Neorealism and revolutionary strategy?

Exploring the power political strategies of revolutionary movements, through a textual analysis of the Management of Savagery

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Abstract

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A close study of neorealist theory, indicates that revolutionary movements can produce some effects, that can have severe power political repercussions. Yet there is very little written in the neorealist corpus, about revolutions and revolutionary movements. The aim of this research was to investigate if these effects could contribute to our explanation, of the power political strategies employed by revolutionary movements. In order to fulfill the aim, a theory consuming case study was conducted. The method employed was a qualitative textual analysis, of a strategic text from Al-Qaeda. The result of the study showed that anticipated power political effects of a social revolution, were discounted for in the strategy. And the expected effects of a conflict between a revolutionary movement and a stable State, did appear in strategy. However the strategists calculations about revolutionary contagation and the vulnerabilities of fragile States, did not match the theoretical expectations. Perceived foreign domination and perceived fragile State structures, effected the calculations in an unexpected way. Thus the results indicate that the employed analytic framework need further refinement.

Keyword: Neorealism, revolutionary movements, strategy, jihadism
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1 Introduction to the study

1.1 Introduction

There is no shortage of revolutionary dreams in the history of mankind. Some revolutionaries dreamt of a classless society and some dream of a society ruled by the laws of God. Yet in order to materialize any revolutionary political program, power is a necessary component. Any serious revolutionary group, will have consider how to get power, and how to deal the with the powers that rule over society today. Neorealism is the dominating, power political theory in the discipline of international relations. Yet as a State-centered theory, it has been argued that neorealism can not be used to explain the power politics of revolutionary movements. John J Mearsheimer has stated: "The fact is that realism has hardly anything to say about Al-Qaeda per se....‘Why can’t you adjust the theory [offensive realism] to fit terrorist groups into it?’ My answer is that you cannot do that, because the theory would end up getting watered down, and it would lose its analytical bite. We should all recognize that no theory - realism included — can explain every aspect of international politics.”\(^1\) However there are a few neorealist authors that has approached the subject of revolutions,\(^2\) indicating that neorealism might have something to say about revolutionary movements. Also, shouldn’t we try to apply existing theories on new phenomena? The only way to find out if neorealism has anything to say about revolutionary movements, is to make a serious attempt to use the theory, and try to explain the strategies and actions of revolutionary movements. This paper is such an attempt. In the paper, I will use neorealist theory and try to contribute to the explanation of a strategy, from an Al-Qaeda strategist.

This study was inspired by an undergraduate course about the Islamic State. The power political calculations of different salafi jihadi movements puzzled me. In order to explain these calculations, I started to dig in to the neorealist corpus, while studying theories about revolutions and asymmetric conflicts. In the light of these theoretical studies, this paper toke form.

1.2 Research aim and research questions

The aim of this study is to investigate how neorealism can contribute to the explanation, of the

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2 See 2.2 Revolutions and neorealism and note 26, for a review.
power political strategies of revolutionary movements. Neorealist theory indicates that revolutionary movements can produce some effects, with severe power political repercussions. In order to investigate if an analytic framework, centered around these effects, could contribute to the explanation of a strategy from a revolutionary movement, I will conduct a theory consuming case study.\(^3\) I will present how these effects were reflected, in a single case of unit level calculations. I will also investigate the attributes of these reflections. Also, I will investigate how influential the effects were in the examined strategy.

My research questions are:

Can a neorealist framework centered around the revolutionary balance of power effect, the revolutionary wave effect and the political vulnerability effect,\(^4\) contribute to our explanation of the strategy\(^5\) in The Management of Savagery?\(^6\)

How is the revolutionary balance of power effect, the revolutionary wave effect and political vulnerability effect described in The Management of Savagery?

How influential is the revolutionary balance of power effect, the revolutionary wave effect and political vulnerability effect, on the strategic calculations in the Management of Savagery?

What causal mechanisms are described in the Management of Savagery, when the author deals with the revolutionary balance of power effect, the revolutionary wave effect and the political vulnerability effect?

