Protest for a future II
Composition, mobilization and motives of the participants in Fridays For Future climate protests on 20-27 September, 2019, in 19 cities around the world

Edited by Joost de Moor, Katrin Uba, Mattias Wahlström, Magnus Wennerhag, and Michiel De Vydt
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Summary

In September 2019, the third Global Climate Strike organized by the Fridays For Future (FFF) protest campaign mobilized 6000 protest events in 185 countries and brought 7.6 million participants out onto the streets. This report analyses survey data about participants from 19 cities around the world and compares it to data from an international survey conducted in 13 European cities in March 2019. Both surveys collected data following the well-established “Caught in the Act of Protest” survey methodology in order to generate representative samples.

What makes FFF new and particularly interesting is the involvement of schoolchildren and students as initiators, organizers and participants in climate activism on a large scale. The September mobilizations differed from the March events in the explicit call for adults to join the movement. Although older age cohorts were more strongly represented in September, young people continued to make up a substantial portion of the protestors – almost one third of demonstrators were aged 19 or under. Additionally, there was a high proportion of female FFF protestors. In both surveys nearly 60% of participants identified as female – with the largest share among the youngest demonstrators.

Overwhelming majorities of adult participants were well educated and had a university degree. Moreover, a large proportion of young people participating in the September strikes had parents who had studied at university level.

Despite the young age of the participants, interpersonal mobilization was the predominant method of recruitment to the strikes, particularly among friends and schoolmates. However, the growth in the size and popularity of the movement also includes a growing share of people who participate alone. Around a quarter of adults fit this category, as well as an initially small but growing number of young people.

When expressing their emotions concerning climate change and global warming, the majority of protesters felt worried, frustrated and angered, as well as anxious about the future, although they did not often express a feeling of hopelessness. Therefore, despite a general tendency of decreasing hopefulness that important environmental issues can be addressed through policies, FFF participants show that their action is driven by feelings, awareness of the issues and a willingness to engage in finding solutions. In answer to a series of questions concerning solutions to environmental problems, respondents were divided over whether modern science could be relied on to solve environmental problems. Agreement varied between cities and age-groups on the degree to which they thought stopping climate change could be accomplished through voluntary individual lifestyle changes. However, there was more unity in skepticism towards relying on companies and the market to solve these problems.

In conclusion, surveys of the strikes in March and September indicate important elements of continuity, as well as a small degree of change. Female participants and people with higher education predominate, interpersonal mobilization - particularly among friends - remains a
central factor in recruiting support, and protesters are mostly driven by feelings of frustration, anger and anxiety. However, the age of protestors is becoming more diverse, protesters’ hopefulness seems to be in decline, and the “Greta effect” is becoming less influential. The report findings suggest that the movement is becoming more established although its emotional basis for mobilization may be changing.
Introduction: Fridays For Future – an expanding climate movement

Joost de Moor, Katrin Uba, Mattias Wahlström, Magnus Wennerhag, Michiel De Vydt, Paul Almeida, Beth Gharrity Gardner, Piotr Kocyba, Michael Neuber, Ruxandra Gubernat, Marta Kołczyńska, Henry P Rammelt, and Stephen Davies

In September 2019, the protest campaign known as Fridays For Future (FFF) organized its third Global Climate Strike, with thousands of protest events around the world. The campaigns started when Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg refused to go to school, instead choosing to sit in protest outside the Swedish Parliament in August 2018. The ensuing campaign was framed as “school strikes for climate”, focusing primarily on mobilizing schoolchildren. Yet, already in its first globally coordinated protest on 15 March 2019, the demonstrations attracted many adults. The September protests were explicit attempts in many locations to broaden the mobilizing base beyond schoolchildren by calling upon adults to take responsibility and protest as well. The event turned out to be the largest globally-coordinated climate protest to date.

This report provides a descriptive analysis of this remarkable mobilization, using survey data on the FFF protest participants in 19 cities around the world: Berlin and Chemnitz (Germany); Bern (Switzerland); Brussels (Belgium); Bucharest (Romania); Budapest (Hungary); Copenhagen (Denmark); Florence (Italy); Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm (Sweden); Helsinki (Finland); Mexico City (Mexico); New York (USA); Oslo (Norway); Prague (Czech Republic); Sydney (Australia); Vienna (Austria); and Warsaw (Poland). This study is a sequel to the one presented in the report Protest for a Future (Wahlström, Kocyba, De Vydt, and de Moor, 2019), which summarizes findings from European FFF protests on 15 March 2019. Since the two waves of protest surveys used the same questionnaire and sampling methodology, it is possible to compare findings for those cities studied in both survey waves.

In the rest of this introduction, we will provide a comparative overview of FFF and descriptive results from the September survey, highlighting some of the themes covered in the questionnaire, including:

- Age, gender, and education
- Mobilization networks

1 While all listed authors take overall responsibility for this introductory chapter of the report, the original drafts of the different sections had the following authors: Abstract – Stephen Davies; Background – Paul Almeida; Description of the survey collaboration and the survey methodology – Joost de Moor and Magnus Wennerhag; Age, gender and education – Beth Gharrity Gardner, Piotr Kocyba, and Michael Neuber; Mobilization networks – Michiel De Vydt, Beth Gharrity Gardner, and Michael Neuber; Emotions – Ruxandra Gubernat, Piotr Kocyba, Marta Kołczyńska, and Henry P. Rammelt; The “Greta effect” and Proposed solutions to the climate problem – Katrin Uba and Mattias Wahlström. The volume editors took the main responsibility for merging and editing the introduction as a whole.
Background

The climate protests studied in this report followed in a long tradition of climate protests, including global days of protest around UN Climate Summits since the 2000s, and recently the “Rise for Climate” campaign in September 2018. The climate movement has thus long proven itself to be one of the most extensive social movements in terms of the capacity to hold multiple and simultaneous global actions (Almeida 2019a). The year 2019 marked the rise of new global climate campaigns, including not only Fridays For Future, but others like Extinction Rebellion and the US-based Sunrise Movement.

FFF developed from an individual school-striker in August 2018 to the gradual spread of climate school strikes later that year across Sweden and Europe, and eventually to the rest of the world (see chapter on Sweden in this volume). From primary schools to high schools, young people have walked out of school every Friday to pressure their respective governments into taking more assertive climate action. The movement came to be called Fridays For Future after one of its original Twitter hashtags #FridaysForFuture.

In 2019, FFF organized four Global Climate Strikes: on March 15, May 24, September 20-27 and November 29. During the September strike, which this report focuses on, FFF (and partnering organizations) held a week of street actions and peaceful demonstrations across the planet, reaching a reported 185 countries with over 6000 events and 7.6 million participants (Chase-Dunn and Almeida 2020). Greta Thunberg led a street march in New York City with 250,000 demonstrators, and some claimed that in Montreal up to 500,000 protesters participated. Activists timed the worldwide campaign to place pressure on the United Nations Climate Action Summit occurring in New York in late September.

The novelty of FFF includes several dimensions, including the large involvement of school students as initiators, organizers and participants, the use of the school strike as a tactic, and sustained weekly pressure on authorities and the fossil fuel industry. School students have thereby boosted global climate activism considerably. Youth participation has a tendency to increase protest size (Somma and Medel 2019) by mechanisms of bloc recruitment and bringing entire schools into demonstrations, and the youthful nature of the mobilizations may
be bringing in many new adherents to the climate movement (Almeida 2019b). What set the September mobilizations apart from previous ones was the explicit call to adults to join the movement. The extent to which FFF succeeded in this regard is one of the questions this report will address.

Description of the survey collaboration and the survey methodology

Following the same approach as the one used in our successful survey of the March 2019 school strikes (Wahlström et al. 2019), a team of scientists from universities around the world organized a survey of the global FFF strikes in September 2019. Some of the events we surveyed took place on September 20, others on September 27 and 28. In many of the surveyed cities, two or more demonstrations were staged during this ‘Global Week for Future’. In each city, we surveyed the demonstration we expected to become the largest. While the March survey had exclusively focused on Europe, the September survey was held in 19 cities in 16 countries across Europe, North America and Australia. Within Europe, the September survey fostered a stronger inclusion of Eastern European countries than the March survey had done. Local teams approached over 13,000 demonstrators, resulting in 3,154 responses from a random sample of protesters.

Data collection followed the well-established protest survey method developed by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) that was previously used in the project “Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation” (CCC) (Van Stekelenburg et al. 2012). Not knowing the population of a demonstration, we had to generate a probabilistic sample to ensure the representativeness of the data. Thus, it was important that every demonstrator had an equal chance of being included in the sample. Therefore, the surveys had to be distributed evenly across the whole crowd. In our case, we used flyers with basic information about the survey and a QR-code, as well as a token taking the individual to an online survey. The protest survey method aims to maximize the representativeness of the sample by adhering to three principles:

First, interviewers do not themselves determine whom to approach for an interview but are instructed by ‘pointers’ (co-members of the research unit) to hand out surveys to specific individuals. Experiments where interviewers could select their own respondents indicated that interviewers are inclined to approach the more ‘approachable’ respondents (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). By separating sampling and interviewing, one source of response bias is thereby eliminated.

Second, pointers follow a systematic selection procedure, which differs for moving and static demonstrations. In a moving demonstration, pointers count rows to ensure a fair dispersion of questionnaires over the marching column. In every N-th row, the pointer selects or points at one demonstrator, alternating between the left, middle, or right side of the row. How many
rows should be skipped, depends on the estimated turnout and the number of surveys the research unit aims to distribute. The goal is to cover the whole demonstration; reaching both (visible) protesters at the front of the moving march, as well as those who prefer to demonstrate less visibly in the middle of the crowd and those at the tail end of the demonstration. In the case of a static demonstration, interviewers are evenly distributed around the edges of the standing crowd. Pointers instruct their interviewers to start from the outer circle, then to hand out a survey two steps further in the direction of the center. The following questionnaire is handed out three steps further in the direction of the center, and so on (4, 5, 6 steps, etc.). The number of steps between two interviews increases to allow for the fact that, due to the circular shape of the crowd, the number of people gets smaller as you move towards the center. Of course, both sampling methods can be used during one event if a demonstration changes in character (composed of a march and a rally).

Third, we conducted a short, on-the-spot, face-to-face screener interview with every fifth demonstrator approached, collecting data on socio-demographics (age, education, gender), attitudes (political interest and satisfaction with democracy), political behavior (past participation in demonstrations and the time of decision to participate in this demonstration). Bearing in mind the anticipated response rates, screener interviews help to estimate a potential delayed refusal bias. By comparing the samples generated on-the-spot to the samples of online survey responses, we can tell whether there are any differences between those participants who decided to accept a flyer with a QR-code and those who actually filled in the questionnaire. Moreover, in the case of a substantial delayed refusal bias, we can eventually weigh the responses and improve the representativeness of our sample. At the release of this report, we are still in the process of analyzing delayed refusal bias, which means that reported statistics may still change. However, the completed analyses of the March data suggest that any changes will be very small.

The events surveyed were all organized under the FFF banner, but varied in size from about 136 participants in Oslo to around 250,000 in Berlin and New York. Table 1 lists the response rates for each of the surveyed events. Strike actions followed the same pattern everywhere, involving a school strike and a demonstration in the main streets and squares of every city. Throughout the remainder of this report, we will be comparing averages for various subgroups in our data set, such as between various age groups and/or cities. In some cases, the size of the compared subsamples becomes fairly small. In those cases, we recommend that averages are interpreted with caution as with smaller samples, the reliability of the averages diminishes as well.
Table 1.1 Details of each survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estimated number of participants</th>
<th>Number of surveys distributed</th>
<th>Number of F2F (short interviews)</th>
<th>Number of web survey responses</th>
<th>Response Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>100,000–270,000</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bern, Switzerland</td>
<td>28 Sept.</td>
<td>75,000–100,000</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucharest, Romania</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest, Hungary</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>2,500–3,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemnitz, Germany</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence, Italy</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gothenburg, Sweden</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki, Finland</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>5,000–16,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö, Sweden</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City, Mexico</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, USA</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague, Czech Republic</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>700–900</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>40,000–50,000</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney, Australia</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>50,000–60,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna, Austria</td>
<td>27 Sept.</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw, Poland</td>
<td>20 Sept.</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of participants builds on the estimations made by the research teams conducting the surveys.
Age, gender and education

The Fridays for Future (FFF) movement has thousands of faces, but the protestor profile that dominates the public or media imagination is that of young, female (school) students. The resemblance of this profile to well-known climate activist Greta Thunberg is not surprising. Nor is it inaccurate, as shown in the last international report on the March 15th FFF climate strikes (Wahlström et al. 2019). This combination of participant features diverges in some ways from the generic, “traditional” protester and from the “traditional” politically empowered individual. While male, well-educated, and older people are relatively well represented among the politically active population (e.g. Dalton 2017), the demographic composition of individual protest events can differ substantially, according to the issue being addressed, political contexts, and the size and legality of the action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).

Age Profile

Accurately profiling participants via the surveys conducted for this report was not without limitations. A significant one concerns our lack of insight into pre-teen participants. Due to ethical and legal constraints, participants younger than 15 years old were not invited to participate in the online survey in most countries (unless parental permission could be obtained or the legal age of consent was lower). Although this limitation is common in social scientific research, we know that people within this necessarily under-sampled category may comprise very relevant portions of FFF strike participants (and, in some cases, serve as key players in local organizational efforts).

Despite this limitation, our results do capture a substantial role played by those under 19 years old at the 2019 global climate strikes. In March, with an average share of 45% across the countries surveyed, the 14/15 to 19-year-old age cohort made up the largest share of demonstrators. By contrast, this cohort accounted for 31% of demonstrators in September. Suggesting a shift towards older participants, the overall median age increased from March to September (from 21 to 28 years). In most countries for which we have data from both March and September (Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Poland), the proportion of 14-19-year-old demonstrators decreased on average by 14%. Italy was the only exception.

Although greater mobilization of older age cohorts in September is strongly evident, young people continued to make up a substantial portion of FFF protestors. Between cities and countries, we found strong differences in the age-composition of demonstrations. In five of the 16 countries where surveys were conducted in September, participants under 19 years old comprised the largest share of demonstrators (around 57% in Italy, Denmark, Romania, and the Czech Republic, and 73% in Poland). We get an even more nuanced picture when we
compare the age distribution across the cities surveyed in September (see Figure 2.1). In Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, Florence, and Copenhagen, 14-19 years old was by far the largest age cohort. By contrast, those aged 46 and older accounted for almost 50% of participants in Stockholm, Sydney, Brussels, and New York.

**Figure 2.1: Age group by city (September 2019)**

![Age group by city (September 2019)](image)

**Gender profile**

The gender distribution did not change as significantly as the age distribution. What remains remarkable is the high share of female FFF protestors. In September, 59% of the participants identified as female – more or less equivalent to the proportion in March (58%). Female majorities were found across every age group when we combine the country results for September. Women most strongly outnumbered men among participants under 19 years of age (~72%). In September, women dominated among this youngest age group, even more so than in March (see Figure 4.2). With a 9% increase from March, women also became the dominant gender in the over-65 age category in September. This suggests that the overall increase in adult participants did not diminish the predominance of women at most of the September strikes.
There is, of course, still much variation by country and by city. When we examine the countries for which we have data to compare participant demographics from March to September, the proportion of women remained relatively stable in three countries (Belgium, Switzerland, and Sweden), increased in Italy alone (by 5%), and decreased in three countries (by nearly 11% in Poland and Germany and by 4.5% in Austria). Belgium was the only country with fewer female (46%) than male (53%) participants in March, and one of the only two countries where women comprised less than 50% of participants in September (the other being Germany with 47% female participants).

The September results for gender composition by city are presented in Figure 2.3. Focusing only on the cities surveyed in both March and September – Brussels, Vienna, Berlin, Florence, Warsaw, Malmö, and Stockholm – some of the changes in women’s participation are more striking. The biggest decline took place in Warsaw, where the share of female participants decreased by almost 11% (from 67% in March to 58% in September). By contrast, Brussels remained relatively stable, with around 46% female participants at the two events. Finally, while the proportion of women decreased between 2.5% and nearly 5% in Vienna, Berlin, and Stockholm, we saw increases of just over 5% in Florence and Malmö.
Educational profile

To get a sense of the educational profile of the demonstrations, we cluster survey respondents into “youths” (defined as those up to 25 years old) and “adults” (those 26 years or older). Using these two groups for comparison, overwhelming majorities of adult participants were well educated (defined here as holding a university degree – B.A., M.A., or Ph.D.). Over 70% of adult participants had obtained some university degree in many countries including Sweden, the United States, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Australia. We also found a very large proportion of youths attending the September strikes with at least one parent who had studied at university level. Differences in educational markers by country and small response rates in some cities make more detailed comparison at the cross-national level difficult at this point. However, high educational attainment levels among adult participants are consistent with findings from the March strikes.

The FFF protester profile continues to be young and female – but not quite as young. Therefore, the movement’s efforts to bring everyone, and a greater number of adults in particular, onto the streets in September appear to have succeeded.

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1 In the analyses of the March 15 report (Wahlström et al. 2019), the distinction was made between “adults” and the narrower category of “school students”, instead of “youths” as in the present report. This is important to keep in mind if comparing the results of the two reports.
Most people join protests in the company of people they already know. Across all of the countries surveyed in September, only 9% of youth respondents indicated having participated alone (this is an increase from 5% on average in March). While adults also tend to accompany known others to protests, they are more likely than youths to go alone. Among adult participants, 24% reported going alone (similar to 25% in March). The latter figure is unusually high compared to research on many other demonstrations (Wahlström and Wennerhag 2014). One possible explanation for the increase between March and September among the youths who participated alone and the high share of lone demonstrators among adults is that participants are becoming familiar with climate demonstrations. In several countries, the third Global Climate Strike simply meant one more event among increasingly commonplace climate demonstrations. Accordingly, the need for social company to feel comfortable likely decreased once FFF protests became generally known as ‘normal,’ inclusive, and routine events taking place in the city. This is in line with previous research showing that one is more likely to find lone demonstrators in protests that display non-exclusive communities and collective identities (Wahlström and Wennerhag 2014).

Protesting together with friends, family, colleagues, or others with whom we have pre-existing social ties is most commonly the result of interpersonal recruitment: being asked or asking others to protest together. Research on micro-mobilization dynamics in social movements has consistently shown that being asked to protest by someone you know is a strong predictor of protest participation. Moreover, people tend to recruitlikeminded others – those people who are more likely to respond positively to the invitation (e.g., Klandermans 2004).

Interpersonal recruitment appears more common among youths than among adults. Among youth protestors, 36% indicated they had personally been asked by someone to participate. Among adults, this share was lower (22%). Figure 3.1 compares these average shares across countries in September to those from the March data. The maroon-colored bars show that more respondents reported having invited others than were asked themselves. This is, in part, a result of our sample: people who invite others are likely to participate themselves. In short, by surveying participants, it is not surprising that we observe high shares of individuals asking others.
Most recruiting participants (i.e. participants who had asked others) had not received a personal protest invitation themselves. That is, of all the recruiting participants, 68% belong to the group that were not themselves invited. This suggests that the majority of recruiting participants begin the interpersonal invitation chain, rather than extending an existing one.

Figure 5.2 shows that people are mostly invited by their friends. Among invited youths, 67% were invited by a friend. This share is significantly lower among invited adults (38% - a pattern also observed in the March data). For youths, schoolmates are another important recruitment source. We specifically instructed our respondents to classify each person who invited them into a single category only. As a result, invitations by people that could be cross-classified (e.g., as friend-colleagues, or schoolmate-acquaintances, or co-organizational member-friend) may have led to under-reporting of some categories of inviters. It is possible, for instance, that the share of those invited by schoolmates is higher because people who considered a recruiting schoolmate as more of a friend may not have checked the schoolmate box, thus lowering the share of schoolmates.

One of the puzzles in micro-mobilization research concerns understanding how widely (across which groups of social ties) and how intensively (how many) movement sympathizers invite others to join in collective action. Figure 3.2 addresses the former issue of breadth. The patterns are mainly similar to those seen in Figure 3.3: recruiting participants mostly invite their friends. Notably, among youths, 15% still reported inviting (one of) their parents.
Figure 3.2. Being asked to participate by whom?

Figure 3.3. Asking whom to participate?
Social movement research and theorizing not only highlights the importance of interpersonal relationships in motivating people to take action, but also the role of interpersonal communication in how people learn about movements and protest events in the first place (e.g. Diani 2004). In line with the findings about recruitment dynamics are the results concerning the most important information channels for participants (see Figure 3.4). Online social media was most commonly identified by respondents as the most important information channel. Overall, the proportion of respondents who reported online social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, but not personal messaging) as their primary source of information increased from 32.7% in March to 41.3% in September. Nearly 45% of youths (25 years and younger) and approximately 39% of adults (26 years and older) reported having learned about the protest through social media. Combining interpersonal communication sources (not including social media), we find that ~44% of youth respondents learned about the demonstration through direct social contacts, compared to about 33% for adults.\(^3\) The trend is reversed when we combine more impersonal channels (again excluding social media), such as newspapers (online or offline), organization magazines, advertisements, radio or TV. Among adults, nearly 28% cited this type of source for learning about the event, whereas only 11% among youths did so.

*Figure 3.4. Most important information channel*

[Graph showing the most important information channels for protest information among youths and adults]

After social media (44.7%), friends or acquaintances (24.1%) and then schoolmates or work colleagues (13%) were the top primary sources for protest information among youths in

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\(^3\) This measure for interpersonal communication includes participants who identified family (or partners), friends or acquaintances, people from school, work, or co-members of an association as the most important information channel for finding out about the demonstration.
September. These top rankings among youths are stable when compared to March; however, the proportion of youth identifying social media as the most important channel for finding out about the demonstration increased by just over 10% (from 33.9% in March) and the share identifying friends decreased by 8% (from 32.5% in March). Among adult participants in September, the top three rankings we find for the most important channel – social media (39%), organization (magazine, meeting, website) (12%), and then friends or acquaintances (11%) – shifted somewhat from March. Social media as the most important source increased by about 8% among adults from March to September, but friends ranked second as the most important channel for learning about the March demonstration (13.2%), followed by family or partner (11.7%). The greater turnout among adults in September, the intermingling of friendship online and offline (e.g. Polletta et al. 2013), and the growing infrastructural bases of the FFF may partially help to account for these differences.

**Emotions**

The role emotions play for protest participation has received increasing attention over recent years, focusing on their capacity to motivate people to become active for a certain cause or restrain them in their activities. While often generated and augmented in crowds, emotions are a resource for mobilization on the group level and on the individual level. Through their potential of increasing the salience of certain issues, they become influential when mobilizing people to protest, as well as to continue participating in collective action. Analyzing the emotions and feelings of FFF protest participants offers insights into their affective reasons to mobilize, as well as in their perception of the problems that stimulate their participation.

Survey respondents were asked to what extent climate change / global warming made them feel angry, hopeless, anxious, worried, fearful, frustrated, and powerless, with response options ranging from “not at all”, through “not very much”, “somewhat”, “quite”, to “very much”. Figure 4.1 shows the proportions of “quite” and “very much” responses for these emotions for all respondents from all surveyed cities, showing that most respondents felt worried while thinking about climate change and global warming, followed by the feeling of being frustrated and angered. For these feelings, differences between youths and adults are relatively small.

Greater differences between youths and adults can be observed for fear, anxiety, and powerlessness, where youths more often reported fear and anxiety in response to climate change, whereas adults felt more powerless. One of the messages of the FFF movement is that the future of young people is in danger, which may be one of the factors that explains why young participants feel more frustrated, anxious and fearful. At the same time, it was young people who started the movement, indicating their ability to respond proactively to the identified threats.
The least often reported emotion is hopelessness, which is not surprising given that hope is a prerequisite for action. Of all respondents, only around 36% of youths and 34% of adults reported feeling “quite” or “very much” hopeless.

*Figure 4.1. Average levels of feelings generated by climate change/global warming*

As socialization and culture play important roles in the cultivation of emotions and feelings, it is worth looking at the levels of these emotions by city. *Figure 4.2* shows proportions of respondents who reported feeling various emotions “quite” or “very much” separately for each of the surveyed cities.

There is considerable agreement in the level of some emotions across cities, with consistently high levels of worry, anger, and frustration, and low levels of hopelessness. At the same time, there is substantial variation with regard to the level of anxiety, particularly among young people. Overall, over 80% respondents reported being “quite” or “very much” anxious in Berlin, Vienna, Chemnitz, and Warsaw, and only around 45% in Gothenburg, Stockholm, Prague, and Oslo.

Regarding the differences between the youth and adults, in most cities youths tend to report feeling less powerless than adults, but at the same time they more often report feeling the remaining emotions, in particular fear.

Generally, in most cities, worry is the most often reported feeling and hopelessness the least.
Figure 4.2. Average levels of feelings generated by climate change/global warming by city
Other findings also confirm that the demonstrators do not, despite everything, feel really hopeless. After answering the questions about emotions, respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with two forward-looking statements. The first read “I feel hopeful about policies being able to address climate change”, while the second was “Even if things look bleak, I do not lose hope that we are able to deal with climate change”. Distributions of responses are presented in Figure 4.3, which shows that the majority of young people remain hopeful, both with regard to climate policies and in general (54% and 61% for the two statements, respectively). Adults are somewhat more skeptical about policies being able to address climate change (38% respondents “quite” or “very much” agree with the first statement) but are much more hopeful in general (55% “quite” or “very much” agree with the second statement).

Thus, with regard to the hope that climate change can be dealt with and to the hope that climate change can actually be addressed through policies, the majority of respondents, adults and youths analogously, feels rather positive. Hence, even though youths feel fearful about climate change and global warming, they also share the feeling that the situation can be changed.

Figure 4.3. Hopefulness

We are able to compare the declared hopefulness of FFF protesters in September 2019 with participants at the March 2019 FFF protests (Wahlström et al. 2019) for seven cities where the survey was carried out in both waves (Figure 4.4). We observe a general yet often modest
tendency of decreasing hopefulness about the ability of policies to address climate change and global warming. Youth is, on average and in most cities, more hopeful in this regard than adults are. A key task for future research is to assess whether this decline in hope is consistent over time and whether it (negatively) affects mobilization.

Figure 4.4. Hopefulness that policies can address climate change (March to September 2019)

The “Greta effect”

Among the media and public school strikes for climate and the entire contemporary wave of climate-change related mobilization have been strongly associated with one person – Greta Thunberg. It is, therefore, not surprising that she has played an iconic role both for young and old activists, inspiring many to pay attention to the climate issue, as well as to participate in the global actions. Indeed, when we asked the participants of the Global Strike for Climate in September 2019, there were hardly any who answered that they did not know who Greta Thunberg was, except for rather small proportions of young people in Warsaw, Sydney, Bucharest and, surprisingly, also a few in Helsinki and Copenhagen (Figure 5.1). Young activists do relate their increased interest in climate change to Greta, especially in Mexico City, New York, Prague, Bucharest, Florence and Malmö. Adults, on the other hand, do so to a significantly lesser extent, except in Budapest. This is also visible in the open answers where
respondents note that they have been interested and worried about climate change for many years already.

**Figure 5.1. Effect of Greta Thunberg on interest in climate change**

The patterns are not surprising, as many adults who participated in the September Global Climate Strikes had a background in environmental organizations or had participated in previous climate strikes or environmental protests. Overall, young female respondents are the most likely to say that Greta has made them more interested in climate change, and those who are not members in environmental organizations tend to state it more than those who are passive members or who do not belong to an environmental organization.

The picture is somewhat similar when we asked participants in the Global Climate Strike about the degree to which Greta Thunberg had affected their decision to participate in the climate strike. The responses to this question reveal clearer city differences (Figure 5.2). The strongest “Greta effect” seems to be in her homeland – Sweden (Gothenburg, Malmö, Stockholm) – among both youths and adults more than half of the respondents say that Greta has affected their participation in the strike “very much” or “quite”.
Figure 5.2. Effect of Greta Thunberg on decision to join the Strike

While among youths the general degree of statements that Greta has affected their participation is around 40%, among adults it is again smaller. In Bern and Berlin, one third of respondents indicated that their participation in the Global Climate strike was not affected at all by Greta Thunberg. These numbers were smaller in March, and Figure 5.3 demonstrates that among youths the “Greta effect” has declined to some extent in all the countries for which we have comparative measures, except Sweden. The trend is not surprising as, in comparison with March, the climate strikes are now already a well-known phenomenon and there are many local (young female) leaders of Fridays For Future who might inspire mobilization outside Sweden.
Proposed solutions to the climate problem

In its official rhetoric, FFF has chosen a somewhat particular path as regards the matter of solutions to the problem it identifies. Greta Thunberg has in her speeches primarily urged policymakers to listen to “united science” and to enact policies based on this. Identifying herself and the core of her movement as children who cannot themselves be expected to provide elaborate solutions, she argues that the solutions are already provided by science. This position has been accused of ‘scientization’ – looking to science for guidance on moral and political questions which it cannot provide – and thus in need of being at least complemented by more specific standpoints in these areas (Evensen 2019).

The respondents in our September surveys were asked to rate seven statements pertaining to solving the problem of global warming, from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ on a five-degree scale. The statements were formulated to capture some prominent ideas and dilemmas connected to addressing the climate issue. Like the surveyed participants in the March 15 FFF marches, few September respondents agreed with the statement that “governments can be relied on to solve our environmental problems” (see figure 6.1). The youth respondents appeared to generally stand out in Sweden (Gothenburg, Stockholm), Copenhagen and New York as having more governmental trust than their adult counterparts have in this respect.
Figure 6.1. Agreement with “Governments can be relied on to solve our environmental problems”

Presumably, this lack of reliance on one’s national government to take appropriate action to stop global warming is connected to the official movement rhetoric of governments not taking climate science sufficiently seriously. In all cities, at least roughly 3 out of 4 respondents even went so far as to agree that “the government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed”. This should arguably be interpreted as a sign of desperation, rather than as a genuinely anti-democratic sentiment. The respondents overwhelmingly agree with another survey statement that “democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.”

Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the need for governments to listen to scientists, the respondents were divided with regard to the statement “Modern science can be relied on to solve our environmental problems”. Youths tend to be somewhat more hopeful in this respect (see figure 6.2), but vary considerably between locations. In relation to the unequivocal support for the notion that governments should act on science, the responses indicate a distinction between science for guiding policies versus science used for “technological fixes” to global warming.
Respondents were more united in their skepticism towards the statement “companies and the market can be relied on to solve our environmental problems”. Only among youths in Budapest and Warsaw did more than half agree or strongly agree with this statement.

