RESEARCH ARTICLE

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INTEREST GROUPS COMPARED
How organisational type matters for explaining Swedish organisations’ advocacy strategies

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ABSTRACT The divide between interest groups and social movement studies runs deep, but present developments call for a renewed focus on the relevance of these analytical categories. Both of these two forms of collective action relate to organisations that are assumed to follow distinctive logics and strategies for political influence. This article aims to contribute to the debates on the analytical difference between interest groups and social movements by comparing their political strategies and addressing the relevance of the typology for explaining organisations’ use of political strategies. The paper draws on a dataset resulting from a large survey among Swedish civil society organisations among which clear cases of interest group organisations and “old” and “new” social movement organisations (SMOs) were identified. The results show that the distinction between interest groups and social movement organisations has some analytical value when it comes to explaining the use of different types of strategies: e.g. direct lobbying and media-based and protest-based strategies. Also, the distinction between old and new SMOs is shown to be relevant because old SMOs seem to be in a way “in between” interest groups and new SMOs suggesting that social movements tend to develop over time and to become more similar to interest groups.

KEYWORDS: Advocacy strategies, Civil society organisations, Interest groups, Organisational types, Social movements, Sweden

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1. Introduction

Interest groups and social movements follow distinctive logics and strategies, and we find extensive studies into how, why, and with what means interest groups or social movements seek to promote political or social change (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). These two sets of actors are claimed to differ with regard to form (formal organisations vs. networks of actors), primary goal (influence over political decisions vs. social and political change), and main type of activity (insider tactics vs. outsider protests) (e.g. Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004).

Present developments, however, call for a renewed focus on the relevance of these analytical categories. Social movement scholars have shown how social movements and activists not only use street protests and unconventional strategies for achieving social and political change, but also use more conventional forms of advocacy, not least because movements tend to turn over time into formal institutionalised professional organisations (Císař 2013).¹ Interest group scholars have noticed how interest groups tend to diversify their advocacy portfolios, using both conventional and unconventional strategies to allow for political influence also in the light of changes in political systems and the expansion of social media (e.g. Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008; Binderkrantz 2005; Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). As one classic interest group scholar noticed already two decades ago (Grant 2001), the traditional model of interest group behaviour had changed in favour of more direct, open, or even confrontational tactics.

This article takes stock of these reoccurring debates in social movement and interest group studies and assesses and discusses the significance of the analytical division between interest groups and social movements and the extent to which such a distinction should be seen as categorical (“two different creatures”) or continuous (“two of the same kind”). We focus on the actual strategies of influence that organisations develop and to what extent such strategic efforts reflect the theoretical assumptions about different logics. This article tests the analytical relevance of the distinction between inter-

¹ What is deemed to be an unconventional strategy of course varies across time and space, if one by conventional means political behaviour that conforms to established institutional routines and norms. In most liberal democracies, peaceful demonstrations would today be considered as conventional in this sense. In this text, however, we use the term unconventional to denote overall protest-oriented strategies because such use of the term is still quite common – although contested – in the literature.
est groups and social movement organisations (SMOs) by comparing their use of different political strategies, controlling for relevant organisational factors such as whether the organisations are local or national and how many members and paid staff they have.

The study draws on a national survey among Swedish civil society organisations, which includes answers from 2,791 organisations. Within the resulting dataset, we in particular analyse 483 organisations that we see as typical instances of interest groups and social movements, where the latter are divided into the categories “old” and “new” SMOs. Sweden is considered a particularly interesting context because it is characterised by an advocacy culture (Arvidson, Johansson, Meeuwisse and Scaramuzzino 2018) that has not only allowed civil society actors to voice critique against public actors and policies, but has also expected them to do so.

“Large N studies” focusing on organisations are common in social movement and interest group research. Surveys geared towards organisations are, however, much more common in the latter (e.g. Binderkrantz 2005; Dür and Mateo 2013) than in the former (see Klandermans and Smith 2002 for an overview). When large N studies of organisations are carried out in social movement research, they tend to use interviews rather than surveys (e.g. della Porta and Caiani 2009). Survey studies of SMOs’ strategies for political influence are thus quite rare in social movement research, while we find extensive literature of this kind in interest group research (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Binderkrantz and Rasmussen 2015; Dür and Mateo 2012). This literature on interest groups at times includes actors that might be considered as SMOs, but it tends to treat them on par with other interest groups (e.g. trade unions in Beyers and Kerremans 2012).

This paper suggests a novel approach by including and comparing a selection of interest group and social movement organizations from a representative sample of civil society organisations. Methodologically, this article clearly draws on interest group research, both in the definition and operationalisation of the dependent variables and in the independent variables included in the analysis. The article’s contribution should thus be seen in the light of testing the relevance of a (partly contested) theoretical distinction between categories of collective actors by systematically comparing cases of organisations that are seen as instances of one category or the other by addressing their use of different political strategies.

The article proceeds as follows. We provide a short review of academic debates on interest groups and social movements with a focus on how these organisations and their political activities have been understood and conceptualised. After a brief description of the Swedish context, we present the method, the data, and the way in
which we have operationalised our model in the analysis. Finally, we present our results and a concluding discussion.