1.3 Limitations

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\(^4\) The three effects are deducted from the theories presented in the theory section. However I have defined and named these concepts. See 2.6 Structural effects and unit level calculations, for an introduction to the concepts. See 5.3.3 Discussing conceptual validity, for a definition of the necessary attributes of each concept. See also Gschwend, Thomas., Schimmelfennig, Frank (edt), *Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 42, regarding concepts and attributes.

\(^5\) I define strategy as an actors overall plan. When I use the term strategy in this paper, I refer to power political strategy. Thus I refer to an actors overall plan to reach political goals, in an anarchic system, in which I assume the actors calculations are based upon power relations. See 2.1 Neorealism, for a clarification of these assumptions. Also see note 21, for a full definition of power politics.

I will only analyze one strategic text from a revolutionary movement and that is the Management of Savagery.\textsuperscript{7}

I assume that the author of the Management of Savagery was a rational actor, with a fixed preference to achieve the political goal stated in the text, the creation of a global Islamic State.\textsuperscript{8}

I also assume that the author's presentation of his strategy in the Management of Savagery, were influenced by an effort, to convince other about the merits of the strategy. Numerous of independent variables could of course have effected the author and the text. But given Al-Qaeda’s tough power political situation when the text was written,\textsuperscript{9} it seems reasonable to assume, that power political pressures were a highly significant independent variable. And since the author is trying to convince activists from different revolutionary groups, to follow the strategy in the text\textsuperscript{10} he would reasonably be very careful about how he presents the strategy.\textsuperscript{11} Thus while the study is focused on how power political pressures and power political possibilities, effects units level calculations, a possible disturbing variable is accounted for.

2 Theoretical consideration

"international revolution “blurs the distinctions between war and peace, international war and civil war, war and revolution.”\textsuperscript{12}

2.1 Neorealism

Neorealist theory\textsuperscript{13} was founded by Kenneth Waltz. Neorealists uses the anarchic nature of the

\textsuperscript{7} The reasons for this is methodological, see 3.1 Initial methodological considerations
\textsuperscript{8} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 50; 61
\textsuperscript{9} See 2.7 Theoretical conclusions, where this constraints and possibilities are specified on a theoretical level.
\textsuperscript{10} See 4.3 Al-Qaeda and it’s material capabilities
\textsuperscript{11} See 4.4.5 Placing the text in a structural context
\textsuperscript{12} From a more general point of view, strategy is often about the long-term commitment of limited resources. Long term predictions are often riddled with uncertainty. If a strategist wants to influence the long-term commitment of resources in an organization or movement, it seems reasonable to assume that strategist will have an incentive to assure others about long term gains of the strategy, and the certainty of the calculations in the strategy.
\textsuperscript{14} Neorealist theory is rationalist and explanatory. Neorealists such as John J Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are
international system as their main explanatory variable. Since there is no organization, with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the international system, the international system is anarchic. Waltz argues that the primary units in the international system are the States, and he assumes that States seek to survive. If a State is attacked by another State, there is no guarantee that it will receive any help from the other States, thus the system is a self-help system. Mearsheimer has contributed with the vital assumption, that States can never be sure about the intentions of other States. While Waltz did not use the assumption that States are rational actors, Mearsheimer has defended the assumption of rationality. From these basic assumptions, a gloomy picture of international politics emerges. Since States can never be sure about the intentions of other States, they will fear the military capabilities that other States commands, other States ability to extract resources and the latent power other States possess. Military power balance, will thus be a determining factor in international politics. The States with most military capabilities, called great powers, will obliviously have a dominating position in such a system.

