Deleuzean time

with reference to

Aristotle, Kant and Bergson

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Foreword

What I have learnt in writing this paper is that studies of ontology deserve to be defended, whether they are an old or new kind. The need for a fluid Deleuzean ontology of time will be noted and emphasised but in the end, doing metaphysics is a rare event that needs good readers. My thanks go to my kind and critical supervisor, Fredrika Spindler, who read earlier drafts with great observation and energy, as did Hans Ruin and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback. The department of teacher education at Uppsala University has also contributed. I am also grateful to Rajya Sjunnesson Rao for language check and helpful revisions. All faults left uncorrected are entirely mine.

Uppsala – Stockholm, summer 2004 – winter 2005

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I

Introduction

This thesis deals with studies about time from the perspective of the contemporary French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. He is one of many thinkers in history who has dealt with the problems of time and he relates his own thought to central figures in western philosophy. This thesis deals for that reason not only with his own philosophy but also with his critique and use of predecessors.

Time is a recurrent issue in metaphysical philosophy, along with substance, being, life and death. Few philosophers have made it a central theme though, maybe because it is so elusive and abstract. But time can be said to have some definite characteristics: duration, persistence, alteration, succession, simultaneity, novelty etc. With analyses of these features, philosophers and scientists since Anaximander (600 - 550 B.C.) have tried to grasp the elusiveness and being of time. This thesis hopes to show light upon time's mysteries from a Bergsonian and Deleuzean tradition in the history of the philosophy of time labelled “distaff”1. This thesis will not deal with the explicitly phenomenological theories of time in Husserl and Heidegger2.

What is given here instead is an overview and historical background to the philosophy of time in Deleuze, The main part of this study concerns Deleuze’s own thought but also others. They are influenced by Deleuze’s own critique (Aristotle) and inspiration (Kant, Bergson, Nietzsche to a lesser extent). The whole thesis tries to use Deleuzian ideas and analysis.

1 Turetzky’s term (1999). For overviews of philosophies of time, see Markosian (2002) and Ingthorson (2002), who present a more traditional account of three philosophies of time: eternalism, presentism and evolving world theory. Bergson and Deleuze can even say to represent a fourth alternative: the "Time of Aion" as Deleuze calls the time of the event when only the past and the future are real. The present is always not yet or already gone. However close one tries to measure the present, it slips into past or future time. "The agonizing aspect of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time something which has just happend and something about to happen" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 63).

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The text is divided into five chapters. Chapter II concerns time as aspect of change in the metaphysics of Aristotle, as seen through Deleuze’s reading. Chapter III deals with Deleuze’s presentation of Kant’s idea of a transcendental time. Chapter IV studies time as duration and virtual memory in Bergson's thought, which lies close to Deleuze’s own thought.

Emphasis in the first two chapters is on the two philosophers of time most distant to one another: Aristotle and Bergson. For Aristotle, time is not an interesting concept. His metaphysics is centred on the stable pattern of substance and its changes of which time is a symptom. Subjectivity does not play a great part of his concept of time, although the necessity of an (human) observer of time is noted. In Bergson however, the subjective aspect becomes central, as time is both related to the experiencing subject but also as what exists in itself. Time is the only thing that is real, whereas the normal spatial entities of Aristotelian metaphysics, "middle size objects", are viewed as bleak snapshots of the true reality: fluid processes: duration, memory and virtuality. That time itself is not at all related to space is Bergson's main thesis.

An ontological claim is brought up from Bergson's conclusion - that time is really not an aspect of being but being itself as becoming, a process of evolving novelty. This claim is discussed in the thesis core part, in chapter V on Gilles Deleuze. Time is a guiding thread in his works that helps us clarify his thought about time as, among other things, our ‘non-thought’ interiority.

The brief concluding chapter VI contains a summary as well as some lines of further research of the main thoughts in this thesis.

The question that this thesis tries to answer is what importance and historical roots the concept of time has in Deleuze’s philosophical system. By bringing in his creative use of the history of philosophy, I hope to show his answers to the problems of time in a framework that is sympathetic to his philosophy. I have not been able to both present and criticise his ideas of

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3 There are connections to Aristotle in Bergson's thought since he devoted his Latin dissertation in 1888 (Bergson 1970) to the concept of place in Aristotle before he left a traditional kind of philosophising and went into thinking time as duration, memory and virtuality.
time. That is for the reader to judge if Deleuzean time is worthwhile studying. I hope my presentation fulfils that mission and inspires critique.
II

Aristotle

This chapter starts with a general introduction to Aristotle's thoughts about time within his metaphysical system of substance. Aristotle as a founding father of Western philosophy is then challenged by Deleuze who wrests a new metaphysics from his system – one that centres on difference in opposition to identity.

Time

Time is problematic, Aristotle notes in the introduction of his analysis of time, *Physics* IV, books 10 - 14. It is both being and non-being and thereby its nature is unclear and puzzling.

Aristotle analyses time to be a somewhat strange succession of ‘nows’ similar to points. Their being is counted and enumerated. Their quantity is measured in the change of objects or movements. The successive ordinal ‘nows’ are like points on a line. As a line cannot be made up of points, time cannot be made up of ‘nows’, but these instants are important as we shall see below.

The nature of time is unclear in that the status of ‘nows’ must be both: the same, since they are of same kind, that is, as ‘nows’, and yet also different, since they replace each other. "Time, then, is also both made continuous by the 'now' and divided by it "(220a5) and "The now follows the moving thing "(219b22) ⁴.

The nows are different when they succeed one another but their substance, to be a now, is the same. A now is like a substratum that can take on different attributes, yet remain the same. Aristotle uses the analogy of locomotion to time by referring to a man being the same entity in the market place as he is in the Lyceum. His being is the same, but the location is different.

⁴ Quotes of Plato and Aristotle follow Bekker’s system, see Aristotle (1984), p. xiii.
Similarly, now as an instant at a present stage of motion or change is always the same, yet its ordinal number is different with respect to before and after.

Aristotle maintains that time is not movement but enumeration of movement. Time is thereby an aspect of change and motion. Here we need to state the concepts of movement and change in Aristotle:

1) Kinesis - movement as a quantitative concept, motion, transportation,
2) Dynamis - movement as strive for perfection, a qualitative concept.

Time is involved in any sort of change for Aristotle; of place, of alteration in quality (e.g. change of colour), of generation and destruction of substances and increase and diminution in size.

Two reasons are given for why time is not change: movement is at a particular location, which time is not, and movements are slow or fast. Time is neither. As it measures speed itself. But time is closely related to change. "Just as motion is perpetual succession, so also is time" (219b10). The relation between a punctual now and a continual movement is established by enumeration.

Further, time discriminates what is more or less in change by two different methods: what is counted (that is, duration of change of time as lapse of time between two ‘nows’) and of that which we count (things moving or changing).

Time is not without change Aristotle continues. If we sleep or become unconscious, like the men among the sleeping heroes of Sardinia, time cannot go by unnoticed. Critics claim his argument is weak as time may pass by without anything happening, as when we sleep. But it gives us the idea of inner time as something essential to our conception of time. Aristotle claims that there must be someone doing the enumeration, the counting of time as it passes and mentions a soul. This does not make time anymore subjective, however, than the fact that unseen areas exist out of reach of our eyes, as the dark side of the moon.

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5 “We notice that time has passed not only when we notice that things have changed but also when we noticed that they have not: that is, to be aware of rest, no less than to be aware of movement, is equally to be aware of the passing in time” (Bostock 1999, p. 145). Aristotle

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Time is what is counted and that requires counting to be possible by a soul or a being with a capacity for memory. The uniform standard of human time in everyday life (waking up, daylight, work etc) and its measurements (celestial body movements, sea changes etc), make Aristotle's concept of time dependent on regularity.

"If there were no regular changes, change would still take time and be countable but time would not measure motion. Given a uniform motion to serve as a standard, motion measures time. Since time is the number of motion [in Aristotle], time measures motion by counting its before and after" (Turetzky 1998, p. 22).

The temporality of the last few words in the quote, "before" and "after", makes Aristotle's analysis obviously circular. His way of getting out of using temporal references is to use movement of location as an analogy, but that is not easily done. Just as there cannot be points without lengths that they divide and join, the temporal points- the ‘nows’ - need duration that they measure. He states this analogy, clearly, twice:

“For it is by means of the body that is carried along that we become aware of the before and after in motion, and if we regard these as countable we get the ‘now’” (219b24)

“It is clear then that time is the number of movement in respect of the before and after and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous” (220a25).

Time as a boundary condition of phenomena is viewed in the role of ‘nows’ in change. They mark off a prior and a posterior duration as change. Hence time demarcates time by numbering the succession of instants forming a change from one now to another.

The ‘nows’ are vague in their status as parts of the whole of time: past, present and future and being itself. This whole is ontology of stable entities, constituted by Aristotelian substance, astronomical time, cyclical and divine time, not unlike Plato's conception of time as the

\[\text{himself agrees that time is the measure of rest as well as of movement at 221b7-12, where he says "All rest is in time".}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}Owen (1986, p. 311 - 314) does not find Aristotle's parallellism of time and space well founded.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{7} This measuring of time can be analyzed as a foundation of ursury (chrematistics) in Aristotle, as the time of interest rate, time as money. See Alliez 1995, ch. 1.}\]
"moving image of eternity"\(^8\). This brings us to the next section on substance, a concept that grants stability.

