbergssamlingen, the National Archives of Sweden, Stockholm (my translation).

⁵ Some of these ideas have been presented by Penny Russell, 'An Improper Education? Jane Griffin's Pursuit of Self-Improvement and "Truth", 1811–12', *History of Education*, May 2004, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 249–265. Important articles are also to be found in Roland Bonnel & Catherine Rubinger, *Femmes savantes et femmes d'esprit: Women Intellectuals of the French Eighteenth Century* (New York: P. Lang, 1994) and Collette Nativel (ed.), *Femmes savantes, savoirs des femmes. Du crépuscule de la Renaissance à l'aube des Lumières* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1999). See also Chantal Grell (ed.), *L'Éducation des filles dans la XVIIIème siècle* (Paris, 2004) on recent research in the field.

portant part of the process of exclusion to this elite. Other, perhaps even more important sources are the letters between parents and children and papers originating from studies. Diaries and memoirs also tell us about the practice of education in everyday life, and are available to a limited extent.

The core of noble elite culture consisted of texts. These served as statements of norms by using examples which were expressed as 'good taste'. The way of life was dictated by taste, and moral values were included in the aesthetic norms through the constant striving for modesty. Good manners were also correct in an ethical perspective. Morality could thus also be taught through etiquette.

Hedvig Charlotte Elisabet, Princess of Holstein, from Eutin, cousin of Gustavus III of Sweden and Catherine II of Russia, may here be an example of how classical humanistic culture was transcended and translated into French salon culture.⁶ The princess was born in 1760, and her social status was never threatened, as she married the brother of the king of Sweden. When she became Duchess of Södermanland she kept a diary, which today is published and considered one of the finest sources on the court of Gustavus III. Already as a girl she loved to write, but her orthography was not corrected, which indicates her high status and important noble rank as opposed to pedantry. She studied quite a bit of moral history, and the use of history is very interesting in her education.

The princess read many of moral tales from different historical settings, and may thus serve as an example of what could be called 'salonnization' of classical humanist tradition that was such a strong component in the education of the boys. A very good example of this cultural integration is David-Etienne Choffin's *Amusemens philologiques* (Halle 1774–1777). In this book, the most important parts of the noble cultural heritage are presented as short examples, which also serve as moral education, rehearsal in the French language and progymnasmata training. The same pattern is found in the popular books of Madame Le Prince de Beaumont. Moral education is central, but so is learning the cultural and politi-

⁶ Hedvig Elisabet Charlotta's notes, The National Archives of Sweden, Stockholm.

cal ABCs. For instance, the princess made a detailed table of the kings and queens of Europe and their counterparts in Roman mythology. It was crucial to be able to correctly interpret the frequent allusions to ancient history during this time. The classic teachings of the authors of old Rome and Hellas were embedded in French conversation.

Augusta Armfelt was the daughter of Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, who was a favourite of the Swedish King Gustavus III.⁷ In 1792, the king was assassinated, and his favourite was removed from all of his political positions. He was instead appointed minister in Naples, where he, in his anger, wrote letters about the Swedish regime which resulted in his being sentenced to death a few years later. Armfelt fled with his family to Russia, where he hid in the small town of Kaluga for some years. During these years he spent a lot of time with his children, especially with his eldest and at the time only daughter Augusta. In 1798, the family finally could leave and move to Berlin. There is a diary from this period which Augusta kept. She was 13 at the time. In this journal, or *brouillon* as it sometimes was referred to, she tells about her daily life. During this period Augusta Armfelt also learned German and Latin. Before that she had learnt Swedish, French, Italian, English, and Russian. She also translated a small book on Russian history, which she dedicated to her younger brother. The book was actually printed by the proud father for political purposes.

Augusta's days were mostly filled with music and writing. She practiced on the piano for several hours, and studied musical theory, singing, drawing, history, and mathematics usually seven days a week. Two days a week she went to a professor to learn experimental physics. An important part of the education was, of course, attending different social events along with her parents. It can perhaps be considered symptomatic that the father of a girl took this much interest in her education, since the context is so extraordinary. He even explained to his brother that it was necessary to give Augusta a good education, so that she could support herself as a

⁷ Augusta Armfelt's journal and Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt's correspondence, G. M. Armfelts arkiv, The National Archives of Finland, Helsinki.

governess if he lost everything. On the other hand, he often made it clear that Augusta's education was to be a lot better than that of other Swedish women.

In 1799, Augusta and her mother returned to Sweden, and her father continued her education by writing letters. In several letters he discussed the metaphysical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It seems that Augusta was a quite clever girl, and he was almost afraid of her being too smart, as he often pleaded with her not to become a philosopher. In fact, he also used his discussions on Kant to prove this point. His ideal woman was an independent and wise lady, and he very much wanted his daughter to astonish the world, but she was obviously more like her mother and wanted to keep a somewhat low profile. His great expectations for her came to nothing. Although she married well and was adored by her family, she never entered a political career. The possibility of women doing that had passed by the time she was grown, and she wanted a more quiet life.

Theresia von Stedingk has left a very interesting diary that she began to write when she was 12 years old in 1806.⁸ This diary is written on a daily basis, explicitly as an instrument of moral education. This kind of approach to writing a diary may be connected with the fact that it is written later than the material presented above. Still, it is evident that the cultural aims are similar to those of the previous cases. Theresia's father had quite a meteoric career, and was at the time the Swedish minister in St. Petersburg. He had quite recently married his previous housekeeper, who was already the mother of his five children. His success as a nobleman was based on his very good personal relations from his youth, and on his good diplomatic work. His children received an excellent education. Theresia had full access to it. She had a French governess, who taught her to write, read and sew. A very good male teacher lived with the family, and Theresia also took advantage of his history and geography lessons. In addition, she took countless drawing, painting, singing, piano, and dancing lessons, as expected. Nevertheless, she also

⁸ Sophie Theresia von Stedingks diary, Släkten af Ugglas arkiv, The National Library of Sweden, Stockholm.

studied considerable amounts of geography and history, besides mathematics, Russian, and Swedish literature. Her diary is written with the main goal of being honest and introspective – but not emotional – albeit a certain romantic tendency can be noted in her interest in flowers and animals.

The education of these girls, despite differences in place and time, share the same values and goals. The Lutheran context made home education the only possibility. As the nobility was subject to great external political and social pressure, as well as internal division, the idea of a coherent cosmopolitan culture was essential to elite identity. Therefore, all of these girls studied French and writing letters to some extent. Minor findings in the archives support this assumption. Although sources are not very rich, due to the exclusiveness and aesthetic norms of this culture, it can be stated that the education of girls was important, could contain the study of many subjects and, in some cases, as a subject of great concern.

The cultural fellowship and idea of a united cosmopolitan nobility in Europe were central elements in the strategies of regeneration and the educational practices of the nobility in Sweden. This elite culture, based on assumptions of superior virtue, was manifested in an exclusive culture regulated by taste and unpronounced rules. Cosmopolitanism and patriotism were parallel features, one supporting the other. By being a cosmopolitan, one was a true patriot.

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6. Cosmic Patriotism: Jane Addams and the Chicago Immigrant's Cosmopolitan Ethic and Experience

David Östlund

An absurd phrase from an age of cancelled cosmopolitanism

In recent years ‘cosmopolitanism’ has become a hotly discussed topic. Social scientists such as Ulrich Beck and philosophers such as Kwame Anthony Appiah are trying to define an up-to-date version of the concept, and to elaborate on its contemporary relevance.¹ A remarkable feature in such considerations is the effort to *strike a balance* between seemingly contradicting views and values – to find syntheses, and to avoid falling in the ditch on either side of the road. The background involved here is obviously a matter of experience. The logical and practical consequences of intellectual excesses in opposite directions have posed the challenge of *re-examining the questions* asked and answered: Is there a kind of ethical universalism possible? One which avoids the implicit ethnocentric absolutism that has been the besetting sin of the Western world, ever since the supposed yardsticks of Christianity or Enlightenment became entangled with colonialist and imperialist

¹ Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) – originally published in German in 2004 with the subtitle ‘...or: War is Peace’. I have used the Swedish edition, *Den kosmopolitiska blicken, eller: Krig är fred* (Göteborg: Daidalos, 2005). Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2006).

demands of submission? Is a cultural relativism possible? One which pays full respect to difference, to the substantial otherness of others – without falling into a particularistic essentialism by treating real human beings as the prisoners of monolithic and preferably isolated collective identities? The following pages aim to re-introduce a voice from the past into this debate – a voice that carried out a somewhat similar balancing act a century ago, and did so within a dual sociological and philosophical effort to deal with an ultra-modern cosmopolitan experience, as well as attempting to phrase cosmopolitan ethics for an emerging new world. True, there are good reasons to doubt the value of the history of ideas as a kind of storeroom of wisdoms, applied to contemporary problems without further thought of our own. But there is often something to learn from the *intellectual efforts* of the past, especially if our own aim is to re-examine the presuppositions of established debates, and to re-examine the way to pose our questions.²

We are going back to a point in time and space where a modern discussion of cosmopolitanism was usually presented with the reasons for anchoring its starting-point similar to the ancient Greeks: in the city, *polis* – in urban culture. At this specific juncture in history, the economic forces of the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century had in a very conspicuous way broken the relative cultural particularity of the *polis*, turning the emerging giant *Metropolis* into a veritable *Cosmopolis*.³ A city like Chicago was not just a hub of contacts transgressing borders: as if by a stroke of magic a small trade station had turned into the hometown of over a million people, most of them having left traditional rural and urban settings on the other side of the ocean in order to find a better future. Such experiences were food for thought a hundred years ago.

² Cf., David Östlund, 'Ett manifest för processtolkande idéhistoria: 100 teser om tänkandet och dess historieskrivning' [A Manifesto for Intellectual History as Process-Interpretation: 100 Theses on Human Thought and its Historiography], *Lychnos*, 1998, pp. 9–36.

³ I use the term 'the second industrial revolution' in the sense of Alfred D. Chandler, stressing the qualitatively new characteristics of the development which had its breakthrough in the US and Germany in the 1880s, see, e.g., Chandler, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA & London: Belknap, 1977), and idem, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA & London: Belknap Press, 1990).

In stark contrast to our time, however, the beginning of the last century was hardly a time when cosmopolitanism was a topic of the day. On the contrary, it was the high tide of essentialist particularisms and hierarchizations, e.g., in terms of ‘race’ and sex, and, of course, in terms of national identities and the nation state. Two ‘cosmopolitan moments’ are said to have occurred in modern intellectual history before the current rediscovery: the late 18th century and the years after World War II.⁴ The years in focus here were probably the most ‘non-cosmopolitan’ of all of the years in between. In 1907, for example, the historian Friedrich Meinecke declared the word ‘*weltbürgerlich*’ to be completely depreciated or ‘cancelled’ (*entwertet*).⁵ Although Meinecke partly attempted to rehabilitate the term, by stressing the positive links between a general notion of *Humanitas* and sound forms of patriotism, his *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* nonetheless delineated the developments in the case of German intellectual history from the age of Wieland and Kant to that of Bismarck and von Treitschke – the story which soon, in the wake of the major clash between industrially armed patriotisms in World War I, would end up in the quintessential negation of every imaginable variety of cosmopolitanism in the spirit of the Third Reich.

In the same year as Meinecke’s book was published, one of the most eloquent intellectuals of the era, Jane Addams, was almost at a loss for words.⁶ Shrewdly though, she immediately turned her

⁴ ‘Cosmopolitan moments’: Beck, *Den kosmopolitiska blicken*, p. 80. Concerning gender essentialism – feminist as well as sexist versions – see, e.g., Barbara Caine & Glenda Sluga, *Gendering European History 1780–1920* (London: Leicester Univ. Press, 2000) (wherein the topic is related to colonialism and racism in an instructive way), and concerning the decades around 1900 as the era of ‘Race is All’, e.g., Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996).

⁵ Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* [1907], (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1962), p. 23.

⁶ Modern historical research on Addams began in the 1960s, especially as Christopher Lasch made her the key figure in his still thought-provoking *The New Radicalism in America 1889–1963* (New York & London: Knopf, 1965), in parallel with editing a commented anthology of key texts by her, *The Social Thought of Jane Addams* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). In recent years the literature has grown into vast proportions. Concerning Addams’s personal development up to the turn of the 20th century, Louise W. Knight has meritoriously

own uncertainty concerning terminology into a rhetorical tool – challenging her readers to think for themselves. This happened as she was summing up the moral of a pretty strange book of hers. *Newer Ideals of Peace: The Moral Substitutes for War* was obviously intended as a discussion of international relations. It was a treatise on war and peace. But in fact the contents of the book mainly dealt with *social* problems – at a *local* level. And in connection with this it dealt with politics – at the *municipal* level. Basically the book grappled with the depth of the problems, the challenges and also the hopes of the ultra-modern, industrialized big city. Addams more or less explicitly discussed her hometown *Chicago* as a concrete example of the modern metropolis, and as such as a kind of test case regarding general trends of development. What was the connection then, between the dilemmas of local politics and social reform in the modern city on the one hand, and the issues of global relations, war, and peace on the other hand? What was the point of more or less ignoring the level of the nation and the state, jumping from *the local* to *the global* without mediation at a level that was the obsession of most social thinkers of the era – long before anyone had ever heard of ‘glocalization’?

Addams was trying to outline a ‘new internationalism’ which she had found to be developing from local experience in Chicago – the place which due to its completely overwhelming majority of new immigrants was *the* cosmopolitan city. This particular cosmopolitan humanitarianism, as she also called it, was something quite different than the *old* ideals of peace. Those ideals included the purely negative critique of war, based on sentimental pity for the victims (her personal hero Leo Tolstoy was hinted at as one of the examples of this), as well as prudent worries about the waste of

returned to the sources in *Citizen: Jane Addams and the Struggle for Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), although Knight’s general pattern of interpretation appears pretty problematic to me (especially with regard to the issue of intellectual continuity or discontinuity 1889–1895). Knight stresses the role of rhetoric in Addams’s thinking. Merits and problems of a quite different nature are to be found in Mary Jo Deegan’s studies concerning Addams’s role in social science: *Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School 1892–1918* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1988) and *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago: A New Conscience Against Ancient Evils* (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

resources through an arms race and combat.⁷ Although she claimed there was ‘something active and tangible in this new internationalism’ she admitted it was rather difficult to make clear. She continued:

... and in our striving for a new word with which to express this new and important sentiment, we are driven to the rather absurd phrase of “cosmic patriotism.” Whatever it may be called, it may yet be strong enough to move masses of men out of their narrow national considerations and cautions into new reaches of human effort and affection.⁸

Addams was toying with something very close to a plain contradiction in terms – ‘cosmic patriotism’. But as in all shrewd rhetoric, the apparent paradox was dependent on the perspective of the reader, and Addams strove, as she always did in her texts, to open up *new ways of seeing things* for her expected audience – the educated Anglo-Saxon upper- and middle class.