According to Waltz the international system does not determine State behavior, rather it creates constraints and pressures, that determines the range of likely State behavior. Waltz assumes that States will maximize their security, yet security maximizing opens up a range of different behaviors and strategies. Thus a State can make different foreign policy decisions, under a specific set of structural conditions. In order to understand the power politics of revolutionary movements, we have to figure out what the structural conditions are, that will limit the range of options for these

committed to the philosophy of scientific realism, see Dunne, Tim., Kurki, Milja., Smith, Steve (red) International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 23. I am also committed to scientific realism,
17 Ibid 91f
18 Mearsheimer, John J, 2014 op cit 31
19 Mearsheimer, John J, Reckless States and Realism, International Relations, Vol 23, Issue 2, 2009. I consider Mearsheimers critique of Waltz reasonable. Thus the assumption of rational actors will be used throughout this paper, and applied to all actors in politics.
20 The concept of a States resource extracting capability, as an intervening variable between the latent power of a nation and the military capabilities of a State, where first introduced by Fareed Zakaria, see Zakaria, Fareed, From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of America's World Role, Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1998, 35ff
21 See Mearsheimer, John J, 2014 op cit 55ff for a discussion on the neorealist concept of power and a definition of latent power. Notice that neorealism conceives power as material capabilities, emanating from socio-economic and political structures. With this in mind I can now define power politics, as a form of politics based upon four assumptions: that the units will try to survive, that the units cannot know the intentions of the other units in an anarchic system, that the units will thus base their calculations on power relations, and that power emanates from socio-economic and political structures.
22 Waltz, Kenneth N op cit 111ff
23 Ibid 72
24 Ibid
movements.

2.2 Revolutions and neorealism

The historical impact of revolutions upon power politics, can hardly be overestimated. The French revolution had a dramatic impact on the balance of power in Europe and it changed the face warfare forever. The long-term effects of the Russian revolution, were essential for the subsequent rise of the Soviet Union, as one of two major actors during the cold war. Yet there is very little written in the neorealist corpus, about revolutions. A possible explanation for this, could be that revolutions have been conceived as a domestic phenomenon. Since Waltz draws as sharp line between international and domestic politics, neorealists could argue that a theory of international politics, only has to deal with the consequences of revolutions, not the causes. And since States are conceived as the primary actors in international politics, a neorealist could argue that revolutionary movement are unimportant for the power politics of States. However there are problems with such an approach. One problem is that a revolution in one country, will not only influence the balance of power in the international system. It can also influence domestic politics in other countries. Thus it seems reasonable to assume, that power political calculations relating to revolutions and revolutionary movements, should contain a mix of elements from domestic and international politics. And since revolutions can have a huge influence on the international balance of power, we can also assume that States will keep an eye on revolutionary movements. Ignoring such movements, and their potential effect on international and domestic politics, seems like a reckless strategy.

26 Kent, Samuel, *On Revolution and Realism: A Structural Realist Theory of Revolutions*, Boston College University Libraries, 2013, https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:102498/datastream/PDF/view, controlled 2017-11-01, 19., Walt, Stephen M, *Revolution and War*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996, 6f. Kent and Walt are the structural realist authors, that have theorized about revolutions. Among the classic realists Kissinger has written on revolutions, see Kent, Samuel op cit 19f, and Snyder has also written about the issue from a synthetic position, combing Realism and Constructivism, see Kent, Samuel op cit 21f. In this paper I will only deal with the structural realist authors.
27 Waltz, Kenneth N op cit 113
28 See 2.3 State – society tensions and revolutionary waves
29 We have to conceptualize the relationship between States and revolutionary movements, as a relationship between different political units, in an anarchic environment. Domestic relations, as they were conceptualized by Waltz, are based on a monopoly on legitimate violence, see Waltz, Kenneth N op cit 103f. Revolutionary movements do not accept the States monopoly on legitimate violence. At least, they do not accept this monopoly in some States. Thus I would argue that there is no efficient hierarchical relationship, that regulates the interaction between a revolutionary movement and a non-accepted State. As long as a revolutionary movement is weak, a State can of course use a strategy of acceptance towards a revolutionary movement. An acceptance strategy could be used, in order to avoid unnecessary internal conflicts. However if a revolutionary movement gains power, and becomes a threat to the survival of the State, I would argue that a power political reaction from the State is anticipated.
2.3 State – society tensions and revolutionary waves

Neorealists assume that States compete and that States socialize. Socialization and competition are two sides of the same coin. Less successful States will try to copy the practices of more successful States. Socialization will involve military practices, and techniques and institutions for resource extraction and administration. Some diffusion of successful State structures, is thus anticipated. Once a hierarchical structure is established in a State, it will limit the States range of options. Thus a particular hierarchic structures, will also limit the range of possible self-modification, of these hierarchic structures. We also have acknowledged, that socio-economic structures can diffuse between different societies. It seems reasonable to assume, that some State structures will be structurally determined to produce tensions, with certain socio-economic structures. Combined political and socio-economic macro-trends, can thus produce similar tensions in State – society relations, among different units in the international system. And revolutionary ideology often adopts a universal approach, calling for social and political change in all nations.