**Substance**

Central to Aristotle’s ontology is the concept of substance, which is timeless and unchanging but is part of change and not without relation to time (see next section below). Here some general remarks on Aristotle's metaphysics will be noted that will help us to see the place of time as an aspect of change.

Being is said in many ways, Aristotle repeats. The Greek word “to be” designates both being as temporal present (present participle tense) and as one or more entities. But all meanings have a focal point, in relation to one sense (that is substance, \( \text{\textit{ousi\d{a}}} \). Whatever that being can be, it remains the same as substance, but what is that then? The definitions in the *Metaphysics* states that

“Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies” (1028b2).

“The word ‘substance’ is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing and fourthly the substratum” (1028b31-35).

“It follows then that substances has two senses, a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and b) that which is a ‘this’ and separable - and of this nature is the shape or form of things” (1017b23-25).

Substance is the form of matter for Aristotle. This form moulds the matter, which makes up a hylomorphism with hierarchical values\(^9\). The form is a timeless essence, *to ti en einai*, of what

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\(^8\) *Timaeus*, 37d. This binds Aristotle to a cyclical time like the dramas of Aschyleos, if we follow the analysis of Hölderlin who viewed man as *ceasura* of time. See lecture 21/03 in Deleuze (1978) and the Hölderlin issue of Kris (1990). For insufficiency of Hölderlin's analysis of time from a Deleuzean reading, see Bergen (2001), p. 298 - 302.

\(^9\) For Witt (2003) this hylomorphism may have gender implications in a hierarchy of male form and female matter. A defence of the "horizontal unity" of matter and form, and especially of matter, is found in Gill (1989). For a polemic defence of Aristotle, especially against developmentalists, see Wehrle (2000).
an entity is in itself. This eternal essence does not make time or change important. Essentialism is also teleological since the essence strives to a preformed eternal goal, the perfected actuality, entelecheia. Form is both essence and substance of the thing. "By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary being" (1032b1). Thus substance is the innermost essence of a thing.

But Aristotle does make way for a certain view of time in his analysis of potentiality and actuality in being. Since time is an aspect of change, time is also brought in with this short summary of Aristotelian dynamics below.

**Change**

To the form/matter distinction is added the distinction of potentiality/actuality. Time measures change and motion as we saw earlier. The definition of time is that it is the enumeration of motion and change with respect to before and after. Since every change actualises a potential, time measures that process. "Motion is the actualisation of what potentially is, as such" (201a11).

As we saw above, form is substance, when it forms matter. In Aristotle's words: “And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter” (1029a30-31).

For an essence to become actualised in matter, it needs to exercise the power as potentiality. This state, dunamis, is however not only related to power of change but also to power as perfection as we noted. What we are interested in here is its capacity to exist in a different and more completed state. Aristotle views the realised state, actuality, as being ontologically before the non-realised state, potentiality. "The actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it "(1049b18-19). The substance as actuality is thereby given ontologically in its essential and timeless state. An actualised substance, a compound of matter and form, must have preceded the seed of a potential substance, a form, where form resides over matter and the compound 10.

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10 See Lewis (1996).
Actuality is prior to "every principle of change" (1051a1), which means that time as an aspect of change, or as such a principle, like the principle of potentiality, is always counted as second to the actualised form/matter compound. Substance is then both the form as essence and the very thing being actualised in the form/matter compound.

But the changelessness of substance does not mean that there exists a timeless Platonic Idea of substances or forms apart from the actual ones. Aristotle argues that although the form of a changing material thing is timeless, it is not everlasting. The claim that the form of a changing substance (from potential to actual) is itself changeless means only that it is changeless for the time or duration it exists in this form\(^\text{11}\). For Socrates, a Greek in 400 BC, it could mean some 60 years.

Another aspect of time and change in Aristotle that concerns us here is his view on infinite becomings in which Bergson and Deleuze take great interest. The infinite can never become 'actual' Aristotle says since it will always be more to realise from an infinite potentiality.

"But we must not construe potential existence in the way we do when we say that it is possible for this to be a statue - this will be a statue, but something infinite will not be in actuality. Being is spoken of in many ways and we say that the infinite is in the sense in which we say it is day or it is the games, because one thing after another is always coming into existence" (206a19-21).

The infinite cannot be conceptualised without losing its features. Its unending duration in time may be secured\(^\text{12}\) but not the infinite divisibility of time, which is what Bergson criticised in ancient thoughts about time. The distinction between potential and actual being is also important in relation to Bergson, to whom we will turn later, but before that we need to view some aspects of Deleuze’s critique of Aristotle’s metaphysics. The concepts difference and repetition are crucial to understanding of Deleuze's philosophy of time, but he uses them in a special way, unlike and opposed to Aristotle.

\(^{11}\) But there are differences between the timelessness of form and essence, see Politis (2004), p. 231.

\(^{12}\) As suggested by Hintikka. See Widder (2002), ch. 3, p. 10-11.
Difference and repetition

"Repetition-in-itself" is one of two central notions in Deleuze’s *Difference and repetition*. The other is "Difference-in-itself" that pictures a concept of difference that is actualised from an inner differenciation\(^{13}\). It is not given from identity of a preconceived essence as in Aristotle, but rather actualised from a virtual, univocal being. In order to understand repetition in Deleuze and thereby his own metaphysics of time, we need to get an understanding of his use of difference and critique of standard notions of difference. Aristotle is a point of reference in this matter and we already have a notion of his philosophy of time so it makes sense here to raise some of the doubts Deleuze has about Aristotelian concepts of difference.

In his work *Physics* (book 1, Ch. 3), Aristotle questions Parmenides’ eternalist static claim “Only the One Being is” by asking how the statement ”X is white” should be understood, asking which one it is that really is; X or whiteness?

If it is “whiteness”, the predicate of X, it does not have existence at all. This is because the subject to which being (supposing it to be an attribute) is ascribed will have no being at all. Attributing being to something that already exists (but here only as predicate) is contradictory as well not doing it, since then the predicate will not exist either. And if it is X, the subject, it does not have existence either, since it will not have any attributes at all as a not-attributed subject. It would be formless matter, which, strictly is nothing at all according to Aristotle.

The ontology of difference and identity weighs around the status of attributes that make a difference, e.g. “being white”. From what was said above we can see that when Aristotle says that “differences are”, he gives difference existence as well as its genus and species, e.g. *whales* in the statement “The whale is white”. Whales are a species of the larger genera of mammals and animals. Being is here said both of genus and of predicated differences in a different way than the genus animal is predicated of species like whales and men. We can say, “Whale is an animal” and “Man is an animal” but we can’t say, “White is an animal” or “Rational is an animal”.

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\(^{13}\) There are important differences in the spelling. "We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differen\(\text{i}f\)cation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation" (Deleuze 1994, p. 207). This thesis deals with the latter

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Being is predicated of both difference (the attributes “rational” and “white” in animals for instance) and identity (whales, men, mammals). Unlike genus, being does not signify a common trait among differences. Being is not a predicate, nor a genus. In this sense, being is not the highest unifying identity that is divided into 10 subgroups as Aristotle has it in his *Categories*. If there is a unity among the categories it must be conceived differently.

Deleuze’s answer is that being according to Aristotle has to be understood in an analogical manner. The being of difference itself must be understood in this manner, as what things have in common, analogously towards one another. To differ is to differ in some common aspect for Aristotle. “For…that which is different is different from some particular thing in some particular aspect, so that there must be something identical whereby they differ” (1054b25).

Since neither unity nor being can be a genus, analogy in relation to substance is crucial. Thus, all that is healthy is relative to health etc. “That which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these” (1003b, emphasis added).

Aristotle uses analogical measurements foremost in relation to quantity, a mathematical proportion, but also in relation to quality, e.g. in ethical comparisons when the Good is said in as many ways as being (*Nicomachean ethics*, 1096a23). Finally, he states that analogy is the sole way to find ways to all comparative metaphysical discussions. “For in each category of being an analogous term is found – as the straight is in length, so is the level in surface, perhaps the odd in number and the white in colour” (1093b18).

The category substance is the only category that expresses being qua being, unlike the other 9 categories that exist as qualifications of being, i.e. attributes, relations etc. There is no ‘white’ in itself but only on surfaces, bodies, colour reflections etc. But ‘being white’ exists in an

\[\text{notion, diffenciation, which is actualisation of the virtual in duration as a creative temporal process of being, a becoming without pre given essential being.}\]

\[14\text{ See Olkowski 2001, p. 19. For a deeper analysis and use of the term analogy in Aristotle, see Brentano 1975, p. 58- 66.}\]
analogue manner to the existence of substance. Difference however is related only to
identity, used as a tool to divide genus into species\textsuperscript{15}.

Deleuze’s criticism leads us to understand how difference can be understood in itself, outside
of the reach of identity, analogy, opposition and resemblance - outside of the four sides of
traditional representational image of thought. In seeing how the 10 categories are related in
their various ways of being, there is no possibility to join them as subdivisions of a shared
identity (which should be substance but it is also predicated of the differences between the
categories, i.e. their adversaries, indeterminate infinite dimensions etc).

