HOLOCAUST REPRESENTATION
AND THE TESTIMONY OF IMAGES

THREE FILMS BY
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PRELUDE 1–3  9-13

WHAT IS A WITNESS?  15-23
AN EVENT WITHOUT AN IMAGE  23-24
WHEN NO WITNESSES ARE LEFT  24-28
IMPOSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS  28-31
IMAGE AS WITNESS  32-36
GESTIC THINKING  36-39
RESITUATED IMAGES AND THE QUESTION OF FRAME  39-43

STILL IMAGES  45-69
BRESLAUER AT WORK IN WESTERBORK, 1944.  45
A FILM UNFINISHED BY YAEL HERSONSKI  46-55
RESPITE BY HARUN FAROCKI  56-63
THE SPECIALIST BY EYAL SIVAN  64-69

ARCHIVAL WORK  71-72
THE STATUS OF ARCHIVAL IMAGES  73-76
ARCHIVAL STORIES 1:
DAS GHETTO AND A FILM UNFINISHED  76-80
ARCHIVAL STORIES 2:
THE WESTERBORK MATERIAL AND RESPITE  80-83
ARCHIVAL STORIES 3:
RECORDING THE EICHMANN TRIAL AND THE SPECIALIST  84-86
CONTENTS

STRUCTURING FRAMES 87-88
  AGENCY AND ANALYSIS 88-91
  THE HOW OF THE IMAGE 91-95
  OVERCOMING AESTHETIC DISTANCE 96-99
  TRUTHS IN NON-TRUSTWORTHY IMAGES 100-104
  REFLEXIVITY AND EXPOSURE 104-107

VOICE, TEXT, AND NARRATION 109-110
  VERBAL AND PICTORIAL WITNESSING 110-115
  SOUNDS OF SILENCE AND COMMOTION 115-117
  SHOWING INSTEAD OF TELLING 117-119
  VISUALIZING TESTIMONY 120-123

THE PERPETRATOR AS WITNESS 125-126
  THE NAZI GAZE 126-129
  THE PERPETRATOR IN FOCUS 129-132
  REMOVING THE WITNESS 132-137
  HAPPY IMAGES OF THE CAMP 137-141

THE TESTIMONY OF IMAGES 143-144
  TESTIMONY AND MONTAGE 145-146
  INTERPRETING TESTIMONY 149-151
  FURTHER ROUTES OF TESTIMONY: WHY DON’T YOU ASK ME ABOUT AUSCHWITZ? 151-154

REFERENCES 155-184
  NOTES 155-173
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 174-179
  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 183
“The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense of being a particular, inessential way of introducing the discourse, remains unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and so too the need to an answer to the question: With what should the beginning be made? remains of no importance in face of the need for a principle in which alone the interest of the matter in hand seems to lie, the interest as to what is the truth, the absolute ground.”
On September 8, 2015 the German newspaper Bild produced a whole issue without images as a response to the role of images in relation to the acute situation for refugees trying to reach Europe. Days before, an image had circulated of a dead child who drowned on his way to Europe and was washed up by the Mediterranean waves on a beach in Turkey. This horrifying image momentarily caused both European governments and citizens to act. Why is an image like this needed? What does it do that words do not?
It is fitting to begin with an image. However, this is an image I have not seen, so we have to rely on my imagination. Somewhere in a pile, in a historian's office, there is an image depicting people entering a gas chamber during World War II. Thus, it was taken inside a camp while it was in operation—probably not by the Nazis, but by someone else in the camp, an inmate or someone passing through. The historian has tried to trace where and when and by whom the photograph was taken, but found nothing. The East German image agency where he found it no longer exists and all that remains is his paper copy. He has brought it to Yad Vashem, to the museum in Auschwitz, and to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, but no one knows under what circumstances the photo was taken. How the historian knows that it was taken on the way into the gas chamber, I do not know, but it seems to be the only thing that is certain about the image. I wish to see it, to analyze it, and to relate to it once he finds it, but at the same time I do not need to see it, since in one sense it fulfills its role by its mere existence. Georges Didi-Huberman claims that in order to remember, one must imagine, and the image can help us do that. It provides a space for the viewers' imagination while at the same time enacting a particular historical moment. Let us keep this image of an image in our imagination while moving along. I, as I write, and you, as you read.
I used to visit my great-uncle Herman from time to time. Seated in the communal living room of the Jewish home for the elderly in Gothenburg, he would be reading booklets on the Swedish media reports about the Holocaust – what the journalists knew, what they wrote and when. On entering the facility, one encountered old men reading newspapers in Yiddish, a woman who had lost the ability to speak sensibly, now happily blabbering nonsensical sounds, and among them, Herman. Although he was not a survivor of the Holocaust, he was severely marked by it, like many in his generation. Still, my grandmother tells me about when her grandparents came to visit in 1939, after she and her family had made it to Sweden, and how they returned to Germany since even the streets of Gothenburg were treif. Even I, the third generation after the war, cannot separate the events from the very essence of my being. In my mind, the story of my family is intermingled with the long line of literary witness accounts, ranging from Anne Frank, Primo Levi, and Imre Kertész, to Fania Fenelon and Jean Améry, that I read throughout my adolescence. I learnt most of what I knew about the Holocaust through these survivor testimonies. Images and films from the war came later, as visual evidence of what I had read. The images shot when the camps were liberated functioned as a confirmation of the images painted by the words of survivors.

When I began writing this dissertation I could not imagine that Swedish Neo-Nazis would ever be granted the right to march through central Gothenburg on Jom Kippur, one carrying a sign with the word “criminal” written below an image of a Holocaust survivor, nor that over ninety instances of arson attacks on refugee shelters throughout Sweden would be reported during one single year and that thousands of lives would be lost on the Mediterranean on their way to Europe. To account for the present and past testimonies is crucial and the need for witness accounts will never end. The survivors of the Holocaust, those who bore witness to the event, will soon be gone, and at the same time, the forces that want to diminish or deny the Holocaust are growing in numbers, in Sweden, Europe, and the USA. It is therefore urgent to formulate alternative routes for the commemoration of this specific historical event, as well as for others taking place currently.

Before the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961, survivors had not testified in public, and from the outset one of the aims of the trial was to create a platform for witness accounts. In this book, I will analyze three films, so as to examine them as reactions to the construction of witness-based Holocaust commemoration that has been ongoing since the Eichmann trial. By different means, and to different ends, the films pose alternatives to the trope of witnessing and the role of the survivors’ oral accounts when historicizing...
the event, I seek to answer the question of how images bear witness when they are produced, reproduced, and restituted in conflicting political and historical situations. My hypothesis is that the testimony of images can be grasped through the work of montage and in relation to their archival conditions, the context, and the framework (conditions of production) and means of aesthetic representation (voice, narration, and gaze). These factors offer the framework for the analysis through which the testimony of images can be understood. The tension embedded in an understanding of the image as witnessing, lies between the image as acting, speaking, and testifying and the necessary interpretation of its speech and testimony.

Thus, throughout this work, I intend to follow two strands of inquiry. The first strand is the specific discussion of the witness tradition after the Holocaust and the role of images therein. Along these lines, I ask what it would mean to bear witness from that specific situation and what role images would play in the act of bearing witness. The second strand deals with the more general question of what images do and how they give testimony. The latter strand poses the theoretical challenge of this book, whereas the former provides the backdrop and context in which my entire endeavor is immersed – hence, the first strand provides the material for the second.

The three films that I discuss in this study are based on archival materials, which are edited visually and aurally, thus reactivating and reinterpreting the materials. Let me introduce them in more detail:

_A Film Unfinished_ (2000) by Yael Hersonski is a documentary which returns to the making of the unfinished German propaganda film _Das Ghetto_ from 1942. The Nazis shot the material in the Warsaw Ghetto, only two months before most of its inhabitants were deported. Hersonski’s film shows staged scenes in the Ghetto, shot by the Nazis, but also includes classical documentary features such as interviews with survivors and a reenacted testimony with one of the camera operators who filmed the material. The images depicting Ghetto life are highly questionable, as they aim at manifesting the anti-Semitic stereotype of the wealthy Jew, contrasted with the actual misery in the Ghetto.

_Respite_ (2007) by Harun Farocki merges moving images with still images from the transit camp Westerbork in the Netherlands. In the spring of 1944 the camp commander commissioned a film, presumably as a means to argue why the camp should be maintained. It was shot by an inmate but never completed. The shots show daily activities in the camp, focusing on labor and production. Farocki’s film displays the original text frames and inserts new written commentary on the images, but no sound is added.

_The Specialist: Portrait of a Modern Criminal_ (1999) by Eyal Sivan is an edited montage of filmed material from the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961. The trial, the first ever to be videotaped, was recorded in its entirety and broadcast daily in 37 countries. Sivan used only archival material, however, reflections are added and the sound is partly distorted in order to set up a narrative based on Hannah Arendt’s account in _Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil._

What brings these three films together, beyond their interventions in Holocaust commemoration, are two common and crucial factors. Firstly, they can be seen as critiques of other films departing from an assembly of several sources, where archival material is put to use in order to illustrate a given narrative. Secondly, these filmmakers inscribe themselves as actors intervening in the materials. In all three films the intervention in the material is highlighted rather than obscured, and the presence of the filmmaker is embedded in the narrative – it is their specific voice, gaze, and argument. Through a reading of how the films reinterpret the archival material and position it in a new time and context, I seek to explain how the film images bear witness.

Each of the three films manifests a particular method, or a certain way of understanding how images testify: in a discussion of a beyond the witnessing subject and the role of images therein, the filmmakers employ different image strategies, ways of working with archival material, and means of working with those images. The strategies employed by the filmmakers have informed my method, which I understand through the notion of resituating. The artistic intervention in the archive formulates how the material is restituted – the filmmaker creates a situation in which the filmed material operates so as to give witness within a narration. This book seeks to unfold the implications of that movement. The concept of resituating arises from a focus on situation – the presupposition that everything is grounded somewhere and in something. Both the phenomenological view of the human condition of being-in-the-world and the feminist critique of universal knowledge can amount to the view of a specific being: a being based in a here and now. The footage on which each of the three films is based is, like all films and photographs, produced in a situation. The films at hand are to be analyzed from and within the specific situation in which they were shot (the context and conditions of production), as well as within the newly constructed one (the films). Hence, the word “situation” in “re-situation” implicates two specific moments: the time of the making of the material and the time when it is placed and reactivated in a new context.

_A Film Unfinished, Respite, and The Specialist_ offer reinterpretations of a temporal negotiation which is embedded in the films. It is a negotiation that spans from the filmic situation to the distribution of the artistic rendering and a continuous span from the filming and development, to the editing, storing, archiving, and collecting, as well as transfer between formats, extraction from the archive, re-editing, and montage. Hence, the main interventions in the materials are made at the editing table. The figure of the filmmaker at the editing table is a recurrent description of how Farocki worked, but it is also applicable to both Sivan’s and Hersonski’s films. In the practice of directing through editing, a backwards movement is set in motion, so that the shooting of the actual film is rather its end point than the beginning. The contemporary gaze bestowed upon the material shapes the montage, but the facts drawn out of the material, concerning its history of production, remain over time. What is unraveled is, in two of the films, Nazi ideology and, in the third, the politicization of the Eichmann trial. This does not mean that the same footage might be recycled again and again and ascribed a new meaning in a different ideological context. Violence can always be done to images, but they do not offer infinite possible readings. How imagery is perceived can of course change, but the circumstances of its production remain and must be adhered to.
Thus, a deciphering of the resituated image encompasses the situation (the photographic situation) and the frame (the temporal and spatial gap and the various contexts of production and reading of the image over time). I will discuss how editing and montage provide a new framework and narrative structure, which is founded in an understanding of the image. The notions of resituation and framing are central and encompass the entire line of production and representation. In A Film Unfinished, new images are produced, testimonies given and staged, whereas Respite and The Specialist operate by reworking the preexisting material. However, Farocki inserts written comments as text frames and Sivan manipulates the filmed material through additional shadows and reflections, as well as distortion of the soundscape. A Film Unfinished investigates the archival material by intersecting witness accounts from both survivors and the cameraman, while Respite offers a reflection on the unstable meaning of the image in the historiography of the Holocaust. The Specialist, further, reacts concretely to that very tradition of witnessing and questions the role of the witness as such, as well as the testimony of the images. This is achieved through the montage of moving images, creating a new meaning out of the conflicting images, as described in classical film theory.

The three works are chosen as examples because of their function as forms of witnessing, their form of production, and their narrative modus operandi. Each one of them originates in a single archival source, fundamental to the films both conceptually and formally. Further, they all operate with a sense of self-reflexivity; in Respite this is explicit in the use of intertitle cards and in The Specialist through exaggerated montages, while in A Film Unfinished it is less apparent but still present in the reflection on the archival material. This self-reflexivity allows for an uncertainty and the suggestion of a possible truth, rather than a presentation of the "true story." Another central feature which brings the three films together is, as mentioned above, that they relate to the cinematic and theoretical discussions on witnessing and representation. However, the films have been produced and presented in different contexts: A Film Unfinished was distributed in cinemas as a documentary, while The Specialist has been screened both in cinemas and exhibitions and Respite foremost in exhibition settings. There are essays written on all of the films, but no extensive studies, and none where the archival footage are very different. In A Film Unfinished the film images serve as a source from which a narration can be extracted, in Respite the images are addressed through textual readings and reflections, and in The Specialist the images make up the narrative through suggestive editing and montage. In one sense, the images serve as witnesses to the various events in all three films, and in another sense the filmed material is the point of departure for the creation of a filmic narration. Two of the films, Respite and A Film Unfinished, intervene concretely in the debate of Holocaust representation, however, the archival material differs from most representations of the Holocaust, since the majority of the images are not gruesome. Rather, the films, especially Respite, expand what can be considered a representation of the Holocaust, and posit a question about the role of such alternative images in Holocaust commemoration. A further fact to be taken into account is that the footage used in Respite and A Film Unfinished was produced as propaganda for the Nazis: it was commissioned by the perpetrator and is limited by his gaze and control. The third film, The Specialist, deals with an emblematic moment in the aftermath of the Holocaust. By means of its montage, the film questions the narration built up around that event, and importantly, the role of the witness in Holocaust commemoration at large. Hence, all the materials were recorded with strong political implications - two as internal Nazi propaganda and the third as a means to remind the world of the Holocaust and to show how justice was being done.

The witness debate which arose after the Holocaust serves as a source and a context from which this project emanates. My research is an intervention in the debate and a proposed extension of what it means to bear witness. A witness can be defined as not only a human subject, but also possibly a visual document or recording, an image, which can testify to an event, as mentioned above - the event being a photographic situation in which a photo or film was shot. The witnessing quality of the image - the testimony it gives and its means of doing it - resides in the totality of the image, which, as we shall see, includes both its context and the structuring frames. The commissioner of the film sets the contextual frame for it, the cameraman frames it in a literal sense and the event filmed is what is represented. Yet, when the film is materialized, distributed, and spread it gains a life of its own. Hence, it is through a form of backtracking that one can see the testimony which the image gives. A witness can only bear witness in the aftermath of an event, in the practice of historicizing, and this is how I see the image as witness as well. As mentioned, I begin from the final product, the film, and offer a reversed reading of the material and its archival history. This implies an approach to the imagery that starts by asking questions, rather than interpreting a representation. My analysis thus extends to the theory of photography and film, as well as into the realms of commemoration and historiography. There are historiographic stakes embedded in the witnessing trope, and I suggest both an extension of it, by regarding the image as witness, and a proposal for the need of alternative sources, when all the living witnesses are gone.
The historiographic issues are complicated by the constructed nature of all archives, as painstakingly visible in relation to the three films. Taking as a point of departure that the archive is first and foremost a collection, further questions need to be posed about who made the collection, when it was made, and with what intent. The archive contains possible truths, just like the witnessing image. I will argue that in the case of these films, truth is conveyed precisely by illuminating the unstable nature of the archive as well as of the image itself. The films testify to this aspect of the material, yet, in so doing, they also make a rendering of the event visible. An affinity appears between the archive and the image, both traditionally holding strong truth claims, but in need of re-evaluation – not because they do not hold any truth, but since truth is not a given. A prominent feature of these films is that a focal point offers a reflection on the very material they are constructed from. Each film consists of material from one archival source, and by different means they all call attention to this material as a main point of interest. The films unravel what the materials are, how they were made, and what they were supposed to convey. In Respite, Farocki examines every shot critically. In A Film Unfinished, the history of the footage is reconstructed through testimony. The Specialist, finally, locates the re-evaluation outside the scope of the film by invoking the politicization of the Eichmann trial.

Beyond my inquiry into the two strands of Holocaust commemoration and the discussion of the image as witnessing, here is a greater and more difficult question that motivates both of them. As mentioned in the beginning, I undertake this investigation at a particular moment that confronts us with a particular dilemma: how can we rethink the notion of the witness when there are no witnesses left? I argue that we can turn to images, but that this is a move that needs to be made with great care, taking into account what lies beyond mere representation. My understanding of the witness is not only someone but also something with the agency to give testimony to an event – an agency stemming from a presence in the situation testified to, which is not necessarily a lived experience but which could also be the conceptual and material history of, for example, a film or an image. Yet, while the subject actively narrates, structures, renders, writes down, and changes his or her account, the singularity in the same instance. Asking what happens if one regards the image as witness, the question is whether the image becomes an agent that should be laid bare in order for a deciphering to take place that can encompass and adhere to the specific situation and the greater picture at once. Each still image, each scene or sequence, should be read in place of and replace the witnessing author. Further, while film images are not determined by the photographer, but are made use of by diverse communities and ascribed one single meaning. Susan Sontag famously claimed that photographic images are not determined by the photographer, but are made use of by diverse communities and thus ascribed different meanings. The same of course applies to film, and it is this indecisiveness that lies at the core of my discussion. Hence, images are neither a substitute nor a guarantee for comprehending a historical event; yet, they point to a possible truth.

The strength of images, be they still or moving, is that they are singular but reach beyond that singularity in the same instance. Asking what happens if one regards the image as witness means following this movement, regarding the exclusion and inclusion and seeing the specific situation and the greater picture at once. Each still image, each scene or sequence, should be read in place of and replace the witnessing author. Further, while film images are not determined by the photographer, but are made use of by diverse communities and ascribed one single meaning. Susan Sontag famously claimed that photographic images are not determined by the photographer, but are made use of by diverse communities and thus ascribed different meanings. The same of course applies to film, and it is this indecisiveness that lies at the core of my discussion. Hence, images are neither a substitute nor a guarantee for comprehending a historical event; yet, they point to a possible truth.

The analogy he makes is that images are like species and pictures are like "organisms whose kinds are given by the species," which also applies to film images. Further, Malin Wahlberg describes how the film image has been seen as "the moving other of the photograph, or the dynamic presence of the film image as opposed to the mute/flat past of the photograph." I agree with her view, since the other is always tied to the one to which it relates. Film and photography might best be thought of as two different, but inevitably connected iterations. Importantly, Mitchell emphasizes that while one can speak of various sorts of images, one must understand that "the image in or on the thing is not all there is to it." Therefore, instead of only employing film theoretical concepts, I have applied a broader concept of the image, encompassing notions of the frame, situation, and aesthetics. What is addressed here is both image qualities in general and the relation between the singular image and the sequential image. That is what is at stake in a specific image, as well as in the combination of images, that is, the montage.

I will argue that images by their nature are unstable – they cannot be pinpointed and ascribed one single meaning. Susan Sontag famously claimed that photographic images are not determined by the photographer, but are made use of by diverse communities and thus ascribed different meanings. The same of course applies to film, and it is this indecisiveness that lies at the core of my discussion. Hence, images are neither a substitute nor a guarantee for comprehending a historical event; yet, they point to a possible truth.

What enables a deciphering of the testimony of images is an aesthetic sensibility. It is a crucial approach for understanding how the filmmakers unfold multiple layers of meaning in the films. Their interventions in the material point towards the political as well as the aesthetic dimensions of the footage, both of which inform my reading, and position the situation and frame of the images as my central quest. This implies a multifaceted reading of the films, where for example sound, image effects, and the politics of representation are considered as interacting factors that together shape the understanding of the films. For example, it is expressed in my discussion of the use of silence in Respite, the distorted sounds...
in *The Specialist*, and the means of narration through different voices in *A Film Unfinished*. Or similarly, when I address how reflections are employed in *The Specialist*, how *A Film Unfinished* is constructed by a combination of newly produced and archival images, or how the reflexivity between imagery and comment plays out in *Respite*. Hence, these films, and my reading of them, is dependent on the dual relation of aesthetic rendering and the intellectual processing of images. This dependence stems from the subject at hand, as Rancière described the *ethical turn* of aesthetics, in which “arts and aesthetic reflection tend to redistribute themselves between a vision of art dedicated to the service of the social bond and another that dedicates it to the irremediable witnessing of the catastrophe” (the Holocaust). Thus, the two strands of Holocaust commemoration through witnessing and image theory are brought together when regarding them in the realm of aesthetics.

The book is divided into six chapters, the first offering a theoretical framework and the second the archival histories of the different material employed in the three films. The subsequent three chapters are analytic, addressing the central conceptual realms of this endeavor, ranging from the concept frame as a means of understanding the stakes in the works, to the role of voice and narration, and the shift from the witness as victim to the perpetrator as witness. The final chapter returns to, and reassesses, the theoretical problems formulated in the first chapter.

In the first chapter, “An Event Without an Image,” I provide a background and a general introduction to the role of the witness in Holocaust commemoration, to then describe a move from the “era of the witness” to the image as witness. It includes a theoretical discussion of previous research on the specific debates on witnessing and representation, as well as a methodological foundation for how I perceive the image as bearing witness and how this can be understood in relation to the specificity of the three films, in terms of genre and method. Here I expand on how one can understand the notions of resituating and frame. This is followed by the second chapter, “Archival Work,” dedicated to questions of the archive. The particular relation between archival images and Holocaust representations is addressed, as well as the implications of archival practices transgressing a notion of the archive as a neutral storage. The main part of the chapter aims to elucidate the specific circumstances and archival stories of the footage from which the three films were made. Hence, the context of the recording of the films in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Westerbork Transit Camp, during the war, as well as the filming of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961. In “Structuring Frames,” the third chapter, I address the heart of the matter: how the practice of resituating is carried out in the respective films and what role the notion of frame plays therein. What is the agency of the image, in terms of witnessing? And how does one find truths in non-trustworthy images? I also address questions of montage and reflexivity, how they are put into practice and how the filmmakers can be seen as overcoming an aesthetic distance.

Following this, I turn to means of narration, which reaches beyond the image work. In the fourth chapter, “Voice, Text and Narration,” I ask what the difference is between verbal and pictorial witnessing, as well as addressing the different strategies of using voice-over, silence, intertitles, and written testimonies as means of narration. Chapter five, “The Perpetrator as Witness,” accounts for how the photographic situation is the key to understanding material like that employed in the three films. I argue that the photographic situation compromises the frames of the footage, and that those frames in turn influence the spectator’s encounter with the images. The different approaches to the perpetrators in the three films and how these are expressed visually, form the core problem of this chapter. Since two of the archival films were commissioned as Nazi propaganda, the perpetrator’s gaze is embedded in the production. The footage in the third film provides a stage for witness testimonies, but in the resituating of the footage the director directs the gaze back to the perpetrator. The sixth and last chapter is devoted to some concluding remarks on the connections between the two strands of this study: Holocaust commemoration through witnessing and the theory of the testimony of images. By considering questions of interpretation and the role of montage in witnessing, this chapter gestures toward future testimonies and ways of dealing responsibly with the violence and the crimes of the past.

**AN EVENT WITHOUT AN IMAGE**

In our times, when the last people who experienced the Holocaust are perishing, an account is needed of how witnessing as such is being transformed. When a face-to-face meeting is no longer possible, the transmission by necessity changes form, due to the specific media and mediation used and the altered position of the receiver of the testimony. The receivers of recorded and literary testimonies are per definition unknown - when time passes the videos or books might be watched or read in various settings and contexts. The act of witnessing is shaped by the specific conditions and agenda of the witness, and so is the reception of the intended receiver. One always testifies from somewhere, to someone. There is a context, a point in time and a place. Yet, the receiver of the testimony shapes the account to some degree: what is heard of that which is spoken, and what the points of identification are. The transmission taking place cannot be the same over time, as a story can never be told in the same way twice. One must repeatedly ask what the witness is testifying to: a trauma; the loss of a people, a way of life, a culture, a *yiddisches*, or as a writer or historian chronicling an individual or collective event. Important here is the fact that the literary accounts and the memoirs remain within the frame constructed by their authors - the pages have a set order held by the book cover - whereas images are subjected to endless reframing and montage. In this sense, the temporality of images differs from that of text, a difference which makes the questions of frame and witnessing pertinent.

The role of the witness has always been present in Jewish tradition; the Holocaust was inscribed in the traditional memorial books as the “dritter hurbn,” the third destruction, following the destructions of the two temples two thousand years ago, thus creating a continuity throughout Jewish history. The memorial book *Memorbukh* is the traditional source for commemorating the names of the dead, through text, image, and family trees, a tradition which resonates in the contemporary practice of pronouncing the names of the victims in Holocaust memorial and museums.
Since the early 1960s, there has been a development of the role of testimonies in Holocaust commemoration. Witnessing has evolved as the prominent means of commemoration, and testimonies are directed towards younger generations, for example through the survivors and children of survivors who tour schools to give testimony, as well as through literary accounts. Testimonies are also collected and preserved for an unknown future through the creation of video archives. Hence, more and more testimonies are transmitted through mediations. Listening to someone speaking is not the same experience as sitting in front of a screen – someone standing in front of you is more difficult to dismiss than someone remote, someone on a screen. The relation between sender and receiver in a shared space does not rely on the same agreement as that which results from the sender being recorded in one context and then replayed on a screen in another. Obviously, the temporal and spatial delay in regard to recordings is an important factor, but so is also what an unmediated bodily presence does. The footage which I address does not consist of talking heads, and the prominent question is not the relation between the witness testifying and the receiver of that testimony. What is pertinent, however, is the question of what is transmitted by a witness, beyond the words uttered. It is the question of how to commemorate and how the event can be transmitted by other means than face-to-face or face-to-face-on-screen. I perceive such a transmission to be possible through images – which is what I will explicate in this study.

The title of this chapter is a reiteration of the description of Holocaust as an event without a witness, which captures the suggested move in this chapter from the impossibility of bearing witness, to the image as witness – and from theory to method. What is the basis for the idea of the impossibility of bearing witness? And how was this debate expanded to include images and to the notion of the Holocaust as an event that is impossible to represent? Attempting to reply to these questions forms a crucial backdrop to the critical debate of this study. I argue that moving images can be seen as witnesses and that a definition of genre might render a further understanding of the films possible. The chapter ends with a section dedicated to two key concepts in this study, resituation and frame. All in all, this chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the move from the subject-as-witness to the image-as-witness – which is the point of departure for my readings of the films.

WHEN NO WITNESSES ARE LEFT

What is at stake is survival, the perseverance of existence, and no human world destined to outlast the short life span of mortals within it will ever be able to sur vive without men willing to do what Herodotus was the first to undertake consciously – namely, to say what is. 25

HANNAH ARENDT

We will soon reach a point in history when all survivors from the Holocaust will have passed away and we will be left with only written, audio and visual collections of testimonies, hence, where the witness narration is mediated. We need to further consider what such mediation could mean. "When no witnesses are left, there can be no testimony," David Rousset states, thus one must turn to other sources and forms of commemoration in order to understand our historic past. Yet, there is neither an unequivocal position on the role of the witness, nor in regards to the possibility of being a witness at all.

The construction of this witness tradition has developed from the attempts to document the events during the Holocaust, via the Eichmann trial to the debate that unfolded towards the end of the century. During the war, both historians and victims in general understood the need to create a foundation for a future remembrance of the events. They collected testimonies, wrote diaries and novels, documented major events and day-to-day life in order to bear witness, in order for something to remain even if the Jewish people would perish. The Nazis had aimed to destroy all evidence of the Holocaust and erase all traces of Jewish life in Europe, with the explicit goal to prevent future witnessing – no one would survive and nothing would remain. Still, victims documented and preserved notes, protocols, diaries by all means possible, but it was not until the sixties that much of these materials were fully recognized. In 1949, one out of three Israeli citizens were survivors, nonetheless the consensus was that "the less everybody talked about the Holocaust, the better, thus the great silence was born." The silence of a parental generation also had bearings on the children born in Israel after the war, as they did not comprehend the trauma or sorrow of the parents. The consequence of this was a lack of knowledge about the event, which was also why one of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's pronounced goals for the Eichmann trial was to educate the Israeli youth about the Holocaust. Hence, the testimonies given during the Eichmann trial spoke to a world perceived as not knowing much of the event, and were internationally televised and broadcast on radio. The witnesses' testimonies broke the silence instated among many survivors after the war, and for this reason the testimonies can be seen as being directed towards the fellow survivors as a gesture encouraging others to speak up. As mentioned in the introduction, the Eichmann trial provided a setting for public testimony. In the words of historian Annette Wieviorka, the trial is the advent of the witness, since it designates "a new era, in which the memory of the genocide becomes central to the way many define Jewish identity." In testimony theory, this has even been labelled as the "Auschwitz paradigm." The enhancement of the individual witness was also a means to resituate what the Nazis had strived to eliminate – the humanity of the victims. And more so, the wish to uphold the singularity of each victim. Therefore, the name gains a central position, to refute the Nazi practice of degrading the victims to mere numbers. Hence, in many Holocaust memorials the listings of victims' names are a prominent feature. Examples of this could be that Yad Vashem is Hebrew for "a memorial and a name," the German cobblestones with names of victims outside their former residences, the Shoahmemorial, or the listing of names by the entrance to the synagogue in Stockholm. The Eichmann trial was followed by an unfolding of the different layers of witnessing, which is marked by a contradiction. The position of the witness and her testimony are emphasized, yet the possibility of bearing witness at all is also questioned. Prominent writers and philosophers, spanning from Primo Levi, Giorgio Agamben, Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub to Jacques Derrida and his reading of Paul Celan and further to historians...
like Annette Wieviorka, have been engaged in the subject – I will return to these in the following chapters. From the 1980s and onwards, this debate has been a central theoretical quest, deeply concerned with how to commemorate the Holocaust and promote the trope of never again. The discussion, which revolves around the impossibility of bearing witness, can be traced back to several elements: Theodor Adorno's famous – and much-debated – statement that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric," the literary attempts made to actually testify about the event; and an engagement with questions of visual representations. Many of the later theoretical interventions have been discussions of the body of memoirs and novels written by survivors, offering readings explicating the relation between trauma and witnessing, and between commemoration and memory. Consequently, a main concern has been the means through which testimony was given.

The paradox is that the actual witnessing stems from the very impossibility of being a witness: a survivor cannot testify from inside the gas chambers, since the ones who entered them died. Yet, the gas chamber is the ultimate signifier of the horrors of the Holocaust and thus what needs to be testified to. Primo Levi famously stated that there are no complete witnesses to the Holocaust; all "complete" witnesses are those who died, and so the survivors "speak in their stead, by proxy." In Giorgio Agamben's rendering of Levi's remark, the lack of the complete witness leads to a form of "pseudo-witnessing" where the survivors "bear witness to a missing testimony." This produces an alteration at the core of the witnessing act, since the witness must always proceed from the impossibility of bearing witness. Survivors and witnesses are thus separated in Levi's comment: the survivors can bear testimony – as Levi himself did – but never testify to the complete horror of the event. Jacques Derrida presents a similar argument: "One cannot and (in addition or moreover or above all) one must not (claim to) replace the witness of his own death, for instance, someone who perished in the hell of Auschwitz.

As mentioned, the title of this chapter paraphrases Dori Laub's and Shoshana Felman's notion of the Holocaust as an event without witnesses. Their central contribution to the theorization concerning the witness partly follows along the same lines as Levi's. The witness speaks the unspeakable; he/she lived through something out of the ordinary, something that needs to be told, which at the same time is impossible to bear witness to. Laub, himself a survivor of the Holocaust, defines the witnesses as those who "witness the truth of what happens during an event," a position impossible to inhabit both for a bystander to the event and for someone involved in it, since it requires an objective standpoint which is not possible within the order of the Nazi rule. The impossibility thus arises from the specificity of the genocide, but on a different basis than in Levi's observation. Laub describes the system set up by the Nazi regime as designed to eliminate the very idea of a transmission: "there was no longer another to which one could say 'Thou' in the hope of being heard, of being recognized as a subject." The Holocaust became a historical reality "which extinguished philosophically the very possibility of address, the possibility of appealing, or of turning to, another." It is a loss of the other to whom the testimony is directed. Thus, for Laub the impossibility of witnessing does not reside in the fact that only the dead experienced the entirety of the Holocaust, but in the intertwined facts of the impossibility of taking a neutral stand and the erasure of even the possibility of imagining to whom a testimony could be directed. Being a witness seems to imply a certain ability to regard objectively what one is being subjected to, which, according to Laub, is unimaginable while being "inside" the Holocaust. For those imprisoned in the camp, the outside world seems to have vanished and no other can be conceived; there appears to be no outside to bear witness to. The act of bearing witness thus seems impossible at its core, but Laub still believes in the importance of giving testimony. One must attempt to describe what seems indescribable, that is "the coercively totalitarian and dehumanizing frame of reference in which the event is taking place, and provide an independent frame of reference through which the event could be observed." Derrida describes the act of giving testimony as always reaching beyond oneself as the speech is directed to someone else. She refers to Emmanuel Levinas's suggestion that the speech of the witness, by its very definition, transcends the witness who is the medium of realization of the testimony, as it is addressed through him to the other. Derrida puts forth a view of the witness as doing more than simply transferring knowledge. The witness engages herself in her own account, with a strong implication of being truthful. The act of witnessing implies something similar to an oath, a promise to tell what really was. The view shared by Arendt and Derrida, of the implicit condition for the witness to be truthful, is the foundation of all witnessing. Derrida dwells upon a stanza in a poem by Paul Celan, addressing the question for whom the witnessing is intended, since the act of witnessing is never directed towards another witness. The given testimony is then by its nature directed towards another, towards someone who does not know.

The two positions held by Levi and Laub are brought together in Agamben's exploration, which relies on both sources. Agamben's understanding of the impossibility of bearing witness is founded in the loss of voice and in a quest for language that signifies something previously not signified. He writes: "The Shoah is an event without witness in the double sense that it is impossible to bear witness to it from the inside – since no one can bear witness from inside death, and there is no voice for the disappearance of voice – and from the outside – since the 'outsider' is by definition excluded from the event." He finds his solution in a figure introduced by Levi: a three-year-old orphan, born in the midst of death. Levi relates that the child did not speak and had no history or name; the other deportees called him Hurbínck. Agamben sees this as the moment when the lacuna can be bridged: Hurbínck had a nonsensical speech, which for Agamben illuminates that language in itself is insufficient and thus forms an integral part of the impossibility to testify.

Agamben does not offer a solution to the paradox, but he illuminates the core of the problem. In response to Shoshana Felman's discussion of Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah, which I will return to later, he poses the critique that Felman 'aestheticizes' testimony by deriving an aesthetic possibility from a logical impossibility. Felman exemplifies a speech beyond words made possible in a scene where a survivor describes how inmates in the camp sang while entering the gas chamber. In Agamben's view this does not solve the paradox of testimony, but what he fails to acknowledge is that Felman's foremost matter of concern is the filmic play between voice and silence, not testimony in general. Still, as a reaction to Felman's discussion, Agamben claims that neither a song nor a poem can redeem an impossible testimony; rather testimony is what from the start enables an aesthetic to take shape. Agamben's view suggests a bond between testimony and poetry, where the latter cannot be conceived of without the former, but where they at the same time seem to remain separated. His assertion poses a theoretical impasse in relation to my reading of the image as an
aesthetic form and a testimony. For Agamben the issue resides in the question of language, as mentioned above, but my presupposition stems from an altogether different view of what a testimony is and can be. In contrast to his reading, a point of departure for me is the very possibility for an aesthetic form to be a witness – hence, Agamben’s hierarchy of the testimony as something before the poem would disqualify my hypothesis from the start. The central trope of the image as witnessing is not an impossible witness in this sense, yet the questions posed and the theoretical claims made above render the idea of a witnessing beyond the witness possible. While this debate flourished, the survivors were still many and there was not the same necessity for these questions to be posed. Now, what is left in terms of witnesses and testimonies are mediations of different kinds, and what needs to be addressed is how one can make use of them and how a further commemoration can be shaped.

IMPOSSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS

So let us not succumb to the unimaginable. How much harder was it for the prisoners to rip from the camp those shreds of which we are now trustees, charged with sustaining them simply by looking at them. Those shreds are at the same time more precious and less comforting than all possible works of art, snatched as they were from a world bent on their impossibility. Thus, images in spite of all: in spite of the hell of Auschwitz, in spite of the risk taken. In return, we must contemplate them, then take them on, and try to comprehend them. Images in spite of all: in spite of our own inability to look at them as they deserve; in spite of our own world, full, almost choked, with imaginary commodities.

GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN

Discussions about the unrepresentability of the Holocaust draw on the same arguments as the debate concerning the impossibility of bearing witness. Both face the same paradox: it is impossible to bear witness, yet testimonies are given repeatedly, the Holocaust can be regarded as unrepresentable, yet there are images and verbal renderings of it. Since the advent of the witness, the role of testimonies has developed and one cannot account for all testimonies made. Besides the written accounts, archives of audio-visual testimonies have been set up, beginning in the late 1970s, giving form to the era of the testimony. Creating archives with testimonies is a widespread practice nowadays: the main ones are the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies (at the Yale University Library), initiated by a group of survivors themselves in 1979, and the largest of them all, Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation (now USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education), which was founded in 1994 by Steven Spielberg after working with survivors for his film Schindler’s List. The difference between the two enterprises is crucial. The Yale archive operated with the utmost respect for every single witness, creating a testimonial past, according to Wiewiora, whereas the Spielberg archive operated on an international level with fast-track training of the interviewers and using a set format, with the given goal of interviewing as many survivors as possible before they perished. Consequently, each survivor’s specific method of narration does not remain in focus in the Spielberg archive, but is subordinated to a form and mode of address. In the construction of the archive collection, the archive itself assumes the task of an authorization, since the selection of witnesses to record follows a set formula. The question of who is authorizing the witness is also present in relation to the footage used in the films at hand.