Revolutionary waves or more correctly waves of revolutionary situations, have been noted and theorized by many authors. Beck has contributed with an ambitious effort to code different revolutionary waves in Europe, noting twelve different waves since the 1560:s. The casual mechanism involved in the diffusion of revolutionary activity, has varied between different waves.

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30 Waltz, Kenneth N op cit 127f
31 States has to be conceptualized as both coercive and administrative units. Administration is important since it can ease resource mobilization in society. If society cannot mobilize resources, there will be no resources for the State to extract.
32 More precisely, one could say that a successful State structure, will limit the range of possible State structures in an international system. Some State structures will simply be unable to compete, with a very successful State structure.
33 Waltz, Kenneth N op cit 81ff
34 This axiom is not derived from the neorealist corpus, yet it seems both reasonable and important to acknowledge.
35 See Kent, Samuel op cit 81ff, regarding macro-trends and neorealism. See ibid 92f regarding the system wide effects of macro-trends
37 Beck, Colin J, The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention, Social Science History, Volume 35, Number 2, Summer 2011, pp. 167-207, 2011, 167f. In this paper I am interested, in the connection between revolutionary waves as an empirical phenomenon and neorealist theory. Thus I will not make a full theoretical presentation of revolutionary waves and the research that surrounds this subject. Beck’s article is synthetic, integrating lessons from previous research and the article is relatively contemporary. Thus the article seems like a good source, for a concise presentation of the subject. I will thus use Beck’s article as a source for the coding, defining and indicating the causal mechanisms that surrounds revolutionary waves.
38 Ibid 180ff
As an effect of this, the length of different revolutionary waves, has varies enormously.\textsuperscript{40} There are different theories about the root causes of these revolutionary waves.\textsuperscript{41} From a neorealist perspective, the structural inability of certain State structures to handle macro-trends, has to be conceptualized as the factor that makes revolutionary waves possible.

2.4 Social revolutions as structural readjustment

Revolutionary waves are made up of several revolutionary situations. A revolutionary situation is per definition an intra-state phenomenon. Tilly defines a revolutionary situation, as a situation where an intra-state contender claims control over the State. And when this claim is supported by a significant group of citizens and when the State lacks the capabilities to suppress this claim.\textsuperscript{42} Such a situation can have many outcomes.\textsuperscript{43} The most radical outcome is a rapid change of social and political structures. This radical outcome has been classified as a social revolution.\textsuperscript{44} Social revolutions are rare events.\textsuperscript{45} Structural theories have pointed out that such an event, seems to require depressed State capabilities. International competition has often weakened States before a social revolution, and made them vulnerable to intra-state contenders.\textsuperscript{46} The mass nature of social revolutions, points to great tensions in State - society relations.

I have noted that a specific State structure, will limit the range of possible self-modifications of this structure. In a worst-case scenario, a current State structure can thus be inadequate for international competition, and at same time it could create tensions in State – society relations. From a neorealist position, social revolution has to be conceptualized as a structural readjustment, of both international relations and State-society relations.\textsuperscript{47} In particular, a social revolution destroys the