Further, contradictions surface in the concept of essence. Essence is the set of essential
predicates of a subject without which it would not be what it is, unlike accidental predicates
like the white sides of whales being brown in certain instances due to being dirty, rather than
belonging to a brown species. The formula of essence then is composed of natural predicates
and a subject. But if these are distinct, a gap opens up between subject and predicates, how
essential they may be. If the predicates do not exist internally in the subject, the very essence
is dependent on its outside. The distinction collapses between natural and non-natural
accidents, knowable forms and unknowable matter etc.\textsuperscript{16}.

Difference-in-itself then is to be thought outside analogy, outside hierarchy and identity in a
new Copernican revolution in Western philosophy.

"That identity not be first, that it exists as a principle but as a second principle,
as a principle \textit{become}; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the
nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference

\textsuperscript{15} Deleuze (1994) p.325, note 12, grants with J. Brunshwig Aristotle to be more open to the
questions "Which one is being (which is being)?" and "Which one is substance (or better, as
Aristotle says, which things are substances?)", rather than the essentialist questions"What is
being?" and "What is substance?".

\textsuperscript{16} "It is henceforth inevitable that analogy falls into an unresolvable difficulty: it must
essentially relate being to particular existence, but at the same time it cannot say what
constitutes their individuality. For it retains in the particular only that which conforms to the
general (matter and form), and seeks the principle of individuation in this or that element of
the fully constituted individuals" (Deleuze 1994, p. 38). Deleuze's criticism of Aristotelian
difference is listed by 8 points in Williams (2003), p. 62. See also Widder (1997) and Widder
(2002). For a comparison between ontologies in Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze, see Protevi
having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical" (Deleuze 1994, p.41).

Difference is always thought in relation to other identities, which makes its identity rely on externality according to this reading of Aristotle, but Deleuze argues with Bergson that there is also an inner difference in duration that differs with itself, immediately.

"We are seeking the concept of difference insofar as it cannot be reduced to degree or intensity, to alteration or to contradiction: such a difference is vital, even if its concept is not itself biological. Life is the process of difference /.../in Bergson, and thanks to the notion of the virtual, the thing differs from itself in the first place, immediately. According to Hegel, the thing differs from itself because it differs in the first place from all that it is not, such that difference goes to the point of contradiction" (Deleuze 1999, p. 50, 53).

Deleuze proposes an affirmative being that does not depend on negation for its identity, as Hegel had it17. Everything that exists only becomes and never is. But what will provide a unity for all differences never ending their becomings? The answer is time; the process of actualisation itself, a becoming, a temporal genesis of individuation, repeated mechanisms that ensure that being is new each time; in short, the eternal return as repetition18.

"Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as secondary power; the identity of difference /.../Such an identity, produced by difference, is determined as 'repetition'". (Deleuze 1994, p. 41)

Repetition-in-itself ensures unity to the differences in the becomings in another kind of being than analogical being. It is a univocal being which states that being is said in a single sense of all that exists19.

17 For a defence of Hegel against Deleuze, see Zizek (2004).
18 We will get back to the Nietzschean eternal return in the third synthesis of time in the Deleuze chapter.
19 "The essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense but that it is said in a single and same sense of all its individuating differences/.../The essence of univocal being is to include individuating differences, while these differences do not have the same
Repetition-in-itself is linked to difference-in-itself in that identity is formed out of a non-conceptual identity, where the first is not what it is but how it differs, how it becomes actualised in real duration, which also affects time and repetition. When repetition was linked to a similar, flat being of differences related to known identities and hierarchies, it meant simple succession in Aristotelian time and a hylomorphism where pre given forms imposed themselves on matter. But given a new kind of difference, difference-in-itself, we will also get a new kind of repetition, an actualisation of the virtual, that does not simply repeat but creates new each time out of a selection of an excess of being that can become something anew. The excess comes from affirmation of being, since Deleuze never accepts negation in any form. "Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle" (Deleuze 1994, p.212).

Repetition is thus not understood, as a simple returning of the same in successive time, but as a new moment in a different concept of time, even if only it is new in the mind. "Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it", Hume said, a remark, which we will come back to.

Bergson's ontology of memory, of which we will see more later, is a pure reserve of immanent temporal aspects of the repeated along with habit in its passive formation of identities. Since difference-in-itself is virtual, real but not actual (more on this concept in the Bergson chapter), it becomes real and acquires an identity. This is always different by the actualisations of repetition in duration in processes of differentiations.

The central importance of repetition here is its relation to time. As with difference, repetition has been subjected to the law of the identical, but also to a prior model of time: to repeat a sentence means to say the same thing twice, at different moments. These different moments are then in this ordinary thought viewed as equal and unbiased, as if time were a flat, featureless expanse. Repetition has thus been considered traditionally from the idea of difference over time as successive moments. But given a renovated understanding of difference as in-itself, as we stated above, are we able to reconsider repetition also? There is also an imperative here: if we are to consider difference-in-itself over time, based in the traditional logic of repetition, we once again reach the point of identity. What gets repeated? essence and do not change the essence of being" (Deleuze 1994, p. 38). See Widder (1999),
As such, Deleuze's critique of identity must revalidate the question of time. Difference and repetition, identity and time hang together.

We now turn to Kant who brings about a clear break with Aristotle’s idea of time as a measurement of change, but also brings a new view of time and identity, which Deleuze uses in his philosophy of time.
III

Kant

This chapter will trace how Deleuze goes back to Kant as the one who introduces time as interiority and as transcendental. Kant’s metaphysical system will be presented as briefly but not as completely as Aristotle’s.

Change and inner sense

Kant reversed the order, viewing time as no longer dependent on change, but the opposite: movement is instead related to the time that conditions it. Time has become the base for measurements rather than the opposite\(^{\text{20}}\). Time is transcendental, a form of pure intuition.

"Time is the formal condition \textit{a priori} of all phenomena whatsoever. /.../No object ever can be presented to us in experience, which does not come under the conditions of time" (B 50- 52, p. 49-50 in Kant 1984\(^{\text{21}}\)).

Time is then not derived from experience but presupposed to it, a form that underlies all possible sense experience \textit{a priori}. This is seen in his analysis of time and change, where Kant (with Newton) reverses Aristotle's view. According to Kant, change would be incomprehensible if time was not already given, because change needs that what undergoes change must take on contradictory qualities. This can only make sense if done at different times. Thus, change presupposes time because time order appearances in succession and coexistence.

"It is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other. Thus our conception of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge \textit{a priori}.../ "
(B 49, ibid.)

\(^{\text{20}}\) Already in ancient Greece, time was already partly derived from manmade abstractions of physical processes and thus becoming free from pure measuring, relying on movements from meteorology, physiology, psychology (Alliez 1995, ch 1).

This can be explained in the notion of infinite regress. Kant presents three relations of time as the form of interiority: succession, simultaneity, and permanence. If we ascribe succession to time itself, we would have to think yet another time outside the passing present that would hold the successive moment of time in case and so on to infinity. If things succeed each other in various empirical times, they must also be simultaneous in a transcendental time. The only thing that does not change is time itself\textsuperscript{22}.

Further, time for Kant is necessarily related to our inner sense. This fact will become a major source for Deleuze as he expands on Kant's idea of time as the unity of a manifold of sense appearances.

"Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither with shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations in our internal state" (B 50, ibid.).

Deleuze believes this to be the Copernican revolution of Kant, although Kant himself did not go far enough\textsuperscript{23}. Deleuze wants to free these three modalities of time (succession, simultaneity, and permanence) from the subordination of the understanding of one stable subject and bring in other, pre-timely temporalisations and real virtual novelty\textsuperscript{24}. But the free play of imagination for understanding was not realised for Kant until the \textit{Critique of Judgment}.

\textsuperscript{22} "Everything which moves and changes is in time, but time itself does not change, does not move, anymore than it is eternal. It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable Form, which does not change. It is not an eternal form, but in fact the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change and movement. Such an autonomous form seems to indicate a profound mystery: it demands a new definition of time, which Kant must discover or create" (Deleuze 1995, p. viii).

\textsuperscript{23} Kant never went as far as Deleuze had him say, "The first thing the Copernican Revolution teaches us is that it is we who are giving the order" (Deleuze 1995, p. 14).

\textsuperscript{24} "In Deleuze, the three modalities or dimensions of time are free from this subordination and are made to constitute the structure of the passive ego, which determines a domain of syntheses that exist prior to the syntheses of the understanding and freed from the constraints of the categories " (Smith 1997, p. 140). These passive syntheses are inspired by Heidegger Smith argues.
Time is itself a manifold and a unity in manifold of the multiplicity of appearances. Infinity at any given number of time means that given any time interval, a greater time interval exists that includes that interval. Time is thus infinite in being unlimited, an order of succession without limits. This feature shows that time is not a concept, but an intuition. Concepts could never contain an infinite number of parts, Kant claims, even though a concept may refer to an infinite number of things. This manifoldness will become important in Deleuze's interpretation of Kant.