The question of if and how witnessing can take place is followed by the subsequent argumentation which asks if and how representations are possible. The images taken during, or in the direct aftermath of, the Holocaust, are heavily charged. How these images are reproduced, spread, and understood is still a crucial question for understanding what such images do. Archival images have been made use of as tools of commemoration, and their role in the intricate web of the writing of history is inevitably associated with the question: is it possible to represent an event as horrific as the Holocaust?

Leshu Torchin, a theorist of photography, argues that the medium of photography has played a crucial part in extending the possibility of witnessing and made up for “the loss of words” experienced by many survivors – a loss that might be structural if one follows the arguments put forward by Levi, Agamben, and Laub, as described above, but which also emphasizes the paradox of testimony and representation. Agamben describes the “grey zone” which existed in camp operations conducted by inmates, which was also evident in the shame of the survivors of the Sonderkommando, the Jewish men who assisted in executing the genocide. Agamben refers to a testimony retold by Primo Levi about a soccer match between the Sonderkommando and the SS, which might appear as “a brief pause of humanity in the middle of infinite horror,” but claims that this horrendous image should rather be understood as “the true horror of the camp.”58 Like the signifying image of the soccer match, every instance of representation seems a possibility to grasp the true horror of the Holocaust. Hence, the expectation to see the entirety of the Holocaust in every single image makes the very idea of representation impossible. Rather, it seems like a search for a stand-in, which would be necessary in order to make the claim for the impossibility to understand or represent what went on. The event cannot be grasped, confined, or summarized, and therefore also not caught in an image. In Agamben’s reading there is neither a possible pause, nor an end to the event, as the “grey zone” exists in every place or time. Hence, the genocide as such might have come to an end, but the “match” cannot reach an end – it repeats itself in every instance when one watches a game, in a stadium, on our television sets, and in the normalcy of everyday life. Jacques Rancière objects to Agamben’s wish for an ontological revolution, as it leaves no room for political disagreement and erases the difference between contemporary democracy and the extremity of the Nazi rule. Under this “ontological destiny,” all differences are erased and we are left to a messianic waiting for salvation. Agamben’s understanding of the camp as the nomos of modernity summarizes what Rancière understands as the “ethical turn” of aesthetics and politics.59

I suggest that the footage in the three films might be a conceivable way out of the impasse of the impossibility to bear witness. Images might be what makes it possible to go beyond the event without witnesses. The footage is in this context, as previously mentioned, a subcategory to the image and if images are bound to their double nature of being both objective and subjective, they both capture what was and remain framed. This might allow them to overstep the boundaries of the inside and the outside that Agamben describes, in a way that
is impossible for a person. Georges Didi-Huberman also addresses the "fold" between two impossibilities: first, the self-obliteration of the witness, since the SS attempted total elimination (no one would survive), and second, that the testimony itself would be obliterated, since no one on the outside could possibly believe what was happening. The image appears in the fold between "the imminent obliteration of the witness" and "the certain unrepresentability of the witness." The image captures what was and provides access for the viewer to see something of what took place. Hence, by its very nature an image provides a possibility for imagining: "since an image is made to be looked at by others, to snatch from human thought in general, thought from 'outside,' something imaginable that one no one until then had even conceived as possible." Thus, Didi-Huberman sees the image per se as something that refutes the unimaginable, by expanding the very idea of what is imaginable. Writing about four photos shot in Auschwitz in August 1944, he refers to them as "images in spite of all." The images, which have become known as the "Sonderkommando images," are the only surviving photos with a confirmed history taken in Auschwitz by its inmates while the camp was in operation. There are other images from Auschwitz, of course, but none where the identity of the photographer is known, apart from the images taken by, or on behalf of, the SS, such as the *Auschwitz Album* or by the Auschwitz camp photographer Wilhelm Brasse. Brasse also testified to the existence of many more images, photos, and films, that he encountered in Auschwitz, that were either destroyed or disappeared during liberation.

Didi-Huberman argues that the four photographs are the closest one can get to a true representation of the Holocaust— not because they depict the camps more accurately, or comprehensively, but because the conditions of their production were decided by the activities in the camps. They both enact a particular historical moment and provide a space for the viewers' imagination. They appear as the possible redemption and means of finally making the Holocaust visible. Images that enact an unthinkable moment also demand a reaction from the onlooker and thus fill a void in the historicizing of the Holocaust— but they must not be regarded as an absolute truth.

The story behind the images is that a camera was smuggled into the camp by a civilian worker in the resistance movement and was hidden at the bottom of a bucket. Photos were taken secretly, and Didi-Huberman emphasizes the importance of those practical conditions that surrounded the shooting and the visual effects of those conditions which form the representation. He also reconstructs sequences in which the four images were taken, since that allows the viewer to extract knowledge both of the images and of what went on. Two of the images have a broad black frame, due to the fact that they were shot from inside a gas chamber; since the room was dark one cannot see the inside of it and the motif is bare life and of a structurally impossible image production.

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The Specialist, based on image material stemming from a very different context, omits the passages when images from the extermination camps were shown to the court and in so doing avoids reproducing those images. However, it is not only a relation on the level of imagery: the arguments of the films are illuminated when regarded within the scope of the discussion of the possibility of representing the Holocaust. For example, when Farrokh proposes a concept of "happy images" in Respite, I read the implication as both an argument for a possible representation and a question of whether or not a "happy image" can be said to represent the Holocaust at all.
IMAGE AS WITNESS

"History decays into images, not into stories." 75

WALTER BENJAMIN

"It has to do with the representation of the camps in German photography and film; it has to do with the politics of the image; it has to do with montage." 77

HARUN FAROCKI

Asking what happens if one regards images as bearing witness, by necessity implies a move beyond the witness (as a subject) and beyond the witness tradition (based on individual testimonies) described earlier. There is a need for alternative forms of and tools for commemoration, which encompass different forms of mediations. The image is neither a substitute nor a guarantee for comprehending a historical event – it requires an interpretation, the form of which I intend to investigate. As the Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg comments, it is not “easy to summarize all that [the picture] contains in words.” 78 The trope of the image as witnessing is in itself nothing new – quite the opposite. Since the invention of the camera, the debate on its ability to represent the real has been ongoing. 79 I suggest a move beyond the presupposition of the moving image as proof or redemption, to allude to Siegfried Kracauer’s discussion on cinematic representation, to instead examine how one can understand the testimony given by images and by which means. 80

In her seminal work on how to regard the pain of others, Susan Sontag described the image as bearing witness, not in the sense of the image itself being a witness, but because a person had been there to take the photograph. 81 She suggests that the image testifies through the presence of the photographer, but as André Bazin argued, the presence of the human agent is what that photography could rid itself of, and was what made it ontologically connected to “the real.” 82 Yet, my subject here is the moving image - which has both similarities and dissimilarities with still photography. A difference could be formulated in line with Jean Epstein’s conception of cinema as the thinking machine and also in relation to the practice of montage. I would argue that the image has more to offer than what the photographer intended to capture and that this can be further elaborated on in montage. In Epstein’s words:

“The cinematograph is a witness that recounts a figure of sensible reality that is not only spatial but temporal, integrating its representations into an architecture whose relief presupposes the synthesis of two intellectual categories (extension and duration), a synthesis in which a third category emerges almost automatically: causation. Through this power of effecting diverse combinations, the cinematograph, though it may be purely mechanical, proves to be more than an instrument of enlargement or replacement for one or several of the sense organs.” 83

What I propose is a view of the image as being able to bear witness – something which can be understood firstly through the threefold relation between the photographic situation, the mechanical recording and developing and the reading of the imagery done by the spectator; secondly, and most importantly, by considering how this witnessing takes shape through the work of montage. I do not believe that the image should be seen as a document of the real, yet neither images as such, nor the specific images discussed here, can be considered to be without truth claims. In part, this is grounded in the montage, which can be said to illuminate a singular, rather than general truth, as Didier-Huberman writes. “[montage] can bring images to a degree of intensity capable of suddenly producing a truth.” 84 Hence, I want to emphasize the constructed nature of all images, rather than arguing for the transparency of film, since the construction and politics enabling the filmic image can be considered a means of defining how it can be regarded as a witness.

When considering written testimonies, the literary form is seldom at the forefront; language is perceived as almost transparent – as conveying a testimony by the sheer combination of words and syntax. In relation to both texts and images, there is a subject involved in the witnessing process, but just like a novel cannot be reduced to biography, an image cannot be reduced to the intention of the camera man. Without maintaining an analogy between text and image, this illuminates the technical as well as the circumstantial aspects of the footage, which are two strong factors for understanding what kind of testimony footage like this can convey. Even if this analogy offers a reductive view of writing and literature and also of the practice of reading, it illuminates the relation in all works of art between producer, work, and receiver. Hence, there is a fundamental – and inescapable – dialectic between the image as an agent, a witness, and the image as having a testimony to give, but one which can only be heard through interpretation. This relation is what is played out in the trope of the image as bearing witness. Images are understood as ontologically and ideologically charged materials and as a form of speaking objects – images have agency, and yet the agency of the historical situation and facts is conveyed through the image. Michael Roth describes this feature of photography as the ontological uncertainty where “photographic images seem to offer the possibility of re-experiencing the past, or of experiencing a past for the first time without a subjective intermediary.” 85 He explicates the ontology stating that the photograph raises “questions of presence and temporal disjunction in mnemonic context of desire and absence;” hence “the photographic image calls one to (and perhaps from) the past, while reminding one that the object one beholds is ‘just an image.’” 86 Hence, as mentioned in the introduction, one is ascribed to the presence and the other as referring to a nostalgic past.

Here, one might recall what Volker Siebel labels as Harun Farocki’s* critique of the enlightened eye: “Philosophy asks: What is a human being? I ask: What is a picture? In our culture, images are not given their due. Images are enlisted. Images are interrogated, in order to extract information, and only the sort of information that can be expressed in words or numbers.” 87 This is a claim against representation, against the idea that an image can be described in words, and against the notion that an image can be deciphered in a coherent or structural way. Above all, it is an argument against the order of affairs, that there is a reality which the image depicts. The image by default comes after; hence the discussion of the Nachleben, the survival of the image or motif which was so important for Aby Warburg. 88
What Farocki wants is to produce another type of images: “Vorbilder” rather than “Abbilder,” or in other words, to produce models rather than representations or reproductive images. 88 Farocki was engaged in an image production reaching beyond the image as replica or mere representation, a production in which images can be thought of as actively creating something anew. The term alludes to a before, to a pre-image rather than an after-image, and thus to the decisive creation of an image rather than, in the wording normally employed, a capture, snatching, catching. This kind of image would be the opposite of Roland Barthes recording. In my view, this understanding of images, “Vorbilder,” as actively created and as creating something may be extended to a method of reading images. In relation to an image already produced, as with the films discussed here, rather than an image production as such, it becomes a question of what these images create – or in other words, what kind of “Vorbilder” they are, and how this is produced and upheld. I see this creation as analogous to how I perceive images as witnessing, objects from which one cannot solely extract information, but rather to which one must listen carefully. To hear what an image has to say, or, in W.T. Mitchell’s words, to let it speak, would then be to do a close reading, and more than that: a reading that takes the image in itself as its point of departure (that is, rather than perceiving it as first and foremost a representation). This would allow the image to appear as giving testimony, recounting an event and simultaneously being the event, rather than considering the event and subsequently the image as a representation thereof.

As many scholars of documentary theory have pointed out, a filmic process entails much more than an objective recording. 86 Film scholar Michael Renow claims that the persuasion of the documentary form rests upon “the ontological promise of the photographed image, its suggestion that what appeared on screen once existed in the world.” 89 This is a reductive understanding of the moving image, as it disregards the montage, still it is the common way of reading documentary footage. My engagement with the work of images is in line with how Volker Pantenburg describes Farocki’s (and Jean Luc Godard’s) interest in “the mechanisms of image production and reception, in how images function, and in the possibilities of gleanings an (oppositional) visual theory from images themselves.” Pantenburg builds on Mitchell’s notion of metapicture, which refers to a sort of self-knowledge of images, which in turn could be related to the testimony of images. 90 What Pantenburg suggests is, thus, a view on film (the films of Farocki and Godard) as “thinking in image, as contributions to a theory intrinsic to film.” 91 This view on the knowledge production enabled by images is helpful, as Pantenburg, in another line of argument writes that “through montage, the image becomes an element of a precise argument” – something that can describe how I read the films through the lens of witnessing. 92

The presumption of a direct relation between the real and the representation might have diminished in today’s easily accessible image manipulation, yet, images are still often employed as illustrations or evidence. Contemplating the construction of the image entails an interpretative act. Writing on the finding and verification process of Josef Mengele’s skull, Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizman present the advent of a forensic aesthetic, against the backdrop of the witness tradition discussed in the previous sections. Their approach might be a way to explain the agency of the image, in relation to its testimony. Keenan and Weizman recount the story of Mengele’s skull and ask how the bones speak: what knowledge can be extracted from them and how can they testify to a life lived? Drawing on the etymological root of the word forensics referring to forum, they perceive forensics as linked to the art of persuasion, to the skill of making and presenting an argument. This involves the use of objects, in classical rhetoric, when addressing the forum. As the object could not speak, a form of interpreter, translator, or mediator was needed – the figure of proopoeia – to endow the inanimate object with a voice. 93 This view could offer a further explanation of how to read images as witnesses and make them speak, like the bones. Yet, the forensic model consists of three components: the object, the mediator, and the forum. What differs here is, thus, the forum, the structural setting of a court room or equivalent, which would mean that the object and the mediator are left to one another, thus lacking the instance granting the validity of the speech. The mediator could be biased, miss facts or misunderstand what the object has to say, and the object could be false or inauthentic. As I am writing about works of art, made out of archival images, the main issue is not to verify the images, but just like the filmmakers, I suggest a similar process of interpretation and a reconstruction of sorts. In some sense the filmmakers reconstruct the footage, by their interventions, and my reading, also provide a reconstruction of the archival and contextual histories of the different types of footage. Stephen Heath describes how film can be viewed as a discourse, which in turn might be decoded: “that reality, the match of film and world, is a matter of representation, and representation is in turn a matter of discourse […] It is the discursive operations that decide the work of a film and ultimately determine the scope of the analogical incidence of the images; in this sense at least, film is a series of languages, a history of codes.” Yet, what this process of decoding amounts to, through the employment of different strategies, makes Keenan and Weizman’s point pertinent: “the forums in which facts are debated are technologies of persuasion, representation, and power – not of truth, but of truth construction.”

Another strand of inquiry in the relationship between the image and the real is expressed in the image interpretation. The image as witness is thus bound both to a time-space category and to the idea of likeness versus interpretation – hence, a further question of representation. Sontag writes: “Although there is a sense in which the camera does indeed capture reality, not just interpret it, photographs are as much an interpretation of the world as paintings and drawings are.” 96 And Andre Bazin observes, in his discussion of the ontology of the photographic image: “In achieving the aims of baroque art, photography has freed the plastic arts from their obsession with likeness. Painting was forced, as it turned out, to offer us illusion and this illusion was reckoned sufficient unto art. Photography and the cinema on the other hand are discoveries that satisfy, once and for all and in its very essence, our obsession with realism.” 97 The ability of photographic images to represent thus frees other art forms from the constraints of representation. 98 Furthermore, the possible readings of the representation are transformed by the passing of time and by shifting contexts, and still, the image is something in itself. Thus, what the image is, as discussed, is not confined within the limits of representation. Thus, the transference of the real is in part due to this process of pointing the camera, the mechanical recording, the imprint on the film, the development as a negative, and the final printed material form, where the real is transformed to a piece of paper and by that is no longer the real. A similar process can of course be imagined with contemporary technologies – digital recordings and the image on the screen – since the sole point is that the representation might be both the outset and the endpoint, but that the process in between is a part of the image to the same extent.
Regarding the image as witness is not a question of mere representation, but means that it must be understood in its totality, a totality which is enacted between the scope of the event as such and the singular moment of the shot. Hence, images do not only show something, but actively bear witness. Ariella Azoulay describes how photographs are never mere objects; they act, and make others act. Her notion of action emanates from Hannah Arendt’s distinction between work and action, and while photographs are products of work, by their nature they more closely resemble action. Arendt understands work as characterized by a demarcated beginning and a predictable end, and, as I have argued, images cannot be restricted in this sense. Actions rely on other actions, which changes the intended end of all actions; hence, they can never have a foreseeable goal, which is also true for the distribution and interpretation of images over space and time. Further, actions, as well as images, are marked by their irreversibility – the taking or recording of an image cannot be undone. As mentioned, the image seen as bearing witness is not a substitute and definitely not a guarantee for grasping a historical event: it does not reveal the truth, but could point to a possible truth. What a reading of the image as witness thus strives for is such truth construction – not necessarily to say schul war, but to offer a fuller frame and context of the image.

GESTIC THINKING

The proper term would have to indicate that the work begins on the cutting table, with already existing film shots. It also has to indicate that the film used originated at some time in the past. The term could also indicate that it is a film of idea, for most of the films made in this form are not content to be mere records or documents – in this factor lies my chief interest in the form, which will have to be referred to in the following pages in various inconsistent ways. Can you suggest a right term? JAY LEYDA

Neither A Film Unfinished, nor Respite, nor The Specialist can be easily confined within any given genre. Rather than offering an exhaustive answer to Leyda’s question above, I seek to trace the question back to the problem at the heart of my endeavor. The films brought together in this study share a basis in archival materials. They are second-hand films, made out of found footage, incomplete accounts, and rushes. This genre has long searched for an appropriate label, such as archival films, chronicle montage films, collage film, library films, or compilation films, the latter of which might be the most relevant term; yet the genre cannot be understood solely within the scope suggested by any of the terms. In the following I suggest that what might best describe them is what Harun Farocki labels as gestic thinking, which is a concept that has to be understood against the backdrop of the other genre descriptions.

The term compilation film was coined in 1927 by the Soviet filmmaker and editor Esfir Schub and reformulated by Jay Leyda in the 1960s, but the first compilation film was made as early as in 1898, as a response to the Dreyfus Affair. Esfir Schub wanted to show pre-revolutionary Russia, using newsreels to reconstruct history. She wished to maintain a documentary quality, which meant not looking at the material for its own sake, but subordinating it to a theme. Hence, the genre is per definition structured thematically – “the actual content and the meaning of the finished product always reflect the editors’ choices and points of view.” Film scholar Paul Arthur outlines how by 1945 the deployment of archival images “to reanimate or polemically reinterpret prior accounts of events, figures, and social processes was a standard feature of nonfiction filmmaking [...] and was established as integral element of exposition and argument, often serving as illustration of a verbal reference or as means of filling gaps in spatial continuity or didactic evidence.” According to Arthur, this trend grew during the 1960s, and in parallel with the spreading of Michel Foucault’s notion of archaeology, both the wish to reformulate tropes of historical narratives and the political quest for a broader inclusion in terms of representation were frequent. The practice of found footage has thus been around since the invention of film and developed through modernity into something like a token of the avant-garde (hence, the prominent role of montage in modern art and cinema).

William C. Wees oversaw a survey of found footage; and collage films for the Anthology Film Archive and then wrote a book, in which he differentiates between three types of montage: compilation, collage, and appropriation. According to Wees, the three modes of montage, or ways of working with found footage, can be deconstructed under the headings of methodology, signification, exemplary genre, and aesthetic bias. The signification of compilation is reality, its exemplary genre is documentary, and its bias is realism. Collage is connected to image, avant-garde film, and modernism, while appropriation is associated with simulacrum, music video, and postmodernism. The criticism which Wees proposes against the method of compilation is the assumption that there is “a direct correspondence between the images and their profilmic situations in the real world,” and further that the process of compilation in itself is not treated as problematic. Appropriation does not rely on the real, but rather on the different media themselves and their inner logic, and is thus exempt from all claims of depicting anything historically correctly, whereas collage appears as the method able to bridge the presumptions of compilation film and yet remain critical as opposed to appropriation, which is rather accommodating. In collage films the found footage “will be recognized as fragments still bearing the marks of their media reality.” Wees builds on an extensive theoretical discussion of montage, in which Adorno prominently wrote that montage articulates discontinuity, since “the principle of montage was conceived as an act against a surreptitiously achieved organic unity; it was meant to shock.”

None of the three films under discussion here is structured in a dialectical relation of shot and counter shot. Another common feature is that none of them work with montage from several archival sources. The imagery is reconstructed as a whole rather than displayed as conflicting shots. Sivan makes use of harsh juxtapositions in his montage; while Farocki creates a dialectical montage between image and text; and Hersonski between archival and newly produced material. Further, they do not belong to any of the three figurations formulated by Wees: they are not appropriations as they still claim a relation to the real, not collage in the sense of avant-garde filmmaking, and not compilation films as they have a strong artistic agenda and question claims of realism rather than upholding it as an aesthetic bias.
The sole fact that each of these films consists of one single archival source differentiates them from compilation films which draw upon manifold archives or newsreels. Jay Leyda describes a successful compilation film as concealing the various sources of its materials, so it “almost seems one cameraman’s work.” Harun Farocki comments on the genre of compilation film stating that, even if the concept is not seen as a pejorative term within the field, the word “compilation” also means “to plunder.” As the essay from which the quotation is taken was written while Farocki was working on Reptile, it can almost be read as a manifesto, stating what he did not want to do. Presumably, he wanted to explore another method for engagement.

I also find the term “compilation film” insufficient, and prefer Christa Blüminger’s distinction between the conventional compilation film and the “thinking” essay film, as the latter in its secondary rendering of the material encompasses its archival story and thus also its specific discourse and materiality. The three works offer readings of the material, but the footage does not serve solely as visual means of narration, as is often the case in mainstream documentary. The artistic presence and the location of the artist’s interest in the material itself differentiate the films from documentary accounts and highlight the artistic intervention. The notion of the essay film has a history as long as that of compilation film and might be the most fruitful conceptual framework, but at the same time the least telling. The essay film is an approach and manner of constructing an argument, but it does not tell us anything about the particular form or method of the specific work. Hence, an essay film can employ documentary strategies, build on archival sources, work with voice-over or with dialogue. Still, it is a feasible genre to place the films within, since as film scholar Laura Rasearol puts it, “the essay film is performative inasmuch as it does not present its object as a stable given, as evidence of a truth, but the search for an object, which is itself mutating, incomplete, and perpetually elusive and thus deeply uncertain and problematized.”

However, since the genre does not capture the methodological use of the single archival source, it is too wide for my purposes.

In order to begin to explore what is at stake in works like these, one can turn to a short text by Harun Farocki about the work done at the editing table, from which I have borrowed the title for this section. “Gestic thinking encompasses the process at the editing table and the confrontation between the director’s memory of the shot and the reappearance of that same shot as something else than what the memory conveyed. Farocki argues that a second script is created at the editing table, not as a matter of intentions, but of facts. This process takes place twice in relation to the filmed materials: first, in the rough editing by the directors – the Eichmann material was edited at the same time as it was filmed – and second, when brought out of the archive by the filmmakers. The reason why I mention this concept is the distinction made by Farocki between intention and fact. The intention guides the moment of the filming and constitutes the framing, whereas the fact refers to the image or shot as it turned out, the actual frame. The role of editing is key – in Farocki’s words, editing has the power to “convert colloquial speech into written language” and to turn bubble into rhetoric. Editing is thus what structures and provides meaning – in relation to the films I address, this capacity is amplified as the filmmakers intervene in the materials foremost through editing, placing the archival materials in a new context and thus, in Farocki’s lingua, organizing the speech of the images into a coherent rhetoric.

What Farocki’s concept of gestic thinking manages to capture is a temporal gap between the shooting of the image and the reappearance of that image at the editing table. The archival material employed in the three films that I discuss here was not shot by the directors of the films, but imagining the gesture of the images as defined by the moment they were shot and by the moment when they reappear at the editing table might be precisely the central and common feature of the films.

Yet another discussion would entail the relation of the films to the genre of the documentary in terms of the concepts of fiction versus reality. Eyal Sivan proposes the label “fictionalized documentary,” where “fiction would be the idea of a construction, which does not exist or preexist prior to the new work.” The films are documentary in the sense of being constructed from documents, hence Eyal Sivan’s preferred genre description. While this labelling of The Specialist as fiction might very well relativize its political, cinematic, and historiographical operation, the view of the documentary as inherently bound to fiction is far from the dominant view. The documentary genre in cinematic traditions of montage and concepts of mise-en-scène does more than turn the real into fiction. The films produce a representation of the historic instances as inhabiting a world separated from the event. As Bill Nichols writes: “since there is no fictional world to be intruded upon, intellectual montage in documentary emphasizes the overt or constructed quality of an argument, based on representations from the historical world, rather than the constructed quality of an imaginary world.” Nichols acknowledges that the structure itself forms a crucial part of constructing an argument, which is fundamental for all three films. Yet, this also bypasses the central position of the archive.

RESITUATED IMAGES AND THE QUESTION OF FRAMES

Thus the present constitutes the past.

THEODOR ADORNO

Where it is interesting, montage connects two things without turning them into one.

HARUN FAROCKI

The concept of resituating captures the image operations at stake in the works discussed here, as they all entail transmission from the context of the filming to the inscription in a new context through editing and montage. All images are produced within a specific frame and visual regime, shaped by the conditions of production, motif, and situational context. That is to say that the archival footage, on which the films draw, is based in a time, place, technique, gaze, and political system. When contemporary filmmakers reinterpret footage like this, the material is grounded in a new time and context – not in terms of what it represents, but in how it is perceived. Dialectical images of sorts are
produced, in Walter Benjamin's classical sense, where the present and the past collides. Benjamin writes:

> It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progress but image, suddenly emergent.

When the filmmakers resituate the footage, they tell another story than that which was intended at the time of the making of the materials. Even though the films cannot be wholly confined within the genre of compilation films, the practice of found footage films entails a form of seeing where one never sees the same film. Christa Blüminger rightly points out that, since film as a medium is profoundly temporal, in terms of the viewer's experience of time as well as of historic and contextual time, what the spectator sees in the footage is also temporally defined.

The gap between then and now, between the filming of the archival materials and the making of the films, allows for a space of reinterpretation. The creation of a new context does not alter the footage as such, but it changes the possible reading of it, and in this process the images are extracted from the historical time confined within the archive and placed in the present, as laid out above. Thus, the films all intervene in how the events in themselves have been commemorated and what role the visual material has played therein. Even if the context of the images alters the understanding of them, the archival material of course has a relation to the filmed event. The crucial question is how these representations fit into a comprehensive conception of the event (are the images misrepresentations or are they staged?) and also how these images are made use of (what is done by editing and montage?); hence, what kind of testimony they give.

Resituation and resituation of the filmic frame. As mentioned previously, when imagery is resituated it is placed in a new context, but this context is not only a temporal or spatial one (as it would be if one only viewed the archival material), but also a new aesthetic context characterized by a geste thinking as described above. The archival footage is not shown as such, but appears as a new work of art: a new film is created. In Sontag's understanding of aesthetic distance, the time passed gives the photograph a chimera of art, differentiating it from contemporary documentary images. The historic image is thus perceived as art, due to a kind of romanticizing of its material and motif. Hence, the archival footage used in the films is subjugated to both the temporal and artistic factors. Although Sontag's claim can be disputed, there is also an additional factor which determines how the material will be perceived: the aesthetic intervention by the filmmakers. They employ means of emotion, affect, sound, light to facilitate an aesthetic experience, which reaches beyond the questions of historic representation. My interest here is precisely in the aesthetic renderings and reactions at work – the geste thinking – in relation to the moving image.

Looking at footage through a situation means adhering to its frame, which calls attention to the partiality of the images and makes it possible to see them as bearing testimony. Frames are understood as a broad concept, ranging from Leon Battista Alberti's view on perspective, and the frame of the pane as a window through which he saw the world he wanted to depict, to Erving Goffman's view on natural and social frames, and to conceptions in art and film theory of the frame as both the image context and the material context. Framing has both a structuring and an enclosing quality, hence the classical contrast in film theory between the frame and the window – the filmic frame and the window to the world as discussed by among others Bazin and Heath. The frame structures the image both conceptually and materially, in the moment when the image is created and in the moment when it is interpreted by the viewer. Thus, frames constitute the border of the image in a both literal and metaphorical sense, referring to the substance of a singular shot as well as to the screen or material containing the image. Ira Kantiger designates the frame as simultaneously being "the borders of the image on the screen that enclose the picture like a frame on a painting" and "the entire rectangular area of the image projected on the screen."

The frame both contains the image and allows it to go beyond its confines. It structures what is seen in the image: it is the intermediary, which is realized in the montage of moving images. Stephan Heath writes:

> Frame describes the material unit of film ("the single transparent photograph in a series of such photographs printed on a length of cinematographic film", "twenty-four frames a second") and, equally, the film image in its setting, the delimitation of the image on screen (in Arnheim's Film as Art, for example, frame and delimitation are assumed as synonymous). Framing, determining and laying out the frame, is quickly seen as a fundamental cinematic act, the moment of the very "tightness" of the image: framing, that is to say, bringing the image to the place it must occupy.

Heath puts forward two understandings of the concept of frame, according to the division proposed above of material and structural frames. In regard to the three films which I analyze, both factors are crucial, as I dwell upon both the material history of the footage.
and the conceptual reframing. In another essay, Heath holds that "frame, framing is the very basis of disposition - German Einstellung; adjustment, centering, framing, moral attitude, the correct position." This idea is connected to Eisenstein's notion of mise-en-cadre, the "pictorial composition of mutually dependent cadres (shots) in a montage sequence." Thus, the structural understanding of frame is closely related to montage; the reframing is achieved through montage. The montage comes per default after the production of the footage, and the argument for the use of the concept of frame in relation to montage is, as described above, the tension embedded in the term - as an integral part of the footage and as reaching beyond it. Judith Butler suggests that a photograph can in fact be an interpretation in itself. The image thus contains its own frame. Therefore, interpretation cannot be regarded solely as a subjective act: an image does not depend upon the individual viewer, but rather the photograph itself becomes a structuring scene of interpretation. The photograph is not simply a visual image awaiting interpretation; instead the image in itself is actively interpreting. For Butler, this practice is sometimes even compulsive, as if the image commands the viewer to interpret what is shown. The image possesses its own image operation (frame) and the wish to control the photograph can never be completely fulfilled.

The frame encompasses the situation - the moment of the making of the photograph, the historical moment in which it was taken - but also reaches beyond it. The frame a specific moment, a moment which also exists beyond the frame of the image. The two concepts of frame and resituating are deeply interconnected, and this connection is crucial for my reading of images. Ariella Azoulay writes: "the photograph bears the seal of the photographic event, and reconstructing this event requires more than just identifying what is shown in the photograph." The situating of the photograph entails a move beyond representation, and the resituating achieves more than a reconstruction. The two temporalities of the making of the image and the later regarding of the same can be explicated further by considering the external and internal factors of the work. In relation to photographic images, the internal aspect, then, would be the representation and the external photographic situation, or as Azoulay argues in relation to what is shown in the image, "what was there is never only what is visible in the photograph, but is also contained in the very photographic situation, in which the photographer and the photographed interact around the camera." The duality of what is shown and what is hidden fits into the notion of the situographic situation, in which the photographer and the photographed interact around the photographic event, and reconstructing this event requires more than just identifying what is shown in the photograph. The image thus contains its own frame. Therefore, interpretation cannot be regarded solely as a subjective act: an image does not depend upon the individual viewer, but rather the photograph itself becomes a structuring scene of interpretation. The photograph is not simply a visual image awaiting interpretation; instead the image in itself is actively interpreting. For Butler, this practice is sometimes even compulsive, as if the image commands the viewer to interpret what is shown. The image possesses its own image operation (frame) and the wish to control the photograph can never be completely fulfilled.

Judith Butler describes the notion of the normative frame as key to reading images, since it does not offer a clear inclusion and exclusion, but rather emphasizes an active instability or a pendulous motion between the two poles. Hence, there is no clear outside, since what is excluded becomes encrypted in the very frame. The photograph is not limited to its physical frame - it extends beyond its representation as well as its materiality. The different archival material that makes up each of the three films at hand is varied in kind, yet they can be read through their respective conditions of production - their situation and re-situation - their frames. Such a reading deepens the understanding of how images can give testimony, when not solely regarded as excerpts of the real, but as situated matters with the ability to speak in manifold voices. A Film Unfinished and Respite, produced as Nazi propaganda in the Warsaw Ghetto and in a Dutch transit camp respectively, tell us something else today. They are not snatched in any sense, nor do they reveal suffering in terms of what they represent. However, the framework of conditions of production as a means of conceptualizing Holocaust representations is decisive. Similarly, an edited sequence from the Eichmann trial, combining several testimonies, must be read against the background of the witness tradition. The notion of frame thus counters the idea of unrepresentability, as discussed, as well as offering another way of approaching images, in line with how I perceive the image as able to bear witness.
BRESLAUER AT WORK IN WESTERBORK, 1944.

PHOTOGRAPHER UNKNOWN
I looked up and saw two men standing by a camera tripod.

On our way to Warsaw, we somehow had no idea what awaited us from.

They brought in a woman who had put on lipstick and was looking at us.

I never knew what the purpose of the film was about.

The city is full of mirrors, shocks during wars.

After her hair was done, she put on a hat and was quite content.

I must've had it written in winter because I remember being in Warsaw.

They filled the cafe and the women and they laughed.
There are rumors that gas was used for the first time in this way.

The next morning at 8 a.m., all the actors were assembled in the street.

The German doctors tell the actors to oversee the scheduled operation.

They insisted that the circumcision take place that one day we were told to shoot inside a ritual bath.

They rounded up well-dressed typical Jews.

He never was able to understand concerning the reason for this action.

Take 2
RESPITE
BY HARUN FAROCKI
2007

A train left Westerbork every Tuesday

The third-class cars went to Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt –
The writing on the suitcase enables us to date the film images:

F of P Kroon can be read and the date 26 ? 82 or 92

The camp administration was very careful with numbers

On the woman's suitcase is an address
The number "74" has been crossed out and replaced with "75".

A little later, on the departing train, the number has been corrected.
We expect different images from a Nazi-German camp.

In Westerbork the inmates were not beaten or killed.

There were newspapers to read, a Kindergarten and a school.
Tuesday evening, inmates in the orchestra and on stage

Inmates were only allowed to remove the yellow star on stage

There wasn’t much to eat, but the inmates didn’t starve
The question of the status of the archive has been central in contemporary art debates during the past decade. The archive is perceived neither as a neutral form of storage nor solely a historical source. The three films were created within that time and context, and relate to that wave of questioning the neutrality of the archive. When images are archived, they are subjected to different processes of assemblage, collection, and probably even editing. As argued in the previous chapter, the status and reading of images is dependent on the specific temporal setting: its ideology and location. This is exposed by the different films; each film offers a reinterpretation of the archival images, by reading them from a specific point of departure. The films bring forth a double reflexivity, reflecting back on the filming of the historical event as well as on the archive. In relation to Farocki’s film, Christa Blüminger traces this to the meta-archival practices of transformation, which are both inter-textual and inter-medial as the appearances and materiality of the stock footage is altered. This argument that can be extended to all three films.

In his seminal work *Archive Fever*, Derrida suggested that the archive should not be regarded as a question of the past but as a matter for the future: “the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow.” The archive contains fragments of the past, but the material is at our disposal not as evidence of the past, but rather as raw material for constructing a future. Hence, the archive is central to my argument as the main site of construction and storage of that historicized account. What the films do, I contend, is to create an alternative narrative both for the present and for further historicizing. Neither a mere window into the past, nor solely a tool for rewriting history, the films provide a reading of the past in the present, for the future. In other words, the films interfere with how the events have been remembered. In so doing, they create a space that allows us to remember them differently in the future. The films posit historical truth as fundamentally unstable, and likewise acknowledge the constructed nature of Holocaust commemoration and other narratives.

The possibility of a Derridian future seems to reside in the choice to create anew out of the past. The films seek to reveal what had not been in focus and to revise history in order to create a new one. They offer a profound deconstruction of the archive and its tokens of truth: Farocki and Sivan construct new narratives by picking the old ones to pieces and reassembling them with the remnants. Hersonski constructs her story through a deconstruction of what is seen in the image, questioning its archival status as documentary. As I shall argue, the films are not only related to history, but also to the history of the archival material they use, since, the different archival materials were, to varying extents, made
for propagandistic purposes, and since they have been used in numerous films about the Holocaust and its aftermath.

I regard the intervention of the filmmakers as a transformation of the entire image context and not only a transmission from the archive to an exhibition or screening context. Okwui Enwezor articulated the methods of using the archival footage in *The Specialist* by stating that these methods "offend the categorical power of the archive as the principal insight into a truth" – a claim applicable to all three films.151 As I insist throughout this book, the use of archival imagery in the films serves to destabilize any claim on truth rather than upholding or revealing one. Central to this claim is the pendulous movement between exclusion and inclusion: by accentuating the editing and displaying fragmentary excerpts. Farócki and Sivan leave the viewer wondering what really happened and at the same time suggest an answer: an archive cannot provide an account of the real event as a totality. An archive cannot bear truth. Hersonski does the same thing, but by other means, as she adds newly recorded witness accounts and gives voice to testimonies in relation to the archival images. As I argue in the following pages, the question of the archive must in this context be read against Claude Lanzmann’s claim that his film *Shoah* from 1985 was “constructed against every archive” – all three films can be said to intersect in that particular history.152 Furthermore, the archival material used, is in two instances footage from unfinished films – the material used in Hersonski’s and Farócki’s films – and in the third film the archival material was at the time broadcast as fragments. As we shall see, the films are not only reiterations of the material, but also the first complete assemblage of the remains of it.