\textsuperscript{40} Beck, Colin J op cit 182
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid 167f
\textsuperscript{42} My presentation of Tilly's definition is simplified. For a more precise and exact definition see Tilly, Charles, \textit{European Revolutions 1492 – 1992}, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1993, 10ff
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid 14ff. Tilly notes that: "Few revolutionary situations have revolutionary outcomes", see ibid 15
\textsuperscript{44} Skocpol defines social revolutions as: "rapid, basic transformations of a society’s State and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below", see Skocpol, Theda, \textit{States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 4. The class concept in Skocpol's definition, is a bit problematic from a neorealism perspective. Kent has contributed with a small modification of Skocpol's definition. His definition is: "the rapid, basic transformation of the political and socio-economic structure of an individual State that is accompanied and in part carried through by mass-based revolt from below", see Kent, Samuel op cit 35. Kent’s definition fits better with the neorealist theory and the idea of State – society tensions, then Skocpol's class based definition. When I write about revolutions in this paper, I mean social revolutions. When I write about revolutionary movements, I mean movements that tries to create and lead a social revolution.
\textsuperscript{45} Skocpol, Theda 1979 op cit 3
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid 285., Walt, Stephen M op cit 20
\textsuperscript{47} For a similar a conceptualization of social revolutions, see Kent, Samuel op cit 90ff
existing State structures, removing intra-state constraints that has hindered an efficient extraction of resources. The anticipated result of a social revolution, will thus be more efficient forms of resource extraction, enacted by the post-revolutionary State. As the post-revolutionary States resource extracting capabilities grows, it becomes hard for an intra-state contender to challenge the new State. At the same time, more efficient forms of resource extraction can have a significant effect on the balance of power in the international system. Revolutions tend to be chaotic affairs and a post-revolutionary State will of course have significant initial weaknesses. Yet on structural level, the heightened resources extracting ability of the post-revolutionary State, is a much more significant phenomenon.

2.5 Failed revolutions and Andrew Mack´s theory on asymmetric conflicts

Social revolutions and revolutionary waves, can have significant power political repercussions. However social revolutions are rare events. The statistic chance of success, for a randomly selected revolutionary movements, is probably very small. If we assume that States worry about the military capabilities of other States, they will reasonably develop military capabilities of their own. There capabilities give States a huge advantage, when dealing with intra-territorial threats. Given this we would expect that most conflicts between States and revolutionary movements, or foreign powers and revolutionaries, will have an asymmetric character. State actor will generally possess more military capabilities then revolutionary movements.

Andrew Mack presented he´s theory on asymmetric conflicts in 1975. In his theory, Mack tries to explain the fact that large nations can lose wars, against smaller actor. Mack´s theory is based on

48 Skocpol, Theda, Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jan., 1988), pp. 147-168, 1998, 148ff., Walt, Stephen M op cit 22. From a theoretical point of view, the assumptions that States seeks to survive, the fact that a social revolution destroys the old State structures and the fact that post-revolutionary States tend to face intra or extra-territorial threats, will lead us to the conclusion that a post-revolutionary State will enact more efficient forms of resource extraction.

49 Walt, Stephen M op cit 21f

50 Walt points to the fact that post-revolutionary States, often lack professionals in the administrative apparatus of the State, see Walt, Stephen M op cit 21f. Skocpol shows that post-revolutionary States tend to be efficient at mass mobilization, especially for wars, see Skocpol, Theda 1988 op cit 149. This gives us a more concrete image of strength and weakness of a post-revolutionary State.

51 Walt, Stephen M op cit 22f

52 Kent, Samuel op cit 23

53 Arreguín-Toft has also presented an important theory about asymmetric conflicts, see Arreguín-Toft, Ivan, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Security, Vol 26, No 1, Summer 2001, pp 93 – 128, 2001. However Arreguín-Tofts theory primarily deals with the interaction between different military strategies and their effect on the outcome of the conflict, see Arreguín-Toft, Ivan op cit 95. Since this paper primarily deals with political calculations, I will not make a full presentation of Arreguín-Tofts theory

54 Mack, Andrew, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict, World Politics, Vol 27,
the assumption that large nations can threaten the security of small nations and its citizens. However small actors can not threaten the security of large nations and its citizens.\textsuperscript{55} If a large nation attacks a small actor, the consequences for the regime in the large nation, can be severe. Since such a war is not necessary for the survival of the citizens nor the polity in the large nation, the costs for the war could have been spent on other goods. The higher the costs, the more likely it is that regime in the large nation, will be questioned because of the war. And if the war drags on, the costs will continue to accumulate. Thus regimes in large nations, will likely become politically vulnerable, if they engage in long wars against small actors. Such political vulnerability can force a regime in large nations, to withdraw from an asymmetric conflict.\textsuperscript{56}

Mack uses explanatory variables that are vital within the neorealist theory: survival and the balance of power. Waltz concluded that the units in the international system tend to maximize their security. But what if a State pursues other goals? Mack shows that if a State attacks a non-threatening actor, it risks its own internal cohesion. And by showing that, Mack also made it possible to explain how a small actor can defeat a large nation, in a self-help system.