In her role as a figurehead for the left wing of the ‘progressive’ reform movement of her age, Addams had developed a strategy for ushering people with backgrounds similar to her own into seeing things from the point of view of others, who then often learned surprisingly bold lessons as a result. Basically, she placed *the privileged within society in school* in her texts – which were often elaborations of speeches and lectures given to middle-class audiences – using the underprivileged as their teachers, and herself as an interpreter of the different languages, thought-worlds, and experiences. As an exponent of philosophical pragmatism in American intellectual life who developed her position in mutual exchange with her close friend John Dewey, among others, she used to claim that the ideas, especially the moral concepts in a broad sense, of her own social and ethnic category tended to be *outdated*. They were no longer adapted to the changed world they were put to use in, and were often not only bad tools for thinking, but also noxious ones. New and adequate concepts were something that developed out of

⁷ Jane Addams, *Newer Ideals of Peace: The Moral Substitutes for War*, [1907] (Chester, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

new *experience*. And Addams, like Dewey, used the term experience in a very broad and active sense, often interchangeable with a concept of *culture*.⁹

Privileged people – the ones who in practice were those in power, even in a formally egalitarian and democratic society such as the United States – lacked the experience from which to develop the intellectual tools needed for dealing with the modern situation especially when it came to ethical ideals. Thus it was important to place the privileged in school, so to speak, making the underprivileged their teachers. This was especially important if the aim was to turn a merely *formal* democracy into a *real* democracy – or, as Addams used to phrase the idea, to make democracy *social*.¹⁰ A condition of reaching such a goal was to replace the monologue of the powerful and wealthy with a dialogue in which every experience had its voice. Addams's informal but subtle sociological analyses were hence strongly connected with her philosophical and political agendas. To fight prejudice, and to make the logic of the life and thinking of those who were identified with 'the social question' accessible and understandable, had a moral intent. It was treated as a lever of change. This attitude was not only mirrored in her own texts, but also in much of the work of the early Chicago school of

⁹ For the case of Dewey, see Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). The intellectual interplay between Addams and Dewey (whose daughter, by the way, was named after the friend of her parents) has also recently been thematized by Louis Menand in his widely read *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), Chapter XII. This was also stressed by Christopher Lasch in 1965, who even generalized the point and claimed that '[t]he settlement movement and the movement for progressive education ran parallel at every point' (*New Radicalism*, p. 158). Dewey was heavily involved in the activities of Hull-House (already before moving to Chicago in 1894), and after 1904 he was associated with the Henry Street Settlement in New York.

¹⁰ Locus classicus for this theme in Addams's writings is the lecture 'The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlement' from 1892, which she later integrated in *Twenty Years at Hull House* (Chapter 6). It was republished together with its tandem lecture from the same occasion in 1892 ('The Objective Value of a Social Settlement') by Christopher Lasch in *The Social Thought of Jane Addams*, and its status as a classic text has, e.g., been confirmed by David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, who used it in the second volume of *The American Intellectual Tradition: A Sourcebook*, Second Edition (New York & Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993).

sociology, e.g., George Herbert Mead and William I. Thomas, whose mentor she was in certain respects (very much in tandem with Dewey).¹¹

Newer Ideals of Peace was basically a sequel to an earlier book, *Democracy and Social Ethics* from 1902.¹² Addams thus continued to apply a certain style of sociological analysis and reflection in order to, softly but expediently, shake up her readers within their solid and narrow outlook. This time Addams followed the argument from the earlier book to what seemed to her to be its logical conclusion: its application to transnational and global issues. Between the lines she was now addressing an opinion that not only saw Anglo-Saxon middle-class culture (and perhaps the Anglo-Saxon branch of the Aryan tree of races) as the spearhead of civilization, but which also saw war and colonial expansion as a vitalizing force in the internal development of the nation.¹³ Addams had been a pacifist in the spirit of Tolstoy since the middle of the 1880s, but it was in connection with the Spanish-American War in 1898 – the debut of the United States in the role of a colonial power in the conventional sense – that she started her public career as an

¹¹ See especially Deegan, *Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School 1892–1918*, and *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago*, and Kathryn Kish Sklar, ‘Hull-House Maps and Papers: Social Science as Women’s Work in the 1890s’, in M. Bulmer, K. Bales & K. K. Sklar (eds.), *The Social Survey in Historical Perspective 1880–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991). Sklar’s article is particularly relevant in the context of our theme, as the trailblazing survey study Hull-House Maps and Papers focused on the ethnic and social physiognomy of one of the neighbouring districts; see especially the literally multicoloured maps from the original study reproduced with Sklar’s text. The close links between Hull-House and the University of Chicago are mentioned within a wider context in Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 226–227. Cf., Ulrich Beck’s invocation of the Chicago school and its way to study urban culture as a means to ‘cosmopolitan renewal’ in connection with the theme of glocalization. Beck, *Den kosmopolitiska blicken*, p. 144.

¹² Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, [1902] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. P., 1964).

¹³ This aspect of the argument, compared with the parallel discussion by William James in 1904 when the theme of the subtitle ‘The Moral Substitutes for War’ was introduced, is stressed by Linda Schott, ‘Jane Addams and William James on Alternatives to War’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54:2 (1993), pp. 241–254.

anti-militarist and anti-imperialist.¹⁴ Her activities as the unrivalled leader of the women's international peace movement during and after World War I would later on render her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.¹⁵ In *Newer Ideals of Peace*, seven years before the major European war, she introduced the intellectual code that would remain visible underneath her commitment until her death in 1935. She did so while trying to let the residents of the slums of the modern kosmopolis teach her hubris-stricken fellow members of the privileged strata of American society a lesson in this new moral attitude which she – with a smile on her lips – toyed with calling 'cosmic patriotism'.

The Hull-House experience: transgressing the front of social war

Before I briefly outline what this lesson was, and in what sense it was supposed to teach a kind of 'patriotism', I will include just a few words on the specific position from which Addams spoke – a position which is essential to comprehend in order to understand what she spoke about. At least this was her own view of the matter. In the preface to her most read book, the autobiographical *Twenty Years at Hull House* from 1910, she begged her readers' pardon because the 'conclusions of the whole matter' could be found to be

¹⁴ Knight, *Citizen*, pp. 394–395. The importance of the Spanish-American War as a background is also mirrored in Schott, 'Jane Addams and William James on Alternatives to War'.

¹⁵ Concerning Addams's highly controversial position during and after World War I, see especially her own writings: *Jane Addams, Emily G. Balch, & Alice Hamilton, Women at the Hague*, [1915] (Amherst, NY, 2003), and *Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War*, [1922] (Urbana & Chicago, 2002). For the context see, e.g., Leila J. Rupp, 'Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women's Organizations, 1888–1945', *The American Historical Review*, 99:5 (1994). Addams was awarded the Nobel Prize together with one of her antipodes in the American political landscape, Nicholas Murray Butler. I have discussed this (among other things) in an unpublished paper for a seminar at the Nobel Museum, Stockholm, February 2006: 'Fred på rättfärdighetens grund: ömsesidighetsideal från Addams till King' [Peace Based on Righteousness: Ideals of Mutuality from Addams to King].

very similar to those of her earlier two books, but she claimed that in those texts she had attempted to ‘set forth a thesis supported by experience’, while she in the third volume endeavoured to ‘trace the experiences through which various conclusions were forced upon me’.¹⁶

Being the daughter of a rural small industrialist, Addams had embarked upon her way to fame at the age of 29, with the founding of an institution. In 1889, Hull-House opened in a Chicago slum district as one of the first ‘social settlements’ in the United States. Hull-House immediately became the flagship of the American settlement movement, which soon came to outgrow its slightly older British counterpart. The basic idea of a social settlement was that a group of wealthy and educated people settled in a house or an apartment in a working-class district of a city in order to share everyday life with the people whose distress constituted the substance of ‘the social question’. The settlers certainly came out there to help their new neighbours – and the endeavour was in that sense philanthropic. But more fundamental was *the knowledge dimension of the project*. The ambition was to let knowledge flow in two directions over the immense social and cultural chasm of the age: the gap between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The aspect of the effort that was connected to popular education on the one hand aimed at democratically distributing the cultural capital that was seen to be the privilege of the rich. The aspect of analyzing the social problems and understanding them ‘from the inside’, on the other hand, aimed at refining the reform zeal – and it was in this context that the settlement movement came to be an important link between the academic social sciences and practical endeavours. Especially in the US many settlements were seen as ‘social laboratories’ with more or less formal links to university departments. In order to achieve this dual transmission of knowledge it was important for the settlement to be *an open meeting-place* for people of every different walk and view of life. It was not intended to be a missionary station for Christian faith (even if many settlers were believers) or for middle-class culture (although it was essential to

¹⁶ Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull-House, with Autobiographical Notes*, [1910] (Signet Classics, 1961), p. xxii.

the task that the settlers avoided all pretence of being anything other than they were).

This vision was far from being always consistently applied. In practice, many settlements actually tended to be hubs for spreading middle-class habits and values among the working class. Even Hull-House occasionally showed tendencies towards this direction, and there were ambiguities in the attitudes and statements of Jane Addams as well. But it is safe to say that Hull-House and its leader were among the most consistent exponents of the settlement vision, and thus of a certain way of thinking about the social question, that is, a certain way of perceiving and approaching the overriding tangle of the problems of the day. They embodied a style of thought which I have proposed calling ‘the ideal of mutuality’.¹⁷ This particular *thought-style* should basically be seen as a contrast to, and a reaction against, the many contemporary forms of patronizing benevolence, which tended to move top-down from conscientious industrialists and modern philanthropists.¹⁸

The contrast was notable in the case of Jane Addams, who seldom missed an opportunity to challenge the priggish paternalism of her own class – in most cases softly, but nevertheless with an edge.¹⁹ This was particularly obvious in her apologetic analyses of the goals, means, and experiences of the labour movement. She never posed as a spokesperson for it, but acted as an interpreter – *translating* foreign experience and values into the frames of reference of people of her own kind. A useful resource in doing this was

¹⁷ David Östlund, *Det sociala kriget och kapitalets ansvar: Social ingenjörskonst mellan affärsintresse och samhällsreform i USA och Sverige 1899–1914* [Social War and the Responsibility of Capital: Social Engineering Between Business Interests and Progressive Reform in the USA and Sweden, 1899–1914] (Stockholm Univ., 2003).

¹⁸ I use the term ‘thought-style’ (*Denkstil*) in the sense of Ludwik Fleck; see David Östlund, ‘Our Preeminently Social Activity: Ludwik Fleck and Thought in History’. In *Det sociala kriget* I treated ‘the ideal’ or ‘idealism of mutuality’ with a particular stress on contrasts and similarities with an alternative, but closely related thought-style, viz. that of ‘reform-philanthropy’, which had its centre in the Charity Organization movement.

¹⁹ See, e.g., the ironic reference to ‘organized charity’s’ terminology of ‘worthy’/‘unworthy’ already in (the earlier mentioned) preface to Addams, *Twenty Years*, p. xxi.

the fact that she was not uncritical. But her criticism did not for a moment consist of concessions to the regular fears of organized labour of her era. On the contrary, she criticized the trade unions for deceiving their democratizing mission by creating new privileged groups out of the skilled, male Anglo-Saxon workers at the cost of female workers, new immigrants, and African-Americans. In this sense, her strictures were quite close to the ones of many Marxist socialists, although she distanced herself from what in the eyes of the philosophical pragmatist seemed to be a cage of abstract dogmatism on their account, and from what she felt was a mirror image of a repressive militarist society in their attitudes to violence as a means to force change.²⁰

One of the most fascinating aspects of Addams's radicalism was her way of linking her *feminism* to her support for the labour movement and its new ethic of internationalism and self-sacrifice for justified collective goals (the latter was, of course, one of her points of reference when she spoke of cosmic patriotism in 1907). She explicitly connected her own experience of actually being part of one underprivileged group in society – *women* – to her efforts of interpreting the workers' struggle for justice. In a striking way she paralleled the fatherly paternalism of the 'family claim', which chained upper- and middle-class girls to the private sphere, with the paternalism of benevolent employers and philanthropists, who doled out gifts of 'charity' or 'welfare' in order to receive gratitude and discipline in return.²¹ It has been claimed that the philosophical

²⁰ A fine example of Addams's stance with regard to the labour movement, besides the ones in *Democracy and Social Ethics* and *Newer Ideals of Peace*, is to be found in Addams, 'Trade Unions and Public Duty', *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 4:4 (1899). This text also exemplifies the use of war-metaphors in social issues, directly connected with the Spanish-American War.