The archive is the source from which the films emanate, still I contend that their purpose is not solely to do the archive justice (however, Hersonski attempts this to some extent). Their *archival impulse* is not foremost a revelation but a complication. I agree with Hal Foster’s claim that “archival art is as much preproduction as it is postproduction: concerned less with absolute origins than with obscure traces (perhaps anarchival impulse is the more appropriate phrase). [...] artists are often drawn to unfulfilled beginnings or incomplete projects – in art and in history alike – that might offer points of departure again."153

I see the role of the archival material as precisely material – not a complete or set source. In this chapter I first introduce a general discussion on the relation between archival images and Holocaust representations, as it is a contested one. This is followed by presentations of each film’s archival history and origin, which serves as a necessary background for my further discussions. I do not propose a comparative reading between the films and their archival origins. As argued, I suggest that it is necessary to understand the contextual history of the different footage, which then not only includes their archival histories, but makes them crucial.

Concretely, I have seen everything that remains in the archives of two out of the three sets of material – I received the Westerbork material from the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision and visited the Bundesarchiv in Berlin to see the Warsaw Ghetto material – but I did not see the entire remains of the Eichmann Trial.154 The salvaged 360 hours of footage from the trial forms a collection that is now available for consultation and use, most of it is also accessible online. I have also consulted the transcripts of the trial which are available in their entirety.154

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**THE STATUS OF ARCHIVAL IMAGES**

The writing of history is informed by traces. A prominent task of the archive is to safeguard material traces such as images and documents, thus, the archive constitutes the most basic form of ordering traces in this broad sense.155 Testimony is a kind of trace, and, inversely, traces are a kind of testimony. Hence, the archival image can be seen as a given form of testimony in this sense. As mentioned initially, the testimony of an archival image operates in a manner similar to a witness’s account: it gives voice to one story, which might not always be told in exactly the same way and which can be used and understood in a different manner. However, whereas language-based testimony has been the premiered means of narration and commemoration, images are often used primarily as a support for an oral testimony (the discursive force of the voice-over for example) – the imagery provides evidence and details or functions as a means of explanation. For example, in the collection of video testimonies at the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, images and artefacts are repeatedly placed in front of the camera, to serve as material evidence or to support the oral narrative presented.156

Generally, when archival images of the Holocaust are discussed, the allusion is foremost to the photographs and films from the liberation of the camps. Polish and Soviet filmmakers shot the first films of the Holocaust when the Red Army liberated Majdanek in July 1944, entering the camp just minutes after the Nazis evacuated.157 These films were followed by several other accounts shot during the liberation: noteworthy is the film shot in Auschwitz in January 1945, as this material has later reappeared in a great number of films dealing with the Holocaust. Alain Resnais used some of this footage in *Nuit et Brouillard* (*Night and Fog*), which is one of the first publicly released cinematic representations of the Holocaust. Resnais’ film from 1955 is constructed from archival images from concentration camps, deportations, and mass graves, mostly filmed by the Allied armies, and some material shot by Resnais cameraman Sacha Vierny in the year of the making of the film. This type of direct and brutal depiction of the Holocaust later became the most prominent type of visual representation – the kinds of images of the camps that are often reproduced in the West. Images which we have come to recognize as the images above others of the Holocaust, such as the ones of bodies so emaciated that it is difficult to understand that they are still alive.158 The archival images used in *Night and Fog* gained a particular status when they were used as evidence against the Nazis in the Nuremberg trials, and later when the entire film was screened during the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. It is rather remarkable that a documentary, even if it was one of the first publicly released cinematic representations of the Holocaust, was used as evidence in a juridical proceeding. In the transcription of the Eichmann trial, after the screening of *Night and Fog*, a comment by the prosecutor is included: “I regret that it was necessary to subject the Court to such a harrowing experience.”159 The comment suggests a supposed effect of the footage, although, it counters the narrative provided by the voice-over of *Night and Fog*, which rather stresses the maintenance of the structure that allowed the crime to take place at all. The images are placed in the realm of emotion rather than as supplying hard facts, something which has become emblematic for the commemoration of the Holocaust based on individual
It was against the use of this type of material and this form of representation that Claude Lanzmann reacted in Shoah from 1986, a film which has reached an emblematic status. Lanzmann regards the images filmed during the liberation as offering little other than a misleading spectacle. Instead, he proposes a means of commemoration through film, in which he rejects archival images. Lanzmann wanted to create a third way, a new genre, that neither relied on archival imagery nor constructed a fictional coherent narrative of a singular experience of the Holocaust. Even if one disagrees with Lanzmann’s refusal of archival images, his film is indisputably the main visual and conceptual source for the discussion of the unrepresentability of the Holocaust. Shoah must be recognized as having revolutionaryized testimony, as, in Wieviorka’s words, the film “transformed it into something beyond the history of historians, into a work of art.”

Shoah is nine hours long, consisting of interviews with and testimonies by Holocaust survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders. There are no pictures from the period in the film and no use of archival resources, something very rare in visual accounts of the Holocaust. Lanzmann’s choice to not show the camps, prisoners, or corpses was an explicit reaction against the conventional way of representing the Holocaust. He makes the claim that a representation of such an event is not possible. According to his reasoning, the crime was so vast and terrible that we cannot understand it through visual representation. In an essay on Lanzmann’s film, Gertrud Koch suggests that “Lanzmann marks the boundary between what is aesthetically and humanly imaginable and the unimaginable dimension of the annihilation. Thus, the film in itself creates a dialectical constellation: in the elision, it offers an image of the unimaginable.”

Instead of archival material, Lanzmann relies heavily on the oral history of the events. His interviews are often filmed on locations where the camps were situated, in villages in the proximity of the camps or in places where major events or killings took place during the war. The sites, which Lanzmann calls “non-sites of memory,” are now like any other forest glades, fields, or small villages, and through their plainness the images seem to convey the ungraspable nature of the crime. The locations are thus inevitably linked to the events that took place there and cannot be just any glade or village. Lanzmann’s pronounced method was based not on memory, on which testimony is founded, but on an active restaging and reliving which would allow for a different narration to appear – and also base the film in the present.

However, in this context, Lanzmann’s refusal to use archival images is the pertinent issue. He points out that he does not solely make a general claim against the use of archival images, but a very specific one. In summary, his claim stems from two interconnected factors: the first one being what archival images actually exist from the Holocaust, and the second the failure of these images to capture what really went on, that is the very annihilation of the European Jewry along with other exposed groups. Archival images of anti-Semitic persecution from 1933 to 1939 exist, as well as the images shot during the liberation of the camps in 1945, but, as stated, few images exist from the time in between while the camps were operating. Lanzmann mentions the material shot in the Warsaw Ghetto, on which one of the films I address is based, but dismisses them as saying nothing, as “images without imagination,” hence having no power. What would have been the sufficient image seems by default to be an impossible image. Although, there are testimonies confirming that images were taken, even of the gas chambers – but these images have not been found.

For Lanzmann, the consequences of the lack of images are far-reaching: therefore, there are “no archival images.” Thus, the impossibility of depicting the Holocaust is founded both in the impossibility of representing the event as such, and in the lack of any original representations. On the contrary, I argue that regardless of if there were such images, they would not offer a more sufficient representation. Hence, even if the impossible images did exist they would display only a fraction of what the Holocaust was, if understood as the totality of systematized racism which lead up to and made the genocide possible.

Even though the prominent position of Lanzmann cannot be overrated when discussing Holocaust representation, time has passed and counterarguments to the notion of unrepresentability have been formulated. Jean-Luc Godard famously stated that Shoah, in its lack of montage “showed nothing at all,” thus turning Lanzmann’s wish to show by other means into something as fruitless as the images shot by the Nazis. Since then, the two directors have been inhabiting opposite positions in regard to images and witnessing. In Godard’s Histoire(s) du Cinema, produced in the years after Shoah (1988–98), this argumentation is visually manifested in a montage of images from the liberation and Elizabeth Taylor in a swimsuit. Libby Saxton accounts for the debate, but also calls attention to the affinities between the two directors – both are interested in notions of ethics, redemption, and revival, but approach the matter from different angles. For Godard, life is resurrected through montage, whereas for Lanzmann this happens through the staging of interviews. It is a question of absence or excess, but both filmmakers “find in cinema a uniquely privileged medium for mnemonic and testimonial work.” Saxton traces this through Godard’s idea of “the missing reel”: given the Nazis’ obsession with documentation, Godard is convinced of the existence of a reel shot inside the gas chamber. His conviction has gained support in forms of testimonies from the camp and the possibility that images of exterminations not only were shot, but actually still exist. In response to this, Lanzmann made the infamous reply that if there were such footage he would destroy it immediately, as it would only provide a reductive account of the real. Lanzmann rejects the logic of proof and questions the image as a credible witness and Godard is also troubled by the failure of cinema to bear witness to the gas chambers. No such imagery should be needed to prove that the genocide did take place. But Saxton fruitfully explicates the figure of the missing reel and finds that “precisely by the virtue of the physical absence of the disputed reel, of the documentary evidence: the view through the spy-hole into the gas chamber has come to haunt cinema, where it has been compulsively staged, either – as in Godard – as a redemptive presence – or – as in Lanzmann – as a structuring absence.” She sees Lanzmann as rededefining the task of the image, freeing it from its confinement as representation or revelation: “an image can do more than show.” In this sense, the Nazi testimonies in Lanzmann’s film can be seen as haunted by a lack of the imagined scene through the spy-hole.
Any film dealing with the Holocaust and made after Lanzmann’s *Shoah*, relates to it to some extent, because of the strong claims made in *Shoah* and the following discussion of the unrepresentability of the Holocaust. But the three works addressed in this study can even be regarded as reactions to the filmic strategy employed by Claude Lanzmann, and therefore his film is a necessary point of reference for my discussion. The footage in the films addressed differs radically from the images created by Lanzmann. Yet, since the same footage has been used in Holocaust documentaries, it is connected to them. In order to fully grasp what is at stake in the films’ image operations, the backdrop of archival documentary images and Lanzmann’s disapproval of the same are crucial on a conceptual and concrete level. The filmmakers return to the footage in the aftermath of this discussion, react upon it, and work with the archival sources as complex matters, rather than as mere representations.

In the film *Images of the World and Inscriptions of War* Harun Farocki includes accidentally taken area shots of Auschwitz, as well as one of the four images Didí-Huberman discusses that were taken by the resistance movement in Auschwitz.263 Farocki calls the type of mechanically captured shots *operational images*, and by introducing that sort of image, Caterina Albano argues, “Farocki shifts the referents of the event to re-address the implication of archiving within today’s mediatized networks.” 264 Even though these are not the kinds of images used in the three films, they capture the archival rendering which precisely alters the referent in the films addressed in this book. The positioning of the referent implies that a crucial fact when considering archival images and the processes of archiving are to consider them in terms of politics and memory. As Albano writes: “the mediation and re-mediation that underpin the archive as a site of consignment and representation can, in fact, reveal institutional strategies for the appropriation, silencing, and manipulation of memories.” 265

**ARCHIVAL STORIES 1: DAS Ghetto AND A FILM UNFINISHED**

This section is dedicated to the unfinished silent film *Das Ghetto* from 1942 and *Shnitak Haarchion* (*A Film Unfinished*) from 2010, directed by Yael Hersonski. Her documentary is based on the archival remains of *Das Ghetto*, commissioned by the SS and shot in May 1942 in the Warsaw Ghetto. The footage was to a great extent staged and what one sees in the shots is often far from capturing the reality of the Ghetto. Hersonski offers a reading of the archival images by contextualizing and situating them in a time and in their specific circumstances of production, which allows for a critical examination of the images as such and how they can be read as witnesses – even when one cannot rely on them as representations. The footage consists of documentary shots of ghetto life and staged scenes with actors, and sometimes a mixture of both. When first encountering the archival material, the border between the overtly staged scenes and the more documentary images is blurred, but with the help of testimonies, diaries, and interrogation, the story behind the shots unravels. Unlike the other two films discussed in this book, Hersonski produces new images in addition to the archival shots as a means to construct her narration: interviews and shots of survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto, a re-enactment of an interrogation, and sequences from what appears to be an archival vault. The film has a voice-over, which is intersected by excerpts of diaries of ghetto inhabitants and a musical score.

In May 1942, a German film team entered the Warsaw Ghetto. At that time, life in the ghetto was dire. The ghetto was heavily overpopulated and there was an acute lack of food and supplies, causing immense suffering and starvation. The Germans had established the Warsaw Ghetto in November 1940, where 400,000 people were imprisoned, monitored, and subjected to systematic violence and discrimination. The conditions in the Ghetto were deteriorating rapidly, with a high mortality rate – over 100,000 people had died of hunger and fatigue since the instigation of the Ghetto. When the famous uprising began in April 1943, around 300,000 people had already been deported to extermination camps. After the uprising the remaining inhabitants were deported and the Ghetto was demolished.

The film team of a Nazi propaganda unit travelled to the Warsaw Ghetto two months before the mass deportations to the Treblinka extermination camp began, capturing the last moments of the Ghetto as it was when most populated. Yet, little is known about the circumstances of the filming and why the film was never finished. It is presumed to be a work of propaganda, as it was filmed on behalf of the Nazi regime, but no paper trails of its commission exist, according to the holder of the materials, the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. It is therefore neither entirely clear who commissioned it, nor why. As the Nazis documented almost everything, it is curious that not a single document or file has been found which could provide more information. In a text commissioned by the holding archive, Anja Horstmann writes that it is clear that the Propaganda Ministry was anxious to preserve images of the victims of the regime, beyond expulsion and extermination. She quotes a diary entry of Joseph Goebbels, minister of propaganda, stating that as Himmler at the time was carrying out a large resettlement of the Jews from Germany to the east, Goebbels commissioned a great deal of film footage, since such material would be needed urgently for the future education of the people.266 The intent of the film, thus, seems to be a future propaganda of sorts, displaying the achievements of National Socialist regime for coming generations. A future where the Jewish question had been solved once and for all, and the film would chronicle a time and a people of the past. This is plausible, as other similar projects were instigated and officially commissioned by Goebbels: in 1939, a camera crew was sent to Litzmannstadt/Lódz and the recordings later appeared in the famous anti-Semitic propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude* from 1940.

What is known, is that the Ghetto material was shot between May 2 and June 2, 1942 and that the team filming in the Ghetto consisted of at least eight people, as well as the person(s) handling the contacts between the Jewish Council in the Ghetto and the production team. This information comes from the diary kept by the chairman of the Jewish Council of the Warsaw Ghetto, Adam Czerniakow.267 The only named cameraman is Willy Wist – his co-operation was also confirmed by the low-volume written material, which refers to the footage: Several SS men are mentioned in relation to the filming: SS Sergeant Franz Avril, SS Lieutenant Karl-Georg Brandt, and the camp commander Heinz Auserwald. They are all engaged in the filming, allocating locations and participators, but none of them act as
director. There seems not to be a single auteur in charge of the film as a whole, besides the SS ordering different shots to be made. Yet, the film material entails a strong argument, which has to be formulated by someone – but who this is remains unknown. Moreover, there might originally have been a sound recording accompanying the film.

The film fragments play on conventional presuppositions and stereotypes of European Jews, and mark the Ghetto inhabitants as Jews and as other in a simultaneous move. Jewish symbols are present in many shots and religious sites and rituals are the basis for several scenes. The fragments are mostly made up of such scenes, as well as those of street life, trade and social gatherings. The shots range from beggars and corpses on the street to daily trade, from private homes to a burial and a circumcision and from a prison visit to a soirée and a cabaret.

The footage shot by the camera crew in the spring of 1942 accounts for the longest recording done in the Warsaw Ghetto, yet, the films are not extensively researched. These film recordings are used in television documentaries and exhibitions at memorial sites to convey an impression of the suffering of European Jewry during the time of National Socialism, even though the majority of the material is made up of staged scenes. Yael Hersonski made an important contribution by deconstructing the propaganda claim and its distorted rendering of ghetto life: A Film Unfinished was the first detailed study of the material. The core of the film is the material itself, not life in the ghetto. What Hersonski does is to construct a frame through which one can read the material today. This is done through the interviews, readings of written accounts of the filming, reenactments, and the interplay of the various film sequences, which bring forth how the film was produced and constructed. The contextualization of the filmed material situates it in the specific context of its production and the investigation of the film images enables a further understanding of what is at stake in the representations. Yet, a thorough and detailed analysis of the context and language of the archival footage, as well as the structural framework, has yet to be done.

Today the Bundesarchiv’s film department holds eight reels with a length of 1.737 meters – about 65 film minutes – filmed in the Warsaw Ghetto. The footage was found and identified in the state film archive of the GDR in the 1950s and then kept in the holdings of the Reichsfilmarchiv. The archival title today is Ghetto, but the film material has also been referred to as Asia in Central Europe. This title, possibly used at the time of the shooting, comes from the memoir of Holocaust survivor Jonas Turkow, accounting for his experiences in the Warsaw Ghetto and published in 1948. Turkow’s is the only reference to this film title; the footage does not contain a title and there are no other sources that could provide information on a final film title. Yet, this title fits into the National Socialist narrative of the Jews as the foreign element of Europe. By instating the Jew as Asian, as non-European, and the practices of the Jewish community as an aberration from the European lifestyle, the argument of the necessity of their removal is constructed. The title marks Jews as others and presents the film almost as an anthropological study. In her article, Anja Hortsman goes so far as to calling it a sort of “Lehrfilm über eine ausgestorbene Rasse” – an educational film of an extirnct race.

In addition to the eight rolls of the film fragment labelled as Ghetto in the archive, further film material has been identified which was created in direct relation to the filming. According to the archive, this includes two reels of film that the Bundesarchiv received in 1998 from the Library of Congress in Washington under the caption “Warsaw Ghetto.” Filmmaker Adrian Wood was the one who found the rest materials in the early 1990s, while doing research for a BBC documentary. He recounts how the material was kept in a private archive in the USA (in the John Allen Collection) under poor conditions and later in the Library of Congress Motion Picture Conservation Center in Ohio. Being familiar with the ghetto materials, he recognized that these images must have been shot at the same time as the main material. He arranged for the 34 minutes of footage to be returned to Germany and transferred to the Bundesarchiv, according to international agreements of ownership of such materials. This material contains the opening credits, indicating that it, at least in that state and at that time, was not intended for the public eye; “Achtung/Geheime Kommandosache!” (Warning/Secret Command Document!) This material contains both the same images as the Ghetto material and additional sequences.

In addition to this, two films with scenes from the Warsaw Ghetto can also be linked to the recording of the main film. One is a ten-minute-long film recording, probably produced by the camera crew members Paul Adam and Andreas Honowski with a private camera on 16 millimeter stock. According to the archive, and Hortsman’s description, it was filmed in parallel to Ghetto and primarily shows the same scenes, only from different perspectives.

The other one is a 16 millimeter color film, probably shot by Hans Juppenlatz. The film was retrieved from the former Soviet Union, as the material had ended up in the hands of USSR soldiers after the war and then been kept in private possession. Adrian Wood was contacted when the film was about to go on the market and it was thus identified as depicting the Warsaw Ghetto. This film contains similar scenes as the mentioned above, but it also includes recordings showing the filming of the main production. The maker of this material remains unknown, but as Wood points out, the color film indicates that it was not an amateur as it was expensive both to buy and to develop, as well as the fact that the filming of the main material is recorded. The four minutes of material recorded in color also includes a short scene in which a soldier in the uniform of the Wehrmacht is recognizable, and on the basis of this scene, one of the cameramen of the main film could be identified as Willy Wist.

Wist’s involvement in the film was later confirmed by documents regulating all contact between the Ghetto and the outside world. Hortsman refers to three instances in the transfer list, showing that a shooting permit was issued for Wist by the Sonderkommando for the “Filmeinsatztruppe” (the special command of the film task force). Wist himself confirmed his participation in an interrogation in connection with a preliminary investigation against former SS leader Ludwig Hahn in 1972, during which he also pointed out the Ghetto lieutenant Helmut Rudolph as a member of the production team. Further members of the film team, cameramen, and editors, have been believed to come from “Propaganda-Kompanie 689” which was a department under the Wehrmacht propaganda ministry, but this has now been proven to be false and the crew seems to have been assembled for this specific task.
This story has in part been constructed by the archive, but it is also based on the research done by Yael Hersonski in preparation for the conceiving of A Film Unfinished. The archive constructed a dossier with articles, interviews, and transcripts of the scenes in Ghetto, which also includes an interview with Hersonski. She describes how she first encountered the material at Yad Vashem and later found the rest materials in the German Bundesarchiv. With the help of the producer Noemi Schory, the German film historian Ronny Leovy and the filmmaker Felicitas Piwaronas, Hersonski assembled all the pieces into a coherent narrative, including the finding of the interrogation records, and collected the rest materials from various archival sources. Hence, Hersonski did not only extract materials from the archive in order to make a film, but also enhanced and structured the archival source. The archive gained information on the material through her research and then referred to her film as a source of knowledge in relation to the material.

ARCHIVAL STORIES 2: THE WESTERBORK MATERIAL AND RESPITE

Haran Farockis Aufschub/ Respite from 2007 is made from archival material that was filmed in the World War II transit camp Westerbork, in the Netherlands. A camp inmate filmed the material on behalf of the SS in 1944, in order to make a propaganda film to maintain the camp. The camp commandant’s film was never completed, but the remains of the uncompleted editing form a rough narrative structure and include text frames as a commentary to the images. The 39-minute film Respite is edited together from the 98 minutes of footage shot in Westerbork, and as a continuation of the silent film’s aesthetics Farocki has inserted more comments on what we see, or rather what he has seen in the pictures. He joins moving and still images, and his artistic intervention and reflexive gaze bestowed upon the material enables a multilayered discussion of image operations, where the interpretation of images is always unstable and dependent on context. The film that was originally intended as interna- nal Nazi propaganda now shows something completely different. The inmates were used as a work force, and every Tuesday a cargo train left for the concentra- tion camps in occupied Poland. As the camp was set up, prisoners themselves conducted the everyday governing. For example, the selections were made by a Jewish security service. The Nazi commandant gave the orders; the Jewish “governing” body carried them out. Westerbork also had a permanent population of forced workers, engaged in metalwork, farming, manual labor, or camp maintenance in both practical terms and as teachers, health providers, and entertainers. These Jewish workers were partly exempted from deportation, some of them because they had British or American citizenship; sometimes they were used in exchanges for military prisoners of war. The permanent camp population was around 2,000 people, mostly German Jews and Jewish Council members. This group was encour- aged to organize their lives according to normal circumstances, to work, exercise, and go to the cabaret. There was a school, a hairdresser, an orchestra, and even a restaurant. There was even a local currency and the inmates were allowed to buy goods that were hard to find elsewhere in Holland at the time, a comfort regarded as a means for the SS to avoid any problems during the transfers to Auschwitz.

Albert Konrad Gemmecker was appointed camp commandant in October 1944. In 1944, Gemmecker commissioned the film and assigned the inmate and filmmaker Rudolf Breslauer to execute the task. Thus, that spring Rudolf Breslauer held a film camera in his hands again, presumably for the first time in a few years. In Respite, Harun Farocki claims that the film was commissioned with the explicit goal of convincing the Gestapo head- quarters of Westerbork’s vital production value. However, the main archive for the mate- rial, Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid (the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision), remains a little more hesitant: “Gemmecker would probably show that Westerbork as Arbeitslager; was important for the German war industry.” What seems certain is that Gemmecker meant to produce a professional film for the department of Public Relations. Hence, it was intended as communication, rather than for internal documentation, and its message was focused on labor and production.

Breslauer, a Jewish deportee, was the head of the camps small photo department, which produced passport photos and other pictures commissioned by the camp authorities. He worked with two staff members, also inmates, Karl Jordan and Wim Loeb. Gemmecker attempted to create a professional environment for the film with a crew, and the Jewish ex-journalist (and allegedly Nazi collaborator) Heinz Todtmann wrote a script for the text frames that were supposed to support the images. According to the archive, Breslauer filmed during the months of March till May 1944 with two 16 mm camera types. He used a Victor Camera Model 4 until March 27, and after this date a Siemens CIH. He filmed on 16 mm film of the brands Agfa and Gevaert.

It is not known how much footage there was originally, as the remaining rushes only add up to 98 minutes, and it is reasonable to believe that Breslauer filmed more than that. The film was never completed and no final edit was made under Gemmecker's command. Yet, it was a work in progress, as title cards exist (as visible in the archive and also in Farocki's film) and a raw edit had been made (by whom remains unknown). A visible trace from that edit is a time code running throughout the archival material.

When engaging with the rushes it is possible to follow a sort of basic narrative scenic structure. The remains of the film are divided into four acts, spanning between 14 and 29 min- utes each adding up to the total 98 minutes. If one attempts to take an overall view of the rushes, all the pieces can be read as a part of the comprehensive storyline: the Westerbork material is ordered in terms of beginning, middle, and end. The material thus begins with a train arriving in the camp, followed directly by a deportation from the camp and ends with the performers of a staged cabaret receiving praise from the audience and the closing of the curtain. The beginning marks the double movement of arrival and deportation, clarifying
the camp's status as a place of transit. This is followed by a long emphasis on labor and production and then on demonstrating the good conditions in the camps in shots of sports and cultural activities. Judging from the archival sources, this was the intended ordering of the scenes, even if we cannot know what the end product was supposed to be like. The material stresses two pressing issues for the Nazi apparatus: the efficiency of the deportations of Jews, Sintis, and Roman and the benefits of forced labor and production. By establishing from the start that deportations took place and that they were smooth and efficient, the opening of the film could be seen as laying the ground for the remaining sequences arguing for the sufficiency and ability of the camp to self-sustain. As the purpose of making the film was to bring forward an argument for the efficacy of the camp, the construction of the narrative is logical. All scenes combined seem to add up to a single statement, which could be expressed simply as: look how well the camp is functioning!

The 88 minutes of filmed material were stored in a known location during the last year of the war, yet, as mentioned, it is most likely that Breslauer shot more footage. After the war, two tins containing film from Westerbork were stored at the Provincial Museum Drenthe, from where the film went to the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (RIOD). Later, all fragments and edits were assembled in one film, which now goes under the label Westerbork Film – the film became part of the UNESCO Memory of the World Register in 2017. Researchers Koert Boersma and Gerard Rossing from the memorial center at the Westerbork camp published the first extensive study on the material in 1997: Westerbork gefilmd het verhaal over een unieke film uit 1944 (Camp Westerbork filmed: The story of a unique film from 1944). Boersma and Rossing’s study reconstructs the origin and provenance of the film, and their research from 1994 to 1996 showed that the original footage from Westerbork, which was used to compile the Westerbork Film, was held first in the Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies managed by the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision, and that additional material was located at the EYE Film Museum.

Discovered after liberation, the footage contains some of the most famous and often reproduced images of deportation. The importance of the material from Westerbork was acknowledged immediately after World War II. There are no other movies kept of day-to-day life in a transit or concentration camp, such as that presented in this material. Since 1948 fragments of the film have been widely used in documentaries, films, and newspapers, as well as in the trials of Nazis in the Netherlands, for instance in the trial of the SS commander in the Netherlands, Hans A. Rauter. The previously mentioned Night and Fog also uses images from Westerbork. According to the archive, the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision, the Westerbork Film is the most reused film in their collection.

As described, a few shots have circulated widely, whereas the context of the entire material and the rest of the imagery remain relatively unknown. The material appears as an illustration of witness accounts in films about the Holocaust, for example in the screen adaptation of the diary of Philip Mechanicus in 1965. It has also been used in historical programs in the Netherlands, as in the series The Occupation from the 1960s and in the new version from 1984. The history of the material itself has been the main quest in the documentary Gezicht van het verleden (History's Face) by Cherry Dyens in 1994 and most importantly in this context, in Respite by Harun Farocki.

All of these films emanate from the remains of the Westerbork materials, but the material itself is not an untouched original. Already from the start there seem to have been different edits. During his trial in 1946, Commandant Gemmeker claimed to have transported all the film material to the Büro der Sicherheit in the Hague. However, his testimony has never been confirmed and the material has not been found. Wim Loeb, the former employee of Breslauer, stated that he edited two versions of the film material: one for Gemmeker and the other one for the Contactafdeling (the department for Public Relations). The latter version was found and handed over to the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (RIOD), whereas the whereabouts of the version edited for Gemmeker remain unknown. A technical analysis has shown that the existing Westerbork film is a copy (an edited version), except for a six-second fragment of a church service from March 5, 1944. Additionally, two remaining reels also contain unedited original material.

Additional rounds of editing were done by the archive, by its own account. They collected the best existing copies of the footage in order to restore the film, but so far they have only assembled the material without the text frames. The intention is to edit the film according to the original plans and scenarios, including the original title cards. This project is intriguing, but also questionable in at least two regards: it obscures the conception of an "original" material and it turns the idea of the archive as a neutral space upside-down. We cannot speak about an "original" other than in terms of the actual reels. The edit made by the archive can be compared to the original film plan, and further discussed in relation to what is known of Gemmeker’s intention. The latter point intersects the question of the archive as such; hence, here the archive must clearly be understood as an active agent. They did not only collect, store, and keep the material, but actually intervened in it and made an assemblage according to certain criteria. All material is of course organized when put in a collection, yet, the exceptional thing is that they did not only assemble all existing reels and copies, but in some sense created a film of their own.

The repeated edits and assemblage make up what is now known as the Westerbork Film, and this is what one must proceed from. This edit of edits, the Westerbork Film, is precisely a film and not just archival material. Hence, the reuse of the material, as in Respite, stems from an already constructed narrative and storyline. The archival intervention is thus different from other similar works, where more remains of the raw material – even if most material have some form of editing done to it.

Hence, we cannot know the scope of representations of the entirety of the material filmed in Westerbork, since what remains is the edit with the specific purpose to function as PR. Images of suffering would hardly fit a narrative constructed to communicate the camp’s productivity. As this was part of the commission from the start, such images might even have been avoided at the time of filming, but even if captured by the camera they would not have been included in this version. Hence, what appears as an argument formulated by Farocki, the emphasizing of the camp as a site for labor and production, might be founded in the very conditions of making and editing the materials. This is expanded upon in the chapter "Structuring Frames" but the levels of editing remain an important factor throughout – the first level being the editing done by Loeb, the second the assembling, organizing, and editing of it by the archive, and the third the intervention by Farocki as he makes Respite.
ARCHIVAL STORIES 3: RECORING THE EICHMANN TRIAL AND THE SPECIALIST

The Specialist: Portrait of a Modern Criminal is directed by Eyal Sivan and was released in 1999. The film exemplifies the controversy that has followed the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961. In 1990 Sivan was doing research for a film at the Spielberg Archive in Jerusalem when he discovered a shelf filled with tapes marked, in English, “The Eichmann Trial.” After some research he found out that the reels held actual footage from the trial. He contacted Rony Brauman, at that time the director of Médecins Sans Frontières, and told him about his discovery. A reason for the wide knowledge of the trial is the pieces Hannah Arendt wrote for The New Yorker in 1961; the following year she released her revised and expanded articles as a book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Brauman gave Sivan the book and they decided to make a film of the material, based upon Arendt’s book. They wrote the script together and Sivan directed it.

SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann was head of the Department for Jewish Affairs in the Gestapo from 1941 to 1945. He was in charge of organizing the practical aspects of the deportation of European Jews from their homes to extermination camps, attending to such details as scheduling the trains that delivered people to the camps. In May 1960, Adolf Eichmann, or Ricardo Klement, as he called himself in Argentina, was kidnapped by the Israeli secret services and brought to Israel to stand trial for war crimes committed during World War II. In April 1961, Eichmann was indicted on 15 criminal charges, including crimes against humanity, crimes against the Jewish people, and war crimes. He pleaded “not guilty in the sense of the indictment” to each charge. Eichmann was sentenced to death in May 1962 and executed in Ramleh Prison.

Three judges presided over the trial, and the prosecution was overseen by Israeli Attorney General Gideon Hausner. It was held at Beit Ha’am, House of the People, a community house in downtown Jerusalem that was remodeled for the trial. The judges were seated in the front of the room on an elevated podium; the witness stand was to their left, and to their right was the glass booth that was built to protect Eichmann. A thicket of journalists and a balcony open to the public spread out in front of them. The public interest and media coverage were huge, and the trial was highly symbolic for the Israeli state, since it was the first time Israel tried a Nazi criminal. The choice to locate the trial in Israel was not only symbolic but crucial to both the defense and the prosecution. In his first statement, Eichmann’s defense attorney, Doctor Servatius, objected that the court could not be unbiased, on the grounds of the judges’ identity as Jewish, since it was likely, as he argued, that “one of the judges himself or a near relative of his was harmed by the acts brought forward in the charges. An assumption such as this is quite possible. It arises from the fact that the entire Jewish people were drawn into the Holocaust of extermination;” Servatius thus tried to invalidate the court by claiming the impossibility of remaining objective; his claim was disregarded and the trial proceeded. The importance of the trial being conducted by Jews in Israel did, however, reappear when the judges raised some of the questions that stood at the core of the trial: “Could the Nazis have carried out their evil designs without the help given them by other peoples in whose midst the Jews dwelt?” and “Would it have been possible to avert the Holocaust, at least in part, if the Allies had displayed a greater will to assist the persecuted Jews?” As Hannah Arendt has rightly pointed out, the “case was built on what the Jews had suffered, not on what Eichmann had done.” The trial not only convicted Eichmann, it also provided a platform for witness accounts about the Holocaust and a framework to understand how and why such an event could take place. It has further become emblematic for various reasons: it was the only time Israel convicted a high-ranking Nazi; it was the first time survivors publicly testified; and the entire trial was videotaped and broadcast on both television and radio around the world.

In 1961 Capital Cities Broadcasting Corporation hired the American filmmaker Leo Hurwitz to film the trial against Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. The American company had signed a contract with the Israeli state which allowed them to document the trial as a whole. It was one of the first trials in history to be videotaped. The trial was broadcast on American television and in thirty-seven other countries, but not in Israel, since the country did not have a television network at the time. The fact that Israel could not broadcast the trial has been used as an argument that the state of Israel could not have had any propagandistic interests in the trial being filmed. Still, it may as well have worked the other way around: Ben Gurion explicitly wanted to remind the world of the Holocaust. He started after the trial that he wanted it to achieve three things: to inform the world about the Holocaust, to educate the unknowing Israeli youth, and to gain support for the Israeli nation state. The reasoning behind the decision to film the trial is uncertain, but it is clear that the initiative came from the USA. However, in the court decision on the matter, the judges quoted the British lawyer and philosopher Jeremy Bentham: “where there is no publicity, there is no justice.” They went on to quote another British lawyer, Lord Halsbury, saying that the court should make its proceedings public in order to “communicate to all that which all have the right to know.”

The judges did, however, demand that the recording of the trial not interfere with the proceedings. Hurwitz therefore placed four concealed cameras in the courtroom and connected them to a control booth across the street, from which he could instruct the camera operators and edit the footage in real time. He had four monitors screening the camera images, and in accordance with his instructions one camera was recorded on videotape, while the other three were not recorded at all. Hurwitz had to make instant decisions and, as he spoke neither German nor Hebrew and thus could only understand what was said when the trial was conducted in English, his editing was dependent not what was said, but on his understanding of the situation based on visual information. Hurwitz and his team shot up to six hundred hours in this manner, recorded on two-inch videotape, in the NTSC standard. Later the same year Hurwitz made a television documentary, Verdict for Tomorrow, based on his material, which was also aired on American television.

Hurwitz chose one out of four possible images and camera angles and through his choices, he created an account of the trial. Even though all of the proceedings are represented, they are also dramatized by image making, such as capturing reflections on Eichmann’s glass booth, close-ups, and sweeping camera movements. Like any director, Hurwitz made choices, which we in turn need to scrutinize.
Almost immediately after the end of the trial, the whereabouts and condition of the original material fell into dispute. Milton Fruchtman, the man in charge of the contract between the production company and the Israeli state, and also the producer of *Witness for Tomorrow*, says that the film was brought to the USA after the trial, and later donated to the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith (an American organization fighting anti-Semitism). However, some tapes seem to have been lost, probably in loans that never were returned, and in 1972 all material left was given to the Rad Archive, later renamed the Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Another copy clocking in at around 200 hours is kept at the Jewish Museum in New York City, and since copies of the videotapes were flown out of Jerusalem daily to television broadcast stations, it is reasonable to believe that some have kept the material. The Spielberg Archive has 350 hours of material, out of an original total of around 600 hours of visual material and 160 hours with sound. Several works have utilized the footage, including the 1987 *Secret Memoirs: Adolf Eichmann*, produced by Lori Perlow and Daniel Brinkley’s *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann* from 1997. Both included archival footage of the trial, but it remains unclear whether the sources came from American copies or the Spielberg Archive. Likewise, excerpts from the material have appeared in different accounts, each of which could have come from any copy of the original videotapes. These films are based on the same imagery but have added other archival sources as well, both use footage shot at the liberation of the camps and thus construct a coherent narrative out of the different archives. They connect the trial directly to the Holocaust, thus removing it from its more strictly juridical context and instead placing it within the realm of the politics of commemoration. In 2002, Alan Rosenthal and Nissim Mossek released the film *Adolf Eichmann: The Secret Memoirs*, using the Spielberg Archive material.

What happened to the material after 1972 is subject to conflicting accounts. Hildegard Trystor, the former director of the Spielberg Archive, gives one, and Sivan and Brauman give another that directly contradicts it. According to Trystor, the material was organized, well maintained, updated, and accessible. According to Sivan and Brauman’s account, they could access copies of only around 78 hours of the material in the early 1990s, and it took them two years to find 300 hours of the original tapes stacked in an unused washroom in the archive’s premises. The material was in poor condition and in an old media format, so eventually they digitalized it at their own expense. However, they only gained the right to copy the material after there had been a court hearing, since the copyright ownership was in conflict. After contacting several other archives, both in Israel and around Europe, Sivan and Brauman had collected 360 hours of material, most of which was filmed by Hurwitz, but some came from different television broadcasters. The remaining footage had to be remastered and catalogued, something which was done by Sivan. The footage for *The Specialist* has thus been restored, regraded, and transferred by computer onto 35 mm stock. Out of the 360 hours that they had access to, they made a 128-minute film. Including the struggle with the archive over the material it took them about eight years to finish the project, and in February 1999 the film premiered at the Berlin International Film Festival.