2. Taking stock of social movement and interest group studies

Social movements and interest groups play a significant role in liberal-democratic societies because they connect citizens and decision-makers, albeit using different means and having different aims. As argued earlier, scholars have debated quite extensively the distinction between interest groups and social movements, and what seems to shape these debates is to what extent scholars claim these different actors to be different species or potentially as two of a kind. The distinction between interest groups and social movements has had particular significance for social movement studies, and two approaches seem to shape the debate, namely the categorical approach and the approach stressing continuity between different forms of organised collective action.

Social movement research

The categorical approach has long dominated social movement research, and several contributions have sought to identify how social movements differ from other forms of collective action. It is often held that they differ with regard to their mode of operation (Rucht 1996, 186) because social movements tend to use protest actions, while interest groups tend to represent members in polities. For social movement scholarship, protest and contentious action is a key factor for distinguishing movements from other forms of collective action, such as interest groups or political parties, which instead primarily use institutionalised means of action (e.g. Snow et al. 2004). They also differ with regard to the resources they draw upon. Social movement scholars suggest that social movements rely on committed adherents and participants, while interest groups rely on expertise, money, information, and access to decision-makers as their main type of resources to pursue their goals. They thus differ with regard to their connection and relation to the causes and to the people or beneficiaries they speak for.

Kriesi (1996) argues that interest groups are specialised in political representation, i.e. they do not directly rely on the participation of their constituents. SMOs might sometimes share some similarities with political parties and interest groups because they also aim to accomplish social change by political goals and activities, but do so with the direct participation of a constituency. The categorical account also emphasises that social movements and interest groups have different structural features because...
social movements are constituted as a network of groups and organisations compared to interest groups that are mainly formal organisations. Diani (1992) moves one step further and adds a conflictual element when defining social movements as actors that are engaged in “… political and cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared identity” (Diani 1992, 3). Elements of conflict and contestation as well as a shared collective identity distinguish social movements from interest groups, which are instead seen as formal and single issue-oriented actors with limited – if any – connection to constituencies or people.

While these suggestions portray social movements and interest groups as two separate species, another strand in social movement studies take a less categorical stance. Císař (2013) argues that social movements are the unruly sibling of interest groups. Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) make a similar suggestion because forms of collective behaviour might be quite similar “…in terms of interests and objectives they share with respect to some aspects of social life” (Snow et al. 2004, 7). Burstein (1999) furthermore proposes that the list of features often used to separate social movements from interest groups is less categorical and occurs along a continuum and that “… the rationale for locating the dividing point in one place rather than another is never made clear” (Burstein 1999, 9). Those arguing in favour of a sliding scale tend to stress that social movements often also include organisations and tend to develop over time: “They often become more and more institutionalized, with some of them evolving (at least partially) into interest groups or even political parties” (Snow et al. 2004, 8). A consequence of this institutionalisation can be that movements become more formalistic in terms of members’ participation, more professionalised, and more embracing of higher forms of internal organisational differentiation (Armstrong and Bartley 2013).

As scholars have paid greater attention to organisations within movements, related to discussions on professionalisation, institutionalisation, or NGOisation (e.g. Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017; Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013), the distinction between movements and interest groups has become less relevant. This is not only due to the effects of informal movements turning into formal organisations, but also due to adaptation to competitive political and institutional conditions. Ruzza (2011) finds that as movements engage in competitive political environments they tend to adopt classic movement tactics like protest, pressure, and confrontation as well as consultation, participation in policy processes, and bargaining. Resource mobilisation slowly turns to external funding schemes. We find extensive conceptual innovation to capture the kind of actors that share resemblance with SMOs, such as advocacy organisations (Andrews and Edwards 2004). Ruzza (2004) puts forward the notion of “movement advocacy coalition” to argue for the organisational hybrids that have developed and presents it as a kind of
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An intermediate actor that on the one hand resembles public interest groups in their activities, and advocacy coalitions in their form, yet retaining the social movement’s commitment to a particular purpose or cause.

Interest groups research

We find similar dilemmas within interest groups scholarship, and the question of “what is an interest group” has occupied the attention of scholars (e.g. Baroni, Carroll, Chalmers, Munoz Marquez, and Rasmussen 2014; Císař 2013). Like many contested notions, interest groups also have a set of related concepts like political interest groups, interest associations, interest organisations, special interest groups, pressure groups, or advocacy organisations. Very briefly, the term interest group carries a set of definitional elements. It can be defined as a formal organisation and not a “... broad movement and waves of public opinion that may influence policy outcomes...” (Beyers et al. 2008, 1106). Although some interest groups might try to change social norms and behaviour, most seek to represent political interests and pursue political advocacy to push the political agenda in a certain direction. Scholars also stress that interest groups are informal and are understood as not seeking public office or engaging in elections, but pursuing their goals by interacting with politicians and bureaucrats.