2.6 Structural effects and unit level calculations

The theoretical considerations presented, have pointed out three effects, that can have dramatic power political repercussions. The first effect is that a successful social revolution, tend to strengthen the resource extracting ability of a post-revolutionary State (and temporarily make a post-revolutionary State weaker). I call this effect the revolutionary balance of power effect. The next effect is that revolutions can spread, through the phenomenon called revolutionary waves. I call this effect, the revolutionary wave effect. The third effect is that regimes tend to become politically vulnerable, if they engage in long conflicts with smaller actors. I call this effect the political vulnerability effect.

In the structural realist corpus, I have only found one author that deals with how the revolutionary balance of power effect and the revolutionary wave effect, is reflected in unit level calculations. In his book Revolution and War, Walt theories about the relationship between States that has just experienced a revolution and other States.\textsuperscript{57} Walt discusses how this two effects are incorporated in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{55} Ibid 181
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid 185ff
\textsuperscript{57} Walt, Stephen M op cit 1}
to unit level calculations, thus making a vital contribution to neorealist theory. Yet Walt assumes that States will not calculate with the heightened resource extraction ability, of new State after a social revolution. The structures of post-revolutionary States are so new and revolutionary, that other States do not understand them. Thus the other States will miscalculate and see post-revolutionary States as weak. But if they attack the post-revolutionary State, they are often in for a surprise. Yet the academic consensus seems to be, that States will generally be more efficient resource extractors after a social revolution. If we assume that States are rational actors, it seems more reasonable to assume that States will discount for this fact. Walt has also theorized about the revolutionary wave effect. Walt assumes that an individual’s willingness to rebel is private information. Thus the States will not have enough information, to make rational calculations regarding the risk of revolutionary contiguation. Yet given the risk and fear created by a revolution in another country, States will overestimate the risk. This theory is based on the assumptions that revolutions are actors-driven phenomenon’s, caused by aggregated individual passions and convictions. However we could conceive the collective will to rebel, as a function of structural factors, such as State weakness and tensions in State - society relations. Then rational actors should be able to make at least rudimentary calculations, about the risk of revolutionary contagion. Lack of information will surely be a problem in a revolutionary situation, but revolutions are inherently collective phenomenon and our theories should reflect this, particularly if we use a structural theory.

2.7 Theoretical conclusions

Given the assumption of rational actors, we have to assume that States and revolutionary movements will calculate with the three stated effects, in their strategy. The heighten resource extracting abilities of post-revolutionary States, should be anticipated. The basic structural conditions that could produce a revolutionary wave, should also be anticipated. And rational actors should be able to anticipate the basic mechanisms of the political vulnerability effect. Since revolutionary movements tend to have less military capabilities then States, a revolutionary movement will generally not be able to challenge a State, with just its military capabilities. According to the theories presented, the three effects can have severe power political repercussion,

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58 Walt, Stephen M op 39ff
59 Ibid 42
60 Ibid 22, Kent, Samuel op cit 87ff
61 Walt, Stephen M op cit 30f
62 Ibid 40
63 See 2.3 State – society tensions and revolutionary waves, regarding these variables
both by a strengthening of a revolutionary movements and by the of weakening of States. Thus I assume that these effects will be vital components, in the strategy of revolutionary movements.

3.0 Methodological considerations

3.1 Initial methodological considerations

As stated, I will investigate how the three anticipated effects appears (or do not appear), in a strategy presented by a revolutionary movement. To investigate if these effects are important for the strategy, I will also investigate how (and if), these effects have been integrated in to the strategy. Understanding the anticipated causal mechanism in the strategy, will be vital in order to understand this integration.