As discussed in the first chapter, a fundamental assumption for my venture is that the footage is framed: by something and someone. The concept of frame helps formulate what images do and how one can interpret that doing – thus, how I read their testimonies. The question of frame is an issue of situation, but also of caption, it is, in Laura Rascaroli’s words: “an element at once of the image, of the apparatus of cinema, and of film language that participates, supports and structures meaning-making in multiple ways, some of which have to do with spheres including technology, perception, psychology, aesthetics, narrative, ideology, and culture.” Framing, as described, is the temporal and ideological situation as well as the actual frame of the shot (the borders of the representation) and the caption given to the image. The question of caption is crucial for the encounter with an image, and as Susan Sontag writes: “For the militant, identity is everything. And all photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions.” Depending on the context and situation of the beholder, the image can depict any side of a conflict, and this inherent uncertainty in regard to photography must be taken into account. If images were looked upon as mere documents, as matters of fact, no rendering or captions would be needed. If looked upon as a surface inhabiting a depth and multiple conditions (such as caption, technical and factual conditions of production) rendering is everything. For Judith Butler photographs play a prominent part in pleas for truth; hence, taken to its extreme, there is no truth about an event if there are no images. Evidential use of images is often supported by verbal accounts, yet it is the image that is seen as proof. I agree with Butler when she argues for an adherence to the non-verbal argument put forth by images. The frame bears an intention, which the viewer needs to pay attention to; the intent is within the image, in its frame. When used as evidence, such a triple function of structuring, intention, and interpretation in and by the image, is still at play. If an image does not only possess a structuring quality in itself, but also structures what we perceive as reality, the necessary question is not only what the image represents, but how? Or, in other words, the structuring frame of the three films is what enables a reading of them in which the how of these films remains a central quest, which in turn could allow a usage of the images as evidence, yet, in a much more restricted set-up. The frame also serves an aesthetic purpose, as it highlights an “image” rather than a “picture” – as Mitchell described images as the species and the picture an organism whose form is given by the species. The frame is a constituting fact for those aspects of the image, that are more than its materiality.

A caption might not always be apparent at first glance, but demand a deeper encounter with the image. In the three films I address, the original captions are emphasized and made visible, they offer a new readability, to borrow Didi-Huberman’s wording, which enables
a transition between seeing [voir] and knowing [savoir]. Hence, as argued, the filmmakers call upon the viewer to take into account the situation in which the material was shot, the history of the material, and the newly created situation in which the images are shown. This chapter is dedicated to the structuring frames in order to bring forth the image operations at play. In all three films the representation remains the same over time. How the footage is read, by whom, and in what context determines what questions are being asked. The question of the frame is thus implied in resituating, since it unfolds the agency of the imagery.

Images unfold over time, as discussed. What the films do is to create an alternative narrative both for the present and for a further historicizing. Neither as a mere window into the past nor solely as a tool to rewrite history, the films provide instead another reading of the past in the present, for the future. The films look to reveal something which had not been in focus and to revise history in order to create a new one. Thus, they offer a profound deconstruction of the archive and its tokens of truth. Considering that the film fragments used in A Film Unfinished, Respite, and The Specialist were made with a clear intention, and that the same footage is read completely differently forty to seventy years later, the temporal gap is a constitutive factor and what makes a resituating possible at all. The temporal aspect is decisive – it informs the frames through which one reads the material, historically and in the present. Time makes new contextual frames possible, as well as a reading of the material frames. Hence, the time that has elapsed shapes both the structural framework and how one can understand the actual circumstances for, on the one hand, the filming of the material and, on the other hand, the reinterpretation of it.

This chapter addresses how the frame, agency, and analysis of the images are bound to one another. How is agency perceived and how it is brought forth in the three films? This further leads to the question of what is in images and what images do? This frame is further discussed in its temporal aspect, which structures the very possibility of reading the images through a notion of resituating, namely how one can overcome an aesthetic distance – something that, by extension, relates to two different strategies for reframing the archival footage. Firstly, how can the footage be understood within the dichotomy of true and false – Eyal Sivan was accused of forging history with his film. And secondly, how the respective usage of reflective and exposure is articulated in the films by Harun Farocki and Yael Hersonski.

**AGENCY AND ANALYSIS**

When resituated, the footage conveys something different from before. In the specific context of the three films, the agency of the images is foremost evident in a reading of their frames. The films thus make something previously unseen appear, which can be seen as being in line with the interventions of all three filmmakers – in their different strategies of resituating the materials. In The Specialist this is done through an intervention in the images such as, in A Film Unfinished through the narrative framework, and in Respite through Farocki’s reflexive approach. On the one hand, at times, the strong narration added by both Hersonski and Farocki overpower the images and govern the interpretation. On the other hand, Sivan’s lack of narration and active intervention in the images risk allowing only a reading in line with his own view of the material. What I want to point out is that all three filmmakers take a firm grip on the materials, but there is already an agency in the archival images, which is why the materials are interesting to begin with. Hence, images are active agents and need to be regarded as such. Where many theorists of photography have seen the act of photography as coming to an end when made into a final product, Ariella Azoulay claims that this is in fact a “new beginning,” denoted by its lack of a predictable end, which I see as true for the footage at hand. 242

Photographs are never mere objects; they act, and make others act. Azoulay refers to Arendt’s notion of action. To become a spectator, in Azoulay’s use of the concept, implies an active relation, rather than a one-way contemplation. 244 Azoulay’s argument can be extended to moving images, as they also contain a similar situation of creation and production, and the idea of a ‘new beginning’ applies well to the reuse of archival materials. Every time an image, still or moving, is materialized – copied, transferred into another format, or edited – the ‘end’ of the image becomes less predictable. In this sense all three films offer ‘new beginnings.”

For example, the visual framing of each scene in The Specialist disturbs any easily conceived notion of an image as a given enclosed entity. The many possible visual effects created when the content of the material was reworked, refute an easily deciphered agency. Amongst other things, Sivan inserts reflections in the shots that were not there before. The montage is, however, constructed by images from the same documentary source. Hence, the added reflection on Eichmann’s glass booth is not an external addition but a distortion of perspective through the original footage. Another concrete example of the relation between framing and agency could be the play with the facial expressions of Eichmann and Attorney General Hausner: several sequences are edited as if they react upon what the other said, but Sivan has acknowledged that they do not always correspond to the “real” moment. 245 These images are not altered per se, but set in a new context as a part of the narrative construction, in a manner which can be said to displace the order of the archival material. Yet, if these images are not regarded as mute objects this is not only something done to the image. Hence, when W. J. T. Mitchell poses the question of “what do images want,” he is echoing the formulation of Sigmund Freud’s and Franz Fanon’s inquiries into women and black men respectively, in order to create an understanding of images as having a desire. 246 One must shift focus from the photographers’ and the beholders’ desires, to the desire of the image itself. According to Mitchell, pictures are “things that have been marked with all the stigmata of personhood animation: they exhibit both physical and virtual bodies; they speak to us, sometimes literally, sometimes figuratively; or they look back at us silently across ‘a gulf of unbridged nature’ – they present not a surface but a face that faces the beholder.” 247

This phenomenon of looking back becomes acute in the moments of death and suffering in A Film Unfinished. The images remind the spectator of the horror of the Ghetto. The cynicism of the original intent is made clear in the different rendering of the material by Hersonski. The agency of the image remains, even though the context is radically altered.
Judith Butler writes: “The ‘how’ not only organizes the image, but works to organize our perception and thinking as well. If state power attempts to regulate a perspective that reporters and cameramen are there to confirm [...], it is part of the interpretation of the war compelled by the state.” From here a line can be drawn to *A Film Unfinished* and *Respite*, which are based on archival material produced through a similar structure of producing, by the ruling body, a regulated image account. One can also imagine the organizing *how* on a structural level: as a method of conceiving images. The *how* is then something of an equivalent to the frame, or a part thereof. The frame is to be seen as a comprehensive concept consisting of the *how* and the caption, as well as the specific situation and the ideological framework.
The film footage labelled Ghetto was intended to make up one self-contained film, with a clear narrative claim, which is communicated through contrasting scenes of the lavish life of a few Jews and the misery of the majority in the Ghetto. The claim is produced as a comparison, through a mixture of found and staged events in the scaled-off district. The first scene of the archival material offers a bird’s eye view of the Ghetto and then zooms in on the street below. This movement, Anja Hortsmann claims, places the footage outside the genre of documentary and shows how its construction is one of ethnographic filmmaking as it was shaped during the Third Reich. It marks the images as authentic, capturing daily life in the Ghetto as the shots move from a distant gaze to a closer account – as if the camera is capturing the real rather than staging it, as we will later find out. The play between propaganda and reality is intertwined and grounded in a shift of perspective. Hortsmann’s claim is interesting beyond the question of genre, as it illuminates the propagandistic level of making a film about a “foreign population,” marking the Ghetto inhabitants as objects of ethnographic interest rather than fellow men. Hence, this can be seen as the point of departure from which the argument of the footage is played out. With this ethnographic gaze in mind, the recordings showing street scenes, trade, but also overcrowded dwellings and catastrophic living conditions, spell out the propagandistic argument. Despite being a forced situation for its inhabitants, the Ghetto, in its desperate state, might appear as a natural habitat for the Jews and the camera as a mere recorder of the ongoing life therein.

There are no scenes of soldiers interfering, enforcing regulations or punishments – even the violence present in the images seems like an internal Jewish affair. One scene displays concrete acts of violence, but it is found in the so-called “rest material” of the original footage. On a separate roll of film, in color, there is a six-minute scene of a staged deployment with the Jewish ghetto police where passersby are chased off by the police. This material was probably never intended to be a part of the feature film, as discussed in the previous chapter on the archival histories of the materials. However, the main violence in the reels is captured through non-actions, through disregard and detachment. The non-violent action is displayed by montage, but also present in single shots, of street scenes where well-dressed scenes of abundance are assembled. There are scenes showing fine foods in a restaurant, an evening dance in a beautifully decorated room, a woman in her luxurious apartment, and an audience enjoying a cabaret. These scenes are all staged. The scenes of corpses in the streets are not.

Hence, the core argument in the Ghetto material, structuring the how of the images also in terms of propaganda, is through a display of the contrast between an allegedly rich upper class and a subdued ghetto, using anti-Semitic stereotypes to show the greediness of the upper classes and their disregard for their fellow men. The montage is structured in a manner commanding the viewer to turn against the presumed upper class of the ghetto, questioning how they could live like that while their neighbors were starving. The propagandistic message is conveyed through this display of stereotypes and affirmation of prejudices. In the filmic account, the Jewish community in the Warsaw Ghetto does not offer a support structure, instead everyone seems left to her own devices. The Jews, in such a grotesque representation, appear to be sealed off due to their own lack of civility and the Germans to be in fact doing the world a favor by removing them from the majority populations. The ghetto is presented as a sealed living space for the Jews, and as an artificial habitat that holds a community which will perish by its own accord. The act of dehumanization as a National Socialist strategy is well documented and this type of propaganda was one of the ways it played out, as the claim of the film has no foundation in a historic event.

In Farocki’s rendering, the how is played out through the double focus on labor and production – present in the original material and investigated in his re-articulation of the footage. If Farocki’s oeuvre is taken into regard, he has had a longstanding engagement in questions of labor and production, an aspect of the Westerbork material which is crucial in Respite. He inserts a drawn diagram, from the archival material, of the inflow and outflow of inmates in the camp. An arrow points into the camp and three arrows point out, denoting the directions of the inmates – to Theresienstadt, “nach dem Osten” (to the east, that is to the extermination camps) and to, less specific, “internment.” The figures represent the number of people who were taken into the camp and later deported. There is no time frame given in the diagram – most likely it was intended to display the efficiency of the camp. Farocki comments upon the fact that Westerbork might be the only camp with its own logo and the significance thereof is clear: a factory, promoting the camp as a site for labor. Westerbork was a transit camp, which the diagram reflects via the arrows pointing through the camp, and in Farocki’s words “an industrial and commercial operation,” which then places the image in line with Gemmeker’s intentions with the film. Farocki even reads the diagram as a visualization of pride, as the image communicates that the camp is well organized and operates effectively. As the transit camp stands for the in-between, for the momentary halt in the production chain, the title, Respite, Sylvie Lindeperg points out, indicates the hypothesis favored by Farocki: the Westerbork footage was shot to demonstrate the camp’s economic efficiency and thereby slow down or suspend the deportation of the slave laborers to the east. The title Respite, or the original German Aufschub, opens up for a reading of the film which indicates that all acts, labor and leisure, can be seen as a means to allow a little bit more time to pass and to defer the inevitable.

This reading shifts the focus of the material from the realm of Holocaust representations to one of production and labor. Farocki’s move brings forth the conceptual framework in which the material was produced and thus offers a greater understanding of the selection.
of scenes filmed. The positing of labor as the central theme is thus both a choice made by Farroki and something deeply rooted in the film. The great number of shots focusing on labor constitutes the argument that Camp commander Gemmeker wanted to emphasize – that the camp was efficient and well-functioning. This is further embedded in the strategy of Nazi propaganda at the time, thus, the how of the imagery is based on the constitutive aim of the Nazis to cast the camps as first and foremost efficient sites of labor, something which can also be seen in the only other filmed account of a camp in operation, the famous footage shot in Theresienstadt, also from 1944. It was made to counter the Allied news reports of the camp and thus to show the camp as a model labor camp. As the outspoken aim of the film was public propaganda, it is evident that no suffering would be represented. The film Theresienstadt: Ein Dokumentarfilm aus dem jüdischen Siedlungsgebiet (Terezín: A Documentary Film from the Jewish Settlement Area) was made following a visit by the International Red Cross to the camp. After the visit, Hans Günther, head of the regional Central Office for Resolving the Jewish Question, decided to produce a movie depicting the “excellent” living conditions for Jews in Theresienstadt. Like in Westerbork, an inmate was in charge of the cinematography, and the rest of the crew were also Ghetto inhabitants. The material as such has an affinity with the Westerbork material, showing the inmates’ everyday life: working, exercising, enjoying performances, etcetera. The Theresienstadt material made it to a final cut but, like the Westerbork film, was never distributed or screened at the time. Since 1945 no complete copy of the entire ninety-minute film has been located. There are only fragments available in different archives. After the war, the film was given the infamous title Der Fuehrer schenkt den Juden eine Stadt (The Fuehrer Gives a City to the Jews) by survivors of Theresienstadt – further emphasizing that the range of shots exclude everything that made the camp a site of exception, that differentiates it from an ordinary city. There is no mention of the forced conditions, deportations, and mass killings that in most cases are what constitute the perception of the same camp. As stated, the films from Westerbork and Theresienstadt are the only two films of camps made during the war; the remaining film footage shot in Theresienstadt, also from 1944. It was made to counter the Allied news reports of the camp and thus to show the camp as a model labor camp. As the outspoken aim of the campaign was public propaganda, it is evident that no suffering would be represented. The quote above is followed by a famous shot of Farroki burning himself with a lit cigarette. The image gives no way equivalent to the burn of napalm, yet, it is painful to watch. To show a wound from a napalm burn would not make us see or understand anything. Farroki claims, rather we would “close our eyes” to the image, to the event and to the entire context. Respite offers another strategy in relation to this claim, with the intention of finding a way to encounter painful events and atrocities without subsuming to the reflex of disregarding. This, in line with Barthès’ rendering of the problems of a “shock image,” implies that the images depicting the full-fleshed horrors might not be the preferred means to communicate and commemorate an event, as discussed in the first chapter. Maybe other kinds of images can provide a fuller idea of what went on? Further, one must ask what kinds of images one can see. Whose suffering is depicted and who is the one watching? The image of a napalm burn is not directed at the victim herself, but at someone not subject to the horrors of war; hence, someone who has the possibility to “close [his/her] eyes.” In Inextinguishable Fire Farroki produces a new image to discuss napalm, and in Respite he uses material seldom regarded in relation to Holocaust representations. The footage from Westerbork offers an operation similar to the one Farroki produces with the burn: by not showing something they still show it. Did-I Huberman describes the formal choices in Respite as both diligent and dialectical, which provide the spectator with new means of seeing, of getting close to the images, or even learning to see anew. Crucially, the footage still testifies to the event, but in a backwards manner, which reaches beyond a mere representation. The images are “proxies” to return to Primo Levi’s description of himself as a witness; they speak in the place of an image that cannot exist. This phantasmagorical image is impossible, because no image can capture the entirety of anything, nor can it survive and testify like Levi or other survivors. In other words, there is no image to depart from: the proxy is the place of departure and it does not stand in for anything more than an idea of what an image of napalm or of the Holocaust is. The witnessing qualities of the footage are on the one hand as a counter image to a mental image of suffering and on the other a relativizing of categorical conceptions such as the category of Holocaust representations. The idea of a category evokes certain mental images, and the question in relation to Respite is how those images can be placed in relation to Holocaust representations in general. The witnessing quality of the footage is bound to the event and what we know of it today. It does testify, it serves as witness, but one must pay close attention in order not to bypass the different layers of meaning. The rushes from Westerbork would not, in another context, in themselves testify to a genocide – yet, because the context is that of a genocide, they do. Hence, the image as witness exceeds the representation; to read the image as witness is to read its frame. The frames of this footage are to be read as its means of production, its representation, and its historical and present context.
OVERCOMING AESTHETIC DISTANCE

The photographer’s intentions do not determine the meaning of the photograph, which will have its own career, bloomed by the whims and loyalties of the diverse communities that have use for it.268

SUSAN SONTAG

When encountering footage of a past time, the gap between then and now constitutes how these images might be understood, which is the point of departure for the works addressed, as discussed previously. Susan Sontag describes the aestheticizing impulse of the viewer when encountering an old photographic image, which shadows an understanding of the motif and labels it an aesthetic distance. A photograph taken a hundred years ago might then have gripped a hold of its viewer due to its motif, but would move us today because it is an old image and would be immersed by a nostalgic gaze on times past. “Time,” Sontag writes, “eventually positions most photographs, even the most amateurish, at the level of art.”269 Film, as well as photographs, are, if not defined by, at least bound to a temporal quality and context. Representations, which at the time were totally conventional, are today read through an aestheticizing gaze. Hence, old photographs and films can be perceived as art in terms of their motif as well as in their materiality, where the artefactual quality is enhanced.

To some extent this is also true in relation to the films here, but the interventions by all three filmmakers also attempt to overcome the aesthetic distance.

The way the old photographic image shifts from documentary to art as it seductively seems to capture the past, is for example precisely in line with how the images of the Warsaw Ghetto have been used in documentaries as depictions of how it really was. It is this type of temporality that is then to be understood as art in the particular viewer's engagement with specific images.270 One’s first confrontation with a previously unknown horror, visually, might be compared to a revelation, albeit a negative one. The vastness of such an encounter is reflected in a description of Sontag’s own first experience of this kind: in 1944, at the age of twelve, she happens upon photographs of Bergen-Belsen in a local bookstore, and nothing in photographs or real life “ever cut [her] as sharply, deeply, instantaneously.”271 Such images instantly and irrevocably sadden. Sontag writes that something within her died when encountering those photographs of the camp and that she is still crying. These are the kinds of images that since the war have become the emblematic images of the Holocaust and as harrowing as they might be in what they represent, their shock effect might have worn off due to their vast reproduction. Since today photographs like the ones from Bergen-Belsen are almost archetypical – they are close to being a definition of what a horrifying photograph is – time has done something to the spectator’s encounter. When seeing those images of piled bodies today, I instantly place them within their context of the concentration camp, as images I have seen many times before: images that have shaped my entire perception of the Holocaust, whereas Sontag encountered something that had literally just passed – something in her present-time and something not previously seen by her.

Roland Barthes claimed that when faced with gruesome images, the spectator does not have any space to react since the images are already over-determined by the photographer. It is he or she who has been shocked, and the photograph transmits this shock to the spectator who cannot use his or her own judgement: the image is already absorbed by its creator. “Shock photos” are caught between literary narration and art’s enlarged actions, they are neither literal nor artistic.272 Hence, such images do not show shock or horror, but display only the scandal of the shock. The kinds of images that do affect us are rather those where the horror is downplayed, and as they are deprived both of their beauty and explanation, their naturalness forces the spectator to engage with and judge them without the restrictions of “the demiurgic presence of the photographer.”273 Much of the footage shot during liberation falls under this scope, yet these are not the types of representations prominent in the footage shot during the war, rather the opposite – the lack thereof is what is remarkable. Two of the films do not contain any shocking images; quite the opposite; they work with that kind of imagery as an external referent. In A Film Unfinished, shocking images are posed as dialectical images within the montage of the original material. There are several scenes of suffering and also of dead emaciated bodies and a mass grave. Many of the Ghetto inhabitants by bringing the old filmed material into a new context and thus collapsing the two sides. Hence, it is not only a distance that is overcome, but also the notion of aesthetics in Sontag’s simplistic understanding. My view of aesthetics, in this context, is rather defined by the artistic rendering of the intersections of representation and frame.

None of the three films can be understood solely as self-referential films assembled from archival material, since the temporal aspect also asserts an ethical dilemma. The time and place of viewing the footage structures the reading of it, and thus governs an ethical agency. Hence, the ethical implications of photographic material are fragile – this even includes images that have reached the status of ethical imperatives, such as those shot during the liberation of the concentration camps. Hence, the viewer should not succumb to a historicizing impulse, since the fragility seems to be grounded in the present. The matter is based in the particular viewer’s engagement with specific images.270 One’s first confrontation with a previously unknown horror, visually, might be compared to a revelation, albeit a negative one. The vastness of such an encounter is reflected in a description of Sontag’s own first experience of this kind: in 1944, at the age of twelve, she happens upon photographs of Bergen-Belsen in a local bookstore, and nothing in photographs or real life “ever cut [her] as sharply, deeply, instantaneously.”271 Such images instantly and irrevocably sadden. Sontag writes that something within her died when encountering those photographs of the camp and that she is still crying. These are the kinds of images that since the war have become the emblematic images of the Holocaust and as harrowing as they might be in what they represent, their shock effect might have worn off due to their vast reproduction. Since today photographs like the ones from Bergen-Belsen are almost archetypical – they are close to being a definition of what a horrifying photograph is – time has done something to the spectator’s encounter. When seeing those images of piled bodies today, I instantly place them within their context of the concentration camp, as images I have seen many times before: images that have shaped my entire perception of the Holocaust, whereas Sontag encountered something that had literally just passed – something in her present-time and something not previously seen by her.
filmed seem to be on the verge of dying, as their emaciated bodies and hollow faces are displayed and uncovered. Many of them have already passed and are filmed as corpses left on the streets. A witness explains in the film that even ‘respectable people’ would place their dead relatives on the street, leaving corpses on the sidewalk every hundred meters. Several witnesses account for the presence of dead bodies in the streets. One woman recalls how she once tripped on a dead body, ending up face to face with the dead man: after that, she states, all corpses appeared to have the face of that single man. The face of the dead man appeared for her almost as a Levinasian face of the other – making her see him as an individual being, and yet, the recurrence of the face erases all differences, making them the same again.

Still, in *A Film Unfinished* the horrifying shots are present as part of a context and narration, not as singular emblematic photographs revealing the horror of the war, and therein lies the ethical question. The shots do not appear as a revelation in Hersonski’s film; as the spectator of the film encounters them at a temporal distance, they do not produce a shock or strong effect; rather, it is the type of footage that we would expect from the Warsaw Ghetto. This also alters the ethical charge in the sense that there seems to be no purpose in showing them in order to enlighten the spectator about the event as such. In fact, the images rather play multiple roles. In the original footage the scenes of suffering are contrasted with scenes of abundance and can thus be read as part of the construction of the propaganda argument. When the same shots are resituated in Hersonski’s film, they also serve as a contrast to the scenes of abundance; however, the fact that the latter are staged is emphasized, rendering them far from documents of how it really was. Yet, the scenes of suffering are not subjected to the same unraveling as the staged scenes; they are provided with context but in most instances the reading of them remains within the realm of the authentic – only a few comments affect how the shots are perceived. At the end of *A Film Unfinished* there is a sequence where people appear before the camera two by two, and when the final pair has been portrayed, the camera pans and a whole line of people is made visible. The couples display oppositions: one is well off and wealthy, the other one poor or even starving. This scene is the most literal staging of the propagandistic claim of contrasts, but it is also one of the few shots in which the spectator can look into the eyes of the filmed subjects. What becomes key is the relation between the one depicted and the one looking at the image. Sontag poses this as a critique of the society as a spectacle since it ‘assumes that everyone is a spectator’ which, ‘suggests, perversely, unseemingly, that there is no real suffering in the world.’

What the footage shot in the Warsaw Ghetto sheds light on and testifies to is not only the suffering of malnutrition or a display of corpses, but also the agency of the camera and the fear its presence aroused. It is plausible to believe that the camera had an effect, by its mere presence in the Ghetto. As a witness described, it might have appeared as a savior – in the sense that those who participated in the film would be rewarded or even saved through their participation – and, as discussed, acts of violence were committed in order to organize scenes accordingly. A report written by Ghetto commandant Auserwald, quoted in *A Film Unfinished*, recounts how the camera crew entered a prison, accompanied by members of the Jewish Council. Their presence in the prison caused great panic as the inmates thought that they were to be executed. He describes how women and children fainted, how the
TRUTHS IN NON-TRUSTWORTHY IMAGES

The films at the core of this book are bound to a contextual relation to the archive, and to its truth claims, which in turn are interconnected. The apparent truths of the footage are questioned; yet, other possible truths might emerge through the accounts presented. Through different strategies of calling attention to the editing and displaying the material as fragmentary excerpts, the filmmakers create an instability within the images. The films ask a question about the claims to truth in the archival context, as well as on the level of representation. And at the same time, they suggest an answer to the question posed: an archive cannot provide an account of the real event as a totality. Archives are not trustworthy.

But if images are not true, do they lie? In *A Film Unfinished*, what the shots seem to represent is far from all they have to say. The fragments have reappeared in documentaries depicting life in the Ghetto, even though most scenes are heavily staged. Hence, the footage cannot be trusted on the level of representation. What it seems to show is Nazi propaganda, but what can it convey beyond what the images represent? The drastic alteration of the understanding of the film fragments over time places them in a space of uncertainty. The film shot in the Warsaw Ghetto cannot be said to truthfully represent the living conditions in the Ghetto. Still, not all scenes are staged, and even those that are testify to another factual condition: the specific conditions of production. However, to regard the film fragments in a binary relation of true and false, runs a risk of diminishing the images as witnesses – which is relevant for all three films.

In *Respite*, the fallacy of the footage is put forward in order to emphasize that the viewer is taking part in the construction of what is shown and what is excluded. Harun Farocki’s film is neither a compressed version of the *Westerbork Film*, nor does it radically break with its narrative structure. The incompleteness of the original film is almost more apparent in *Respite* than in the material available in the archive. Farocki has inserted documents related to the film in the material, as well as adding text frames of his own. By using the original text card and a diagram over the inflow and outflow of the camp, a fuller account of what the film was intended to be is revealed. The same shots are displayed several times, and each time they are contextualized differently, or a specific detail is highlighted. The information we can draw from the imagery seems to lie within the film as such, and simultaneously depend on context. Hence, the footage does not tell us what it was supposed to express (that the camp was efficient) but it does tell us something else. The film recounts the story of the filming, how the material came about, and the reasons behind it. However, it also offers an account of a reality in that specific camp – hence, if the falseness of the images is taken into account, knowledge about the camp can be extracted. For example, the sites as such are not staged, even if the specific scene in that site is constructed, and neither are the factories and the type of labor conducted within them.

In *The Specialist*, Eyal Sivan uses only a fraction of Leo Hurwitz’s filmed material, which is then distorted through the use of montage, manipulation, and reworking of the images. The narrative is constructed in a non-chronological way - the scenes do not follow an apparent sequence. *The Specialist* is a suggestive account and the filmmaker does nothing to hide it; biases are rather reinforced by strong sounds and abrupt cuts. The first moments of the film show an empty auditorium – the courtroom, in fact - and the voices of the trial interpreters are heard speaking in Hebrew, French, German, and English. This is not a newsworld; this is not a representation that claims conventional truth. By opening with a cacophony of voices that cancel each other out, Sivan gestures towards uncertainty in the field of interpretation. Since all the voices we hear are different translations, there might also be something that is lost or misunderstood in each account. Sivan acknowledges that his voice is only one among many. In other words, the film explicitly presents itself as one interpretation, one translation. He states: “Originally, all the images in the film were found in the archival material, yet, not a single image of those that compose the film can actually be found in the archive.” This is due to the fact that the images in the film, as well as the “chronography,” i.e. the time invented in the film, were manipulated, according to Sivan. The film does not only react upon the archive or the images. The collection in the archive consists of hundreds of hours of particular moments, but by reshaping the material, Sivan forces a re-evaluation of the collection. By editing and manipulating the archival images, he rewrites the historical narrative constructed around the material, that is the commemoration of the trial.

As mentioned earlier, the material itself is the main focal point in all three films. The moving images are put to work: by editing and montage, by structure and sequence, and by repetition and attendance to detail so that they cannot be regarded solely as representations. Through the manner in which they are resituated, their meaning is radically altered: in *A Film Unfinished* as well as *Respite* the footage has ceased to be Nazi-propaganda and become something else. Yet, the different archival film materials all relate to historic events, and even the resituated films can, to different extents, be read as representations thereof.

In some scenes in *A Film Unfinished* what appears to be must be considered as a cover for what really is beyond the mere appearance. In instances where truth and fiction collapse, the distinction becomes superfluous, except as a tool to unravel the agency in each shot. One example of how this is aesthetically expressed is when a diary entry is employed as a narrative tool to account for the violent ramifications of the filming: a crowd was assembled and the Jewish police were ordered to rapidly disperse them. The shot is shown along with the reading of the diary. The same scene is described by another witness, who states that in order to create a more natural effect the Germans shot in the air, and people indeed look terrified. The same scene is then repeated, in another shot from the rest materials. What could have been an event in the Ghetto, is really an event for the camera. The violence expressed is performed at the command of the SS, but for the benefit of the film. The inhabitants of the Ghetto assembled for the scene are made into actors within their own reality. The beatings with police batons are simultaneously acted and real: the strokes are intended for the camera, but they hit just as hard as any other day. The scene is staged, but the fear in the eyes of the crowd is real.

In relation to *The Specialist*, the intervention in the footage was read as a distortion of the actual history of the Eichmann trial and gained lengthy critical ramifications. The editing of the archival material is crucial to the controversy that *The Specialist* caused.” The film
received generally positive reviews when it was released and screened in cinemas around the world, but since then it has continued to cause heated discussions. As addressed throughout, the topic is in itself a minefield; representations of the Holocaust, or its aftermath, are still sensitive matters.

Hillel Tryster, the former director of the Spielberg Archive and the harshest critic of The Specialist, voiced his objections in 2005, six years after the film was released. He was concerned by how Sivan handled the archival material. In Tryster's view, The Specialist is not truthful, the reason being that the filmmaker relies on "those trends in post-modern philosophy that deny the existence of objective truth and reality." By evoking the notion of the film as somehow counterfeit, he implied that the filmmaker had a hidden agenda to deceive the audience. The audience is made to understand that we do not see everything; the filmmaker not only rearranges scenes and makes a selection, but also manipulates the footage by adding scratches, reflections, and sounds.

Tryster's critique, however, poses several problems. Firstly, he implies that the archive is a neutral entity and not a construction. Secondly, he presumes that the documentary imagery offers a 'true' presentation and fails to acknowledge that the actual footage is directed by Hurwitz. Lastly, he posits the archive as a building block in a greater construction of a Shoah narrative, rather than offering it as a source that contains an endless number of possible interpretations. For an archive is necessarily a construction, both as a collection and as an excerpt of a historical event. In Sivan's film, the archive's imperfection is made visible when three black frames with white text — providing the viewer with a date and indicator of the court session as well as production and director credits — are inserted one after the other. Since one frame follows the other, none of them can be trusted as correctly referring to what follows. The audience is made to understand that we do not see everything: the film can be read as an excerpt of the archive, which in turn is an excerpt of the event. Tryster went through Hurwitz's material and located the sequences that Sivan used in the film, and then claimed to have revealed a forgery performed by the filmmakers. In articles and lectures he listed examples of instances where sequences that follow upon each other in The Specialist did not do so in the original recording and moments when sounds are added and the image manipulated. "This reproach is somewhat baffling — Sivan's film in no way hides the fact that it manipulates the original footage in order to construct its pieces into a new narrative; on the contrary, the alterations lie at the core of the film's grammar. As the filmmaker himself stated, the core of the film plays with the contradiction that the footage is from the archive and yet manipulated into new images, which cannot be found in the archive." Furthermore, sounds are constantly distorted and black frames intersect every scene. Sivan not only rearranges scenes and makes a selection, but also manipulates the footage by adding scratches, reflections, and sounds.

One of the scenes that Tryster criticizes involves a map of the Third Reich. During the trial, Adolf Eichmann is asked to point out the areas invaded and annexed by the Reich on a map attached to the wall next to his booth. He asks if he can step out of the booth in order to see it better. Attorney General Hausner and Judge Halevi exchange a nervous gaze before he is granted permission, and Sivan reinforces the look with sound effects. Once more, both the image and the sound quality are deconstructed; Eichmann is shown from behind, explaining in what order areas were incorporated; Hausner steps up next to him, and their words are buried in sounds. This scene shows both Eichmann's way of naming the events of the war, in which areas where "incorporated," and the specificity of the circumstances of the trial. However, the scene is also one of the instances where the filmmaker has chosen to emphasize the material as archival and old; by reinforcing the bad quality of the image, he places it in the historic context of the trial.

Tryster, however, reacted to the fact that the image depicts Eichmann and Hausner standing side by side: both bald and dressed in black and looking very much alike. Sivan did not create this image, but Tryster argues that it sets up a correlation between the accused and the prosecutor. I agree with Tryster to the extent that a parallel between the two men is made throughout the film, and that the argument is made visually in this shot. It does not, however, make them the same, as Tryster indicates. He misunderstands the scene in line with the misunderstanding of Hannah Arendt's book as being based on the presupposition that Eichmann is anyone and that anyone could be him.

In the context of the Eichmann trial we know that only one out of four cameras was recording at any given time and that the director was incapable of understanding what was said and thus edited based primarily on sensory instinct and facial expressions. We also know that part of the filmed material is still missing. The Specialist is one account of the trial, one which evokes the notion that no holistic account can exist. Tryster rejects the film on the basis that it refutes the authority of the archive, and thus also diminishes the trauma that it represents. Enwezor also recognizes that the film questions the authority of the archive, but draws another conclusion: it does not diminish the event, but is an attempt to raise questions about archival truth and the relation of documentary images to memory. What seems to be forgotten in Tryster's criticism is what is accentuated in Enwezor's praise: the awareness of an artistic practice that removes the footage from simple truth claims, as previously discussed, since the artistic intervention of re-articulation and restating demands a more complex approach to issues of both realism and representation. Hence, the films do not remove any given truth, but by working with disparate strategies and methods of reading they enable more truthful readings of the footage. The arguments set forth by Tryster on how to represent the Eichmann trial truthfully, allow for only one true narrative and thus counter other possible readings and representations of the trial.

As mentioned above, The Specialist and A Film Unfinished have both been distributed in cinemas under the label of documentary, thus bound to represent the real in some sense. But The Specialist has also, like Respite, been shown in art settings without a strict genre label. I hold that the quest of the gestalt thinking that I discussed earlier lies beyond the realm of documentation or presentation. The films unfold on the basis of an argument formulated by its director by means of montage. Thus, embedded in the truth claims of the footage or in the possible truths pointed out by the filmmakers, is the question of method and narrative. I return to the latter in the following chapter, and the question of method is present in
all parts of this book – in terms of what it means to resituate archival footage. In the films by Farocki and Sivan the montage is central and relates to how a possible truth can be perceived. In my reading, the juxtaposition of ideas brings forth their political claims, but also posits them as conceptual works – rather than documentary and thus, not foremost preoccupied with questions of truth and falsehood. This might be especially true for The Specialist. Here, again, the films by Farocki and Sivan seem driven by conceptual frameworks, whereas A Film Unfinished rather seems to manifest a didactic urge. This has ramifications when considering the image as witness, since two of the films destabilize any given narrative of a representation while the third does not question the representation as such, but rather provides something equivalent of expanded captions. The conceptual frameworks employed by Sivan and Farocki intervene in questions of historicizing and representation, as two separate realms that both need to be accounted for, whereas Hersonski’s film investigates representation as a means to unravel historic truth.

REFLEXIVITY AND EXPOSURE

Even today the images shot in the Warsaw Ghetto and in Westerbork might pass as plausible representations when various scenes are inserted in documentaries. Yet, as discussed, when this footage is presented in A Film Unfinished and Respite, its claim to reality is disturbed. In Hersonski’s film, the aim is to expose a possible truth hidden in the shots and in Farocki’s to pose the image as fundamentally unstable. A Film Unfinished attempts to expose what lies behind the surface of representation, whereas Respite is reflexive at its core. While The Specialist makes the most apparent intervention in the archival material in order to construct a new narrative, A Film Unfinished and Respite operate in subtler ways.

Respite opens with a sequence of still images: an overview of the camp, a shot of inmates and to the living quarters with rows of bunk beds. The photographs are intersected by text frames presenting historical facts about the camp. However, after just a few minutes the meta-level is introduced: a shot of Breslauer filming, preceded by a text frame accounting for the history of the film. The film does not follow the chronology of the Westerbork material, except in short sequences. Farocki returns to the same scenes on several occasions, highlighting different details or contextualizing them in different ways. Other scenes are played in slow motion; on one occasion Farocki states that that was how the scene was recorded, but in other instances it is the director’s choice. Strategies like these point towards the reflexivity that runs through the work, in terms of montage and in the commentary inserted as text frames, destabilizing any given truth claims of the image.