These short reflections illustrate that the political system, political institutions, and political processes are of key importance for interest groups, and their activities “... are largely focused on influencing policy outcomes, trying to force issues onto, or up the political agenda, and framing the underlying dimension that define policy issues” (Beyers et al. 2008, 1107). While these elements suggest a clearly defined actor with certain aims, some interest group studies have focused on interest groups’ exchange relationships with politicians and decision-making bodies where interest groups “...exchange their resources for political influence in an effort to maximize their own utility. In this view, how much influence interest groups can get in exchange for their resources depends on political actors’ demand for such resources” (Dür 2008, 1214). Political actors will only exchange access and influence if they cannot produce these types of interest group resources by themselves. Most commonly, interest groups’ activities are equated with lobbying for political influence (Grant 2004) because it is assumed that interest groups follow conventional insider strategies rather than unconventional protest strategies (e.g. Beyers 2004; Eising 2007; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Mahoney 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996).

Interest groups studies have developed extensively in recent years, including interest in new arenas for lobbying (e.g. the EU, see Beyers 2004) and cross-country com-
parative studies of interest groups (e.g. Dür and Mateo 2012). Recent developments have, however, blurred the boundaries between social movements and interest groups. Discussions on interest group ecology have broadened the scope of actors and have enhanced studies into a wider set of actors than those only engaged in particular types of advocacy activities (see for instance Gray and Lowery 2000; Sorurbakhsh 2013).

Public interest groups, i.e. groups that promote issues of general public concern (e.g., environmental protection, human rights, and consumer rights), are treated with scepticism by interest groups scholars. Like SMOs, they do not fit into the standard manual of policy impact and mechanisms of consensus aggregation because they also have a propensity for conflictual stances and they are characterized by stronger identities and denser networks (Ruzza 2011, 457). However, some have addressed the coalitional elements of interest group activities. Although the focus is not on coalitions between interest groups and movements (e.g. Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015), there is a greater acceptance for the interconnectedness between the types of actors engaged in pushing for political and social change (see Holyoke 2009; Hula 1999). There is a common critique of interest group scholars being too much engaged in empirical studies and too little in analytical explorations (e.g. Beyers et al. 2008).

Interestingly enough, some of the more recent attempts to reinvigorate interest groups studies have used conceptual inspiration from social movement theory. Binderkrantz (2019) used the notion of “frame” to form the basis for analysis in her study of interest groups, thus expanding upon previous studies on the notion of policy issues. Some have introduced the notion of “political opportunity structures” to address the structural perspective of interest group strategies and activities alongside its extensive focus on organisational resources as the main definitional element to explain interest groups’ choices of strategies (e.g. Princen and Kerremans 2008). There are also extensive discussions on the changing context, both in terms of how policies are being made and what tools are available, that have made interest groups and other advocacy organisations (NGOs, SMOs, and so on) more similar in terms of their action repertoires. The idea that interest groups mainly – or only – deploy insider tactics has largely been abandoned for a broader conceptual toolbox that pays attention to direct and indirect strategies for political influence, including both conventional and unconventional ways of seeking influence (e.g. Binderkrantz 2005; Binderkrantz and Kröyer 2012).

Such wider focus on different types of strategies certainly challenges previous assumed arguments of social movements as more prone to protest and using unconventional tactics and interest groups as primarily engaged in insider lobbying. For these reasons new concepts have been developed to capture the increasingly blurred
boundaries between interest groups and social movements. Thiel and Uçarer (2014), for instance, use the term “interest NGOs” to capture the changing forms of advocacy. Others have argued that one of the reasons for the conceptual divide is a normative element involved in the separation between social movements and interest groups. Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008, p. 1110) suggest that social movements scholars “... go to great lengths to avoid the ‘interest group’ label because they associate this term with selfish inside lobbying”. Social movements come with a much more positive connotation of advocating for a particular type of society and promoting more and better democracy, while interest groups tend to be associated with negotiations behind closed doors and hence a threat to participatory democracy and forms of accountability (e.g. Beyers et al. 2008).

Because of the different normative understandings and expectations that are projected on interest groups and social movements, empirically testing the relevance of the distinction is also of importance from a more general societal perspective.

3. Studying interest groups and social movements in national contexts

The analytical distinctions flourishing in academic debates have differing relevance in various national contexts, depending on state–society relationships and the degree and forms of organising and mobilising. This paper addresses interest group and social movement-related activities in the context of Sweden. To carefully examine the relevance of interest group and social movement categories in a particular context, we argue that it is important to both consider top-down (the state’s principles and governance arrangements vis-à-vis various social groups and interests) as well as bottom-up factors (the traditions and forms of mobilising and organising among civil society actors).