²¹ The key text in this respect, and thus in Addams's writings generally, is the essay 'A Modern Lear', which was written in the wake of the Pullman conflict of 1894 (a drama in which she played an active role), but never published until 1912, when it appeared in *The Survey*, 2 November – although the main contents had been delivered orally in many contexts before that. It was also reprinted in Lasch (ed.), *The Social Thought of Jane Addams*. For an analysis of the text with focus on the issue of industrial paternalism, see Östlund, *Det sociala kriget*, pp. 73–83. For an analysis of Addams's experience of, and role in, the dramatic events in Chicago 1894–95, see Knight, *Citizen*, Chapter 13–14. Knight also elucidates the relation between the argument in 'Lear' and the development of

pragmatism of Jane Addams – with its stress on the need to replace the monologue of the privileged with a dialogue between different experiences – thus became a precursor of the feminist *standpoint theory* of the late 20th century.²²

A telling characteristic of the style of thought embodied in the most consistent manifestations of the settlement movement, aside from the anti-paternalist stance, was its overlaps with the zeal for peace of the era. Strikingly many of the settlement activists and sympathizers were pugnacious critics of militarism and armaments, and were prominent advocates of solving international conflicts through the means of negotiations and international law.²³ In this sense they were often somewhat the heirs of the cosmopolitanism of Kant's *Perpetual Peace*. Underlying this was a quite simple parallel. The state of affairs in the industrialized world was seen as a state of war between labour and capital: a war between the two paramount forces of the current historical development, each mobilizing resources of power in order to confront the other in the big clash of interests of the modern world. Occasionally the latent war manifested itself in labour conflicts – strikes and lockouts – which frequently threatened to degenerate into literal violence. Many ad-

Addams's feminist analysis in terms of 'the family claim' vs. 'the social claim'. At the same time as she wrote 'Lear' she was, e.g., prepared to discuss this in explicit terms of power, using terms connected with her anti-militarism: women were not entering politics and public life, she claimed, because '...they have been chained down by a military code whose penalty for violation is far worse than the court martial'. Knight, *Citizen*, p. 350. Knight has not observed though that the themes from 'Lear' also reappeared in *Democracy and Social Ethics*, although the analogy with the classic tragedy in this context had become reserved for the issue of young women and 'the family claim', while the Pullman conflict was discussed separately and without singling out names, i.e., without the provocative image of George Pullman in the role of Shakespeare's mad old father/king. Addams's 'A Modern Lear' has also recently been discussed in relation to Dewey's Chicago experience in Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, pp. 289–316. (Cf., Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, pp. 86–104, and Lasch, *New Radicalism*, p. 158, as well.)

²² See, for example, Mary B. Mahowald, 'What Classical American Philosophers Missed: Jane Addams, Critical Pragmatism, and Cultural Feminism', *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 31 (1997), pp. 39–54.

²³ Addams is the most obvious case, but Herbert Stead (William Stead's brother) in Britain and Nathanael Beskow in Sweden offer a pair of instructive and probably quite disparate European examples.

herents of the ‘ideal of mutuality’ made an explicit point of the analogy between their stance towards this war and other kinds of war. In each case the goal was to substitute the logic of the *right of might* with *dialogue aiming at justice*. True and lasting peace could not be the result of one party conquering its adversary and unilaterally determining the conditions; it had to be the outcome of a *process* in which all parties concerned were heard, and all claims were seriously taken into account. With regard to the ‘social war’ of industrial capitalism, this attitude included a broad range of more or less radical visions of social justice and real democracy, envisioning a future societal condition in which no one longer had a justified interest in changing the basic rules of the game, especially as the fruits of modern industrialism and its amazing potential capacity of satisfying human needs actually would serve all.

This was, of course, also a major theme in Jane Addams’s *Newer Ideals of Peace*. The book ended with a solemn appeal to found ‘the cause of peace upon the cause of righteousness’, and a vision of a future in which, ‘under an enlightened industrialism, peace would no longer be an absence of war, but the unfolding of world wide processes making for the nurture of human life’.²⁴ She also applied the theme in more specific contexts, for example, when criticizing the contemporary United States for responding with militarist repression – with police and troops – when organized labour challenged the petrified 18th century principles of individualism and private property with their new ideals of collective solidarity and demands for equality with regard to power and resources. She also quite provocatively mocked the US, the supposed model of democracy, for actually lagging behind the German Empire – the quintessential militaristically authoritarian state – in terms of making headway towards essential elements of *real* egalitarian democracy by means of social policies and legislation.²⁵ A key problem was the American ruling elite’s comparative lack of perception and intellectual flexibility in a changed world: it kept on meeting the challenges of the 20th century with the conceptual tools of the age of the Founding Fathers. Notions such as the abso-

²⁴ Addams, *Newer Ideals*, p. 145.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–55.

lute sanctity of private property were implemented against the legitimate interests of labour through court decisions and legal violence.

Solidarity among strangers: the immigrants' exposure and ethics

In making her most distinctive argument for a new, positive, active, and creative ideal of peace, however, Addams actually left the analogy between international conflicts and the state of war between labour and capital out of the picture. In the pivotal parts of *Newer Ideals of Peace* she returned to a theme she had dealt with in *Democracy and Social Ethics* as well. This was the problem of *power* in connection with city reform in a modern cosmopolis like Chicago, where the overwhelming majority of the population were 'new' immigrants – mainly of the kind which English-speaking 'old' Americans regarded as 'the scum of Europe'.²⁶ In the eyes of the establishment these 'hyphens' (Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Jewish-Americans, etc.) were the main objects of *Americanization*, if not of eugenic measures and restricted immigration laws. They were targets of the seemingly hopeless task of turning them into reliable American patriots with modern habits and values – that is to say, Anglo-Saxon habits and values. In her earlier book, Addams had shocked her audience by celebrating the relative virtues of the corrupt city district boss in comparison to the morally unassailable reformer from the opposite corner of the city.²⁷ The difference was that the ordinary ward boss – as a model she actually used an Irishman she had personally been fighting against for years – was familiar with the complex conditions and problems of the area as the local people saw them. He knew this

²⁶ Addams opened Chapter 3 in *Newer Ideals*, 'Failure to Utilize Immigrants in City Government', the key chapter from our point of view, with mentioning the phrase 'the scum of Europe' as an example of 'loose talking in regard to American immigration'. Characteristically she used the inclusive 'we' form in order to open communication with her target audience ('we do much loose talking...', 'we use the phrase...').

²⁷ Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, Chapter VII ('Political Reform').

well enough to use it in his own interest and also managed to serve a certain minimum of his voters' interests, thus gaining their confidence. The progressive reformer, on the other hand, which they refrained from voting for, never had the slightest clue, and his calls for change were thus viewed as irrelevant and patronizing, without regard to how obvious they may have seemed from his own point of view, i.e., from the perspective of his own corner of the city.

The moral of this story – an instructive example of Addams's peculiar style of sociological analysis – was that leaving room for *self-government* among the people of the district was essential in order to really make life better for those who lived there. A wise reformer had to listen and understand in order to *assist* people in making changes under conditions decided by those who knew best, viz. those concerned. True democracy was not the same as forcing the new immigrants to live and think like the established citizens of the democratic republic. Real democracy showed respect for people's different experiences, accepting and appreciating the various and continually changing *cultures* people lived with. Genuine democracy offered them a chance to form their own destinies.

In *Newer Ideals of Peace* this conspicuously local theme was expanded, and was given significance in regards to transnational relations. In doing this, Addams fell back on her highly personal readings of a pair of European thinkers from the preceding century. Far from being a Comtean positivist, she had nevertheless in her youth been fascinated by Auguste Comte's vision of a future religion of humanity, fostering universal 'altruism'. In 1907, she implicitly hinted at a more specific aspect of this line of thought: the reconstruction of historical developments according to which a vanishing military-aristocratic society once had been kept together by its peculiar code of ethics – including the military ethic of self-sacrifice for the sake of the group, destroying its enemies. In the eyes of the philosophical pragmatist, such values had been functional (in the Darwinian sense) in an earlier stage of social evolution. The society in which such sentiments thus had made sense in modern times had left room for an industrial society. Now this new social formation (in line with the main plot in Comte's scheme) needed its own functional code of ethics: a similarly active, poten-

tially self-sacrificing, but also constructive social ethic aimed at serving human needs – in Addams’s terminology for ‘the nurture of human life’, rather than killing human life in order to secure the survival of a particular group (a family, a tribe, a nation).

She combined this idea with a more explicit reference to the radical national ideals of Giuseppe Mazzini. Mazzini was a quite significant figure in Addams’s world. In *Twenty Years at Hull-House* she recurred to ‘that greatest of all democrats’ in two contexts. On the one hand, in connection with her settlement’s interaction with the many Italian-Americans living in the neighbourhood, e.g., the Chicago branch of the Society of Young Italy, which presented Hull-House with a ‘heroic bust’ of him [Giuseppe Mazzini] during the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of his birth in 1905.²⁸ On the other hand, Mazzini’s name came up in connection with her own personal development, specifically, her reading as a young woman and her experience as a child. Mazzini was closely associated with the two foremost American embodiments of the ideals of democracy and republican virtue in her personal imagination, Abraham Lincoln and her own father. Her father’s tears at the news of Mazzini’s death in 1872 had made her ashamed, she claimed, for her own ‘meager notion of patriotism’, as for the first time she realized that it was possible to share hopes and desires over national borders – even across an ocean – and that there were parallels between efforts like ‘trying to abolish slavery in America’ and ‘[throwing] off Hapsburg oppression in Italy’. As a result of her father’s grief over the Italian revolutionary, ‘impersonal and international relations’ were shown to be ‘actual facts and not mere phrases’.²⁹

But Mazzini had made a more indirect but crucial impact on a very peculiar trait in her thought as well, although never mentioned in *Twenty Years* in connection with her reading of his *Duties of*

²⁸ Addams, *Twenty Years*, p. 279 (‘greatest of all democrats’) and pp. 169–170 (hundredth anniversary). The bust seems to have been a token of gratitude to Addams for teaching a group of Italian men a course on Mazzini’s *Duties of Man* (apparently in part given as a course in English, free from ‘Americanization’ in the conventional sense). Knight, *Citizen*, pp. 205–206.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14; for Addams’s early reading see *ibid.*, p. 50.

Man in the 1880s.³⁰ This link is of interest in order to understand the argument in *Newer Ideals of Peace*. Mazzini had namely contrasted the individual citizen's private, egoistic duties to himself and his family with his *social duties* to the nation, hence forming a better future for a unity beyond the limits of self-interest, and stressing the relative importance of the latter in relation to the former. This theme had actually been an important springboard in Addams's articulation of a non-essentialist variety of feminism. She had begun to state that 'the social claim' in a very broad sense (she discarded the term 'duty' in this context) was just as urging for *female citizens* as it was for male ones, and that young women who gave priority to this claim at the cost of 'the family claim' hardly could be accused of being egoistic – although this was the established middle-class view of the question. It was a democratic right as well as a duty, for men and women alike, to participate in the creation of a good life for a larger group than oneself and one's own kith and kin. The question for the philosophical pragmatist may then have been how the destructive dimension of such a patriotic call from the 19th century – the outdated form of self-sacrificing virtues of fighting other nations for the sake of one's own – could be dropped on the rubbish heap of history. But Mazzini was a fitting thinker to take as a starting point in this respect. Quite consistently he had treated the national project as *a step* towards a socially and politically democratic world, analogous with the step from the duties to one's own family to national responsibility, and hence a world wherein the freedom of the people of each nation was dependent on the freedom of other peoples.³¹ In *Twenty Years* Addams thus spoke of 'this man who, with all his devotion to his country was still more devoted to humanity and who dedicated to the workingmen of Italy an appeal so philosophical, so filled

³⁰ Knight, *Citizen*, pp. 142–143, 256.

³¹ For an analysis of those aspects of Mazzini's (in a certain sense 'anti-nationalist') thinking that were particularly relevant to Addams's notion of 'cosmopolitan humanitarianism', see Nadia Urbinati, "'A Common Law of Nations': Giuseppe Mazzini's Democratic Nationality", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 1:2 (1996), pp. 197–222. (I am grateful to Ann-Cathrine Jungar for drawing my attention to this article.)

with a yearning for righteousness, that it transcended all national boundaries and became a bugle call for “The Duties of Men”.³²

In short, *patriotism* in the spirit of Mazzini had more to do with an active, forceful (indeed revolutionary) and practical readiness to sacrifice narrow personal interests for the sake of the interest of strangers – ultimately for all of mankind – than with a collective egoism directed against ‘others’ of one or the other definition. Later on, Addams would be given reason to reflect on two distinct faces of the phenomenon of national fervour. In the immediate wake of World War I she would travel around in Europe (among other things presiding over the founding congress of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, which probably issued the first analysis claiming the Treaty of Versailles to be a disaster). Comparing her experience of the 1880s with that of 1919, she noted that the radical, positive, and constructive variety of patriotism that she had often met east of the Atlantic in her youth now had been completely substituted by the embittered, hateful, and collectively egoistic patriotism that bore the obvious contours of rising Fascism and Nazism already in her text from 1922.³³ But in 1907 it was still possible for her to toy with naming the new internationalism or humanitarian cosmopolitanism which she vindicated *cosmic patriotism*. This was the kind of global social ethic required to take the good out of industrialism while leaving the bad behind. This was the ideal of peace that in her mind was positive, active, constructive, and even *aggressive*.

But, returning to the distinctive argument of 1907: In what sense were the immigrants of Chicago suited to teach this attitude, when Addams now attempted to place the privileged of her era in school? In what way did the neighbours of Hull-House, in her eyes, appear to make it possible to discuss international relations in terms of local conditions, without paying much regard to the level of the state and the nation? The precious resource of the people of the districts around Hull-House was their *experience*. According to the philosophical pragmatist, new and adequate concepts, suitable tools to think with, were something that developed out of new *experi-*

³² Addams, *Twenty Years*, p. 169.

³³ Addams, *Peace and Bread*, pp. 98–99.

ence, and the Chicago immigrants had this asset in abundance. In most cases they had been leaving a rural life in their old home countries behind, with fears and hopes – hopes which, to a large extent, were crushed – and been forced to live their everyday lives close together, in spite of the huge contrasts in terms of world-views, habits and values. This had hardly made these people more peaceful than anyone else. If they shouted for anything it was *war rather than peace*, she claimed, as their hatred of an unjust society grew in strength.³⁴ But they had learned to live with each other, to accept the differences and respect them, although they didn't understand them. And out of this shared experience a new social ethic, a new humanitarianism, which was also founded in the experience of what was universally human – basic needs for food, shelter, safety and company – was growing. In spite of cultural and social gaps, the people of the modern multi-ethnic city slum were prepared to show a remarkable degree of altruism, or, as Addams preferred to say, *plain human kindness*. Confronted with a shared exposure to adversity and injustice (shared 'risks', Ulrich Beck would possibly say), the immigrants of the modern cosmopolis had up to a notable degree developed a positive way of dealing with their exposure to strangers, i.e., to each other.