Farocki highlights the instability of the footage, and in this special perspective the imagery is perceived as a complex matter which needs to be reflected upon if one attempts to read it at all. The reflexivity, thus, consists of a continuous dialectic between image and text, between the visual material and the gaze bestowed upon it. A sentence, inserted in a text frame, reads: “These images can also be read differently.” The short statement summarizes this reflexivity put in motion, in terms of both Farocki’s own working through the material in the film and my reading of it. The image operation can be read in line with Butler’s understanding of the photograph as being not solely a visual image awaiting interpretation, but as in itself actively interpreting. The work performed by images is, thus, a work in progress. The montage, syntagms, and paradoxes can bring out different elements of the images, rendering different readings of them. The footage is an acting agent, progressing over time and space. This is brought forth in Respite as one reading opens up for other possible readings, whereas the archive, as a truth-bearing entity, can be seen as solidifying one given narrative. As discussed in the first chapter, images, if understood as “Vorbilder” (models) in Farocki’s own terminology, entail the aspect of a before, rather than an after. These were the kinds of images Farocki wished to produce; something of an example image rather than a replica. For example, might be most interesting to think of the images shot in Westerbork as exemplifying a possible representation, rather than as a depiction of what took place. The exemplifying quality of the footage can then offer an escape from the truth claim of photography and instead tie it to the testimony of the image.

Although the footage in Respite was not filmed by Farocki, there is an image production in progress. What Farocki does is to put the footage to work in a manner that suggests an image production of sorts, which could be understood within the realm of resituation. The Westerbork material is not merely shuffled into a new context, but reproduced within it. In line with Butler’s view of the active image, where the images’ demand for interpretation is sometimes even described as compulsive – as if the image commands the viewer to interpret what is shown – one must adhere to what the footage says in every specific context. Returning to the quote from Farocki’s film, “these images can also be read differently,” the can should be altered to a will – since the interpretative act will always remain necessary and always unstable. On the one hand, Farocki opens up the footage and questions a pre-conceived view of it, and on the other, he steers the viewer with a steady hand by indicating what parallels one can possibly draw in certain instances. One example is precisely the frame stating “these images could be read differently,” which urges the spectator to extend her analysis, but which is also followed by another frame indicating how Farocki reads it. In the specific scenes in relation to which the comment appears, approximately halfway through the film, men are seen preparing a field for sowing by digging holes in the earth, followed by a shot of women sowing and unloading a cart – scenes in line with Gemmacher’s aim to demonstrate the self-sufficiency of the camp. Yet, the reading Farocki proposes is that these men and women, working the field, could be building their own society. Without Farocki overtly stating it, this enables me to see something else in the shot. Where he hints at the foundation of a new unspecified society, the images that appear before my eyes constitute images from the early Kibbutz movement in Israel. In my mind, these images are uncannily similar.

Earlier in the film, Farocki suggests another reading that puts the same scenes in a different light. The men and women working the field do it in place of horses, in place of machines, he claims. They are made use of in the most literal sense, as slave labor, as they draw the harvested earth as the hole is made. Simultaneously, details appear. Women unloading bricks, a vestment behind them. The entire sequence is played in slow motion and this, combined with the low image resolution, makes the footage almost abstract. Feet moving slowly, the shattering as the hole is made. Simultaneously, details appear. Women unloading bricks, a returning shot of a single throw, from one woman to another, with a smile exchanged. The
dual use of this sequence is telling for the film as a whole, where something is put in focus and other things are blurred. The spectator can read the footage, but never grasp it fully; one interpretation can always be substituted for another. The reflexive approach enables these shifts between obscurity and illumination and zooming in on one detail at a time, regardless of possible contradictions. Farocki suggests reading upon reading, reflecting back and forth between footage and text.

While the material in many ways seems exhausted, it is curious that Farocki neither comments on the scenes that are excluded, nor on how he made his selection. The reflexivity only reaches so far. A reason for this might be found in a text which the filmmaker wrote the same year as he made the film. Farocki reflects on the scene of a deportation in Westerbork, as it was used in Night and Fog, and writes “in that sequence the deportees are more than mere instances, the images more than mere visual signals.” This can be understood as a starting point for the investigation of the material in Respite. Farocki continues by stating: “I advocate a filmic procedure that doesn’t treat the image like raw material that the montage melts down, and instead considers the singularity of each shot. The montage itself should be this consideration: What is the value of a shot? What does it say, also alongside and beyond what I want to convey through it?” The statement can be seen as manifesting the method used by Farocki, in both Respite and other instances, where a sort of puzzle is laid out, without becoming a mere compilation film. The material used in Respite might, in line with this claim, not be seen as a whole – in all its imperfection – but as a collection of singular shots. In this way, one escapes the problem of the material being faulty from the start, as it is a compilation of an edited copy, as well as the possible problem of excluding certain scenes. The shots that Farocki has chosen to exclude, out of the Westerbork material, are no different from the ones he includes. If the archival material is seen as consisting of a multitude of shots, rather than as a single filmic structure from which things can be left out, this does not appear as problematic. The intervention by and the agenda of the artist is conducted openly. The shots chosen by Farocki do not stand as representations of the material as such, but instead each shot stands as a singular instance, emanating from the same context and conditions of production. Interestingly, such a relation to the material can be seen as simultaneously bypassing the question of the archive and being immersed in it. Farocki’s statement can be seen to echo the Derridian call for a view on the archive as raw material for the future, but the act of accounting for the archival process and the different rounds of interventions in the material seem superficial. Yet, what Farocki is advocating is a filmic procedure, not a general viewpoint, and thus it might boil down to a question of editing and reflecting rather than of historically correct archival practice. What is brought forth in the example of the scene of deportation – but as a collection of singular shots. In this way, one escapes the problem of the material being faulty from the start, as it is a compilation of an edited copy, as well as the possible problem of excluding certain scenes. The shots that Farocki has chosen to exclude, out of the Westerbork material, are no different from the ones he includes. If the archival material is seen as consisting of a multitude of shots, rather than as a single filmic structure from which things can be left out, this does not appear as problematic. The intervention by and the agenda of the artist is conducted openly. The shots chosen by Farocki do not stand as representations of the material as such, but instead each shot stands as a singular instance, emanating from the same context and conditions of production. Interestingly, such a relation to the material can be seen as simultaneously bypassing the question of the archive and being immersed in it. Farocki’s statement can be seen to echo the Derridian call for a view on the archive as raw material for the future, but the act of accounting for the archival process and the different rounds of interventions in the material seem superficial. Yet, what Farocki is advocating is a filmic procedure, not a general viewpoint, and thus it might boil down to a question of editing and reflecting rather than of historically correct archival practice. What is brought forth in the example of the scene of deportation, which he refers to in the quote above and came to use repeatedly in his own film, is that the shots of the deportees remain specific in a manner that does not fit in with the greater idea of Holocaust imagery. The SS men stand around smoking, there are no fences, and no one is rushed, pushed, or mistreated. This ties in with an idea of another type of montage, which should not be thought of as the relationship between two shots, one following the other, but as the “montage at a distance,” where “every shot relates to every other.” This is put into practice in the reflexive strategy of Respite, as shots appear and reappear to serve another context and to make another point, and where all image relations seem multiple rather than binary.
To think of the sounds in film as a soundtrack is as reductive as regarding the imagery as an "imagetrack," as Michel Chion has pointed out. Hence, in this book where much attention is paid to the footage, the voices of the films must also be addressed. The notion of a soundtrack, that encompass speech and music, is obviously not enough. What constructs the narrative in the films, in addition to the images, are multifaceted means of expression: voice, text, and soundscapes. *Respite* remains silent, but inserts intertitles. *A Film Unfinished* relies on verbal accounts to elucidate the imagery and employs the firm grip of a voice as a way of framing the content. *The Specialist* edits the sounds of the trial into a specific narrative; it is the only one of the three films where the sound emanates from the images, but it is itself as much of a montage as the visual material. Hence, the voices through which the films speak are manifold and possess various characteristics. In *A Film Unfinished*, the construction of the narrative is based on language: the voice-over and the readings of written accounts enable Hersonski's unraveling of the footage. In *Respite*, the reflexivity, which I have discussed previously, is played out through the written commentary. *The Specialist* is a sound film from the start, as it is a video recording from a later date. Further, *The Specialist* is based on a chapter in Hannah Arendt's book about the Eichmann trial. Hence, the question is by which means the narrative is constructed, if one takes into account the role of the comments, voices, silences, and sounds of the films.

The narratives are, however, not only structured by audiovisual montages. The narrations in these films are invested in finding the voice of the images as such. Thus, images can be seen as speaking entities - they possess an agency from which they make their voices heard. In the films by Hersonski, Farocki, and Sivan, the question of how the image speaks, truthfully or falsely, is central. As the context of speaking is radically altered when the archival material is resituated in the works, the question raised is how one can hear what the footage has to say.

That is to say, that the identification, or misidentification, of what an image "says" involves several layers of interpretive modes and circumstances: firstly, there is often a shift of focus from what the image "says" to what it *should* be saying, secondly a photographic image is always someone's view - there is no transparency in the representation, nor in the caption. This could be better understood by an account of Judith Butler's criticism of Susan Sontag's understanding of caption as encompassing the meaning of an image, hence, it prevails on a narrative account. Butler argues that Sontag "misunderstands the way that non-verbal
or non-linguistic media make their ‘argument.’” Instead, Butler proposes a reading of the interpretive frame. This is played out by different means in the films, but all three do construct decisive stories. As mentioned before, in The Specialist Sivan does not add any verbal commentary, but works intensively with the soundscape and the voices in the courtroom, while in both A Film Unfinished and Respite commentary is added. Hersonski does this by producing new images, adding interviews with survivors, and staging a reading of the cameraman’s diary – thus, the images function as a source of witnessing, around which the film’s verbal narration is constructed. By contrast, in Respite Farocki has inserted text frames commenting on the images shown, and the montage of image and text constructs the film. Thus, the deciphering of images with the help of words might take manifold shapes, and words have different ways of signifying. Images are dense and ambiguous and convey their message non-discursively. In W. J. T. Mitchell’s view, pictures are like ventriloquist dummies in relation to speech, where the speech of the dummy should not merely be the opinions of the ventriloquist but a search for the dummy’s own voice. Hence, to read the image as witness is to try to find that voice, but, as stated, the filmmakers also act as the ones conducting this search for voice – foremost in relation to A Film Unfinished. The films in their totality are subjected to the hand of the director, in terms of montage, editing, and narrative structure.

In this chapter, I ask what role voice and narration play as a means to build an argument in the different films. Firstly, I address how images and words play out in parallel in A Film Unfinished. Secondly, I discuss how Respite and The Specialist are structured with the help of silence and sound respectively. Thirdly, I shed light on the relationship between Hannah Arendt’s book and the narrative constructions in The Specialist. Lastly, similar questions of the role of narrative and literary sources are posed in relation to A Film Unfinished. What I want to emphasize is a movement between key elements of the narrative structures in the films, spanning from verbal and pictorial witnessing to silence, voice, and soundscape and then further to how literary sources are employed.

VERBAL AND PICTORIAL WITNESSING

What images say, if they do say something at all, is dependent on the spectator who brings the verbal message or speech act into, or out of, the image. As W. J. T. Mitchell points out, the spectator “projects a voice into the image, reads a story into it, or deciphers a verbal message.” However, his remark concerns images that lack caption, movement, and montage. Footage cannot be read as a mere stack of single images, since each shot is connected to the previous and the following ones, as discussed in relation to montage. Yet, I hold that a discussion of how the photograph speaks is applicable to the three films. What is needed is an expanded understanding of who is deciphering the image: it is both the director and the spectator. The footage filmed by the cameraman is interpreted and processed by the contemporary directors. Their interventions, in turn, enable the spectator to encounter the imagery from a specific point of view. That is to say, the archival footage spoke to the filmmakers, who both amplified and altered its speech.

A Film Unfinished uncovers the filmed material, thereby giving it urgency as an introductory lesson about Nazi film propaganda. The film opens in classic documentary mode as the camera pans through what appears to be a vault in an archive, accompanied by a piano score. A deep female voice opens the narration: “This is the story of a film that was never completed. A film designed to serve as propaganda for the Third Reich, that empire effectively with a camera, that knew so well to document its own evil, passionately, systematically like no other nation before.” The next shot is of an old archive and the story of how the material was found is retold. A frame stating “Anfang” (“beginning”) follows – hence, it is the first image of the archival footage – and then a shot of a bird’s eye view of the Ghetto appears. A brief story of the Ghetto is laid out and the spectator is informed that the film fragments were staged and based on contrasting shots. The voice-over goes on to state that the intentions of the propagandists can never be determined, and poses questions about why the film crew was sent to film the Ghetto, shortly before it would be wiped out, and also why the editing was cut short in its early stages. The next image is a cut-back to the film reels in the archive. The narrator recounts how the material has been used to show “how it really was” and to tell the untellable, with the result that the “cinematic deception was forgotten.” The sequence ends with a shot of a film reel being rolled out of the archive. The credit then appears: “A film by Yael Hersonski – the stage is set.”

Hersonski creates a narrative around the archival footage, emphasizing the material as such. This approach encourages a view of the images as being inseparable from their conditions of production, suggesting that a frame is needed in order for the image to make sense. Without such a frame, the fragments remain in the realm of propaganda, and their reproduction runs the risk of being a mere reiteration of a Nazi message. Hersonski resituates the main part of the archival material in her film. She illuminates the layers of meaning of the film fragments mainly through voice-over, readings from diaries, and witness accounts, and also through interviews with survivors from the Ghetto. A reenactment of the interrogation of the cameraman Willy Wist also serves as another layer of testimony. The encounter with the images is simultaneous with the verbal rendering, telling the viewer that there is more to the images than what you see. Throughout the film the pairing of images and words creates a sort of matching – what is talked about is shown and vice versa. A possible consequence of this is that the visuals turn into illustrations of the spoken, where the narration overpowers the speech of the footage. Hersonski’s method of constructing a narrative out of different types of commentary operates on several levels, which achieve different things through different means, but together they form the overarching narration. The voice-over functions as a didactic narrator, bridging the different voices and offering background information. The reenacted voice of Willy Wist embodies the filmmaker’s perspective and the witnesses represent the victims who survived. The diaries go along with the film fragments, showing the victims and giving them a voice, but also structurally placing them as the ones who did not survive. The memoir of the survivor Jonas Turkow is structurally placed in between the diaries and the interviewed survivors, since it is neither a source from the time of the filming, nor offering a contemporary perspective. Thus, the images speak through the assemblage of voices.

In the first minutes, the story which the film wants to convey is formulated and the filmic structure is established. Verbally and visually the film reel is taken out of the archive and
introduced as an urgent matter of today. The fundamental questions are already posed. The rest of the film will attempt, if not to provide an answer, then at least to account for what can be known of the circumstances of the filmmaking process. Simultaneously, the director takes a firm grip on the material and creates an authoritative reading in which the truth of the imagery is elucidated. The voice-over has a dual function as a didactic tool and as a framing of the exposed truth of the footage. As it already begins before the first credit, the indication is clear: this is the true story of the material. In this sense, the voice-over operates in a way that is opposite to Farocki’s written commentary: where he wants to destabilize, Hersonski wants to explain; where he insists on the instability of any reading, she claims to find the hidden truth. Hersonski’s intervention seems to be intended to correct a historical mistake, which has caused the footage to be read as documentary, whereas Farocki by means of his commentary intervenes in a broader debate on representation and image production. The use of voice in A Film Unfinished is what executes this corrective act – the speech provides the spectator with an account of the images and, thus, enables a correct understanding of the footage. The acousmatic presence of the voice emanating from a source outside the frame steers the spectator’s encounter. Michel Chion traces the concept of the acousmatic back to a Pythagorean sect “whose followers would listen to their Master behind a curtain” in order not to be distracted by the speaker, which is how the classical voice-over operates. The voice-over speaks from an omnipresent, omnipotent, and bodiless position; it speaks to and for the footage, but remains outside the frame. It is more than a caption, as it does not only describe what is seen in the image, but constitutes a frame of reading. In Hersonski’s rendering, the voice-over immediately determines the perspective from which the material is read, and the reading of the testimonies and diaries solidifies that story. The voices that do have a bodily presence, the witnesses and the reenactment of Willy Wist’s interrogation, are distant from the material in the sense that the temporal and spatial gap is both visible and audible. The witnesses speak back to the material, to their childhood and a place lost in time, while the reenactment constructs a third room and temporality, separate from both the present and the historic time of the Ghetto. The voices in A Film Unfinished operate in a liminal space, outside the frame of the archival footage but inside the frame of the film. Or, as Chion beautifully phrased it, the acousmêtre must “have one foot in the image, in the space of the film; he must haunt the borderlands that are neither the interior of the filmic stage nor the prosenium.”

As discussed, new images have been created since archival material displaying all that is said does not exist, nor are there sufficient images to visually communicate the narrative structure. These images link the voices heard to the archival footage. The newly produced footage visually communicates who the narrator is in specific instances. For example, the voice-over is combined with images of film reels and of archives. The voice reading the camp commander’s reports is paired with images of a typewriter. Thus, in a literal sense the images are created as illustrations or signifiers to the narration. This relation is played out fully in the reenactment of the interrogation, where the actor Rüdiger Vogler plays the role of Willy Wist. The questions posed to Wist are in most cases concerned with the process of the film production, rather than with particular scenes of the footage. Thus, his utterances cannot be paired with concrete scenes. Instead, new images as created. The viewer first encounters Wist in a scene in the beginning of the film, where a man is seen climbing a staircase in an official building. In the following scenes he is interrogated, and in the last shot of him, he leaves by the same stairs. These images recreate the situation of the interrogation, and communicate the conditions under which it took place (Wist came seemingly voluntarily and was free to leave). The sequence in the interrogation room is shot from a sidew ard angle, framing his profile from behind. The shots alternate between this profile and the two pairs of hands on the table (Vogler’s/Wist’s and the unrepresented interrogator). The real Wist appears in one of the film fragments, in this shot, also in profile, he wears a pair of black framed glasses, and the actor in the interrogation scene wears a similar pair. The profile shot and the glasses enhance the resemblance between the two, blurring the line between the reenactment and the historical situation. Hence, in one sense the setup of the reenacted scene is filmed and represented in documentary mode, yet in another, as the interrogation room is dark and blue-tilt, it looks almost like a crime drama.

Another site of tension is the anonymity of most of the voices – some are named, like Wist, Turkow, Ringelbaum, and Czerniaków, but the vast majority remain nameless. The diaries that are read from and the names of the witnesses are listed in the credits, but even then one cannot tell who is who. The same goes for the voices reading the diaries. Even the five witnesses who are interviewed are not easily distinguishable (four of them are women of the same age). In my first viewing they were blurred together into one common narrative. By depriving them of their individuality and their names, they are equated with the diaries read aloud, positioning them as generalized voices of the Ghetto. The loss of singularity produces a mass-victim of sorts, whereas the prominent men like Czerniaków and Ringelbaum keep their individual fates. The manifold languages of the historical written accounts enhance a figure of a witness in general, languages tied to Jewish identity such as Hebrew, Yiddish, Polish, and German are all spoken.

The contemporary interviewed witnesses, on the other hand, all speak Hebrew, marking them as Israeli, which, today also bears a certain political aspect. The translated (English) voiceover seems to function as a space for neutrality also in this sense (in the original Israeli version of the film, the voiceover was in Hebrew). The five witnesses are filmed one by one, in a cinema setting where they are watching the film fragments from the Ghetto. In an interview, Hersonski states that she chose this setting as a means of changing “the traditional scenery of the interview and creating a new interactive space where they could also be viewers.” As pointed out by media scholar Daniela Agostinho, this replicates Lanzmann’s strategy of “traumatic awakening,” but through a confrontation with archival images – thus, using a means which he rejected. The witnesses are introduced early in the film, one after another in sequences intercut with archival footage. In one of the first scenes a woman asks: “What if I see someone I know?” and in a following scene another witness lets out a deep sigh. As mentioned, no names appear until the credits in the end, and no background story is given. The witnesses are situated in the Ghetto through their own narrations, and they are all positioned as surviving witnesses through the first woman’s remark. The four women, and the one man, all have individual recollections of the filming in the Ghetto. Their voices are heard throughout the film, as they reflect on what they see. Shadows from the film projection flicker over their faces as they encounter the place of their childhood. The shadow of the projector light might be an aftereffect, what it does is to mark that they are watching the material. Still, the spectator cannot see what they see. At one point a shot is inserted showing a projector and its projection, but it is clearly not from
the cinema setting. These kinds of markers recur in the film, alongside those indicating whom the voice belongs to. The witnesses are thus positioned as inhabiting two spaces: as Ghetto inhabitants they are witnessing Ghetto life and the filming; as witnesses in the present day they are observing the result of this filming. The viewer of A Film Unfinished encounters them in this dual way, as their act of witnessing is grounded both in the historical event and in the present. Concretely, this is made visible in the last scenes of the film, where the witnesses are edited one after another – like in the beginning – watching the same images of a mass burial. The harshness of the images underscores the temporal gap: they are at once reliving the event and observing it from a safe distance. At the time when they lived in the Ghetto, they were used to encountering corpses; today all of them cover or close their eyes, and one woman exclaims that she cannot bear to watch these images today, now that she has regained her ability to cry. "I'm human," she explains.

The witnesses offer retrospection; their recollections take place more than sixty years after the filming in the Ghetto. In that sense they stand against the historical sources, the archival images and the diaries, as well the reenactment from the interrogation in the 1970s with Willy Wist. Different temporalities are at play both visually and audibly, enhancing the difference between the uncertainty of the present and the retrospective knowledge of history.

The Ghetto inhabitants knew little of what was about to happen and the accounts from after the war are inevitably marked by the destruction of the Ghetto a few months later and the subsequent deportations and mass murder in the concentration camps. The voices of the witnesses are marked by their temporal settings in a way that is impossible to disregard, as exemplified by the woman who cannot bear to watch in the scene described above. This scene also gestures towards the indefinite nature of the image as witness. Even the woman who was present at the event and now views the image decades later cannot perceive it in the same way as she did then.

Hersonski’s project emanated from a silence, the silence of her grandmother who was reluctant to speak about her time in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the general silence of many Holocaust survivors, as described in the introduction. The question of silence runs through the project as a whole, as the original material lacks sound. The void of silence is filled by the testimonies and voices added by the director, as well as by music and surrounding sounds that create the (false) impression that they stem from the images themselves. The addition of sound is partly an attempt to explain the images, but also a didactic tool as it frames the film as more accessible – in contrast to a more experimental approach. Yet, even the explicating aspect frames the images as documentary to a certain degree – not in the sense of them being documents of the Ghetto, but in the film created by Hersonski. This strategy is the opposite of that applied by Farocki in Restite, preserving the silence of the silent film. Hersonski explains that she encountered Farocki’s film as she was struggling with the question of sound in her own process. She regards his choice to keep the silence of the film as assigning a central position to the filmmaker, whereas she “wanted people to see the footage first, not the formal re-working.” Her reliance on the spoken word is, of course, also a formal choice. Thus, Hersonski intervenes as much in the material, only not by the same means. If Farocki’s presence speaks loudly through the film’s silence, her presence is hidden by all the words uttered, and sounds and images added. Further, the silence is a question of editing, of both withdrawing meaning and of active interpretation. As she puts it in her commentary, the silence interrupts a narration, the narrative unravels. The cut offers similar silences. Hence, meaning can be extracted at the editing table. When working with archival material, the work of the director is done in the editing process, since the concrete intervention in the material is central in its reframing. “The editing felt as a certain act of speech,” Hersonski states, “speech that comes on top of the original Nazi film-footage’s silence.” The notion of the speaking image is, thus, a manifold quest of deconstruction and resituation by means of editing, as well as watching and listening. The editing process is not a soundtrack, but what constitutes the speech of the image, or in other words, the cut and montage organize the utterances on behalf of the images. When working with materials like this, the processes of editing and directing are inevitably bound to one another, altering the gaze bestowed on the images and making them say something beyond what was intended at the time of their making.

SOUNDS OF SILENCE AND COMMOTION

Silent film was not mute, it was just quiet. Chion remarks, No sound was transmitted from the actors, hence silent film “had no ears for the immediate aural space, the here and now of the action.” There are no actors in that sense in the two silent films, nor is there any sound from the here and now of the filming. Most classical silent film was accompanied by a musical score offering a form of relief, which is also a strategy to convey and dramatize emotion. One of the things placing A Film Unfinished within the conventional documentary genre is precisely its use of music. In the first scenes, a piano tune solemnly accompanies the shots, setting a tone of gravity reflecting the subject at hand. The melodies built up by clarinet, cello, and piano serve as indicators or heighteners of a certain ambience throughout the film. The soundtrack operates in parallel to the newly shot images of the film reels and boxes – neither the music nor the images bear meaning in their own right. They are there to serve a specific purpose, which is an affective setting of the stage. This is also reflected in how the music is credited: the musicians are mentioned, but no specific compositions. Whether existing pieces of music were used or if it was all improvised is not central; rather the choice of instruments can be seen as an indicator of the role of the music. Cello, piano, and clarinet are all classical film music instruments and the type of music played serves well as a mood communicator.

The reason why Hersonski included music in A Film Unfinished appears to be the same as why Harun Farocki choose to exclude it. Restite does not have a musical soundtrack, so when installed the work spreads its silence into the room of its installation. The silence of the film demands a silent room, it demands engagement and concentration. The reading he proposes goes against the given grain of emotional response to Holocaust imagery in order to suggest an alternative understanding of what is at stake in the footage – and this is what is also central in his commentary. The silence, as mentioned, carries another type of suggestion, but seems to steer clear of the melodrama in favor of a detailed encounter with the footage without any distractions – the intertitles, as stated, being between the shots.
Despite all the shots of labor, of machines and crowds, in *Respite*, the viewer never hears the squawks, whir, and bellows of the machines, nor the voices of the laboring people. Like in the classical silent films, at times one can see the movement of lips as something is said, but contrary to the standard of those films, such speech is not translated into an intertitle. Rather, the intertitles inserted by Farocki in *Respite*, which structure what I previously discussed as reflexivity, have an affinity with the acousmatic voice, as the commentary belongs to the voice of the filmmaker. Instead of a voice-over, text is employed as a means of narration, maintaining both the silence of the film and inserting the comments between the images rather than above, on, or into as a classical voice-over. The in-between both serves the reflexive movement from image to text and back, and dissociates the comment from the presence of the image, at the same time as it follows the classical aesthetics of the silent film. Since Farocki also has a strong proposition in his engagement with the material, the commentary plays a double role of voicing that proposition and of sustaining the proposed unstability of any given reading of an image. The footage and the text are conceived in parallel; the intertitles are marked by their layout as newly produced; they are visually striking, still and clear, whereas the footage is sometimes blurred and consists of movement. The contrast is thus created both in terms of language, visual and verbal, and as montage between the footage and the intertitle as an image.

Sivan could be said to take the opposite route; instead of keeping language, or sounds, at a distance, he amplifies both voices and the general soundscape of the courtroom. Sound is put up front, and creates a constant disruption of the footage. The audio is not only synchronized with the images, but speech is repeated at times, superimposed on one another, languages are spoken without translation, and sounds are added at other times than when they originally appeared. Since the sound of the video was inferior, Sivan chose to work with the audio recorded for radio instead, and then synchronize it with the filmed material. In the film, sounds made by the audience – mostly reactions to Eichmann’s statements – are added, increased in volume, or replaced.

Inserted among these are the pleas by Judge Landau that the audience in the courtroom must remain silent. This draws attention both to the fact that the trial has an audience, like a theater performance, and to the fact that the judges are striving for a properly conducted trial. The reinforcement of the theatrical aspect seems to be juxtaposed with the earnestness of the judges. Yet another layer is brought forth by the sonic effects: Sivan does not allow the audience of the film to forget the other possible audiences of the trial – whether in the courtroom or via the radio or television. By inserting, or amplifying, audible reactions after statements by Eichmann, the reaction of the viewer is anticipated so that the audience of the film cannot react in the same manner as the audience in the film. Sounds of surprise and disagreement leave the audience of the film reacting to them almost before reacting to Eichmann’s statements. The soundscape of the film works along with the visual montage, as a crucial factor constructing the filmmaker’s narrative.

*The Specialist* opens with a shot of the empty courtroom, making the audience aware of the theater-like setting. Then the room fills up, while the viewer hears several languages spoken simultaneously – probably understanding only a few key words such as the names of concentrations camps – until everyone is seated, a voice calls out “all rise,” and the judges enter. What these minutes do is to provide a foundation for the spectator to experience the rest of the work. It sets the scene spatially and sonically for the trial as depicted in the film, since all images that follow are shot in that very room. Seeing the room empty reinforces Hannah Arendt’s point that the house, *Beth Ha’am* (*The House of the People*) was remodeled for the trial by someone with “a theater in mind, complete with orchestra and gallery, with proscenium and stage, and with side doors for the actors’ entrances.” Arendt argues that the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion wanted a show trial and that this was evident even in the choice of space. The first shot of *The Specialist*, of the empty room, displays the anonymity of the space which resembles a theater as much as a courtroom. The courtroom, and thus the opening images of the film, can literally be understood as a mise-en-scène. The room is the stage for the event and the soundscape created by Sivan is one of a theater, including the reactions of the audience. The prominent placement of the presentation of the courtroom at the very beginning of the film suggests that the understanding of the staged setting is necessary to read the forthcoming proceedings. Without any other articulation of the political claims of the trial, the framework is communicated by the mise-en-scène, which provides the visual framing for the film; the courtroom is the sole stage. The opening scene shows the physical setting and decor; the staging of the action and the manner in which these elements are framed. This is expressed sonically in the film when the audience reacts in outrage to almost everything Eichmann says, in contrast to his own calm mildness – what he says is never particularly shocking and seems even less so when it is followed by an irate murmur. In this manner the audio montage is at the core of Sivan’s narrative construction, turning the gaze toward the perpetrator in line with Hannah Arendt’s report from the trial.

**SHOWING INSTEAD OF TELLING**

Words and utterances are understood as either facts or fiction, as products of a subjective body, while images on the contrary are seen as representations of something as it existed before us, based in a real event and confined by the mechanical capturing and rendering. Within Judaism, as well as in other religions, images are ascribed an agency, which text is lacking – hence, the ban of graven images. Furthermore, the relation between a written or a visual account does not reside only in the difference of media, but also in how they relate to one another, as discussed throughout this chapter.

The DVD case and the credits of *The Specialist* state that the film was “inspired by” and “based upon” Hannah Arendt’s book, or built on her report from the Eichmann trial. While watching the film, her book and the discussions it generated, at times seem as central as the trial.

The footage in *The Specialist* functions differently from the text of Eichmann in Jerusalem: not only because of the deconstructive nature of the film, but also because of the images themselves. Rancière’s notion of the metamorphic image explicates the image operation in the film, since the metamorphic image “set out to displace the representation of the imagery, by
the aspects that Arendt is speaking about, which is the expertise, or the expert, the specialist to be the greatest influence from Arendt. Sivan describes that he set out “to take one of Eichmann being described in third person in Arendt’s text. The focus on Eichmann seems is Eichmann. One hears his voice and his words, which I see as immensely different from Concretely, the spectator is confronted with the perpetrator: the figure seen on the screen committed those deeds. Sivan describes it as a “proximity between Eichmann working in and listening, conveys a sort of extended reality by visually pointing out that it was he who scene with the glasses and again, conceptually, later in the film when considering him as a Eyal Sivan stresses the importance of portraying Eichmann in images instead of words, only because he is visible. A film made out of one archival source is limited by that material, it is forced to work with what can be shown or told through those images. The crucial difference between the film and the book is therefore that the film never leaves the courtroom. On the contrary, the spectator is almost claustrophobically enclosed by it.

Many of Arendt’s most striking passages seems to be represented in The Specialist. In the opening scenes of the film, the first pages of Arendt’s book seem to echo especially clearly. Arendt begins by describing the courtroom and the circumstances of the trial: who sits where, how the language issues are dealt with, and how the court is ordered to rise before the judges enter. As we have seen, the film begins in a very similar manner and the first encounter with Eichmann is perhaps even more striking: a few minutes into the film we see him polishing a pair of glasses. He does it almost as if he is unaware of the courtroom setting, and then he tries to put them on without realizing that he is already wearing a pair. Eichmann’s confusion about his vision provides a correlation for his lack of ability to “see” anything at all. The attempt to put on a second pair of glasses might suggest a total obliviousness to his situation. The film seems to playfully acknowledge Arendt’s argument of Eichmann’s thoughtlessness through the use of visual imagery. Even though the small and slightly embarrassing gesture captures Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann, and despite Arendt’s detailed description, Eichmann is present in a different way when introduced in The Specialist, only because he is visible.

Eyal Sivan stresses the importance of portraying Eichmann in images instead of words, since the film can show the body. It is Eichmann’s physicality that is underscored in the scene with the glasses and again, conceptually, later in the film when considering him as a body with a history of experiences. The shots of Eichmann in the glass booth, taking notes and listening, conveys a sort of extended reality by visually pointing out that it was he who committed those deeds. Sivan describes it as a “proximity between Eichmann working in the glass booth and Eichmann working in Berlin: there is continuity. There are internal relations that image and sound can give in terms of body, performance and space which the book could not and vice versa.” The book seems to act at a distance and to set up a triangular relation between the trial, the text, and the reader. The reader is aware that he or she is encountering words and not the accused himself, while the viewer of the film is much more directly confronted with Eichmann and the situation of the trial. We are confronted with Eichmann as a body and as a fellow human being, who sits behind a desk during the trial and who sat in the same manner in Berlin constructing timetables for deportations. By seeing him, one can more easily imagine him.

Despite crucial similarities in content, naturally the two accounts also differ. Out of the fifteen chapters of Eichmann in Jerusalem, six are directly concerned with the trial or with Eichmann, while the others provide context and historical background. The film does not relate to all aspects of Arendt’s text, and Sivan omitted the context of the Nazi system and the events of World War II. Today Sivan may be able to afford not to account for such aspects, since the audience is largely aware of what happened during the war, but when Arendt wrote her book these facts were not as well-known and the reasons for including them were more compelling.

One example of a concrete theme treated in different ways involves the discussion of the role of the Jewish councils during the war. Arendt includes them in her background chapters, pointing at their actions and their knowledge of what was going on during the time of the deportations. She does not discuss their function or role in the trial. In the film, the first of the few testimonies included is the one by Dr. Melkman, a member of the Jewish council in Holland and director of the Holocaust memorial Yad Vashem from 1957 to 1960. His testimony continues for several minutes, as he explains how the council came about and what its mission was. He tells the court how people were chosen for deportations, what time the trains left, and about the preventive measure of sending one thousand and twenty people with each transport, to ensure that one thousand would be alive when they arrived in Auschwitz. His manner of recounting is depicted as very similar to the account given by Eichmann and it is concluded that he, like Eichmann, only did what he was told. Sivan enlarged the debate, initiated by Arendt, concerning the Jewish councils – something outspokenly “done by the choices and the articulations within The Specialist.”

Hannah Arendt can follow Eichmann historically and expand theoretical discussions, regardless of spatiality and temporality. A film made out of one archival source is limited by that material, it is forced to work with what can be shown or told through those images. The crucial difference between the film and the book is therefore that the film never leaves the courtroom. On the contrary, the spectator is almost claustrophobically enclosed by it.
While *The Specialist* is based on Arendt’s book, in terms of storyline and narrative structure, the narration in *A Film Unfinished* consistently emanates from written narrative accounts. Besides the voice-over and the witness testimonies, Hersonski organizes her story on the basis of diaries, reports, and a memoir. The most prominent source is the diary of Adam Czerniaków, used by both Hersonski and later also by the Bundesarchiv. In order to recreate the production of the images shot in the Warsaw Ghetto, these sources are crucial for a reconstruction of the approximate course of the film work and the procedure of the film crew. What is unraveled or exposed is the staging of the scenes, to which both the witnesses interviewed for *A Film Unfinished* and those inhabitants of the Ghetto who wrote diaries attest. They recall and note the presence of the camera crew in the Ghetto: “they filmed everywhere,” an interviewee exclaims, “all scenes are being staged,” a note in a diary reads. However, this is foremost visible in relation to specific scenes. One witness describes how people were told to pass by some dead bodies in the street, holding their heads up high. The shot pans between the corpses on the sidewalk and the seemingly untouched faces of the passersby. The witness accounts for the fact that people were ordered to walk back and forth while several shots were taken. *A Film Unfinished* displays several takes of the shots, from various camera angles. The voice-over also highlights the fact that these were repeat shots, and inserts frames allocating the different takes.

Czerniaków commented on the entire duration of the filming. His diary entries are all concise, noting facts but offering few expanded reflections. However, the notes recount the means by which the filming was set up, the staging, the use of actors, as well as giving some comments on the impact of their presence in the Ghetto. Czerniaków, as head of the *Judenrat*, the Jewish council of the Warsaw Ghetto, has a dual position – he is a witness and a victim, and at the same time part of the executing machinery of the German rule, which enables him to give an account of the filming unlike anyone else. He gains an overview of the project as he is asked to assist in practical manners, used as an actor, and able to follow the locations and scenes planned throughout the month of shooting. The first entry mentioning the filming is from April 30, 1942, when Czerniaków notes that there are eight uniformed officers in the Ghetto, who neither look like they belong to the Army, nor to the Gestapo. The next morning, he has received more information and the men are described as uniformed officers in the Ghetto, who neither look like they belong to the Army, nor to the “German propaganda people,” as he notes the choice of locations of the film crew and the arrangements made to facilitate the filming over the course of the following days. Later on, he mentions that the *Kommissar* (the German camp commander Ausserwald in charge of the Ghetto) has ordered him to provide the film crew with civilian clothing, a fact which also testifies to the conditions of filming in the Ghetto.