Sweden belongs to a broader group of countries characterised by “corporatism”, i.e. a system of institutionalised contacts, negotiations, and joint decision-making between the state and organised social interests. The corporatist logic relies on the premise that citizens are able to influence public policies in two different ways – through voting in general elections (the “electoral channel”) and through membership in interest groups (the “corporate channel”) (Lewin 1992; Rokkan 1999; Rothstein 1992). Corporatist arrangements imply that some organisations are given a special status because the state institutionalises its contact with them and elevates them to legitimate participants in public decision-making (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Pierre and Rothstein 2003).
Like in most corporatist systems, it is almost only the workers’ and employers’ organizations that have clearly been included and that have had close cooperative relationships with the Swedish state. An important exception to this overall “mainstream” approach has been the government’s relationship with some social movement groups, e.g. the disability and the senior citizens’ movements. These groups have been invited to participate in consultative bodies together with government officials and are regarded as reliable partners in discussions about adjustments and further development of largely redistributive welfare provisions (Feltenius 2004; Lundström 2004).

Discussions on corporate structures and arrangements have waned in recent years, and the Swedish political system step by step has moved away from a corporatist logic (Hermansson, Lund, Svensson, and Öberg 1999; Naurin 2001). Since the early 1990s, there has been a transformation of governance in a direction where the voices have become more numerous, competition for politicians’ attention has increased, and personal contacts and networks have become more important at the expense of the traditional forms of corporatist-arranged consultation (Hermansson et al. 1999). This would suggest that the relationship between the government and organisations has adopted more pluralistic forms in terms of less institutionalised cooperation and that individual organisations are less embedded in the public structures and hence need to seek influence through a variety of channels.

Swedish civil society has often been described as made up of “popular movements” (folkrörelser) with an emphasis on membership, fostering citizenship and social relations, and strengthening democracy (Amnå 2006; Olsson, Nordfeldt, Larsson, and Kendall 2009). Among the most common examples of such movements, we find the labour movement, the temperance movement, and the senior citizens movement. Several of these movements have developed into large national federations and powerful actors, yet still relying on an associational structure and a broad membership base across the country. These movements have played a significant role because they represent groups of citizens, providing them with a collective identity and making their “voices” heard in policy-making and in society. They have challenged – and still challenge – the Swedish government regarding rights for various groups (e.g. workers, women, migrants, and pensioners) and have been influential in pushing for their rights (e.g. Lundström and Wijkström 1997; Micheletti 1995). This has been a central aspect of the national political culture.

However, a pro-state tradition and a continuous integration between the state and the civil society sector have institutionalised many of the popular mass movements because “… this is the type of organisation that has consistently been encouraged by State policy and the system of subsidies…” (Lundström and Svedberg 2003, 224). Even
if we can find SMOs in the Swedish context that are much less institutionalised, many large social movements have been incorporated into the policy-making processes and their organisations are often studied as “interest groups”, “interest organisations”, or “organized interests” (e.g. Christiansen, Nørgaard, Rommetvedt, Svensson, Thesen, and Öberg 2009; Feltenius 2008; Lundberg 2013).

Several processes seem to challenge such models of organising and mobilising in the Swedish context. Papakostas (2004) highlights how Swedish civil society organisations, and especially new generations of organisations, to a greater degree than before make use of other organisations for resource mobilisation. They tend to a greater degree to depend on funds from both public and private organisations and have become less interested in mobilising resources from individuals, both as members and beneficiaries. This process is often associated with a weakening representativeness of civil society organisations and an increasing dependence on other collective actors. Also, a shift from “voice to service” has been highlighted in previous research about civil society organisations’ role in the welfare state (e.g. Lundström and Wijkström 1997). Through privatisation and contracting out of services, publicly financed services provided by subcontracted private enterprises and civil society organisations have increased substantially in every welfare sector (Hartman 2011; Trydegård 2001). Such development has highlighted a shift from the advocacy function of organisations to the service function and from the organisational input in terms of membership to output in terms of what they can produce. Despite these processes, the Swedish advocacy culture is still characterised by an expectation that civil society organisations are willing and able to uphold a critical function in society towards public policy both directly in contact with authorities and by being visible in the public space (Arvidson et al. 2018).

4. Method, data, and operationalisation

The survey

The present paper is built around a comparison of interest group and social movement organisations in Sweden. By comparing the political strategies of these categories of organisations we aim at testing the relevance of such a distinction in the Swedish context. The study is based on a large quantitative dataset resulting from a national survey that received responses from 2,791 Swedish civil society organisations. The survey was carried out in 2012–2013 as part of the research program “Beyond the welfare state: Europeanization of Swedish civil society organizations” (EUROCIV).
The sample for the survey was based on the government agency Statistics Sweden’s (SCB’s) register of Swedish organisations (Företagsregistret) that was used to get contact information and register data about the organisations. The focus of the research programme was civil society organisations engaged in welfare issues and interest representation. To cover such organisations, the sample included associations (ideella föreningar) and religious congregations (registrerade trossamfund). In Sweden, most civil society organisations register with the authorities as belonging to one of these categories, and “association” is the most common organisational form.

The sample was further specified by including only civil society organisations that were classified by SCB as associations involved in “social service and care”, associations involved in “interest representation”, and religious congregations. These three types of organisations were chosen to allow us to analyse civil society actors that typically use advocacy to further their aims. We deliberately chose not to include other types of organisations – for instance, sports, recreation, and leisure associations – because we deemed these as not primarily being oriented towards advocacy.