As was also observed in relation to the March 15 survey, there is much variation – both between cities and between youths and adults – in the degree to which respondents agreed that “stopping climate change must primarily be accomplished through voluntary lifestyle changes by individuals”. Youths tend to be somewhat more positive towards this claim, in particular in Bucharest, Florence, Warsaw, Prague, Mexico City and New York (Figure 6.3). Only in Brussels were youths less supportive of prioritizing individual lifestyle changes than adults.
Two statements also pitted addressing global warming against other societal goals – maintaining a strong economy and welfare arrangements. On the one hand, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed with the statement “protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs”. On the other hand, as noted by Emilsson et al. (2020), respondents become much more divided and ambivalent when confronted with the statement “measures to decrease CO2 emissions cannot be allowed to make social welfare arrangements worse”. While the statement found markedly little support among protesters in some locations – such as Vienna, Chemnitz and Berlin – especially adults in Sydney, Helsinki, New York and Brussels appeared much more concerned about protecting social welfare arrangements (Figure 6.4). Indeed, in the overall distribution of responses, few respondents either strongly agreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, indicating a broad acknowledgement that this might be a dilemma for the movement.
Conclusion and outlook

Compared to what we found in March, our global September survey indicates elements of both continuity and, to a lesser extent, change in who participates, how and why. Moreover, it shows that the geographical expansion of our scope indicates fairly large degrees of similarity across and beyond Europe. Women and individuals from higher education backgrounds remain overrepresented, but in terms of age the demonstrations seem to have become more diverse. A growing share of people who participate alone might indicate that the FFF demonstrations are becoming such well-known public events that being embedded in the right social networks becomes a less important factor for participation. Interpersonal mobilization remains predominant – especially among friends. While protesters experience feelings of frustration, anger and powerlessness, hopelessness is the least strong among both adult and youth participants. However, between March and September, hopefulness seems to have declined among the protesters, the effects of which require further analysis as the movement tries to maintain its momentum. Greta Thunberg remains a widely known figure in the movement, but while she continues to exert a positive influence on many protesters’ interest and action-preparedness for climate change, the “Greta effect” does seem to be declining. This again suggests that FFF is becoming a more established campaign that people find access to in various ways. Regarding perceived solutions, we see a considerable level of
stability. For instance, protesters remain highly skeptical of governments’ ability to address the climate issue, and their campaign remains focused on pressuring governments to do what scientists recommend. Confidence in science remains higher than in any other institution, but few seem to believe that scientific fixes alone can solve the climate crisis.

Some of our findings seem to suggest the consolidation of the movement, such as by offering a more diverse range of entry points into the movement. However, if average levels of hopefulness among the protesters are indeed declining, the emotional basis for these mobilizations might be at stake. Future research is thus needed to establish how these trends develop further as FFF continues to organize global climate strikes in 2020.
References


Overview of countries where the Global Climate Strike events were surveyed.
Australia

Philippa Collin, Ingrid Matthews, Brendan Churchill, Stewart Jackson

Team Acknowledgements: Ariadne Vromen, Judith Bessant, Rob Watts


Background

Environmental activism and protest in Australia encompasses a wide range of issues and contexts going back to colonisation - from fighting for rivers and valleys against dam and inundation projects (Lee 2019) to protecting bushland and seas from extractive industries, logging practices and urban over-development (Macquarie, 1822; Mills 1988). The struggles that began as Indigenous resistance to British invasion in 1788 (Reynolds 1981 and 2013) have diverged into movements against racism, for Land Rights, and to stop mining.

More broadly and over time, Social Movement Organisation (SMO) activities aimed at environmental protection have been numerous and diverse. Primarily facilitated by traditional advocacy organisations they have aimed to mobilise broad community opposition to specific developments with major environmental and cultural impacts. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s Lake Pedder Action Group and Australian Conservation Foundation coordinated protests as well as standard lobbying techniques in the struggle against the drowning of Lake Pedder and mining on K’Gari (Fraser) Island. The 1980s and 90s increasingly saw a shift to informal, community-led, and confrontational activities, including anti-uranium and anti-nuclear movements with high-stakes actions at the Jabiluka Ranger mine in Kakadu National Park and the Pine gap military base in the Northern Territory. Famously, the Franklin River dam and Terrania Creek Forest blockades were supported by a myriad of loosely organised groups while the Wilderness Society played a lead coordination role. While formally organised campaigning led by state, national and international organisations continues in the 2000s, a range of networked, less formally structured groups are prominent in leading direct action activities. Importantly, the struggle to protect lands and waters from logging, damming and mining is increasingly connected with climate justice, from community resistance to coal and coal seam gas mining (Gamilaraay People and Clan Groups Against Coal Seam Gas and Coal Mining and the #GamilMeansNo campaign, Knitting Nanas, Lock The Gate, and Rising Tide) to broader youth-led movements for climate (SEED Mob Indigenous Youth Climate Network and Australian Youth Climate Coalition [AYCC]).

While the causes of climate change, specifically, have been observed since 1912 (Popular Mechanics, March 1912: p. 340-341) the policy and public debate in Australia emerged in the
mid-1980s. By the 1990s, the goal of lowering emissions had become a key mobiliser in Australia as it was around the globe - informed by scientists and activists, the threat of mass extinctions, and intergenerational equity and precautionary principles (Rio Earth Summit, 1992). In Australia, the continued intransigence of the conservative Howard Government (1996-2007) towards taking any government action on climate change saw post-Kyoto climate-related action gain pace. At this time NGOs such as Nature Conservation Councils, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth organised a series of actions and protests prior to federal elections. These included the annual Walk Against Warming rallies, held prior to UNFCCC COP meetings beginning in 2005, through to actions and protests in the lead up to the 2007 federal election. The election itself was dominated by campaigns on labour and environmental issues, and the resulting Rudd Labor Government promised to prioritise climate action. Indeed, the subsequent Labor governments did pass carbon pricing legislation, but this was spectacularly repealed by the new Abbot-led Liberal government in 2014, leading to significant anti-government protests against pro-business austerity and climate denialism 2015-18. The advent of the Thunberg-inspired school strikes has again invigorated climate activism in Australia - this time led by the country’s youngest citizens.

The contemporary mass mobilisation of school students in Australia is unprecedented but also reflects the growing numbers of young people participating in the past 15 years in Australian youth-led organisations for climate and social justice (Collin, 2015). Among these, the youth-led Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC) has been particularly significant: running high profile participatory campaigns, delivering climate campaigning workshops, training for school-age students and developing an extensive and decentralised model of community organising and action. With more than 150,000 members, the AYCC enables personalisable collective action: AYCC followers choose their own level of engagement and organise localised and networked actions, online and offline - hallmarks of the current climate protests.

The climate strikes in Australia

While AYCC and other groups have been undertaking significant campaigning, advocacy and lobbying activity for more than ten years, the recent surge of climate action protests was instigated by the school-student led movement #SchoolStrike4Climate (https://www.schoolstrike4climate.com/), which began in the regional Victorian city of Castlemaine in October 2018. Autonomously organised by a group of (mainly) Year 8 high school students, these early actions in solidarity with Greta Thunberg were an effort to voice deep concern for the catastrophic impacts of climate change and dissatisfaction with current government policy. By word of mouth, students organised eight initial school strikes in the Castlemaine region, attracting 20 – 50 students to each event. The AYCC then worked with the Castlemaine students to create a webpage; develop a campaign strategy; and run workshops on organising actions and developing a social media presence. This built capacity
for a decentralised model, enabling students anywhere in Australia to organise and coordinate school strikes for climate action (Collin and McCormack, 2019).

The network grew, and students across Australia began to coordinate and organise in their own regions. On 30 November 2018, an estimated 15,000 students temporarily left school to attend rallies in 30 locations around Australia to demand that politicians take immediate action on climate change in this first large-scale student ‘Walk-out’. The November 2018 protests garnered significant media attention for their size and the unique profile of the protesters: the majority were school students aged 5 – 18 years old, some accompanied by supportive parents or carers. The action drew commentary from politicians including the incumbent Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, who said: [W]e do not support our schools being turned into parliaments… What we want is more learning in schools and less activism in schools (AAP, 26 November 2018).

The students were not deterred, and organised further School Strikes on 15 March, 4 May and 20 September 2019. During 2019 the #SchoolStrike4Climate also drew new support and alliances from trade and tertiary students’ and professional unions, while continuing to build solidarity networks with parents, churches and some independent schools. Despite support for ongoing climate strikes and mass actions from more traditional quarters, #SchoolStrike4Climate nevertheless remains an autonomous student-based movement. By 20 September 2019 #SchoolStrike4Climate reported 115+ climate actions were held around Australia and the organiser-estimated attendance had grown to 350,000 people.

In Sydney, we estimated the crowd at 50,000–60,000 but news media and #SS4C reported some 80,000 people attended. The rally was held in the Domain a large public open space between the State Library and the NSW Art Gallery, directly behind Warrane (Circular Quay) where the 1788 British landing is commemorated every 26 January. The first speaker was Marlie Thomas, a 16-year-old proud Kamilaroi woman and student at regional Gunnedah High School - 422kms from Sydney. After acknowledging the Gadigal clan and Country where the protest took place, she said: “I am here on the authority of my elders. I struggle to think of one way climate change doesn't affect our culture. I have had to help collect bottled water for our family in Walgett. Many other towns in NSW are facing the same crisis. We rely on Country and these rivers are our life.” Her speech brought together the many threads of past struggles with the urgency of youth-led climate action today: as a young person speaking, with the imprimatur of her elders, to universal rights, to protecting lands and waters from commodification, and to demanding action on climate policy.

**Survey delivery**

The Climate Protest - Sydney project was delivered by a team of 15 who conducted the short face-to-face surveys and distributed approximately 800 flyers to recruit to the online survey and follow up interviews. In addition our team visually recorded (photographing) event signage (placards) for future analysis.
Given the central role children and young people have played in the Australian protests, we sought to capture data on their motives, aspirations and views. Keeping in mind the global climate study protocol, we created versions of the online survey for 5 – 9 year olds and 10 – 15 year olds. Surveys were adapted with the input of children of diverse backgrounds and ages and in line with ethics approval requirements we sought informed parental consent for children’s participation in the survey during the protest. As such, only children who attended with a parent were recruited for the surveys for U16 year olds. The online surveys received 190 completions for over 16 year olds; 28 completions for 10 - 15 year olds and 13 completions for 5 - 9 year olds. We also collected 83 short in-person surveys.

1. Who Participated?

Although the Sydney protests to date have been dominated by young people, the 20 September 2019 protests drew far more adults in solidarity with school students. While school-age campaigners led the event the short face-to-face survey findings (n=83) suggest the largest age group in attendance was the 24 – 38 year olds (Millennials), followed by children and young people aged under 23 years (Gen Z), then 55 – 71 year olds (Boomers) and 39 – 54 year olds (GenX). Generation X are the smallest single group in this sample although our online survey sample (Graph 1) shows a larger number of Gen X participants.

(Graph 1 Age of online survey respondents (n=190))
Obtaining completed surveys from children and young people aged under 16 years was relatively unsuccessful. It is therefore extremely difficult to determine how many students there were in attendance. Given the leadership and focus of the protests on encouraging school students to attend we estimate there were at least equal numbers of young people under the age of 18 as those over the age of 18 at the September 20 2019 rally in Sydney.

We conclude that Gen Z participants were numerous and underrepresented in the online survey, and many were likely to be in attendance with their Millennial or GenX parents. Also, of all the rallies, this was not only the largest rally to date, but was also the one the drew participation from the broadest age range and a higher median age of 36 signally a growing intergenerational solidarity for the climate strikes.

The survey conducted with those aged over 16 years (n=190) indicates that only 17% were students. Protest participants aged over 16 years are, however, highly educated (Table 1. Highest level of education attained)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest level of education completed to date</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None, did not complete primary school</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary school</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary, non-university</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>61.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More women attended the protest than men or those who identify as another gender. The face to face survey gender ratio was 48 (58%) women, 33 men (40%), one person each identifying as non-binary and gender queer (2%) (Graph 2). The online survey gender

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4 A paper that focuses on the limitations of the methodology for collecting data with people under the age of 16 will be collated. However, brief observations are that a number of barriers to completion likely exist including: going online after the protest to complete, length of the survey and requirement for parental consent. The Sydney team is currently piloting alternative methods that are more relatable and engaging for young people to increase data collection with this important group of participants.
breakdown was 67% female; 32% male; 1% other. This may be explained by the historical participation of women in protest movements, the role women continue to play as primary carers of children and therefore attending with younger students; and the fact that women benefit less from maintaining a status quo which continues to reproduce gender inequity in both the public and private spheres.

**Graph 2 Gender distribution of face-to-face short survey sample**

![Graph showing gender distribution]

In terms of ethnic diversity, 70 percent of online survey respondents were born in Australia and 57% of participants’ mothers were born in Australia and 56 percent of participants fathers were born in Australia. This indicates that just over half of participants had at least one parent born overseas, broadly reflecting the general population.

Protesters overall reported a working-to-lower-class identification with only 8 percent viewing themselves as ‘upper middle class’ (Table 2).

**Table 2 Class self-identification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class self-identification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>44.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle class</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Prior experience of participating in protests and other forms of political participation

Sydney protesters reflected reasonable levels of engagement with political and civic organisations (Table 3). Passive membership is relatively high, specifically for environmental organisations (20.36%) and charities or humanitarian organisations (18.56%). There are more active than passive members in youth organisations (15.97%) and student organisations (21.05%) most likely reflecting the effort to bring tertiary students to the 20 September 2019 protest. Many protesters also reported being either a passive or active a member of an environmental organisation (33.93%) and humanitarian or charitable organisation (29.34%).

Table 3 Protester participation organizations in the past 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Not a member</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School council</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>93.41</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organisation</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>73.68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church or religious organisation</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>92.22</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student organisation</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>68.42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade organisation or professional association</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>79.04</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party or its youth organisation</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>85.63</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organisation</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>91.62</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or cultural organisation</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>85.63</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organisation</td>
<td>20.36</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>67.07</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTQI rights organisation</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>91.62</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community or neighbourhood association</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>80.24</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity or humanitarian organisation</td>
<td>18.56</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>70.66</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third world Global Justice or Peace organisation</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>86.83</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racist or Migrant organisation</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>93.41</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human or civil rights organisation</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>85.03</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>97.01</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The online surveys showed protestors are engaged with a range of interest, community and politically-oriented organisations (Table 3) but the short face to face surveys found that they are not experienced demonstrators (Table 4). As with education, past participation in demonstrations falls reasonably predictably along age lines, with the lower numbers clustering around the younger respondents. By far the largest cohort was of people who had attended a few other protests, but not many, which reflects the largest cohort overall being millennials.

Table 4 Have you taken part in demonstrations in the past?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1B, 1X, 3M, 8Zs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 – 5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3B, 4X, 19M, 15 Zs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 – 10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3B, 3X, 3M, 0Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11 – 20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1W, 4B, 3X, 4M, 0Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Over 21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3B, 2Xs. 1M; gender: W4, GQ1, M1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One third of Generation Z protesters were attending their first ever protest (8 respondents) and the remaining two thirds had attended 1 – 5 protests in the past (15 respondents). There were millennials in every category, but by far the most (61%) nominated 1-5 previous protests indicating that the SchoolStrike4Climate protests are mobilizing people who have not been active in demonstrations in the past. Among online survey respondents, the vast majority had either never, or only attended 1 - 5 protests ever prior to the climate strikes (Table 5.). These findings are generally supported by the online survey which suggests that these climate protests are mobilising people who have either never participated in protests before, or have not done so in the last 12 months.

Table 5: Excluding the Climate Strikes, how many times have online survey respondents participated in a demonstration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>1 to 5</th>
<th>6 to 10</th>
<th>11 to 20</th>
<th>21+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ever</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past 12 months</td>
<td>42.21</td>
<td>53.25</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By contrast, protesters report high engagement in individual political repertoires, particularly conscious consumerism, signing petitions and reducing energy consumption. None had used violent forms of action to express political views (Table 6).

Table 6: What actions people have done in the past 12 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>contacted a politician, government, or local government official?</td>
<td>51.83</td>
<td>48.17</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signed a petition/public letter?</td>
<td>86.59</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donated money to a political organization or group?</td>
<td>49.07</td>
<td>50.93</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boycotted certain products?</td>
<td>90.12</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>57.67</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raised awareness for a political issue via social media?</td>
<td>73.01</td>
<td>26.99</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>joined a strike (other than today's Climate Strike)</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taken part in direct action (such as: blockade, occupation, civil disobedience)?</td>
<td>11.04</td>
<td>88.96</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>used violent forms of action (against property or people)?</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gave up a trip by plane for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>84.66</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deliberately bought products for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>96.27</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changed your diet for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>71.95</td>
<td>28.05</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumed less products altogether for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>87.88</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reused products like bottles and plastic bags for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>99.39</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduced energy use in your household for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>87.27</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bought second-hand goods (such as clothes, bikes, phones, etc.) for political, ethical or environmental reasons?</td>
<td>70.91</td>
<td>29.09</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Why did they protest?

Sydney survey respondents were most likely to report that wanting to put pressure on politicians to make things change motivated them to attend the protests (Table 7). They were also mainly motivated to express solidarity, raise public awareness and due to a sense of moral obligation. Few were motivated to attend because someone had asked them to, or to defend their own interests. This may also reflect the gender ratio, in a society where pursuit of ‘rational self-interest’ in the liberal/free market value system is more vigorously promoted to boys and men in traditionally masculine spaces such as male-dominated workplaces and sporting arenas.

Table 7: Reason for participating in the 20 September Climate Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>defend my interests</td>
<td>3.78 (.08)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>express my views</td>
<td>4.31 (.05)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pressure politicians to make things change</td>
<td>4.70 (.05)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raise public awareness</td>
<td>4.56 (.05)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>express my solidarity</td>
<td>4.58 (.05)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because I felt morally obliged to do so</td>
<td>4.37 (.07)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because somebody asked me to join</td>
<td>2.10 (.08)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores indicate more agreement.

Protesters aged 10 – 15 were invited to say in their own words why they attended the rally. Most common themes were wanting governments to take action on climate change, being worried about the future and wanting to make a difference (Word Cloud 1)
Protesters were almost unanimous in their belief in the goal of the demonstrations to call on “politicians to fulfil their promise to stop global warming” but were ambivalent about the demonstration being effective in achieving this goal (Table 8).

Table 8. How important is the goal "Politicians must fulfil their promise to stop global warming".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This goal is important</td>
<td>4.98 (.02)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This demonstration will be effective in reaching this goal</td>
<td>3.07 (.06)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores indicate responses closer to “very much:”

Similarly, the protesters agreed with the goal of advancing global justice through climate action, but were ambivalent that the goal will be achieved through protesting (Table 9).
Table 9: Agreement with the statement: "Global justice must be advanced through climate action."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This goal is important</td>
<td>4.62 (.05)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This demonstration will be effective in reaching this goal</td>
<td>3.05 (.06)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The role of affect

Most Sydney protesters reported feeling largely frustrated, worried and angry about climate change.

Table 10. How people feel about climate change/global warming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>4.25 (.06)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeless</td>
<td>3.20 (.09)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxious</td>
<td>3.63 (.09)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried</td>
<td>4.28 (.06)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearful</td>
<td>3.73 (.08)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustrated</td>
<td>4.50 (.06)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerless</td>
<td>3.49 (.08)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores indicate responses closer to “very much:”

When analysed by age/generation, the youngest protesters (GenZ) have the strongest sense of all these feelings except ‘Frustrated’ - which older protesters feel more strongly (Graph 3). Trust in Australian democracy is at its lowest since time series data has been available (Stoker et al, 2018). Indeed, the face to face short survey indicates that 70% of respondents were dissatisfied to very dissatisfied.

The online survey respondents suggest that Sydney protesters are more likely to trust in the police or the European Union than they are in the Australian Federal Parliament (Table 10).
Political parties and the mass media accompany the federal parliament as the least trusted institutions. Protesters were more likely to trust Environmental Groups and the United Nations.

**Table 10: Trust in types of institutions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian federal government</td>
<td>2.11 (.07)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW government</td>
<td>2.23 (.07)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>2.06 (.05)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>3.13 (.06)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>3.67 (.07)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3.19 (.08)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>2.12 (.06)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental groups</td>
<td>3.91 (.06)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local councils</td>
<td>2.85 (.07)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores more trusting.
Despite low levels of trust, protesters are generally likely to be interested in politics. In the face to face survey 71% reported being ‘quite’ (25%) or ‘very’ (46%) interested. Online survey respondents reported low levels of belief in the efficacy of institutional forms of political participation, such as voting. However, they report a greater belief in their capacity to influence policies and, in particular, the impact that organized groups of citizens can have on public policies. Sydney protesters also believe that international solidarity can have a significant effect on the global response to climate change (Table 11).

**Table 11. Views on political agents and efficacy. (to what extent do protesters agree with the questions below) (n=163)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything</td>
<td>3.85 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway</td>
<td>2.25 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My participation can have an impact on public policy in this country</td>
<td>3.93 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country</td>
<td>4.12 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If citizens from different countries join forces, they can have a lot of impact on international politics</td>
<td>4.09 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider everybody’s side of an argument before making a decision</td>
<td>3.87 (.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores indicate greater agreement

This notwithstanding, Sydney protesters are equivocal regarding current policies to address climate change.

**Table 12. How hopeful protesters are that climate change can be addressed.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel hopeful about policies being able to address climate change</td>
<td>3.04 (.08)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even if things look bleak, I do not lose hope that we are able to deal with climate change</td>
<td>3.60 (.07)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Higher scores indicate responses closer to “very much:”
They are neither optimistic, nor pessimistic when asked if we are able to deal with climate change. When asked to what extent they felt hopeful that climate change can be dealt with, the protesters were generally ambivalent (table 12). In relation to the two questions on hope (above) GenX are more hopeful than all other age groups and GenZ are the least hopeful (Graph 4).  

Graph 4. Feelings of hope by generation

Survey respondents disagreed that governments, companies and the market can be relied on to solve the current challenges the environment faces. They did report feeling very strongly that governments should prioritise protecting the environment and taking science-informed action on climate change regardless of public opinion.

5. What do people want to change and who do they think should bring this about?

Survey respondents disagreed that governments, companies and the market can be relied on to solve the current challenges the environment faces. They did report feeling very strongly that governments should prioritise protecting the environment and taking science-informed action on climate change regardless of public opinion.

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5 ‘Series 1’ is in response to the question I feel hopeful about policies being able to address climate change; ‘Series 2’ is in response to the question “Even if things look bleak, I do not lose hope...”.
Table 13 – Views on how climate change can be addressed. (To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Score (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modern science can be relied on to solve our environmental problems</td>
<td>3.79 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments can be relied on to solve our environmental problems</td>
<td>1.85 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies and the market can be relied on to solve our environmental problems</td>
<td>2.10 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping climate change must primarily be accomplished through voluntary lifestyle changes by individuals</td>
<td>2.54 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed</td>
<td>4.48 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs</td>
<td>4.57 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to decrease CO2 emissions cannot be allowed to make social welfare arrangements worse</td>
<td>3.34 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Scores closer to five indicate more agreement with the statement.

Conclusions

The Sydney 20 September 2019 Climate Protest was large-scale and brought together a diverse and intergenerational crowd. Despite our best efforts, we were unable to sample a ‘representative’ number of children and young people due to the challenges of administering a child-friendly version of the online survey and securing informed parental consent. However, our observation was that at least half of the protesters were under the age of 18 years. Students were strongly supported by Millennials and GenXers, women and people identifying as working or lower-middle class who came to protest.

Importantly the Climate Protests appear to be mobilising people who have either had little or no experience with demonstrations – even as many reported high levels of engagement in individual political repertoires, particularly conscious consumerism, signing petitions and reducing energy consumption.
Protesters in Sydney mainly participated because they want to pressure politicians to take action on climate change, raise awareness and show solidarity with others. They feel very strongly that politicians need to fulfill promises to address climate action and that global justice must be advanced via action on climate change. Protesters feel most strongly a sense of anger and frustration although Gen Z are most likely to feel hopeless and worried suggesting that youth action is driven not only by hope but also deep concern. Indeed, in our survey the youngest protesters are the ones who have the lowest sense of hope. Nevertheless, their commitment to addressing climate change is clear: because they want a future.

References


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Austria

Antje Daniel and Anna Deutschman

Background

Austria is part of the worldwide Fridays for Future (FFF) movement. In many cities, such as Vienna, Graz or Linz, young people are taking to the streets to mobilize for climate justice and for sustainable policy action according to the Paris Agreement.

The Austrian environmental movement was strong in the 1970s and 1980s and had two important mobilization peaks (Gottweis 1997): firstly, when people protested against the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant, which was the first commercial nuclear plant for electric power generation built in Austria. The startup was prevented by large demonstrations. Secondly, during the occupation of the Hainburger Au wetlands in December 1984. This was of great significance for the development of democratic processes in Austria, leading finally to the institutionalization and the reconstitution of various smaller parties and pressure groups into a new political party: Die Grüne Alternative. In addition, civil society organizations in the field of environmental activism became established in the 1980s (such as Global 2000).

Austria has a lively and diverse civil society. However, public protests have remained rare since civil society had a close relation to the government. Against this background, the continuous mobilization of FFF is exceptional.

The organizers of many FFF activities in Vienna were students from different universities. The first FFF demonstration in December 2018 was organized by students who were inspired by meeting Greta Thunberg in Katowice during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in December 2018. The students started to organize FFF strikes and the weekly demonstrations gained in size over time. At the beginning, only a few people participated, but the movement increased and mobilized thousands of people who took part in different protest events in 2019. In addition to the weekly school strikes since December 2018, they also organized four climate action days, which were part of the Global Climate Strikes. The climate action days were in addition to the weekly school strikes. The first day for climate action was on March 15, when about 10,000 protesters took part; the second Global Strike mobilized around 25,000 people in Austria (Standard 25.5.2019); and in the Earth Strike on September 27 around 150,000 people protested in different parts of Austria: in Vienna 30,000 (according to the organizers 80,000) people took to the streets; in Graz 8,000 protesters.

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6 We want to thank Andreas Wingender for his support with the figures in this report and the students of the Department of Development Studies at the University of Vienna for their supporting work.

7 Further important mobilization was against the ÖVP-FPÖ government in the beginning of the century and in 2018/2019.
participated, and in Innsbruck 18,000 (Standard 27.09.2019). The fourth strike in Vienna had 20,000 participants (Standard 29.11.2019; ORF 29.11.2019).

The protest events in Austria

In addition to the FFF Vienna, 28 regional groups of the FFF movement in Austria exist, including Graz, Linz and Salzburg. Moreover, FFF is supported by a number of civil society groups which emerged in relation to FFF and are subsumed under the FFF’s guiding principles. These include, for example, the Scientists for Future, Parents for Future, Farmers for Future, Workers for Future or Religions for Future. In addition to these sub-groups, numerous formalized civil society actors from the environmental sector participated in the protests. In this way, adults increasingly declared their solidarity and supported the concerns of FFF (see below).

The protest event on September 27, as in many other places, was related to a series of events during the week-long climate strike. On September 20 FFF called for nationwide mobilization. With the title “Austria for Future” the movement aimed at showing that strikes were organized all over the country. Therefore, on September 20 an event related to FFF took place at 784 places: at each place, pictures of activists were taken in front of their place name sign.

The climate strike on September 27 was also embedded in a number of important political events. On September 25, parliament discussed the national climate emergency and finally agreed to it. FFF was extensively involved in lobbying for the declaration of a climate emergency. On September 29 national elections took place. Therefore, the intensity of public debates on climate issues was high during this week. Likewise important is that the Minister of Education, Iris Rauskala, agreed to the participation of pupils on Global Climate Strike during school time, provided teachers were involved in the organization (Standard 20.09.2019). All these different processes show the density of public political discussions and explain the context in which the Global Climate Strike took place.

1. Who participated?

From the beginning FFF demonstrations in Vienna were characterized by the central role of young people at school and university. The data indicates that many participants were over twenty. The figure, as much as 43%, shows that the main group of protesters was between 20 and 35 years old. 25% of the participants were younger than twenty and 30% were 36 and older (Figure 1.1). Remarkable is the increasing number of older participants in the age group between 36 and 65. While this age group accounted for 14% in May, the number increased to 30% in September.
We have chosen to use a broader distinction of age groups and distinguish between youth and adults. As ‘youth’ we categorize all participants who were up to 25 years old. ‘Adults’ means participants who were 26 and older.

The age distribution of the protesters in May shows that over 65% of the participants were younger than 25. In contrast, 45% of the participants in September belong to the category of youth, and 55% were adults. The data shows that the number of young people decreased, while the number of adults grew (Figure 1.2).

Regarding gender, FFF was described as a movement driven by women and girls. Compared to the social category of age, the distribution of gender remained relatively stable between May and September. Women dominated the protests. The peak was on May 31, the day Greta Thunberg joined the demonstration in Vienna. In September 52% of the participants were girls and women (Figure 1.3). The predominance of women was clearly stronger among youth than among adults. It is quite interesting that the number of women increased in the age group above 65 (Figure 1.4).
The educational level among the participants was high. In September 59% stated that they had a university degree, 11% even a PhD degree. Among the participants who were still studying, more than 85% stated that at least one of their parents had received university education. This shows that the educational level of the participants is extraordinarily high and corresponds to the findings of demonstrations in other cities.
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

Many of the protesters are very young. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of them were participating for the first time at a demonstration. Among the protesters, 20% of the youth were first timers at the September demonstration, and there was also a remarkable number of adults at the demonstrations in May and September who were doing this for the first time. In September 80% of the youth and adults has taken part in other protest events within the last 12 months (Figure 2.1). It must be taken into account that the Global Earth Strike in September was the third world-wide protest event taking place in Vienna. It is quite possible that many of the protesters had been politically sensitized and mobilized within the last 12 months in the course of the FFF and climate justice protests. However, it is interesting that the number of first timers did not dramatically decrease in the course of protests after May, particularly amongst the youth (Figure 2.2). This reveals that the movement has the ability to mobilize new participants who had never attended a protest before. In addition to former protest participation, many youth and adults had chosen various other forms of political participation (Figure 2.3). 82% among the youth and 92% among the adults had signed a petition. 9% among the youth and 25% among the adults had contacted a politician.
Figure 2.1: Previous political participation in protest events (last 12 months)

Figure 2.2: Previous demonstration participation (ever)
Figure 2.3: Previous political participation

That there is a link between political engagement and participation in demonstrations is not surprising. In September 2019, among the youth, 81% were interested in politics (31% said very and 50% said quite). The interest in politics was even higher among the adults (92%: 36% very and 56% quite) (Figure 2.4)

Figure 2.4: Political interest

Figure 2.5: Organizational membership of protesters

Environmental Organization
Some of the protesters were engaged in various other types of organizations. 11% of the youth and 9% of the adults were active members of a political party and 5% of each age group supported a political party financially or were passive members. 10% of the youth and 25% of the adults stated that they were active members of an environmental organization, while 8% of each age group were passive members or financial supporters of an environmental organization (Figure 2.5).