As discussed, in *A Film Unfinished* the archival film images are paired with some of the diary entries, structuring them as comments to the images produced, as well as to the event of the filming. Czerniaków’s comments are crucial for gaining an understanding of what one actually can see in the images. Besides the scene in his office described earlier, another example is a scene of luxury shot in a restaurant, for which, Czerniaków notes, the Jewish Council will receive the bill. Thus, the abundance of staged scenes has a concrete effect on the finances of the Ghetto. Further, Czerniaków guides a provincial governor on the same day and in passing mentions his astonishment when seeing all the food in the restaurant. This happens at the same time as the “Order Service” raids restaurants to confiscate luxury foods. Hence, the image production influences reality in the moment of its making in manifold ways. A similar staging of luxury takes place when a ball is arranged; champagne and “ladies” in evening dresses are engaged, as well as Czerniaków himself. He is told by SS Hauptsturmführer April to play the role as host, but the Ghetto commander Ausserwald forbids him to perform and Czerniaków asks himself if he has the strength to acquit himself honorably in the affair. In the end both he and another member of the Jewish Council are excused from participation (the other one because he cannot speak Yiddish) and Czerniaków is replaced by a professional comedian. At the end of the entry he returns to the topic of the filming as he mentions looking out of the window and seeing a hearse full of flowers taken from the cemetery to the ballroom. The flowers had been brought to the ghetto and used a few days earlier when a funeral was filmed. He sees the cynicism of the making of the film and allows the present-day reader of the diary and the viewer of the film fragment to see it too.

The diary reveals information on the filming, but it is obviously far from a complete account. For example, judging from the diary entries, Czerniaków was more aware of the staged scenes of luxury than of the ones of dire suffering in the streets. The instances when his assistance was needed, or when extraordinary events were staged, were the ones of excess – the emaciated children in the streets were more easily found. Hence, the diary aids in the reading of the film fragments, not only influencing the truth claim of the images – which is of course crucial – but also helping one understand what kind of propaganda message the material was intended to communicate. Hersonski’s unpacking of the footage depends heavily on Czerniaków’s account. He grasps that the intention of the Nazi filmmakers is not to show the Ghetto in all its facets, but to communicate a preconceived narrative, and Hersonski’s reading confirms the same view. The diary thus functions as a source of knowledge about the material, as well as being one of the voices inserted in the film. Other diary accounts are used in the same manner, and one of the most striking examples is part of a scene from a performance. Here sound and image are paired in the sense that we see the scene that is described in the diary entry, what is said, however, stands in stark contrast to what we see. The film fragment shows an audience entering a theater in the ghetto, a performance poster is filmed, followed by several shots of performances and pans over the audience watching and giving praise. Yet, in *A Film Unfinished* a male voice reads in Yiddish a description of the event, which reveals an altogether different event.

The next morning at 8 a.m., all the actors were ordered to appear at the New Azazel Theater. During the rehearsals with the actors on the stage, a group of soldiers picked up people. People started running and panic ensued, in the midst of which the Germans treated everyone to heavy beatings. Since no one knew why they were being held there, you could hear the sighs and groans of...
the children who were picked up together with their parents. After each actor finished his part, the audience had to yell “Bravo!” The audience in the theater was ordered to roar with laughter. Woe to anyone who didn’t laugh properly. His fate was doomed. They laughed as never before. The Germans ordered all the actors to overact as much as possible. David Seiderman sang “My Yiddisher Mame.” Ruth Zandberg, who accompanied him on the piano, wept bitterly, as her mother, Yiddish actress Zusha Zandberg, had just died of typhus.

From whom this account stems and what part the person played in the event is unclear, as Czerniaków writes from an external position: was he in the audience, did he work at the theater or did someone just tell him what had happened? Regardless, the quote captures the tension surrounding the filming and the violence it produced in order to stage the scenes – none of which is seen in the actual shots; hence, it serves its purpose to unravel the scene. The quote reveals the unbridgeable gap between what took place that day and what is represented in the footage. Further, as there is no sound recording, the viewer cannot hear the sounds described, neither the groans, nor the performances, nor the applause. In A Film Unfinished music accompanies the reading, at first adding to the severity of the words being read, but then at one point a woman is seen drumming and the music directly reflects what is shown. In this instance the sound illustrates what is seen, rather than commenting upon it. While the mode of commenting allows a distant gaze upon the archival material, this intersection of sound and image implicates the viewer as audience – for a brief moment the spectator does not get a back-story of the shot and one cannot know to what extent the scene is staged. Without the testimonies, the spectator is at a loss and in one sense the footage remains opaque. In another sense, a scene like the one of the dancing child is where the ambiguity of the footage is allowed to remain and be displayed. In her didactic striving to unravel each shot, Hersonski risks depriving the material of some of its agency, instating a linguistic imperialism where language conquers the image. Thus, her narrative structure separates image and narration, but without instating the gap as a productive montage (as Farocki does with the dialectical relation between text and image).

The choice of narrative form once again illuminates the question of genre, as discussed in the first chapter, and, by extension the work of montage.  

This label is, as shown, not sufficient for any of the films, yet, the quote underlines how Hersonski’s formal choice of narration has bearing on the status of imagery in the film. The argument brought forward in her film is an image exegesis, but one in which the images serve as a source from which knowledge can be extracted. A Film Unfinished gives preference to a linguistic narration – the image as such is not central. By contrast, the main concern in Respite is to posit the imagery within an ongoing question of how and by which processes images operate. The Specialist also gives the image a central place, as the argument is brought forth in and by a rearrangement of the imagery – hence, the imagery remains at the core of both films. This amounts to a question of how the argument of the films is communicated, and what the role of voice and narration are therein. I agree with Farocki’s formulation as the pertinent point: “discourses are a form of narration.”

Laura Rascaroli argues that essay film is a not “merely a hybrid, a documentary film with a nonfictional component; rather it is a specific form of textuality, and narration is a constitutive element of its epistemological and signifying strategies.” 334
The figure of the witness is usually the victim of an event. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is those witnesses who are mobilized in *A Film Unfinished* to construct a narration. But there is another level of witnessing at play in the three films, as well as in the archival footage. The archival film fragments should be read as witnessing in the sense that they testify both to what they show, and to the narrative of how the same imagery came into being. Through the intervention of the filmmakers yet another level is brought out, as the archival material is subjected to a double set of gazes – the one of the director and the one of the spectator of the films, while the original material was determined by the commissioners and cameramen. In relation to the materials used in *Respite* and *A Film Unfinished*, the commission must be taken into account and the filmed material can be seen as an extension of the Nazi point of view. Or, in other words, the perpetrator is the one who commissions the testimony to be recorded and thus decides what it can testify to.

In the materials that make up *Respite* and *A Film Unfinished*, the roles of the directors and cameramen are momentous, as they were commissioned by the Nazis, and the cameraman in Westerbork, on the other hand, was an inmate. The director of the archival footage that makes up *The Specialist*, Leo Hurwitz, was not the cameraman, but he edited the shots live from the four cameras installed in the courtroom. Importantly, the role of the perpetrator in *The Specialist* is quite different from that in the other two films, since he is in front of the camera rather than behind it. In this film, it is the director Eyal Sivan who actively turns the gaze towards the perpetrator and thus makes him the central witness.

The perpetrator as witness is, thus, a constituting fact for two of the filmed materials and the central point of narration for the third. As discussed in the first chapter, in two of the films the role of the perpetrator is connected to the “photographic situation,” to use Ariella Azoulay’s terminology. In the third film, it is played out in the restituting of the materials and also provides a direct intervention in the debate around what has been called the *era of the witness*. Azoulay argues that one needs to stop looking at the photo and begin to watch it instead; to watch rather than to look is to encompass the moment of the images’ becoming within the gaze directed at the image. Watching is based on a sense of time and movement, which is re-inscribed in the image, and allows the interpretation to reconnect to the photographic event. The filmed material addressed in this book contains the situation of its filming, yet the purpose that surrounds the creation of that very situation is rebuked in the reiteration of the material. All footage is evidence of the social relations of the situation
of its production, and these must therefore be included in how one reads that which is visible. The photographic situation in which the photographer, or the cameraman, and the depicted interact around the camera is not present in terms of representation, but it is still crucial for an understanding the image. This is important in relation to all three films, since the production of the films involve forced labor and ideologically charged commissions. In this aspect the role of the spectator is crucial, since he or she must reconstruct what was there from both what is visible and what is not immediately manifest, but what can – in principle – become visible in the exact same photograph.\(^ {10} \) One of the things that become visible by the intervention of the filmmakers is the prominent role of the perpetrator – be it inside or outside the frame.

In the three films, the testimony of the perpetrator takes on various guises, structuring the very conception of the material and the image production, determining the gaze and even appearing as a figure within the film. In this chapter, the manifestation of the Nazi gaze is a central quest. This is first and foremost present in the commission of \textit{A Film Unfinished}, but also in Eichmann’s central role in \textit{The Specialist}. What are the implications of the role of the perpetrator? In \textit{The Specialist} the perpetrator is shown as a bureaucrat, removed from the scene of the crime and thus an impaired witness, whereas in \textit{Respite} the issue addressed is how the entire material can be seen as structured as a testimony of the perpetrator and how this relates to more conventional Holocaust representations.

### THE NAZI GAZE

Both sets of material employed in \textit{Respite} and \textit{A Film Unfinished} can be seen as evidence of the Nazi ideology – in the fact that they were shot in the first place and in what they represent. The footage is constructed to bear witness to a preconceived idea. The film fragments do bear witness in this sense – just not to camp or ghetto life. If not perceived as documents of how life was shaped in the camp or the ghetto, but as documents of propaganda and witnesses of how it was manufactured, the materials do speak loudly. They speak of the measures taken to create and uphold an ideologically charged image, of the specific means used to construct a narrative for the future, and of the strong position of propaganda in the Third Reich in general. Just like one can approach the archive today, as a source of historical knowledge with the hope of a different future, these materials were shot in a present with the future in mind. The footage was thought to bear witness to the Jewish life which once existed, but is now extinct. The witnessing function of the footage is inseparable from what it represents, but today, one needs supplementary information about the origin of the shots in order to read them beyond the claims of propaganda. The images shot in Westerbork and Warsaw cannot be regarded as documentary images. Hersonski, for her part, made a documentary about the material and its history, whereas Farroki made something resembling a reflecting essay film – both previously described as invested in a geste thinking. Nevertheless, as noted, excerpts from the films have been reproduced in documentaries about the Ghetto as shots capturing life as it was.\(^ {37} \)

Consequently, what Yael Hersonski does in \textit{A Film Unfinished} is to make the staging of the material a central issue. Throughout her film she unravels the layers of the production of the film, exposing the fact that the images are not what they appear to be and how the argument of propaganda was constructed. The medium of film is defined by a double gaze, the gaze of the cameraman and that of the camera. Things are recorded against the intention of the cameraman, they are caught in the frame, at the same time as the person holding the camera sets the frame. This double nature of the cinematic image structures the framework through which I read Hersonski’s film. Notions of seeing and the gaze are addressed in manifold ways in \textit{A Film Unfinished}. An overarching question is how one can regard the footage filmed in the Ghetto today, interlinked with the subsequent question of how one can watch the material today? What is shown, what do we see, and how can we watch it? Hence, Ariella Azoulay’s conception of the active spectator watching, rather than seeing, is embedded in the film by the director.

Far from being a testimony about the life of the Jews in the Ghetto, this footage was guided by the Nazi perception of reality, and of how the European Jewry should be remembered in the future. Something similar is true of the \textit{Westerbork Film}, which is also the product of forced labor. Cultural theorist Zoltán Kékesi makes a two-folded argument in relation to this: on the one hand the material was produced within the German war effort, even if it was never put to use, and must be read through that lens; yet, on the other hand, the viewer sees firstly through the eye of the camera and secondly through the viewpoint of the cameraman Breslauer, whose gaze is determined by the process in which he is filming, that is the situation of forced labor. Thus, Kékesi writes that “the Westerbork film material offers two different positions to the viewer: one is that of the (archival) power, while the other is that of somebody testifying against it.”\(^ {35} \) The forced labor that the cameraman was subjugated to shapes what is filmed, as well as informing the viewer about what can be seen in the images. This points towards something crucial for the entire material: the framing of the film cannot be separated from the representation in the rushes. One cannot be read without taking the other into account – the image representations are bound to the context of their making. Furthermore, the entirety of the material cannot be read as the commissioner camp commander Gemmaker might have intended that the Public Relations Bureau would have read it.

\textit{A Film Unfinished} has been viewed as reviving the “now” of the Nazi filmmaking, making both survivor and spectator “inhabit the Nazi gaze,” as Daniela Agostinho remarks.\(^ {39} \) I would suggest the opposite: that the employment of the footage is at times too caught up in the narrative, rendering the imagery almost obsolete.\(^ {40} \) The Nazi gaze is a circumstantial fact structuring the production of the footage, but, as discussed, in Hersonski’s reading, it is subjugated to a linguistic imperialism. The unraveling of the footage is the point of departure and the goal, but the method of doing it is by means of language. As Hersonski’s resituating is carried out through the addition of voice, providing a narrative, there is only one specific scene where the structure is turned on its head. The enacted voice of cameraman Willy Wist expands on what he remembers from the filming and recalls a Jew with a handcart carrying corpses to the burial ground. As he recalls this event, the shot is also shown. Wist says that a leg fell out of the cart, but in the image the entire body slides down. He talks of seeing a shack outside the burial ground, where bodies were kept while...
Hence, to regard the image as a definite entity appears paradoxical in this context – I see the film “chooses to duplicate the perpetrator’s gaze” the images must be understood as inevitable bound to their context of production. They were produced in a situation informed by Nazi ideology, which is made visible in their representations, but when resituated in the film’s coming into being and also what is filmed. In Agostinho’s view, this is the only moment when Hersonski is able to move beyond the ruling Nazi gaze by destabilizing the totality of the image and enabling the viewer to see outside the frame, something which I consider to be done throughout the film. Though Hersonski’s means of constructing her narrative are restricted to the basic conventions of documentary filmmaking, the unraveling of the material speaks. This, in turn, is achieved through cinematic strategies of editing and montage, but also through a distortion of the images by freezing them or slowing them down. Hersonski describes this as an attempt “to alter or reorder the gaze,” while Gyunn sees it as the rhetorical figures of emphasis or hyperbole and Agostinho as a means to “accentuate the gap between being trapped inside the Nazi image and resisting it.” Agostinho’s claim is the most interesting, but the first two views are easier to agree with. In part, I think that it is a question of accentuation, of elucidating the gaze of the people caught on film – as when the image freezes when a passerby looks into the camera, or in the mug shots when the filmed subject’s gaze is turned toward the lens. In Agostinho’s view, this is the only moment when Hersonski is able to move beyond the ruling Nazi gaze by destabilizing the totality of the image and enabling the viewer to see outside the frame, something which I consider to be done throughout the film. Though Hersonski’s means of constructing her narrative are restricted to the basic conventions of documentary filmmaking, the unraveling of the material allows for an engaged reading, which implicates a reading of precisely what is outside the frame. Hence, the crucial point of both Das Ghetto and A Film Unfinished is found outside the frame, in the framework – that is in the situation and resituating.

THE PERPETRATOR IN FOCUS

In the two films discussed above, it is the perpetrator who determines the image production, the film’s coming into being and also what is filmed. In A Film Unfinished both the commissioner and the cameraman belonged to the Nazi machinery, whereas in Respite the cameraman was an inmate – plausibly influencing the shots, but still under the authority of the camp commander who initiated the filming. This perspective, which forms the discussion of the presence of the perpetrator, is not at all applicable to The Specialist. In Sivan’s film, the perpetrator is confined within the shot and the focus on him is the most important narrative choice by the filmmaker, connected to the removal of the witnesses as discussed later in this chapter.
One of the film's most striking features involves its point of view. A great number of shots are focused on Eichmann: listening to translations, scribbling down notes, organizing his papers, or trying to answer questions posed to him. The film does not make Eichmann more human; although he is not depicted as a symbol of evil, he is still a figure of ordinariness and thoughtlessness. The case of Eichmann's thoughtlessness is visualized in *The Specialist* when Eichmann is waiting for a translation of something said in Hebrew, or listening to it, he tilts his head, looks at the ceiling or plays with a pen in his hand. In these moments he seems thoughtless and unable to really grasp what is going on; he looks as if he is not thinking, and as the camera lingers on his face while his gaze drifts, the viewer is left with the impression that he is daydreaming. Yet, the images of Eichmann in the courtroom also convey a sense of ordinariness; sometimes he looks attentive and at other times distracted, always with a tic: he is constantly blinking his eyes. He seems restrained, sometimes absent-minded or slightly irratated, but never with a strong facial expression. *The Specialist* shows what Arendt described as Eichmann's normality, for example in the many images when, eager to act properly, he stands up when addressed by the judges. Arendt refers to one of the psychologists that examined Eichmann, who supposedly exclaimed that Eichmann is “more normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him.” This is the major line of argument for Arendt, partly founded on Eichmann's claim that he lacked motives and knowledge about the consequences of his actions. The same point is also made in the film. Sivan has said that the choice to focus on Eichmann was not to bring forth the psychology of one individual, but rather an attempt to focus on a case, the Eichmann case, since there are not many occasions where we get to hear perpetrators speak: “the only situation where we can hear perpetrators speaking, those are situations like international courts, or truth committees, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. In this it [the Eichmann trial] is a historical moment, because it is a moment that gave us the opportunity to listen to the perpetrator.”

There is an ambiguity in the film's depiction of Eichmann, which is present in Arendt's text as well: Eichmann is portrayed not only as an opportunist but also as a potential liar. In the film a few striking images are inserted in the closing credits, where Eichmann looks straight into the camera and at the spectator. Sivan explains that these were all images in which Eichmann accidentally looked at the camera, since in fact he could not see it. These images differ from Arendt's description of Eichmann, where she makes an explicit point that he never faces the audience. By giving us a moment of illusory contact with Eichmann, Sivan forces us to take a more intimate view of him than Arendt gives us. In one of the shots Eichmann smiles, and this is the first visual expression of feeling that the audience encounters in *The Specialist*. According to Sivan, this footage was included to illustrate the terrifying ordinariness of Eichmann, since “he is human in that moment.” At the same time, Sivan says that the effect of the image is twofold: it also provides the spectator with a feeling of being deceived – Eichmann was lying all along. Viewers are confronted with this person, looking at us, in an image that endows the film with an uncanny mirror effect. Hence, the image of Eichmann's humanness and inconsistency also offers a possibility for identification, if an unpleasant one. The placement of the images in the closing credits, outside the unity of the film, when the spectator expects it to be over, shifts the perception of Eichmann. The image of Eichmann smiling takes the viewer by surprise and alters the impression of him as profoundly thoughtless, while also reminding the spectator that everything in the trial could be perceived as an act.

Still, as Eichmann is presented, he seems to perceive himself more as a witness than as an actor. In the film Eichmann claims that he had asked to be transferred to other duties after a mission, but that his request was denied. He goes on to recount the story of his trip to Minsk, where he went to write a report on the ongoing executions. In this moment Eichmann is transformed from a perpetrator into a witness in the more traditional sense. He describes how a child was shot in its mother's arms. On another trip in Lemberg he saw something he had never seen before; he states, after which he goes on to paint a highly disturbing image of blood shooting up from the ground due to the all the gas in the bodies buried below. These experiences can be added to the horrifying acts of the Nazis and Eichmann thus adds to the knowledge about the Holocaust. If one further considers that the story of the Holocaust is not only a story of suffering, but also about what made it possible, including the political system and the bureaucratic execution, any former Nazi can be acknowledged as a witness. The Specialist does not pose Eichmann as a mere spectator, but by seeing him as a witness to the Holocaust, Sivan opens up the narrative structure created around it so as to include the testimonies of the perpetrators, as I argued above. What is made visible in the film is that Eichmann also has a story to tell about the events, which should be of general interest. I hold that his story, as presented in the film, is given prominence at the expense of understanding him as an actor and that the image of him thus places him only on the side of witnessing. The gesture of expanding the concept of witnessing to a more literal meaning allows a possibility to view events from more than one perspective, but at the same time it can deconstruct locations of agency. Even if Eichmann functioned as a scapegoat, he was nevertheless an agent in the Holocaust. The film suggests such a reading, but it also allows Eichmann to give voice and witness both to the administration of the Nazi system and to the horrors that he at once encountered and contributed to.

The central placement of Eichmann also links the film to the genre of courtroom drama. It is evoked in *The Specialist* by emphasizing the dramatic relation between the accused, the prosecutor, and the judges where they become not only similar, but also actors. Legal scholar Sadakat Kadri argues that by televising trials they become “battles between champions” since the lawyers become celebrities outside the court and then gladiators inside it. This can be understood as true also for *The Specialist*, both in the sense that it is playing on such notions of the trial which arose when it was televised in 1961, particularly offering a specific depiction of Attorney General Hausner. He seems to be fighting a battle, aggressively trying to convince the judges rather than relying on legal justice. His counterpart in the film, however, is not the defense attorney Dr. Servatius, but Eichmann himself. Doctor Servatius does not play a role in the drama of the film – Eichmann and Hausner are the antagonists.

Other aspects of the film that can be understood as related to the courtroom drama are closely connected to the trial itself, and the view that it was a show trial. For example, it may be argued that Eichmann is already convicted before the trial begins. The audiences in the courtroom, in front of the television, the radio, or the film by Sivan participate in judging Eichmann, since they know that he is in some sense guilty. In accounts of the Eichmann trial there is a recurrent assumption that it could not have gone any other way – the trial was important because it was necessary for Israel to judge a Nazi. The implication is not solely that he was known to be guilty, but that the very act of putting him on trial was part
of the goal. The show trial is thus constituted by the importance of the proceeding as such, in contrast to a mere rendering of justice. In the context of the political aims of the trial, the events in the courtroom were possibly even more important than the act of judging and executing Eichmann. Like in a courtroom drama the audience follows the action, takes sides, and delivers judgment, on both Eichmann and the proceedings. The emphasized reactions of the courtroom audience in *The Specialist* can be seen as Sivan’s way of reinforcing this view. Also, as described in relation to the image of Eichmann smiling, the viewer of the film doubts Eichmann and presumably also the proceedings. Simultaneously, the doubt is put aside, since the viewer knows that he will be convicted. This is not only because we know the historical event and the set-up for the trial, but also because that is the drama-turgy of the courtroom drama. Regardless of our doubts, Eichmann is the bad guy, and the bad guy always gets caught. The certainty of the trials outcome seems to have been absolute, and it was reinforced even more, as I’ve mentioned before, by the express purposes of reminding the world of the Holocaust, educating the Israeli youth, and creating support for the Israeli state. This was of course also one of the reasons why so many survivors were summoned to give testimony. Countering the predominance of the survivor witnesses and placing Eichmann at the center, as Sivan does, thus questions the entire trope of the witness – forcing us to ask who is allowed or entitled to occupy that position. The question of who bears witness also relates to what is remembered and how. In Caterina Alvarado’s understanding of Sivan’s film, what plays out is a reconfiguration of the “unremembered memories of Eichmann’s explanation of the implementation of the Nazi regime of persecution and indirectly brings them to bear on the complexities that surround the Holocaust *vis a vis* its hegemonic policy towards the Palestinians.”

### REMOVING THE WITNESS

While the survivor witnesses are given a central position in *A Film Unfinished*, they are almost excluded in *The Specialist*, even though they played a prominent role in the trial. *The Specialist* includes a few survivor testimonies, but Sivan redistributes the time in representing the trial proceedings, shifting the focus back to the defendant. Considering the vast amount of time spent on the witnesses in the actual trial and the very small amount representing them in *The Specialist*, it is clear what the focal point in Sivan’s intervention in the material is and the way in which he resituates it.

During the trial, many of the witnesses were called upon to provide a background, for example to testify about Auschwitz and Treblinka, where Eichmann was never involved. They represented all the affected countries in Europe (except Bulgaria and Belgium). The prominent role assigned to the witnesses was also one of Hannah Arendt’s main criticisms towards the trial, and in relation to one testimony, by a man named Grynszpan, she writes that “one foolishly thought: everyone should have their day in court […] only to find out, in the endless sessions that followed, how difficult it is to tell a story – at least outside the transforming realm of poetry – it needed a purity of soul, an unmirrored, unreflected innocence of heart and mind that only the righteous possess.” Sivan has created a filmic device for conveying a similar point of view in a sequence of testimonies, which are presented in very short, fragmentary scenes, edited into a single fast, choppy, almost cartoon-like sequence. When this sequence starts, the format of the image changes: it becomes smaller, with a black frame, and the quality of the image itself changes, becoming slightly yellower and of worse quality, suggesting that this is an excerpt and an exception, something not to be read as just any part of the film, or even of the trial perhaps. Each witness takes off where the previous one left off, giving their names, taking the oath, etcetera, and before they get the chance to say anything else the scene is cut and the next witness appears. Some witnesses are only present as almost mute images while others get to speak. In the scene before this section we see a witness telling the court about Auschwitz, and the scene following the sequence seems to continue his account. The bits and pieces that one can gather from the sequence of witness accounts relay horrible events in the camps – such as an infant being banged to death against a wall by an SS officer – and the viewer can see the suffering of the witnesses when trying to retell such events.

One purpose of this sequence seems to be a sincere desire on the part of the filmmaker to show how many were affected and the hardships they suffered. However, the sequence does more. Firstly, it situates the testimonies in the past, more clearly than the rest of the trial, through the yellowing and distortion of the images that makes them look older than the rest of the material. Secondly, it provides a view of the witnesses as being superfluous and interchangeable; they almost cancel each other out by being presented one after the other. Lastly, it demonstrates Arendt’s argument concerning the difficulty of telling a story in a truthful way: they depict the slippage towards poeticization and drama. Sivan creates moments of dramatic absurdity: the witnesses tell their stories in different dramatic voices, gesturing and making faces. In one instance, Sivan strengthens this impression by adding laughter from the audience. In that moment the spectator assumes the role of a member of an audience in a theater, looking at someone performing. This interpretation is supported by the scene that follows after the sequence of the witnesses. A witness has finished, and Judge Halevi turns to Attorney General Hausner and says: “We have just heard profoundly distressing matters related in the words of a poet. But … with this testimony, we are getting away from the object of this trial.” One can see how the realm of fiction, of poetry, is brought into the trial, and Sivan reinforces that aspect by resituating the material to imply the trials loss of focus due to the extent of witness testimonies.

The choice not to highlight the survivor testimonies is one of the aspects of the film that conflicts with what has been considered important about the trial since it took place. The Eichmann trial can be regarded as a founding moment for the Israeli state, as legitimized by the Holocaust, and *The Specialist* calls that very legitimation into question. The use of the Holocaust to legitimate Israel in the trial is apparent, considering the Attorney General Hausner’s opening speech where he evokes the presence of the six million victims whom he claims to represent. Hausner, as a representative of the Israeli state, speaks in their name, claiming the agency as a voice of all Jews affected by the Holocaust. His tone is remarkable, as is also the emotional sentiment it provokes – suitable for Ben Gurion’s aim to create a history lesson rather than the setting of a trial. Hausner’s rhetorical figures depicting the victims of the Holocaust lay the groundwork for the testimonies later in the trial – by those who are still able to stand and point an accusing finger. Hillel Tryster constructs his criticism
of the film by posing a question that he believes the film to answer: "If one were a filmmaker with a political agenda that could benefit from a re-evaluation of the Eichmann trial, one that made Eichmann seem a harmless pawn used by the Zionist establishment to consolidate the myth of Jewish victimhood that provides moral authority for the existence of the State of Israel, how might one proceed?" What Tryster rightly points out is that Sivan has a political agenda: he seems to want to re-evaluate the Eichmann trial in order to question its role in the Zionist nation building. What seems absurd is the implication that Sivan thereby calls the existence of Israel into question. Such claims cannot be found in the film, and suggesting that they exist rather seems to be an effect of Tryster's attempt to undermine the film and its maker's authority. Tryster interprets the film according to his own bias concerning the political views of the filmmaker, without acknowledging the film as a work of art.

As described above, the major representation of the testimonies is edited into a sequence that is placed almost outside the cinematic narrative. It is inserted into a black frame that makes the image smaller, thus implying that it belongs to the greater narrative of the trial but not really to that of the film. I understand the editing as functioning similarly to a footnote, acknowledged and referenced, but not important enough to be a part of the main text. Still, there are survivor testimonies that are given both time and narrative space in the film and some of them follow the sentimental path laid out by Haasner. Their role in the film differs from the function they served in the trial. Their presence in *The Specialist* is not as bearers of testimony, rather their presence portrays the conflict between the judges and the Attorney General's will to "paint pictures."

*The Specialist* might be best understood if read both in relation to the circa 358 hours of material which the director chose not to include and, more importantly, to the aspects of a constructed narrative around the Holocaust that the film left out. The Eichmann trial was the first opportunity for survivors to give their testimonies, and thus it functioned as a setting for a construction of a narrative of the Holocaust based on survivors' testimonies, as discussed in the first chapter. The inclusion of the trial of almost a hundred survivor testimonies seems more urgent for the future than for the legal process as such: the trial cannot only be understood as an act aimed towards the past. On the one hand, justice is done through the conviction and on the other hand, a commemoration for the future is created. The testimonies by survivors in the trial account for a trauma and the imagery of them has become important for the commemoration of the trial. What Hillel Tryster objects to is Sivan's striving to construct a narrative, not only about the trial, but about memory. Sivan confirms this claim and states that the "idea to do *The Specialist* was not really to do a film about Eichmann or adapting Arendt's book but in fact, the basic idea was to continue my work on the instrumentalization of memory and the state of Israel." The question of the usage of the archival material thus seems secondary to the content of the material to Tryster, but crucial for the restaging by Sivan. Tryster's critique seems to be a misuse, causing the questions about the archive to catch the bullet, while the real target, Sivan's problematizing of the commemoration of the Holocaust, remains untouched.

The last scene of *The Specialist* depicts Eichmann in his booth. The image zooms in and item after item around him disappears: the guards, the glass cage, his papers, and his desk becomes wider, taking the proportions of a business desk. The noise is turned into music. The black-and-white image turns into color film, and Eichmann appears in an office setting, wearing a dark blue suit. He sits in front of a dark wooden table, with beige wallpaper behind him and a small note pad in front of him. The image removes Eichmann from the setting of the trial and brings him back into the realm of bureaucracy. He is neither the accused, nor a mere clerk; he seems to be in charge, slightly reclined and a bit skeptical. His facial expression, which in the trial setting appeared doubtful, now seems only suspicious. The image frees Eichmann from the spatial and temporal setting, illuminating the possibility of a crime and an understanding of criminality far removed from the crime scene. In this rendering, he is a manager who gives orders, a faceless bureaucrat whose power is like an invisible hand managing modern society – as mentioned before, he could be anyone and anyone could be him. The scene also hints at the beginning and end of Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* which are also in color to mark the scenes as being in the present. The temporality in play in the last shot of *The Specialist* is a similar move from past to present.

Turning the archival material of the Eichmann trial into a courtroom drama is the film's representational politics. Sivan consciously bypassed the testimonies, which have been at the center of the trials public attention, and instead presented a "portrait of a modern criminal." With this he implied a certain theory of modernity and a claim to universality. Sivan addresses the issue when describing Eichmann as an example of "the bureaucrat criminal," as one possible way of being a perpetrator: "the pen of the bureaucrat or the mouse of the computer, can be the ultimate weapon of killing." There is a distance between the order and the act – hence the perpetrator can avoid being a witness to his own crime. He becomes a remote witness, dissociated from the very event he should testify to. Here, the image and understanding of the perpetrator are at stake, since the idea of a crime implies not only an illegal act, but having blood on one's hands in a literal meaning. For Eichmann, the murderous act was committed at a distance; he did not order anyone's murder, but solely organized the deportation of people to the camps. This seems to shed light upon an aspect of the trial, recognized by both Arendt and Sivan, indicating that what was really on trial was Nazi policies as such. The film first defines Eichmann as the accused and as the man in the glass booth, and then, when those tokens are removed, he seems to become like anyone and no one. He is a figure of modern society doing his job; anyone could have replaced him. He is a token of a type. In *The Specialist* Eichmann comes to represent (something like): a genocidal possibility of modernity, and the crime becomes a specifically modern crime.

The view of Eichmann as a bureaucrat becomes apparent in the recurrent shots of him eagerly taking notes and following the proceedings in the pile of documents that lies before him in the glass booth. This is stressed by sound effects where the noise of his scribbling is increased and sometimes even seems to block out the proceedings in the courtroom. In these images Eichmann does not act as the defendant, but as the defense attorney, making sure that nothing is bypassed or misunderstood. The bureaucracy of the trial links up with Eichmann's own career as a bureaucrat – documents are at the center both of the trial and of Eichmann's own duties.

Hannah Arendt notes on the first page of her book that the number of documents on the judges' desks is "more than fifteen hundred," and in *The Specialist* time is devoted to a scene where the judges ask Attorney General Haasner about the exact name of a document,
and then decide to divide the document into two and rename the first part to include the same combination of numbers and letters as before, but now also an "A." These seemingly small details show bureaucracy as something which the judges, Attorney General Hausner, and his staff have in common with the defense attorney and the defendant himself. Bureaucracy then is a shared space or discipline. Throughout the film, Sivan returns to the image of Attorney General Hausner while Eichmann is answering questions. In contrast to the stiff-faced Eichmann, the prosecutor openly displays his frustration. Arendt describes how Hausner frequently glances at the audience and how he exclaims that he is "sick of cross-examining Eichmann, who answers all questions with lies" when speaking to reporters in the court building. 379 The emphasis on this behavior in the film not only makes the prosecutor look foolish, it also arouses a concern that Arendt expresses— that "justice does not permit anything of the sort; it demands seclusion, it permits sorrow rather than anger, and it prescribes the most careful abstention from all the nice pleasures of putting oneself in the limelight." 380

In Arendt's view, Hausner's stepping into the limelight is only counterbalanced by the constant efforts of the judges to prevent the proceedings from becoming a show trial. The three judges avoid all theatricality, and Arendt acknowledges them, especially the presiding judge Moshe Landau, for being remarkably independent of Israeli public opinion in conducting the trial. They try to keep the proceedings within a juridical realm and shy away from the political claims made upon them. They never pretend to have to wait for the Hebrew translation: they were all born and educated in Germany, and they even use their mother tongue in dialogues with Eichmann. 381 The Specialist conveys these points too: we see one of the judges shifting into German and continuing his questioning of Eichmann in their shared language. We also see the judges demanding that the prosecutor should keep his focus and avoid too much "picture painting," a line also quoted by Arendt. 382

The view of Eichmann as a bureaucrat furthers the uncanny parallel between Eichmann on the one hand and Hausner and the judges on the other. All of them are posed as experts in the film and as bureaucrats doing their jobs, and they can be understood almost as equals. Thus, the film exhibits the courtroom as a space presided over by experts, lawyers, and judges, who are presented as clinically as Eichmann himself. They are experts in their fields, skillfully fulfilling their tasks with the only, if crucial, difference being the consequences of their actions. In another setting they could have been in a situation similar to Eichmann's, and since it seems inherent in the position of the bureaucrat to have what Sivan calls a "potentiality of criminality." 383 The defense claimed that Eichmann did not do anything unlawful within the framework of the Third Reich.

Eichmann is not freed from responsibility by either Sivan or Arendt. Rather, their works suggest that the concept of responsibility needs to be redefined and removed from the realm of a physical act to include the direct ordering of an act or indirectly giving permission. In one sense, Eichmann is being tried for the consequences of his actions, not for a bureaucratic act of signing documents or the concrete act of giving orders. Sivan suggests that "the cleanliness, the emptiness, the fact that there is no direct body involved does not mean that there is not responsibility." 384 A redefinition would then have to account for a responsibility not only in terms of lawfulness, but also in an Arendtian sense of a criminal who has taken "upon himself the responsibility of an act whose consequences now determine his fate." 385 In both accounts Eichmann is ascribed a lack of judgment, in the sense of an inter-human responsibility, not only as it concerns the trespassing of legal boundaries. 386 The question of judgment and responsibility is of course also related to the concept of law. Arendt describes Eichmann as seeing himself as a law-abiding citizen: he did not only obey orders but also the law, and thus, he acted as if he was the legislator of the law he obeyed. 387 The portrayal of Eichmann in The Specialist conveys this obedience to Nazi law as absolute, as a fundamental issue on Eichmann's part. Like a Kafkaesque figure, he stands before the law with no other choice than to obey— however, he seems to lack Josef K's determination to take control over his own life. While the filmmaker posits Eichmann as the leading character, he is in this sense neither a witness to the event as such, nor does he have a sufficient testimony to give about it— rather what the remote witness, in this sense, testifies to is the machinery making the genocide possible at all. He does not account for what happened, but for how it was carried out.

**HAPPY IMAGES OF THE CAMP**

One must question the ways in which we read visual material, especially images which have become as charged as the images of the Holocaust. The footage at work in Respite differs from most images of the Holocaust, like the ones from the liberation of the camps that go under the post-war label atrocity film or what photography theorist Barbie Zelizer correctly labels as "atrocity aesthetics." 388 The footage from Westerbork appears to be a paradoxical addition to a visual account of the Holocaust. Paradoxical, since it does not depict suffering, but is still part of an event that is signified as nothing but horrendous suffering. The filmed material gives an overview of the activities in the camp, ranging from work to relaxation, as well as the weekly deportations. Yet, most shots display moments of normality, which can be seen as a direct consequence of the film being commissioned by the Nazis.

Pictured are men and women working in factories and workshops, farming, playing sports, or scenes from a cabaret set up by inmates. These are the kind of scenes included in Faroqui's film, which also make up the main part of the original material. The filmmaker rhetorically asks whether or not such "happy" images can be seen as representations of the Holocaust. Can they at all be said to be images of the event? I argue that they actually tell us something about the Holocaust and also about the role in images in the remembrance of that event. On the factual level, the Westerbork material gives a unique account of the inmates' life during the war in this specific camp, before reaching the so-called final solution— before they were sent to the extermination camps further east. Faroqui's film exposes the surrounding systematization that made the genocide possible. People were not randomly sent off to their deaths, but were part of an entire system of slave labor, imprisonment, and oppression. Yet, the "happy" images also remind the viewer of something deeply uncanny: the simple fact that life goes on under all circumstances. The inmates still laughed, exercised, and enjoyed a cabaret. Simultaneously, this footage is shot in order to create a narrative of the camp in line with Nazi policies. On the one hand the events did take place and a certain
level of normality was present in the camp: on the other hand, the circumstances cannot be 
overlooked, neither then, nor now. Life did go on and yet in hindsight the inmates stand 
like living ghosts, on the route to death. The footage, produced to display the beneficial 
conditions in the camp, are marked by the dichotomy of life and death, by then and now 
and by what was and what was coming. Hence, life goes on, yet there was nothing normal 
about the situation, leading to those lives coming to an end.