Among these registered associations and congregations, one finds local and regional chapters of national federations as well as the national federations themselves (most Swedish civil society organisations register their local, regional, and national bodies as separate associational entities). One also finds quite small associations that do not belong to any federation.

Through these choices, the total population of organisations forming the basis for our study’s sample consisted of 80,015 associations, which represents approximately 40% of formally organised Swedish civil society. According to SCB’s calculations, Swedish civil society includes about 217,000 formal organisations (SCB 2010).

Because the actual numbers of organisations differed significantly between the three types of organisation constituting our population, we decided to make a stratified sample so as not to end up with insufficient numbers of cases for the smaller organisational types.² Having used this stratified sampling procedure, we gave the three types different weights in the analysis so that the presented results of univariate and bivariate analyses would be the same as if we had analysed a non-stratified sample.

The survey questionnaire was sent by mail to 6,180 randomly chosen Swedish civil society organisations belonging to the three types of organisations targeted in our study. SCB provided us with a random sample of these organisations. After three re-

² Of the 2,689 associations classified by SCB as associations involved in “social service and care”, we sampled 1,781 (66.2%); of the 74,462 associations classified as involved in “interest representation”, we sampled 3,552 (4.8%); and of the 2,217 religious congregations, we sampled 809 (36.5%).
minders, 2,791 questionnaires were returned. The final response rate was 51.3% after a number of organisations had been excluded because they had ceased to exist or changed their associational form or due to faulty postal addresses. The data analysis below includes only cases from the associations that answered positively to the question about whether the organisation had had any activities at all during 2012. For more detailed information about the sampling procedure, see Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag (2019a).

The three types of civil society organisations described above were used to create a sample in accordance with the overall aims of our research programme. For this article, however, we group the cases of our dataset according to a theory-driven typology that more clearly correspond to this article’s aims. Thus, in our analysis we compare three categories of civil society organisations – “interest groups”, “old social movement organisations”, and “new social movement organisations” – on the basis of survey data from 483 organisations belonging to various sub-types of these categories. To focus our analysis on civil society organisations belonging to these three categories, we exclude the 2,308 cases in our original sample that do not meet the criteria of our typology.

A distinction to be tested

The present paper draws on the theoretical debates presented above and has an overall aim of testing the relevance of the distinction between interest group and social movement organizations in the Swedish context. To highlight the evolutionary dimension of social movements, and to include relevant aspects that characterise movements created and consolidated during different historical periods, we also make a distinction between “old” and “new” social movements, which is common practice in social movement research. Whereas the former has often been used to label in particular the labour movement, but also other movements emerging during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the latter has often been used to group the movements that since the 1960s have emerged out of new forms of protests in most Western democracies, e.g. the environmental, the feminist, the LGBT, and the international solidarity movements (Buechler 2013; Wennerhag 2010). This division has not only been motivated by the period during which the movements were formed, but also, for example, regarding whether they relate to traditional left–right conflicts and identities such as labour and class or to conflicts and identities going beyond traditional socio-economic divisions, such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, etc. More relevant in this context is that the new social movements have often been regarded as preferring more decentralised and participatory forms of activism and organisation, as well as more often using unconven-
tional strategies to achieve political and social change, in comparison to the old social movements (Buechler 2013).

The analysis presented here compares strategies for achieving political influence for these three categories of actors. Based on the theoretical discussions presented above, table 1 presents a typology of five central features that might distinguish interest group organisations, old SMOs, and new SMOs from each other. The five central features of the typology focus on the organisations’ overall aims, whether they aim to represent specific social groups and identities or only instrumental interests, what constitutes their main resource base, how they tend to organise, and their main strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Typology of different categories of collective actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest group organisations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity/representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of organizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the typology in table 1, we have categorized the civil society organisations of our survey sample by identifying different sub-types of organisations as belonging to one of the three categories. If the types of organisations did not clearly display any characteristics typical of the three categories, they were excluded from the analysis. For instance, we excluded all lifestyle associations (hobby, sports, cultural, scouting, fraternal orders, etc.), political parties, religious congregations, and social service-providing associations. From the organisational type humanitarian associations, we only included those organisations considered typical new SMOs (and excluded old and established NGOs such as the Red Cross and Save the Children and various well-established Christian charities). Both disability and immigrant associations were excluded because they did not fit our typology well.

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3 For instance, we excluded all lifestyle associations (hobby, sports, cultural, scouting, fraternal orders, etc.), political parties, religious congregations, and social service-providing associations.
on the basis of individual organisations’ answers to variables that we later test in the analysis. When operationalizing our distinction between old and new SMOs, we took into account whether various types of SMOs in general were established during the older phase of “popular movements” in Sweden or during the later phase of “new social movements” since the 1960s.