3. Why did they protest?

The protesters had varying motives for participating in the FFF demonstrations. Out of the predefined reasons for taking part in the protest, namely to put pressure on politicians, to raise awareness, to express solidarity, or moral obligation, a majority of the respondents (93% of the youth and 87% of the adults) agreed or strongly agreed that they protested to “pressure politicians to make things change.” Participants also frequently acknowledged wanting “to defend my interests and to raise public awareness”: 83% of the youth and 70% of the adults agreed or strongly agreed. The least common among the predefined motives was “because someone asked me to join”, to which 5% of each age group agreed or strongly agreed (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Motives to participate
Many participants in Vienna attended the Global Earth Strike in September in small and in large groups. It is also important to note that the Minister of Education agreed to the participation of pupils provided their participation was organized by the school (teacher). As a consequence, a remarkable number of protesters attended the protest in school-related groups. 63% of the protesters were accompanied by friends, 24% of the respondents appeared together with schoolmates, and 7% appeared with their teacher (Figure 3.3). 30% of the youth and 18% of the adults were asked to join the Earth Strike. About 45% of the respondents (youth and adults) asked someone else to join the strike (Figure 3.2).

4. Emotions and Greta Effect

Emotions do not completely explain protest participation rather they restrain the behavior of participants and explain their affection and perception. The emotions “anxiousness” and “worry” dominated among the protesters in Vienna. Around 80% of the respondents (youth and adults) agreed that they feel these emotions quite or very much in relation to climate change. These were followed by “anger”, acknowledged by 68% among the youth and 64%
among the adults. The emotions “powerlessness”, “fearful” and “hopelessness” were more in the middle of the spectrum, around “somewhat” and “quite” (Figure 4.1).

In sum, the protest participants were concerned about their future (worry and anxiousness), and they were angry. But they did not automatically feel fearful, hopelessness or powerless. Most of the emotions were expressed more strongly by young participants, but adults tended to feel more powerless than the youth.

Figure 4.1: Emotions
Besides emotions, the icon Greta Thunberg has an impact on the movements. However, the responses on the impact of Greta Thunberg (very and quite) remained under 50% (Figure 4.1). Greta Thunberg joined the Strike on May 31 in Vienna, where 47% of the youth and 56% of the adults stated that Greta Thunberg shaped their interest in climate change. 29% of the youth and 31% of the adult participants in September answered that Greta Thunberg influenced their interest in climate change (very much or quite). 30% of the youth and 30% of the adults stated that Greta had “somewhat” influenced their interest. In September 27% of the youth and 31% of the adult respondents answered that Greta had very much and quite influenced the decision for the participation at the strike.

Greta Thunberg tended to be more important for adults than for youth. Quite surprisingly, in May 2019 the influence of Greta Thunberg on interest in climate change is higher among the adults. This is probably due to the fact that Greta Thunberg took part in the protests in Vienna and her presence attracted many.

**Figure 4.2: Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in climate change**

![Bar chart showing the impact of Greta Thunberg on interest in climate change among youths and adults in May and September 2019.](image-url)
Figure 4.3: Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike

5. What do they want and who should do it?

In terms of support for various solutions to environmental problems among Austrian protesters, the broad tendency is to advocate changes on the political level. In Austria, we witness a strong skepticism that the government or big companies are able to solve the problems. By contrast, a high proportion of protesters believe that science can solve environmental problems (Figure 5.1). 66% of the adults *strongly agree* and *agree* that modern science will be able to solve the problems. The percentage of youth is lower and 61% *strongly agree* and *agree*.

Figure 5.1: Science, government and companies are relied to solve our problems

*Modern science can be relied on to solve the climate crisis*
Governments can be relied on to solve our environmental problems

Companies can be relied on to solve our environmental problems

Many respondents expressed the need to address climate change even if such policies negatively affect the economy (Figure 5.2). Likewise, the majority of participants agree that politicians need to follow the advice of climate scientists, even if a majority of the population opposes this (Figure 5.3). This attitude is expressed more frequently by adults than by young people.

Figure 5.2: Statement - priority over economy
The respondents were also asked whether they agreed to a voluntary change of lifestyle, and whether a change of individual lifestyle could accomplish climate change. The need to change one’s lifestyle is unclear: 43% of the youths and 43% of the adults neither agree nor disagree. And on the question whether climate change policies impact social welfare arrangements, 55% of the youth respondents disagree or strongly disagree, and 67% of the adults.

Figure 5.4: Political trust
With regard to trust in the institutions and actors who are responsible for implementing climate change policies, the participants did not trust the national government: 46% of the youth responded that they did not trust the government (*not very* or *not at all*), and 50% of the adults (Figure 5.4). Participants in both age groups, youth and adults, had the tendency to trust supranational institutions like the UN or the EU more strongly. Not surprisingly, the protesters’ trust was highest in relation to environmental organizations: with regard to trust in environmental groups, 68% young protesters responded that they would *quite* and 12% *very much* trust environmental organizations, while this trust is only slightly lower among adults (61% *quite* and 12% *very much*) (Figure 5.5). Thus, most of the participants believe that environmental groups have an impact on public policy in the country.

37% of the youth *agreed strongly* and 47% *agreed* that organized citizens can have an impact on public politics. The trust in organizations among adults is lower and accounted for 33% *strong agreement* and 41% *agreed* (Figure 5.6).

**Figure 5.6: Impact of organized groups on policy**
The youth also believed that their participation had an impact on public politics: 13% agreed strongly and 42% agreed. Among adult protesters 16% stated that they agree strongly and 30% agreed. (Figure 5.7).

**Figure 5.7: My participation can have an impact on policy**

![Graph showing participation impact]

The fact that the Austrian national election took place on September 29 had a low impact on participation in the protests. 75% of the adults and 69% of the youth agreed that the national election did not influence their participation.

**References**


Belgium

Michiel De Vydt

Background

Climate activism in Belgium dates back to at least 2007, when on Saturday 8 December about 3000 people demonstrated in Brussels. The demonstration was organized by De Klimaatcoalitie (officially established in 2008) following the 13th UN climate conference in Bali. The demonstration was called the first national climate march in original news reports. Since then, climate demonstrations in response to the end-of-year UN climate conferences have become an annual tradition. The demonstration in 2008 attracted a mere 500 people. On 5 December 2009, in the run-up to the Copenhagen Conference, 15,000 people demonstrated. These numbers are useful to contrast the magnitude of today’s wave of climate contention.

This country report for Belgium examines the mobilization of protesters during the Global Week for Future (20-27 September 2019), which was the third globally coordinated protest event organized by FridaysForFuture, following the first Global Climate Strike (GCS) on 15 March 2019, and the second GCS on 24 May. The current country report specifically compares the September event to the event in March, as the Belgian team collected protest survey data at these two points in time.

In our descriptive report of the first GCS, we described the March event in Belgium as “a third peak or a renewed impetus within the already established domestic protest wave” – the first peak being the annual Claim the Climate-demonstration on Sunday 2 December 2018, mobilizing an exceptionally high turnout of no fewer than 65,000 protesters. This was the biggest climate mobilization in Belgium until then. On Thursday 10 January 2019, during school hours, Youth for Climate (YFC) mobilized around 3000 demonstrators in Brussels, thereby kicking off their announced weekly series of civil disobedient street protest. A second peak in the protest cycle was signaled by the two demonstrations at the end of January 2019: the third Youth for Climate-school strike on Thursday 24 January, which drew an unexpected 35,000 participants, and the Rise for Climate-demonstration on Sunday 27 January which was attended by a record-breaking 70,000 people. By the time of the first GCS in March, the Belgian streets had thus already seen high turnouts, but the turnout of 30,000 in Brussels (and

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8 This is not the place to evaluate whether this truly was a first ‘national’ ‘climate demonstration’. The point is to set some temporal background to the recent Global Climate Strikes in 2019. For on original news article, see: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf08122007_025
9 Sources for the turnout numbers, 500: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/b27981399081206, 15,000: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf05122009_022
an extra 10,000 in other Belgian cities) warrants to describe the Climate Strike of March as a renewed impetus in the climate protest cycle in Belgium.\textsuperscript{11}

After the first GCS, YFC continued their weekly protests, from now on in a more diffuse manner, also in cities other than the capital. Gross turnouts, however, never exceeded 15,000. The Belgian climate protest cycle appeared to slow down during April and May.

With the national elections on Sunday 26 May, the second GCS on 24 May marked a temporary rest point for Youth for Climate; a kind of “end of the beginning”, to quote from the speech by Anuna De Wever, one of the main organizers of YFC. According to police estimates, 7,500 protesters demonstrated in Brussels during the second GCS. The relatively low turnout in May confirmed the cooling down of the protest cycle. The national elections did not bring the desired green shift. Political parties Groen (+0.8%) and Ecolo (+2.8%) increased their voters’ share, but only slightly so. How did the movement respond to the disappointing election results? Did the summer bring a renewed motivation to mobilize for climate, once more, during the Global Week for Future in September?

**The Global Week for Future in Belgium**

During the Global Week for Future, more than 7.6 million people in 185 countries across the globe took to the streets to strike for climate action.\textsuperscript{12} In Belgium, the opening demonstration on Friday 20 September was also the main event of the week. According to the police, around 15,000 people participated. The demonstration was supported by several organizations, most notably Greenpeace, WWF, Amnesty International, the labor unions, Extinction Rebellion, and spin-off groups like Grandparents for Climate, as illustrated by their being listed on the official Facebook event page and by their presence at the event. The demonstration also meant the comeback of Youth for Climate (Anuna called it the start of “season two” of their climate actions). According to newspaper reports, a several hundred Gilets Jaunes were present. The demonstration started in the neighborhood of the Brussels North train station at 2 o’clock in the afternoon and ended in the Jubelpark. Weather conditions were nice. Extinction Rebellion halted the demonstration temporarily at the Rue de la Loi, but there were no clashes with the police.

**Who participated?**

In the previous report, we defined school students as those under 20 with an ongoing education not higher than secondary education. In March, we observed 36 school students among our total sample of 166 respondents, suggesting that about 1 in 5 of the participants was a school-going student. Compared to the other countries surveyed in March, this was already low (with a median age of 40, the average Belgian protester at the first GCS appeared to be relatively old). In our September sample, we observe 22 among our 183 respondents

\textsuperscript{11} For a more detailed description of the climate protest events in Belgium between December 2018 and April 2019, see: Wouters, Ruud and Michiel De Vydt (2019). Youth for Climate Belgium: The narrative of an exceptional protest wave. Online.

\textsuperscript{12} At least according to organizers like 350.org, see: https://globalclimtestrike.net/about/
who qualify as school students. This is a share of 12%. In other countries as well, we observe that the relative group size of school students has become quite small, sometimes too small to sensibly run descriptive analyses on. Therefore, in this report, we choose to use broader categories: we now distinguish between youths and adults. Youths are those aged up to 25 years, adults are 26 or older. Figure 1.1 shows the shares of these groups, for both the March and September event. We notice that the share of adults has increased between March and September.

Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations

![Bar chart showing the age distribution in March and September.](chart.png)

Figure 1.2 shows the age distribution along a different age grouping. It is noteworthy that by September, almost two in three (64%) Belgian protesters were 36 or older. The Global Climate Strikes are clearly not the same as the younger YFC school strikes, mostly populated by schoolchildren.

The baby boomer generation (here operationalized as those born before 1964) is certainly represented in the Belgian Global Climate Strikes: in March, 25% of the Belgian protest population was 56 or older. In September, 31% was a baby boomer (figures not shown). I mention this age category to refer to the “OK boomer” meme which also entered climate debates across the globe.
In March, we observed that the Belgian protest population shows the typical gender gap (typically, a protest population tends to be slightly more male than female): in March we observed 46% female in Belgium, compared to the gross average across countries of 58% female. In September, we observe an identical gender distribution: 46% female versus the gross average of 58%. Thus, next to its age distribution, Belgium appears to be an outlier for its gender distribution, compared to the other surveyed cities. Figure 1.3 shows the gender distribution across the earlier used five age groups.
The group size for ‘under 15’ (6 in March, 1 in September) is too small to be meaningful. Note that the sample sizes for this figure are slightly smaller than in other figures due to respondent loss (the gender question was one of the final questions in the survey). Notice that, in September, among those aged 36-65 (N=93), 63.4% is male. In March, this was 52%. In September, 19/22 = 86% are female in the group 15-19. In March this was 11/26 = 42%.

Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

Are these experienced protesters? Figure 2.1 shows the patterns for past participation. In both events, almost one in five among the youths said they had never demonstrated before. Although our sample sizes for youths are quite small, our data suggest that the September event still managed to draw relatively many new, inexperienced young people. Typically, we find the share of first-timers to be around 10% (Saunders 2014). Figure 2.2 shows in which other forms of political participation respondents have been active during the previous 12 months. A surprisingly large share of 40% among the adult Global Climate Strikers in September have contacted a politician. The other forms of participation are more popular. An interesting finding is that, among our protesting respondents, still considerable shares of Global Climate Strikers did not raise awareness “for a political issue via social media” (as in the original survey phrasing).
Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Brussels

Figure 2.2: Previous political participation, Brussels
The next figure shows whether our respondents are members of an environmental organization (ENGO) and any political party. The main point we wish to highlight, just as in the March report, is that a large share among the youths is not tied to an ENGO: only one in ten is an active member.

Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters in Brussels
In our September sample, 8% among youths and 12% among adults are active member of a political party. We did not ask which Belgian political party. We did however include a question asking all respondents whether they identified with a political party, and if so, with which. In September, 114/164 (69,5%) respondents said they identified with a political party, of which 83/114 (72,8%) answered Groen/Ecolo (the green party in respectively Flanders and Wallonia). 9 respondents answered PVDA/PTB (the Marxist, extreme left party), 7 answered they identified with both Groen and PVDA. 15 answered something else (or nothing).

Why did they protest?

Our survey presented respondents with seven preselected potential motives. We highlight four of these here (Figures 3.1 – 3.4). Relatively more young people than adults agreed with the statement “I participated in the demonstration in order to express my views.” Young respondents also said to protest to “defend my interests” more so than adults. Relatively more adults, on the other hand, experience a moral obligation to protest. Relatively more young protesters than adults agreed they participated “because somebody asked me to join.”
Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views

Figure 3.2 Motive - defend my interests
Figure 3.3. Motive – because I feel morally obliged

Figure 3.4 Motive – because somebody asked me to join
Figure 3.4 brings us to the topic of interpersonal protest recruiting: asking others (or being asked) to participate in a demonstration (whether or not together). Young protesters appear more frequently as recruits (being asked) and recruiters (asking others) compared to adults.

**Figure 3.5: Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate**

![Bar charts showing percentages of youths and adults being asked and asking others to participate in demonstrations.]

**Emotions and the Greta-effect**

In the survey we presented the statement: “Thinking about climate change/global warming makes me feel”, continued with seven preselected answer options, all (negative) feelings, like angry, hopeless, anxious, worried, fearful, frustrated, and powerless. Figure 4.1 shows how many protesters feel fearful, when thinking about climate change. Although the act of demonstrating may be a cheerful experience, – as many of us observed during data collection – this survey question measures how people feel when thinking about climate change (or at least, which feelings people associate with thinking about climate change). I agree that our top-down survey methodology is not most suitable to explore the complex world of feeling-thinking during demonstrating (cf. Bowman 2019). Figure 4.1 suggests that young protesters associate climate change with fear more than adults.
Figure 4.1 Emotions – fearfulness

Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show how many among the Belgian Climate Strikers agree with the statements “Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in climate change”, and “Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike.” Whereas we still observed a few Belgian protesters in March who had never heard of Thunberg, in September this is no longer the case. Relatively more young protesters than adults name Thunberg as a direct influence.
Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change

![Bar chart showing the percentage of youths and adults who are more interested in climate change since Greta Thunberg's actions.]

Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike

![Bar chart showing the percentage of youths and adults who have been affected by Greta Thunberg's actions to join the Climate Strike.]

What do they want and who should do it?

What do they want and who should do it? Although the answers to some of our open-ended survey questions could provide more depth to an answer to this question, this country report currently remains at the surface of an answer: what Global Climate Strikers want is more ambitious climate policy that addresses global climate change effectively. There is a clear call for system change among the slogans of Belgian protesters (but the issue of how the solution is framed deserves more attention on its own). Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show how Climate Strikers evaluate whether we can “rely on” each of three institutions: modern science, governments, and companies and the market. Concerning science, our data suggest a significant share difference between youths and adults – among the youths, $\frac{29}{40} = 73\%$ (strongly) agrees we can rely on modern science to solve our environmental problems whereas this is $\frac{58}{138} = 42\%$ for adults. Figure 5.2 shows very few Belgian protesters believe we can rely on governments. Figure 5.3 shows similarly low levels for companies and the market.

Figure 5.1 Can we rely on modern science?

13 In the Belgian public (media) debate on climate change, it has often been pointed out that ‘the environment’ (milieu) is something different than ‘the climate’. In the Belgian version of the survey, we therefore translated ‘environmental problems’ broadly, as ‘klimaat- en milieuproblematiek’. 
Figure 5.2 Can we rely on government?

Figure 5.3 Can we rely on companies and the market?
Figures 5.1 brings us to the issue of ‘scientization’: In a recent scholarly comment, Darrick Evensen (2019) has argued that the rhetoric of #FridaysForFuture is focused too heavily on the need to ‘listen to science’, thereby turning a blind eye to the many ethical and political questions central to climate action:

“The fundamental problem is that science can only ever be a point of departure for normative decision-making and political action. The language of the students’ activism, however, treats science as the clear arbiter of effective policy.”

While I agree with Evensen’s warning, our data does point out that behind the (typically simplified) scientizing rhetoric of FFF is a somewhat more nuanced embrace of science: science is not uniformly treated as a neutral arbiter (a kind of panacea) by Belgian Climate Strikers.

Consider Figure 5.4 which shows that both among youths and adults, a large majority of 80-85% (strongly) agrees with the statement “The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed.” This statement can be considered to echo, or belong to the scientizing rhetoric of FFF that urges to “listen to the science.” Figure 5.1 (above), however, shows that in September, still 49/138 (35,5%) adults explicitly (strongly) disagree that “We can rely on modern science to solve our environmental problems.” Thus: yes, today’s protesters undeniably believe politicians must “listen” or “act on science”, but this does not imply that all Climate Strikers think we can blindly rely on science. Our data (Figure 5.1) suggests that one in three adults is aware of the limits of science, and the highly political, non-obvious and ideologically charged character of global warming.
Figure 5.4 Statement – follow scientists’ advice, Brussels

Figure 5.5 Statement – priority over economy, Brussels
References


Denmark

Trine Cosmus Nobel, Silas Harrebye, and Thomas Olesen

Background

“Dear young people: You made this election the very first climate election in Danish history.”

This is how the new prime minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen of the Social Democratic Party, addressed her fellow party members on the night of the most recent election, in June 2019. Mette Frederiksen was not wrong in this conclusion: According to most Danish researchers and observers, climate was indeed a very, if not the most, important issue for Danish voters in June 2019.

Approximately two weeks prior to the election, 30,000 participants of all ages marched through Copenhagen for a Climate March. The demonstrators ended up in front of the parliamentary building, where amongst others, Greta Thunberg held a speech - being able to quite literally call upon the politicians peeking through the windows to take the matter seriously.

The march, though, was not the first large climate event in Denmark: A couple of months before, in March 2019, approximately 24,000 participants joined a climate strike in 40 different cities. There are several organizations planning a continuous stream of events in Denmark, especially amongst youth: Den Grønne Studenterbevægelse (The Green Student Movement) and the Danish branch of 350.org are among the most prominent. Both were part of of planning the climate strikes and protests on 20th September 2020. Also, the civil disobedience movement Extinction Rebellion and it’s youth branch has been quite active in Denmark.

The Climate Strike in Denmark

In Denmark, approximately 10 climate strikes were held all over the country on September 20, 2019, with the biggest being Copenhagen, which we surveyed. According to our own estimations, there were approximately 3,000 protesters present at this climate strike when it peaked – the size of the crowd changed significantly throughout the demonstration. The crowd initially gathered at the Town Square at 12:00 pm where speeches and music were organized until 2:00 pm. From 2:00 – 3:00 pm the protesters marched through the inner part of Copenhagen, past the parliament and back again. When they returned, more music and speeches were organized, and a live reporting from strikes in various countries was broadcast on the big screen. Invited speakers included amongst others Amnesty, Børnemagt (Children Power) and The Climate Action of Grandparents.
The climate strike was organized by 19 organizations with the primary organizers being *The Green Student Movement* and *Fridays for Future Copenhagen*. Initially, the organizers of the strike noted in the Facebook event that they did not want any banners, flyers or pennants of political content because as they state: “We’re party-politically neutral, and so are our demonstrations”. Still, many obvious partisan and especially clearly left-wing political banners, flyers and pennants were noticeable, and amongst others, the *Revolutionary Socialists* and the far-left party *The Unity List* (Enhedslisten) and its youth branch were present.

Initially, as noted above, we estimated that about 3,000 protesters were present. A light rain was falling. At that point, the town square was almost filled up, and it was rather hard for the interviewers to make their way through the tightly packed crowd. During the initial speeches, it started raining very heavily, which resulted in two things that affected the hand out and interviewing process: for one, it was hard for the interviewers to write down the answers on the papers, and secondly, many protesters left the town square to find shelter for the rain. Thus, the crowd thinned out significantly, leaving only at the end of our tally about 500 protesters, why we ended up handing surveys out to everyone in the crowd.

Even though it was raining, the atmosphere of the protest was very friendly and generally, the crowd was cheerful – and our interviewers reported that the vast majority of the protesters they approached were friendly and many were very interested in the project. Some even asked to answer the survey even though they were not picked out (they were not allowed to, though, due to methodological rigor). The overall assessment was that this was indeed a youth demonstration – both the participants, organizers and speaker were mostly young. It is worth noting that this might also be related to the fact that one week later, another demonstration targeted at the older generations “*Give your lunch break to the climate*” was organized.

In total 1,000 flyers were handed out and 100 F2F interviews conducted. We received 98 full and 104 partial answers to the survey, leaving us with a somewhat disappointing response rate, compared with many other cities. In this report, both the full and some of the partial answers have been included, and in total 148 respondents are included. We speculate that the low response rate may be due to the very young age of the respondents. It may be less easy for this age group to understand the exact goals of the survey and its importance. The rather long and cumbersome nature of the survey itself may also be off-putting when you are not used to take part in this type of information collection and/or do not see the point of doing so.

1. **Who participated?**

The overall picture of the protest in Copenhagen was, that the protesters were very young. Below, the division of age is shown, illustrated by the share of protesters being 25 or under.

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14 The Facebook event can be found [here](#).
There was in total slightly more women present at the demonstration, as illustrated below. Amongst the young protesters, the overrepresentation is larger, and for the adults, there is slightly more male respondents.

It is worth noting that the education level amongst respondents is very high compared to the national division: As illustrated below, 74,3% of the non-students hold university degrees, and 28,0% of the students (including school pupils) attend university.
Also, when asked if their parents have gone to university, 40,3 % answers that both their parents have done so, and only 10 % have no parents with university degrees.

In addition, when asked to report what class they belong to, 57,6 % answer the upper middle class, and only 10,1 % report belonging to the working class, which again does not mirror the national class division.
Lastly, it should be said that the group seems to be very left-wing. Below, we have illustrated the political party identification of the respondents. It is worth noting that the far-left party is the most common answer, with 35.6% affiliation – and apart from no identification, the Green Party is the second most common answer. This was also represented in the fact that several left-wing parties and organizations were visually present at the demonstration. Only 2% have clearly identified as supporting conservative or liberal parties.

To sum up, the demonstrator group at the climate strike was very young, and there was an over representation of women, particularly amongst youths. In addition, the group was very highly educated, and many attend or had attended university. Also, over half of the respondents identify as belonging to the upper middle class, and most have parents that have attended university. Lastly, almost all the respondents identify with political parties of the left wing.

15 53% stated they were not able to vote (because they are not yet 18 years old, we assume).
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

Most of the protesters had prior experience with protests, but there were also many first-timers, specifically within the youth group, where 20.6% had never participated in a demonstration ever. Remarkably, 48.5% of the adult respondents had attended 21+ demonstration.

![Participation in previous demonstration (ever), youth](image1)

![Participation in previous demonstration (ever), adult](image2)

Also, large proportions of the respondents have been active in different forms of political participations – an overwhelming part have changed their diet, signed a petition or used social media to raise awareness. Somewhat fewer have contacted a politician or other official directly.
On the other hand, formal membership levels are lower than the level of general political participants, although they are still quite high. 30% of youths and 45.5% of adults hold membership – active or passive – of an environmental organization. In addition, 14.3% of youths are a member of a political party, and the same goes for 33.3% of the adults.

On the other hand, it is worth noticing that the respondent group seems to be rather political: 81.4% state they are quite or very interested in politics, and only 2.9% are not at all interested. When asked if they discuss politics with their friends, relatives etc. Out of the non-students, 80.6% often or very often discuss politics. For the students, the number is 51.5%. This is not very surprising considering the event the respondents are attending.
3. **Why did they protest?**

Overall, there were various reasons to participate in the strike. Though, an overwhelming part of the respondents reported they participated in order to pressure the politicians – 54.5% of the adults and 69.6% of the youths strongly agree that they participated in order to pressure politicians. In addition, the respondents also wanted to express their views; 46.0% of the adults and 43.0% of the youths answer that they strongly agree that this was a reason to participate in the protest. The least common reason to participate was that someone specifically asked one to join, which is quite surprising as it is very often school mates that participate together.
Reasons to participate, express views

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Reasons to participate, defend interests

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<td></td>
<td>21,20%</td>
<td>18,20%</td>
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Even though the participants don’t necessarily see being asked by somehow to participate as one of their primary reasons to participate, many were actually specifically asked to participate themselves – 51,30 %, and even more asked others to participate – 79,6 %.
4. **Emotions and Protest**

The respondents report relatively high levels of negative emotions in regards to climate change, both amongst youth and adults, as illustrated below. There seems to be no noteworthy differences between levels amongst youth and adults except the group stating ‘very much’ for anxiousness, where 28.7% of youth and 15.2% of adults state this.
In addition, the respondents were also asked about the impact of Greta Thurnberg. For youths, 46.4% reported that Greta Thurnberg had made them more interested in climate change very much or quite. Not surprisingly, Greta Thunberg seems to have an effect on the
youths, where more respondents report her having an effect on their decision to join as well as making them more interested in climate change.

5. What do they want and who should do it?

In the wake of the before mentioned climate election, it is rather interesting who the respondents point towards in regard to do something about the climate issue. Interestingly, 77,6 % of the youths and 85,3 % of the adults agree or strongly agree that the government must act on what climate scientists say, even if the majority of people are opposed. Also, almost all (97,2 % of adults and 90,9% of youths) also agree or strongly agree that protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
Lastly, the respondents were also asked to what extent they agreed that measures to decrease CO2 emissions cannot be allowed to make social welfare arrangements worse. It is interesting that not an overwhelming amount of respondents agree or strongly agree when it comes to this, seeing as group is so oriented towards the left-wing.
The survey also included questions on trust in various institutions and the extent that they agreed that modern science can be relied on to solve our environmental problems. On the latter question, especially amongst youth, a rather large proportion agreed or strongly agreed.

In regard to trust, the respondents, not surprisingly, particularly trust the environmental groups, and they trust political parties the least.
Background

The Finnish climate movement’s roots are in the early climate campaigns adopted from the global agenda by big actors, such as the WWF, the first one to bring climate issues onto its agenda in the late 1980s. However, the actual starting point of Finnish civil society’s climate mobilization can be traced to the founding of the Friends of the Earth (FoE) Finland in 1996. It was FoE that launched the first Finnish climate change issue campaign in 1997. FoE has continued to play a central role in the climate movement ever since, along with other – both national and global – organizations. In recent years, new organizations have emerged and joined the Finnish climate movement, many of them following examples from abroad. New mobilizers include organizations like Elokapina (the Extinction Rebellion), Ilmastovanhemmat (Climate Parents Finland) and Ilmastolakko (Climate strike; Fridays for future).

The Finnish environmental movement has a long history, with its first steps of development in the 19th century. The first known environmental association, The Kuopio Nature Friends’ Association, was founded in 1896, and became a local branch of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation at its foundation in 1938 (FANC 2016). After the World War II, the environmental movement has been described through consecutive “waves” of mobilization or focus of action (Konttinen & Peltokoski 2004). The features highlighted as the characteristics of these waves tie the Finnish movement closely to the partly Western European, partly global environmental mobilizations. The first wave, at the turn of 1970s, was triggered by the oil crisis and focused on contention in energy politics. The 1980s mobilizations had two main claims: anti-nuclear power and pro-forest protection. The former was diffused from other European countries, Germany in particular, whereas the latter was somewhat home-born, and particularly important in that it gave the decisive spark for the foundation of the Finnish Green party. In the 1990s, the animal rights movement led the mobilization wave, with strong roots in Western Europe, this time particularly in the UK). The climate mobilization, especially since the Finnish version of the UK-originated Big Ask campaign (Polttava kysymys, 2007-2015, see Maan ystävät 2015), has been and continues to be the consequent mobilization wave.

The Finnish environmental movement comprises, still today, of a relatively dense, interconnected network of environmental groups and activists. Most of the big organizations are located in the national capital and take part in many of the same efforts of lobbying and raising consciousness. A recent effort of protesting has been the “Climate March” (Ilmastomarssit) first organized in October 2018 by various organizations such as Greenpeace,

16 We thank Katrin Uba for realizing the figures for this report.
WWF and The Finnish Nature League (Luontoliitto). Greta Thunberg spoke at the event along with Finnish politicians and activists. Bigger local action groups in big cities and smaller ones all over the country continue to be relatively well connected to the same central organizers, yet the social media era has facilitated also more independent local organizing. Climate striking has become one of the known ways of mobilizing for climate in Finland. The numbers of strikers remain rather small, in particular on a weekly basis, but the novelty of school children mobilizing in this way has been widely noted in public debate.

The climate strikes in Finland

The school-strike movement protesting climate change started from Sweden on the 20th of August 2018, when Greta Thunberg sat down in front of the Swedish parliament. The strikes started to spread first within Sweden under the name ‘Fridays for Future’. By the end of 2018, the movement had spread to Finland: The Finnish Facebook-page for the Climate Strike (Ilmastolakko\textsuperscript{17}) was created on the 13th of December 2018 and the national page ‘Fridaysforfuture Suomi’ was created on the 27th of February 2019. The first strike in Finland was organized on the 11th of January 2019, in front of the Finnish parliament house, attracting more than 300 participants\textsuperscript{18}.

Even though the example set by Greta Thunberg clearly was the trigger to the Finnish school strikes, there were also characters that gave faces to the local movement. Notably Atte Ahokas, a 16-year old schoolboy from a five-thousand-inhabitant municipality Jokioinen in Tavastia Proper, Southern Finland, decided to follow Greta Thunberg’s example and go climate striking. In January 2019, he protested, to begin with by himself, at the steps of the local library. He made it to the news, and this along with his vivid presence in the social media gradually made him one of the principle organisers of the Finnish #FridaysForFuture movement.