This kind of readiness to take responsibility for the needs of others than one's own had nothing to do with the philanthropic benevolence of the upper and middle class, because – and this was probably the main point of Addams's rhetorical deed – it was far beyond their range of experience. Which employer dedicated to 'welfare programs' or which lady of a charity organization would ever be prepared to let a perfect stranger with peculiar habits and views sleep over on the couch for a few weeks in times of need? Would they be prepared to do this, even if they were unable to even imagine what it would be like to have only one crowded room without water or a latrine for their families? The example of practical unselfishness, with no thought of reward, among people from the old, increasingly antagonistic nations of Europe, who had their patriotic feelings in the conventional sense divided between their old and new countries, was the true source of hope in the eyes of

³⁴ See especially the key passage in Addams, *Newer Ideals*, pp. 9–10.

Jane Addams in 1907. Her rhetorical challenge to prevalent attitudes certainly contributed to the development of new ways of seeing the issues of conflict and coexistence between states and nations. The prominent role she was given among the counterforces during the spree of militant patriotism in World War I testifies to that. But in 1907 it was quite strange to make such an argument without using the state and the nation as the starting point, instead boldly jumping from the local to the global. Even Addams's friend George Herbert Mead had to admit, in his long and enthusiastic review for *The American Journal of Sociology*, that he had a problem with the 'logical organization' in *Newer Ideals of Peace*, although he fully appreciated the analyses and the moral *per se*.³⁵ Perhaps her jump is less strange a century later?

*

The same year as *Newer Ideals of Peace* was published, the African-American sociologist, pan-Africanist, and civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois paid one of his many visits to Hull-House. His links with the network of reformers and social analysts around Jane Addams were manifold and important. Soon afterwards, for example, a group dominated by settlement activists, among them Addams, took up the thread from Du Bois's Niagara Movement and created the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in order to fight the most obvious of all deviations from *real* egalitarian democracy in the United States of the time, the Jim Crow system of apartheid. (This was a deviation that very few people were interested in challenging at that time.) This project would soon present Du Bois with a regular public platform, as for the next few decades he would be the editor of its periodical *The Crisis*.³⁶

³⁵ George Herbert Mead, 'The Newer Ideals of Peace. By Jane Addams', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 13:1 (1907), pp. 121–128. Mead is mainly remembered as a pretty abstract social thinker, but, in fact, he had other qualities as well, see, e.g., Dmitri N. Shalin, 'G. H. Mead, Socialism, and the Progressive Agenda', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 93:4 (1988), pp. 913–951.

³⁶ Besides Deegan, *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago*, Chapters 3 and 4, see Gilbert Osofsky, 'Progressivism and the Negro: New York, 1900–1915', *American Quarterly*, 16:2 (1964), pp. 154–168; Wilson Record, 'Negro

Juxtaposing the spirit of Hull-House in 1907 with the ‘colder, scunter curiousness’ which he sensed at the University of Chicago, he chose to characterize its atmosphere in terms of ‘cosmopolitan catholicity’.³⁷

Obviously this had nothing to do with ethnic diversity among the residents. Few of those who lived at Hull-House were anything else than the children of the Anglo-Saxon social elite. Harriet Rice, the African-American physician who lived there for some years in the 1890s, had been one of the few who left because they did not feel totally at home (although she returned periodically in the following decades).³⁸ Rather, Du Bois was probably referring to the atmosphere created by *the neighbours* of every background who filled the house at all hours, and of the unusual openness the residents apparently showed for listening to these people and learning from their experience. Perhaps the vision of an emerging cosmic patriotism was a bit naïve, although it was far from as naïve as it may seem at first glance. (New readers of *Democracy and Social Ethics* as well as *Newer Ideals of Peace* obviously have to judge for themselves.) But I suppose that our era, that of armed democracy fighting Muslims from Iraq and the French suburbs (and doing so in a strikingly naïve way), has something to learn from this peculiar atmosphere of ‘cosmopolitan catholicity’, with its attempt to strike a delicate

Intellectual Leadership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: 1910–1940’, *Phylon*, 17:4 (1956) pp. 375–389; August Meier & John H. Bracey, ‘The NAACP as a Reform Movement 1909–1965: “To Reach the Conscience of America”’, *The Journal of Southern History*, 59:1 (1993), pp. 3–30. The most important person out of Addam’s immediate network in the early NAACP was the Marxist, labour legislation zealot and consumer organizer Florence Kelley (who had spent most of the 1890s as a resident at Hull-House). See Louis L. Athey, ‘Florence Kelley and the Quest for Negro Equality’, *The Journal of Negro History*, 56:4 (1971), pp. 249–261. When Kelley died in 1932 Du Bois claimed in *The Crisis* that ‘...save for Jane Addams, there is not another social worker in the United States who has had either her insight or her daring, so far as the American Negro is concerned’. *Ibid.*, p. 249 (also quoted twice in Deegan, *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago*). It may be of interest to note that a young W. E. B. Du Bois is given a role (although a surprisingly insignificant one) in Ulrich Beck’s recent appeal for a ‘cosmopolitan vision’. Beck, *Den kosmopolitiska blicken*, p. 251.

³⁷ Deegan, *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago*, p. 3.

³⁸ Knight, *Citizen*, pp. 289, 346, 351, 387–388; *Ibid.*, p. 38.

balance between an ethics of universal responsibility and a pronounced respect for the genuine otherness of others as well as an interest in understanding and being enriched by it, but especially by its eagerness to replace the monologues of the privileged with dialogues including all.

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7. Rediscovering *Kosmopolis* in the Cyber-Information Age? Social Agencies and Activism in their Geo-Historical Place

On-Kwok Lai

This paper examines the ideas and cultural (re-)presentations of the politics of global cosmopolitanism and world citizenship in the cyber-age, with special focus on social agencies and the strategies and structures of transnational activism and progressive advocacy networks. It is argued that the Internet and mobile telephony have been an important part of the anti-globalization demonstrations against global capitalism in major cities around the world. The new identity and actions for global citizenship are represented through electronically distributed messages, while new cultural representations argue that the present mode(s) of the WTO/G8/World Bank-sponsored global projects are not just or fair. The reason for this is that they are not available to many people in the developing world, or to underprivileged groups and individuals in the developed world. This might endanger healthy cultural reproduction.

Articulating the transnational advocacies in general and the anti-globalization in particular, this paper addresses (i) the synergy of hyper-modernization with the informational society, (ii) the significance of social agencies for the transnational advocacies network (TAN), (iii) the (re-)presentation of a new identity politics and the global citizenship, and (iv) the particular historical role of the socio-cultural dynamics of cyber-activism in shaping the *kosmopolis*, that is, in constituting the global civil society as well as the new identity building for social activists and world citizenship.

Positioning *kosmopolis* in a hyper-modernization trajectory

Thanks to the advanced applications of information and communication technologies (ICT), within the developed economies productivity growth has accelerated almost everywhere since 1995.¹ The socio-economic transformations are crucial: free and timely flows of capital and goods across borders have become the global economy; technologies are the functional necessity for socio-economic development. A new epoch of modernization – hyper-modernization – is on its historical course.

Hyper-modernization in the information age

To characterize the speed and momentum of the technological changes, as well as the socio-economic changes that follow, and to juxtapose the high-tech regime of development, the concept of so-called hyper-modernization is used here. All of the above facilitate cultural formation and the change of everyday social practice in various ways.² The use of hyper-modernity is merely a descriptive and an indicative, as the controversies about what exactly the present (post-)modernity is are still an unfinished project.³

Hyper-modernization is not just characterized by global competition towards the increasing use of ICT, but also by socio-cultural transformations. Facing the rapid globalization processes, societies have been undergoing immense transformations. This is particularly true for East Asia's newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the high-growth economy of China. Through exposure to the globalizing 'external' forces, capital, goods, labour (and jobs) are more mobile than before. All of these reinforcing hyper-modernization developments in Asia are exemplified by the Asian Miracle, the rapid recovery of Asian NIEs after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as

¹ *The Economist*, 25 October 2003, p.74.


² Murdock 2004.

³ Bauman 2000; Beck 1999; Beck et al. 2003; Dirlick 2003; Harvey 2003; Murdock 2004; Therborn 2003.

well as the two decades of continuous rapid economic development in China – with an average annual GDP of above 7.9%.⁴

Presented with an increasing bandwidth utilization, faster downloads and improved processing power in handsets, and juxtaposing the increasingly miniaturization of mobile digital phones and gadgets, 3G allows both producers and consumers to use extensive and intensive mobile exchanges and the data in/beyond cyberspace as they could never before in mobile phone environments, for work, e-learning, and entertainments (see Figures 1 and 2).⁵

Figure 1. Migration of 2.5G to 3.5G mobile communication




Source: Sanford Bernstein, Ericsson, Nokia, Qualcomm and NTT DoCoMo

⁴ Lai and So 1997; ADB 2005.

⁵ Srivastava 2004; Thornton & Houser 2005; Wieser 2005.

Figure 2. World Internet users growth



Transnational advocacies network (TAN) in its informational spaces

With the advanced application of ICT, the praxis of transnational advocacies network (TAN), succinctly discussed by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1999) and recently explored in depth by Piper and Uhlin (2004), is firmly established and embedded in the new communicative flows of the new media and the identity politics of social activists within and outside the cyberspaces. Cyber-politics challenges the traditional political establishment as well as the behavioural repertoire of a political actor(s).⁶

⁶ IDEA 2001; Goldstein and O'Connor 2000; Hick et al. 2000; Hick and McNutt 2002; Stefik 1999.

John B. Thompson (2005) rightly points out that the new media not only has a strong impact on global politics, but also has become the weaponry of individuals and groups who have been excluded from traditional mass media making:

In this new world of mediated visibility, the making visible of actions and events is not just the outcome of leakage in systems of communication and information flow that are increasingly difficult to control: it is also an explicit strategy of individuals who know very well that mediated visibility can be a weapon in the struggles they wage in their day-to-day lives. Once again, the war in Iraq provided us with countless reminders of this fundamental truth: the macabre beheadings carried out by (among others) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Tawhid and Jihad group, videoed and shown live on the Internet and then recycled with varying degrees of explicitness through the mass media of television and the press, are only the most dramatic illustration of a new political theatre that is played out in the world of the media, where spatial distance is irrelevant, communication instantaneous (or virtually so) and – especially with the rise of the Internet and other networked media – the capacity to outmanoeuvre one's opponents is always present.⁷

Similarly, James N. Rosenau (1997, 1998) in his seminal work, *Globalized Space*, stresses that the new media and their networking capacities are one of the functional equivalents of democratic governance where transnational issues are beyond the control of the nation state as well as a state-sponsored institutionalized regime, such as the UN:

The widespread growth of the Internet, the World Wide Web and the other electronic technologies that are shrinking the world offers considerable potential as a source of democracy... by facilitating the continued proliferation of networks that know no boundaries, these technologies have introduced a horizontal dimension to the politics of *Globalized Space*. They enable like-minded people in distant places to converge, share perspectives, protest abuses, provide information and mobilize resources – dynamics that seem bound to constrain vertical structures that sustain governments, corporation and any other hierarchical organizations.⁸

⁷ Thompson 2005, pp. 31–32.

⁸ Rosenau 1998, p. 46.

David Held's theory of 'Cosmopolitan Democracy' (1998, 1999) argues that in a world of overlapping communities of fate, Cosmopolitan Democracy is the creation of new political institutions and a diversity of NGOs in global civil society, with the democratic principle and praxis of broad access to avenues of civic participation on national, regional, and international levels. More specifically for our discussion here, TAN is the new wave for the democratization process aided by new electronic communication technology through various forms of electronic-mobilization.

Here, the ideas (and ideal) of *kosmopolis* or the questions it focuses on of liberty, progressiveness and democracy's extension beyond the nation state in terms of the articulation of international (humanity's) norms and justice call for a more open and participatory regime of global governance. This echoes the ideas of international civil societies and social movements for global and local justices.⁹ These movements are multi-dimensional, ranging from local human rights to global environmentalism.¹⁰

Re-presenting global citizenship in *kosmopolis*

The spread of the relevant ICT is vital for transnational activism, as it highlights the dynamism of world citizenship and constitutes the global civil society of *kosmopolis*. For Asia's hyper-modernization, four distinct yet inter-related issues need to be examined here.

First and foremost, although the activism derived from and through the Internet/cyberspace can be described as borderless in many ways, the networks are sometimes geographically confined to global cities of the developed world. More specifically, the locational choice of TAN agencies is still important, although the activism itself can shape regional affairs beyond the local base of the activists.¹¹ In other words, the cross-border advocacy is by no

⁹ Archibugi and Koenig-Archibugi 2003.

¹⁰ Lipschutz 1996; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Piper and Uhlin 2004; Wapner 1996.

¹¹ Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999.

means borderless or non-territorial, as the specific location or mode of protest organizing and social mobilization is still very much geographically specific. Cities and micro regions with a high concentration of information flow and knowledge exchanges as well as capital and economic activities¹² usually attract international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These places, among others, also have a comparative advantage in terms of the availability and functionality of ICT – and this gives the seemingly borderless, transnational activism a geo-cultural political fix.

Secondly, despite the promising development of TAN on a global scale, severe obstacles to cyber-activism remain, not least the state's control of the Internet in the case of Asia.¹³ In addition, digital deficiencies and divides remain problematic in Pacific Asia. The communicative backbone (the Internet) is still controlled by developed economies: 50% of the Internet communications among Asian countries are routed via US infrastructure. The ratio of the Internet population in Southeast Asia compared with the total population in the above area is about 0.5%, in East Asia it is 0.4%, and in South Asia 0.04%. For the OECD countries (except the US), the figure is 6.9%, and for the US it is 26.3% (UNDP 1999). The gap within Asian countries is also very wide: around 20% of the adults in the wealthy part of Asia (for instance, the four Asian 'little dragons' of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) are online but less than 1% of the people in the poorer parts (such as the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) use the Internet (ITU 2000). These figures confirm the digital divide inside and between regions and countries in Asia. An overwhelming majority, especially poor people in poor countries, are deprived of the benefit of the Internet and are therefore not active participants in the globalization process.¹⁴

Thirdly, new identity formation and progressive political praxis by the information revolution are contingent upon a complex con-

¹² Like London, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong; cf., Downey and McGuigan 1999; Hick and McNutt 2002; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Sassen 1998.

¹³ Hong 2001.