Table 2. Types of organisations included in the analysis, divided into the three categories, and the number of organisations included in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organisation</th>
<th>Interest group organisations</th>
<th>Old SMOs</th>
<th>New SMOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade associations</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations (not trade unions)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners’ associations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers’ associations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owners’ associations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other interest group organisations</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperance associations (IOGT, AA, etc.)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior citizens’ associations</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants’ unions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s associations</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, human rights, and international solidarity associations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and animal rights associations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT associations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other new SMOs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When identifying types of organisations for this purpose, we relied on a classification of all organisations in the dataset inspired by the SCB’s study about associational life in Sweden (Vogel, Amnå, Munck, and Häll 2003). Our classification was made manually by assessing the main focus of activity on the basis of the organisation’s name, information given in the survey’s open questions about the organisation’s main goals and activities, and information found on the Internet (mostly the organisations’ own websites). From our classification, we chose types of organisations fitting the typology of this article. For some individual organisations that were difficult to classify other than as belonging to very generic organisational types, we once again used the survey’s open questions (including information about what year the organisation was founded) to determine whether they fitted one of the categories used in this article. To identify
interest organisations, we especially considered whether the organisation sought to represent the interests of a specific constituency. vis-à-vis other actors (and not simply coordinated other activities within this constituency).

Table 2 shows the different types of organisations that were ultimately identified in this process using our typology as being interest group organisations, new SMOs, or old SMOs.

Organisational strategies (the fifth feature of our typology) have not been taken into account in our operationalisation because this feature coincides with our main dependent variables, which we use to test the relevance of the theoretical distinction between interest group and social movement organizations. The analysis hence includes 483 Swedish civil society organisations and test the following two hypotheses based on the theoretical discussion presented above:

1. Interest group organisations use inside, lobbying-oriented strategies to a greater extent than SMOs
2. Old and new SMOs adopt a wider set of strategies than interest group organisations, including both inside and outside strategies and conventional as well as unconventional strategies

The distinction between old SMOs and new SMOs allows us to address the understanding of the divide between interest groups and social movements as categorical or continuous, by developing a third hypothesis:

3. Old SMOs are more similar to (or less different than) interest group organisations in their advocacy strategies than new SMOs.

The analysis

In the analysis, we focus on questions from the questionnaire that show to what extent the organisations make use of some specific strategies in order to influence Swedish politics. Because the sample includes different organisations active at different policy levels (local, regional, national, and supra-national), these strategies might refer to different policy levels within the national polity, different policy areas, and different phases of the policy process. These questions were originally constructed to generate ordinal variables, thus making it possible for the respondents to indicate their degree of use of certain strategies on a Likert scale, with the response alternatives “often”, “sometimes”, “rarely”, and “never”. In order to focus the analysis on whether the organisations use the different strategies at all, we have chosen to recode these ordinal variables into dichotomous variables by combining all alternatives stating some degree of use of a certain strategy into one single value, which is then contrasted to the value
“never”. This analytical focus also allows us to use a binary logistic regression to analyze to what extent specific qualities of the organisations, including being classified as interest group organisations or old and new SMOs, increase or decrease their probability of using different types of strategies for influencing politics. All mentioned differences between any of the three categories have been tested through post-hoc analysis to guarantee that they are statistically significant.

5. Results

Organisational levels and resource base

Table 3. Organisational level and resource bases for the three categories of organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation level</th>
<th>Interest group organisations</th>
<th>Old SMOs</th>
<th>New SMOs</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local organisation</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>.403 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional organisation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>.147 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organisation</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>.390 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Interest group organisations</th>
<th>Old SMOs</th>
<th>New SMOs</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–99</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–999</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-organisation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>.352 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of employed staff</th>
<th>Interest group organisations</th>
<th>Old SMOs</th>
<th>New SMOs</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>.164 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>.146 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer’s V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer’s V are based on weighted data, and N is based on the actual number of cases.
First, we present how the different categories of organisations perform when it comes to a set of independent variables, namely organisational level, number of individual members, and number of employed staff (see table 3).

It is clear from table 3 that the categories of organisations differ when it comes to many of these variables. We find more local organisations among old SMOs than among new SMOs and interest group organisations. In these latter two groups we instead find more national organisations. When it comes to members, we find organisations with a larger membership base (1,000 or more members) among SMOs than among interest group organisations. Meta-organisations (i.e. organisations that only have other organisations as their members) are, in contrast, more common among interest group organisations. Finally, when it comes to the degree of professionalisation, we find that most organisations do not have any employed staff, but of those that do it is more common that new SMOs have employed staff than old SMOs and interest group organisations.

Previous research shows that access to resources is relevant when it comes to organisations’ choices of political strategies. Accordingly, organisations with many resources are usually keener to engage in street protest and inside lobbying, while outside advocacy is the preferred strategy for organisations with fewer resources (cf. Dür and Mateo 2013). The geographical level of the organisation also plays a certain role in the use of strategies. In a multi-level system of governance, it has been argued (Beyers and Kerremans 2012) that organisations tend to pursue political influence at proximate or nearby venues rather than venues that are located farther away. These variables have previously proven relevant for explaining the use of different strategies for political influence among Swedish civil society organisations (Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2017; Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag 2018; Linde and Scaramuzzino 2018; Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2019b). Later in the analysis when addressing whether the category of organisation explains differences in strategies for political influence, we use these variables as control variables.