The following events were the ‘Global Strikes For Climate’ on the 15th of March 2019 and on the 27th of September 2019, and on both dates the principle protest was organized in Helsinki, in front of the Parliament House. The strikes were organized with the help of social media: the events were marketed and planned through Facebook, especially the page ‘Fridaysforfuture Suomi\textsuperscript{19}, as well as on Instagram and Twitter. The Facebook event pages were created for both of these protests, with the protest in March attracting more than one thousand Facebook users to click “participate” and more than two thousand users to be “interested” in the event. Two smaller events were organized through the same Facebook page on the same date, and other pages were created for other local protests. For the September protest the corresponding figures were more than six thousand accounts “participating” and more than 11 thousand accounts “interested” in the event. The organizers estimated that on the 27th of

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\textsuperscript{17} Available at URL: https://www.facebook.com/ilmastolakko/, accessed 23.1.2020

\textsuperscript{18} The estimate is by journalists of Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/espoo/art-2000005962180.html

\textsuperscript{19} Available at URL: https://www.facebook.com/fridaysforfutureSuomi/, accessed 26.1.2020
September 16 000 demonstrators had visited the site during the protest event that lasted several hours. The Helsinki police estimated that the highest number of participants present at any single moment was 5000 at noon (Yle, 2019). The wide range of variance between the different estimates is, thus, partly due to the usual practice of the organizers reporting larger numbers than the police, but also to the fact that the police reports the highest number present at one moment and the organizers the number over the course of the protest. Our research team observing the coming and going of participants concluded that the total number of people joining the protest over its course can fairly safely be estimated to exceed 10,000. Protests took place in other cities as well but not in the same scale. However, it should be noted that a turnout of 5000 participants marks as significant in the Finnish context, in which street demonstrations tends to attract relatively small crowds compared to many other countries.

1. Who participated?

The role of students and youth in the Fridays For Future movement has been emphasized due to its origin as a school strike. However, in line with the movement’s aims, adults were encouraged to participate in the Climate strike in September: a video of Greta Thunberg inviting adults to take part was shared and spread in Twitter prior to the strikes. In Finland, this invitation was met by a prepared ground: for instance, the movement of “parents and other people close to children concerned about climate change”, Ilmastovanhemmat, had been founded and active since 2013, and its example has since been followed by other similar groups, such as one of the latest arrivals, the “Activist Grannies” (Aktivistimummot), founded on 2019. Indeed, as Figure 1.1 shows, adults were in majority in the September 2019 protest – but perhaps not as big a majority one could expect. The age category “over 25 years” is likely to cover a fair share of a typically significant protestor group, university students.

Figure 1.1 shows the shares of young people (aged 25 or younger) and adults (all other protesters). The share of youth was 46 %. The majority of the protesters – 54 % - were adults, despite the protest being organized during office hours on a Friday.
In terms of gender division among the protestors, a large majority of the protestors were female in all age groups surveyed, as figure 1.2 shows. This result is in strongly in line with observations from e.g. Sweden (with the exception of the eldest group in which men are more under-represented than in the Swedish case). The share of males was slightly higher among adults than youth, especially in the age groups of 20 to 35 and 36 to 65-year old, although it still remained well under 40 %. The gender division is the least balanced among the under 15-year old, where the proportion of men didn’t exceed 10 %. Excluding the age group of over 65-year old, the gender balance decreases along with the age of respondents surveyed. Under 15-year old represented the largest proportion of other gender identities, while the two eldest groups (36 to 65-year old and over 65-year old), rather unsurprisingly, did not report to represent any other gender identities. The gender division reflects general trends of civil society participation in Finland, in particular among the youth (Pekkarinen& Myllyniemi 2019).
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

Most of the surveyed participants had some previous experience in protesting. Figure 2.1 looks at the past participation of protesters in demonstrations among both youth and adults. As can be expected, the young participants had less experience in protesting: 62% had previously participated in 1 to 5 demonstrations and 22% were first-time protesters. A small share (3%) of young participants had taken part in 11 to 20 or more demonstrations. Among adults, the amount of previous experience was divided more evenly. 12% of adults had taken part in more than 20 demonstrations in the past and 9% took part for the first time.
A majority of the surveyed participants had previously engaged in other types of political participation (Figure 2.2), excluding contacting a politician. All forms of political participation listed were more common among the adults than the youth, signing petitions and raising awareness significantly so. A little over 60% of young people surveyed had signed a petition, whereas the corresponding figure for adults was over 90%. The change of diet was as common with both groups. About 4 out of 5 protesters had made changes into their diets.
Most protesters were not members of either environmental organizations or political parties. Organizational membership was more common among adults. 18% of adults and 6% of youth were passive members or financial supporters of environmental organizations, and 6% of adults and 2% of youth were active members. 11% of adults were passive members of political parties and 3% of both adults and youth were active members of political parties. The higher shares of passive membership or financial supporters among adults may be impacted by better financial situations and increased opportunities to become active members through work, but it also reflects the larger trend in the Finnish civil society: formal membership in voluntary associations used to be the primary mode of engaging in the past, a feature that made Finland an extensively “organized” civil society, yet a feature that did not necessarily correspond to readiness to act (see e.g. Strømsnes & Wollebæk 2010). The younger generation has shown signs of a different organizing principle: one less membership-based, and also more polarized between those who take part (increasingly) actively and those whose participation is weak (e.g. Pekkarinen & Myllyniemi 2019).
3. Why did they protest?

The participants were surveyed about their motivations to participate in the protests, by asking them to respond to statements about possible motivations. The differences in the responses of youth and adults were narrow. A high share of both youths and adults strongly agreed with the statement “express one’s views”: more than half of participants surveyed strongly agreed with the statement. Youths were more inclined to agree (28% strongly agreed and 38% agreed) with the statement “defend one’s interest” than adults (25% strongly agreed...
and 31% agreed). While this difference may result from the youth viewing climate change as a threat of the future that will affect them, more so than the older generations, it may also reflect the somewhat more individual-based understanding of political participation among the younger generation in general. The youth were also slightly more prone to join the mobilization following an invitation by someone than the adults.

*Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views*

![Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views](image)

*Figure 3.2 Motive - defend my interests*

![Figure 3.2 Motive - defend my interests](image)
The young participants were a bit more active in recruiting other participants than the adults. Similarly, the youth were also more often recruited to participate by someone. Both groups were more likely to ask others to participate than to be asked. More than 50% of youths had been asked to participate (compared to about 25% of adults) and more than 70% had asked someone else to join (compared to close to 60% of adults). The adults were much more likely to ask others to participate than to be asked to participate. It thus seems that interpersonal recruitment was more successful among youth, although adults were almost as active in recruiting others.

Figure 3.4: Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate
4. Emotions and “Greta effect”

Emotions have been an important feature in both scholarly and public talks about the climate mobilization, and in Finland in particular anxiety caused by the threats related to global warming has been subject of increasing attention. Reports of especially youth’s growing anxiety concerning climate change have come from a variety of professionals (see e.g. Pihkala 2019; Sitra 2019). In line with this trend, fearfulness was the emotion the most emphasized also among the participants of the surveyed protest. When asked about emotions, the youth felt more strongly fearful in relation to climate change than adults. 27 % of the surveyed youth felt very much fearful, almost double to the 14 % of adults who responded the same. 28 % of youth and 29 % of adults felt quite fearful, and 29 % of youth and 31 % of adults felt somewhat fearful. A larger proportion of adults (22 %) than youth (13 %) did not report to feel very much fearful. Only a small proportion of all protestors said they did not feel at all fearful of climate change.

Figure 4.1 Emotions – fearfulness

As a singular feature, Greta Thunberg’s example had had a rather strong impact on the protesters. Unsurprisingly, the youth reported her more often as a significant influence for participation than the adults. Almost 50 % of the young protesters agreed or strongly agreed, that Greta Thunberg has made them more interested in Climate change. The adults perhaps had been interested prior to Greta’s impact, as 28 % did not agree very much, and 11 % did not agree at all. A little over 30 % of both adults and youth didn’t feel strongly about the statement and agreed that Greta had made them somewhat more interested in climate change. However, as seen in the figure 4.3, larger shares of both youths and adults agreed with the statement that Greta had affected the decision to join the Climate Strike. This could
indicate that Greta has inspired the protesters who were previously concerned about climate change to take action.

*Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change*

*Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike*
5. What do they want and who should do it?

The Finnish protestors supported solutions based on scientific information, even if these solutions were opposed by the majority of Finnish citizens. They also agreed that political decision making should consider climate change as a priority over economic growth. The adults supported these solutions even more strongly than the youth, which indicates that the adults represented a specific ideological group perhaps even more so than the youth.

The participants were asked to respond to statements about possible actions to protect the environment. An overwhelming majority of both youths and adults strongly agreed or agreed with the statements they were presented with. The first statement addressed climate change in regard to economy: “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs”. Adults agreed more often strongly with this statement than the youth. A majority of 72 % of adults strongly agreed with the statement, as compared to 53 % of youths. No adults disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement and only 3 % felt neutral. The share of opposers was low among the young: only 1 % strongly disagreed and 3 % disagreed. 13 % of youth did not agree or disagree.

Figure 5.1: Statement – priority over economy

Slightly smaller shares of both adults and young people agreed with the second statement: “The governments should act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed”. Nevertheless, more than 80 % of both groups agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. A larger share of adults agreed strongly with the statement, whereas young respondents were slightly more likely to disagree with the statement. In both groups, one % of participants strongly disagreed with the statement.
**Figure 5.2: Statement – follow scientists’ advice**

![Bar chart](image)

The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed.
References


Germany
Michael Neuber and Beth Gharrity Gardner

Background

Despite Germany’s international image as a pioneer in the promotion of renewable energy sources, public debates and policy directives at the energy-environment nexus reveal a more nuanced picture. Ramping up to the 2015 Paris summit on climate change, the “Global Climate March” — targeting issues very similar to those of the subsequent “Climate Strikes” — brought nearly 13,000 protestors to the streets of Berlin. The protesters, supported by a broad alliance of environmental organizations, expressed concerns about the weakness of policy proposals being advanced by the German government to tackle climate change. Discrepancies between the “green” rhetoric of politicians and the measures actually being taken made them doubt the willingness of political leaders to accomplish the “Energiewende” (i.e., a complete phasing out of nuclear and fossil energy). Little has happened since to change this perception. Notably, the limited governmental response to the large-scale exhaust gas fraud of Germany’s largest automobile manufacturer, Volkswagen (VW), did little to alleviate the concerns of large segments of the population.

Moreover, the gains of the populist right-wing party AfD (Alternative for Germany) in the 2017 parliamentary elections likely dampened hopes that the general political environment would become more responsive to the goals of climate activism. For the first time, the AfD met the threshold for moving into the national parliament — obtaining even more seats than the Green Party (Bündnis 90/die Grünen), the most important representative of environment-friendly policy in the Bundestag. And in sharp contrast to the Greens, the AfD explicitly denies human influence on climate change, portraying mobilization around the issue as the result of systematic misinformation and as contributing to furthering economic disadvantage among the working class. At the start of 2019, it remained unclear whether or not these political contexts would enhance or diminish people’s willingness to engage in pro-climate activism. But the tide seems to have turned towards greater mobilization. This is evidenced not only in the significant electoral success of the Greens in the May 2019 European Parliamentary elections, but also in the huge turnouts of people to the Fridays for Futures (FFF) international days of action in Germany on March 15, May 24, September 20-27, and November 29 of 2019. Overall, then, and in line with the situation in many other countries, the ongoing FFF protests

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20 Both authors contributing equally to this report. We owe a big thank you to the authors of the previous Germany report, Sebastian Haunss, Dieter Rucht, Moritz Sommer and Sabrina Zajak. We also thank the students and colleagues who helped us administer the surveys at Berlin’s September 20th strike. And we are grateful to the survey team from Chemnitz, Jurek Wejwoda, Simone Teune, and Piort Kocyba, for collecting and sharing their data from that city, as well as to the Weiterdenken foundation for financing the survey administration in Chemnitz.
in Germany are embedded in (and perhaps even symptomatic of) an increasingly polarized debate over environmental issues.

**The climate strikes in Germany**

In Germany, a lot has changed since September 14, 2018, when the first FFF “Climate Strike” demonstration took place in Berlin. As discussed in the previous report on the March 15, 2019 global climate strikes in Germany, the Friday for Futures movement has grown substantially (Haunss, Rucht, Sommer, and Zajak 2019). While the international day of action in March exceeded all prior FFF movement marches and rallies in terms of both participant numbers and the number of concurrent protests that took place across the country, it was surpassed by the Global Climate Strike on Friday, September 20th in Germany. Organizers estimated 270,000 participants in Berlin alone – a tenfold increase from March. While an estimated 300,000 people joined in the March event across Germany, an estimated 1.4 million people participated in actions across the country in September (according to 350.org). Organizers reported events in over 200 cities on the March 15 day of action, compared to more than 550 cities in Germany over the September 20-27 “week for future.” For instance, in the Großstadt (large city) of Chemnitz, up to 2,000 people protested on the 20th.

Along with the increasing attention the FFF movement has earned since its humble beginnings in 2018, two other factors help to contextualize the September strikes in Germany. For one, the demonstration was scheduled for the same day that the so-called Klimakabinet, a board of the German government that deals with climate change issues, was set to agree upon concrete strategies for ensuring that Germany’s emission goals for 2050 would be met. The goals had already been formulated three years earlier in the Klimaschutzplan 2050 (Climate Action Plan), which the Merkel administration crafted to reaffirm Germany’s commitment to the 2015 Paris agreements.

Second, the organizers, mainly school-aged youth, explicitly called upon all segments of the German society to on September 20th. The FFF’s hashtag #AllefürsKlima (‘everyone for climate’) illustrates the movement’s efforts to expand beyond its traditionally young participant base. These efforts were also evident in the diverse array of political advocacy and civil society groups allying themselves with the action, as well as the variety of FFF sub-groups, such as ‘Grandmothers for future,’ ‘nurses for future,’ and ‘entrepreneurs for future,’ to mention only a few. The presence of a broad spectrum of civil society groups (e.g., Anifa, Böll-Foundation, Brot-für-die-Welt/’bread for the world,’ Greenpeace, Nabu, Omas gegen rechts/’grandmas against the right,’ WWF) at the starting rally held next to the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin was highly visible via flags, placards, banners, leaflets, and so on. The visibility of environmental organization logos and various signage is noteworthy because these were rare at the March strikes (Haunss et al. 2019). However, no single group appeared to dominate the protest and, consistent with the March 15th events, political parties were not

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21In comparison, organizers estimated between 15,000-25,000 participants in Berlin’s March global climate strike, between 5,000-6,000 in Bremen, and 300,000 across Germany overall.
noticeably present. Though some protesters emphasized discontent with the AfD (“Stopp die AfD”/’Stop the AfD’), or with capitalism, most slogans and visual materials directly addressed environmental problems (e.g., “There is no Planet B,” “Think of the CO2nsequences”). Among these climate-related concerns, ending brown coal based energy production (“Kohleausstieg”) was one of the most prominent topics. For example, “Kohle in die Psychotherapie nich in den Abbau” (Coal needs psychotherapy not mining) and “Kohlekraft abschalten!” (Switch off coal energy!). The protests were peaceful, and pleasant weather conditions may also have made it even easier to attract people to take to the streets (about 19°C Berlin and 15°C in Chemnitz).

In this report, we contribute to the insights gained from surveys of the March 15th 2019 global FFF strikes in Berlin and Bremen by reporting findings from surveying protestors at the September 20th 2019 global strikes in Berlin and Chemnitz.22 As part of the international network social scientist collaborating in researching the Global Fridays for Futures movement, we adhered to the same rigorous survey methodology and asked the same questions of respondents. For the September 20 demonstrations, 115 participant surveys were collected in Berlin and 286 were collected in Chemnitz (whereas in March, the teams obtained 204 surveys in Berlin and 151 in Bremen).23 In what follows, we compare some of our results across cities and between March and September in order to provide a new vantage on FFF movement mobilization in Germany.

1. Who participated?

The broad strokes profile of Friday for Future demonstrators is that of a young, school-going female — a profile largely and unremarkably associated with Greta Thunberg in the public imagination. The general accuracy of this profile was illustrated in the previous international report on the protests that took place in March 2019. However, the FFF participant base appears to have changed. For the September 2019 Global Climate Strikes, not only did movement organizers aim to mobilize people beyond the standard profile, they appear to have done so — or at least to have done so in Germany. This section examines shifts in the age and gender distributions of FFF demonstrators by comparing the surveyed demonstrations that took place in March and September of 2019 in Germany.

September climate strikers tended to be older than their March predecessors. While the largest respondent age cohort was 14-19 years in March (52%), in September this age group contained only 22% of respondents (a 30% decrease). The largest age cohort in September was 20-35 years (37%). Similarly, the average demonstrator who took part in the March survey was about 26 years old (25.5 in Berlin; 26 in Bremen), but in September the mean age

22 We acknowledge the Weiterdenken - Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Sachsen for financing the survey administration in Chemnitz.

23 We encourage some caution when it comes to our results about changes among young participants. Due to ethical constraints, protest participants under 14 years of age were not surveyed. Moreover, the absolute number of youth respondents (those under 25) surveyed in September was small, especially in Berlin. The representativeness of the findings may be diminished as a result.
rose to 34 (a 10% increase to 35.5 in Berlin and an average age ~34 in Chemnitz). The shift to older protest participants in September is also glaring when we cluster survey respondents into “youths” up to 25 years old and “adults” 26 years or older (Figure 1.1). In contrast to youth dominance in March, adults made up the majority of demonstrators in both September events. In Berlin a near reversal in the proportion of youth participants is observable between the two events (a 44% decrease in youths in Berlin). Because the youth category also serves as a rough proxy for students, the decrease of this category of FFF protestor suggests a drastic shift in the dynamics through which the movement is recruiting and sustaining activists in Germany.24

Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations

The gender distribution also changed in September, though less dramatically. Prior cross-country reports on FFF events have shown the share of women to be exceptionally high on average, especially among school aged participants. More or less in line with this pattern, the March protest surveys from Germany found women and girls to be numerically dominant (55.6% female in Berlin and 63% in Bremen). In September, however, this gap narrowed to 51% female in Berlin (compared to 47% men) and with 47% of respondents identifying as female in Chemnitz. The percentage of respondents that chose “other” in response to the gender question remained relatively stable at 1-2%, which suggests we must look elsewhere to understand these changes. Differences in the gender distribution by age cohorts strongly point to the lower turnout among young people in the 14-19 age group – particularly young women (Figure 1.2).

24 In what follows, we routinely use this distinction between youths and adults to explore various features of FFF protest participants. We do so for a variety of reasons beyond our interest in capturing demographic changes in FFF mobilization. Namely, it helps us to ensure greater consistency and statistically reliable estimates across the international country reports.
In Bremen’s March event, while the proportional dominance of women crossed every age category, young women from 14 to 19 years old comprised 56% of all female participants. This suggests that young women participants substantially accounted for the high overall share of women (63%) in Bremen. Similarly, in Berlin’s March protest, 14 to 19 year-old females accounted for 52% of all women. This distribution changed in September. In Berlin, young women in this age group represented only 13% of female participants. The shift in Berlin is striking: whereas 73% of female respondents were younger than 26 at the March event, 79.5% were older than 25 at the September event. The September data from Chemnitz reveal a similar trend – though not as stark. Only a slight majority (53%) of women were over 25 years old. A substantial proportion of female participants in Chemnitz were between 14 and 19 years old (30%), but this figures is not nearly as high as those from the March events. Overall, the gender profile of FFF demonstrators – intertwined with the change towards more adult participants – shifted away from the young, female protestor in September.

Education levels among surveyed protest participants were high. Among those not currently attending a secondary school or below (so excluding “adults” over 25 years old), majorities of participants in every city had completed university education. Between the March and September events this proportion of participants with a university education or higher
increased on average (from 63% to 71% respectively). Unsurprisingly, education levels were especially high in Berlin. Among adults surveyed at Berlin’s September protest, 84% had completed a university education (a 6% increase from the March event in Berlin, and compared to 60% in Chemnitz in September).

2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

This section examines protestor responses to questions about their experiences with participatory civics. Beginning with prior protest experience, the majority of participants in all three cities had previously attended a demonstration (see Figure 2.1). As to be expected given fewer opportunities to engage in activism there were quite a few first-timers among the youth. But when we compare March to September, the proportion of first-timers among youth participants declined (45% in Bremen and 22% in Berlin in March; 16% in Berlin and 13% in Chemnitz in September). Experienced protestors – or those whom had previously participated in 21 or more protests – also decreased on average between March and September. For instance, while 50% of adult participants in Berlin’s March strike were frequent protestors, this proportion declined to 33% among adult strikers in September. Comparing across the events, Chemnitz stands out in having very similar distributions of prior protest experience between youth (25 or younger) and adults (26 and older). Given the larger size of the September demonstrations and people’s growing familiarity with the FFF movement, it is not surprising that the proportions of participants with low (0-5) versus high (6-21+) prior protest experience appear to have become more evenly distributed.

Moreover, and in keeping with the finding that more adults turned out for the September 20th climate strikes on, only 30% of adult respondents reported that they had previously participated in any FFF demonstration (26.7% in Berlin, 32% in Chemnitz). By contrast, 63% of the youth had previously participated in a climate strike (52% in Berlin, 65% in Chemnitz). These results reinforce the idea that the FFF movement’s base expanded from its core in September’s mobilization.

*Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation in Berlin, Bremen, and Chemnitz*
We also queried demonstrators about their engagement in other, arguably more “conventional” or “traditional,” forms of political action over the past 12 months. These included contacting an elected official, signing a petition, engaging in online political advocacy, and changing dietary habits. Large proportions of the participants were active in several forms of political participation in the past year, with the exception of directly contacting a politician (see Figure 2.2). Although we only show results for the personal behavior of changing one’s diet in these figures, strong majorities among both youths and adults surveyed in September also reported reducing their energy consumption, consuming less, boycotting, purchasing second-hand goods, and reusing products.

Figure 2.2: Previous political participation in Berlin, Bremen, and Chemnitz

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25 The question wording was: “There are many things people can do to prevent or promote change. Have you, in the past 12 months...?”
Participant engagement in the forms of action illustrated in Figure 2.2 are fairly similar over time and by city, but *slightly more youth protestors and fewer adult protestors* reported using social media to raise awareness about a political issue in September than in March. Focusing on Berlin over time, the proportions of adults reporting engagement in any of the queried forms of political participation over the past 12 months decreased in September. This suggests that FFF organizers were not only able to mobilize more adults in September, but that the adults they mobilized were not as politically active as those at the March climate strike. To better assess this assertion, we turn now to another form of political activity, organizational membership.

As formal organizations and political parties classically served as channels to or incubators for varieties of political engagement, protestors were also asked about their membership in such groups. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggest, however, that these types of formal organizational membership were not particularly strong bases for protestor mobilization. Across the events and cities, large majorities of participants were neither members of environmental organizations nor political parties. What does seem to have changed between March and September when it comes to any degree of membership in a formal environmental group is the shrinking gap between youths and adults (see Figure 2.3). Moreover, fewer participants in September reported trusting environmental organizations more than “somewhat.” The results presented here provide some additional support to our assertions about the September strike’s broader and older participant base. In Berlin, for example, smaller proportions of adult protestors were either active or passive members in environmental organizations (a 16% decrease from March).
Figure 2.4 (below) shows that low levels of political party membership were largely stable across the cities and over time (averaging 8% in March and 14% in September). In Berlin, a slightly larger proportion of adults reported being passive members of a political party in September. That the majority of demonstrators expressed only trusting political parties “somewhat” helps to account for these low party membership figures. Membership in environmental organizations and political parties, however, present a fairly conservative picture of people’s civic associational lives. Many FFF protest participants reported membership in other types of civic groups. About 35% of participants were members of other group across all of the strikes surveyed in Germany, (figures not shown)²⁶ Nonetheless, in keeping with the general membership trends, the proportion among both youths and adults reporting any membership in this category of other civic groups decreased between the March and September events in Berlin.

²⁶This measure includes membership (active or passive/financial support) in any student, charitable, global, anti-racist, trade union, women’s or human rights group. In an effort to better capture politically-oriented groups the measure excludes school councils as well as religious and sports organizations (figures not shown).
Political interest was relatively consistent in Germany. Majorities (~56%) of respondents stated they were “quite” interested in politics and around 30% stated they were “very much” interested in politics. Adults tended to report greater political interest than youths. In September, adults were slightly more politically interested compared to youths in both Berlin (+2%) and Chemnitz (+6.5%). From March to September in Berlin, the proportion of youth participants that were “quite” or “very much” interested in politics increased by nearly 12%, whereas this proportion of politically interested adults decreased by 6%. Taken together, the results on previous protest experience, organizational membership, and political interest lend additional support to the argument that the FFF movement managed to mobilize a different, somewhat less politically active and institutionally embedded spectrum of participants in September, especially among adults.

3. Why did they protest?

Experience with protest and other forms of participatory civics, organizational membership, and political interest can all influence people’s decisions to join a protest, but they still require us to infer a lot about people’s motivations and feelings. Therefore, this section explores how
participants responded to questions explicitly about their motivations for joining the climate strike.

Across all of the German events, the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with several preselected motives for protesting (as opposed to strongly disagreeing, disagreeing, or neither agreeing nor disagreeing). But, as we will discuss below, very few respondents reported having joined a demonstration because someone asked them to. On average, overwhelming majorities of respondents agreed or strongly agreed to being motivated to “pressure politicians to make things change” (~90%; 89% Sept.), to “express my views” (87%; 87% Sept.), and to “express solidarity” (85%; 90% Sept.). Large majorities also acknowledged protesting to “raise public awareness” (83%; 84% Sept.), to “defend my interests” (81%; 80% Sept.), and because they “felt morally obligated” (72%; 78% Sept.). These motivations were relatively stable across the March and September climate strikes.

Expressing one’s views was one core motivation. The proportion of participants on average that strongly agreed to holding this motivation increased only slightly from March to September. And across all of the events, larger proportions of adults than students strongly agreed that they were motivated to express their views (see Figure 3.1). In Berlin, the proportion of adult participants who agreed to some extent with holding this motivation increased by nearly 10% from March to September (from 80% to 90%). The increase among youths was smaller, but in September almost 90% agreed that expressing their views motivated their participation.27 In Chemnitz, the percentage among youth and adult participants reporting at least agreement with this motive was similarly high (85%).

Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views

As previously noted, we must be cautious interpreting changes among youth participants, especially in Berlin. Because the absolute number of respondents within this group was small in September, they may be less representative.

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27 As previously noted, we must be cautious interpreting changes among youth participants, especially in Berlin. Because the absolute number of respondents within this group was small in September, they may be less representative.
The proportion of respondents (both youths and adults) expressing some agreement with being motivated by wanting pressure politicians and to fulfill moral obligations also increased between March and September. We highlight the latter in Figure 3.2. Among both youths and adults surveyed in Berlin’s September demonstration, 56% agreed strongly with being motivated to protest because of a sense of moral obligation. When combining the the answer categories of agreement and strong agreement, the proportion among youths increased by 17% from March to September in Berlin, whereas the increase among adults was 5%.

*Figure 3.2 Motive – moral obligation*
In contrast to substantial respondent agreement with nearly all queried motivations, very few respondents agreed that they were motivated to protest by someone asking them to participate (see Figure 3.3). Over 80% of respondents at each surveyed event either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that they were motivated to protest “because someone asked me to join.” Nonetheless, slightly more youths than adults at the September events expressed some agreement (and less disagreement) with this motivation statement.

These results alone are not sufficient to undermine longstanding movement research and theorizing on the importance of interpersonal relationships in motivating people to take action. Instead, the results might suggest limitations with the question or simply indicate that few FFF strike participants were asked to join in the first place. Different versions of both of these possibilities are conceivable. For instance, respondents might have thought that agreeing with this question would imply that they do things simply because “someone” asks them to or that they are simply an uninformed follower (e.g., jump off the proverbial bridge, sheep-like, etc.). Similarly, people might have asked them if they were going, assumed they were going and asked if they wanted to meet beforehand, and so on. In any case, we probe responses about interpersonal recruitment and interpersonal communication further in and effort better account for findings on this motive.

Figure 3.3. Motive – because someone asked me to join
Despite the clear weakness of interpersonal recruitment as a motive for protesting, interpersonal communication mattered. Interpersonal communication mattered as a way participants heard or obtained information about the FFF September strike. Although media, especially social media (37% on average), were major channels through which participants learned about the planned Climate Strikes, many respondents (31.5% on average) identified interpersonal communication – friends, family, colleagues, or co-members of an organization – as the most important information channel for finding out about the demonstrations. To highlight some notable differences in important information sources, we compare youth and adult participants in Berlin where we have data from both the March and September events (figures not shown).

At Berlin’s March 15th event, 38% of adults and 55% of youths identified family, friends, or contacts from school, work, or an association as the most important source for finding out about the climate strike. At the September event, this pattern reversed to 46% of adults and 32% of youths. Co-members of an association as a primary source for information decreased by over 7% from March to September among both adult and youth participants. The other notable changes among adults were a 7% increase in the proportion reporting “Friends and/or acquaintances” (20%) and an 11% decrease in the proportion who selected “Newspaper(s) (online or offline)” or “Radio or Television” as their predominant information channel. Among surveyed youths, the central importance of FFF strike information via friends (42%) in March appears to have been displaced in September by the greater importance of social media (44%). The proportion of youths identifying social media as primary information sources increased by 16% and the proportion identifying friends decreased by 26% from March to September. Overall, then, direct interpersonal communication – especially with friends – seems to have become substantially less important among youth participants and slightly more important among adults for finding out information about the September strike. Social media (not personal messages) was predominantly identified as the most important information channel among youths (44%) and among adults (22%). These findings generally support research showing that friendship and social media networks often play a pivotal and increasingly intertwined role in people’s pathways to protest (e.g. Polletta et al. 2013).

Of course, hearing about or telling people about a demonstration is not the same thing as being asked or asking others to join. Fortunately, another set of questions helps us to explore if the results showing the weakness of the being “asked” motive (Figure 3.3 above) reflect an absence of direct interpersonal recruitment efforts. Figure 3.4 presents an overview by city and strike date of the proportions participants specifically asked by someone to join and those whom specifically asked someone else to join. Clear minorities of both adult and youth participants were asked take part in the demonstration. This lends support to the idea that

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28 This measure for interpersonal communication includes participants who identified family (or partners), friends (or acquaintances), people from school or work, or an association co-member as the most important information channel for finding out about the demonstration. In March, 47% in Bremen and 49.5% Berlin. In September, 43% Berlin and 27% Chemnitz.
people weren’t motivated to join the protest in this way because no one specifically asked them to join in the first place.

Figure 3.4: Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate

More youths than adults were asked by someone to join. Berlin’s September strike is a bit of an outlier with 32% of youth participants reporting having been asked by someone to take part. The same difference between youths and adults holds for asking others to join. The generally stable result across the cities and events is that far more protestors asked others to participate in the events (48.5% on average) than were themselves asked (16% on average). In short, although few FFF protestors were recruited by someone else to join, they were not averse to engaging in their own direct recruitment efforts. As the majority of demonstrators (both youths and adults) participated with other people as opposed to alone (on average, 91% in March and 83% in September), further inquiry into interpersonal communication and recruitment dynamics is warranted.