¹⁴ Kenny et al. 2000.

figuration of dynamic socio-economic factors.¹⁵ The prospects for the greening of global/regional civil society, in the Asian case, are further shaped by the differential state-society conflict and intra-socio-cultural fault lines in the region, in addition to varied forms of undemocratic praxis which need to be challenged. Democracy, political liberalization for an open society, and environmentalism are as important as the economic miracle for Asian societies.¹⁶ Furthering democratization is the way to go. Given the rise of Asian digital power and the expansion of cyberspace, the strategic use of the Internet can thereby foster transnational activism and social capital building across local, regional, and global spaces. On the other hand, there are powerful forces to slow down the scope of transnational activism. Asian states/societies are deeply divided along religious lines (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam), political ideologies (democracy, authoritarianism, and market socialism), colonial heritages (British, Japanese, and American), boundary disputes (between India and Pakistan), and security tensions (in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula). All of this might provide a pretext for the state's control over civil forces, and for its exerting its hegemonic banner of nationalism and cultural-political correctness in and out of cyberspace, challenging the e-liberalized communicative politics.¹⁷

Lastly, the disadvantages of the 'information society' should be stressed.¹⁸ Even advanced societies are still characterized by more or less high levels of segregation, diversity, and hierarchies with regard to the level of information gained through the Internet. More specifically for Asia, this has, to a large extent, to do with the dominance of the English language and American culture.¹⁹ In the long term, the domination of the English language in global communication might bring about a serious crisis regarding the existence of minority languages. Furthermore, the US lifestyle, movies, comics and other visual popular culture, and the 'manufactured'

¹⁵ Waller et al. 2001.

¹⁶ Lee and So 1999; Sachs 2001.

¹⁷ Comor 2001; Dryszek 1999.

¹⁸ Castells 1996, 2000; Luke 2000; Menzies 1996; Schiller 1999.

¹⁹ Main 2001.

news and documentaries (the US version of the ‘war against terrorism’ represents such a case) could be seen as cultural manifestations of a global imperialism. As long as the Internet is based on existent power structures, it will likely reinforce cyber-imperialism.²⁰ How to confront cyber-imperialism will be the challenge for transnational activists.

The globalization project versus cyber-activism in the information age

To discuss the multifaceted and complex manifestations of tensions between local and globalizing forces, the rest of this chapter examines the socio-economic logics of communicative actions in (anti-) globalization processes.

Competitive globalization

The ideological driven neo-liberal global project, i.e., the creation of a global free market by the G8, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and cheered on by transnational corporations (TNCs), enables further deregulation, privatization, and structural adjustment programmes, and also limits governmental power.

Yet globalization processes are problematic, and tend to polarize the socio-economic life opportunities of people – this has been confirmed by the *Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization* (WCSDG 2004). There are two competing views on the globalization project: globalization might be regarded as a benign and automatic force that fosters better economic benefits for everyone; even the poorest group can be better off. This is in strong contrast to the political extremes of the Left and Right. According to the Left, unbridled capitalism produces an exploitation of the weak and socio-ecological degradation; for the Right the malignant forces of globalization engender xenophobia

²⁰ Ebo 2001; Lai 2004a/b, 2005; Ogura 2001; Wyatt et al. 2000.

and the loss of people's jobs, culture, language, and hence identity at a local level.²¹

Since the early 1990s, most of the nation states have adopted the international financial institutes' (the IFI, the World Bank, and the IMF) recipe for reform in macro-economic policies in order to make their economies more competitive. Their strategies are the deregulation of international capital flows and trades, and the re-making of (the once protected or socially guaranteed) labour market into a deregulated (less rigid, more dynamic and more flexible) one. With the exception of the Asian Industrializing Economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and China, most developing economies are not adjusting well to the globalization project. On the other hand, most of the developed capitalist economies have suffered from the sluggish economic growth, which ironically resulted from the deregulation of capital markets, and which weakened the relationship between banking and industry.²²

Taking the globalization discourse seriously has also helped to reinforce the political ideologically-driven reform of the so-called welfare state in the developed economies, but most of the reforms are not deemed as successful by their fellow citizens.²³ In the case of most developing economies, the globalizing forces have not actually helped them much, and with the exception of China, global poverty did not diminish during the early globalization era.²⁴ The number of poor (less than US\$1 per day) did fall in Asia, but rose elsewhere; rising by 50% in Africa (see Figure 3).


²¹ Milanovic 2003.

²² Navarro et al. 2000.

²³ Huber and Stephens 2001.

²⁴ Milanovic 2003, p. 679; Ravallion 2004, p. 65.

Figure 3. People living on less than US\$1 per day²⁵



Source: World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2004*.

To recapitulate our present state of digital capitalism, economic productivities have been much improved for the developed economies, but the aggregate progress of the ICT-aided globalization project has not achieved its intended purpose for a better and just world. And it is within this context that the anti-globalization movement, a quest for *kosmopolis* in the global arena, is articulated.

Economic globalization-driven social polarization

The instrumental role of the ICT in a free global market is crucial and referred to as ‘digital capitalism’ – the condition where ICT networks are directly generalizing the social and cultural range of

²⁵ Source: WCSDG 2004, p. 45.

the capitalist economy as never before.²⁶ Digital capitalism therefore is predominantly a global corporate-led market system. It is also free to physically transcend territorial boundaries and, more importantly, to take economic advantage of the sudden absence of geopolitical constraints on its development.

Globally speaking, the present form of informatization of people's work and societal (virtual) encounters has reinforced a divided as well as a dual society: the informational-based informal economy is juxtaposed with a down-graded labour-based informal economy resulting in a spatial structure: a city which combines segregation, diversity, and hierarchy.²⁷ The ICT enhances a flexible production regime, generating more wealth and global economic activities. Yet far from developing an equitable and better society, our ICT-driven post-material society has produced more social disasters in the period 1960–1990 than ever before (see Figure 4). All of these are part of the globalization processes. Not without exception, all developing economies aided by TNC networking have been integrated hierarchically into the global system of capitalism, and the process of integration widens gaps and causes divisions among communities, countries, and regions.

²⁶ Schiller 1999.

²⁷ Castells 1996, 2001; Lai 2004b.

Figure 4. Income inequality²⁸




Figure 18

Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Sampsa Kiiski, "Trends in Income Distribution in the Post-World War II Period: Evidence and Interpretation", WIDER Discussion Paper No. 89, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, 2001.

Kosmopolis: Global and flexible mobilization of socio-political actions

In contrast to the liberal and progressive ideas of *Kosmopolis*, *Technopolis*, with high-tech development in the Information Age, is much championed by most nation states. *Technopolis* has become the iconography for a futuristic high-tech 21st century society. In Asia, such projects are aimed at enhancing national competitive-

²⁸ Source: WCSDG 2004, p. 44.

ness in the global system, and are initiated by strong and/or developmental countries such as China, Japan and Singapore.²⁹

Global protests against economic liberalization: Global norm-setting

Cosmopolitanism is occurring again, not just at annual 1st May anti-globalization demonstrations, but also through other protests against global capitalism in major cities around the world. Their message is loud and clear, namely the present mode(s) of the WTO/G8/World Bank-supported global project is not just or fair for many people in the developing world, or for those who are underprivileged within developed countries. Most of these social mobilizations are mobile and Internet network coordinated.

The 'Battle in Seattle' (demonstrations against the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting) marks the beginning of a new epoch of global activism, aided by ICT. Since then, global activism has shaped decisions regarding locations for IFI meetings, which are attempting to move away from cities and the transportation hub. Yet increasing amounts of e-mailing and mobile phone text messaging have become a central tool for e-mobilization: just before the Seattle meetings, about 1,500 NGOs had signed the anti-WTO declaration using e-mails and SMS text messages.³⁰ The more recent example is the global peace campaign against the US calling for war against Iraq: with the full-fledged utilization of ICT, the Internet/Web and mobile multimedia, over 12 million protesters were on the march in hundreds of cities around the world on 15th February 2003. All of this ICT-enhanced global activism therefore give leverage to ordinary people, resource-poor activists, and protest agencies to fight against the establishments, governments, big businesses and the mass media. All types of 'anti-'information and ideas in cyberspace which bypass the mass media can turn into global real-time social actions.³¹

²⁹ Downey and McGuigan 1999; Lai 2004b.

³⁰ Bennett 2003; Brecher 2000; Held and McGrew 2002.

³¹ Anti-globalization protest networking, see: <http://www.indymedia.org>, and <http://www.wtohistory.org>.

On the other hand, but with the same logic, the developing countries are gathering momentum to fight for a more equitable and fair regime of trading – highlighted by the recent rebellious move by the Group 22 to walk out of the Doha Round of the WTO trade negotiations in Cancun (September 2003)³² – this is in line with the call for a reinvention of global governance for fair globalization.³³

Retrospectively, as the rich countries' concessions to the poor ones were too limited, the NGOs' communicative actions in the mass and cyber media were highly exploitive and instruments for the collapse of the WTO Cancun negotiations. Shouting loud and long enough in various media enables the strong provocative communicative power to 're-frame' the anti-rich country sentiments, which eventually forced the Group 22 trade negotiators to take a decisive and radical stand against the present global project run by the WTO and the rich countries.

Obviously the WTO has been learning quite a bit from the communicative global actions of NGOs – and until recently, the WTO (like the World Bank) initiated activities for the participation of NGOs mainly in consultative sessions prior to an important trade summit. But these are more or less a form of public relations campaign, as the real multi-lateral trade negotiations are the prerogatives of nation states.³⁴ Through moral and ethical criticism of the globalization project, the cosmopolitan forces use a mobile communicative network to empower the (presumably) powerless NGOs, and the global civil society has learned quickly, adopting a wire and wireless communication set-up to champion their project in cyberspace and the mass media.³⁵

³² The Group 22 includes the following developing countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela.

³³ WCDG 2004.

³⁴ Ullrich 2002.

³⁵ Hajinal 2004; van de Donk et al. 2004.

A rejuvenation of *Kosmopolis* – rediscovering humanity

For social agencies and NGOs at both the local and the international levels, there are two major issues (or more specifically, dynamics) of anti-globalizing processes. They challenge the unfair and unjust economic processing as well as the consequences of global poverty and environmental degradation resulting from the globalization project and the ideological struggles against the hegemony of (US-led) global power. In short, it is the search for humanity.

In mid-August 2003, mobile communicative actions – the use of all wired and wireless media of communications in both cyberspace and in real communications – enabled over 200,000 people to participate in a three-day anti-globalization rally in Larzac, France.³⁶ Like other anti-globalization demonstrations their target was clear: it was the WTO Summit in Cancun, Mexico, one month later. The rally (or better put, a carnival-like anti-globalization's media platform) turned out to be informative and a communicative diversity, highlighting actions, knowledge, performance, and entertainment as well as new cultural praxis for the anti-globalization project.

The multi-media performing and expressive aspects of the anti-globalization campaign highlighted that it involves not only anarchic and violent clashes between the police and demonstrators, or the mob against transnational corporative symbols like McDonald's and international banks – actions we normally watch on television – but also represents a new politico-cultural praxis for an anti-globalization campaign as expressed through fine and performing arts as well as multi-media representations. New media definitely enhance the dissemination of the alternative agenda for the anti-globalization project – in some way, the mobile communicative actions constituted the creation of a new social capital of networking.³⁷

³⁶ *The Economist*, 14 August 2003, online edition.

³⁷ Katz and Rice 2002.

Kosmopolis as an unfinished project

In contrast to the 20th century's pro-growth yet unsustainable development, the 21st century's challenge is not just the economic crises and ecological sustainable development, but also the survival and rejuvenation of cultural diversity in a globalizing world – the project of *kosmopolis*.

The reality of global capitalism is more chaotic and not as positive as the neo-liberal economics' discourse tells us: the permanence of global poverty, regional economic problems, and social exclusions coupled with the vulnerable social protection plus ecological degradation all push for the demands for ethical and normative terms for globalization processes and highlight the quest for equitable, fair, and just trading and an economic exchange regime. For this, TANs should be championed for the empowerment of people at large (the global civil society) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Piper and Uhlin 2004; van de Donk et al. 2005). The idealism of the *kosmopolis* project is as yet unfinished. Mobile communicative actions in a progressive mode which support these initiatives are particularly important, and will provide the leverage for the resource-poor and/or under-privileged groups in articulating their justifiable demand for a fair and equitable life.

Despite its sporadic success in mooting the critical issues of global development, such as human rights and environmental sustainability, the extent of the impact of global civil society is much constrained by international governmental institutions. Craig Calhoun rightly questions the new media (the Internet in particular) in the formation process of new human communities, and to what extent the solidarity of the communities constitutes or makes cosmopolitanism more conducive to global civil society.³⁸

Yet two obvious limitations of the new media need to be noted here: both (i) the strong in-group identity for the participants and (ii) the ownership structure of the content (in the name of intellectual property rights) and conduits (ownership and subscription channels) can limit the formation of any imaginative global civil society for justice and equity mobilization. The latter can be shown

³⁸ Calhoun 2003; see discussion by Kennedy 2006.

by the fact that the media giants Google and Yahoo! are both much constrained by the regulatory framework in the US and its counterpart in China – their offerings of unlimited access and freedom of communication in cyberspace are contingent upon a set of socio-political conditions which are neither equitably nor fairly allocated.

Against the problematic marketization and informatization of the socio-economy, the new global project should therefore not only focus on economics, but on the reinvention of cultural specificity, the promoting of social equity, and the safeguarding of people's control over socio-cultural development. The ICT-enhanced (wired and wireless, stationary and mobile) communications are a double-edged sword: the Net and mobile networks can likely be a good facilitating agent for global, cross-cultural communications but at the same time can reinforce the existing fault lines between the *lingua franca* and the extinct indigenous languages. Needless to say, there is a normative dimension for its further development: equal opportunity, social justice, e-equity and e-inclusion.

In the hyper-flexible globalization processes, two differential logics to embrace (versus challenge) global free market capitalism are obviously shown by the IFI-sponsored regime of economic liberalization and the ICT-enhanced global/transnational activism of TAN. They will confront each other, and their communicative actions will be in and beyond the cyberspaces as long as the struggles for an equitable, fair, and just regime of global governance – the ideals of *kosmopolis* – continue. It is therefore incumbent on both the IFI and TAN to work out feasible routes for the humanization of the globalization project – the recent yet belated attempt by the IFI and the WTO to adopt TANs as their developmental dialogues is a welcoming one.