Use of different strategies

Now we address to what degree the three categories of organisations use different forms of strategies for influencing politics. Table 4 presents some concrete examples of the actual use of different strategies divided according to whether they focus on access, information, or protest (see Beyers 2004).
### Table 4. The organisational categories’ use of various strategies to influence politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest group organisations</th>
<th>Old SMOs</th>
<th>New SMOs</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying/insider strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact national politicians</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact state officials</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer government commission remiss</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in panels, reference groups, dialogues, or similar on national level</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy/conventional strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social media</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests/unconventional strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer’s V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer’s V are based on weighted data, and N is based on the actual number of cases.

The first four strategies addressed are access strategies. The first two are forms of lobbying, i.e. contacting politicians and officials at the national level. The third strategy relates to the “recess system” by which organisations have the opportunity to comment on drafts of legislation, while the fourth strategy relates to the practice of forms of “collaborative governance” in which organisations are invited to participate in reference-groups, civic dialogues, and the like. For these access strategies we only find significant overall differences when it comes to contacting national state officials, where
we find that new SMOs are more active (61 per cent) than both old SMOs (39 per cent) and interest group organisations (43 per cent).

The second set of strategies includes conventional information strategies, which are pursued in the public arena by making claims and statements through the two channels of traditional mass media and new social media. New SMOs use such channels more often (83 and 75 per cent, respectively) than old SMOs (67 and 44 per cent, respectively) and even more so than interest group organisations (52 and 36 per cent, respectively).

The third and last set of strategies includes protest-oriented strategies such as demonstrations and petitions. Concerning both strategies, we find that SMOs more commonly use them than interest group organisations do. There is no significant difference between new and old SMOs regarding their use of demonstrations as a strategy. However, petitions are used more often by old SMOs (62 per cent) than by new SMOs (39 per cent). Interest group organisations use demonstrations to a much lesser extent (13 per cent) than both old and new SMOs, but interest group organisations’ use of petitions (27 per cent) only differs significantly from old SMOs.

These bivariate analyses of our dependent variables seem to support our second hypothesis that SMOs adopt a wider set of strategies than interest group organisations. For most of the variables, it is the new SMOs that most frequently use all types of advocacy strategies.

The findings so far might of course be the result of systematic differences in other factors between the three categories, and not only because they are interest group organisations or old or new SMOs. For instance, the organisations’ access to different types of resources, e.g. a large membership base or many employees, might affect their actual use of different strategies to influence politics. Furthermore, the organisations’ main geographical area of activities might also affect their use of different political strategies.

Factors explaining differences in the use of strategies

In order to test whether this is the case, we used binary logistic regressions to analyse what factors, besides belonging to one of the three categories of organisations, make interest group organisations and old and new SMOs more or less likely to use access strategies (table 5) and conventional information and unconventional protest strategies (table 6). Because the bivariate analysis showed that interest group organisations in general made the least use of many of the advocacy strategies considered here, this category is used as the reference category in the regression models. The re-
gression models also include the control variables of organisational level (using local level as the reference), membership size (using 1–99 members as the reference), and number of employed staff (using no employed staff as the reference).

As shown in Table 5, organisational category matters only for the first two lobbying-oriented strategies. The regression analysis confirms that new SMOs are more likely to use such strategies than interest group organisations when it comes to contacting national politicians (odds ratio 3.8) and state officials (odds ratio 2.7). Old SMOs differ from interest group organisations only regarding contacts with national politicians. An additional analysis only including old and new SMOs showed that these differ only regarding contacting state officials (new SMOs being more likely to use this strategy than old SMOs).

When it comes to access strategies, all control variables impact the regression models. In particular, organisational level is important and both regional and national organisations are more likely than local organisations to employ all four access strategies. It is most likely that national organisations use these strategies (odds ratios varying be-
Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag. *Social Movements and Interest Groups Compared*

tween 3.2 and 7.7). Large membership bases also make organisations more likely to pursue political influence through all access strategies except participation in panels and reference groups. Meta-organisations are also more likely to use some access strategies (such as contacting national politicians and state officials) than organisations with few members. Having employed staff also facilitates pursuing access strategies; however, the effect of having some (fewer than five) or many (five or more) employees varies across strategies.

While the results from the bivariate analysis show few significant differences between the three organisational categories in their use of access strategies, the regression models show more significant differences. Table 6 presents four more regression models for the dependent variables that relate to conventional information strategies and unconventional protest strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Factors explaining organisations’ use of information and protest strategies to influence politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational category (interest group org. = ref.)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old SMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New SMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational level (local org. = ref.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of members (1-50 = ref.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-999 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1000 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed staff (0 ref.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 401 | 392 | 415 | 390 |
| Nekelkerke’s pseudo $R^2$ | 0.306 | 0.245 | 0.354 | 0.224 |

Note: Columns show beta coefficient and odds ratio. Levels of significance: * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance.