4. Emotions and the “Greta effect”

Emotions and leadership are also integral to the processes by which people come to engage in protest. In this section, we examine the primacy of different emotions and the impact of
Greta Thunberg on climate strike demonstrators surveyed in Germany. Starting with the former and averaging across the events, large majorities (~70-85%) felt “quite” or “very” anxious, worried, angry, or frustrated when thinking about climate change (as opposed to not at all, not very, or somewhat). In short, anxiety, worry, anger, and frustration were the dominant emotions. The other emotions asked about – those of fear, powerlessness, and hopelessness – were, by contrast, relatively weakly felt in relation to climate change. Some respondents, of course, felt no fear, felt powerful, or felt hopeful, but these emotions never reached a majority among respondents nor did they dominate among the emotions queried.

There are, however, some noteworthy differences in emotion responses between cities and between the two global climate strike events. Marked differences are evident in hopelessness and powerlessness, two of less dominant emotions among protestors, as well as the lowest ranked of the dominant emotions: frustration. From the March survey data, the greatest difference between respondents in Berlin and Bremen concerned feeling hopelessness. Eleven percent more strikers in Bremen (32%) reported feeling quite or very hopeless compared to Berlin (20.5%). By September, Berlin “caught up” with a 12% increase in the proportion of protesters feeling hopeless (33%). This increase came from mainly from the bottom of the hopelessness rather than from the middle, and seemingly from a reduction in (more hopeful) youth participants (see Figure 4.1a). The results for powerlessness from March to September in are similar. The proportion of Berlin climate strikers reporting feeling powerless increased by 10% (to 51%), whereas those feeling very little or no powerlessness decreased by 13%. In Chemnitz, 45% of participants expressed feelings of powerlessness when thinking about climate change.

*Figure 4.1a: Emotions – hopelessness*

Frustation also increased by more than 10% among Berlin strikers between March and September (see Figure 4.1b). Although feeling quite or very frustrated was reported by a majority of respondents in all of the German surveys – a dominant emotion along with

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29 The proportion of respondents reporting not feeling any or feeling very little hopelessness decreased by 13% and the middle category of “somewhat” changed by less than one percent. In addition, September data from Chemnitz indicate a similar distribution as Berlin (~34% of respondents felt quite or very much hopeless).
anxiety, worry, and anger – frustration (77%) eclipsed anger (71%) among participants in Berlin’s September climate strike. Among respondents from the September strike in Chemnitz, frustration (68.5%) was about on par with anger (68.7%). These trends should continue to be monitored, especially as hopelessness and powerlessness can be categorized as longer-term emotions or even ‘moods’ that can lessen people’s confidence and willingness to take action (c.f. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001).

Figure 4.1b: Emotions – frustration (Berlin)

A more positive note may be found in our examination of what is sometimes called the “Greta effect.” This variously refers to the real or imagined influence of climate activist Greta Thunberg on initiating the Global FFF movement, directing people’s interest to the climate change issue, and/or motivating young people’s participation in climate strikes. At the very least, we can see that most participants know of Greta Thunberg in Germany – not a single September survey respondent didn’t know who this was (see Figure 4.2). Large proportions of respondents at all demonstrations acknowledged Thunberg as having made them more interested in climate change. This interest influence tended to be more important among youth than adult participants. For instance, in both Berlin strikes around 13% more youths than adults stated that she made them “quite” or “very much” more interested in climate change.
What remains less clear is whether or not Thunberg’s attention leadership (or even opinion leadership) role is waning over time. Comparing results from Berlin’s September event to those from March, fewer youths (~4%) and adults (~6%) reported being made “quite” or “very much” more interested in climate change by Thunberg. However, a corresponding 4% increase was seen in the proportion of youths reporting she made them “very much” more interested. A similar proportion of youths from the September strike in Chemnitz (26%) as Berlin (28%) reported that Thunberg made them “very much” more interested in climate change. Perhaps more telling, then, is that the already relatively low proportions of March participants stating that she had not at all increased their interest in the topic decreased in September among both adults and youths.

In contrast to a substantial “Greta effect” when it comes to interest in the topic of climate change, smaller proportions of September youth and adult participants reported her influence on their decision to join the protest (see Figure 4.3). In terms of over time change, while around 19% of both adults and youths in Berlin’s March strike stated she had not at all affected their decision to participate, 20% of youths and 34% of adults at the September demonstration reported her lack of influence on their choice to participate.
Considering the greater adult turnout on September 20th along with Thunberg’s youth, her declining motivational influence among adult protestors in Berlin is not surprising. However, this is also likely related to other components of participant profiles and event contexts. In Chemnitz, an even higher proportion of youths (32%) than adults (25%) reported that Thunberg had *not at all* influenced their decision to join the September protest. As Greta Thunberg’s public (and media) profile as a FFF movement leader continues to evolve, we expect that her role in contributing to people’s decisions to protest will also change.

### 5. What do they want and who do they think should do it?

When it comes to assessing solutions to the problem of climate change and identifying the actors who can be trusted to make the right decisions on the issue, German protesters largely look to scientific expertise. Overall, 54% of youths and 57% of adults trust modern science to solve environmental issues. By contrast, only 1% of youth and adult respondents in Berlin, Bremen, and Chemnitz thought that the government was capable of doing so. The verdict on companies and market forces is equally damning, if not worse – not even 1% of FFF demonstrators trust these actors in relation to solving the climate issue. It is not surprising, then, that relatively large shares of demonstrators think that lifestyle changes can play an important role in stopping global warming. On average, 53% of youth and 32% of adult
respondents stated that voluntary lifestyle changes are a decisive factor in overcoming climate issues (as discussed in section 2 of this report, respondent personal consumption behaviors reflect this belief). Despite encouraging environmentally-friendly lifestyles and distrusting government, FFF participants still prioritize a need for change at the political level in Germany.

Large majorities of respondents across the cities and over time think that the government must act according to the advice of climate scientists (see Figure 5.1). Overall, 69% of youths and 78% of adults agreed to the statement that “The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of the people are opposed.” This suggests that protestors have such a strong trust in scientists’ guidance that they would even accept this guidance when the majority of people are opposed. That is, it hints at a potential willingness to trade-off of democratic representation in favor of expertise. Looking at the data over time, youth participants agreed even more firmly with this approach in September (80% in Berlin and 80% Chemnitz) compared to March (63% in Berlin and 68% in Bremen). It is also evident that between March and September, youth participants “caught up” with adult demonstrators who consistently expressed support for scientists’ advice to direct government action.

*Figure 5.1 Statement – follow scientists’ advice*
For FFF protestors in Germany, not only should the expertise of scientists direct governmental actions in response to climate change, but climate change also needs to take priority over economic concerns in politics. Extremely high proportions among both participant age groups across surveyed events agreed or strongly agreed that economic growth and even job losses are acceptable if environmental protection makes such compromises necessary (Figure 5.2). Overall, between March and September, the proportion of participants agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement “Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” increased – as opposed to the proportion “on the fence” or disagreeing.

**Figure 5.2 Statement – priority over economy**

Despite slightly lower levels political interest and engagement among September demonstrators, FFF protest participants continue to support putting the environment at the top of the traditional political agenda (e.g., economic or job growth). While prioritizing expertise in democratic representation is not unusual for Germany, FFF protestors appear to continue supporting the evidence-based expertise of scientists over the constituency/representation-based expertise of politicians. Demographic changes and all, these consistencies are important. If we consider the rise of right wing populist movements, parties, and disinformation of all stripes, participant’s increasing trust in scientific expertise
and prioritization of environmental issues are very relevant to the current political moment in Germany and beyond.

References


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In Hungary the environmentalist movement had a prominent role during the democratic transition. As a catch-all movement it gave opportunity to express the general dissatisfaction with the communist system through an issue which was deemed as less harmful by the party state. As the opposition could form their own political parties, the environmentalist movement lost its significance. The depolitization of the green movement was further amplified by the NGO-ization in the region in the 1990s. After the new millennium the global justice movement appeared in Hungary as well, which made environmentalism once again a political issue. As after 2010 media freedom, education and rule of law became the main issues of anti-government movements in Hungary, beyond green urban planning environmentalism lost its mobilization potential. In 2019 the green movement revived in Hungary with the appearance of climate activism and as climate change became a frequently discussed issue in the public discourse.

Background

The Fridays For Future Group was established in Hungary in 2018 and joined the international protest campaigns by organizing demonstrations. These include the first global climate strikes on March 15, 2019, the second on May 24, and the third on September 27. The latest demonstration took place during the first Global Climate Week from 20 to 27 September, with awareness programs and demonstrations across the country. In addition to these events and the movement’s initiative, in the summer of 2019, the Amazon rainforest fires and the consumer boycott of disposable plastics had an impact on environmental and climate awareness. Green parties like the LMP (Politics Can Be Different) and the Párbeszéd (Dialogue) deemed the climate issue as a political opportunity, while opinion leaders of the governing Fidesz party first denied the relevance of the climate issue. Activists were depicted in the pro-government media as deluded by “Soros-organizations”. However after the 2019 October municipal election in the government party intra-party critics blamed the inadequate answer of the government to the climate question.

The climate strikes in Hungary

1. Who participated?

Due to the context of mobilization, the majority of the demonstrators are women and young people, thus the event preserved its school strike character in Budapest as well. Demonstrators between the ages of 15 and 19 account for more than one-third of the participants, their number is higher than those protesters who are between 36 – 65 years. People aged between 20 and 35 are the majority.
High school and university students account for 58 percent of the respondents, and 58 percent of them are women. The proportion of women is higher in the 20-35 and especially in the broader 36-65 generation. Among the 15-19 generation the gender proportion is balanced, which is probably the effect of block recruitment in high schools.

Figure 1.2 Gender division in each age group
3. Prior experience of political participation and formally organized activities

Particular attention was paid to participation in demonstrations during the research. Data shows that respondents are members of an active population, with the majority of young respondents having demonstration experience in the 12 months preceding the survey. Only 23 per cent of adults did not take part demonstrations. It is striking, however, that there is a very active, hard core group (3 per cent) within student climate demonstrators. It is fair to assume that they represent the group that participated in the movement beyond the global climate demonstrations because members of the Hungarian Fridays for Future group regularly appeared before the Parliament at Kossuth Square.

*Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever)*

The fact that climate demonstrators are much more politically active than Hungarian society is illustrated by their activity in different forms of direct political participation as an opinion poll data made by the researchers of the Budapest based Centre for Social Sciences demonstrates it. Boycotts are a form of participation that is associated with environmental movements, but boycott of certain products is actually the most popular form of participation in Hungarian society as a whole, and among protesters as well. A special case of this form of participation is changing one’s diet due to political or ethical reasons, more than 60 per cent of student and adult protesters did so. There are similar proportions regarding raising awareness via social media of a particular political issue or signing petitions. Only 2 per cent

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30 The opinion poll survey was conducted by the Závecz Research Institute on a sample of 1000 respondents in October 2019 on behalf of the Center for Social Sciences.
of the total population joined a strike, while the proportion of protesters was 38 per cent. Although the proportion citizens wearing badges among the general population is insignificant (2 per cent), it is relatively popular among climate protesters (18 per cent). The difference between the financial situation of students and adults is best illustrated by the donation of money to political organizations: while nearly one-third (31 per cent) of adult protesters have used this opportunity, only 8 per cent of students did the same - although they have done so in a much higher level than the general population. Nevertheless the level of participation in the work of environmental organizations is higher than in political parties, yet organizational participation is more typical for adult protesters. Visiting politicians and organizing blockades is not a key element of the political participation of protesters. It is true, both for climate protesters and for society as a whole, that violent protests are not part of their action repertoire.

*Figure 2.2: Previous political participation*
Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters

Figure 2.4: Membership of political parties
4. Why did they protest?

From the aspect of mobilization protesters’ motivation have special relevance. The main aim of the climate protests was to raise awareness of the population and decision makers on the effects of climate change and the inevitability of immediate action. It is thus not surprising, that both adult and student protesters in Budapest were motivated by expressing their views, which was of course a general feature of demonstrations. Among student protesters 61 per cent and among adults 56 per cent strongly agreed that expressing their views was a motivation of participation for them.

*Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views*

Defending their own interest was however a less stronger motivation for both groups as 35 per cent of students and 30 per cent of adult strongly agreed with this kind of motivation. It can be assumed, that for the demonstrators climate change activism is not about the representation of interest but about collective responsibility.
The data also shows, that the majority of participants (60 per cent of students and more than 40 per cent of adults) asked others to participate. While almost 40 per cent of the students and 20 per cent of adults have been asked by others to participate, only 10 per cent of the students and 7 per cent of the adults agreed to be motivated to participate, because someone asked them to join.

Figure 3.3. Motive – because somebody asked me to join
5. Emotions and Greta effect

The phenomenon of climate anxiety was a frequently discussed issue in the Hungarian public sphere as well. Around 50 per cent of the protesters felt fearfulness when it came to the topic of the demonstration. According to the data young people felt more fear because of climate change than their adult counterparts.

*Figure 4.1 Emotions – fearfulness*
The Greta-effect is not obvious among the protesters. More young people stated to very much agree that Greta Thunberg made them more interested in climate change (36 per cent) than adults (28 per cent). However, a bigger proportion of adults agreed very much and quite (49 per cent) than students (39 per cent) that Greta Thunberg affected their decision to take part in the climate protest.

**Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of youths and adults who very much agree that Greta Thunberg made them more interested in climate change.](chart1)

**Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of youths and adults who agreed that Greta Thunberg affected their decision to join the Climate Strike.](chart2)
6. What do they want and who should do it?

We also asked both the protesters and the Hungarian population what they think about the ability of different political, scientific and economic actors to solve the climate crisis. The idea that environmental considerations should take precedence at the expense of economic development is popular among both Hungarian society and climate protesters. There is a somewhat smaller but still significant consensus that state actors should follow the recommendations of climate scientists in solving the crisis.

*Figure 5.1 Statement – priority over economy*

Climate protesters, especially students, are the ones who believe that modern science can solve environmental problems; at least the rate of the respondents who agree with this statement is higher among them than among the general population. Young climate demonstrators believe less than adults that state actors and market actors are capable of solving environmental problems and disagree that solving problems related to climate change is primarily a voluntary, individual responsibility.
Figure 5.2 Statement – follow scientists’ advice

The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed.
Background

The emergence of Friday For Future has marked a significant step forward in the history of the Italian climate movement. For at least two decades, environmental protests in Italy had been mainly conducted by territorial movements, focusing in particular on the opposition to large infrastructural projects, with the partial exception of the national referendums against the privatization of water (2011), the nuclear program (2011) and natural gas drilling concessions (2016).

The unexpected and massive success of the March 15th strike generated an unprecedented attention for the climate issue in the media. Most political parties declared on the side of the FFF movement, although no significant change of position in their platforms regarding environmental issues has changed. The success of the movement clearly contributed to the unexpected success of the previously almost disappeared Italian Greens, whose list in the European elections of May 2019 got 2.3% of the votes, the highest result for the Greens since 2004.

In Italian movement milieus, the most important youth groups, including student unions and post-autonomous social centres, have significantly contributed in the development of FFF, in its adoption of a clear stance for climate justice and in its connection with existing territorial movements. The movement has organized two national assemblies: the first in April in Milan, the second in October in Naples.

The climate strikes in Italy

In Italy the strike was organized for September 27th and not for September 20th, being the latter date considered too close to the beginning of the school year. The strike saw about one million students taking the streets in most Italian cities and towns. The organizers claimed the participation of 200 000 people in the march in Rome, 200 000 in Milan, 150 000 in Naples, 100 000 in Turin and 50 000 in Florence. The demonstration that we covered in Florence, was, thus, the fifth largest in the country. The September strike marked a stage of growth for the movement, both in terms of size and of political development. Declarations of climate emergency have been passed by city councils of 83 Italian municipalities and by 6 regional councils. While the first attempt to make the national parliament proclaim the climate emergency was defeated in the Senate on June 5th, 2019, a second attempt succeeded on December 11th, with the House passing a resolution proposed by deputy Rossella Muroni (former national director of Legambiente, the largest Italian environmental organization). On
February 5th, 2020, two spokespersons of the movement intervened in the Environment Committee of the House, invited for an official audition. Their speech was rather critical towards the political system. They claimed to be “disappointed” by the only partial action taken by governmental institutions in the last week months and asked for a “stop all subsidies to fossil fuels in the shortest possible period with a view to a decarbonisation plan by 2030”, “efficient and widespread public mobility”, “climate justice for all the territories that are, and will be, most affected by the effects of this emergency”, “a precise road-map that leads to the conversion and then to the shutdown of the major Italian thermoelectric plants, and their replacement with renewable alternatives and energy storage”.

1. Who participated?

When comparing the March and September 2019 FFF events in Florence, a major feature that stands out is the dramatic increase in the share of young people among protesters. While in March a bit more than half of respondents were 25 years-old or younger (53%), this percent amounted to 77% for the September 2019 event. Not only young people in general are overrepresented in both protest events but especially young females. This holds true for both events: there were many more females than males among those aged 15-19 and those below 15 years-old. However, the proportion males/females was balanced among adults across both events (i.e., among those aged 20 to 35 and 36 to 65 years-old subsets). While the share of males/females amongst the eldest group of participants (i.e., 65 years-old or more) was even in the March 2019 event, in September 2019 there were only women in this specific subset.

Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

In this section we consider the students and not the young activists, as in the previous paragraph. Students have been operationalized as those respondents who declared 'to be pupils' and at the same time younger than 25 years old.

The focus of this section is on the “political socialization” of Italian FFF activists. Different measures can be used to investigate this dimension: we here consider prior experiences of political participation (meaning both participation in street protests and in other forms of political engagement), and the membership in other collective actors, in particular environmental organizations and political parties.

Some similarities can be noticed comparing March 2019 and September 2019 survey waves, but also some differences emerged. As a first element, we look at previous participations of Italian FFF activists in previous demonstrations. As can be seen in figure 2.1., the most relevant variations occurred among the adult activists. Among them, first time protesters were already very few in March 2019 (4%) and disappeared completely in September 2019. This is probably due to the scarce capacity to attract civil society in the very broad sense in the period between the two demonstrations, while on the contrary those who were already engaged often increased the level of participation. Percentages of adults who participated from 1 to 5 demonstrations is in fact very similar, and is likely to argue that those who participated in September, also did it in March. However, the more important evolution regarding previous participation is registered among the more active protesters, namely
those who participated to more than 21 protest events. Already in March 2019, the range between assiduous protesters among students and adults was considerable; in September 2019, the percentages of high engaged remain substantially unchanged among students, but doubled among the adults, passing from 28% to 50% of activists who declared to have participated to more than 21 protest events in their lifetime. This clearly represents a change in the composition of the protesters’ population, that in September was much more composed of highly politicized activists. On the contrary, students are for the great majority newcomers: about 50% of them participated from 1 to 5 protests, both among the respondents of March 2019 and of September 2019.

Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Florence

Then, we also asked activists to specify what other forms of action they adopted in the 12 months preceding the demonstration during which they received the questionnaire. In this case, as visible from figure 2.2., the more relevant changes occurred among the students. On the one hand, some “classical” forms of individual political action (contacting a politician and signing petition) remain unvaried between the two global strikes; on the other hand, some forms of individual daily commitment increased considerably among students. We refer to the use of digital media as tools to spread the claims, and to the adoption of a new diet. It is not surprise that these forms of individual daily actions are more diffused among students, but is relevant the increase in their diffusion among younger FFF activists passing from March to September 2019. This could be interpreted as an outcome of FFF, that already in its first months of activity contributed in some forms of social change and daily engagement of young generations. On the contrary, among adult activists, these two items (digital media and diet) remained constant in the two survey waves; but the other two voices increased: signature of petitions and especially the contact of a politician. This could be justified by an increasing relevance assumed by the topic of climate change in the political (and especially electoral) agendas, at least at a rhetorical level.
The last observation is confirmed by the increase of adult protesters that are active members of a political party in September 2019, compared to March 2019. Looking, in fact, at the two tables referred to the membership in political parties, the only relevant difference is represented by those adult activists that are active member of a political party, that passed from 7% in March to 16% in September. The other data do not show important changes, neither longitudinally nor looking at the generational dimension: the very great majority of respondents (both students and adults) did not belong to political parties in both waves of protest, and few percentages were financial supporters.

At the same time, also membership in environmental organizations is low: this is an expected data, that confirm the newness of FFF in the panorama of environmental movements in Italy (and not only). People who took the streets in 2019 for climate change do not generally belong to other environmental grass-roots groups or NGOs. This is true for adults but especially for students: on the one hand, it is to be related to the general crisis of collective membership in SMOs in an era always more characterized by the insistence on digital activism, lifestyle changes, political consumerism and other similar forms of individualize (collective) actions; on the other hand, this is due to explicit claim of independence made by FFF from the beginning. However, it is worth noting the partial increase in membership among students, and especially of the financial support (passed from 5% to 10% in September, while remained unchanged among adults). It is likely that some young activists decided to invest their time and energy in FFF mobilizations, but at the same time to financially (and passively) support some more formalized environmental organizations.
3. Why did they protest?

People went to the streets of Florence in the year 2019 to express their views (figure 3.1). We can see a slight difference in the response between students and adults in the March mobilization - with adults giving a higher importance to this motivation than adults (90% of the adults and 83% of the students agree or strongly agree). In September adults and student responses are nearly on the same level at around eighty-five percent (students 87% and adults 83% agree or strongly agree). While Greta Thunberg continues to have a strong impact on the students by rising their interest towards climate change topics (see chapter 4, figure 4.2), the key motivation students and adults declare to have for joining the protest mobilization is to express their views; directly followed by “defend my interests” (figure 3.2.).
Defending once interest remains a strong motivation for the participation in the FFF mobilization, with adults giving less emphasis to this frame than students (figure 3.2.). This difference persists in the March and September 2019 results, with a slight increase in the group of the adult respondents who neither agree nor disagree to this item (figure 3.2.). Compared to the other stated motivations the motive “defend my interest” has a less prominent position, especially for the adult participants (only around half off the adult’s state it).

Figure 3.2: Motive – defend my interests

The participants of the protests in March and in September act as promoters of protest participation: around eighty percent of the students and the adults asked others to participate (figure 3.4). Having been asked to participate in the mobilization counts for less than one fifth of the participants as a reason for their participation (figure 3.3). These figures remain stable and can be seen as an indicator for an ongoing outreach effort of the students and adults in order to broaden the participation in the FFF mobilization. By stating that the motivation for their participation was not, that someone had asked them to do so, the students and adults underline their intrinsic motivation that derives from environmental concerns and not from ingroup pressure (in case of the students) or the need to accompany someone to the protest event (in case of the adult participants).

Figure 3.3: Motive – somebody asked me to join
4. Emotions and Greta effect

In this Section, we analyse the role of both emotions and Greta Thunberg in the Italian mobilizations. Figure 4.1 shows that the sentiment of ‘fearfulness’ is generally widespread, with the students being more fearful than the adults. Moreover, young protesters’ fearfulness is on the rise by September 2019, while adults are currently slightly more positive as compared to the previous event. When adding up the ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ categories, it emerges that 64% of the young respondents in March 2019 and 67% in September 2019 are fearful. The share is lower among adults: 57% in March and 45% September, as they increasingly (35% in September) place themselves in the ‘grey zone’ of the ‘somewhat’ fearful protesters.

Figure 4.2 investigates the influence of Greta Thunberg on the respondents’ interest in climate change. Again, we find a significant difference between students and adults. The symbolic leadership of Greta was ‘very much’ or ‘quite’ important for 51% of the students in March, and for 60% of them in September. Figures are significant lower for the adult respondents, among which only 33% in March and 39% in September declared that Greta contributed to increase their interest in climate change.

In the case of young people, the presence of Greta was not only important to rise awareness on climate change, but also to take action, especially in the March event. As shown in Figure 4.3, in March 2019, 57% of the students said that Greta ‘very much’ or ‘quite’ affected their decision to join the Climate Strike. This effect was instead more limited among the adults (44%). As times passed by, the role of Greta in motivating the respondents to participate in Climate Strikes seems diminished for all age cohorts: in September 2019, Greta was a motivating factor for 42% of the students and 38% of the adults.
5. What do they want and who should do it?

Among the questions addressing what should be done, one contrasted climate protection with economic growth and occupation (measuring agreement on the statement “the government must give priority to the environment even at the cost of harming economic growth and causing job losses”) the other addressed trust in science (“the government must follow what scientists say even if a majority of the people are opposed to it”).

An overwhelming majority of the interviewees states that the environmental protection has to have priority over economic issues (fig. 5.1). Almost all the non-student protestors interviewed during both protests agree or even strongly agree (for more than half of them) with that statement, with percentages slightly lower for the students (especially in the second...
protest event, when about a quarter of the student disagree with the statement). To be noted that disagreement could depend on prioritizing the economy, but also from a refusal to put the two aims one against the other.

*Figure 5.1: Statement – priority over economy*

Similarly supported is the statement on the need to follow the advice of the scientists (figure 5.2), that are in fact considered as trustworthy and, what is more, providing empirical evidences of the human responsibilities in climate change. Here as well, the almost totality of the adults and a very strong majority of the students (about ¾) agree or strongly agree with the statement, with little change between the first and the second strike. Here as well, the motivation for disagreement remains to be investigate, as it could point at either mistrust in science, in general, or at the perceived need to democratize science.

*Figure 5.2: Statement – follow scientists’ advice*
Background

In Mexico, environmental protests arise mostly in local socio-environmental conflicts. The defence for the territory encountered by communities or social collectives in face of the threats posed by megaprojects, the exploitation of natural resources by the agroindustry, mines, among others, are inserted in a country where activism runs high risks. Environmental activism is characterised by a high repression by either the institutional police apparatuses or paramilitary groups employed by corporations and interest groups in order to displace communities and repress protest. With over 800 socio-environmental conflicts in the past twelve years, Mexico actually represents one of the most dangerous countries for territory defenders, with over 15 murders only in 2018. As if that were not enough, protests are continuously criminalised by the mainstream media.

Despite this high degree of social unease discontent with respect to socio-environmental issues, there is not a structured ecologist movement in Mexico. The Mexican ecologist movement emerged and achieved its maximum visibility and cohesion in the late 1980s, campaigning against Laguna Verde nuclear power station located in the state of Veracruz. Successively, with the creation of the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), the movement collapsed and the term “ecologist” lost legitimacy and fell in disuse to such an extent that most pro-environmental activists not only do not call themselves ecologists, but also deplore this term. In addition, the 1990s saw the adoption of neoliberal policies, and the presidents implementing them would be the first ones in promoting neoliberal environmental policies, thus institutionalising a series of environmental problems.

Neoliberalism brought with it an increase in local discontent regarding a series of socio-environmental problems which were confronted only by local groups in the rural and urban contexts and by farming and/or indigenous communities. These conflicts have been characterised not only by their local nature, but also for affecting the most vulnerable populations such as indigenous communities or marginalised neighbourhoods in cities. As a result, environmental protests in Mexico have been led by popular sectors who are directly threatened with losing their territory, lifestyle and livelihoods without the support of a structured ecologist movement that so far has not been able to withstand the impact of the...
Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), which compared to other parties in the world scene maintains an unusual centre-right position and is linked to neoliberal interest groups. All of this goes hand in hand left-wing parties, such as the Democratic Party Revolution (PRD) and the most recent National Regeneration Party (MORENA, originally founded by Mexico’s current president López Obrador) which is associated with the Marxist ideology, bearing a nationalist and developmental discourse, based on the exploitation of fossil fuels — rich in the country. In this landscape it was not possible to develop a national environmental culture.

Consequently, problems such as air pollution, labor mobility, lack of public green spaces, or in general the effects of the climate crisis in urban areas, if addressed, are subjected to non-governmental organisations’ campaigns such as Greenpeace. Local government campaigns such as Mexico City’s, constrain to promoting pro-individual environmental actions such as household water saving or the use of public transport; yet, they do not guarantee accessible and safe infrastructure to most people, let alone deal with the main actors responsible for such environmental problems. On the other hand, rural movements such as Sin maíz no hay país (Without corn, there is no country) address food sovereignty issues while also attending ecologic dynamics.

Bearing this in mind, the first climate action of the Fridays For Future movement (FFF) held on 15 March 2019 in Mexico City represented a breakthrough in the scenario of Mexican contentious politics. In only a few weeks the organisers (most of whom are university students) accomplished to gather a thousand youth and adults to march together to the Monument of Revolution. In spite of the organisers’ satisfaction at this first achievement, it became evident that in Mexico these actions did not enjoy the same congregation than in other cities around the world. Furthermore, conspicuously absent was the collective participation of high school students and Mexico City’s major public university students as leading actors in this new wave of climate activism.

Irrespective of the number of participants, the 15 March strike together with the 14 May strike where approximately 1,400 people participated, launched FFF to the national public scene on the one hand, and on the other, served to gather round this young movement the most experienced organisations and groups already present in Mexican territory, such as System Change, not Climate Change! Mexico, Greenpeace, and the Mexican Alliance against Fracking, in addition to the collaboration with the recently formed climate movement, Extinction Rebellion Mexico (XR). Also, other FFF and XR groups were formed in other cities across the country.

So far, it can be argued that this new wave of climate movements may be an opportunity to reactivate ecologism in Mexico, eventually paving the way to a generational turnaround that only a few months ago was inconceivable.
The climate strikes in Mexico

During the Global Week for Future (20-27 September, 2019), Mexico’s most important protest event took place on Friday, 20 September (20S) in Mexico City.

The strike’s start point was the Angel of Independence roundabout. At mid-morning, this monument was the meeting point for youth, children and parents, and adults. A little after 2 pm, protesters began to move and organised in different contingents, although most strikers marched on their own or in small groups, exactly as they had arrived at the strike. It is estimated that around 6,000 people attended this strike, which lasted four hours marching along Paseo de la Reforma Avenue to turn at the Palace of Fine Arts into 5 de Mayo Street towards Mexico City’s main square, the event’s end point. Around 6 pm, a tropical storm interrupted the polls conducted by the organisers, where in addition to FFF Mexico, activists of socio-environmental conflicts in Mexico City and rural areas and other organisations also participated.

Most banners held by the participants were made of recycled cardboard and hand-painted. Some of the most prominent mottos were: “We want to breathe”, “There’s no planet B”, “We only have one planet. Let’s care for it!”, “Climate emergency now!, and “If climate is changing, why aren’t we?.” As a plus, collectives in defence of the territory participated with slogans such as “No to fracking”, “No more budget to gas and oil”, “Water is life and life is defended”, among others.

In addition to the main strike of 20S in Mexico City, 69 protest events were recorded across the country during the Global for Future Week from 20 to 27 September. Along with asking the government to declare the climate emergency — FFF’s main demand — in these locations protesters included local demands against large undesired works such as the thermal power station in the state of Morelos, the Dos Bocas refinery in the state of Veracruz, the wind power stations in the state of Oaxaca, and the mining corporations’ projects spread across the Mexican territory.

1. Who participated?34

Most participants in the 20S strike were youth. 58.83% of the participants surveyed (data confirmed by participant observation), were young people between 20 and 35 years old (Figure 1). In contrast, younger protesters — between 15 and 19 years old — represented a mere 14.38%. This figure differs from the rest of countries where the mean in the younger

34 Technical information: In Mexico City, we handed out 450 flyers and completed 450 face-to-face (F2F) interviews. 38 online surveys were collected, which means we had a response rate of 38/450=8%. Given the very low response rates, comparing these results with face-to-face data is essential to test data representativeness.
group under 19 years old has been around 45%.\textsuperscript{35} Despite this difference that may be attributed to both the differences in education systems and insecurity that characterises Mexico, 75.01% of participants are under 36 years old, which confirms young people’s interest in the climate crisis.