**Cracked cogito and disjointed time**

Utilising poetic metaphors from Shakespeare and Rimbaud, Deleuze states in his reading of Kant that "Time is out of joint" and "Je est un autre" (Deleuze 1995, preface). Since time is not an aspect of change or movement, or a part of a consciousness present to a stable subject, it is unhinged, disjointed. A fractured passive cogito is a consequence of this immanent time that needs a thinking subject. Deleuze brings a thorough critique of our Kantian presuppositions of a stable subject, a stable world, of a stable time – in short of a stable Aristotelian hierarchy of being. Neither of this is evident from a traditional reading of Kant, but Deleuze views him differently.

We noted that time is considered to be a Form of Intuition by Kant just as space. A progression from 17th century rationalism is taken further. The cogito taken from Descartes is thereby structured in a new way in this analysis of our inner sense.

"Kant demands the introduction of a new component into the cogito, the one Descartes repressed - time. For it is only in time that my undetermined existence is determinable/.... /but it is a completely different time from that of Platonic anteriority /.../Time becomes form of interiority"

(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 31-32).

For Descartes it was possible to go from the determination "I think" to the undetermined "I exist", but Deleuze argues with Kant that there must be a third term lacking, the determinable. There is something existing in the consciousness but nothing is thereby given for thought as a thinking entity, a cogito.
"Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental difference between Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an *a priori* relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: The form under which the undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time. The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only *within time* as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive receptive subject appearing *within time* /.../ But only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it"

(Deleuze 1994, p. 86).

We have thus moved from a unacknowledged time of Descartes to an impersonal time. Time as auto-affection, subjectivity, the cracked "I" of time, is the unthinkable in thought.25

"This is the line of time which separates the 'I think' from the 'I am'. It's the pure and empty line of time, which traverses, which affects this sort of crack in the I, between an 'I think' as determination and an 'I am' as determinable in time. Time has become the limit of thought and thought never ceases to have to deal with its own limit. Thought is limited from the inside. There is no longer an extended substance which limits thinking substance from the outside, and which resists thinking substance, but the form of thought is traversed through and through, as if cracked like a plate, it is cracked by the line of time. It makes time the interior limit of thought itself, which is to say the unthinkable in thought".

(Deleuze, lecture 28/03/78).

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25 See Bryant (2002), p. 20- 21 and Smith (1997), p. 137- 141. Deleuze stated this subjetivation in time with reference to Foucault: "Memory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the affect of the self by itself" (Deleuze 1988, p. 197).
Time is not in the subject, but the subject is in time and is thereby not the first transcendental condition but rather an effect of time\textsuperscript{26}.

However, the subjectivity that Kant stated is not psychological in the associationist sense of Hume but transcendental. Hume inspired Kant to imagine a fractured subject, but it may be Deleuze 250 years later who went all the way to a new empiricism. But Deleuze hesitates in front of the conventional conclusion Kant draws, that there is a transcendental unity of self-consciousness, as the evident Kantian apperception of the ego following each thought by an "I think".

**Image of thought**

Basically Deleuze thinks that the error consisting of defining the transcendental with the help of consciousness is that it gets constructed out of the image of thought it was supposed to ground. We do not think transcendentally enough, but with our “Image of thought” based on conceptual prejudices and laziness. The idea of an Image of thought is a central part of Deleuze’s system, and the title of a central chapter in *Difference and repetition* and will only be briefly outlined here.

The image of thought generally associated with rationalism, such as Kant’s, thinks in representational and recognisable terms of subjects and objects, persons and things. This image of thought and its identitarian logic lives all through the history of Western philosophy.

The image is made out of Goodness, Truth and Common Sense, philosophy's worst doxas. To believe that people, and especially philosophers, seek the true and the good out of a natural commonsensical habit to think is a deception. The normal thinking self is required to stay with these conditions in order to remain normal. The alternatives Deleuze views coming from Kant are the Schylla of the undifferentiated Abyss or Charybdis of a Supreme Being\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{26} "When [Deleuze] approaches time on the level of subjectivity and says that time is the interiority in which we move and change, he is not grounding time in subjectivity or in an intentional consciousness. The depths of time that are involved in the exploration of the pure past and in the 'volcanic spatium' of Nietzsche's eternal return, are beyond the ambit of a simple or straightforward phenomenology of time (we would do better to speak of a geology
The alternative to Kant's transcendentalism, which never really frees itself from a psychologism which already Husserl noted in Kant, is a "transcendental empiricism", where the conditions are made along with experimentation outside what is good, true or common sense. Kant sees only what he recognises, Deleuze argues, and represents what he perceives to a known self all within the Same (identical, similar, opposite to, and analogical).

Further, Delueze argues that Kant viewed only conditions for possible but not real experiences and deduced from these facts of reason and morality a set of transcendental conditions to a consciousness. He relied on the very same facts for which he sought conditions. Man is moral, so where is Morality? Man is rational, so where is Rationality? Etc. “The error of all determinations of the transcendental as consciousness is to conceive of the transcendental in the image and resemblance of what it is supposed to found” (Deleuze 1990, p.105). Kant never brought up the genetic conditions of a transcendental field. In this post-Kantian critique, Deleuze is a late successor the Kant's contemporary Salomon Maimon, someone who Kant himself acknowledged had overturned his critical philosophy.

In the Deduction of the categories and the Paralogisms of the first Critique, Kant showed that the self cannot be treated as an unmediated relation of spontaneity to itself, such that it would...
bring us immediately to our own noumental reality. Rather, the self too is an appearance within internal time-consciousness and we only posit the spontaneity of the "I think". Kant filled the void of this fissured cogito with active syntheses of understanding, always remembering that it is an "I" that thinks, as if we have to be reminded of ourselves every morning of who we are. The importance of repetition is crucial. Deleuze revives in his own way the Kantian idea of three passive syntheses of a fractured cogito as will be shown below in the Deleuze chapter. But first we need to encounter the concepts of habit and memory from Bergson's analysis.
In this chapter, Bergson's idea of time as a foundation for metaphysics is presented along with Deleuze's interpretation and expansion.

**Time is real**

That time is something in itself, is said to be Bergson's main thesis. It can also be stated in the thought that only time is real. A summary of Bergson's main idea yields four notions:

1) The future is undecided - which means that there are no pre-given, determinate events in a creative universe of living processes,

2) The time of physics is not real - which means that physics never captures time proper, but only an artificial account by quantity

3) Real time is only possible in memory - physics never remembers time flowing in its quality or in its duration, but in memory, time is accumulated in its fullness,

4) Evolution displays mind-like properties - which means that if real time only exists in memory, if its nature is psychological, we live in a time-bound universe where the evolution of organic matter is actually the work of the mind (Kolakowski 2001, p. 2-4)

Man spatialises time – that is the critique of the reality of time that led him to counter conventional thoughts of time. Time, according to him, has been wrongly viewed as an aspect of change in space. In space, elements are made up of discrete parts that are related by juxtaposition and exteriority. By contrast, the reality of time is of interiority and intensity. This analysis is not new, since subjective views on time have always been a part of, even if
not the major part of Aristotle’s concept of time. Augustine, as any history of time in Western philosophy tells us, is the great predecessor to an interpretation of time as interior consciousness. His idea of our memory as divine and man as a temporal image of an eternal God make us bearers of our memories for our salvation. But the methods Bergson used were based on scientific measurements, which abound in his first book (Bergson 1992). Only later in life did Bergson relate time and life processes to religion.

An example that confirms the subjective yet scientifically noted nature of time is the registration of minute successive moments of time as the way in which the notes of a melody melt into one another in a totality different from a totality of innumerable spatial parts. The underlying ontology of this analysis is a universe of flux rather than one of stability as in Aristotelian substance. Time is ontological duration, a qualitative multiplicity that cannot be captured by concepts of juxtaposition, unity or reason, but craves intuition and sensation.

“When we interrupt the rhythm of a tune by perhaps dwelling longer than is customary on one note, it is not the exaggerated length that signals the mistake to us but rather the qualitative change caused in the whole of the piece of music” (Ansell Pearson and Mullarkey, 2001, p. 4).

A movement has two parts; the physical alteration in space and the infinitely varied action of that alteration viewed as duration, as a co-existing quality of the alteration that cannot be divided into discrete parts. The time of a piece of sugar melting has a clock time and an intensity, where the last notion is my waiting, my thirst and memories of waiting for sugar to melt (Bergson 1998, p. 10). Similarly, a succession of notes make up a melody where the physical sound waves have their particular frequencies along with that lively character that make up a song, a melody, by our anticipation of their succession as a reality apart from their numerical stances.

Aristotle's definition of time as the number of change is done with a view of space as the surrounding metaphor for such an enumeration. To count instants, they have to be distinguished from one another as points in space or on a line. This ability to be counted for is only possible in quantitative multiplicities, like sets of numbers, extensions of lengths etc, but not as (well-) played notes in a melody. Bergson's great contribution to philosophy of time can be said to hail a notion of another multiplicity, a qualitative one that exhibits
heterogeneous differences in kind rather than homogenous differences in degree as in the quantitative multiplicities\(^{30}\).

An example: The sliding of a hand from position A to B in the air can be analysed from two points of view: the space covered in air and the movement of the hand.

"How could the movement be applied upon the space it traverses? How can something moving coincide with something immobile? How could the moving object be in a point of its trajectory passage? It passes through or in other terms, it could be there. It would be there if it stopped; but if it should stop there, it would no longer be the same movement" (op cit, p. 143).