I decided to focus on a single case, in order to study the qualities of the analytic framework, rather than the ability of the framework to explain many cases. It seems reasonable to start with a qualitative study of a new analytic framework, in order to refine it, before it is tested on several cases. Case studies offers two particular strengths that I will try to exploit, in order to investigate if the analytic framework can contribute to the explanation of revolutionary strategies. Within a case study, the researcher can carefully examine the conceptual validity of the observed indicators. And a case study makes it possible to contextualize the phenomenon of interest. By a careful examination of conceptual validity, I will investigate if the effects that appears in data, has the attributes that I anticipate. And by contextualizing the data about these effects, in the strategic framework presented, I can investigate if these effects were important in the strategy.

3.2 Case selection

In order to fulfill the aim of the study, I needed some kind of rich, qualitative data. Qualitative textual analysis seemed like an obvious choice. The text for the study had to come from a revolutionary group and the text had to have a strategic character. Because of personal interest, I chose to limit the universe of cases to texts from salafi jihadi movements. The next limitations were to work with influencal and well-known text from this universe, something that should raise

65 Esaiasson, Peter., Gilljam, Mikael., Oscarsson, Henrik., Towns, Ann., Wängnerud, Lena op cit 211ff
66 See 4.1 The ideas and practices of salafism and note 83, regarding the concept salif jihadism.
the social interest of the study. My chose fell upon the text The Management of Savagery. The text was chosen because the power political pressure on the unit (Al-Qaeda), seem to have been huge when the text was written.\textsuperscript{67} This would reasonable mean that the strategy suggested in the text, had to be very sensitive to this pressure. Since power political constraints and possibilities is the variable I am trying to isolate, the text seems useful for the study.\textsuperscript{68}

3.3 Qualitative textual analysis

The textual analysis will focus on the content of the text and I will focus on certain aspects of the content, thus structuring the data in the text.\textsuperscript{69} However in order to understand these aspects, I believe that it is necessary to gain a preliminary understanding of the whole text, by framing the text in its power political and ideological context. When I have a general understanding of the text, I can focus on the parts of the text that deals with phenomena of interest.

3.4 Framing the text

In order to frame the text, I will use a hermeneutic method.\textsuperscript{70} The frame will consist of a short presentation of Salafism, the development of the jihadism and Al Qaeda's power political situation. I will also present earlier interpretations of the text. These frames will function as the whole, while the text will function as the part, within the hermeneutic circle.\textsuperscript{71} The interpretation of the text, will aim at a short characterization, of the function of the text.

3.5 Analysis

\textsuperscript{67} See 4.3 Al-Qaeda and it’s material capabilities
\textsuperscript{68} In chapter 2.4 Social revolutions as structural readjustment (see note 44), I stated that I will investigate revolutionary movements, that tries to create and lead a social revolution. Is the text from such a movement? We can use text itself, in order to investigate if the author is proposing a social revolution. The author states that he desires a global political revolution, see Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 50; 61. Naji also proposes extensive redistribution of resources, with both national and international consequences, see ibid 112. Regarding the mass nature of the proposed revolution, see 6.4.1 Strategy A – Images, causal mechanism and the influence of the different effects and 6.4.2 Strategy B – Images, causal mechanism and the influence of the different effects. Thus the proposed revolution in the text, seems to match my definition of a social revolution.
\textsuperscript{69} Esaiasson, Peter., Gilljam, Mikael., Oscarsson, Henrik., Towns, Ann., Wängnerud, Lena op cit 213f
\textsuperscript{70} See Alvesson, Mats., Sköldberg, Kaj, Tolkning och Reflektion. Vetenskapsfilosofi och Kvalitativ Metod, Third Edition, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2017 142ff, for an introduction to hermeneutics. Unlike many hermeneutic approaches I will not frame the text with any personal information about the author or the authors history. Since I focus on political units such as States and revolutionary movements, I will simply threat the author as someone functioning in a strategy producing role, within a revolutionary movement.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid 135
The analysis will consist of two parts. In the first step I will make a thematic, qualitative content analysis of the text.\textsuperscript{72} I will try to locate and put together the parts in the text,\textsuperscript{73} where the revolutionary wave effect, revolutionary balance of power effect and the political vulnerability effect, is described. Putting each part to together, I will the present the data in a structured form.