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8. The Cosmopolitan Foundation of International Law

Peter Kemp

The crisis of international law

Since 11 September 2001 many people have begun to believe that international law as we have known it – that being since Francisco Vitoria (1483–1546), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and up to the international agreement on the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 – is in a deep crisis. A military intervention has been carried out against Iraq without the required permission from the Security Council of the United Nations, and prisoners from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been transferred to prison camps at Guantánamo and elsewhere. These prisoners have, furthermore, not been given the right to a fair trial according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their later supplements.

But this is only the tip of the iceberg. It is true that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction appeared as new reasons for the use of force in the defence of the state, which was not a consideration when the United Nations Charter was made and when the Geneva Conventions concerning the protection of civilians and the rights of soldiers were ratified. But the crisis does not only concern warfare; it concerns the entire world order.

It is a crisis for the state itself, as it has been conceived since Jean Bodin (1529–1596) who defined sovereignty as ‘the absolute and perpetual power of a State’. This sovereignty, which means the

command over a territory and over the people belonging to that territory, is today increasingly fragile – not because it can only be a power within limits (it has always been), but because many new players in addition to the states and across all state borders have appeared.

There have always been religious movements and institutions who were alternative players, and there have been insurgency movements, etc.; however, it is the religious movements in particular which have become stronger and stronger today – sometimes out of the states' control. But at the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century transnational players have emerged, including international employers' and workers' organizations, multinational corporations, global banks, non-governmental organizations, and, particularly, international courts.

This means that political, economic, and legal decisions today are not only determined by governments and parliaments, but also by these new players who, rather than being universally accepted by the states, are sometimes in direct conflict with the states. Moreover, this is possible because the main political problems today are global problems.

Let me mention three of the complex, profound problems that concern the world today:

First, the problem of *financial globalization*. Transnational corporations and international banks function today thanks to the enormous telecommunication system, including the Internet and e-mail, which has transformed the world into a global market where the power of national states is limited. Therefore, a more or less open fight exists between this global system and the individual states. However, global financial problems cannot be handled by any one state alone, and states must recognize that they need international institutions and organizations if they want to control financial globalization.

Second, the problem of *intercultural coexistence*. Different cultures are currently discovering each other, and the dialogue, which is still very difficult, has just begun in encounters between people from different cultures. Many prejudices and biases have to be re-

considered, and they can be found not only in the so-called Third World, but also in highly developed countries, such as my own country, Denmark. Moreover, reconciliation between cultures, and especially between Islamic and Judeo-Christian cultures, will never take place unless both parties refrain from trying to resolve their differences through the humiliation of or violence against the other. We must learn to show respect not only for local and national cultures, but also for the great symbols of the religions.

Thirdly, the problem of *the physical sustainability of the Earth*. Human beings not only increasingly use up some of the planet's most accessible but non-renewable resources without the capability of replacing them with renewable resources, but we also use production methods that may permanently destroy the natural conditions for human life. We may therefore leave future generations with a world that has material conditions inferior to those known to us. We need a global democracy that includes a responsibility towards the Other in a future world where human beings should not have to blame us for the exploitation of the world's physical capital.

To add to these complexities of common global problems, we must consider that peace in our world today requires a legal order that can punish global crimes, which include not only the smaller crimes within trade, over the Internet, etc., but also the major 'crimes against humanity' such as war crimes, as in the cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals just after the Second World War, or crimes against the future of humanity through the pollution of air and water, etc.

Therefore different international courts (both permanent and *ad hoc*) have been established. Further, as a consequence of the World Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which was ratified by all member states of the United Nations, a court of human rights was created in Europe that allows a single individual to bring a lawsuit against his or her own state.

This is quite new in international law which, since Grotius and Pufendorf, was mainly law that regulated the relations between states and did not allow an individual to be considered as a legal subject.

It is this limitation of the role of the state on the international scene that is the real and profound reason for the current crisis in international law. We are now obliged to look for a new legal order that can take into account the new players in international politics and law. And my question is, therefore: What should be the basis of the new rules for a new international order if this order should be accepted by all people around the globe?

My answer is that this basis must be cosmopolitan. I shall now try to explain what that means.

The cosmopolitan

The concept of the cosmopolitan or citizen of the world is quite old in European history, originating in ancient Greek Cynic and Stoic philosophy. The first philosopher who called himself ‘cosmopolitês’ or ‘citizen of the world’ was the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope, who lived from 412–323 BC, i.e., the time of Plato and Aristotle. If someone asked him where he came from, his only reply was: ‘I am a citizen of the world’.

Three centuries later, the Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BC), and a little later Seneca (AD 4–65), developed the idea of a *societas generis humani*, a society of humankind as the most extensive society to which human beings belong. Thus, every human being belongs to two societies: the society into which they are born, and the society of the world. Even a head of a major state could thereby understand himself to be a member of a more comprehensive social reality than his own state.

This was the case with the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180), who wrote in his *Meditations*: ‘I am a member of the enormous organism of Humanity’ (VII). This membership, however, had a purely spiritual or personal character. It was the feeling of belonging to a community of thought between all human beings, even individuals who, as Marcus wrote, were ‘interfering, ungracious, insolent, full of guile, deceitful and antisocial’ (II.1). In practice, this meant openness to everyone irrespective of whether they lived close by or far away. Marcus wanted to put himself in

everyone else's shoes: 'Accustom yourself not to be inattentive to what another person says, and as far as possible enter into his mind' (VI, 53). As Martha C. Nussbaum points out in her book *Cultivating Humanity* (1997), this idea thought by a powerful politician could only diminish his anger towards other individuals and cultures he spontaneously disliked and rationally criticized.

However, the Stoic citizens of the world were not united by common political and cultural problems, only by general human conditions. Their cosmopolitanism remained on the purely personal level and was not concerned with global peace.

This changed in modern times when Kant proclaimed in his work *The Metaphysics of Moral* that the cosmopolitan law is more developed than the law of peoples.

The law of peoples – *das Völkerrecht* (Section 53–61) – was at the time considered by Kant to be a law of states or nations in relation to one another, i.e., their right to go to war with one another, the conditions they must fulfil in order to wage war, how as victors they must and must not treat their enemies, and how they may make alliances in order to renounce war. According to this concept of 'the law of peoples', which was rather a 'law of states', the citizens of a state tolerate citizens of other states, even though they have no concept of belonging to a common world. Jeremy Bentham introduced the name international law to replace the term 'law of peoples' in order to prevent the misunderstanding that it was anything other than a law for the relation between nations or states.

In contrast, the cosmopolitan law – *das Weltbürgerrecht* according to Kant (Section 62 of his *Metaphysics of Moral*) – presupposes that every human being has the right to be treated as a member of the common human community, and hence that perpetual peace is not – as with the law of peoples – an unachievable idea. A parallel exists between the moral law for the individual and the cosmopolitan law for the citizen of the world: both have universal validity and must be able to guide practice. Kant sees the reason for the latter in the fact that human beings as 'citizens of the Earth' originally inhabit a community of land forming a *globus terraqueus* (the globe of the world), and as reasonable beings must therefore adopt

the idea that they have the right to live together in peace and conduct commerce with each other in all regions of the world.

Cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and liberalism

Today we must apply this idea of the cosmopolitan to the question of the basis of international law and, thus, to the basis of reason regarding the invention of new rules for a global legal order. We can only overcome the crisis in international law that involves the reliability of international institutions and rules if we can refer to a normative basis which legitimates them. This legitimacy must be based on a conviction that can create a good and just global social life under the given conditions. Further, the conviction must consist of the commitment to a vision about the good, or rather the best possible world, in the same sense that we speak about a vision of the good society.

After Kant and Fichte, cosmopolitanism disappeared from philosophical and political discourse, and nationalism, based on the romantic ideal of the individual and the people, was mostly opposed to cosmopolitanism, as can be seen in Max Weber's inaugural address when he received the chair in national economy in Freiburg in 1895. Later, during the 20th century, a cosmopolitan often became tantamount to a national traitor, and the most violent accusations against the cosmopolitans came from Nazi Germany: they considered the Jews in the concentration camps to be cosmopolitans.

However, cosmopolitanism was also seen as being in opposition to liberalism, according to which the relations between states were based on competition and trade agreements.

Therefore, during most of the 20th century there was no discussion about cosmopolitanism.

After the Second World War, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were certainly judging the criminals in the name of humanity, but these tribunals were creations of the victors; the defeated were condemned by the victorious. They were not tribunals created by

an international jurisdiction, as were the later international courts concerning the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which were created by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994. So in 1946 the recognition of the fascist war criminals at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was not an occasion for real cosmopolitan thinking. On the contrary, at that time the conflict between East and West had already begun.

However, the situation changed in the 1990s. Before that time no philosophers and no sociologists, at least of whom I am aware, discussed the cosmopolitan. But suddenly Habermas, Derrida, Nussbaum and others began to defend cosmopolitanism, and sociologists such as David Held and Ulrich Beck presented analyses of the societies which showed that the idea of cosmopolitanism was the only idea that could guide people in our time to develop democracy on a global scale. *Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* is the title of David Held's book from 1995.

What has happened since cosmopolitanism took the floor again after nearly 200 years of silence? It is true that the complex problems mentioned here have become more and more urgent, but environmental problems were also discussed before the 1990s without ever raising the question of cosmopolitanism.

What then has happened? A great political event indeed: the end of the East-West conflict was symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Before this point, it was virtually impossible not to be caught up in the focus on the fight between the so-called free world in the West and the Communist world in the East. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, people discovered that the real issue was not a clash between two superpower spheres but rather a plurality of conflicts crossing various borders. In Europe, we had the Balkan conflicts, in the Middle East the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, in Iraq the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict, and so forth. Furthermore, these conflicts were not only military; they were also economical and cultural. The anti-globalization movement of the late 1990s was a revolt against worldwide financial repression, and the demonstrations in 2006 against 12 cartoons in a Danish right-wing newspaper re-

veal a wide gap between common people in the Islamic world and common people in the Christian world.

A global contract

If we aim to find a global agreement on a world order that all peoples and all individuals might be able to accept we must, first of all, agree to a cosmopolitan basis, which means an idea of belonging to two citizenships: the national and the cosmopolitan. But the cosmopolitan citizenship must have a content, just like the national citizenship has. And how do we express this content? It must be a vision that can be formalized to an idea about rights and duties, as we have a vision and an idea about rights and duties within a single society.

Moreover, the ultimate end for the cosmopolitan must be superior to the ends of a particular society. If this were not the case, it would thus be meaningless to be a citizen in the world at the same time as one is a citizen of one's own country. Further, if this end should be more than a dream, then it must refer to the tasks and challenges that a particular state cannot handle alone and therefore must be dealt with through institutions aiming at an international or transnational order: for example, politically through the United Nations, legally through international courts, economically via a world bank and various global trade organizations, and culturally through societies and networks of researchers, artists, philosophers, etc.

In European political philosophy the reason for social coherence has been expressed by the idea of the contract. For instance, the philosophers of the Enlightenment – except Rousseau – all combined the idea of the contract with their cosmopolitanism. This is, in particular, the case in the works of the great pre-Kantian philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Kant himself. They developed the idea of a global contract.

The idea of a social contract first appeared in the 17th century in Thomas Hobbes' work, although his idea of a social covenant only referred to the coherence of the state and the dependence of the

citizens on the state's power, the Leviathan. The idea was transformed, as has been shown by Francis Cheneval in his great work *Philosophie im weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung* from 2002, by Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Leibniz, wherein it became a contract between states or princes, and then by Wolff and Kant therein becoming the great fiction ('ens fictum', said Wolff) by which a people can express not only that they accept the order of their society, but also a real world order.

Some lawyers have claimed that this transfer of the idea of the social contract from the particular society to the whole of humanity is not reasonable, because the contract is only conceivable for small societies, such as Rousseau claimed. But what could prevent this transfer? It cannot be the fictive character of the contract, because a social contract for a small society is no less fictive than a contract for a world community. The idea of the social covenant does not presuppose that it was concluded at a certain moment in historical time. Even small societies have often been created by violence and not by a real contract.

Thus, the social contract only supposes that its citizens behave *as if* they themselves or their ancestors had instated the contract. All ideas about the formation of the contract are, in principle, fictive, regardless of some possible evidence of historical events in the representation of the social community. As mentioned, Christian Wolff called the contract an 'ens fictum'. Also in his work *The Social Contract* from 1762 Rousseau does not claim that the contract is other than fictive. The reason why he did not believe in a global social contract was that he could not accept representatives in the governance of a society. But Wolff and Kant did not have these hesitations with regard to a representative system of governance, and they could therefore very well imagine a world community based on a global social contract.

When today we ask about the legitimacy of international law, it may be fruitful to again discuss this connection between contractualism and cosmopolitanism. However, it will indeed not be the contract we find in the work of Thomas Hobbes, who assumed that all human beings 'by nature' are in a 'war of all against all'. On the contrary, it will be the contract that presupposes the Aristotelian

idea about the human being as ‘a social animal’ and expresses the knowledge that all people live in a common world, as when Kant reminded us that we are living on a globe and have to live here together.

Thus, there are two possible basic reasons for the formation of social life: the desire to escape death, as we find it in Hobbes’ work and in the 20th century in the work of Carl Schmitt and others, and the desire to live together in peace, as we find it in the work of Aristotle, Wolff, Kant, Ricœur and others. Only the latter desire can motivate the conviction that we are citizens of the world and have rights and duties as such. Thus, we must make a choice between the two ideas of a social contract. We must choose between Hobbes and Kant.

Towards a new world order

The concept of state, however, has changed since the Enlightenment and, consequently, so has the role of the states on a global scale. Therefore, the idea of a global contract has to be applied in a different manner than in the work of Wolff and Kant. Although by using the concept of a cosmopolitan contract they both imagine a human community on a global level, this concept only embraced ‘hospitality’, i.e., the right to travel and to be kindly received everywhere in the world, which Kant calls the cosmopolitan law. To them, the political community on the global scale remained only as commercial and diplomatic relations between states.