Bergson claims that our minds prefer stability to mobility since we understand it better. Habitual patterns are very strong and only at a few instances do we realise the movement of reality itself, as we do in art, in heightened intensities of mysticism or personal crisis. We go on in the world as if it was stable. When we try to fix positions of a passage of time, we make of it a series of discrete quantities, although we know that there always will be another quantity between those we fixated.

"We put this [new indefinitely numbered] passage off indefinitely the moment we have to consider it. We admit that it exists, we give it a name; that is enough for us /.../We have an instinctive fear of those difficulties which the vision of movement as movement would arouse in our thought" (ibid.).

A feature of Aristotle's counting of time passing between 'nows' is that between each now and another there will always be an infinite number of 'nows'. He registers that but never draws the conclusion of Bergson: "We shall think of all change, all movement, as being absolutely indivisible" (Bergson 1974, p. 142).

Our habits permeate also our scientific endeavours: "Common sense, which is occupied with detached objects, and also science, which considers isolated systems, are concerned only with the ends of the intervals and not with the intervals themselves" (Bergson 1998, p. 9). Language and social life encourage us to view time in a spatial mode, but make us mistake the most useful notions for the most philosophically clear.

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\(^{30}\) See Bergson (1992), ch. 2. Later works do not make an easy opposition between
Duration

The alternative to scientific and habitual reasoning of time is to view time as duration (durée). Duration is the pure flow of time, undivided, and always free of pre-given forms from the past or future expectations. Duration is not only that of life and living things, but also a feature of the whole universe and of matter.

"The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the new. The systems marked off by science endure only because they are bound up inseparably with the rest of the universe /.../There is no reason, therefore, why a duration, and so a form of existence like our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates, provided such systems are reintegrated into the Whole" (op cit, p. 11).

What this Whole could be will be touched upon later in the section on virtuality. The mistake to view time either as a series of states in an extended juxtaposition or as a unified progression leads to sacrifice of either one of the features or to confusion. Attempts to express both the unity of infinitely varied movement and the discrete numbered positions as belonging to the same time are fruitless.

The result, apart from confusion or one-sided approaches to the measure of time is that time is abstracted, intellectualised and given a stable character that it never has had. This is the irrationalism of Bergson that many philosophers disapprove of. His fault, it is said, is that he limits the bounds of reason, replacing intellect with intuition. He claimed that if we allow ourselves to put ourselves into duration, we may come up with appropriate concepts intuitively that are specifically suited to that specific time-flow. But we use established notions. Our language and habits of thoughts consolidate things under fixed essences that never are exact. Things and events get the same name headings though they never are the same. We do not go deep enough but stay on the superficial levels of genus, species, being, substance etc. To call Bergson an irrationalist is wrong since he was almost too rational in his analysis of inner intuitive states. An irrationalist would hold that there are special, quantitative and qualitative multiplicities, but rather their mixtures.

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incommunicable means to know reality as it is and that reason on its own is not enough. Bergson never held this view. He was rather a nominalist in his defence of simple cognition that avoids abstractions and that groups sense-impressions into ready-made frames and conventions.

Our inability to have true perception is shown in his careful analysis of immobility vs. flux. "Immobility is but a picture (in the photographic sense of the word) taken of reality by our mind" (Bergson in Kolakowski, 2001, p. 12-13). Bergson argues that we have an almost divine, unscientific view of being that says that being is full only in immobile Ideas. Matter and movement distort the fullness of this immobile being, this God. This is due to our "inborn Platonism" (Kolakowski's term).

"The same diminution of being is expressed both by extension in space and detention in time. Both of these are but the distance between what is and what ought to be. From the standpoint of ancient philosophy, space and time can be nothing but the field that an incomplete reality, or rather a reality that has gone astray from itself, needs in order to run in quest of itself" (Bergson 1998, p. 318-319).

Duration is thought in terms of consciousness in Bergson's earlier works. It is in the raw state of feelings, in the qualitative states of our mind that duration surfaces, as in dreams: where the total effect of melodies or ringing of clocks is experienced. But there is more to time that consciousness of a present event. There is also a virtual past that co-exists with the present.

**Virtuality**

A difficult concept in Bergson's philosophy of time is virtuality. It is closely connected to memory but a special kind of pure memory of the past, a pure or virtual past.

A pure past is something real and virtual that exists along the present just like unperceived objects (e.g. the dark side of the moon) exist in physical pace. Memory is stored as pure perception (as in habit and pragmatic directed intentions), in memory-images (flashbacks, dreams) and pure memory.
This pure memory conditions the present, which would otherwise only be an instant. The present is divided into an actual future and a virtual past. The latter is not a psychological concept but an inactive being of the past itself. This past can be personal or universal. Bergson exemplifies his idea of the virtual with a cone where the whole of the cone, $SAB$, is meeting at its vertex, $S$, a plan, $P$ (Bergson 1926, p 165). The cone is all of the existing past and present stated. $S$ is the passing present that at $P$ meets the representation of the universe. $S$ and $P$ advance into the future along the arrow of time.

Now, the base $AB$ depicts an immobile past of recollections and memory. Out of actions and habits the present $S$ at $P$ extracts what is useful out of its perceptions. The closer its focus is on present perception, that is, at the pointed end of the cone, the more habit repeats and time contracts into a present. But if need or habit do not impinge on the present, $S$ can dwell on any part of the past time of all of $SAB$ and dilute time into past, where any memory may attach to any present situation and perception.

The cone renders itself to two series of movements; contraction and dilution, matter and memory, being and time. However, Bergson never saw them as absolutes, but as endpoints of the same being. Between $AB$ and $S$ there are an infinite number of "time slices", $a-b$, $a'-b'$, $a''-b''$ etc that out of every situation get activated as memories, although all of $SAB$ always exists even if only $S$ actualises $a-b$ at a particular time.

Duration consists of the virtual becoming actual through a process of actualisation and differentiation. The virtual is always real but never actual, until it actualises itself as something different from a possibility. The latter is just duplication of the actual but without

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any reality. Bergson states that possibility is just a pre-given form (Aristotle's essence), something given from essences or forms, that gets actualised as a repetition. In contrast, virtuality is never given since its actualisation creates new lines of non-formed matters and memories that make up a manifold of qualitatively different items.

The present is a meeting of matter and memory, of perception and recollection. By the cone, we could, according to Lawlor (2003, p.48) draw another cone from the underside, which is that of matter from where images stem. Thus we have two cones meeting one another at the perceived perspective $P$. Reality is not what is presented to consciousness but all of the cones, all un-recollected memories and unperceived matters. The present is a "quasi-instantaneous section" in the continuity of becoming, which is reality itself. But for being to be time, it should not be viewed as the present, which is a bleak image, a snapshot, of the moving reality. The present is a function of time, just as the conscious (the perceived present out of utility at $S$ in the cone) is a function of the unconscious (all of $SAB$). "Instead of defining being as the present or consciousness or presence to consciousness, [Bergson] is going to define being with the past" (Lawlor 2003, p. 49)31

Bergson left subjectivity and objectivity behind in this concept of being as past time. A psychological embodiment arises in a present perception of consciousness but along with a movement of virtual memory from an ontological past. Movements of rotation and translation in this past time bring memories to mind, but the image of the present and its conscious state never will. "The image pure and simple will not take me back to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past that I sought it "(Bergson 1926, p. 146, my translation). The past is stuck between the present it was and the existing present to which it is now past. What we often do is view both as the same but different only in degree of quantity, whereas Bergson holds that the past never is of the same kind of quality since it always actualises itself into new pasts out of new present perceptions and internal mixtures among and inside the various planes of memory.

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31 Lawlor argues against Heidegger's interpretation of Bergson's philosophy of time as a simple subjective reversal of Aristotle's time. See Heeg and Wallenstein (1988) for a Swedish translation of Heidegger's note 30, § 81 in Being and time and a discussion of Derrida's famous interpretation of this debate.

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The present must already be past when it is present as it otherwise would not pass into the past Deleuze argues in his study of Bergson:

"How would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same time that it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the same time as present? /.../ The past is 'contemporaneous' with the present that it has been. If the past had to wait in order be no longer, if it was not immediately and now that it had passed, 'past in general', it could never become what it is, it would never be that past" (Deleuze 1991b, p. 58-59).

Each present passes then along with the past, which is presupposed to exist before the present.

As we stated earlier, what is virtual is always real since it has happened but it is not always actualised. The potential is actual but not always realised. The potential is the possible. What is possible may exist but not necessarily so. Thus it is here interpreted as a weak form of being of what is pre-given in form and substance but lacks being, reality. Referring to Aristotle, potentiality (form) is the lesser form of existence than actuality (form and compound form/matter) The latter is substance, as we noted earlier. “...Form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance...” (1029a30-31). We also saw that actuality is ontologically prior to potentiality (p. 12)

Virtuality is reality and is never actualised out of a possible pre-given form but always as different.

Thus we get four processes:

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The virtual is real but not actual. The potential is actual but not real.