On the contrary, the “productive” segment of the population only accounts for 22.80% of strikers, coinciding with the rest of countries where the climate crisis is not perceived by adult workers as threatening enough to join the strike and engage in this type of events. Another noteworthy factor is labour conditions, which are extremely different between Mexican workers and workers abroad. Finally, as experienced in the other countries, the involvement of retired people was remarkably poor.

Figure 1: Youth and adults in the demonstrations (N=450)

With relation to gender distribution, it seems that the actions promoted by FFF involve more women (64.02%) than men (35.53%) (Figure 2). This confirms the results in the rest of climate strikes where young women have developed a profile as leaders of the movement.

\textsuperscript{35} In order to conduct a comparison consistent with the report of prior demonstrations in the rest of countries involved in the project, we have maintained the same age range; although it is worth mentioning that in Mexico there are substantial differences in the education system, labour conditions and pensions.
This brief analysis is followed by further discussion on the profile of interest in this paper: youths.

Only 51.21% of young participants were students (Figure 3). This figure shows another difference between Mexico and the rest of countries that participated in the project, where virtually there is a correlation between youth and students. Most students were taking a major and only 15.22% were in high school (Figure 4). These data reverse in the other countries, confirming an international presence of very young students in FFF (higher or lower secondary school).
In Mexico, the climate movement of the 20S strike substantially comprised university students pursuing an undergraduate degree. Gender student distribution reports a majority of women (Figure 5). This information confirms the female presence in this new wave of climate activism.

Figure: Gender distribution of students (N=450)

2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organised activities

The 20S strike was characterised by a significant component of first-time participants (first timers), and overall, participants who did not have any background of having participated in protest activities. While this may not be surprising considering younger participants and their minor political experience, it is really interesting to prove this is also the case of adults (over 36 years old), who do not have a high participation in protest events (Figure 6). This might well be related to the fact that adults belong to a middle-high class that is usually absent in the Mexican political contest, characterised by a higher participation of lower social classes.

Figure 6: Previous demonstration participation (ever)

The lack of prior political experience is reflected in the participants’ political behaviour for the past 12 months (Figure 7).
Youths show a more active behaviour in comparison to adults, especially when assuming a pro-environmental behaviour such as changing their diets (53.57%), saving energy (57.14%), reusing products like plastic bottles (64.29%), or purchasing or boycotting certain products, which reveals a link between environmental practices and values.
Youths political participation in the past 12 months prior to the strike displayed an increase in terms of individual pro-environmental practices; yet, political participation in the public sphere, for example, seeking to contact political representatives, is rather insignificant. This pattern also matches data from the rest of countries, indicating that new generations strongly tend to distrust and lack representation at public institutions in addition to having little or no participation in associations of various kinds. None of the survey respondents have approached a political party for the past 12 months, furthermore, hardly 40% of participants have declared to be active members of an environmental organisation over the same span (Figure 8).

![Figure 8: Engagement in an environmental organisation (for the past 12 months)](image)

No survey respondent claimed to have participated in a political party or youth organisation for the past 12 months; not surprisingly, however, adults evince a higher interest in politics (Figure 9), although this figure is lower than the mean results of other countries engaged in the survey.

![Figure 9: Interest in politics](image)

As to when strikers decided to participate in the 20S strike, it is interesting to see that there is a similar trend in ‘over a month ago’ (24.21%) and ‘a few days ago’ (22.65%) responses given by youths, whereas most adult participants made such a decision over a month prior to the strike (Figure 10).

![Figure 10: Decision to participate in the 20S strike](image)
3. Why did they protest?

Overall, respondents have expressed various motivations to participate in the strike called by FFF. Having a pre-selected number of motivations available, most participants (around 80% on average) totally agreed with participating in the strike to “express solidarity”, “sensitise the public” and “push politicians to make things change” (Figure 10). It is interesting to see how in Mexico between the two main motivations, first comes solidarity towards the worldwide FFF movement, and second, the possibility of sensitising the public opinion. The response claiming that the strike seeks to push politicians, — a motivation that in the rest of countries is ranked first — comes in third place in Mexico, which proves to what extent Mexican political institutions are not trusted.

Another contrastive figure between Mexico and the rest of countries is the motivation of feeling morally compelled (“because I felt morally obliged to do so”), usually ranked in the first places in countries such as Sweden. In our country, moral obligation is one of the lowest motivations. With regard to “defending my interests”, it appeared to be one of the lowest motivations as well, as occurred in the rest of countries involved in the project.

![Figure 10: Motivations to participate in the 20S strike](image)

While participants in general were not invited to participate in the 20S strike, it is worth noting that around 60% of them requested another person to participate (Figure 11). This aspect is of great importance as a factor for participation and commitment since supporting a cause only by participating in a demonstration is substantially different from publicly and openly asking others to participate in something you support.
4. Emotions and the Greta effect

If we look at other motivational aspects such as the emotional dimension, it can be observed that the main emotions related to climate change felt by Mexican protesters, especially youth, are: worry, frustration and anxiety. In contrast with other research showing that in the Global South a central emotion related to climate change is rage\footnote{Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren (2017). “Fear, hope, anger, and guilt in climate activism”. \textit{Social Movement Studies}, 16(5), 507-519.}, in Mexico concern comes first, followed by frustration, anxiety and helplessness. Anger and fear are listed among the last emotions. Although despair is not among the first choices, it maintains important values in the “very much” response. As shown in Figure 12, there are significant differences between youth and adults; however, both groups claim to feel moderately helpless, angry and fearful with relation to climate change.

In the F2F surveys, we decided to slightly modify the original survey by inserting a series of questions regarding the emotional dimension. The 450 responses obtained during the 20S strike provide a broader landscape, particularly in terms of the role of some mobilising emotions (Figure 13)\footnote{One of the questions we made was, “What emotions motivated you to be here today?”}. By comparing the two databases, it can be observed that in addition to being an emotion linked to “thinking about climate change”, worry is also one of the main mobilising emotions, although hope comes first in our F2F survey. These data confirm that, also in Mexico, worry, without fear but together with hope, mobilises\footnote{Smith, N. and Leiserowitz, A. (2014). “The Role of Emotion in Global Warming Policy Support and Opposition”. \textit{Society for Risk Analysis}, 34(5), 937-948. doi:10.1111/risa.12140}, and that this new wave of climate movements is perceived as a driving force for change. This brings hope, an emotion that in other movements has been linked to processes such as empowerment\footnote{Poma, A., and Gravante, T. (2019). “Nunca seremos las mismas de antes. Emociones y empoderamiento colectivo en los movimientos sociales: el Colectivo Mujer Nueva (Oaxaca, Mexico)”. \textit{Desafíos}, 31(2), 231-265.}, although this is yet to be confirmed in terms of the FFF movement.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figures.png}
\caption{Interpersonal recruitment, \% being asked and \% asking others to participate}
\end{figure}
One of the survey’s goal was to observe Greta Thunberg’s impact on strikers. Charts in Figure 14 illustrate how a large proportion of participants agree that Greta Thunberg prompted both the decision to participate in the strike and climate change to become a topic of interest. None of the survey respondents answered, “I don’t know who Greta Thunberg is”, indicating they know about the dynamics and leaders that characterise this new wave of climate movements.

If we observe the same data in terms of age groups (Figure 15), we can see that concerning Greta’s impact on the decision to participate in the strike, there is a similar distribution between youth and adults, but in youth’s responses the percentage is almost consistent, which consequently shows that, relatively speaking, Greta’s impact was more decisive for adults in order to participate in the strike, whereas her impact on becoming more interested in climate change issues is more evident in youth.

**Figure 12: Emotions and climate change**

**Figure 13: Mobilising emotions in 20S (N=450)**
5. What do they want and who should do it?

The main demand of the Mexican FFF movement in the 20S strike was for the government to declare a climate emergency in Mexico (98%), although 60% do not expect the current government will accept this initiative. In line with this, protesters expressed their distrust in the government and other political institutions. As far as Mexico is concerned, it can be asserted that the perception of the government not declaring a climate emergency is associated with the manner in which the current government is addressing the series of environmental problems in the country. Promoting various controversial projects such as a new refinery or the Maya train in southeastern Mexico as well as some thermal power stations across the country reinforces the trend towards a Mexican developmental economic model still betting on fossil fuels.
With relation to supporting different solutions to the climate change issue, Mexican protesters are inclined to changes essentially promoted by the political sphere, although strong consensus highlights the importance of individual changes (Figure 17.1). Also relevant is the significance that strikers give to environmental protection (over 90%) to the detriment of any eventual economic growth. This position runs entirely contrary to the economic growth measures promoted by the current Mexican government, as mentioned above. This sheds light on why 50% of respondents said they did not agree at all with the statement claiming, “Governments can be trusted to resolve our environmental problems”.

Figure 15: Importance of climate emergency in Mexico (N=450)

Figure 16: Declaration of a climate emergency (N=450)
While there is little trust in the government to deal with environmental problems (although it must address these, according to survey respondents), there is even a higher level of distrust in corporations and the market as actors capable of resolving socio-environmental problems (Figure 17.2).

**Figure 17.1: Solutions to climate change**

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs</td>
<td>67.86%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed</td>
<td>53.57%</td>
<td>32.14%</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern science can be relied on to solve our environmental problems</td>
<td>35.71%</td>
<td>53.57%</td>
<td>10.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17.2**

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Companies and the market can be relied on to solve our environmental problems</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>32.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To Mexican protesters, health — and in general social wellbeing — does not represent a priority. When enquired about this, the opinion of survey respondents is distributed in all the options without a clear trend from one another (Figure 17.3). Contrastively, there is a high level of agreement on trusting in modern science to tackle our environmental problems (almost 90%).

![Figure 17.3](image)

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures to decrease CO2 emissions cannot be allowed to make social welfare arrangements worse</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 17.3*

Relevant differences among age groups in this type of topics addressed in the survey were not observed.

Finally, with respect to trusting in decision-making institutions so as to implement climate change-related policies, the trend suggests protesters are highly confident (over 60%) in universities and environmental organisations. On the contrary, there is profound distrust (around 60%) in local and national institutions such as the federal government, the city’s government, the police, the congress, and political parties not to mention the conventional media. Supranational organisations such as the United Nations are regarded as moderately to poorly trusted institutions. Age groups do not reveal significant changes in the respondents’ opinions.

The negative viewpoint that participants have expressed of the government once more reveals their distrust in institutions (Figure 18.1).
Figure 18.1: Democracy score in Mexico (N=450)

Over 60% of respondents (N=450) disapprove of the current government. Observing the variation of responses in terms of age groups (Figure 18.2), it is adults who give a more positive opinion whereas — as seen in data shown before — youths maintain a distant and negative political stance.

In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in Mexico?
In conclusion, it can be asserted that the climate movement that expressed itself during the 20S strike comprises university students (mainly undergraduate), with a prominent presence of women, all of whom have very little previous political experience.

These youth are willing to make changes in their life by adopting pro-environmental behaviours, although they consider the government must be the main actor promoting solutions to the on-going climate crisis. Despite this, there is no trust in the country’s democratic institutions, political parties, corporations and market. Greater trust is given to universities in conjunction with environmentalist organisations as agents of change.

These young people are filled with worry about their future, an emotion that, together with hope for change, represents one of the major mobilising emotions. These youth have a strong perception of climate change in comparison with Mexican adults and consider environmental protection as a priority to the detriment of economic growth, which proves there is a close relation between values and political commitment.
This country report on Norway has a somewhat limited scope due to the very low turn-out of people at the protest event in Oslo on 27th of September, 2019. About 136 people showed up in heavy rain at the square in front of Stortinget (the parliament) on the 27th, when the research team gathered data. Thus, the statistical data underlying this brief report is based on a very low N. There is no way way can generalize from these data to a larger population. Including only the ones reporting an ID-number given out at the manifestation, the number of respondents to the survey is twenty eight. (N=28). We have restricted our report to the more unambiguous figures from the data, due to the irrelevance of comparing minor differences in just a couple dozens of people. It should be stressed that we are only drawing very tentative conclusions, not representative for a larger crowd. However, the numbers may give us some clues about the type of participants taking part in one of the smaller FFF-protests.

Regarding Norway generally, the Fridays for Future website reports a total of 18 protest events during the Week for Future. Although this is a quite low number compared to Sweden (183 events), the number of protest events is quite equivalent to the number of events in Finland (17), Denmark (26) and Iceland (5). A somewhat larger amount of people, about 300 people, participated on friday the 20th. Morover, larger climate strike mobilizations have occurred in Oslo, for example on March 22, 2019, when about 8000 people protested outside the parliament, and 24th of May, 2019, when more than 4000 people gathered.

Nevertheless, when comparing the number of participants with protest events in other Nordic capitals on the 20th and 27th of september, the low number of participants in Oslo is exceptional. About 10 000 people gathered in Helsinki, and a similar number in Copenhagen. 1245 participants were reported in Reykjavik and as many as 70 000 people gathered in Stockholm. Thus, a relevant question is how much of an exception Norway is compared to the other Nordic countries. How can this difference be explained? However, we will not discuss these questions in this brief country report. Instead, we will look at some simple figures from the data.

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40 It was raining heavily on Friday 27th of september. The rain was so heavy that most people used umbrellas, and the recruiters had to circulate in teams of two in order to prevent the papers from getting soaking wet. It was clear from the weather forecasts the days before that Friday would be very rainy.
41 https://www.fridaysforfuture.org/statistics/list-countries
42 Estimated from photos of the protests in Copenhagen.
1. Who participated?

Not many schoolchildren participated in the protest-event on the 27th in Oslo. Among the participants on Friday 27th, only a fifth of the participants were 25 years or younger and a majority were adults (26 years or older). The fact that not many school-children showed up, and possibly were not striking at all that day, is a main reason why the number of participants were so low. As mentioned, there had been mobilization in Oslo earlier, but September 27th will not go down in history as a particularly important date.

The number of pupils or students were equal to the number of non-students, and not many of the pupils were from elementary school. A number of children, probably not in school age, accompanied their parents, or perhaps the other way around. Some had hand painted signs and paintings, showing different possible futures for the children. Most of the participants were female and that goes for most of the age groups. As for the above 65 age group, no male person responded to our survey. The group calling themselves Grandparents’ climate action were pretty visible at the demonstration, wearing red hats and sandwich signs, shouting “Norway, no more oil drilling”, “Stop all oil exploration” and “Children’s climate are our matter”.

Figure 1.1: Youth and adults in the demonstration

![Figure 1.1: Youth and adults in the demonstration](image_url)
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

One would assume that this type of event does not mobilize many new protesters, and that such a small crowd would consist only of persons having demonstrated before. Among the adults, most participants had experience of demonstrations and a majority had taken part in 11 demonstrations or more. However, 40 percent of the youth had never participated in a demonstration before and neither were they members of an environmental organization. Thus, a substantial group of participants demonstrated for the first time and most of participants did not primarily come to the demonstration as active members in an environmental organization.

Figure 2.1: Organizational membership
Political participation and active involvement is common among the participants. A clear majority, about 80%, have raised awareness via social media and the same percentage have changed their diet due to concerns for climate change. Having signed a petition is more common among the adults, but more generally, it is something that most of the participants have done. Only a few, however, have contacted politicians, and those who have are all adults.
3. Why did they protest?

Some of the Fridays for Future protests in Oslo have mobilized a large amount of participants. This report, however, does not aim to evaluate why this was not the case on September 27th. Among those who protested, no one agreed that they took part in the demonstration because somebody asked them to join. Rather, a large proportion insisted that they expressed their own views. Connecting this to the fact that few reported active involvement with an organization, this suggests either some sort of individual motivation, or that climate strikes has become an habit for the participants.

*Figure 3.1: Motive – because somebody asked me to join*

![Figure 3.1: Motive – because somebody asked me to join](image)

*Figure 3.2: Motive – express my views*

![Figure 3.2: Motive – express my views](image)
As for inspiration from Greta Thunberg, about one fifth of the protesters acknowledge that it has been quite or very important. A few more youth (compared to adults) agree to the statement that Greta Thunberg has “made them more interested in climate change”, and about half of the youth agrees that “Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike”. For adults, a larger percentage still says that her action was not decisive for their decision to join the climate strike. Although the numbers are not very clear, there is a difference between youth and adults regarding any kind of Greta-effect on participants.

*Figure 3.3: Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in climate change*

*Figure 3.4: Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike*
Generally, many of the participants felt morally obliged to protest and that goes for both youth and adults. Among the adults, however, a number of people deny this. It would be interesting to have the participants’ elaborations concerning the feeling of moral obligation in contrast to other feelings. Fewer participants say that they are “fearful” of climate change. Being fearful seems a little less common among youth, where 40 percent say that they are “not at all” fearful. A significant number says the opposite, and there is thus a pretty wide span between those positions. Whether the difference between youth and adults in our data is somehow representative for a larger population is impossible to say, but the possibility of such variations is interesting to keep in mind for further examination.

*Figure 3.5: Motivation – moral obligation*

![Chart showing moral obligation among youths and adults.](chart1)

*Figure 3.6: Emotions - fearful*

![Chart showing levels of fear among youths and adults.](chart2)
4. What do they want and who should do it?

Given banners such as “Climate strike for the future”, and “Climate action now!”, the messages displayed during the demonstration focus action with a view to the future. Representatives of Extinction Rebellion displayed messages such as “For our children” and “No time left”. Among the remaining slogans, many focused on government and political leadership. “The government consist of cowards, we’re turning out to strike!”, and “Erna (prime minister) is a coward, we’re on strike!”, was shouted at this demonstration, right outside of the parliament. These slogans were used also in earlier demonstrations in 2019.

Protests targeting the Norwegian government and state have also been a part of Klimasøksmålet (the climate lawsuit). The case has been going on since 2016, when the environmental organizations took legal action against the Norwegian state. The main claim is that the government’s decision to allow further oil exploration in the Barents Sea was not in accordance with paragraph 112 of the Constitution. The case was still ongoing in 2019. At the demonstration, Greenpeace waved a large banner saying “See you in court - § 112”. Apart from this, climate justice was also a focus, with slogans such as “What do we want? Climate justice! When do we want it? Now!”, and posters such as “Just transition – 100 000 new climate jobs”.

Adult respondents agreed strongly to the statement that the government must act on what climate scientists say, even if the majority of people are opposed. The youth, however, were somewhat less certain about this although a majority agreed. One might further investigate whether there is a potential difference between youth and adults over this issue. When it comes to prioritizing protection of the environment, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs, nearly all the respondents think that this should be the done.

Figure 4.1: Statement – follow scientists´ advice
Figure 4.2: Statement – priority over economy

![Graph showing the priority over economy in Oslo]

By way of conclusion, the numbers presented in this report have provided the Norwegian team with an overview of core participants in FFF-protests of Oslo. Whether the same goes for the larger population of protestors cannot be known for the moment, but the small survey provides some clues of what to look for in studies of future demonstrations. We also find some potentially interesting patterns that should be further investigated. We have had the chance to try our way with protest survey methods, so we are well prepared to do a good job investigating future protests. However, the interesting fact for the moment is that Oslo was such an exception compared to other Nordic capitals during the Week for future in late September 2019. We have refrained from providing an answer in this descriptive overview, but plan to discuss it thoroughly in forthcoming Nordic comparisons.
Background

Poland does not have a strong tradition of collective environmental protest and there is no strong green movement to speak of even today. Despite the de-emphasis of heavy industry after the collapse of Communism in the 1990s, Poland is still one of the most polluted countries in the European Union. Nevertheless, people are becoming more aware of the growing burden of modern lifestyles on the environment.

For example, around 20% of Poland’s electricity is generated at the Belchatów coal-fired power plant, the largest brown-coal power plant in Europe, which pumps out over 31 million tonnes of CO₂ annually. This previously unquestioned power plant is now facing increasing criticism from civic activists. In 2008, around 5,000 residents of Kruszwica gathered to protect a bird sanctuary and a site of cultural-historical importance near Lake Gopło when threatened by the extension of open-cast mining to feed the Belchatów plant. Another successful example was the campaign of 2006-09 to reroute an international highway in northeast Poland around the Rospuda valley, a protected natural habitat. Less successful were attempts to restrict logging activities in Białowieża, one of the last remaining areas of primeval forest in Europe and home to a herd of free-roaming European bison. Here protests were insufficient and only EU intervention in 2018 could stop the Polish government from destroying large parts of this last European virgin forest.

Until the beginning of Greta Thunberg’s Fridays For Future movement, the idea of young people taking to the streets over a shared interest was barely conceivable in Poland. However, they have had many years of being socially mobilized through their voluntary work with the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy), which raises large sums of money during an annual charity event, predominantly to purchase medical equipment to help sick children. Polish youth is also occasionally motivated by actions which affect them personally, such as the spontaneous protests against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012, which was the most active demonstration against the agreement in Europe.

44 https://en.wosp.org.pl/
45 https://www.wired.com/2012/02/europe-acta/
Atmospheric pollution in Polish cities is regularly among the worst in the EU and at times even the worst in the world. Regular smog alerts pose a serious threat to the quality of life, making outdoor activities, including exercising for health benefits, hazardous. Nevertheless, despite the urgent global and local environmental problems, they did not trigger a mass mobilization until 2019. The current Polish government’s policy of protecting the national coal industry, which makes almost no attempt to reduce CO₂-emissions, was embarrassingly clear at the 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP24) hosted in Katowice, in the Polish region of Silesia, in December 2018. Polish officials repeatedly defended the coal industry and openly denied the fact of climate change at this conference. It was also at this conference that Greta Thunberg gave a plenary speech telling leaders “Don’t steal our future”. This made her a well-known figure in Poland and her words acted as the catalyst for a new climate movement led by schoolchildren.

**Climate strikes in Poland**

Młodzieżowy Strajk Klimatyczny (MSK, Youth Climate Strike) events, the Polish version of the Fridays For Future, organized in Warsaw on March 15 and September 20, 2019, were by far the largest events of this kind in Poland. Although climate strikes were organized in many other cities around Poland (as many as 68 in September), they usually attracted only a few hundred participants. By contrast, the events in Warsaw attracted around 6 700 protestors in March and around 12 000 in September.

Most of the participants arrived punctually for the 10am start in March, although shortly before this time under 1 000 participants had arrived at the departure point. The short 1.7 km route through Warsaw city centre was covered very quickly by the majority of the participants. The survey team often had to jog to keep up with the participants indicated by the pointers. The post-march speeches given by young people in front of the Ministry of Energy criticized politicians’ environmental inaction. The last part of the rally outside the ministry building was a party with loud dance music.

Similarly, the turnout for the September event also appeared low initially and one side of Constitution Square in the southern part of the city centre was hardly conducive for a large gathering of people. The start of the march was delayed by half an hour, which allowed a larger number of people to arrive at the event. Both events were easily accessible by bus, tram and metro routes, which may explain the arrival of participants at the last moment. The September route was slightly longer than that of the previous event and passed in front of the Polish parliament. Despite this, the police presence was decidedly relaxed and understated. Unlike the previous event, the energy of the march was somewhat dissipated toward the end as people loosely gathered outside the Palace of Culture. Speeches were made and a ‘die-in’ staged before the remaining participants left the event.
During both events, participants were enthusiastic and cheerful. The march itself was well organized and participants adhered to the rules laid down by the organizers and police (including requests not to display political symbols or banners). Many protesters carried banners made from recycled materials such as cardboard and sheets, with slogans like “Make love, not CO²”, “There is no Planet B”, “Life in plastic – not fantastic” and “You’re never too small to make a difference”, a direct reference to Greta Thunberg’s Katowice speech in December 2018. Some participants wore smog masks and even gas masks. The demonstrators at both events often chanted slogans like “Don’t raise our temperature” and “Don’t take away our future” (the motto of the September protest and another reference to Greta Thunberg’s speech).

1. Who participated?

The vast majority of participants in the Warsaw MSK strikes of March 15 (96%) and September 20 (82%) were either schoolchildren or students. The first strike was attended almost exclusively by young people, who spread news of the event by invitation and word of mouth. The stated intention of organisers was to encourage parents, teachers and scientists to join the September strike. Although their presence was significantly higher than in March, adults still made up less than one fifth of all participants. Participants over the age of 65 were not represented in the March event, whereas they made up a very small percentage in September. Participants in the 36-65 age-group were also poorly represented at no more than 5% during both events. Very few adults participated in the March event, and since many groups came from schools, we can suppose that most of the adults were teachers accompanying and supervising their own pupils during the march. In September, however, the 20-35 age-group had almost trebled to 20% from around 7% in March. The proportion of young people was also different. Between March and September, the under-15s grew from 14% to 25% and the proportion of 15-19-year-olds fell by one third from around 75% to 50%. This seems to be the most significant change and may be caused by a number of factors, such as different schools taking part in the protests, greater awareness among younger schoolchildren of the event or partial loss of interest by older teenagers.
Figure 1.1 Age composition

Figure 1.2 Youth and adults in the demonstrations
During both events, a clear majority of the protestors were female, which differs from general street protests in which the gender distribution is more or less equal (with the exception of feminist events, which over-represent females, and right-wing events, which over-represent males).

The spring event had a slightly higher overall female participation rate than the autumn event. In the former, the lower the age-group involved, the higher the proportion of female participants was. Under-15s were 75% female, gradually falling to 65% female in the 35-65 age bracket. The percentage of females in the latter event was virtually identical for under-15s to that in March. However, males made up almost 40% in the 15-19 group, and were almost equal to the female groups over the age of 35. Only in the 20-35 age-group were females in the minority (40%). Interestingly, during both events, a small percentage of participants aged 35 or under described their gender as ‘other’. The highest number fell within the 20-35 age-group (around 7%), and this finding was repeated in the September survey.

Figure 1.3 Gender division in each age group

2. Prior experience of political participation and formally-organized activities

In Warsaw, a high percentage of the young participants at the protest were newcomers. Even though this number fell from 44% in March to 31% in September, the second Polish MSK protest we surveyed was still able to mobilize many young first-time demonstrators (see Figure 2.1). The percentage of newcomers seemed to increase among adults, but their
numbers were small in Warsaw and should therefore be interpreted with caution. In September, 69% of the demonstrators in total stated that they were participating in an MSK event for the first time. This means that *Młodzieżowy Strajk Klimatyczny* was able to attract many participants who had not previously engaged in a strike organized by and for school students, which supports the observation that the September event could have doubled the number of participants who took part in March and, in this way, mobilized many new protestors.

*Figure 2.1 Previous demonstration participation*

Taking a closer look at the different forms of political participation during the last 12 months, it seems that there were no big shifts among the young people taking part in the MSK protests in Warsaw – with two exceptions: more protestors had signed petitions and more had changed their diet (see Figure 2.3). What is interesting here is that not only had very few young participants at both of the events surveyed contacted a politician, but they also raised awareness of the events via social media less often than adults. Thus, although the MSK movement seems over time to have influenced the individual behavior of its young participants, it has not really engaged them in online campaigning or increased their willingness to contact politicians. The latter observation might be explained by the fact that most of the young participants in Poland were not yet eligible to vote. This is borne out in both surveys, since a majority of young people did not identify closely with any party (the distrust and distance from the “political class” is sufficiently strong in Poland that the organizers forbade the use of any political party symbols at both MSZ events).
In the case of adult participants in March, the results for those who said they had signed a petition (100%) or contacted a politician (almost 60%) seem to be quite dramatic. The adults surveyed in September seemed to be less active in both areas; however, we should bear in mind that the number of adult participants in Poland is very low and no firm conclusions can be drawn on this basis.

*Figure 2.2 Previous political participation*

![Graph showing political participation](image)

Also, few of the young participants in the Warsaw MSK protests were members of either an environmental organization or a political party (or its youth wing). The number of non-active supporters grew from a mere 7% to 11% for environmental organizations, while it remained stable at 8% for political parties (see Figure 2.3). Again, the dramatic shift within the adult population in the case of supporting environmental organizations should not be overestimated because the numbers are too small and will most probably reflect the volatility typical for small samples. However, despite the low level of organization or party membership, we are not dealing here with a politically uninterested population; quite the contrary - at the March and September demonstrations more than 60% stated that they were “quite” or “very” interested in politics. The numbers for prior political participation and the degree of organization are stable over time and reflect the young age of the protestors. Within the Polish political context, we see low overall numbers for organizational engagement, as well as low identification with party politics in particular.
3. Why did they protest?

Respondents were asked their reasons for coming to the MSK demonstration. Here we focus on three of them: expressing their views, defending their interests, and having been asked to join. The distributions of responses to these three questions are presented in Figures 3.1-3.3.
Almost all respondents in the March and September events “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that they were participating in the demonstration to express their views (Figure 3.1). The level of agreement was higher among adults compared to young people, but it is worth bearing in mind that the first group is small and likely to be highly selective.

*Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views*

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents who strongly agree or agree that they were participating to express their views in Warsaw, for both youth and adults, in March and September 2019.]

Fewer respondents, but still the majority, admitted attending the demonstration to defend their interests (Figure 3.2). Altogether 69% of young respondents in both survey rounds said that they “strongly agree” or “agree” with this motive for participation, while a small minority - 10% in the March edition and 16% in the September edition - said that they “strongly disagree” or disagree”. Among adults, the change between survey rounds was much greater, probably reflecting the volatility inherent in analysis of small samples.
While respondents generally agreed that expressing their views and defending their interests motivated them to participate in MSK demonstrations, they equally clearly disagreed that being asked to attend was among the reasons (Figure 3.3). Of the young people, 81% and 69% of respondents in March and September respectively “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” that they came to the protest because someone had asked them to. Only 13% and 14% respectively either “agreed” or strongly agreed” with this motivation. Among adults, the tendency is even clearer, with all or almost all respondents “disagreeing” or “strongly disagreeing” with this statement.
Even if not the reason for participation, some 30-40% of young respondents admitted to having been asked to attend, while a much larger share (around 80%) declared that they had recruited others (Figure 3.4). Among adults, few respondents in the September round said they were asked to attend, while a majority said they had asked others to come.

**Figure 3.4 Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate**

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**Warsaw, because somebody asked me to join**

15 March 2019 (N=220)

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20 September 2019 (N=178)

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196
Overall, patterns in motivations remain largely stable over time among younger participants, while the very small adult sample sizes prevent us from drawing any conclusions about the trends.

4. Emotions and the ‘Greta’ effect

When comparing data from March and September, it is clear that adults show a major change in emotions; however, the samples are small and no firm conclusions can be drawn. When looking at the emotional attitudes of young people, there were no noteworthy changes (all attitudes surveyed became slightly more explicit). This indicates that there is a stable perception of climate issues among young people.