The testimony of the footage is not one of displaying suffering; it rather testifies to the 
complex machinery and the Nazis’ elaborate methods of staging and covering up what was 
really going on. The shots of a cabaret show the factual circumstance of it taking place 
in the camp, but also tell us something of that feature of Nazi ideology. This cover-up is 
directed at the very first minutes of Farrowki’s film, as the concept of a beautifying image 
is presented. An intertitle poses the question “Are these prettifying images?” The film then 
returns several times to this comment in different iterations, questioning how these shots 
can be perceived in relation to the historical circumstances. One intertitle card states: “We 
expect different images from a Nazi German Camp” and another, towards the end of the 
film: “These images are only shown rarely – perhaps to avoid giving a false impression 
of the camps.” The last comment leads up to the previously discussed theme of how one 
reads those images today, namely how other images of more horrifying events of the time 
superimpose themselves on the footage from Westerbork. Overall, the prettifying image 
is a matter of covering up and of averting, or in other words: a matter of not seeing and 
of hiding, both in terms of historiography and in relation to the image operations. These 
images could maybe even be used as a means of Holocaust denial, as propaganda stating 
it “was not that bad.” Yet, today, those images are most likely to be seen as aberrations 
that disturb a Western understanding of what the Holocaust was – an understanding that 
does not allow for leisure activities, for example.

The scenes of deportations are the ones which have appeared in other accounts, as such 
images more overtly testify to a Holocaust narrative consisting of ghettos, deportations, 
and camps. However, the shots where the inmates, smiling, wave goodbye and help the 
commanders to close the wagon doors are not – for the very same reason – included in those 
accounts. One frequently reproduced image is especially striking: the image of Sctella 
Steinbach, a young girl who looks out between two boards in a boxcar. Her gaze is filled 
with sorrow and her face is marked by malnutrition. She seems to be the only one who 
knows what is about to happen. The transport that she was on brought 238 Jews to Bergen-
Belsen and 208 Jews and 245 Roma to Auschwitz, of whom only 30 Roma returned. Even 
though the shot of Sctella Steinbach is the most reproduced image from the archival foot-
age, it stands out in Farrowki’s film. The short shot testifies to the severe situation that is 
not made visible in the other scenes. Simultaneously, in another sense the image brings 
the filmic account back into place, in the sense that it is more what one expects to see in a 
Holocaust representation.

Another instance where the larger context of the Holocaust is visibly present is when a 
deatil is highlighted on a deportation train on its way to the camps further east. Farrowki 
notes that at first the figure 74 is written on the boxcar, indicating the number of inmates 
in the car, but when the train leaves the platform, the number is crossed out and corrected 
to 75. He illuminates this both in text and by extracting a still image where he zooms in 
on the remaining number and the one which has been crossed out. In the attention to the 
detail of the number on the car, the meaning conveyed is not solely a matter of motif. A 
number and another one crossed out do not signify much in themselves, but when written 
on a boxcar caught on film in Westerbork in 1944, they signify something very specific. The 
shot cannot be freed from its original context: its historiographical reference is stable; the 
interpretation of it, however, is negotiated over time and dependent on context. In other 
words, for the intended addressee at the time of the making of the material, the correction 
of the numbers most probably signifies the diligent and meticulous work involved in the 
deportations. Today, a general conception would be to see it as an expression of the Nazi 
machinery – its exactness and its power to turn lives into numbers, as mentioned above. 
Farrowki’s reflection displays a sensibility to the image, but it can also be read as a comment 
on the strict systematization executed by the Nazis – hence, the importance of the number 
being right. Thus, the shot can be read as a symbol of the genocide in a more general sense. 
This is how the Westerbork images have been perceived when used in other contexts, such 
as the scenes included in Alain Resnais’ Night and Fog. Zoltán Kekesi describes how “the 
semiotic economy which makes use of the film footage as a metaphorical sign of the Nazi 
genocide in general” removes the images from the original context of their making and also 
from the archival context where it is possible to pose questions about their making and role 
in the historical event as such.38 In Kekesi’s view, Farrowki avoids this disruptive removal 
through his critical attention to the material and his usage of a single archival source. The 
use of one source of archival material forms the conceptual base of Respite. However, the 
film is unavoidably also related to the broader tradition of Holocaust documentaries, which 
are, as described, most often assemblages of several archival sources. These are the kinds 
of images and, more importantly, the approach to images, that have been most prominent 
in Holocaust representations. Farrowki’s use of those very shots, of Sctella Steinbach for 
example, is not free from such connotations – rather the opposite: by inserting such scenes 
and adhering to such emblematic details, he makes a symbolic gesture by juxtaposing them 
to the other kinds of images that do not fit into the same narrative. The montage calls atten-
tion to the divide between different image categories, since, even if the motifs are rather 
similar, one fits into a general conception of Holocaust imagery and the other does not. 
What Respite does is to bring forth the testifying qualities of the image in all its possible 
renderings and to approach it like a prism, entailing several possible readings, restricted 
only by context and situation.

Kekesi claims that Respite should be read as a moment of normality, in the Agambian sense, 
since what we see “still, takes place within the particular circumstances of the Westerbork 
camp, but already in the shadow of the weekly transportations to the ‘East.’” Yet, by read-
ing the footage of the deceitful normality of life in Westerbork as an agent of the true horror 
of the Holocaust, one runs the risk of disregarding the complexity of both the images and 
the Holocaust as such. The footage, as Kekesi also acknowledges, is a part of an intricate 
system of forced labor, ideology production, and documentation, which cannot be reduced 
to a single, stable signification. That would mean understimating the resituating of the 
images in the film by Farrowki, as well as the chain of production, editing, archiving, extract-
ing from the archive, and contextualizing in the new work.
The footage does not gesture to the actual killings, but should, in its specificity, be regarded as a part of the whole. It was of course produced within the framework of the Holocaust, as well as in the particularity of Westerbork and should be read in relation to that, but the footage also expands the understanding of what a representation of the Holocaust frame can entail. The Westerbork material and Farocki’s film would in such a rendering be inevitably bound to reproduce the horrors of the Holocaust in its triviality: all scenes, if seen as signifiers of the “true horror,” become the “soccer match,” which is eternally repeated, as discussed in the first chapter and as Agamben phrased it. 384 There would be no way out of the impasse and no room either for the images to act, nor for a restructuring of the frames.

Yet, the resituating of the material brings something out. One can, on the one hand, turn to Farocki’s own view of the editing as the key, where the editing process makes something visible. 389 On the other hand, one must also see the footage in terms of representation, regardless of editing and montage. The process of visualization in Respite is not only achieved through juxtapositions, but by putting the footage in relation to the context in which it was produced, which is then further elaborated on through Farocki’s reflective approach. An image from the mid-forties of women doing gymnastics is not surprising in terms of what is actually seen in the image. The particularity of that image resides, of course, in the fact that it is an image of Jewish women doing gymnastics in a camp under Nazi rule, and further in how that image contrasts with a general conception of what the Holocaust signifies. Hence, images like these are bound to their conditions of production: their temporal and spatial context, as well as the indications of those. A concrete example of this is when Farocki, at the end of Respite, points out that eye witnesses from the deportations in Westerbork testify to moments of despair on the platform, but in the film the deportation proceeds in utter calm, as described earlier. Farocki inserts two frames commenting on this. The first one reads: “Perhaps, the presence of the camera had a certain effect” and the second one: “Could the destination be as bad as expected if the SS were letting the train’s departure be filmed?” Thus, the camera is an active agent in the event and the shots are produced as consequences of that agency. The helpfulness depicted, the waving goodbye, and the deportee closing the wagon door himself do not testify to all deportations, only to the one on May 15, 1944, as it was played out in front of Breslauer’s camera.

In an essay, Farocki recalls the Dictionary of Inhumanity, a reference book consisting of the Nazi lingua, and asks if one could imagine an equivalent with pictures. 390 His own answer is no, as images and text are quite different. Words were at the core of Nazi ideology, some coined in the specific context like Sonderbehandlung (special treatment) and Endlösung (final solution), whereas others have returned to everyday colloquial language like selbsterständlich (self-evident), Volk (the people), or Fanatismus (fanaticism). Drawing on Raul Hilberg’s account of the role of language during the Holocaust, Farocki cannot imagine anything similar in terms of images: “at most there are image sequences, image constellations, declarative constellations and characteristic statements with images – one or several – that more or less correspond to a fixed verbal expression.” 391 Still, can one not imagine certain images as something similar to the words especially coined within the Nazi regime – as indexical signs of the genocide in general, to return to Kékesi’s formulation? Here two opposite readings are possible: on the one hand it would rather be the shots at liberation when the camps were opened that function as signs in this respect – not the images of the camps and the ghetto, as discussed above. Images of emaciated prisoners in striped uniforms with shaved heads in front of the rows of barracks or looking through the camp fence, can be seen as inhabiting not one of the concepts from the dictionary of Nazi lingua, but all. Thus, those images stand as manifestations of the Nazi ideology, as well as its language. Hence, they correspond to expressions like special treatment and final solution; yet, they are not mere representations thereof. On the other hand, the words used were a means to cover up what really went on – the experiments and the genocide – while the images from the liberation rather expose the truth hidden behind those concepts. Following this, the footage at the core of this text could more easily be equated with the Nazi concepts: images like those from Westerbork were designed to cover up what really took place in the camps. This was partly the intention behind the materials from both Westerbork and Theresienstadt, but as argued, one can read the footage differently from a contemporary perspective.

Sivan joins the discussion of the imagery of the camps from another point of view. In The Specialist he includes the instance where the prosecutor screens films from the camps in the courtroom, but he does not exhibit the highly charged footage. The audience can only get a hint of what is shown, since the spectator only sees the images from the side. At the same time one does not have to see such images to know what is shown. With the way the scene is represented visually, the viewer does not get the impression that one is seeing the actual screening in the courtroom. The different films are projected over each other, interchangeably, on a black background that does not appear to be the actual film screening in the courtroom. One could read this as being in agreement with Lanzmann’s rejection of archival images, as discussed in the beginning of this book, but what The Specialist does is to react to the symbolism created around the trial, thus arguing that the film provides an alternative to this act of nation building. 392 Without the particularity of the testimonies, the trial could be any trial concerned with crimes against humanity. The trial employed survivor testimonies as a privileged means of informing about the Holocaust, as a specific historic trauma and event. The exclusively testimonial character of the Holocaust narrative distinguishes the event from other historical genocides, perhaps even to such an extent that it can be dismissed as having little to do with the world today. The Specialist seems to reveal the universality of the events and to pose them as an example of a recurrent crime, i.e. modern genocides. By claiming the crime to be more general, the film also positions Eichmann’s case as a part of ongoing structures of oppression, racial or otherwise, which lead to disastrous events such as the Holocaust.
Then what are images? What has been, what can be perceived, again and again, and only here, only now.

PAUL CELAN

When my great-grandfather found out that his nephew and nieces had been sent to Westerbork in 1939, and that Holland was not the safe place their parents had imagined, he wanted to facilitate a reunion in Sweden, which their parents had already reached by then. The story, as it has been told, is that my great-grandfather appealed to the Swedish king at the time, Gustaf V. The king granted him an audience at his country house outside Gothenburg, where the monarch spent part of his summers playing tennis. Somehow, His Majesty also saw to it that Swedish citizenship was conferred upon those Jewish children. A young man who was traveling back to Gothenburg from Europe was assigned the mission to collect the children in Westerbork and bring them with him. I remember the story about the king from my childhood, but in a different rendition. In my version the king made my great-grandfather a Swedish citizen. When I ask my mother about the story, she also remembers it from her childhood – then heard directly from her grandfather. However, when I ask my grandmother about it, she retells the version above.

This family myth is one of many, as my grandfather often told us stories and jokes where one never knew if they were true or not. Sometimes the truth was hidden purposefully, sometimes it was the fault of memory, and sometimes it was just for the sake of telling a great story. From this I learned that words and narratives seldom have a direct relation to how things actually happened. Too many factors open such stories to doubt. The stories are testimonies of sorts, but not in the same sense as when a witness takes the stand and presents his or her testimony under oath. Still, there is a presumption that ‘the truth’ is remembered and can be told. As discussed throughout this book, words and narratives operate differently than images and have often assumed the role of the interlocutor of images. When in Hersonski’s film the contemporary witnesses watch the film from the Ghetto, describe what is seen in the footage, and recollect their own experiences, such interlocution is put in motion.

In the introduction I outlined two strands which my project would follow: one concerned with the question of Holocaust commemoration and the role of images therein and the other with a more general image theory. The first one stems from the tradition of testimony...
as the means to historicize the Holocaust in the era of the witness. In the second strand I ask how images can be regarded as bearing witness in relation to that specific history. At this point in my study, however, it seems clear that these two strands cannot be separated. I argued that the two strands might be brought together – and in hindsight I would claim they are indeed one. Thus, the strands are two and one simultaneously; where the second, which I described as offering the theoretical challenge, not only rests upon the first as a background, but borrows its very shape from that background. As stated, the first strand provides the tools for the second, but it also seems to supply the very material for constructing a contemporary image theory – the construction being both the theoretical quest posed, and the image that is witnessing in the films. My readings have been shaped by this specific interdependence: the era of the witness is what informs the discussion of the impossibility to represent the Holocaust, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for my perception of images as bearing witness. In the introduction, I briefly mention Rancière’s description of the bond between the idea of the non-representable and a contemporary aesthetics. He writes: ‘In the idea of the non-representable, two notions come together – an impossibility and an interdiction. To declare that a topic is non-representable through the means of art is in fact to say several things at once. It might mean that the specific means of art, or of one particular art, are not appropriate for its singularity.’ Thus, the description of something as unrepresentable calls for another type of representation. The question is by which means the artistic expression takes shape. Archival images could then be a type of art appropriate for bearing witness. Whereas it is precisely archival images that Lanzmann wanted to rid Holocaust commemoration from. And in a sense, I agree with Lanzmann – I don’t believe that archival images per se bear historical truth. I do not hold that archival images in general are appropriate, not on the level of representation. Rather, I am suggesting a careful and respectful approach where the images have to stand in their own right. And, what the quote by Rancière illuminates is the implication of an interdiction within the frame of the impossible.

In order to explicate this relation a bit further, I will in this concluding chapter address three central issues: I first return to the questions of the montage, followed by a discussion of interpretation. The third section is a brief sketch of what a future witnessing could be. Through an account of an unrealized and unreleased montage, Henchman Glance, by Chris Marker, I discuss how montage concretely enables witnessing and how the concept can avoid a too general rendering. Secondly, I ask what it means to regard testimony through the image and where the interpretive act reside – is it with the cameraman, the spectator or the image itself? Lastly, I address a future witnessing through the creation of 3D holograms of survivors, which is neither a subject, and nor an image.

What I have shown is that an image can bear witness and that its testimony is transmitted through montage. The witnessing image is, thus, not the I behind the camera nor in the matter of the image as such. To regard the image as bearing witness is to take account of its full (his)story. Put differently, the image, as caught by the camera, framed, developed, and situated, is a possible witness if thoroughly watched – as discussed throughout this book. Furthermore, each of the three films bring several subjectivities into play: the cameraman and the spectator, the commissioner and archivist, and the directors and editors of the new films. In this sense, the witness cannot be said to represent one single subject and not one single thing, and the image is not a witness that speaks by itself. Images can bear witness without, against, and in spite of any given intention.

Thus, a witnessing image is an image brought forth in the montage – by resituating and frames. The archival footage depends on an intervention which enables them to bear witness – gives them a stage so to speak. In the closing credits of The Specialist, images of Eichmann with a cunning smile are inserted, as discussed in the previous chapter, which disturbs the image of him as “thoughtless,” as Arendt described him. The viewer is confronted with his somewhat rebellious smile and gaze, in contrast to how he had been presented until then. In 2010 I was fortunate enough to attend a presentation within the framework of Berlin Documentary Forum where Eyal Sivan screened an unreleased film by Chris Marker, Henchman Glance, who was Alain Resnais’ assistant director on Night and Fog (Nuit et Brouillard), had made the film in response to the French media controversy surrounding The Specialist. It is a montage of shots of Eichmann watching Night and Fog countered with the equivalent scenes from the film: the spectator thus “sees” what Eichmann sees and can also follow his reaction to what he has seen. Marker also inserted the missing sound from the screening. The film recording of Eichmann at the screening was made by Leo Hurwitz in defiance of a court ruling, according to Sivan. Sivan describes the film as an “unsigned 32-minute documentary composition” where “the observation of the perpetrator, the visual interrogation of the witness of the political evil, the investigation of power and authority, marked the post-World War II documentary cinema.”

His argument is close to the cinematic suggestion in The Specialist, which, as described, has a firm focus on the perpetrator. What Sivan seems to describe is a cinematic and documentary tradition developed since the Holocaust, focused on individual stories of victims. Could one then imagine that the figure of the witness both thematically and conceptually has a special place within cinema? If one follows this line of thought, a subsequent question is who is a witness? When this question is asked, it soon becomes evident that the perpetrator is generally absent as a witness, and his presence is first and foremost conceptually...
presented in terms of a call for recognition of the crimes committed – hence, something like an evil other. Thus, the perpetrators are hardly present on the level of representation. And there are few films focusing on the Nazis and their collaborators, like Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah. Plausibly, Sivan refers to his film and makes it a signifier for an entire tradition. There is a decisive difference between representing a victim and a perpetrator, and Henchman Glance takes this a step further as it combines the two in one film. The thematic treatment of the witness within postwar cinema in general, and the three films discussed in particular, can be said to follow the line described by Wiewiórka reaching from the adlocut of the witness to the era of the witness.

What I have discussed in this book is rather a larger take on the conceptual place of the witness in the three films. As I have made clear, I see the witnessing of the images as playing out in the totality of the image. A totality that can only be understood in terms of an aesthetic approach, through frames, situations, effects, sounds, and editing. Thus, I have argued that the conceptual place of the witness in cinema is defined by the montage, by the framing and resituating of the film and its images.

Yet, a return to Henchman Glance demonstrates that the layers of witnessing are multiple. As stated, the spectator watches Eichmann watching, and simultaneously watches the clips from Night and Fog with him. This witnessing is literary brought forth by Marker’s montage. The film enables a witnessing on the level of representation as well as reiterating it conceptually, since Eichmann was watching the same material. And the spectator watches Eichmann: his facial expressions are assumed to correspond to what he sees projected. As the montage is constructed, the spectator relates those expressions to the clips Marker has inserted between the shots of Eichmann. These factors of watching and being watched and the assumed relationship between the two, leads to witnessing which is bound to both representation and spectatorship, as well as to the relationship between perpetrator and victim and representations thereof. The images from Night and Fog gain a renewed strength when I see them through Eichmann’s eyes, so to speak. The power of the testimony of those images appears to have been multiplied by this montage. Hence, here one can see precisely how the image can bear witness in and through montage: the footage from Night and Fog is not altered, but with the addition of the imagery of Eichmann its testimony is amplified.

The rows of emaciated inmates from the camps seem to look not at the camera, but at Eichmann, and he looks back. In the montage, the perpetrator is confronted with his victim, reaching across time and space. A similar encounter took place in Eichmann’s courtroom. But there both parties refer to past events, whereas the Henchman Glance stages such an encounter in a time out of joint. The confrontation, created by the montage and by the resituating of the images, is powerful: it makes the images of the liberation speak, and it makes Eichmann an intermediary in that speech. Yet, the footage of Eichmann also bears testimony – to a screening that should not have been documented and to Eichmann’s reactions to the same screening. It is not known why Hurwitz decided to film it and to thereby break the rules of the court. The footage gives the impression of both surveillance and voyeurism. It enables Marker’s montage, which in its model of shot versus countershot, appear as a means to both confine and destabilize the figure of the witness. The montage principle of a logical back and forth confines Eichmann as the one who is witnessing, yet it also poses the spectator as the one witnessing since the dialectical relation also seems to create a closed entry. Thus, the alternating between the shots of Eichmann watching and the sequences from Night and Fog produces a unity between the two materials even though the sequences from Night and Fog that the spectator sees are not the projection that took place in the room. Of, in other words, a logic is established where the spectator soon realizes what is play and through which form it is conveyed.

Shot versus countershot is the classic form of montage and it is easily recognized: it creates an expectation of what will come next as the images move back and forth. Harun Farocki argues that this convention is so strong that the spectator, even if the countershot is missing, will at once experience the omission as another type of montage. He writes: ‘shot/counter shot is the most important expression of the law of value; it is a norm even when absent’ and he also recalls that Godard drew a connection of shot versus countershot to fascism. None of the three films discussed in this study can be reduced to such a clear-cut formula. However, what Farocki’s quote illuminates is something similar to Judith Butler’s conception of normative frames, where the norm’s impact makes itself felt even in its absence. In Henchman Glance the norm of shot/countershot is fulfilled, and the montage enhances the expectation of the spectator, but what makes it fascinating is that it is both conceptually and formally decisive for the film. As described above, the montage is not a narrative means, it is the narration itself. That is what makes it profoundly uncanny to watch.

As Farocki acknowledges, shot/countershot is a simplified understanding of montage. And it is a concept burdened by superficial clarity and deepened obscurity. For example, montage is a crucial term for Didi-Huberman but his definition of it also remains vague. What Didi-Huberman assigns to the montage is not simply a dialectical juxtaposition, but a mechanism of semblance versus dispensability; a montage does not assimilate one image to another but produces something anew. He quotes Godard, stating that ‘montage is the foundation of cinema’, however, in his text there is no differentiation between moving and still images. He discusses montage through the concept of image, a term I also use, but he fails to distinguish the various kinds of images at play. Hence, he moves freely in discussions of Aby Warburg’s atlas, Godard’s films, Lanzmann’s Shoah, and the four photographs from Auschwitz. A temporality is still set in motion, but it does not reside within the images, in the moving image that is, but seems like an external factor tied to editing and distribution.

Further, montage produces knowledge. Didi-Huberman holds, which then would be transmitted through the testimony of the images. I agree with this in relation to the films discussed. However, as Tond Lundemo rightly points out, ‘while the archival image alone constitutes a document of historical knowledge in Didi-Huberman’s discussion, […] for Godard the single image, stick or moving, is not yet history’. Didi-Huberman sees montage as the writing of history where the images are already, whereas Godard posits the montage as a making and becoming. Godard’s view is, thus, more in line with how I have discussed the images as resituated. Embedded in that notion is precisely an understanding of the relation between spatial and temporal factors as immersed in the montage work. Hence, it is an aesthetic operation, but one which must be considered in relation to a historical situation.
This could also be related to Georges Didi-Huberman’s reading of Respite as a remontage, as I briefly mentioned earlier. He argues that Farocki works with a respectful adherence to the singularity of the images when doing his re-montage. Didi-Huberman holds that this brings forth the relation between the historical fact and the scene. Hence, the special attention given to the singularity of the material in its new constellation, the film, is what enables historical and political reflection. The montage, thus, illuminates the material as a source and offers a new way of seeing. However, this is not only a safeguarding of a set framework, historical and political reflection. The montage, thus, illuminates the material as a source and offers a new way of seeing. However, this is not only a safeguarding of a set framework.

The singularities of the material in its new constellation, the film, is what enables remontage. The three-folded process, described by Didi-Huberman, of exhibiting (montrer), mounting, and remontage (remontrer) is grounded in image work, but also tied to a greater context of political rage, and an emancipatory drive. The mounting is bound to a de-mounting, a de-montage of the material, as well as of the own position, in order to didactically construct the foundation for a new understanding – a view that could be applied to the three films discussed and to Holocaust. The witnessing through montage is thus a witnessing enabled by montage. The montage is not the testimony, but maybe something equivalent of the voice transmitting it – hence, it is what makes it possible.

Caterina Albano has suggested the term rememorialization to describe Farocki’s anticipatory, and simultaneously retrospective investigation of the material. Something which indeed lends itself to describe the work of all three filmmakers. In my view, the remontage and the rememorialization, as well as the remontage, is what renders the images as something which one can see. Or, in other words, the remontage or remounting make the images into possible witnesses and the rememorialization is the consequence of that testimony. The question of seeing is always also a question of the unseen or forgotten, not because it is invisible, but rather, as Thomas Keenan beautifully phrased it, “a sort of blindness [s] built into sight, it attends to what is not of the order of sight, to another light or an oversight in the image.”

The three-folded process, described by Didi-Huberman, of exhibiting (montrer), mounting, and remontage (remontrer) is grounded in image work, but also tied to a greater context of political rage, and an emancipatory drive. The mounting is bound to a de-mounting, a de-montage of the material, as well as of the own position, in order to didactically construct the foundation for a new understanding – a view that could be applied to the three films discussed and to Holocaust. The witnessing through montage is thus a witnessing enabled by montage. The montage is not the testimony, but maybe something equivalent of the voice transmitting it – hence, it is what makes it possible.

Because the object and its interpreter constitute a single interlinked rhetorical unit, in order to refute a statement attributed to the thing it is necessary to dismantle the mechanism of its articulation, which is to say, to show that the object is inauthentic, that its interpreter is biased, or that the communication between them is short-circuited. The object and its “friend” do not speak the same language, one could say, either because the expert misunderstands, or, more radically, because the so-called speech of the object comes entirely from its would-be advocate.

THOMAS KEENAN AND EYAL WEIZMAN

Even if the montage enables testimony, it does not do away with the question of interpretation. One can still ask whose testimony it is and if the image remains an agent in its own right. Or is its speech only coming from its would-be advocate, as Keenan and Wizman phrased it? One criticism of Didi-Huberman’s reading of the four images from Auschwitz, argues that Didi-Huberman himself assumed the role of the witness, which in turn renders the source lost. The act of reading an image, of making it speak, of watching it, or of interpretation, thus, seems to overpower the image. To assume the role of the witness is to make oneself present in another time, and maybe place, neither of which one necessarily knows. But does it mean assuming the role of the photographer or the image as such? Who is it that bears testimony: the photographer, the image, or the spectator?

These questions might be answered by Jean Epstein’s view on cinema as the thinking machine – and a more general discussion of the relation between the subject and technol- ogy. Trond Lundemo discusses how the witness per definition is a subject with first-hand experience, whereas the most common constitution of memory takes place through a medium. The medium transmits the testimony, that is to say, testimony can be seen as what distinguishes the human witness from technology. Images cannot convey the pre-scribed subjectivity of testimony, Lundemo goes on to argue, and he suggests that a more modest request should be proposed in regards to the dark margin in film and photog- raphy. This dark margin of the archival image regulates what can be said, seen, and heard at a given time about an image and thus functions as a potential for resistance against the mnemonic technologies around us, which in this sense would mean not to search for the subject behind the image, but to seek to understand the historic event through images. In line with this, Lundemo draws attention to Didi-Huberman’s problematic need to refig- ure the photographer. By inventing a subject behind the camera, as Didi-Huberman does, the imagined photographer is the one giving testimony, rather than regarding the images as the witness. Didi-Huberman even labels the images a sort of self-portrait of the Sonderkommando. An interesting, but quite tenuous claim, because it is not the members of the Sonderkommando that are depicted in the images. And, to see images of one’s own actions or work, forced or not, as a self-portrait might expand the term too much to make sense. Further, one must ask what such a view does to the ones actually depicted in the images.
Still, Didi-Huberman also seeks to understand through the image. His book offers a model of reading images through their means of production, which entails attention to the ones behind the camera (both the cameraman and the commissioner of the footage) but it does not necessarily cast those subjects as witnesses. Contrary to a view of the image as being the testimony of the photographer or cameraman, I have shown how the image bears its own testimony. In addition, to argue that Didi-Huberman suggests that the image is primarily an extension of the photographer is not entirely accurate. Following the description of the images as self-portraits he argues that since no one in front or behind the camera “survived that to which the images bear witness,” the images alone are the survivors.416 The one giving testimony is not a remnant, in the sense Agamben would have it, but the image is what remains.417 This notion of images is what I have taken as my point of departure, and it also, in the sense Agamben would have it, but the image is what testimony is not a

The forensic work is done by the filmmakers, but it is furthered by the spectators – in defiance of the impossibility to represent the Holocaust. Despite the strong charge this footage carries, the filmmakers and then by the spectators – in defiance of the impossibility to represent the Holocaust. Why? Maybe just because this footage demands a response.

Moreover, the scarcity of images from the Holocaust also implies a risk, when used as tools for contestation. For example, “operational images,” like the mechanically rendered area shots of Auschwitz included in Farocki’s Images of the World and Inception of War, have been used both as a means to verify the camp layout and as tool to deny the Holocaust. Obviously, interpretation does not grant truthfulness, or even a valid reading of an image. As Judith Butler has described, interpretations are a sort of response; “interpretation does not emerge as the spontaneous act of a single mind, but as a consequence of a certain field of intelligibility that helps to form and frame our responsiveness to the impinging world.”418 As previously stated, images can be abused and they can be made false witnesses. What is needed is both an interlocutor and image technological means to counter such readings – a forensic aesthetics if you will.419 The forensic work is done by the filmmakers, but it is furthered by the spectator of the films. Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizman’s description of a forensic aesthetics captures the movement of deconstruction and reconstruction implied in resituation; the detailed investigation deconstructs the image by reconstructing its conditions of production, its material history, and its situation and by doing so enables a more structural reconstruction, a resituating. In turn, this pinpoints a sort of frame for what can possibly be read out of the image. Hence, truth reconstruction is not a construction of any truth.

The material means of Holocaust deniers are further explained when Weizman discusses the use of architectural evidence (drawings, models, aerial, and ground-level photographs) in the lawsuit initiated by Holocaust denier David Irving in 2000.420 During the trial, the same operational images that Farocki included in his film were used to counter the historical fact of the gas chambers. Against this backdrop, Weizman describes how a move beyond the witness runs a risk of being used as a means to deny the Holocaust, since material evidence has been employed to contradict survivors’ testimonies. Weizmann recounts that Holocaust deniers claimed that witness testimony “produced too much metaphysics, not enough materialism,” which he understands as “a desire to preclude the very ability of witnesses to speak to history at all” since “by posing matter against memory, they demanded a history without subject and beyond language.”421 Hence, while deniers of the Holocaust have wanted to remove the very possibility of bearing witness, and have used the image in order to prove a lie, I have argued for a similar move from subject to matter but on opposite grounds. The image as witness is not only a complement to the traditional witness, the subject-bearing witness could also be complemented by images – beyond a function of evidence or verification.422 As mentioned, in several of the filmed testimonies in the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonials, witnesses bring photographs as a means to support their story – “look here,” they say, “it is as I said” or “that is her, whom I spoke about.”423 Still, these images are not given their due, to return to Farocki’s formulation, their roles are restricted to guarantors.

**FURTHER ROUTES OF TESTIMONY: WHY DON’T YOU ASK ME ABOUT AUSCHWITZ?**

It is through an interrogation of the selectivity, convergence and silences of global remembering that we can mobilize the amnesic traces that permeate the contemporary politics of memory and address the contingencies that remembering generates thus allowing the unleashing of images for the future.424

CATERINA ALBANO

A project is currently being developed as a collaboration between the USC Shoah Foundation and the University of Southern California, where 3D holograms of survivors are created. The project New Dimensions in Testimony is described as an “initiative to record and display testimony in a way that will continue the dialogue between Holocaust survivors and learners far into the future.”425 This can keep up practices, such as the touring of schools, infinitely, and maintain the traditions of oral testimony. The survivors, as individual
bodies, are granted, or doomed to, eternal survival. Interviews are conducted and the sur-
vivors’ bodies are scanned with advanced 3D technology to enable a later testimony in the
form of a hologram. The project stages prior testimonies, which were given to the Shoa
Foundation, and by filming the survivor with 16 cameras, and posing around a hundred
questions, a sort of interactive witness hologram is created. This project, and others like it,
blurs the line between the witnessing subject and witnessing beyond the witness. It is
neither a person giving testimony nor an image or film. Or maybe it is both. It has the fea-
tures of a subjective testimony, but the person is missing. There cannot be any outbursts,
breaks, or impass in discourse, as Michal Givoni has rightly pointed out. In her view
this amounts to a “witnessing without witnesses.” In the same way that it is not a person,
even if it can reply to questions, it is also not an image or a film. Its features are radically
different, as both the image projected and the narration is altered due to the questions
asked. A farfetched affinity could be traced to montage, but the analogy doesn’t hold as the
montage is the tool of the filmmaker in the construction of a narrative, whereas the inter-
active hologram lacks an auteur beyond the one who scripted the questions. At least two
interesting points come from this: one is what happens to the ontology of the witness and
the image alike, and another is concerned with what this does to the witnessing trope, as
discussed in the preceding chapters.

The ontological question is played out in the hologram as a sort of in-between image and
subject. And the witnessing trope, the image as witness, is altered, since the hologram is
neither an oral testimony, nor a film sequence. Hence, in a short film about the project,
produced by the New York Times, an elderly woman is seated in what looks like a globe
of cameras, surrounded by their flashes. A voice is heard: “Why don’t you ask me about
Auschwitz?” and the woman repeats the question in a slightly broken English. The
words uttered are the same, but the meaning they carry are radically different depending
on the subject uttering them. The neutral instruction changes into a request to address a
deeply traumatic and personal experience. And next, the hologram will be the one utter-
ing the question. Looking at the film, a shiver runs down my spine as the woman speaks.
The uncanny question lingers. The witness is not only asked to narrate, but also to steer
the expected viewers’ interaction with the hologram. The witness becomes responsible for
both her testimony and to make sure that there is someone there to listen. As if she/the
hologram/the research program in charge silently says: “don’t ask me about trivial things,
ask me about Auschwitz.” The “why don’t you” implies a question not being asked, a con-
sversation comes before it, and its rhetorical figure does something else than if it would have
been “let me tell you about Auschwitz.” This “why don’t you” seems like an implication,
almost an accusation, bound to the trope of never again.

Thus, the way in which a testimony is presented informs the testimony as such: how the
speech is structured is part of its narration. Something similar is true for film, as discussed
in terms of montage and narration. The forms of narration, the montage, shape the film’s
discourse, which is inseparable from the film’s argument – hence, precisely what the holo-
gram lacks. There is no argument to be found, as there is no narrative structure. Yet, as
described, there are also not any memory gaps or responsive emotions, which otherwise are
internal to the type of reminiscing entailed in giving testimony. The problem is thus present
both as form and authorship, and in regards to the source of the testimony.

The notion of the “witnessing without witnesses” is a beyond the witness as discussed in
this book. But it is also a fundamentally unstable notion if applied to all images – and not as
a means to discuss three specific films. In the readings of the three films in this book I
have addressed an ontology of the image and discussed how images can bear witness. Yet,
it might be applicable to most images. With the intense image production and circulation
of our time, images devoid of context appear and disappear, and they are ascribed different
narratives and situations. Gruesome images are easily accessible online, tools for image
manipulations are available on every computer, and we are surrounded by a discourse of
“fake news” and “alternative facts.”

Images need to be trustworthy, contextualized, and situated. Especially if regarded as
bearing witness. On the one hand there are organizations dedicated to the verification of
images from conflict zones – for example, a film of an attack must be ascribed a date, time,
and place in order to testify in any concrete way. On the other hand, there is a need for
alternative representations, dignified images, as the Syrian film collective Abounaddara labels it. The notion is addressed as a right to an image, as a human right, which might be images
that do not show dead or emaciated bodies. A striking feature in the videos posted by
Abounaddara are the depictions of everyday life, since they testify to something seldom
represented in warzones. Such imagery contradicts the type of images circulated by news
media, as the one of Alan Kurdi, mentioned in the second prelude, which directly testifies
to a horrible consequence of war, and also to European restricted immigration policies.

If considered in a more general sense, the discourse of a dignified image could of course also
be related to an impossible representation and also to Farokhi’s reflection on “pretifying” images.
One might argue that any images shot in a time and place of war that do not show the hor-
or embedded in the very notion of war, are “pretifying” to some extent. What this argu-
ment misses, however, is that suffering might not be representable. However, this should
not lead to an impossible representation. The suffering of war cannot be reduced to a mere
moment, but often consists of long-term endurance and trauma. This is also true of the
camps, as the Holocaust cannot be defined by the moment of death – which leads us right
back to the question of what a Holocaust representation might be. What is illuminated
by Abounaddara in their demand for a dignified image is then neither pretifying nor impossi-
ble. What is pertinent in Abounaddara’s claim is the question of self-representation and the
right to remain in control of one’s own representation. Images of war are often ascribed an
enlightening value, providing evidence, regarded to reach beyond these claims, but what
happens if that representation is all one gets? Alan Kurdi will for a large public in the West
remain the symbol of the dangerous flight to Europe from Syria. But, as Syrians cannot be
reduced solely to victims of war, other images are also needed to provide a fuller testimony.

How then, in light of all this, can the image as witness help us think about future witness-
ing? One point of departure for this endeavor was the fact that we will soon have reached a
time when there no longer are any survivors among us. The need to remember won’t dimin-
ish, rather the opposite is the case, as time passes and connections unravel. The Holocaust
should not be relegated to a confined historical past. Yet, it should also not be upheld as a
political tool justifying contemporary atrocities. Nor should it be only a Jewish matter, even
if it is the Jewish Holocaust that has predominantly been addressed in this book. To bear
witness is not by necessity to confirm a given narration, nor to counter it. Witnessing could support a narrative, confront it, or even resist it – just as well as it could make something unknown known, and bring something hidden to light. In her discussion of the ethics of witnessing, Michal Givoni posits the activity of witnessing as a prospective resistance to power in a neoliberal age. It is a means to bring forth a nongovernmental politics, like for example human rights violations or environmental crimes, which are not only formulated in terms of legality but also ethically. Givoni describes an ethicalization of witnessing: “witnessing and testimony have been instrumental to nongovernmental politics not just by virtue of the practical solutions they offered for making public claims but also for providing a framework for articulating ethical problems.” Witnessing, in this broad sense, might be one of the strongest tools there is to counter and resist the rise of fascism and right-wing politics, not only in regards to contemporary testimonies, addressing contemporary events, but also in relation to historical witnesses as a way to remember what was and in order to think what can be.