The process of realisation of the possible is weak since all that is added is being, as it was pre-given in form to begin with. Duration is virtuality, ontological memory that through
movement in time becomes actual. It is even living nature as opposed to dead matter. The process that gives life to movement, to being, to actualisation of a creative unity out of memory, is life itself, its inner spark, an \textit{élan vital}. Actualisation on the other hand is free creation, a spark of novelty. Actualisation of the virtual takes only place in duration, which was not the case in Aristotle. Being is what differs from itself already from the beginning, Deleuze argued (1999). Being becomes, it never is.

"To recognise the essential nature of being as a substantial unity, then, we have to think being in terms of time: 'a single Time, one, universal impersonal'" (Bergson in Hardt 1993, p. 15)\textsuperscript{32}. Being as becoming is the temporal movement from virtual to actual. Time is by this move of thought elevated in Bergson to chart the movement of ontology rather than the number of successive positions in space.

Like Aristotle, Bergson views that time must be noted by a consciousness. The universe is made out of fluxes with seemingly different times. However, there is only one reality and one time. Einstein's idea of a relativity of time is nothing but a further spatialization and confusion of that fact Bergson argued in his study of Einstein, \textit{Duration and simultaneity}.

"What we wish to establish is that we cannot speak of a reality that endures without inserting consciousness in it /..../If we were to fix attention upon time itself, we would necessarily picture succession, and therefore before and after consequently a bridge between the two...But once again, it is impossible to imagine or conceive a connective link between the before and after without an element of memory, and consequently, of consciousness" (Bergson 1999, p.33).

The universe is like a gigantic memory, like a Whole of a cone \textit{SAB} all way up to the time of stars, a virtual coexistence that actualises itself in always-new minglings of quality and quantity. Duration spreads movement into always increasingly quantitative contracted matters.

Our existence then is always dual, virtual and actual. Like a mirror - image, the virtuality of our life, our pure past follows us.

\textsuperscript{32} The scholastic use of virtual being as \textit{ens realissimum} describes the process as an ideal or transcendental being that is real in all its states. It becomes creative in actualization, a univocal being (Duns Scotus) or immanent substance (Spinoza) (Hardt 1993, p.17).
"Each moment is split up as and when it is posited. Or rather, it consists in this very splitting, for the present moment, always going forward, fleeting limit between the immediate past which is now no more and the immediate future which is not yet, would be a mere abstraction were it not the moving mirror which continually reflects perception as a memory" (Bergson in Ansell Pearson 2002, p. 175-76).

Time according to Bergson is central to our existence. We are ready now to see how Deleuze expands Bergson's and Kant's ideas of time in his three passive syntheses of time as habit (inspired by Hume), memory (Bergson) and novelty (Nietzsche).
Three syntheses of time

In *Difference and repetition*, Deleuze presents three passive syntheses of time. They make up an important part of his ontology, which we will examine only briefly here.

1. The first is the passive connective synthesis of time as circle, a passive repetition of the same. Time considered like this is pure habit: the linkages of successive contracted presents out of expectancy. Habit synthesises the immediate past as a contraction in the present and as expected behaviour towards the future. The “living present” is not the given as an abstraction, a transcendental condition, but the living expectancy.

"Passive synthesis or contraction is essentially asymmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus, from the particular to the general, thereby imparting direction to the arrow of time" (Deleuze 1994, p. 71).

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33 Deleuze's three passive syntheses are not unlike Heidegger's *Ek-stases* of time (Heidegger 1981, §65), where the past is our thrownness into the world, the present is the within-time-ness of our care and the future is our being-towards-death (Smith 1997, p. 140). The final examination of relations between these two close but also distant philosophers is still to be done. See Agamben (1998), p.171 and Deleuze (1994), p. 64 -65. Deleuze himself was silent on the issue, just as Foucault was about the Heideggerian roots to his analytics of finitudes in *Les mots et les choses.*

34 "The insistence on three syntheses of time - habit, the synthesis of the whole of the past and the cut in time that orders, assembles and divides it into two series - account for the importance of a philosophy of time for Deleuze's philosophy and for its wider significance and originality. The philosophy allows him to explain how things acquire consistency free of conscious activity and natural law (first synthesis), to explain how all things are connected but in a non-casual manner (second synthesis) and to explain how the virtual and actual are necessarily related but without being reducible to one another (third synthesis)" (Williams 2003, p.104).
Deleuze uses an example from Hume with a series of AB, AB, AB, A…where we expect B to follow in our mind, though they are all mechanically separated and repeated. Hume explains the expectancy as a product of our imagination and habit. But it is not carried out by the mind or understanding or memory but occurs in the mind that contemplates it. "Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind that contemplates it" Deleuze writes referring to Hume's famous thesis (Deleuze 1994, p.70).

This first synthesis is thus the way we normally conceive time, the habitual, clockwise repetition of moments. The past lingers on in the present with its preformed habits of our life: how it usually is and probably will continue to be. The first passive synthesis precedes the expectancy. This has consequences for our active consciousness and memory in other synthoses in that they rest upon the passive habitual time. “The active synthoses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of imagination [i.e. expectancy]” (op cit., p.71).

The term contraction is taken from Bergson where it defines matter becoming inert, as opposed to dilution that defines memory's vivid state, which is more of the second passive synthesis of time. Contraction and habit make up our identity. We are because we repeat and we make sense of time as a continually living present. This passivity creates a split subject out of minute parts that we seldom perceive. “Selves are larval subjects; the world of passive synthoses constitutes the system of the self, under conditions yet to be determined, but it is the system of a dissolved self" (op cit, p.78).

Deleuze rejects Kant's question, “How can something be given to the subject?” since it implies an active synthesis with an intact subject, and is in favour of Hume's more associationist question, “How is the subject constituted within the given?” Time as repetition and habit is a part of these spatio-temporal dynamisms that Deleuze wants to replace Kantian transcendence with36.

35 Retention in Husserl for an intentionality, which is not presupposed by Deleuze. See Turezky (1999), p. 212, ch XI.
2.
The second synthesis is a conjunctive passive synthesis of diluted past time, an ontological past that the presents of the first synthesis can be “in”. This is what we call memory but for Deleuze there exists another kind of memory than the active recalling of past events. This passive memory is the virtual past that Bergson showed with his image of the cone. For Deleuze it becomes a transcendental condition for the active kind of memory.

"In this sense, the active synthesis of memory may well be founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be grounded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself". (op cit, p. 81)

This passive synthesis has three features that lead us to understand it better. First, the present that passes has already a past within itself, which is the relation of the being of its own past to the past it enters. Second, when this present and its past have passed away it becomes a past event for any future present. “All of the past co-exists with the new present in relation to which it is now past” (op cit, p. 82). Stated differently, any present passes away in relation to any present that went before it because the past that accompanied those former presents also accompanies later ones. Third, the passive synthesis of all of the past as past elements of all presents is an a-priori condition of the present passing away. This past of the future pre-exists all presents.

Bergson divided memory into the mentioned “habit-memory” that Hume also noted, the representational “recollection- memory” that we are conscious of and usually call memory, and the last kind, the "pure memory" that Deleuze uses for his idea of this second passive synthesis. This pure past is contemporary, co-existing and pre-existing with the present as virtuality: real but not actual.

36 Philosophy has no prominence here. Biology and chemistry are as important as geology, sociology and history to explain heterogenous, morphogenetic processes of body and thought. See Delanda (1997 and 2002) and all works of Deleuze and Guattari.
37 "Whereas empirical memory concerns those things which are quite readily grasped since what is recalled needs to have been seen, heard, imagined or thought, a transcendental memory seeks to grasp that which form the outset can only be recalled, even the first time of something. It deals not with a contingent past but the being of the past, the past of every time" (Ansell Pearson 2002, p.170).
One can say even that we move from the past to the present, and not the opposite. “The past has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is identical with being itself” (Deleuze 1991b, p.55).

But this past is not a stable identical past of the presents that have passed, but rather their virtual counterparts, a pure past of our whole life that we carry with us. Bergson's cone is used to show how we always play out our life at different levels (the - b: s, and a'-b':s of our life), and where our destiny consists in choosing levels. These are never stable but resonances and echoes that vary according to our state of diluted time. Being a contraction of all our life, the present holds us tight to what is needed, practical, moral and common. But the pure past can be useful for us in order to act out our life in new creative ways if we take a leap to the pure changeable ontological past of our life, and not the past of all the pre-given presents.

“It is not the case of one region containing elements of the past, particular recollections, in opposition to another region which contains other recollections. It is a case of there being distinct levels, each one of which contains the whole of our past, but into a more or less contracted state” (op cit., p.61).

The past has another function in the first two passive syntheses. Since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but exists along with it as a pure past into which the present passes, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and as past, both differing in nature (qualitative multiplicities). One dividing direction comes from habit in the first passive synthesis that makes the living present absorb the future and the past, another dual direction from the second synthesis that divides the present into a virtual future and past, at every instant, in both directions, at once. A becoming small and large at the same time as when one grows (who grows? X. But X is small. Yes but now X is larger than X was. Who? X. The X that was small or the X that is large? Which is the X? Both). The first is Chronos, living, empirical time, the other Aion, empty form of time. Another name for the second category of time is the event (more below). The difference between the two pasts as well as the difference between the two simultaneous directions in a becoming, guarantees an actualisation of the virtual, a differencliation.
The third synthesis is the disjunctive passive synthesis of time. It has no ground or foundation but is a chance, a creation, and a future. We saw earlier how Deleuze used Kant's critique of Descartes but went further to unhinge time completely. This disjointed time ceases to be cardinal (to order numbers in series, the Third time) and becomes only ordinal (Three times). This time is unconditioned unlike the other two and divides past and present in relation to the future out of a virtual reserve of pasts and presents. Here the present and past are dimensions of the future: the past is its condition, the present its agent, but both the condition and the agent are annulled, dissolved if necessary, in the production of the new.