Figure 4.1 Average levels of feelings generated by climate change/global warming

This awareness and stability of attitudes among young people is also visible in their attitudes towards Greta Thunberg. The percentage of those who do not know who she was in September (19%) was similar to the outcome from March (16%). Interestingly, the data from March indicate that Greta Thunberg had influenced a slight majority of protesters (55%). In September, however, only 38% declared that Greta Thunberg had made them more interested in climate change (combined answers for “very much” and “quite”). A similar change is visible with the statement “Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the climate strike.” In September, only 22% acknowledged the influence of Greta, whereas in March it was 37%. 30% of young people declared that Greta had no impact on their decision to join the climate strike in September. Therefore, even though the numbers in Warsaw seem to be quite stable over time, we can claim that Greta Thunberg’s role in raising awareness on climate issues among young people is becoming less significant.
5. What do they want and who should do it?

In this section we analyze the responses of climate-strike participants to two statements: (1) whether protecting the environment should be given priority over economic goals (Figure 5.1); (2) whether the government should follow scientists’ advice, even if the majority of
people are opposed (Figure 5.2). Generally, the majority of respondents expressed support for both statements and the percentage of young people favoring environmental protection regardless of its consequences was even higher in the September demonstration.

For the first statement on prioritizing the environment over economic growth, the percentage of young people who agreed with the statement increased from 68% in March to 75% in September (the percentage of those who strongly agree increased from 29% to 42% respectively). Support for the second statement on following scientists’ advice is even higher and increased among young people from 84% in March to 90% in September (the share of those who strongly agree also increased from 47% to 61%). Considering the low number of adults participating in the Warsaw demonstrations, we cannot draw any significant conclusions for this group.

*Figure 5.1 Statement – priority over economy*
Climate-strike participants hold individualistic rather than systemic views on preventing climate change. Among all the surveyed participants in both demonstrations, only 7% agreed with the statement that governments can be relied on to solve our environmental problems. The majority of respondents (around 70%) believe that modern science can be relied on to solve our problems, and stopping climate change must primarily be accomplished through the voluntary lifestyle changes of individuals. In addition, 46% of respondents agreed with the statement that companies and the market can be relied on to solve our environmental problems. As an outcome, this differs strikingly from all other FFF protests surveyed in Europe and hints at the importance of the neo-liberal discourse in Poland.

7. Conclusion

The distinctive feature of participants at both of Polish climate events we surveyed is the predominance of youth, and in particular of school-aged individuals. In fact, of all surveyed demonstrations in the September round, the respondents in Warsaw were the youngest (mean age 20.3, median 17, compared to the overall mean of 33 years and median of 28). In the March round, only respondents from the Amsterdam survey were younger than those in Warsaw (mean age of 16.3 and median 16 in Amsterdam; in Warsaw 18.4 and 17 respectively).

The young age of participants in Warsaw needs to be kept in mind when making cross-event comparisons, as it is likely to explain their relatively low experience with political participation and organizational membership. It also has an effect on their mobilization patterns, attitudes and emotions. For example, participants in Warsaw are more hopeful about policies being able to address climate change compared to participants of any other surveyed FFF
demonstration, and more optimistic about modern science and – most strikingly – companies and the market being able to solve our environmental problems.

The young age of attendees at the Warsaw climate strike also indicates a likelihood that the environmental awareness movement in Poland is itself young; a potential future increase in the share of adult participants would be a signal of maturation and consolidation of the movement. Thus far, few overall changes could be observed between the March and September events.
Ruxandra Gubernat & Henry P. Rammelt

Background

Environmental concerns did not play an important role in the Romanian public agenda before the 2010s but, as a result of a longstanding campaign against potential gold mining in the Apuseni mountains, that started at the beginning of the 2000s, this country has seen a wave of protests ranked, amongst analysts and media, as one of the biggest environmental movements in Europe. In 2013, the “Save Rosia Montana” campaign culminated in mass protests, labeled the “Romanian Autumn”. These protests have been both the continuation of previous mobilizations and the trigger for an increasing politicization, growing environmental consciousness and a widening acceptance of protests as a means of political participation within broader segments of society (Rammelt, 2018; Margarit, 2016). From 2012 on, a strong spill-over effect between the Rosia Montana movement and other environmental movements can be observed; the movement against the exploitation of shale gas - with protest campaigns gathering several thousands of participants in Bârlad in 2012 and in Pungești in 2013 - being the most prominent one. Subsequently, ecological concerns garnered increasing public support and media attention. More recently, protests against illegal logging of Romania, mainly as a reaction to very controversial commercial practices by an Austrian company, managed to attract public attention and resulted in a number of smaller events, such as flash mobs, and medium-sized protests. Romania is the country with the biggest share of primary forests in the EU, excluding Scandinavia (Schickhofer & Schwarz, 2019). These forests are under growing pressure by intensive, often illegal, logging, concomitant with alleged corruption by (local) authorities. On November 3, 2019, roughly five weeks after the FFF protest, a “rally for forests”, with around 600 participants, took place in Bucharest.

Young people played an important role in Romanian mass protests over the past years; the 2013, 2015 and 2017 protests were predominantly composed by participants younger than 35 years old. Further, students took a very active role in mass protests since 2011 (Burean, 2019; Bădescu & Burean, 2014). However, campus protests and protests targeting particular student issues, as well as protests by pupils, are rare. The last major student protest dates back as far as 1995.

46 This research would not have been possible without the efforts of members of CESIP Bucharest (Blebea, Cezar; Chitu, Paul-Gabriel; Gherghiceanu, Rares; Popovici, Adrian; Radoiu, Rares; Tudorache, Alexandru;), who contributed to the data collection.
The climate strikes in Romania

Even though environmental issues are more and more debated upon in Romania, the Climate Strike and Fridays For Future movement are rather new phenomena. The first local groups have been formed at the beginning of 2019. A first FFF/ Climate Strike protest took place in March 2019. It mobilized a small number of participants, mainly the organizers.

On September 20, a bigger protest took place in Bucharest, mobilizing around seven hundred participants (our estimate). This ‘national’ protest in Bucharest was part of a bigger campaign involving smaller events in other cities of Romania such as Târgu Jiu and Oradea (27.09.2019), Iasi, Craiova, Călărași and Timișoara (20.09.2019) and Bacău (30.08.2019). In the following months, more local branches of the movement formed in all major cities in Romania, culminating in a second effort of organizing protests on a national level on November 29, 2019, when events took place in 18 cities. The main protest in Bucharest mobilized around 100-200 participants. However, social media attention was increasing, with over 2000 people clicking on “interested” or “going” on the event page. In the months between September and December 2019 a number of smaller events were organized, often involving rather artistic approaches, such as flash mobs. They were fairly small in scale involving active and committed participants of the movement. One such event was a flash mob in a central Bucharest square on November 17, when around 15 participants staged a flash mob, covering their faces with bills in the national currency, red hands and painting a banner stating, “The Blood of Our Planet on Your Hands”.

The September protest in Bucharest, for which the survey has been carried out, was characterized by small, but constant changes regarding the organization of the protest, notably itinerary, starting time etc., mainly due to difficulties in the interaction with local authorities. The rally itself set off more than 2 hours later than initially scheduled with a changed itinerary, leading from a parking lot in front of the National Library to the Ministry of Environment, lasting over three hours. Along the itinerary, police was kettling by installing fences and restricting movement. At the final stop (the Ministry of Environment) protest participants were separated by fences and crowded in small areas. The whole march was very vivid and vocal, slogans such as “There is no planed B”, “System change, not climate change”, “Stop denying, our earth is dying” were chanted.

The organizers of the protest underlined the global dimension of the movement and the link between the protest, the Climate Action Summit and Greta Thunberg’s speech. The description of the Facebook event for the Bucharest protest stated:

“From September 20-27, leaders from all countries gather in New York for the Climate Action Summit 2019 to discuss what steps should be taken to avoid ecological collapse. Greta Thunberg, the initiator of the Fridays for Future movement, will also participate, addressing her mobilizing message to leaders and the entire world, being
supported by the voices of all people protesting at this time for the same cause in different cities around the world.”47

Similarly, the Fridays for Future event in Bacau (August 30, 2019), that preceded the protest in Bucharest, pledged allegiance to Greta’s initiative:

“On Friday we will be organizing movements to support Greta Thunberg’s initiative: Fridays for future! The 16-year-old Swedish teenager speaks directly and honestly to politicians of the present moment, in order to make them pay attention to the real pressing problems of the moment, namely: the comfortable and consumerist behavior that led to the catastrophic state in which the environment arrived.”48

The strong involvement of young people, notably those that have not been politically active before, as well as the ongoing organizational efforts of the movement, with a growing number of active participants to the movement and a growing number of local initiatives, combined with the severe environmental problems Romania faces, and growing media attention, suggest that the movement will grow and influence the public agenda.

1. Who participated?

As it was the first organized Fridays for Future/Global Climate Strike protest in Romania, and the movement did not particularly benefit from awareness campaigns or prior mobilization on the topic in schools or high schools, participation was rather low, counting around one thousand people present. People were mainly mobilized through the social media channels of Fridays for Future Romania and Climate Strike Romania - two Facebook pages founded around one month before the September 20 protest, accounting around 2.5 thousand people interested for the event created. The offline presence was, as such, at around 40% of the interested population, which shows a high level of commitment of those who participated.

While, prior to the event, organizers were estimating a presence of youth of around 30% of the total number of participants (cf. the response summaries for organizers), the presence of teenagers (15-19 years old) reached almost 55% and that of young people between 20-35 was of 28% (Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations).

Women and girls dominated the protest in Bucharest (77% girls age 15-19 to 22% boys; 62% women age 20-35 to 35% men). Around 3% of the respondents chose the “other gender identity” option (Figure 1.2 Gender division in each age group).

The responses to the question on the education level, at the studied demonstration, shows a high level of education of participants that are not in school or high school (accounting for 50% of the protests participants), with 38% studying or having finished university (76% of the remaining population), 8% having finished a master program and 3% of the population holding a Ph.D. title. Also, at the subjective assessment of their belonging to a social class, almost 42% declared that they belong to the “upper middle class” category, and 5% to the “upper class”. 0% placed themselves in the “lower class” category, and only 3% to the “working class”. Almost 70% of the participants declared that both their parents finished university. This could fall under the label of ‘elite movement’, concerned with post-materialistic issues.
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

As the online survey showed, the majority of participants are newcomers to protesting: 26% never participated in a prior protest and 38% took part in 1-5 protests before (see Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Bucharest). In the youth category, the percentages are much higher, with 40% of the population being first-comers and 46% participating to 1 to 5 protests before this one. In the adults category, we are witnessing more experienced protesters, with 32% percent taking part in 6 to 10 protests, and 37% participating to at least eleven, out of which 29% took part in more than 20 protests before. Nevertheless, almost 90% of the population present at the protest never took part in a Fridays for Future/Global Climate Strike event before.

Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Bucharest

Concerning the forms of political participation Romanian protesters engaged in throughout the past 12 months (Figure 2.2: Previous political participation, Bucharest), the results show that people are mainly active in ‘raising awareness campaigns’ (mainly signing petitions and raising awareness through social media), but they are also operating changes in their lifestyle, such as changing their diet (more than 60% of youth and almost 80% of adults answering affirmatively to that question). The interaction with politicians is reasonably high, around 15% of the youths and 27% of the adults having contacted a politician in the course of the previous year.
With percentages oscillating between 80 and 96%, the majority of people present at the September 20 protest in Bucharest are not active members in any kind of formal organization or political party (9% of the youths declared their membership to a party, compared to 7% of the adult population), as shown by Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters in Bucharest. The only two categories scoring higher percentages in active membership of protest participants are “environmental organizations”, with 13,5% active members and 6,2% passive members or financial supporters and “charity or humanitarian organizations”, with 12,5% active members and 7,3% passive members or financial supporters. Split by age cohorts, 15% of the youths are affiliated to an environmental organization, to only 10% of the adults, this age category adding 15% of passive members or financial supporters.

Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters in Bucharest
3. Why did they protest?

The strong commitment of the respondents to taking part in and supporting the FFF movement in Romania can be seen through the high support they show for almost all preselected reasons, a convincing majority strongly agreeing with most options (except with that of “because somebody asked me to join”). 91% of the protest participants agree or strongly agree that they protested in order to “express their solidarity” and to “raise awareness”, while almost 90% protested to “pressure politicians to make things change”. The equal importance participants to the protest give to these three aspects shows how involvement in this movement is manifesting in three different forms - first, the community aspect, manifested in the solidarity motive, around the idea that it’s a global theme that needs consequent actions; second, the perceived necessity to further push the issue on the public agenda, through the awareness component; third, the relationship between citizen and authority, that goes together with the idea of responsible action: while the individual is in charge of acting together and raising awareness, authority - mainly politicians - is in charge of “making things change”. Holding authorities responsible is not a Romanian specificity, but, given the waves of mobilization from Romania’s recent past, placing this motive among the most significant ones takes a more powerful dimension, as the citizen began, more and more, to be more exacting with its representatives.

Consistently, it also means that people are more prone of freely expressing their views (with 82% of youths strongly agreeing (54%) or agreeing (28%); while 83% of the adults strongly agreeing (44%) or agreeing (49%)), as it can be seen in Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views. A certain sense of entitlement is also to be observed, 87% of youths considering that, through this protest movement, they are defending their interests, and 93% of the adults agreeing or strongly agreeing with that view (Figure 3.2 Motive - defend my interests).

*Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views*
In the case of youths, autonomy seems to play a key role in their mobilization, their socialization in their families not seeming to influence much their decision to take to the streets. While a fair 43% of the youths declared that their parents are quite or very aware of and concerned with environmental issues, only 18% said that their parents are also taking political actions to prevent climate change, and 28% stated that they are making changes in their everyday lives. Discussions with parents on the topic are also somewhat limited, 22% of the youths declaring that they are debating this issues at home.

Interpersonal ties are, however, an important aspect of the group forming the FFF protest in Bucharest. Whereas it does not constitute a reason for mobilization (67% of youths and 73% of adults disagreeing or strongly with this being a motive for their presence, as shown by Figure 3.3. Motive – because somebody asked me to join, almost 80% of youths and around 50% of adults were being asked or asked someone to participate (Figure 3.4: Interpersonal recruitment, % being asked and % asking others to participate).
4. Emotions and Greta effect

The emotions "worried", "frustrated" and "angry" are the most dominant ones among Romanian protesters. Feeling “fearful” constitutes a fourth highly influential emotion, notably amongst young respondents. For these four variables, over 75% of youth indicated that they feel these emotions “quite” and “very much” regarding climate change. The rather powerful experiencing of these four emotions also sets Romanian protesters apart from protests in most other cities where this study has been carried out, where a more balanced distribution of these four emotions can be observed.

On the other hand, only around 25% of both youth and adults have a strong feeling of “hopelessness” and between 25% and 50% feel “powerless”. “Hopeless” is also the only emotion for which more adult respondents indicated "quite" and "very much" than young people. The biggest difference between youth and adults can be observed for the emotion “fearful” (Figure 4.1), with 84% of youth, but only 52% of adults indicating “quite” and very much”.

**Figure 4.1 Emotions – fearfulness**
Greta Thunberg’s influence on the protesters seems to be significant. Her impact on both becoming more interested in climate change and the decision to join the protests is generally stronger on youth than on adults. Figure 4.2 shows that 68% of youth, and 37% of adults indicated that Greta Thunberg made them more interested in the topic (“very much” and “quite”). She also played an important role in the decision to join the protests (Figure 4.3), with 55% of youth and 39% of adults indicating that she affected their decision “quite” or “very much”. The fact that larger proportions of young participants indicated that they became more interested in the topic as compared to having been influenced in their decision to join the protest suggests that many young participants were not as concerned with climate change before Greta. Conversely, less adults became more interested in the topic due to Greta, than they were affected by her in their decision to join, suggest that she contributed to mobilizing those adults that were already informed and concerned with climate change to participate in the protests.

Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change.

Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike
5. What do they want and who should do it?

The issue of global warming/climate change is associated, in Romania, with other environmental issues this country was confronted with, over the past 10 to 20 years: a massive process of deforestation throughout the country and several cases of disregard for environment regulations by corporations being emphasized upon in the answers to “who is responsible for the current situation” question of this survey. Thus, companies and government are seen as the main negative actors of global warming. The very low levels of trust in government’s capacity to solve environmental problems (5% strongly agree and 16% agree) or in companies’/the market’s willingness to change practices in order to prevent climate change (8% strongly agree and 11,5% agree) are correlated with the respondents’ assessment of the economic situation/environment that would be more beneficial to environmental health. However, more than 80% of the respondents think that the government must act in accordance to what scientist say on the topic (see Figure 5.2 Statement – follow scientists’ advice). A high majority of the respondents consider that protecting the environment should be given priority, at the risk of slowing down the economic growth and even with the sacrifice of stable employment (92% of participants agree or wrongly agree with this statement). As seen in Figure 5.1 Statement – priority over economy, 88% of youth and 94% of adults are in favor of this solution. Almost 70% of the respondents also take into account individual responsibility and changes in their daily lifestyles, changes that manifest in their decisions to consume less (76% of the respondents), waste less or recycle more (94%).

*Figure 5.1 Statement – priority over economy, Bucharest*
Overall, the respondents to the Romanian part of this survey are in line with major features of the FFF/Global Climate Strike movement. Even though the movement is at its beginnings in Romania, the levels of awareness, commitment and in-group solidarity are quite high.
References


Background

Greta Thunberg started the global wave of school strikes for climate in front of the Swedish parliament on the 20th of August 2018. She was alone at start, but soon other people joined her and the strikes also spread from Stockholm to other cities: Borås, Linköping, Malmö, Västerås, Gothenburg, Örebro and Umeå. On March 15, there were 165 events with about 25,000 participants taking place in Sweden according to the website Fridays For Future.\(^{50}\) By September 2019, many more — in total about 1900 larger and smaller strikes or demonstrations had been organized (authors own calculation based on coded protests). The third Global Climate Strike — called Global Week For Future — took place 20–27 September and attracted 105,100 participants across 184 events in Sweden (ibid.).

Surely, school strikes for climate were not the first climate protest in Sweden. Previous campaigns have mainly been mobilized by organizations like Jordens Vänner (Friends of the Earth), Greenpeace, Naturskyddsföreningen (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation). Similar to other countries, there have been waves of climate protests, starting with those mobilized in relation to the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Nairobi in November 2006, followed by Climate Walks in December 2007 and 2008, a Swedish nationwide campaign (organized by the climate group Klimax) in May 2008, and then travelling to protest in neighboring Denmark during the UN climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009.\(^{51}\) During the period of 2010–2012, there were fewer large protest events, but small-scale mobilization still took place. The next wave of larger demonstrations in Swedish cities took place in relation to the UN climate report release in May 2013, as well as in relation to the UN climate talks in November (Warsaw) 2013; and in December 2015 (COP21, Paris). In May 2017, in relation to People’s Climate March a protest in Stockholm was also demonstrating solidarity to the activists in the U.S., and this was repeated in 2018.

Thus, Greta Thunberg’s action followed a series of events, the idea of school striking on Fridays got nationwide support already on 21\(^{\text{st}}\) of September 2018, when in 6 larger cities different strikes were mobilized. For the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) of November people in 19 locations all around

\(^{49}\) The Swedish part of this project has been supported by the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development, FORMAS, grants 2019-01961 and 2019-00261.

\(^{50}\) Available at URL: https://www.fridaysforfuture.org/events/list, accessed 26 April 2019.

\(^{51}\) In a survey of the participants in the protests outside COP15 in Copenhagen 2009, 21% of the respondents were Swedes (Wahlström et al. 2013).
the country (but also all around the globe) joined her strike. Still, one could say that the absolute numbers of participants in Sweden during this early phase were not very large.

**The climate strikes in Sweden**

While all Fridays For Future (FFF) events were in some way inspired by Greta Thunberg, the Stockholm events that we surveyed on March 15, May 24 and September 27 2019 were quite literally a continuation and escalation of Greta’s first school strike. The Malmö (15 March and 27 September) and Gothenburg (27 September) events were significant examples of the national spread of the school strike. Each of these dates represented the most visible and widely attended peaks in a much longer, continuous global campaign of school strikes. According to one of the Stockholm event’s main organizers, the weekly Fridays For Futures events had – at least until March – at most attracted a couple of hundred participants. The Global Climate Strikes attracted many more participants. In March, Stockholm, despite rainy and cold weather, we estimated that 3,000 to 5,000 individuals participated in Stockholm’s main event. According to Fridays For Futures website, 12,000 took to the streets across all of Stockholm in March, 18,000 in May, and 70,000 in September.

The Stockholm event of 27 September was, as in many other places, the closing event of the weeklong Global Week For Future. While another large demonstration had taken place a week before on 20 September under the banner of “School Strike”, the demonstration of 27 September explicitly aimed to reach beyond the traditional youth constituency of Fridays For Future and was titled “Storstrejk för klimatet” (General strike for the climate). The event took place under good weather conditions, which may partly explain the very large turnout. In the run up to the event, it slowly became clear that many more people would attend than anticipated. As a result, the plan to have speeches and performances at the starting location of the march (the Medborgarplatsen square) had to be changed to having them at the end of the demonstration itinerary (the Kungsträdgården square) where more space was available. The demonstration was so large that by the time the front of the march reached the end of the 2.5km itinerary, there were still many people leaving from the starting point.

In Gothenburg on September 27, school students had a strike rally in the centrally located park Trädgårdsföreningen, followed by a march on the very short route from nearby Bältespännarparken to the square Gustav Adolfs torg, where there was a rally with speeches and music performances. Before September, Fridays For Future protests in Gothenburg had been rather small and appear to have mobilized a comparatively small proportion of school students. Prior to the protest on 27 September, the organizer had no indications that the protest was expected to become significantly larger and expected only a few hundred participants for the main march. However, despite the heavy rain throughout most of the day and the first hour of the march/rally, the turnout was unexpectedly large. Because of the short demonstration route and difficulties associated with estimating the crowd size when the view is obscured by umbrellas, it was difficult to arrive at a reliable size estimate; the
organizers (FFF) claim around 10,000 participants, but our research team could not safely say that there were more than around 5,000 people participating.

The Malmö event of 27 September, was a 4–5 hours long event, containing a mix between static and moving demonstrations. Two hours before the moving demonstration, protesters started gathering in the square in front of the main building of the Malmö city municipal council. During this static demonstration, which attracted around 200–300 protesters, the participants could listen to speeches and music performances while having a snack and something to drink, which was provided by the organizers for free. Around noon more people arrived to the square, in time for the moving demonstration. After quite a long walk the protesters arrived to the Stortorget square, where the participants stopped and shaped a semicircle in front of the old town hall. After a short stop at Stortorget the protesters walked the same way back to the square in front of the municipal council. With a lot fewer participants than the moving demonstration, the static demonstration continued for about one hour. In total we estimated that around 1,500 participants took part in the demonstration, where the moving demonstration attracted the largest numbers. It could be noted, though, that our estimations differ from the organizers’ estimations, claiming that around 2,500 protesters participated. Just as in the case of the Gothenburg, persistent rainfalls dominated the first half of the demonstration. Due to the weather conditions the participation turnout can be seen as comparatively large, as the Malmö event of 15 March attracted around 650 participants in total.

1. Who participated?

From its start, the Fridays For Future demonstrations have in particular been characterized by the central role schoolgoing teenagers played in them. In previous reports, we have therefore included separate analyses of school students (defined as below 20 and attending high school) and adults, to distinguish what separates the former from the latter. However, as FFF has more recently been able to mobilize older people as well (in line with its explicit mobilization aims), we have witnessed a shift in the relative age distribution of the protests. Specifically, while in March 2019, we concluded that 54% of the protesters in Stockholm were school students, in September this gone down to around 10% across the three cities we surveyed (in March it was already as low as 20% in Malmö). Not only does this indicate that school students do not any longer, percentagewise, constitute the largest age group in FFF protests, it also means that in our data, this group has become too small to make statistically reliable statements about. We have therefore chosen to adopt a broader distinction between, on the one hand, ‘youth’ of up to 25 years old, and ‘adult’ as 26 and older.

Despite this broader definition, youth was still a fairly small category of 21% in Stockholm, 22% in Malmö, and 29% in Gothenburg. This segment had a lower tendency to respond to the online questionnaire in March. Already in May, we saw this shift towards a more adult protest.

52 The old town hall is still in use for various public matters, such as political assemblies.
population take place in Stockholm, as the relative presence of youths had gone down to 35%. Overall, then, we see that FFF protests are becoming more representative of the general population in terms of age distribution (Figure 1.1).

*Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations*

Women and girls numerically dominated each surveyed Swedish protest in September. In Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg 58, 69 and 56% respectively were women. In each city, 2–3% of the respondents chose the option “other” in response to the gender question. Compared to earlier demonstrations, the dominance of women in FFF is a stable factor. The Stockholm demonstration saw 59% women in March and 63% in May. Malmö saw 64% women in March. What did change was the difference between gender distribution among youth and adult protesters (Figure 1.2). The proportional dominance of women was clearly stronger among youth than among adults in March, but the gender gap became less pronounced in September.

Education among the participants was high. Among those indicating that they were not a student (anymore), no less than 80% had completed university in each demonstration we surveyed. In Stockholm, 86% had completed university education, and the corresponding figure for Malmö was a full 83%. In Gothenburg, this was even 98%. This pattern is quite stable over time, with 80% in May in Stockholm being the lowest number. Among those who were still studying, in Stockholm in September, 82% knew for sure that they had at least one parent with university education; the corresponding figures for Malmö and Gothenburg was 77 and 76%. While high education is a recurring pattern among contemporary protest participants
(as in other forms of political participation), these proportions are extraordinarily high, which may be related to the scientized nature of the climate debate. The pattern is fairly stable over time, though the number in Malmö has come down from 96%. In Stockholm the number stayed the same at all three studied demonstrations.

*Figure 1.2 Gender division in each age group*

**Stockholm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>15 March 2019 (N=179)</th>
<th>24 May 2019 (N=254)</th>
<th>27 September 2019 (N=132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>15-19</td>
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**Malmö**

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**Gothenburg**

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</table>
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

A fairly large percentage of the protest participants in all three cities had prior protest experience, but especially among the youth there were also many first-timers (see figure 2.1). In Malmö the proportion of first-timers went down between March and September, whereas in Stockholm the proportion went down between March and May but reached a new high-point in September (39%). In May, 56% of participants had already participated in an earlier FFF demonstration (which was asked in a separate question). In September this went down to 42%. This is probably because the September demonstration was much larger and presumably had managed to reach out to more newcomers.

Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg
Not surprisingly, large proportions of the participants had also been active in several forms of political participation during the last 12 months, except for contacting a politician directly (Figure 2.2). Patterns were similar over time and across cities, though a larger share of the protesters in Malmö and Gothenburg had used social media to raise awareness.

Figure 2.2: Previous political participation, Stockholm

Political participation (%), Stockholm

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53 The question wording was: “There are many things people can do to prevent or promote change. Have you, in the past 12 months...?".
Not many of the youths were members of formal organizations or political parties (see figure 2.3). Membership of political parties or their youth organizations was only slightly higher among adults, but adults were a lot more often members of environmental organizations. This is unsurprising given adults’ much longer exposure to opportunities to become engaged. These patterns were stable over time. The adults also seemed a bit more politically interested: 44% of the Stockholm adult respondents from the September demonstration stated that they were “very” interested in politics. This was similar in Malmö (46%), but notably higher in Gothenburg (61%). Among the youth, fewer indicated to be very interested in politics (19% in Stockholm, 47% in Gothenburg, and 27% in Malmö). These figures are fairly stable over time. Many of the youth had parents that appeared to be engaged in the climate issue: 69% in Stockholm and 55% in Malmö stated that their parents cared quite or very much about climate change. These numbers are based on the September survey, and compared to March these numbers are again quite stable (61% in Stockholm, 57% in Malmö). In Stockholm 56% of the youths and 57% in Malmö talked quite or very often about climate change with their parents.
Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters in Stockholm

Stockholm, environmental organization

15 March 2019 (N=179)

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24 May 2019 (N=254)

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27 September 2019 (N=132)

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Stockholm, political party

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24 May 2019 (N=254)

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27 September 2019 (N=132)

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3. Why did they protest?

Overall, the respondents expressed rather strong support for several parallel motives for participating in Fridays For Future protests. When presented with a number of preselected motives, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (on average around 85%) agreed or strongly agreed that they protested to “pressure politicians to make things change”, to “raise public awareness”, to “express solidarity” and because they “felt morally obliged”.

Participants also frequently strongly acknowledged motives such as “expressing one’s views” (see figure 3.1). Fewer saw the protests as a way to “defend one’s interests”, but this tended to be more common among the youths (Figure 3.2). Over time, the Stockholm data indicates a weakening of this motive among the youths, but since the absolute numbers of respondents within this group was rather small in September, this change is possibly not statistically significant. The least common among the pre-stated motives were “because someone asked me to join”, which, however, received slightly more support from the youths (See figures 3.3). The general pattern of motives fluctuates somewhat, but there is little significant change over time, as well as across the cities.

*Figure 3.1 Motive – express my views*
Figure 3.2 Motive - defend my interests

Figure 3.3. Motive – because somebody asked me to join
While the protesters themselves may generally not have experienced being asked by someone as an important motive for their participation, previous research strongly supports that this is in fact an important contributing factor for participation. When someone in one’s network asks one to participate, this could make the difference between merely supporting the cause of the demonstration and actually taking action. Most youth participants indeed confirmed that they had been asked by someone to join, while this was a minority among the adults. Correspondingly, a considerably larger proportion of the youth respondents, compared to the adults, had asked peers to join them to the demonstration (Figure 3.4). These patterns were relatively stable over time and across the cities.

*Figure 3.4 Interpersonal recruitment: being asked and asking others to participate*

![Bar chart showing percentages of being asked and asking others to participate]

**Stockholm**

- Youths, 15 March 2019
- Youths, 24 May 2019
- Youths, 27 September 2019
- Adults, 15 March 2019
- Adults, 24 May 2019
- Adults, 27 September 2019

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4. Emotions and Greta effect

The emotions anger, frustration, and worry tended to dominate among Swedish protesters; 70–80% of the respondents stated that they feel these emotions “quite” or “very much” in relation to climate change. For other emotions like anxiety, fear, powerlessness and hopelessness, protesters tended to cluster in the middle of the spectrum, around the “somewhat” response. There were no consistent major differences in emotions between youths and adults, except that youths were more likely than adults to feel “fearful” in all demonstrations except on September 27 in Stockholm. Fearfulness also decreased somewhat over time (Figure 4.1.). Interestingly, youths and adults expressed an overall equal degree of “powerlessness” in relation to climate change (on average roughly 50%, but youth and adult proportions varying between different demonstrations).
Greta Thunberg has had a generally strong impact on the protesters. As can be seen in figures 4.2 and 4.3, a large proportion of the respondents in all demonstrations agreed that Greta Thunberg had made them more interested in the topic of climate change. Even larger proportions of the participants agreed that she had affected their decision to join the protest, which indicates that many were already concerned about the issue but that Greta gave them the extra push needed to turn their concern into political action. Thunberg generally tended to be more important for youths than adults, on the one hand probably reflecting that more adult protest participants already had a prior engagement in the issue, on the other hand possibly indicating that sharing a social identity with Thunberg of being youth may have increased her impact as a role model. Whereas the Greta impact on the adults appears to have been rather stable over time, there is a slight waning tendency in her impact on youth, noticeable when comparing the March and September demonstrations in Stockholm and Malmö (see figure 4.4).
Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change.

Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike
5. What do they want and who should do it?

In terms of support for various solutions to the problem of global warming among the Swedish protesters, the broad tendency seems to be to advocate changes on the political level (as opposed to the individual level), but far from everyone (and fewer among the adults) thought that governments could be relied on to solve climate change. Adults also tended to be notably more suspicious of private companies and the market in relation to solving the climate issue. Large proportions of the respondents expressed the need to address climate change even if such policies negatively affected the economy (Figure 5.1)\(^\text{54}\), and large shares thought that politicians had to be prepared to follow the advice of climate scientists, even if a majority of the people were to be opposed (Figure 5.2). Among the adults, these proportions appeared to be rather stable over time, whereas the youth segment of the participants shows tendencies towards a stronger prioritization of the climate in relation to the economy or to following the will of the majority. There is also no significant difference across the cities (for Malmö see Figure 5.3).

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\(^{54}\) A recent research article explored this further, but also whether the protesters prioritize the environment before social welfare arrangements (Emilsson et al. 2020).
Figure 5.1 Statement – priority over economy, Stockholm

![Bar chart showing the percentage of agreement with the statement: Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.](image)

Adults and youths were surveyed in Stockholm on 15 March 2019 (N=179), 24 May 2019 (N=254), and 27 September 2019 (N=132).

Figure 5.2 Statement – follow scientists’ advice, Stockholm

![Bar chart showing the percentage of agreement with the statement: The government must act on what climate scientists say even if the majority of people are opposed.](image)

Adults and youths were surveyed in Stockholm on 15 March 2019 (N=179), 24 May 2019 (N=254), and 27 September 2019 (N=132).
Figure 5.3 Statement – priority over economy and follow scientists’ advice, Malmö

The Swedish respondents were also asked about the extent to which they agreed with the statement: “Measures to decrease CO2 emissions cannot be allowed to make social welfare arrangements worse”. On this, the overall average of respondents was roughly equally split
between those disagreeing, those agreeing and those neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Higher percent of the youth want to prioritize welfare arrangements before anti-CO2 measures, in comparison to the adults.

With regard to trust in the institutions potentially involved in deciding and implementing policies on climate change, the protesters had a stable tendency to more strongly trust supranational institutions like the UN or even the EU rather than, for instance, the national government or the local municipality. Not surprisingly, the protesters average trust was highest in relation to environmental NGOs.

Overall, despite the demographic changes among activists, that is activists becoming older, there are rather few changes in the views that are common among Swedish Fridays for Futures protesters.

References


Background
Youth protest and especially school strikes are not very common in Switzerland. Youth protest in the past have often dealt with issues relating to urban autonomous centers. Here Switzerland, and more specifically Zurich, was one of the strongholds of the autonomous movements in particular in the 1980s. Ecological concerns, however, have a long tradition in Switzerland, and the environmental movements is quite important, albeit more in terms of organizations and less in terms of participation in street demonstrations. Prior to September 28, when the national climate demonstration took place in Bern, there have been other climate marches, namely on January 18, on March 15, and on May 24, when thousands of protesters participated in several Swiss cities.

There has been a lot of reactions from the political establishment, but also from the economic milieus sometimes, to the climate-strike demonstrations. Since March 15, many politicians, including members of the government, have declared in the press that more should be done against climate change and its negative effects. This trend has become all the more evident after the demonstration of September 28. So, at least discursively, the climate-strike demonstrations are having a strong impact. The September 28 demonstration seemingly also had a strong impact on the national elections of October 20, when the Green Party made big electoral gains.

The climate strikes in Switzerland
The present report covers three demonstrations: one held in Geneva on March 15, 2019, another on the same day in Lausanne, and the national demonstration that took place in Bern on September 28, 2019. The demonstration in Geneva had an estimated 5000-6000 participants, the one in Lausanne an estimated 12’000-15’000 participants. Other demonstrations were held in other Swiss cities on the same day, but with less participants. With an estimated attendance of 75’000 to 100’000 participants, the September demonstration in Bern gathered one of the largest crowds of recent decades in Switzerland, if not the largest ever. The three demonstrations were peaceful and cheerful, with only a minor intervention by the police in Geneva when a small group of demonstrators were heading to the local government and parliament.

The climate strike movement in Switzerland is very active. Among its activities, there is the organization of the European meeting of climate strikes (SMILE for Future) in August 2019. Climate strike activists from 37 countries gathered in Lausanne to discuss during a week the goals of the movement. The Swiss climate strike movement started with the first
demonstration in many cities across the country on January 18, 2019. Other events took place throughout the year, including monthly events alternating between climate strikes on Fridays and climate marches on Saturdays. The movement brings together young activists (pupils and university students) as well as older participants (their parents and grandparents’ generations). The movement is flanked by other environmental groups that use civil disobedience as a main form of action (Extinction Rebellion) and by other social movements, in particular the women’s strike. The movement remains active in 2020 with several events that will take place during the year, such as a climate strike to mark the first anniversary of the movement on January 17 and a national strike on May 15.

1. Who participated?

Who participates in the climate strikes and demonstrations that have taken place in 2019 in Switzerland? Figure 1.1 shows the share of young people (aged 25 or younger) as compared to adults (all other protesters). The share of young people was much larger in March, with respectively 54 and 49 percent of the surveyed participants, as compared to 25 percent in September. In this regard, we should note an important difference between the three protest events: the March demonstration took place on a Friday in the framework of the Fridays for Future climate strikes, whereas the September demonstrations took place on a Saturday. This might explain the different age composition of the demonstrators.

Figure 1.1: Youths and adults in the demonstrations

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55 Two first climate marches took place in Bern on December 14 and 21, 2018. However, they were not yet part of the climate strike movement. The movement formed in January 2019 and its first event took place on January 18. The next events took place in different cities around the country on the following dates: February 2, March 15, April 6, May 24, August 31, September 27, 28 and 29, and November 29.

56 Various feminist groups and trade unions organized a women strike on June 14, 2019 to give visibility to gender inequalities that they face in their daily lives across different fields. The movement brought 500,000 women and solidary men to the streets in many cities across the country.
Next, we turn to the gender division of the protesters. In Switzerland, the climate strikes and marches involved similar percentages of women and men. In March, women represented 58 percent of the protesters in Geneva and 58 percent in Lausanne. In September, in Bern, women represented 51 percent of the protesters. Figure 1.2 looks at gender in relation to the different age groups. The share of women tends to be slightly higher among the younger participants, especially so among the 15 to 19 years old – the school climate strikers. The gender distribution becomes more balanced in the older cohorts.

*Figure 1.2 Gender division in each age group*

![Graphs showing gender division by age group for March and September 2019 in Geneva, Lausanne, and Bern.](image)

2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

In this section, we focus on students, that is, people who currently study and are younger than 25. This differs from the category of youth above, which might include students and other young people.

Figure 2.1 looks at previous participation in demonstrations. We asked respondents whether they had ever participated in a demonstration in the past. We observe marked differences between the March climate strikes in Geneva and Lausanne and the September demonstration in Bern. In March, the share of students who had never participated in a demonstration was higher – 24 percent of the students in Geneva (where the demonstration was smaller and attracted more seasoned protesters) and 41 percent in Lausanne said they had never participated in a demonstration. However, in September, in Bern, the share of
students who had never participated to a demonstration dropped to 10 percent. This share is similar to that of adults in the three demonstrations who said they had never participated in a demonstration.

Figure 2.1: Previous demonstration participation (ever) in Lausanne, Geneva, and Bern

Next, we turn to other forms of political participation protesters might use to make their voices heard. Figure 2.2 shows four different forms of participation: contacting a politician, signing a petition, raising awareness on social media, and changing diet for environmental or political reasons. A first interesting finding relates to the politicization of young people participating in the demonstrations. The share of students who participated in the four forms during the last 12 months was higher in Bern than in both Geneva and Lausanne. More specifically, 20 percent of the students in Bern said they contacted a politician (as compared to 12 percent in Geneva and 3 percent in Lausanne). As for petitioning, the difference lies above all between Bern and Lausanne (80 percent as compared to 60 percent), whereas in Geneva 80 percent of the students said they signed petitions. When we examine social media activism and changing diets, however, we see a different trend. Students who participated in the demonstration in Bern still appear to be more active (63 percent are active on social media and 74 percent adopted a new diet), but the differences between Geneva (45 and 57 percent, respectively) and Lausanne (53 and 63 percent, respectively) are smaller.
Looking at the action repertoire of adults who participated in the demonstrations, we see that the share of adults who engage in the different activities is very similar to that of students that we have just discussed. The main differences appear with regard to contacting and signing petitions, but only in the case of Lausanne, where we had the highest share of first time protesters, therefore less seasoned demonstrators, and also young people who are more generally less involved in politics. These differences do not appear in Geneva, nor in Bern for the September national march.

Figure 2.3 shows the organizational membership of protesters. We are interested in two types of affiliation: being a member or a financial supporter of an environmental group or a political party. First, if we consider the first part of the figure, which presents the results for Geneva and Lausanne. Students are not often engaged in environmental groups or in political parties. More than 90 percent say they are not members of any such organizations. Considering financial support instead of membership does not change the picture. Very few students donate money to environmental groups or political parties. This might be related to their financial situation, which is often limited and offers few opportunities to donate money. What is more surprising is the very different result that we observe for the September demonstration in Bern. In this case, 17 percent of the students said to be engaged in an environmental group and 19 percent to donate money to such organizations. Compared to the 90 percent who did not engage or donate money in March, the share of youth involved in
environmental groups is strikingly higher. Similarly, membership and financial support are higher in the case of political parties (14 and 6 percent, respectively).

Figure 2.3: Organizational membership of protesters
The picture is quite different when we look at the adults. Climate protesters tend to support financially environmental organizations (40, 33, and 45 percent donate money in Bern, Geneva, and Lausanne, respectively) and a few are more committed through membership (12, 7, and 14 percent in Bern, Geneva, and Lausanne, respectively). Yet, political parties are less popular, with fewer adult climate demonstrators who either donate money or are engaged in a political party. Between 8 and 10 percent donate money to a party and an equivalent share is engaged in a party. These percentages are very similar across the three demonstrations.

3. Why did they protest?

In this section, we look at the motivations to participate in these protests. We examine three different motives: expressing one’s views, defending one’s interests, and participating because someone asked to join the demonstration.

First, figure 3.1 shows the results for expressing one’s views. We find little differences between the responses of students and those of adults. Similarly, we observe little differences across the three demonstrations. More than 80 percent participated to express their views on climate change across groups and demonstrations.
Second, figure 3.2 shows the percentage of respondents who said they participated to defend their interests. Here, we observe more variations between young students and adults, especially so in the demonstrations that took place in March in Geneva and Lausanne. In both cities, more than 70 percent of the students we interviewed said they were protesting to defend their interests. Among the adults, the share who said so drops respectively to 31 and 41 percent in Geneva and Lausanne. However, these differences between students and adults disappear when we look at the September demonstration in Bern. We observe very similar shares of respondents who came to defend their interests, respectively with 84 percent and 76 percent, if we consider strongly agree and agree. This could be related to the fact that the demonstrations in Bern took place a few weeks before the national elections and that instrumental motives where therefore more important than in the previous demonstrations in March.
Third, figure 3.3 shows that someone asking to participate was seldom a reason to attend the demonstration. This holds across the two groups and the three demonstrations. On average, less than 10 percent of the respondent said that this was a reason to demonstrate.

Lastly, we examine the importance of interpersonal recruitment for participation in the demonstrations. Figure 3.4 shows the share of respondents who asked someone to participate and those who have been asked to participate. It is more common to be asked to participate – 40 to 60 percent of our respondents have been asked to participate in the
climate demonstrations – than to invite someone else to participate. Between 10 and 20 percent of the respondents asked others to join. We observe no important difference between students and adults nor across the three demonstrations.

Figure 3.4: Interpersonal recruitment, percentage being asked and percentage asking others to participate

4. Emotions and Greta effect

In this section, we look at the importance of emotions and the influence of Greta Thunberg on climate protesters. First, concerning emotions, figure 4.1 shows the results for fearfulness. Students are slightly more fearful – when adding up the strongly agree and agree categories – than adults. Between 42 (in Bern) and 52 percent (in Lausanne) of the students say that they are fearful. The share is slightly lower among adults (37, 36, and 43 percent in Bern, Geneva, and Lausanne, respectively).
Figure 4.1 Emotions – fearfulness

Figure 4.2 Greta Thunberg has made me more interested in Climate change.
What was the influence of the iconic figure of Greta Thunberg for the respondents’ interest in climate change and for their participation in the demonstrations? The answers to these questions are shown in figures 4.2 (interest in the topic) and 4.3 (motivation to participate).

Figure 4.2 shows that about a third of the students said their interest for climate change was “very much” or “quite” influenced by Greta Thunberg. It ranges from 37 percent who said so in Bern to 31 percent in Geneva and 32 percent in Lausanne. The share of adults who said so is lower across the three demonstrations (23 percent in Bern and 27 percent in Geneva and Lausanne).

Figure 4.3 shows the motivations to participate in the demonstrations. In this case, the Greta effect is more limited. A share of students of 24 percent in Bern and 23 percent in Geneva said it did, but only 15 percent in Lausanne. Surprisingly, the share is higher among the adults in both Geneva and Lausanne (28 and 24 percent, respectively), but not in Bern, where only 18 percent of the adults said that Greta Thunberg affected their decision to join the demonstration.

Figure 4.3 Greta Thunberg has affected my decision to join the Climate Strike

5. What do they want and who should do it?

Lastly, we address the question of what should be done according to the climate demonstrators. We focus on agreement with two statements: (a) the government must give priority to the environment even at the cost of harming economic growth and causing job losses (figure 5.1) and (b) the government must follow what scientists say even if a majority of the people are opposed to it (figure 5.2). An overwhelming majority of the climate protesters agree with both statements.
Agreement is very strong with the need to act even if it harms the economy. Figure 5.1 shows that 90 percent or more of the students agree with this statement in the three cities. Agreement is equally strong among the adults who participated in the three demonstrations.

**Figure 5.1: Statement – priority over economy**

**Figure 5.2: Statement – follow scientists’ advice**
Figure 5.2 shows that agreement is slightly lower for the second statement, but remains above 80 percent across all groups and demonstrations. The only exception being the share of agreement among adults in Bern, where it drops to 75 percent.
Background

The Friday’s for Future (FFF) movement to combat climate change began in August of 2018 in Sweden preceding the Rise for Climate global protests taking place on September 8 across the planet. The distinguishing features of FFF include the participation and leadership of youth and the sustained pressure to fight global warming by holding weekly actions every Friday via school walkouts. In 2019, FFF picked up steam by holding global days of Climate Strikes in March and May. These actions spread the FFF movement to the United States where protests were coordinated in conjunction with pre-existing climate justice organizations such as the Sunrise Movement, AVAAZ, and 350.org. In March and May of 2019 over 100 US cities participated in solidarity climate strikes. The FFF mobilizations peaked in September of 2019 with the third international day of Climate Strikes. The September 2019 Climate Strikes lasted for a week with peak days on Friday September 20 and Friday September 27. The strategy of the strikes was to pressure the United Nations Climate Action Talks that began the week of September 23 in New York City. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on world leaders to attend the conference and present national plans for greenhouse gas reduction in 2020. Hence, similar to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Third Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 (Almeida and Lichbach 2003), the FFF organized a massive march in New York City and solidarity demonstrations around the United States and world between September 20 and 27.

For social movement type mobilizations, the struggle for climate justice in the United States can be traced back to the early 2000s. In 2005, during the COP Climate Meetings in Montreal, 20 US cities held solidarity actions. The climate movement gained momentum in the US with the release of Al Gore’s film, An Inconvenient Truth in 2006. A series of climate actions were held across the United States in 2007 and 2008. These mobilizations gave rise to 350.org, which began to work nationally and internationally in the build up to COP 15 in Copenhagen. Between 2009 and 2012, US cities continued to organize during annual UNFCC COP conferences. Perhaps the highpoint in US climate mobilizations to date occurred during the September 2014 United Nations Climate Summit in New York City. During the Summit, an unprecedented street march was held with an estimated 400,000 people. This is one of the largest climate marches in history in terms of the number of participants in a single demonstration. In addition, hundreds of solidarity events were held across the United States.

The United States climate justice movement continues to grow as the Trump Administration represents an accelerated ecological threat to global climate justice efforts. A national day of climate action was held in hundreds of US cities in April of 2017 to denounce the
administration’s plans to pull out of the 2015 Paris Climate Accords. In 2020, the movement retains its vitality in the United States with the rise of the Sunrise movement and closer collaborations with the pre-existing environmental justice movement battling environmental racism and the disproportionate distribution of pollution in low income communities.

The September 2020 Actions in New York City and The United States

In September of 2019, the global climate strike actions within the United States initiated with the dramatic arrival of Greta Thunberg. She sailed into New York Harbor on August 28 after a 15-day journey across the Atlantic Ocean in an emission-free yacht (symbolizing alternatives to the heavy carbon footprint of air travel). She decided to be present in New York City to spearhead demonstrations and formally present a speech at the United Nations Climate Action Talks and meet with world leaders. During the week of September 20, there were nearly 1,000 documented climate strike events across all 50 states in the USA, including in smaller cities such as Merced, California.

On September 20, 2019 the New York City climate strike demonstration began at noon at Foley Square. The march was headed by Greta Thunberg and other youth leaders in the Fridays for Future Movement. An estimated 250,000 people participated in the street demonstration that ended with a rally in Battery Park at 4pm with speeches from FFF youth representatives, including Greta. This street march was the largest of the United States climate events, and is probably one of the 10 largest climate demonstrations in history in a single city. The massive street demonstration was multi-sectoral with heavy participation by youth groups, labor unions, and environmentalists. Beyond FFF, some of the largest sponsors and participating organizations in the New York City march included the Sunrise Movement, Extinction Rebellion, 350.org, AVAAZ, and SEIU labor unions, among many others. Our team distributed 768 survey flyer invitations to participants in the New York City demonstration.

1. Who participated?

As stated above, the New York City demonstration was diverse with many participating sectors. The majority of respondents in our sample identified as female (63%) as indicated in Table 1. Table 2 provides the distribution of demonstrators by age. Over two-thirds of the participants were 26 years of age or older (adults). Those 25 years old or younger were classified as youth. 25 percent of our sample was 17 or younger, demonstrating the influence of the school based FFF movement. Nonetheless, a few days before the march, the City of New York permitted the participation of public school students in the Friday, September 20 demonstration without penalty. Given these late incentives to join the march, one might expect a higher percentage of youth participation.
2. Prior experiences of political participation and formally organized activities

A large majority of New York City climate strike demonstrators had participated in past collective action. Only 8.5 percent reported as never having participated in a protest in their lifetime (see Figure 3). This may indicate social movement spillover from other movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994). Indeed, over the past 12 months, 78 percent of respondents reported participating in at least one protest event. The United States has experienced high levels of protest since 2017, with the arrival of the Trump administration and the rise of the Resistance (Almeida 2019). Figure 4 queried demonstrators about if they had participated in a previous climate strike. Only 12 percent of respondents had participated in a Climate Strike before September 20. This is consistent with the view of a slow spread of FFF to the United States after its diffusion across European cities in the spring of 2019. Despite the low level of previous participation in Climate Strikes, participants did display substantial involvement with environmental organizations. About half of the demonstrators identified as passive members (making financial donations) or active members of environmental advocacy groups (see Figure 5). In summary, for activists looking to grow the movement, a place to emphasize strategy in the short term may be to target progressive social movements working in other areas and pre-existing environmental organizations.
3. Emotions and Greta effect

Similar to climate strike demonstrators in other countries, in the United States demonstrators reported the sentiments of anger, frustration, and worry as the dominant emotions associated with climate change. 80% or more of the respondents stated that they feel these emotions “quite” or “very much” in relation to global warming (see Figures 6-8). Around 70% of demonstrators also indicated “quite” or “very much” in feeling the emotions of anxiety and fear in relation to climate change. For other emotions such as powerlessness and hopelessness, demonstrators reported them as having less salience. The predominance of the negative emotions of anger, frustration, and fear are consistent with a threat-driven model of collective action whereby worsening ecological conditions motivate collective action at the micro-level (Almeida 2018).
Figure 7

Emotion of Anger (N=85)

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Thinking about Global Warming Makes Me Angry:

Figure 8

Emotion of Frustration (N = 85)

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Thinking about Global Warming Makes Me Frustrated:
The New York City Climate Strike demonstration was headed by Friday for Future founder and teenager Greta Thunberg from Sweden. The climate strike of a school walkout to protest global warming originates from her original actions in the fall of 2018, and quickly gained widespread publicity across the globe. Even though there has been large-scale public awareness about climate change in the United States for over 20 years, and at least 15 years of climate protests, Greta has helped to revitalize the movement in 2019, following the difficulties of holding countries accountable since the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate the influence of Greta’s leadership on concern for global warming and taking action to reduce it. The highest response in Figure 9 (28%) is that Greta “very much” made protesters more interested in climate change. Participants also responded more frequently to the strongest category of “very much” regarding the question of Greta affecting their decision to participate in the current climate strike.

*Figure 9*
References


## Appendix: List of contributors

Researchers involved in the September data collection and analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country team</th>
<th>Name*</th>
<th>University affiliation</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Paul Almeida</td>
<td>University of California, Merced</td>
<td><a href="mailto:palmeida@ucmerced.edu">palmeida@ucmerced.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Daniel Arnesen</td>
<td>Institute for Social Research</td>
<td><a href="mailto:daniel.arnesen@socialresearch.no">daniel.arnesen@socialresearch.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Anja Corrinne Baukloh</td>
<td>Technical University Munich</td>
<td><a href="mailto:acbaukloh@yahoo.de">acbaukloh@yahoo.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Niccolò Bertuzzi</td>
<td>Scuola Normale Superiore</td>
<td><a href="mailto:niccolo.bertuzzi@sns.it">niccolo.bertuzzi@sns.it</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Daniela Chironi</td>
<td>Scuola Normale Superiore</td>
<td><a href="mailto:daniela.chironi@sns.it">daniela.chironi@sns.it</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Brendan Churchill</td>
<td>University of Melbourne</td>
<td><a href="mailto:brendan.churchill@unimelb.edu.au">brendan.churchill@unimelb.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Ondřej Cisár</td>
<td>Charles University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ondrej.cisar@soc.cas.cz">ondrej.cisar@soc.cas.cz</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Philippa Collin</td>
<td>Western Sydney University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:P.Collin@westernsydney.edu.au">P.Collin@westernsydney.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Trine Cosmus Nobel</td>
<td>Roskilde University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nobel@ruc.dk">nobel@ruc.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Joost de Moor</td>
<td>Stockholm University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:joost.demoor@statsvet.su.se">joost.demoor@statsvet.su.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Antje Daniel</td>
<td>University of Vienna</td>
<td><a href="mailto:antje.daniel@univie.ac.at">antje.daniel@univie.ac.at</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Stephen Davies</td>
<td>IFIS PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dsteve910@gmail.com">dsteve910@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Donatella della Porta</td>
<td>Scuola Normale Superiore</td>
<td><a href="mailto:donatella.dellaporta@sns.it">donatella.dellaporta@sns.it</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Anna Deutschman</td>
<td>University of Vienna</td>
<td><a href="mailto:anna.deutschmann@univie.ac.at">anna.deutschmann@univie.ac.at</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Michiel De Vydt</td>
<td>University of Antwerp, Belgium</td>
<td><a href="mailto:michiel.devydt@uantwerpen.be">michiel.devydt@uantwerpen.be</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Rune Ellefsen</td>
<td>University of Oslo, Norway</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rune.ellefsen@jus.uio.no">rune.ellefsen@jus.uio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Kajsa Emilsson</td>
<td>Lund University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kajsa.emilsson@soch.lu.se">kajsa.emilsson@soch.lu.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Beth Gharrity Gardner</td>
<td>Humboldt University, Berlin</td>
<td><a href="mailto:gardnerb@hu-berlin.de">gardnerb@hu-berlin.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Marco Giugni</td>
<td>University of Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:marco.giugni@unige.ch">marco.giugni@unige.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Tommaso Gravante</td>
<td>CEEIC-UNAM, Mexico</td>
<td><a href="mailto:t.gravante@gmail.com">t.gravante@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Ruxandra Gubernat</td>
<td>Paris Nanterre University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ruxandra.gubernat@gmail.com">ruxandra.gubernat@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Silas Harrebye</td>
<td>Roskilde University, Denmark</td>
<td><a href="mailto:silas@ruc.dk">silas@ruc.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Stewart Jackson</td>
<td>University of Sydney, Australia</td>
<td><a href="mailto:stewart.jackson@sydney.edu.au">stewart.jackson@sydney.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Maija Jokela</td>
<td>University of Tampere</td>
<td><a href="mailto:maija.e.jokela@gmail.com">maija.e.jokela@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Håkan Johansson</td>
<td>Lund University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hakan.johansson@soch.lu.se">hakan.johansson@soch.lu.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Kjell Kjellman</td>
<td>University of Oslo, Norway</td>
<td><a href="mailto:k.e.kjellman@sosgeo.uio.no">k.e.kjellman@sosgeo.uio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Email</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Kateřina Kňapová</td>
<td>Charles University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:knapova.katerina@gmail.com">knapova.katerina@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland/Germany</td>
<td>Piotr Kocyba</td>
<td>Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:piotr.kocyba@phil.tu-chemnitz.de">piotr.kocyba@phil.tu-chemnitz.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Jasmine Lorenzini</td>
<td>University of Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jasmine.lorenzini@unige.ch">jasmine.lorenzini@unige.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Eeva Luhtakallio</td>
<td>University of Helsinki</td>
<td><a href="mailto:eeva.luhtakallio@helsinki.fi">eeva.luhtakallio@helsinki.fi</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Małgorzata Łukianow</td>
<td>IFIS PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences), Poland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mlukianow@ifispan.waw.pl">mlukianow@ifispan.waw.pl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Jiří Navrátil</td>
<td>Masaryk University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jiri.navratil@fss.muni.cz">jiri.navratil@fss.muni.cz</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Michael Neuber</td>
<td>&quot;Technical University of Berlin, Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb), Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mineuber@uni-potsdam.de">mineuber@uni-potsdam.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Ingrid Matthews</td>
<td>Western Sydney University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:i.matthews@westernsydney.edu.au">i.matthews@westernsydney.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Dániel Mikecz</td>
<td>Centre for Social Sciences – MTA Centre of Excellence, Hungary</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mikecz.daniel@tk.mta.hu">mikecz.daniel@tk.mta.hu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Lars Mjøset</td>
<td>University of Oslo, Norway</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lars.mjoset@sosgeo.uio.no">lars.mjoset@sosgeo.uio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Thomas Olesen</td>
<td>Aarhus University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:THO@ps.au.dk">THO@ps.au.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Dániel Oross</td>
<td>Centre for Social Sciences – MTA Centre of Excellence, Hungary</td>
<td><a href="mailto:oross.daniel@tk.mta.hu">oross.daniel@tk.mta.hu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Martin Portos</td>
<td>Scuola Normale Superiore</td>
<td><a href="mailto:martin.portos@sns.it">martin.portos@sns.it</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Alice Poma</td>
<td>IIS-UNAM, Mexico</td>
<td><a href="mailto:alice.poma@gmail.com">alice.poma@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Henry Rammelt</td>
<td>National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania</td>
<td><a href="mailto:henry.rammelt@politice.ro">henry.rammelt@politice.ro</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Sonja Savolainen</td>
<td>University of Helsinki</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sonja.savolainen@helsinki.fi">sonja.savolainen@helsinki.fi</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Anna Christine Styket</td>
<td>University of Oslo</td>
<td><a href="mailto:annacst@student.sv.uio.no">annacst@student.sv.uio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sebastian Svenberg</td>
<td>Örebro University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sebastian.svenberg@oru.se">sebastian.svenberg@oru.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Simon Teune</td>
<td>Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:teune@ztg.tu-berlin.de">teune@ztg.tu-berlin.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Katrin Uba</td>
<td>Uppsala University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:katri.n.uba@statsvet.uu.se">katri.n.uba@statsvet.uu.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Katerina Vrablekova</td>
<td>University of Bath</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kv327@bath.ac.uk">kv327@bath.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mattias Wahlström</td>
<td>University of Gothenburg, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mattias.wahlstrom@socav.gu.se">mattias.wahlstrom@socav.gu.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Magnus Wennerhag</td>
<td>Södertöm University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:magnus.wennerhag@sh.se">magnus.wennerhag@sh.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Tuomas Ylä-Anttila</td>
<td>University of Helsinki</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tuomas.yla-anttila@helsinki.fi">tuomas.yla-anttila@helsinki.fi</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lorenzo Zamponi</td>
<td>Scuola Normale Superiore</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lorenzo.zamponi@sns.it">lorenzo.zamponi@sns.it</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Researchers are listed in alphabetical order
Researchers involved only in coordinating the March 15 survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country team</th>
<th>Name*</th>
<th>University affiliation</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Per Adman</td>
<td>Uppsala University, Sweden</td>
<td><a href="mailto:per.adman@statsvet.uu.se">per.adman@statsvet.uu.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Philip Balsiger</td>
<td>University of Neuchatel, Switzerland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:philip.balsiger@unine.ch">philip.balsiger@unine.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Aron Buzogany</td>
<td>University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna</td>
<td><a href="mailto:buzogany@zedat.fu-berlin.de">buzogany@zedat.fu-berlin.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Brian Doherty</td>
<td>Keele University, United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="mailto:b.j.a.doherty@keele.ac.uk">b.j.a.doherty@keele.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Teodora Gaidyte</td>
<td>VU Amsterdam, Netherlands</td>
<td><a href="mailto:teodora.gaidyte@gmail.com">teodora.gaidyte@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sebastian Haunss</td>
<td>Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb), Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sebastian.haunss@uni-bremen.de">sebastian.haunss@uni-bremen.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Valentina Holecz</td>
<td>University of Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:valentina.holecz@unige.ch">valentina.holecz@unige.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Dieter Rucht</td>
<td>Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb), Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dieter.rucht@wzb.eu">dieter.rucht@wzb.eu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Clare Saunders</td>
<td>University of Exeter, United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="mailto:c.saunders@exeter.ac.uk">c.saunders@exeter.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Moritz Sommer</td>
<td>Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb), Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sommer.moritz@fu-berlin.de">sommer.moritz@fu-berlin.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Jacquelien van Stekelenburg</td>
<td>VU Amsterdam, Netherlands</td>
<td><a href="mailto:j.van.stekelenburg@vu.nl">j.van.stekelenburg@vu.nl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Ruud Wouters</td>
<td>University of Antwerp, Belgium</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ruud.wouters@uantwerpen.be">ruud.wouters@uantwerpen.be</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sabrina Zajak</td>
<td>Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb); German Center for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM), Germany</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sabrina.zajak@ruhr-uni-bochum.de">sabrina.zajak@ruhr-uni-bochum.de</a></td>
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