BEYOND THE WITNESS

PRELUDE 1-3


WHAT IS A WITNESS?

3 Food not in accordance with Jewish dietary laws, kosher, is called treif. Over time, the meaning of the term treif expanded from non-kosher to anything “forbidden” or non-Jewish and it was in this regard the streets of Gothenburg were treif.

4 In the fall of 2017, the police of Gothenburg granted the organization the Nordic Resistance Front the right to march through the city center on Jom Kippur, passing within a few blocks of the big synagogue. Jom Kippur is one of the most holy days for Jews, when many attend the synagogue to ask for forgiveness and to commemorate the dead. During 2016, ninety-two instances of arson targeting refugee shelters was confirmed by the police.

5 The Eichmann trial can be understood as a part of the formation of Israeli identity and collective memory, since the Holocaust was hardly discussed in Israel before the trial. The early series were an important period for the Israeli state in positioning itself as having the agency to determine how the Holocaust should be judged and remembered. Yad Vashem: Shoaḥ Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority was established in 1953 by an act of the Israeli Parliament, and its first exhibit opened in the administration building in 1958. However, a permanent exhibit was not established until 1976 in a museum building. One needs to take into account that the Israeli nation state, which amongst other things meant a re-evaluation of Jewish identity, both in the sense that a mostly urban class had to learn how to cultivate the earth, and that a position opposite to victimhood needed to be created after the war. Attorney General Gideon Hausner stated, when looking back on the trial three years later, that “the trial was thus, in itself, an overwhelming manifestation of the revolution in the position of the Jewish people that has taken place in that generation [that survived the Holocaust].” Even the cover of the 1968 English edition of Hausner’s book on the issue seems to make such argument: it depicts a yellow star being removed, revealing the underlying blue star of the Israeli flag – as if to say that the Jewry of the yellow star, understood as the European Jews, transformed into Israelis: Gideon Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 42–3.

6 In this book, I have chosen to use the term Holocaust over Shoaḥ. Anne-Marie Baron provides a persuasive discussion of the meaning of the two concepts and how they have been formed by films and TV series. Use of the term Holocaust became widespread after the release of the 1978 TV series by the same name. The term is a word of Greek origin, used in antiquity for animal sacrifices and meaning “wholly burnt,” that is, both burnt whole and totally consumed by fire. This was countered by the word Shoaḥ, which became established in the wake of Claude Lanzmann’s 1985 film. Baron holds this as “perhaps one of the films most important functions: providing an imperishable name.” It is a non-religious word meaning “overwhelming catastrophe,” “utter destruction,” or “devastation.” Giorgio Agamben also finds the term Holocaust insufficient due to its link with a Biblical punishment and the historic Christian anti-Semitic use of it. Yet, his choice seems to be to use neither, to call places by their names and avoid overarching concepts. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New Y ork: Zone Books, 2008), 28–32 and Anne-Marie Baron, The Shoaḥ on screen – Representing crimes against humanity (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2006), 9.


9 This differentiates the three films from, for example, Würsele Uprising from 2004. It tells the story of the
Warsaw Uprising through the use of newscasts filmed in August of 1944, which have been colorized. Warszawa: Uprising was directed by Jan Komasa, and the project initiated by the Warsaw Uprising Museum. The filmmaker wrongly claims that it “is probably the worlds first war documentary film made entirely of real archive materials and problematically describes it as “87 min of truth.”

1. Agents of Liberation includes chapters from The Specialist and Report, however there are no connections made between the two films, beyond the conceptual correlation in the same subsection dedicated to the question of the archive existing despite everything: Zehn Kekesi, Agents of Liberation: Holocaust Memory in Contemporary Art and Documentary Films (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015).


14 One might, in line with Wolfgang Ernst, differentiate between the archive and the collection and maybe even more crucially identify what type of a work is being talked about. I refer to a traditional notion of the author, rather than a media technological storage. Yet, as Ernst explicates the difference, the traditional notion of the archive gains a similar movement to the logical storage. Yet, as Ernst explicates of archive one is talking about.


16 Images, in Mitchell’s sense, include all kinds of representations: films and photographs, as well as paintings. Yet, as described, is an important divide between images and pictures between an image and a material representation of sorts. Mitchell quotes Wurtzstein to make his point clear: “An image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it.” Image, thus, comes before picture, yet they operate in different spheres. The image is the medium of thoughts, dreams, memory, and fantasy, and the picture is the material support of such an image. The image, or the imagined, is not necessarily matter, and the picture cannot be completely immaterial. I prefer the concept of image, over picture, since, in my view, opens up to a discussion of different kinds of pictorial representation rather than an image ontology.

Yirovski explains how the image is a composite structure and, in line with Gilbert Simondon, he sees both as a process of imagina-


17 For an excellent recapitulation of the ontological differences between photography and film see Malm Walsberg’s discussion in Film Image as Ontology,” in Figures of Time: On the Phenomenology of Cinema and Temporality (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2003), 86.


21 Cristina Blüminger quotes Serge Daney, a French film critic, in order to employ his distinction between the cinematic image and the media image the “cinema in his words,” thus placing the artistic creation versus the television image: the commercial or military technological image. Blüminger understands Eurokans practice as invested in a re-evaluation of the cinematic image in order to re-rectify it as an image, without a team to the right of the artist, of course Blüminger, “Harun Farukis: Critical Strategies,” in Harun Farukis Working on the Screen, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 345.

22 This is a dissertation in Aesthetics, investeed in a re-evaluation of the cinematic image in order to re-rectify it as an image, without a team to the right of the artist, of course Blüminger, “Harun Farukis: Critical Strategies,” in Harun Farukis Working on the Screen, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 345.

23 Wieviorka points out that historians of the time realized the necessity to give the victims a voice, not knowing how the war would end and what kind of story would be told. Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 2.

24 Bield, 73.


26 Yael Hersonski’s film is the only one including contemporary testimonies, and this relation is present in those scenes, although it is not part of my central argumentation around the films.

27 I will return to Shoshana Felman’s claim that the Holocaust is “an event without witnesses,” but for now I borrow this paraphrasing formulated by Libby Saxton in her insightful discussion of Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah. Libby Saxton, “Anamnesis and Hearing Witness: Godard/Lanzmann,” in For Ever Godard, ed. Michel Temple, James S. Williams, and Michael Wint (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2007), 377.


30 Wieviorka points out that historians of the time realized the necessity to give the victims a voice, not knowing how the war would end and what kind of story would be told. Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 2.

31 Ibid., 73.

32 Lizzie Doron beautifully accounts for the specificity of the novel Das Schwestern meiner Mutters (My Mothers Sisters): Lizzie Doron, Das Schwestern meiner Mutters (Munch: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2012).

33 Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 36.


35 Around 4.7 million names of victims have been collected and they are commemorated in Yad Vashem’s Hall of Names, a room whose walls are lined with bookshelves containing folders of testimonies.

36 Prominent theoretical contributions to this debate are amongst others: Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1992); Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Wines and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999) and Jacques Derrida, Segregations in Question: The Politics of Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005) or Jean-François Lyotard, The Diffrerent: Finesses in Deploits (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). 37 The discussions were formed by survivors and the generation born during the war. hence it was their parents, real and symbolical, who perished.

38 Adorno’s statement has become emblematic and endlessly quoted, often with the latter part of the sentence left out and without much regard to the context it was written in. The original quote is in full: “Kulturkritik findet sich in der letzten Stufe der Dialektik von Kultur und Barbarie gegenüber: nach Auschwitz ein Gedicht zu schreiben, ist barbarsch, und das frisst auch die Erkenntnis an, die ausspricht, warum es unmöglich war, heute Gedichte zu schreiben.” The passage is from Theodor Adorno, Prima Schramm, “Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Anti-Aesthetic,” in Adorno, Postmodernism and the Dialectics of Culture (London: Routledge, 1991), 546-7.

39 Again, Felman and Laub are central in this discussion, Laub himself also being a Holocaust survivor. See also Cathy Caruth, “On the Witness,” in German Life and Letters 52:2 (2005): 82-94.

40 There are testimonies from the camps of almost everything leading up to the last horrific moments, when the gas was turned on in the gas chambers. There are extensive accounts from the outside of the crematoria of the screams and cries for help from those locked inside. In a sense one can see this as a testimony of the death in the gas chamber, even if there is no one who can in hindsight recount what happened when the doors were closed. What might be impossible is a transmission of the singular account, the individual experience, and the immense horror felt.


event to oneself, and the experience it was also impossible to transmit the lack of a conceived bear witness for the / witness," Derrida, 51 The English translation of the Literature 43 Derrida, 50 Ibid., 15. 47 Ibid., 82. 48 The figure of the "muselman" is in the Holocaust created in this way a disjunction between two impossibilities, of Laub reasoning about the non-language, in Agamben, is also a non-language, in Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 35. 54. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 35. 55. In her reading of Shabb, Felman addresses the voice and silence in light of a communal singing, bringing the dead and the living together through the reclaiming of an identity through songs stemming from a context before and outside the camp. She relates the singing to the act of giving voice in the film and the creation and impact of a chorus - hence, the voice of many rather than the one. Felman and Laub, Testimony, 279.

Shohana Felman and Dori Laub, 45 Shohana Felman and Dori Laub, Remnants of the Shoah, 80–1. 50 Ibid., 15. 51 The English translation of the testimony, he writes, "is the Holocaust created in this way a disjunction between two impossibilities, of Laub reasoning about the non-language, in Agamben, is also a non-language, in Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 35. 54. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 35. 55. In her reading of Shabb, Felman addresses the voice and silence in light of a communal singing, bringing the dead and the living together through the reclaiming of an identity through songs stemming from a context before and outside the camp. She relates the singing to the act of giving voice in the film and the creation and impact of a chorus - hence, the voice of many rather than the one. Felman and Laub, Testimony, 279.

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As will be discussed throughout, questions of framing, possible staging, the presence of the camera and crew, and later the caption, as well as the development and distribution, are just as decisive for the image and all contribute towards the becoming of the image.


4. Azoulay uses the example of two Israeli soldiers having their picture taken next to the corpse of a Palestinian man. Caught in the image are not only the soldiers and the dead body, but also a third soldier taking the others' picture. Their action of taking the image is irreversibly frozen within the image of the distant photograph, and the two actions of photographing are entangled with one another, changing the possibility to attain a visual memory production taking place in the photographing of the two smiling soldiers and the dead man. The only one not acting is the Palestinian man. He is dead and therefore cannot act, but also because actions are tied to citizenship: the "space of plurality, which is the necessary condition for any action in Azoulay's sense, is forbidden to the noncitizens." Azoulay's argument understands the image as intensifying the Palestinian man's condition as a non-citizen, when transforming him into mere decoration. Further, the image also marks a flaw in the soldiers' own citizenship since their action is uniform, removing the space for plurality that is reinstated by the distant photographer shooting the image of the soldiers shooting their image. Azoulay, Civil Contract of Photography, 141-2.

5. An idea, in this broad sense, is never one but a composite structure, a cluster, governed by interconnectibilities and montages. Images are pre-individual and autonomous beings forming networks of memory through association and propagation. Torild Lundemo, "Mapping the World: Les Archives de la planète and the Mobilisation of Memory, in Memory in Motion. Architecture, Technology and the Social, ed. Ina Blom, Torild Lundemo, and Eivind Rostaa (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 244.


7. Ibid., 82.

8. Published interview I conducted with Eyal Sivan via email and MJP, April 10, 2009. From here on referred to as Eyal Sivan, interview conducted by Rebecca Katz Thor via email and audio recording on MJP. (New York: Anthology Film Archive, 1999), 36.

9. Nees, Royal Images, 36.

10. Other prominent contributors to this debate are Sergei Eisenstein, who practiced and theorized the concept in the advent of montage filmmaking, and Walter Benjamin, who, like Adorno, wrote on montage in relation to popular cultural forms. It is also present in Siegfried Kracauer's theorization on film. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetics Theory (New York: Continuum, 2004), 204.

11. The concept was coined in the 1920s by Eduard Schub and has been used in film studies since then. Leyda, Filmen Regt Films, 71.

12. This metaphor of vision in order to locate the photographing of the two smiling soldiers and the dead man is actually seen in the image. Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 137.

13. Laura Rascaroli writes that the first filmic reference to the “essay” is found in a note written by Sergei Eisenstein in relation to his work on the filmmtation of Die Kapitel: Laura Rascaroli, He is the Essay: Film Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.


16. Ibid., 80.

17. Ibid., 82.


19. The very term documentary is highly debated and constantly re-evaluated, for example, film scholar Bill Nichols gives six different definitions of the documentary. Bill Nichols, Representing Reality (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 12-31.


23. Resembling a conceptual framework for reading the works, but it also grounds my writing in a feminist tradition. As a longstanding practice within feminist film text production, knowl- edge is understood as situated in a particular context, hence, what Donna Haraway labels situated knowledge, i.e. a feminist objectivity encompassing a knowing body. Haraway uses the metaphor of vision in order to locate the gaze within a body and to reclaim a sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere. To write with a knowing body entails both an acknowledgement of always being partial, one body, and as possessing a certain power of seeing a gaze that stems from that particular body. Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledge: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspectives,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575-99.

24. The concept was coined in the 1920s by Eduard Schub and has been used in film studies since then. Leyda, Filmen Regt Films, 71.


26. Eisenstein, Film Form, 16.

27. Butler makes this claim without a clear reference to Sontag’s text, however, as stated, Sontag writes that a photograph is an interpretation by a photographer. The difference is, thus, whether or not an image has an interpretative quality in and by itself.


29. Ibid., 71.

30. The notion of situation has been expanded upon throughout the history of philosophy, from the phenomenological ideas of the subject as being-in-the-world, hence, in a time and place, to Jean Paul Sartre’s recurring references to the concept. The phenomenological approach to the notion is to be restricted to the subject and the conditions of human existence and cannot be translated to any situation as a historical occurrence.


32. The photograph displays the social relation in which the image was taken, which cannot be separated from what is actually seen in the image. Axonay
proposes the concept of a "civil contract of photography" based on the notion of citizenship, which is then understood not merely as a status but as "a tool of a struggle or an obligation to others to struggle against injuries inflicted on those others, citizen and noncitizen alike - others who are governed along with the spectator." She attempts to rethink the concept of citizenship by understanding spectatorship as a civic duty toward the photographed.


ARCHIVAL WORK


154 Fotconnection Videos Archive for Holocaust Testimony: http://web.library.yale.edu/testimonies.

155 Lanzmann, "Site and Speech," 34.

156 Bernard-Donals and Glejzer, Between the Witness and Testimony, 111-2.


159 Comment made by attorney general Guido Haussner, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann Session 79.


161 Bernard-Donals and Glejzer, Between the Witness and Testimony, 111-2.

162 In my readings of the films by Steven Farocki, and Horstmann I argue against this claim, suggesting that it is rather a question of how to employ archival materials. Lanzmann, "Site and Speech," 40.

163 Wieviorka, The Era of the Witness, 82-3.

164 Lanzmann, "Site and Speech," 34.


166 Bernard-Donals and Glejzer, Between the Witness and Testimony, 111-2.

167 One might argue that Lanzmann’s idea of anti-representation might make more of a claim to represent the Holocaust than an actual picture or video from the camps in a sense, which just depicts a glimpse of that history.

168 His discussion on how Lanzmann employed re-experience see Koch, "The Aesthetic Transformations of the Image of the Unimaginable," 129, as well as Lanzmann, "Site and Speech," 42.


170 The photographer in Auschwitz; Wilhelm Brasse; claimed he saw images from inside the gas chamber. Dobrowolska, The Auschwitz Photographer, 164.


172 Saxon, "Anamnesis and Bearing Witness," 364 or Saxon, Haunted Images; where the quoted essay is also included.


174 Ibid., 378.

175 Ibid., 369.


177 Saxon, "Anamnesis and Bearing Witness," 373.

178 Ibid., 369.

179 Saxon, "Anamnesis and Bearing Witness," 374. For a further discussion of how cinematic representations of the Holocaust are haunted, see Saxon, Haunted Images.

180 Harun Farocki, Bilder der Hölle und Bauschreibung des Krieges: Images of the World and the Inscription of War, 96mm, directed by Harun Farocki (Berlin: Harun Farocki Filmproduktion, 1998).

181 Albano, Money, Forgetting and the Meaning Image, 173.

182 Ibid., 182.

183 Anja Horstmann, Das Filmfragment "Ghetto." 191 Ibid.

184 In the archive they are however referred to as "amateur films" Ibid.

197 This material is found in the Bundesarchiv under the title: Jo Wierschau Ghetto.

192 Horstmann, Das Filmfragment "Ghetto." 197 Ibid.

198 After the war, the camp was used as an internment camp for Dutch collaborators and later on, during the decolonization processes, it was used as a hostel for former soldiers to facilitate their transfer to the Netherlands.

199 In early 1942, the Germans enlarged the camp and in the same year the German Security Police took control of the camp, however, Westerbork was a Durchgangslager - a transit camp - and not an extermination camp. In spite of the attempted normality for the permanent inmates, most of them were eventually sent to the concentration camps in the Netherlands. When the Allied troops approached the camp in early April 1945, the Germans abandoned Westerbork, and when it was liberated on April 11, 1945, only 876 inmates remained. The camp was torn down in the 1950s, what remains are various memorials and indications of where the buildings and railroad ramp once stood.

200 He went by the nickname the "German gentleman" due to his, under the circumstances, civil role. He also allowed and encouraged leisure activities in the camp such as sports and entertainment. Yet he also organized and overseen the weekly deportations. After the war he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

201 Only a few months later, in September 1944, Breslau and his family were sent via Theresienstadt to Auschwitz. Only his daughter Ursula survived the war.

202 Harun Farocki, Archivkal (Reprint); video, b/w; silent, directed by Harun Farocki / Berlin: Harun Farocki Filmproduktion, 2007. 

ARCHIVAL WORK

ARCHIVAL WORK
203. The two companies merged in 1964 under the label Agfa-Gevaert.

204. I have not been able to find out if this has been removed from Faurick’s edit or if he gained access to another copy of the material without a time code.

205. The institute was later renamed for Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies.

206. The film shot in Westerbork was submitted to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register in 2016 and accepted in the fall of 2017. The inclusion was applied for by the archive and the unpublicized application itself is my main source for the history of the material. There are accounts of the material in Dutch, but no thorough studies have been published in English. I therefore wish to thank the archive for its generosity, for sharing their application with me. Part of the application is now available on the UNESCO website.

207. Their research was also presented in a television documentary Gelande hut het geheugen/1 His story: face) by Cherry Duyns in 1994, none of these have, however, been translated into English. Other accounts of, and research in, the material have been conducted, yet more vastly in relation to the film by Faurick.

208. The only film that is accessible and somewhat equivalent is the material shot in Theresienstadt, but as described later in this chapter, that footage was heavily staged. Yet as mentioned, there were also films recorded in Auschwitz by the Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid for the UNESCO Memory of the World Register, 2016.


210. A television program based on Philip Mechanicus’s (1889–1944) diary that describes his life in Westerbork. The program was directed by the historian Jacques Presser in 1965.


212. Ibid.

213. Ibid.

214. In the application it is also stated that: “All existing copies of the film will have to be identified and compared. Not only the famous acts archived at Sound and Vision but potential unknown material as well. The viewing and analyzing of the film will take place in cooperation with specialists from EYE Film museum. Specialists of Sound and Vision will execute preparation and restoration.” The research is a cooperation of the archive specialists of NIOD, Sound and Vision and the Memorial Center Camp Westerbork. The reconstruction will be accompanied by a study of the film in documentaries and television programs.” Application by the Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid for the UNESCO Memory of the World Register, 2016.

215. In 2016, when I ordered the material from the archive, this was an ongoing process and they did not know if the Waterbook Film would be included in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register, which would enable the further editing. Now a year later the film has been included in the register, but whether or not they will pursue their previous plan is not clear.

216. An example of such editing is the video of the Eichmann trial which was edited live during the recording, out of the four cameras mounted in the courtroom only one camera recorded footage at any moment. For further details regarding this see the section of this chapter dedicated to filming of the Eichmann trial and the Specialist.

217. Hannah Arendt’s depiction of Eichmann as a mere bureaucrat eager to obey orders angered many readers. This, as well as her view on Eichmann also thoughtless rather than profoundly evil, raised objections. Arendt’s book is still highly controversial, since, as Amos Elon writes in the introduction, “the controversy has never really been settled.” The impact of this debate stopped the publishing of her book in the Netherlands, and it was not released until 2000, after Eyal Sivan bought the translation rights and handed them over to an Israeli publisher. Arendt herself states in an interview that she hopes that in the future the reaction to her report will be quite different. And Attorney General Gideon Hausner “refrain[ed] from dealing with her book at all” in his account of the trial. Amos Elon, “Introduction,” in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

218. Rony Brauman and Eyal Sivan, interview on DVD Eyal Sivan, The Specialist Portrait of a Modern Criminal, b/w video, directed by Eyal Sivan, co-author Rony Brauman (Paris: Momento Film, 1999).


221. A special cage with bulletproof glass was built to protect Eichmann from murder attempts by victims’ families. The booth has become emblematic in the depictions of Eichmann in the trial, like the play The Man in the Glass Booth by Robert Shaw, from 1977.


225. The trial’s aftermath has also been marked by controversy. Two years after the trial, Hannah Arendt published an account of it in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, and in so doing forever damaged her relationship with the international community of Jews in exile and established her image as the controversial thinker she would be remembered as.


232. Ibid.


234. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum reconsists the archival process as follows: “One set of videotapes containing selected portions of the trial for distribution to television stations. The selected portions’ version remained in Israel and was later turned over to the State Israel Archives. Capital Cities Broadcasting retained the set of videotapes containing the complete trial proceedings at offices in New York City until 1967, when they gave the videotapes to the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. The Anti-Defamation League, in turn, gave the complete set to the Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1972. With a grant from the Research Foundation, the Hebrew University transferred the two-inch videotapes to U-Matic format. During the transfer process, the Hebrew University created three duplicate sets. One set was given to the Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archives of the Israel State Archives, and one set to the Jewish Museum in New York City. In 1995, the Israel State Archives transferred the trial footage to digital video. For an extensive, and excellent, discussion of the televising of the Eichmann trial and its effects, see, Amos Elon, “Introduction,” in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

235. Pinto, “The Specialist is almost entirely a perverse fraud.”

236. The material was not freed from copyright restrictions until 2006, when an Israeli court, in accordance with the contract from 1966, stated that the material should belong to the Israeli National Archive. However, the court ruled that access rights can be charged for.

STRUCTURING FRAMES

237. In Rasmussen’s discussion of the complexity of the concept, she refers to Edward Brannigan’s identification of at least fifteen different employments of the concept in film discourses.

238. Rasmussen, How the Essay Film thinks, 69.


240. Dieth Huberman, Renommier der Zeit, 133–5.

241. Ibid., 10.


243. Sivan further notes that when it comes to Eichmann there cannot be any notion of “real reactions” since Eichmann did not understand Hebrew and he reacted not to what we as spectators hear but to the translation. Sivan, interview by Katz, Thor.

244. Freud’s formulation: “Was will das Bild?” (What does a Woman want?) and Fanon’s paraphrase: “What does the black man want?”.


246. The picture appears as the other – as the scandal of the previously unmarred surface, or canvas, and, in a psychoanalytical language, its power is to be understood as lack rather than possession. The face that appears in Mitchell’s view a feminine, black, or marked face, yet it is the image in itself that makes an appearance, not a person depicted.
in the image, Mitchell's notion of face is therefore crucially different from Butler's as described earlier. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want*, 90.

254 Butler makes this claim without a clear reference to Sontag's text, however, as stated above, Sontag writes that a photograph is an interpretation by a photographer. The difference is thus whether or not an image has an interpretative quality in, and by, itself. Butler, *Frames of War*, 71.

255 This discussion can be found in a psychoanalytic rendering in *The Optical Unconscious* where Rosalind Krauss takes Walter Benjamin's formulation of an optical unconscious as a point of departure to tackle the relation between modernism and vision. She also addresses the specific question of photographic images, Rosalind Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 179.

256 Neither the camera, nor the photographic aspects of the images are to blame for the deeds, even if appearing as a provoking circumstance. What is brought forth is a question of the correlation between the camera and an ethical responsiveness, since the images were circulated without any moral outcry. Butler describes the images as operating in several ways as a暑假 for the deceased, as a threat of shame for the prisoners, as a chronic war crime, as a testimony for the unacceptable of torture, and as a paradigm and everyday work made accessible in different media and institutions. And she recalls Adorno warning that violence in the name of civilization reveals itself as barbarism, simultaneously as it justifies its violence through a presumption of the inferiority of the one that the violence is aimed at. Ibid., 85.

257 Ibid., 71.

258 Butler alludes to the contemporary practice of embeddcd reporters and points out the great change over the last forty years in the perception of war photography, due to the awareness of extensive state control. It is now a fact to read into the image. The contemporary state control, which governs the images, aims to control the effect of the general public, rather than enlighten it about the war.


260 Ibid.

261 Unlike Breslauer, the camera crew in Theresienstadt were promised that their participation would spare their lives, yet immediately after the end of shooting in September 1944, Kurt Gerron and other crew members were deported to Auschwitz where they perished.

262 The staging is apparent in the Theresienstadt film: the inmates are euphemistically called residents (*Bewohner*) instead of inmates and wear civilian clothing with the yellow star attached to it. No SS guards or other armed Germans are shown. Besides the shots of craftsmanship and the like, there are also scenes indicating a different standard of life than in Westerbork. One example is a long shot of a backyard where the audience looks like general intellectuals rather than camp inmates, and another is a sign reading "rum Spiekale" (to the playground): a shot of two kids in a sandbox. Other facts about camp life were evidently omitted, as the camp was also vastly omitted, as the camp was also vastly

263 In his memoir, Jonas Turkow describes the images were circulated without any correlation between the camera and the time of the filming, about how displays of sweets in store windows were raided and handed to children on the streets, how food was collected from restaurants to stage scenes, how they collected actors and musicians and made them perform, gathered passersby and forced them to move around according to directions and then violently dispersed them.


265 This is the favored reading of the film, which is also in line with Farocki's general interest in questions of production and labor. For readings of *Repet* in such perspectives see Lindeng, *Suspended Lives, Revenant Images*, and Thomas Elsaesser, "Holocaust Memory and the Ethnography of Forgetting? Re-wind and Postponement" in Harun Farocki Against What? Against What?, ed. Antje Ehmann and Kodwo Eshun (London: Raven Row, 2009), 31.

266 Barthes claims that such images are too deliberate in comparison to other types of photography, which have the possibility to shock, and do not possess the truthfulness of art. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), 12.

267 Ibid., 18.

268 Ibid., 77.

269 In her later writings, Sontag is not engaged in the issue of whether images make us act or even respond ethically, however, they have an affective power. What follows is that Sontag's conception of how understanding operates is disturbed, since, importantly, war photographs are not mere referents, hinting at the depicted gruesomeness, but they sustain and verify those deeds for certain interests and onlookers. She sees a failure in how we regard the pain of others, in the fact that affect cannot be turned into political action. The ability to act as an intellectual is circumcised and all that is left are narcissistic quests of how to look and contemplate. It is a question of ailing and of how, if the image looks back at us. Butler is critical of Sontag's view on photography as she claims it only offers affect, not understanding. In Butler's view, Sontag wrongly sees the ethical power of the photograph in its ability to reflect the utmost narcissism in our desire to see, and its refusal to adhere to this narcissistic claim. Rather, Butler suggests, our inability to see is also of interest as a critical tool, and the role of visual cultures during wartime of great importance. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 13 and Butler, *Frames of War*, 38–40.


272 Aoxoay delivers a critique of Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag in this regard, since they "preserve a notion of a possible meaning of what is visible in the photograph and reduce the role of the spectator to the act of judgement, eliminating his or her responsibility for what is shown in the photograph." Aoxoay, *The Civic Contract of Photography*, 130.

273 Aoxoay makes the point that frequent calls on the presentation of the type "this is X" diminish what a photo is and "homogenizes the plurality from which a photograph is made and unifies it in a stable image, creating the illusion that we are facing a closed unit of visual information." Aoxoay, *The Civic Contract of Photography*, 168.

274 Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.

275 Ibid.


277 As mentioned previously, even though the entire trial was filmed, only one out of four cameras was recording on tape at any given time. Furthermore, the director did not speak the main languages spoken at the trial and, thus,edited without knowing what was said. Ibid.

278 Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.

279 The parallel between the prosecuor and the defense appears in several

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**Citation:**

Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.
accounts of the trial, for example Sadakat Kadri argues that by broad-
casting the trials, like the Eichmann trial, they play out as a match of sorts
where the prosecutor and defense constitute the two sides engaged in a battle.
The Trial, 344.

390 Tryster’s line of argument implies that the video footage from the trial should not be used in the manner Sivan employed. He further claims that the scenes are forged to fit in with the anti-Zionist politics of the director but also, in several texts, that his “attack is not political and Sivan cannot claim artistic immunity from it.” For Tryster, the critique comes down to a question of choices related to ethics, as when he concludes an essay by asking Sivan: “Have you no sense of decency left?” To the sort of criticism, voiced by Tryster, Sivan has publicly responded with only four words: “We made a film.” Tryster, “We Have Ways of Making You Believe,” 34–44.

295 He borrows the term “Believe”: 34–44.

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In this even his explanation seems to be in the realm of bureaucracy, where nothing can be understood except as a part of a greater system. These factors are, according to Sivan, the elements that compose administrative, managerial modernity and I would argue also what is indicated in Arendt’s use of the concept of banality, Sivan elaborates on Arendt’s understanding of systematized evil and obedience by critically engaging with notions such as management, efficiency, and loyalty. And also by expanding the temporal situation of the trial in such a way that one can regard Eichmann as a figure of modernity, since the nature of his crime is inherently bound to administrative societal formations. Hence, the film subtitle: “Portrayal of a Modern Criminal.”

360 Hausner opened the trial with the following speech: “When I stand before you here, Judges of Israel, to lead the Prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, I am not standing alone. With me are six million accusers. But they cannot rise to their feet and point an accusing finger towards him who sits in the dock and cry: ‘I accuse.’ For their ashes are piled up on the hills of Auschwitz and the fields of Treblinka, and are strewn in the forests of Poland. Their graves are scattered throughout the length and breadth of Europe. Their blood cries out, but their voice is not heard. Therefore, I will be their spokesman and in their name I will unfold the awesome indictment.” State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, the Trial of Adolf Eichmann. District Court Sessions, Vol. 1, Eichmann Trial: Complete Transcripts, May 8, 1961.


362 Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.

363 Lanzmann included several testimonies of former Nazis, often filmed with a hidden camera and often not only presenting their story but almost wittingly ridiculing them. Claude Lanzmann, Shlom, 33 mm, directed by Claude Lanzmann (Paris: Les Films Aképh, Historia Films, WNCT, 1985).

364 Arendt claimed that Eichmann’s testimony “turned out to be the most important evidence in the case.” Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 212.

365 Kadri, The Trial, 344.

366 In a scene, Eichmann holds up a diagram, seemingly drawn by him, to show the court the line of hierarchy and organizational proceedings within the departments of Nazi Germany. In this even his explanation seems to be in the realm of bureaucracy, where nothing can be understood except as a part of a greater system. These factors are, according to Sivan, the elements that compose administrative, managerial modernity and I would argue also what is indicated in Arendt’s use of the concept of banality, Sivan elaborates on Arendt’s understanding of systematized evil and obedience by critically engaging with notions such as management, efficiency, and loyalty. And also by expanding the temporal situation of the trial in such a way that one can regard Eichmann as a figure of modernity, since the nature of his crime is inherently bound to administrative societal formations. Hence, the film subtitle: “Portrayal of a Modern Criminal.”


368 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 3.

369 Ibid., 5.

370 Ibid., 6.

371 Ibid., 4.

372 Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.

373 Sivan, interview by Katz Thor.


375 After attending the Eichmann trial, Arendt became interested in the notion of thinking, and her understanding of Eichmann as thoughtless is crucial in her understanding of his inability to judge. She describes thinking, willing, and judging as the three basic mental activities and even though they are different they cannot be separated from one another - so Eichmann neither can think nor assume responsibility for his actions. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, San Diego: Harcourt Inc., 1978, 6, 69.

376 She draws a parallel to the Kantian figure of a law as free without exception and this can be understood as what she has accounted for in her writings on totalitarianism, the easing of difference between law and ethics in the Nazi system. Arendt describes Nazi law as treating the whole world as under its jurisdiction and thus “a law which already supposedly existed before everyone.” Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 137 and Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 394–406.

377 Zeluz, Remembering to Forget, 204.


379 Farkoci, Náchod/Impress/Tent/ Writings, 108.

380 Eyal Sivan was privately given the film by Chris Marker shortly before his death. It is seldom shown - to my knowledge it was only screened at the above-mentioned Berlin Documentary Forum in June 2000 and then presented by the Ottawa Group at Tate. Modern as part of their contribution to the Turner Prize exhibition in the fall of 2010 – it has never gained public distribution. Chris Marker, Hankoge/Clame, video/35 mm, directed by Chris Marker (Paris: unreleased and undated).


382 Farkoci, Náchod/Impress/Tent/ Writings, 94.

383 The question of montage is hardly addressed in the first half of Images in Spite of All, but becomes key in the second. In the second part he responds to Elisabeth Pagnoux and

The Testimony of Images

384 In relation to the aim of the trial Arendt states: “the purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblestapurposes <> can only detract from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused; to render judgment, and to mete out the punishment.” This can be understood as the main claim made by both Arendt and Sivan, and the ultimate criticism of the trial as such. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 255.


387 Saxton, Anamnesis and Bearing Witness, 369.

388 Farkoci, Náchod/Impress/Tent/Writings, 108.

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...
Germaine Wajcman’s harsh dismissal of the essay that constitutes the first half of the work is a foundational argument for Didi-Huberman’s argument, as he claims that there are “no images of the Shoah,” since Auschwitz is the Absolute: Otherwise and therefore by nature unrepresentable—something, which, as discussed in the first chapter, is an argument reiterated in different forms by many. See the criticism of Elisabeth Pagnoux and Germaine Wajcman in the journal Les Temps Modernes. Germaine Wajcman, “De la connaissance photographique,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 663 (2006): 47–83. Elisabeth Pagnoux, “Reporteur photographique Auschwitz,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 663 (2006): 84–98. Didi-Huberman, Images in Spite of All, 57.


395 Ibid., 15.

396 In relation to the four images from Auschwitz he almost seems to animate them in the reconstruction of the photographic situation—the four images are decided by the movements of the photographer, thus they play out as a sequence rather than as four singular instances. Ibid., 11–6.

397 This brings us back to Raul Hilberg’s comment, which Didi-Huberman also mentions, about how the image can be seen as a source for the historian. The standing of the image is shaped by both the image’s richness, which exceeds what words can describe, but also the difficulty of deciphering images, an issue that is at the core of this book. Ibid., 66.


399 Didi-Huberman, Remnants der erlitzen Zeit, 53.
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First and foremost, I would like to thank my main supervisor, Cecilia Sjöholm, for giving me the opportunity to write this dissertation, and for her support and advice over all these years. I also wish to thank my secondary supervisors for their encouragement: Gertrud Koch for being so generous with her knowledge and comments, and Stefan Jonsson for his immense support and for stepping in at a crucial moment and providing a dedicated and thorough textual critique. This book could not have been written without the many years of thinking and talking about the subject. I therefore extend a warm thanks to my fellow students and teachers at the New School for Social Research, to my dear peers at Jan van Eyck Academic – and my current colleagues in the research school of Critical Cultural Theory at Södertörn University, especially Kim West, Anna Enström, Gabrielle Ines Sznap, Irina Seits, Maria Linn, Johan Schiberg, Gustav Strandberg, Erik Bryngelson, and Mirey Gorgis, for responding to and commenting on my manuscript throughout the years. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Trond Lundemo for his insightful comments at my final seminar – I could not have wished for a better reader.

I would like to thank the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies for funding this PhD within the research project Perceptions of the Other: Aesthetics, Ethics and Prejudice. I am also very grateful to the various archives for making the materials for my research available and replying to my endless questions, as well as to Eyal Sivan and Anjje Ehman for their generosity. R.I.P. Harun Farocki, one of the greatest image-thinkers and makers of all time.

I am also deeply indebted to my beloved family: My parents for all that formed my life – love, values, and books – and special thanks to my mother for being one of my best readers. My sister Sara, and Coco and Max, for always being there for me. To the loves of my life: Kalle, for his comments, patience, and most of all, his enduring love, and my beautiful Sam and Isidor – my love for the three of you is beyond words. This book is dedicated to you.

To my dear support structure: thank you for being there for me and for the shared thoughts and discussions that helped me along the way. Special thanks go to Petra Bauer for our collaboration, many pieces of which ended up here in one form or another, and to Jonas Hassen Khemiri for always insisting on the question of urgency.

Had the Katz and Bindefeld families not had the good fortune of getting a chance to rebuild their lives in Sweden, I would not be here. This book is also dedicated to all those who didn’t have the same good fortune and instead perished, as well as those who are forced to flee today, whose history is still in the making.
THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE POSSIBLE WITH THE GENEROUS SUPPORT OF: THE KARL STAAFF FOUNDATION, LAURITZÉNS FOUNDATION FOR FILM HISTORIC RESEARCH, THE ÅKE WIBERG FOUNDATION, AND STIFTELSEN KONUNG GUSTAV VI ADOLFS FOND FÖR SVENSK KULTUR.

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IN A TIME WHEN THE VERY LAST HOLOCAUST WITNESSES WILL SOON BE GONE, A POSSIBLE ROUTE FOR COMMEMORATION IS TO ASK WHAT TESTIMONY IMAGES CAN GIVE. THIS BOOK SEeks TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF HOW IMAGES CAN BEARE WITNESS BY EXAMINING THEM AS MULTIFACETED ENTITIES PRODUCED, REPRODUCED, AND RESITUATED IN CONFLICTING POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL SITUATIONS.