The third synthesis selects out of the past and presents something new that is the main direction of Deleuze's thought. How this is done is related to Kant and his critique of Descartes that we touched upon earlier. We stated that there were three parts in the cogito, the determination (“I think”), the indeterminate (“I exist”) and the determinable (the condition under which “I” become determinable, that is pure time). If something is to be determined at all, it is determined through time. The given cogito is given passively in time and only afterwards gets thinking added actively. The “I that thinks” is then given secondly to the condition that it is passive to.

"Time signifies a fault or a rift in the I and a passivity in the self; and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental or the element of the Copernican revolution"

(Deleuze 1994, p.86).

Kant secures the rift in the cogito in his practical philosophy by stating that we have to act as if the “I” had a secure identity. Deleuze however searches for the condition that makes the undetermined ground of a determined given as determinable. Given the sensations “I think” or “I expect”, we cannot draw further conclusions other than to understand what forms or existences this thinking or expectation presupposes.

Kant isolates sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic and takes away from it everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing may be left save empirical intuition. Secondly, he separates all sensations, saving pure intuition and the mere form of

38 See Deleuze (1990), 1st and 23rd series, Smith (1997), p.163-165 and Zourabichivilli,
appearances, an a-priori sensibility. Deleuze on the other hand, leaves the sensations free-floating with no stable conditions. Since representation as an alternative is criticised and excluded by Deleuze, but not by Kant who synthesises object and subject along with receptive sensibility and active understanding in representation, he must another way to find sensations and conditions in the fractured cogito.

Deleuze does this by adding to expectancy of the passive assumption that something will occur (first synthesis) and the passive archiving of the passing present in the pure past (the second synthesis), an openness of the future (third synthesis). It is a chance and a risk of novelty. We are passive to this sense of future and change: an aspect of what we do being a part of the future, whatever that we may do or act. There is always a future to our present as in what will remain, what will be the judgement from future civilisations and ourselves etc. One could even call it nihilism as we never know how our actions will be judged.

Its pattern is the Nietzschean eternal return of the different (more on that below). It makes something new occur from the future, in the present and the past. This third passive synthesis of time then, is the form for actions that make things anew. If it did not exist, we would repeat the same. We have to make a cut in time, a caesura, to open up the possibility of the new, the event. Identities rest in the past but that which is new, returns, as when a play is enacted again and again in different ways.

The connections between actual and virtual time is the effort of the third synthesis, its differenciation, as it makes something new become actualised and different each time out of the virtual. Actual things are viewed in linear time but can only be completed in relation to virtual non-linear time. Events shake the virtual past when we suddenly understand it differently.

The eternal return repeats that which differs-from-itself. Leave all conceptions of return of the same, Deleuze maintains. It is the being of becoming that returns. Not the beings themselves, but their actualisations, affirmations and selections. One can even say that the third synthesis is the mechanism by which the actual and virtual is made along with the other syntheses. An actual present (habit) and a virtual past (memory) are brought about by the split out of


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something new being created (future). Although it is passive, since the third synthesis grounds the consciousness, it splits the past and present open. The past can then produce something new by launching itself into the present and recreate the past as a disjunctive paradoxical time that becomes the differenctiatrix that precedes identities.

The virtual past exists along with the present, but in the third synthesis, it is the whole of time, its past, present, future and all their intertwinnings and actualisations, that subsists, insists or ex-ists, between times, a between-time, meantime, meanwhile, entre-temps.

"It is the event which is a meanwhile: the between-time is not of the eternal, but it is not of time either - it belongs to becoming/.../ it coexists with the instant or time of the accident, but as the immensity of the empty time in which we see it as still to come and as having already happened/.../all the meanwhiles are superimposed on one another, whereas times succeed each other".

(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 158)

The third synthesis is what gives Deleuze's project of a theory of novelty and creation its peculiar twist. Here are some more notions that concern Deleuzean time.

Affects, Affirmations, Aion, Becomings, Crystals, Events, Rythms, Values…

This section continues the Dionysian labour of the third synthesis as Deleuze's thought evolved in other areas and with other terms.

Since non-thinking time is interior in us, we are of time but also of something we do not know (e.g. facts of language, bodies, work). We are simply not negations of others, or of being, but affirmations and affects, couplings between our virtual past and actual events. The passage between two series, their becomings and actualisations, are what constitutes our world.

39 The empty time is dead time and death. Deleuze writes on the Freudian death drive as not a part of living or strive towards equivalence in energy but as governing the risk of the eternal return with its repetition of differences, of small deaths and personal, of time as pure form. "Death cannot be reduced to negation /.../[It] is, rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, the sign of their persistence over and above every response,
We saw earlier that the pure form of time is the correlate of the passive self as the empty form of the determinable in Kant. It signifies the death of God and the fractured passive self. Time is no longer subordinate to the cardinal measure of movement.

Unfortunately this was an aborted initiative by Kant where self, world, and God underwent a resurrection, and all was safe for the world of representation again. The fracture of the “I” was filled, and with it, the empty form of time was filled too. When Kant filled the fracture, reconstituted the self, and re-hinged the faculties, he found himself again at the level of a traditional concept of self. His spatio-temporal forms were, a priori, in the image of the preformed concept. Then, all that Kant’s transcendentalism could do, as empty time (empty of empirical content), was to remain within the hidden schematism of the concept40.

We cannot go much further here with the alternatives Deleuze had to Kant's resurrected metaphysics. But we need to mention briefly the idea of a univocal ontology that underlies Deleuze's views on being and time. The main idea of univocity is that, of all that exists, being is said in the same sense.

Regarding time, the univocity of time means that there are really and formally distinct durations in an ontologically single time. Real distinctions are qualitative, but not numerical. All really and formally distinct changes are of the same form, which does not change or move. This is the static form into which singularities are dispersely distributed in the time of Aion (empty, transcendental form of time), as opposed to Chronos (mathematical measuring time). With the univocity of time then there are no numerically distinct times in succession. In this pure order of time, every time as really and formally distinct is the whole of time. It is ontologically one. To realise this concept of time as a pure affirmation of differences, of differenciations, temporal actualisations that create new becomings, is to "realise univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return" (Deleuze 1994, p. 304).

We need to make a brief detour to examine Nietzsche's philosophy of time as it lies so close to Deleuze41. The Nietzschean concept of Eternal Return makes what is valued, return as

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the "Where?" and 'When?' which designate this (non)-being where every affirmation is nourished" (Deleuze 1994, p.112).
40 See Paradis 1995 and Smith 1997, p.146..
41 This detour is based on Turetzky (1999), ch VIII

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different and actualised in the pure form of time, of the whole of all times, past, present and future. What is worthy returns but always in a disguised, different manner.

The being of becoming is the pure form of time. Deleuze puts it formally as “the returning is the being of that which becomes” (Deleuze 1983, p. 48). What returns is the form of time, a becoming without being since all that exists becomes, rather than is. Nietzsche himself spoke of how the fact that “everything returns is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being” (Nietzsche's *Wille zur Macht*, quoted at ibid.). It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of diversity, univocally differenciated and explicated. Said with other Bergsonian/Deleuzan terms, in repetition, the difference between the actual and virtual is what constitutes a becoming.

Identity in the Eternal Return describe “the fact of returning for that which differs/.../this is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis of time and its dimensions/.../of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation” (Deleuze 1983, ibid.). Zarathustra's teaching is of redemption of the existence. The “It was” transforms into “Thus I willed it” and gets double affirmation by the active forces that are able to return, leaving reactive forces only to dead time, non-existence, oblivion.

The actualisation of virtuality goes both ways; actuality becomes virtuality as is passes into the pure past. The double movement is viewed as a crystallisation, in a crystal of time. Both exist and interchange endlessly, rhythmically. “Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual” (Bergson in Deleuze 1989, p. 79). For Nietzsche, this rhythmic pulsation is an outcome of struggle between forces, active and reactive. Will-to-power as an ontological principle selects what forces may strive to the limit of its power. Nihilism is for Nietzsche the opposite tendency, that captures forces aimlessly and favours being before becoming, a teleology of stable substance turned to theology instead of experimentation to an unforseen goal, outside pre-given essences and

42 "...the times of differenciation incarnate the time of the structure, the time of progressive determination. Such times may be called differential rhythms in view of their actualisation of the Idea" (Deleuze 1994, p. 217). For figural och pictorial rhythms, see Deleuze 2002. Time pulsates with being rather than just endures, and in its starts and fits, desire pulsates rhythmically and plateaus are established that endures only to be erased in temporal variations (Deleuze and Guattari 1984 and 1987). See also Nietzsche (1987) §84.
forms. Made simple, one can say that the Will-to-power differentiates, while eternal return evaluates and selects that which returns. This selection excludes reactive forces, since it demands that whatever is willed must also be willed eternally to return. To be active each force must increase it power as far as it can.