Today the new political actors mentioned in the beginning have appeared and have reduced the importance of the boundaries between states. The interests of the states are now entangled in one another and the great problems of our time can only be handled by the assistance of other players, like multinational corporations, NGOs, scientific, legal and philosophical networks, and so forth.

This means that political power today is much more fragmented than in the past. What is political power? It is the capacity to transform social and physical conditions in different contexts or ‘sites of power’ (Held, 1995) which yields different forms of power. Thus,

there is power in health care and environmental protection, education, the market, the media, social and religious institutions, the use of force by the police, the army and other constraint relations, and in legal and administrative institutions, which makes the basis of the state as such – and all these forms of power are intertwined.

The fragmentation of political power consists, in fact, of the state no longer having absolute control of all these forms of power that are now more or less in the hands of other players. The state can only govern in collaboration with other political players, not only inside the state itself and outside in relation to other states, but also in relation to international and transnational non-state institutions and movements.

However, this can only work in a democratic way if states are ready to recognize a transnational institutional structure that reflects the different forms of power which have appeared and accept a corresponding decision-making process. In other words, the fiction of the global social contract in our time must imply that non-state companies and institutions, which are decisive for the future of the world, are given rights and duties in line with their co-responsibility for the new world order that is to come.

But then the global contract cannot be in accordance with the idea of Hobbes' social covenant, which supposes that all power is given to one political player, the Leviathan. This, on a global scale, can only mean a form of governance that gives few states or one single state all the power, or rather a world government that all other political players give all power to out of fear of mutual destruction.

The global social contract on which international law today must be founded and that includes the recognition of different political players and makes possible a democratic control of all use of power, can only be a contract based on the desire to live together with all other people in dialogue and generosity. International law is then not only the law by which cruelty and violence are sanctioned, but also the law by which international understanding, the good life and generosity are promoted in the world.

This idea of a new world order does not deny the hard necessities in politics and the interests of political power. But it supposes

that 'soft ideas' also can play a role, and that the strongest states can see their advantages in alliances with other players, even purely humanitarian players, in order to obtain their recognition.

The cosmopolitan basis of international law means a global order based on democracy. This would be a democracy where the desire to live together is stronger than the fear of death.

Conclusion

It follows that the citizen of the world must be the ethico-political ideal for our new century. As an ideal, it has not yet been realized. It is not simply a product of the state, however, since it aims beyond the order of the particular state. It incorporates (or in German *aufhebt*) the state in the pursuit of a higher cause rooted in cultural traditions with a legacy of ideas concerning the good life.

The citizen of the world will always remain such an ideal. In the same way that the national state cannot become a collective individual that abolishes all particular human individuals as such, the cosmopolitan ideal cannot be realized in a world state that would abolish all national states.

We have to work on constructing international structures and networks and enforce a transnational legitimate authority able to watch the cosmopolitan ideal and coordinate the efforts to arrive at concrete solutions to our enormous international problems.

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9. The Tie that Binds: Cosmopolitan Obligation and the Primacy of Institutions¹

Lena Halldenius

Cosmopolitanism is one of those terms that seem to be always around, denoting something vaguely laudable and therefore more or less up for grabs. It is often used synonymously with terms like global justice, international justice, or international morality,² and so has become a vehicle for expressing the idea of global obligations of justice.³ No job could be more important. Indeed it is so important that it cannot be safely left to a rhetoric of ‘global community’ and ‘humane world order’. Taking the idea of global obligations seriously, I will discuss what kind of theory such an idea requires.

Leaving the conceptual history to others for the moment, I will start by presenting what I see as three aspects of modern cosmopolitanism conceived as a position within political philosophy. I wish to emphasize that these three aspects in no way are meant to count as a definition, nor are they exhaustive, but they are there in the ongoing debate. What I want to highlight initially is cosmopolitan-

¹ This is an extended and much revised version of a text that was presented as a comment on Peter Kemp’s paper ‘Towards a Global Covenant: The Cosmopolitan Foundation of International Law’ at the conference ‘The Idea of Kosmopolis’, Södertörn University College, 24 March 2006.

² An example of this is Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

³ See Christine Sypnowich, ‘Cosmopolitans, Cosmopolitanism, and Human Flourishing’, in G. Brock and H. Brighouse (eds.), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

ism conceived as a multifaceted position including, first, a certain attitude or state of mind; the cosmopolitan regards herself as a member of a global community, tied together by a thin tie of shared humanity. Second, the cosmopolitan is committed to moral universalism. The third is an institutional implication. Cosmopolitans support a global or transnational set of institutions with a degree of priority over local, national or regional institutions. These three together seem to form a backbone of contemporary cosmopolitan philosophy.

Of the three aspects outlined here, the third is often conceived as a consequence or a fall-out of the first two, as if a sense of a global community bound to a commitment to universal morality is what provides the rationale for global institutions. This I will question for three reasons. First, it is always a mistake in political philosophy to proceed from wishful thinking about people's state of mind. Second, universality is indispensable to cosmopolitan thinking but it is not enough – indeed it is of the wrong kind – to provide a rationale for obligations that are global in scope. And finally, rather than regarding the third as a fall-out of the first two, we should regard it as the primary and distinctive feature of cosmopolitanism, entailing importantly a certain view of justice: justice as dependent on accountable institutions. But we still need something more, in addition to universality, to establish the idea of global institutional obligation. We need a thicker tie to bind us together.

The first aspect of contemporary cosmopolitanism, then, is a state of mind, a certain moral consciousness. The cosmopolitan regards himself as a member of a global community – humanity itself – something great and uncluttered within which borders and boundaries are arbitrary and morally underdetermined. On any reasonable understanding local ties and relationships are certainly not morally irrelevant – it is hard to imagine how life could be worth living without them – but there is a sense of being a member of something greater, which takes moral priority. We are bound together by the very fact that we are part of the same humanity. Nothing more than that is needed; indeed, it is necessary not to say more than that since as soon as you do, you risk reintroducing things that separate

rather than unite. This is a thin tie, in the sense that it is prior to all those layers that mark people as being this way rather than that, prior to commitments and loyalties that are personal and local or at least less than global. In his contribution to this volume, Peter Kemp seems to have this thin tie in mind as the basis of cosmopolitan obligation. He talks about ‘solidarity with all humanity’ as a step towards ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ and ‘the universal community to which a person belongs merely by virtue of belonging to humanity’.

This moral consciousness – the perception of a thin tie – makes an intuitive case for accepting the universal status of morality. If we are all part of a global community which is morally prior to local communities, then tying people’s moral status and what they can claim to historical circumstance and varying and unequal local ways of life will indeed appear illegitimate. So this moral consciousness – the sense of a thin tie, unencumbered by circumstance, binding all of humanity together – is supposed to work as a backdrop to the ethical position that morality is universal, which is the second aspect of the cosmopolitan position, its moral commitment. Particularly conducive perhaps to the cosmopolitan position is the doctrine of universal human rights, which not surprisingly is an established moral language in cosmopolitan theorizing and which rests easily with the thin tie. Saying that all individual people are equal rights-holders presupposes that all individual persons inhabit one moral world in which comparative assessments make sense. If all children everywhere have the same claims to shelter and education, then children denied these things have their rights violated. We do not need to know anything about them to know that this is the case. An important point of the thin tie is that it emphasizes that people do not need to do anything to qualify as members of this moral community. You are not granted membership as a prize for good behaviour, nor for anything that is contestable about you or that you could lose. That again is conducive to the universal doctrine of human rights. Membership is automatic; hence, no one is or can be excluded, and that is indeed important.

For some, the universality of morals and its concomitant commitment to a basic equality between holders of claims⁴ are regarded as so integral to cosmopolitan thinking that they have come to define it. David Held, for instance, argues that the three key elements of contemporary cosmopolitanism are egalitarian individualism, a requirement that the status of equal worth is acknowledged by everyone, and that all claims are treated impartially.⁵ On this account, the key elements of cosmopolitanism seem to amount to spelling out what is here referred to as the second aspect and hence nothing more (and nothing less) than ethical universalism.

The third aspect is what makes cosmopolitanism political, not merely moral. It is what puts the *polis* into *kosmopolis*. Those individual people who constitute the shared humanity within which each is, and is recognized by all as, equal, are conceived of as *citizens* of that global order. I will discuss some of the implications of this aspect, which I will take very seriously. The upshot of this will tell us something about the tensions between these three aspects of cosmopolitanism and the job it is supposed to do to secure global justice.

But let me first make a brief note about the term *kosmopolis* itself. In outlining what a cosmopolitan position might be, the term comes to our aid in an ambiguous yet challenging way. *Kosmos* means world but it also means harmony, order and ornament. *Kosmos* is the world in an encompassing sense – the entirety of crea-

⁴ It is worthwhile to distinguish between basic equality, that is, that everyone is equal in moral status and has the same rights and can make the same claims on the basis of them, regardless of what rights we believe people have, and equality in application, that is that everyone has an equal claim to whatever it is that the system of rights is supposed to be a means to, for instance, capabilities or welfare. Basic equality emphasizes similarity; in this respect everyone is the same. Equality in application requires an acute understanding of when and how people are relevantly similar or different. Given that people are differently situated, equality in capabilities is not achieved by treating everyone the same.

⁵ David Held, 'Globalization, Corporate Practice, and Cosmopolitan Social Standards', in A. Kuper (ed.), *Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights?* (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 190–194. See also Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*, pp. 15–17, who stresses cosmopolitanism as a moral position of impartiality, universality, individualism, and egalitarianism.

tion – conceived as orderly, harmonious and, hence, beautiful. *Polis* is the site of politics, the full members of which are citizens (*polites*) who collectively govern themselves. It is the city, a small self-governing unit. Necessarily bounded and at least partially closed to the rest of the world, it is defined by its limits. The term *kosmopolis* can therefore be regarded as something of a pun, an oxymoron even, and the cosmopolitan as an empty category. Is not the very idea of *polis* – a bounded political unit – in opposition to *kosmos*?⁶ To put it in more contemporary words: Are not national allegiances – giving priority to ‘one’s own’ – what makes a just and harmonious world order impossible? And how could you be a citizen of the entire world if the very category of citizenship is predicated on the bounded political unit? Perhaps this is why the term cosmopolitan in everyday parlance has come to denote not a political agent committed to world harmony and global justice through politics, but an urban dweller, removed from politics at all levels but vaguely at home anywhere in the world as long as there is a Gap and a barista.

Let me illustrate: in the movie *The Student Prince*, set in Cambridge, an American Fulbright Scholar stretches languidly on her exercise mat in her college room, saying ‘I miss my coffee. I could kill for a decent non-fat latte’, adding in passing that she was raised a republican ‘as in Robespierre, not Reagan’. She is completely at ease, since away from home does not really mean anything if home is not a place, managing to make a reference to the *res publica* into an apolitical piece of small talk. Towards the end of the movie, the main character – a prince of the United Kingdom, burdened by the expectations of his appointed role, a prime but unwilling carrier of national allegiance – renounces his claim to the throne at the May Ball, shouting ‘I am a citizen of the world’ to an enthusiastic crowd of intoxicated new graduates. These two characters are representa-

⁶ On the history and development of cosmopolitanism, see for instance R. B. Branham and M-O Goulet-Cazé (eds.) *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and Margaret C. Jacob *Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe* (Phil., PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). See also Sypnowich, 2005.

tives of what could be seen to be the only two possible responses to the oxymoronic pun of *kosmopolis*: ironic detachment from the political, from the very idea of being a citizen of anything, or active denouncement of the obvious, of the primacy of rights and obligations emanating from a fixed seat of bounded allegiance. What the latter response amounts to is turning the pun into a challenge, and a challenge it is, not only in practical, but also in theoretical terms. What could it possibly mean to be a citizen of the world?

What I wish to emphasize with this digression is that the term *kosmopolis* – if we take it seriously – imbues ‘cosmopolitanism’ with an implication which ‘global justice’ and ‘international morality’ do not have in themselves. This is the third aspect of cosmopolitanism.⁷ The universal moral commitment in relation to the global community bound together by the thin tie is realized through an institutional structure of which all are members. And the harmonious world-order envisaged by cosmopolitanism is a *polis*, the members of which are *citizens*. And citizenship entails rights and obligations in relation to the institutional order without which it cannot exist.

If we take seriously – or perhaps literally rather than metaphorically – the implications of the concept of a world citizen, it is certainly correct to say that in the absence of a globally accountable institutional order such an entity can exist only in the narrowest metaphorical sense. Citizenship – at any level – is a status function,⁸ dependent for its existence on institutions of a certain kind: the institution of law, a legislator, and an accountable form of government.

Kemp describes the concept of the cosmopolitan as implying ‘the idea of simultaneous citizenship in two societies: the national society into which a person is born or admitted, and the universal community to which a person belongs merely by virtue of belonging to humanity’. But one is not a citizen of a society or a commu-

⁷ Another implication is an emphasis on the relation between justice and peace since *kosmos* is a world order without strife.

⁸ See John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 37–43, on the assignment of a status function through collective intentionality as constitutive of institutional reality.

nity, on whatever level. One is a citizen of a political system run on the basis of collective self-government through representation and the rule of law. A transnational legal order (leaving the specifics of such an order open) is therefore not only a means for things like regulating relations between non-global institutional structures, countering the impact of economic globalization or preserving and managing peace. It is also necessary for the existence of the cosmopolitan.

If cosmopolitanism has a distinctive sharpness of its own, surely it must be this. This is why cosmopolitanism is not ‘merely’ a theory of global justice. This is also why, as I started out saying, this third feature of contemporary cosmopolitanism is not a fall-out from the other two, but primary, which in its turn makes the question whether cosmopolitanism requires or justifies international or transnational law a closed one, answered by the concept itself. Cosmopolitanism understood in this sense is predicated on a certain view of justice: justice can only be had through representative institutions that are accountable to its citizens. That is the difference between justice and charity. This is the important insight that cosmopolitanism brings to the table on matters of global justice. Not that morality is universal (although that is important as well) but that a just state of affairs (rather than a vaguely ‘good’ or ‘humane’ one) is a matter of institutional arrangement. Comparatively wealthy people can make poor people’s lives a whole lot better by well-targeted donations and they should do that, but, from the point of view of justice, such charitable actions are neither here nor there. It is perfectly possible to imagine a world that satisfies a certain pattern of distribution and where welfare levels are decent across the board. But where this happy state is a matter of personal benevolence and dependent for its continuation on the goodwill of a few mighty agents who cannot be held to account by those destined to lose out as soon as the goodwill fades it is not a state of justice – when justice is understood in the cosmopolitan sense – since it is not secured by a set of accountable institutions. So if we are concerned with global justice, then ipso facto we need global accountable institutions.