The regression models for information and protest strategies overall confirm the results from the bivariate analysis. New SMOs are much more likely than interest group organisations to pursue information and protest strategies for political influence. Also, old SMOs are more likely to use most of these strategies, but not to the same degree.
as new SMOs. Differences are largest for staging demonstrations, where new SMOs are much more likely (odds ratio 23) to do so than interest group organisations. Old SMOs are also more likely (odds ratio 8) to do this than interest group organisations are, but not to the same degree as new SMOs. When it comes to the use of mass media as a strategy, however, we find no significant difference between old SMOs and interest group organisations. In an additional analysis only including old and new SMOs, we find that the new SMOs are more likely than old SMOs to use all of these strategies except petitions.

Concerning our control variables, we find that organisational level is of almost no importance for the use of information and protest strategies, while it is in general important for the likelihood of using access strategies. Striving for public visibility through different types of media and by staging demonstrations and organising petitions are activities apparently less bound by the organisation’s geographical level (see Johansson et al. 2018). A large membership base, however, facilitates such activities, and organisations with more than 1,000 members are more likely to use mass media (odds ratio 14), stage demonstrations (odds ratio 8), organise petitions (odds ratio 7), and use social media (odds ratio 6) than organisations with fewer than 100 members. The number of employees matters less. Significant differences are only found between organisations with no and few employees (fewer than five), and not for organisations with many employees (five or more). This shows that the use of information and protest strategies (apart from petitions) is facilitated by having employed staff, but only to a limited degree, and organisations with many employees apparently do not tend to use these strategies any more than organisations without any staff at all.

6. Conclusions

This article shows that the distinction between interest groups and SMOs has analytical value and that the typology has explanatory power when it comes to strategies for political influence. The results are confirmed also when considering organisational factors that have proven to be important in previous research about advocacy strategies.

Our results support our second hypothesis because they show that SMOs not only use protest strategies (demonstrations and petitions) to influence politics to a greater degree than interest group organisations, but they also tend to use conventional information strategies (mass media and social media) to a greater extent.

However, we find little support for our first hypothesis because SMOs do not differ systematically from interest group organisations regarding their use of access strate-
gies. Only regarding lobbying towards politicians do we find that SMOs are more likely to use this strategy than interest group organisations.

We chose to distinguish between old and new SMOs to test the assumption of SMOs’ progressive institutionalisation and hence the evolution of social movements. In a sense, this also allows for testing whether the distinction between interest groups and social movements is to be understood as categorical or continuous. Here, our results suggest that the answer to this question depends on which type of strategy we consider. When it comes to access strategies, the distinction between old versus new SMOs is less relevant than when looking at information and protest strategies, where the relevance of this distinction becomes more evident.

Regarding most strategies, new SMOs differ more from interest group organisations than old SMOs do, which seems to support our third hypothesis. One could argue that these results support the idea that the distinction between interest groups and old and new SMOs rather should be understood as a continuum, placing old SMOs somewhere in between interest group organisations and new SMOs.

These results give rise to different interpretations of the development of these categories of collective actors. A possible interpretation of this could be that SMOs tend to become institutionalised over time and to become more similar to interest groups. While this might be the case, new SMOs also seem to have entered the terrain of interest group organisations by diversifying their repertoire of strategies. Interest group organisations, however, seem to keep within their traditional logic, especially when it comes to their limited use of unconventional protest strategies.

When it comes to the factors that are most important for whether the three categories of organisations use access, information, or protest strategies, our analysis has shown that organisational category matters, but it matters differently for different strategies. It is foremost for protest strategies such as staging demonstrations that organisational category matters strongly. In general, however, the most decisive factor is the organisation’s membership size, which has a relevant impact on the likelihood for an organisation to engage in any of the considered strategies for political influence.

It has been argued (see Johansson and Scaramuzzino 2019) that in a digitalised society shaped by the widespread use of social media, a logic of political presence and visibility in the public arena becomes increasingly relevant and possibly intertwined with a logic of influence. This fits very well with our results suggesting that SMOs are more

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4 This interpretation can also find some support in our data, at least between old and new SMOs. For the three analysed categories of civil society organizations, the median year of the organizations’ foundation was 1943 for old SMOs and 1990 for new SMOs, while it was 1982 for interest group organizations (Eta^2 = 0.176. Median values and Eta^2 are based on weighted data).
clearly adopting a logic of presence in the public arena through different channels while at the same time pursuing influence through access strategies. Interest group organisations instead seem keener to follow a logic of influence where presence in the public arena might be more instrumental towards influence than an end in its own. For SMOs, being present in the public arena might also be about upholding a collective identity and keeping in touch with the grassroots base of the organisation.

These results are, however, dependent on our operationalisation of the typology and the way in which we have categorised Swedish civil society organisations considering their aims, forms of organising, resource base, and identity/representation. Furthermore, one should also consider that the results are based solely on Swedish data, which is a national context long characterised by social movements being the organisational norm for seeking political influence.

REFERENCES


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