An untimely event follows history, Nietzsche maintains, as if it is always possible that something outside history bursts in. A becoming that is opposite history. For Deleuze, he talks of these moments referring to his predecessor:

“I became more and more aware of the possibility of distinguishing between becoming and history. It was Nietzsche who said that nothing important is ever free from a 'non-historical cloud' /.../What history grasps in an even is the way it's actualised in particular circumstances; the event's becoming is beyond the scope of history /.../Becoming is not part of history; history amounts only to the set of preconditions, however recent, that one leaves behind in order to 'become', that is, to create something new” (Deleuze 1995, p.170-171).

Creation of something new in Deleuze's paradoxical terms means that a true becoming can only emerge through repetition. What repetition repeats is the virtuality inherent to the past and thus betrayed by its past actualisation(s). Politically, Deleuze refers to the idea of revolutions going bad, where many people confuses two concepts; the way revolutions turn out historically and people's revolutionary becoming.

Another way to put it is that time is opposed to the chronology of time itself. What bursts through as event is eternity in time: time as history versus time as eternity. Zizek analyses the paradox as

“.../time is the striving of eternity to REACH ITSELF. What this means is that eternity is not outside time but the pure structure of time 'as such': as Deleuze put it, the moment of stratigraphic superimpostion that suspends temporal succession is time as such. In short, one should oppose here development within time to the explosion of time itself: time itself (the infinite virtuality of the transcendental field of Becoming) appears within the intra-temporal evolution

43 An attempt to write a nonlinear history of events outside chronology is Delanda (1997)
under the guise of eternity. The moments of the emergence of the New are precisely the moments of Eternity in time” (Zizek 2004, p.11).

For Deleuze, cinema is a way to philosophically understand a subject-less gaze outside time. In the time-image of post-war films, time is split up, chronology jammed and several times exists simultaneously. This pure time of all times weighs heavily on the spectator and shows how all past, present and future can be all up in the air, as in a throw of dice: a feeling for life, a vibration, an intensity, the pure living life. The Italian neo-realist movement after 1945 is such an event that escapes the conditions of misery and creates something new, irreducible to its time.

Further on cinema, Deleuze views the duplication, differenciation, of two times in the concept of a crystal-image.

"Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time that we see in the crystal. The crystal-image is not time, but we see time in the crystal/.../What we see in the crystal is always the bursting forth of life, of time, in its dividing in two or differentiation" (Deleuze 1989, p. 81, 91)

Thus we have come back to the living impulse, the _élancement_ of Bergson, that makes a being differ from itself, immediately. We met earlier free-floating sensations in the fractured cogito, which Kant rescued into consciousness and representation. For Deleuze, affects are what can make us think, force us to sense time in all its dimensions. “To render Time sensible in itself, the task common to the painter, the musician and sometimes the writer. It is a task outside of all meter and cadence” (Deleuze 2002, p. 63).

Bergson and Deleuze are one at this importance of our sensibility. To enlarge perception is to make not only the present flow from a painting or a music piece, but at all times, forcing us to feel passively new sensations and, later perhaps, think and act. Time is forceful as Proust  

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44 My translation. See also Deleuze 2004.
showed when a Combray appeared that never existed apart from a memory in a pure past (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 189).

In the intuition of the sublime, in art or nature beyond all faculties of the sensible we can feel the pressure of all times to make us step out of time itself. The efforts that make us feel something of all times, our life, a life, beyond our senses and mind annihilates the succession of time. An intuition of the sublime would mean the end of time, of representation but with a feeling of something new perceived, even conceived by our creative emotions.

"...The sensible is valid in itself and unfolds in a pathos beyond all logic, which will grasp time in its surging forth, into the very origin of its thread and giddiness/.../it is Pathos which leaves [the I and the Ego] to evolve freely in order to form strange combinations as sources of time" (Deleuze 1995, p.xii).

The free play of imagination and sensibility make us live more vividly, especially if all our times are saved for ourselves (Deleuze 1994, p. 84). The practical purpose of this ontology of time and becoming is to create new ways to live, to feel, to endure, to be affected. It is a redemptive ontology that wants us to create values to live by rather than find truths to know. The success of philosophy and its conceptions is measured by what new values and living conditions they allow us to conceive, rather than the opposite way, testing our lives by measuring to what extent they match our philosophic conceptions. That is, values before beings. But the values have to be created, not simply taken over or thought as universal Ideas, or copies of an original.

The past should then be a source of creative invention that we deal with in an artistic manner or as true artists do when they create. It needs a germinal life, a working through of the past that we seldom do, as it requires a leap into the past itself. What we often do is do live the past by clichés, as sensory-motor images of the things rather than as becomings, differentiations. But the novelty of future and the new per se, is not something farfetched or from out of space, as a break in continuity, but rather a creative, unrolling inside duration, not

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45 For affects and expressions from culture interpreted by Deleuzean thought, see Massumi 2002 and Braidotti 2002.
46 See also Kant 2003 and Olkowski 1996.
47 "If we are to embrace Deleuze's conception of time, then, we must articulate our politics not as the recovery or liberation of an essence, but in other terms, terms more consonant with difference than with identity" (May 1996, p. 298).
outside it\(^\text{48}\). Duration with its virtual past is the condition of novelty, an immanent condition of the production of something new.

What returns and gets created is difference-in-itself, as force in material (Bergson) rather than form in matter (Aristotle). The values are not to be evaluated out of a goal, human or natural. Nihilism is evident but there is at least an acknowledgement in Deleuze who holds experimenting with practices better than making political theory\(^\text{49}\). If a new concept of time makes us live more at the utmost of our powers, it has achieved something that made a difference. Deleuze held that the post-war films influenced the masses by their new approach to time, the time-image, in this manner.

There is Deleuzean ontology by way of ethics and politics that also includes sciences and religion. Such ontology of time and change is beyond the scope of this thesis but there are connections between Deleuze's philosophy of becoming, contemporary physics, process philosophy and even theology\(^\text{50}\).

Finally, death as Deleuze's and, what he interprets as, Kant's pure form of time, states an important aspect of time. Death as the moment when all time passes, when one's life flashes by and when all one has done, what one has become and where one could have gone is at stake - as in a dice throw. The weighing down of all times and the inevitability of future events on the shoulders of Oedipus and Hamlet is also a time of death, not only tragedy\(^\text{51}\).

Deleuze states with Blanchot that there is an impersonal death with no relation to me, neither present nor past but always coming. A becoming - dead always. “It is inevitable but inaccessible death; it is the abyss of the present, time without a present” (Blanchot in Deleuze

\(^{48}\) To state the new in terms of an interruption as Bachelard and Badiou do is to make it mysterious. See Ansell Pearson 2000 and 2002, ch.4..


\(^{50}\) See Stengers 1994, Alliez 1993, Serres/Latour 1995, Murphy 1998, Delanda 2001, Clark 2002 and Faber 2002. Out of these studies, a Whiteheadian Deleuze would appear without divinity, but with a materialist vitalism, a process machinism of non-organic life. Yet to be seen, but all these works point to a new metaphysics of time and space that few physicists manage to think, even if some try (Davies 1995, Prigogine 1996, Hawking 2001).

\(^{51}\) Here we encounter three times of the deaths of man: Man as the caesura of being ("the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture [of the self in time] appears", Deleuze 1994, p. 89), man as mortal animal ("There is always a 'one dies' more profound than 'I die'", op cit, p. 113) and Man's finitude. See also notes 9, 25 and 34.
The urge to die as Freud had it with his idea of a death instinct, is doubled by a death of pure differences, of a source of (Stoic) experimentation even with death (“Is it possible, since it absorbs every instinct, that it could also enact on itself?” Deleuze asks (1990, p. 332)

Death is further “an internal power which frees the individuating elements from the form of the I” (Deleuze 1994, p. 259). This notion of death as experiment is accelerated by wilder methods in the concept of the full and empty body without organs as an affirmative transformation of the death instinct (Dale 2001). Time in its pure form as death is the absolute limit, but for Deleuze even being-towards-death can be a source of affirmation.
VI

Conclusion

Loose ends remain untied at this moment, but it is my hope that the reading has been a revival of some old ontological questions and the creation of some new ones. I hope this thesis will encourage an interest in Deleuzean time and if not, a critique of his views. But as shown in this thesis, such a critique would bring in most of the history of Western philosophy and the most difficult area at that, metaphysics.

To resume: Deleuze viewed time as actualisation of novel virtuality, a becoming without being as a split in our inner but unknown self and a temporal challenge to live more vividly. His ideas of time are bound to his ontology of becoming that show us how our passive lives are being affected by different aspects of time (habit, memory, fate) but also ways to create new values, or experiment dangerously with them all way to death as the last stop on the passage of time.

Further research on Deleuze and time would benefit from the studies of Manuel Delanda. The very detailed descriptions of differenciations, spatio-temporal dynamisms, actualisations into life, energy, power etc that Delanda tries to capture would make vivid, in scientific detail, the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze. I hope some day to come back to this grand task. Nothing seems more important.
VI

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