Now what does this tell us about the first two features of contemporary cosmopolitanism? The cosmopolitan consciousness – the *kosmos* as an imagined community tied together by the thin tie of a shared humanity – is a nice thought, but what function or status is it supposed to have? Is it an ideal? Possibly, but why? Is it better in itself that people regard themselves as thinly human in this way rather than as workers, environmentalists, women, Swedish, Swedish-Somali, newspaper readers, and human or all of these things at once in no particular order? Is it a norm? Surely not. We should resist any attempt at formulating norms about how people should conceive of themselves. Norms also need to have some resonance in what people are actually like and a capacity to be action guiding, which this one is not. Actions are particular to place, time, and circumstance; a sense of belonging to a totality does not tell us anything about what we should do. Presumably its role is supposed to be moral in the sense that it is wrapped up in the acknowledgement that morality is universal. But this is a mistake for two reasons.

First, asserting that morality is universal – that moral principles are valid equally for all regardless of circumstance – amounts to *not* making it dependent on people's frame of mind, felt affinities or inclinations. Doubtlessly a cosmopolitan sense of belonging to the entirety of the world is conducive to an inclination to accept morality as universal but at the same time morality has its most important role to play when inclination and solidarity are absent. This was Kant's point in saying that an action gains its moral worth from being done for the sake of duty rather than from inclination, be it self-interest, benevolence or a wish to do good. Contrary to popular belief, this is not meant to say that cold-bloodedness is good while benevolence is for wimps. Rather it is meant to preserve the commanding force of morality also when an inclination to do good is not there.⁹ Surely that is when the oppressed and dispossessed need it the most.

⁹ 'For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—is *practical* [...] and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command'. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. and ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper

Second, it is important to acknowledge that universality is a formal feature of moral principles. It is a test, not of the content of what we believe but of our way of reasoning in relation to what we believe. In a recent article, Andrew Dobson has argued that the problem with framing the tie that binds us together in this thin way is that although it might be enough to get us to think that cosmopolitanism is right, it is not enough to motivate us to act as cosmopolitans, since a shared humanity is not compelling enough as a source of obligation.¹⁰ This strikes me as correct, but the problem for the cosmopolitan is more fundamental than that.

The intuitive pull of the cosmopolitan state of mind is that we – all humans – are all each other’s concern, in the sense that rights and obligations are the same for everyone. I cannot claim something for myself if I am not prepared to accept that everyone else has the same entitlement to it. Conversely, I cannot place obligations on others that I am not prepared to shoulder myself, and this goes for everyone wherever or whoever they are. The point to emphasize is that this is a formal feature that does not in itself tell us anything about what rights and obligations there are or how far and to whom they extend. One can be a perfectly consistent universalist without believing for a moment that rights and obligations are global in scope. ‘Everyone should give priority to their compatriots’ is a universal principle. It satisfies the formal feature of applying equally to all, but it is not an obvious cosmopolitan principle.¹¹ A perfectly reasonable, perfectly universal principle says that parents have both a right and an obligation to give priority to their own children’s welfare (up to a point). Given what people are like and what they value, extending the universal principle of parental responsibility to a principle which is also global in scope (‘Parents

Torchbooks, 1964), p. 67. The *Groundwork* was first published as *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* in 1785.

¹⁰ Andrew Dobson, ‘Thick Cosmopolitanism’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2006, pp. 168–169.

¹¹ It can be a cosmopolitan principle given the assumption that some cosmopolitans make that the outcome on a global scale will be better for all if there is a moral division of labour along national lines, but it survives as a cosmopolitan principle only as long as and to the extent that the assumption is well-founded.

have an obligation to look after all children's welfare equally') would be unreasonable as well as unworkable.

We can take the human rights doctrine, a quintessential universalist theory endorsed by many cosmopolitans, as an example. There is an intense debate going on at the moment about the disjuncture between the universal system of human rights and the global justice it is supposed to serve. Thomas Pogge has put it succinctly. There are two senses, he says, in which human rights are universal: 'Human rights are equally possessed by, and are also equally binding upon, each and every human being. These two features are compatible with a "nationalistic" interpretation of human rights, according to which any person's responsibility for the fulfillment of human rights is limited by the boundaries of his or her society'.¹² In international human rights law individual rights-holders have claims against their own governments, and governments have obligations in relation to their own population. There are no global carriers of obligation in relation to individual rights-holders. Nothing in this detracts from the universality of the system – and the system itself as expressing a world community of rights-holders certainly is in congruence with the cosmopolitan state of mind – but given that states as the primary bearers of obligation differ so greatly in resources, competence, ideology and will, it most definitely is a problem of global justice. There is nothing uncluttered about the actual circumstances in which claims can be made.

Needless to say, many cosmopolitans know this and worry about it. The international human rights system falls short of the requirement embedded in the institutional implication of the cosmopolitan position but neither of the other two aspects of cosmopolitanism explain why. Universality – a formal feature – is not the same thing as global reach – a substantial feature. And we certainly cannot

¹² Thomas Pogge, 'Human Rights and Human Responsibilities', in Kuper (ed.), *Global Responsibilities*, pp. 17–18. It is worth noting that 'universal' and 'cosmopolitan' are often used synonymously to mean 'encompassing all humans' (an example is Onora O'Neill's contribution to the same volume, 'Agents of Justice', in Kuper (ed.), *Global Responsibilities*, p. 37), which is not wrong but makes it more difficult to conceptualise the tension between the universal status of a principle and its substantive global reach.

base the case for global obligation on psychologically and anthropologically unfounded notions about the sense of a thin tie. If it is there it could still not be action guiding. And if it is not there, then that is testimony to how badly we need a more stable foundation for global obligation. For that we need a thicker tie, not merely for the sake of motivation (even though that seems true as well) but for the sake of the global reach of obligation.

So, for cosmopolitanism to provide a principle of action that takes seriously the idea of one global community of citizens, the thin tie needs to be supplemented by something thicker, capable of grounding obligations that are global in scope but still reasonably action guiding and which hold independently regardless of whether people happen to feel solidarity with all of humanity or not. Surely, as Kant reminds us, obligation has its most important work to do when inclination is absent.

In *Perpetual Peace* Kant says that through colonization and trade '[t]he peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in *one* part of the world is felt *everywhere*'.¹³ Colonization and trade are not what establishes the universal category of right and its violation. It might establish a moral consciousness of right being violated in places where we have never been and do not know anybody. If it does then we might acquire some sort of 'cosmopolitan state of mind' but that does not establish the universal category of right and its violation either, even if it might smooth the way for its general acceptance. What colonization and trade do, however, is to support the case for global obligation, obligations that are not only universal in character, but also global in scope, since colonization and trade globalize cause and effect of what we do and don't do. Here is the missing thick tie, and really it is not that thick. It is a matter of identifying proper circumstances of justice, in appreciation of the fact that with a

¹³ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* in H. Reiss (ed.), *Political Writings*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 107–108. *Perpetual Peace* was first published as *Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* in 1795.

global reach of the effects of what we collectively do and don't do, responsibility is globalized as well. This responsibility is collective, not necessarily irreducibly so but still. If there are global obligations, as the thick tie entails, then we are obligated to set up and support those institutions necessary to realise the object of our obligations. We do not need to have a cosmopolitan state of mind for this to be true.

So what is the thick tie? When Rawls, following Hume, makes the striking point that for issues of justice and injustice to make sense, certain circumstances have to obtain already, he proceeds from the category of a society, understood as a 'cooperative venture for mutual advantage [...] typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests'.¹⁴ In the absence of conflicting interests and desires in relation to moderately scarce resources, where cooperation is both necessary and possible, 'there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice'. I do not wish to assess the merits of Rawls's principles of justice (he himself had surely a bounded and closed society in mind), nor his later contribution to the debate on global justice. I merely wish to insist that the foundation of global obligations of justice is in fact found here. Not in a vague idea of a shared humanity, nor in the formal feature of morality as universal, but in a certain view of what role is played by justice and what its subject is. The thick tie is the cooperative and conflicting venture of agents who depend on and compete with each other and that tie is certainly global no matter how people conceive of themselves. That tie is the circumstances of global justice.

I have argued that what I started out describing as the third aspect of cosmopolitanism is really its distinctive feature. It makes it not a

¹⁴ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 126–128; see also p. 4. Cf., David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), Book III, Part II, Section ii: 'I have already observ'd, that justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain *qualities* of the human mind with the *situation* of external objects. The qualities of the mind are *selfishness* and *limited generosity*: And the situation of external objects is their *easy change*, join'd to their *scarcity* in comparison of the wants and desires of men'.

theory of a ‘good world’ or a ‘humane world order’ but primarily a theory of a just set of global institutions within which individual agents are citizens in the sense that they have the status function of being carriers of claims and obligations in relation to the set of institutions which is accountable to them. This is in acknowledgment of the fact that the tie that defines the circumstances of justice is indeed global. This certainly presupposes moral universalism, but so do lots of other theories. It makes the cosmopolitan state of mind largely redundant since the circumstances of global justice are partly defined by the absence of it.

I have, of course, said nothing about what a cosmopolitan theory of justice would or should look like. I have merely discussed what kind of theory it is. This leads me to make a few concluding remarks about a choice that Peter Kemp, in his contribution to this volume, presents to us as a stark one, between Hobbes and Kant in relation to peace, which in cosmopolitan thinking is intrinsically linked to justice.

Kemp points out that in Hobbes’s state of nature everyone is at war with everyone else. From this he seems to conclude that the covenant – the transformative acting ‘as if’ that constructs the commonwealth – is an expression of a wish to avoid death. This is in alleged opposition to Kant, for whom the social contract is an expression of a wish to live together in peace. But framing this as a stark choice is misleading. After all, Hobbes’s first law of nature is not ‘avoid death’ but ‘seek peace and follow it’.¹⁵ There are, of course, any number of choices to be made between Hobbes and Kant,¹⁶ but the choice whether or not we wish to live in peace is not

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, Edwin Curley (ed.) (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), Part I, Chapter xiv, Paragraph 4. *Leviathan* was first published in 1651.

¹⁶ One important difference of opinion between them concerns whether there can be peace without subordination to a sovereign power, something that Hobbes flatly denies (*Leviathan* Part II, Chapter xvii, Paragraph 4). If we think about cosmopolitanism, and its commitment to peace, in terms of a global covenant, a Hobbesian global covenant (to the extent such a thing seems palatable) would have to be a covenant constructing a world sovereign. A Kantian global cove-

one of them, nor is the idea of what kind of state a peaceful state is. In fact, there are striking and in this context quite important similarities between Hobbes's and Kant's ideas about peace. They both describe the state of nature – a state unregulated by law, defined by its absence of law as an institution – as a state of war, not because it is characterized by actual strife and violence but because whatever tranquility might be enjoyed in it is always unstable, precisely because there are no institutions capable of guaranteeing its continuation. Both Kant and Hobbes maintain that peace is impossible without adequate institutions and that is our reason for establishing institutions capable of ending the natural state of war. But both also make the existence of adequate institutions a definitional feature of peace.¹⁷ A state of peace must be formally instituted and guaranteed, which requires a lawful state. In the absence of institutions there can be no such thing as peace, only temporary armistice and a lot of fear. In an important aspect, this concept of what peace is that we find in both Hobbes the authoritarian and Kant the republican ties in with what I have said about the institutional implication of cosmopolitanism being its primary and distinctive feature. Just as we cannot talk about justice in the absence of proper institutions we cannot talk about peace in the absence of proper institutions because both justice and peace are functions of institutional structures. It is interesting to note how similar Rawls's description of the circumstances of justice is to Hobbes's description of the state of nature.¹⁸ Both are situations of absent or at least limited goodness and solidarity, but that is not the problem – indeed it is part of the

nant, however, involves no subordination – Kant makes that clear in *Perpetual Peace* (pp. 102–105).

¹⁷ 'A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is rather a state of war. For even if it does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted'. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 98. '[D]uring the time that men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war [...] so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE'. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter xiii, Paragraph 8.

¹⁸ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 126–127; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part 1, Chapter xiii, Paragraphs 1–3.

human condition – and, importantly, more of these admirable things would not be the solution. The solution is adequate institutions. I absolutely do not mean to make any comparisons here other than this very general one: goodness and benevolence are fickle companions, and in matters of justice and peace fickleness is an anathema.

A thin tie is easily broken. A thoroughly institutionalized one is not. Members of a global community can be regarded from different vantage points and *what* they are will vary correspondingly. It might be difficult to shake the oxymoronic feel of ‘the global city’. But it is not very difficult to figure out what is meant by regarding everyone as a citizen in relation to the global effects of what we do and do not do. A citizen is not a recipient of benevolence but a maker of claims in relation to accountable institutions. If we want *kosmos* – a harmonious world order – it had better be organized along the principles of a *polis*. That does not answer the question of what a just world would look like and how it is achieved. But it does answer the question of how to conceive of the people in it. That is the insight that cosmopolitanism brings to the table in matters of global obligation.

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The Idea of Kosmopolis

History, philosophy and politics of world citizenship

Contemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism are often based on older assumptions that have become invisible or hard to unearth. This volume explores the idea of *kosmopolis* by placing it into different historical, philosophical, social, and political contexts. By bringing together different views on and aspects of cosmopolitanism, the volume aims at contributing to new understandings of *kosmopolis* and the resulting cosmopolitan ideal, and of the fears this concept may generate.

The nine contributors discuss *kosmopolis* within the contexts of philosophers such as Heraclitus and Kant, the thoughts and texts of the nobility, intellectual thoughts from the Enlightenment, contemporary political institutions, and grass root cosmopolitanism. The intent is to illustrate how the meaning of »cosmopolitanism« is influenced not only by its history but also by its specific contexts.