I will use a relatively wide operationalization\textsuperscript{74} of the concepts in the content analysis. This is because the different pieces of textual evidence, need further structuring, before the images that the author presents becomes clear. The research strategy is thus a rather wide gathering of data in the content analysis, followed by a more careful test of conceptual validity later in the analysis.

In the second part of the analysis, I will make an interpretation of the authors overall strategic framework. My pre-understanding was stated under limitations, where I noted that both power political pressures and possibilities, and efforts to convince the readers to adopt the strategy, could have influenced strategy in text. Given this pre-understanding, I will be careful to note any inconsistencies and tensions in the presented strategy.\textsuperscript{75} Based on my interpretation, I will link the pieces of textual evidence from the content analysis, to the strategic framework. The aim will be a final structuring of the data from the content analysis.

When this structuring is done, I will put together and present the images of the three effects. I will then discuss the conceptual validity of each image.

4.0 Framing the text

4.1 The ideas and practices of salafism

Salafism is a widespread, leaderless, deterritorialized religious current, within Sunni Islam.\textsuperscript{76} Salafists are united by a specific set of teleological beliefs.\textsuperscript{77} Yet it’s heuristically useful to point out

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Halperin} Halperin, Sandra., Heath, Oliver op cit 346
\bibitem{Esaiasson} Esaiasson, Peter., Gilljam, Mikael., Oscarsson, Henrik., Towns, Ann., Wängnerud, Lena op cit 56
\bibitem{In any interpretive analysis} In any interpretive analysis, transparency is vital to ensure reliability. Thus my effort has been to register my pre-understanding in a clear and unambiguous way, and to clearly point out why I make certain interpretations.
\bibitem{Meijer} Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 38ff., See also Fazlashemi, Mohammad, Våldets sociala dimensioner, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, pp 81 – 104, regarding the theological roots of salafism. I will not discuss the historical
\end{thebibliography}
some other characteristics, that salafists tend to exhibit. Salafists wants to recreate the original believes and practices of the first three generations of Muslims.\textsuperscript{78} A primary salafist value is purity, purity in belief and purity in actions.\textsuperscript{79} The interest in purity has a social dimension. Unbelief and heretical innovations should be fought and purity is linked to purification.\textsuperscript{80}

The ideas of a return to an ancient, pure form of Islam has as political side. But the world of politics is messy and engagement in it can threaten personal purity.\textsuperscript{81} This has led to a wide range of approaches to the political sphere, among salafists. On one extreme are politically submissive groups, that focuses on religious issues. On the other extreme, there is a minority of salafists that advocates revolutionary violence, trying to produce a global revolution.\textsuperscript{82} I will call this current salafi jihadism.\textsuperscript{83}

4.2 The historical development of jihadism

4.2.1 The first wave of modern jihadism

Jihadism is a relatively new phenomenon.\textsuperscript{84} The first of wave of jihadism started with the end of roots of salafi theology in this paper, yet both this sources clearly shows that salafism has deep theological roots, going all the way back to the earliest theological debates in Islam.

The term salafism is derived from the term al-salaf al-salih, meaning pious forefathers. The forefathers indicated are first three generations of Muslims, see Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 3ff., Esposito, John L., The oxford dictionary of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 274f

Ibid 13ff. As the source show, this usually means purification of the religious sphere and the setting up of social limits, allowing a salafi to avoid contact with “unclean” spheres and people. However there are important historical examples, where salafist ideology have been used to justify violent attacks on other forms of Islamic practice, see Esposito, John L op cit 333 about Wahhabism.

A quote from a salafist, religious leader in Gaza illuminates this point well: "We do not engage in politics, and we keep ourselves away from what is happening in political life because it is all lies and deceit. We only clarify the 'religious ruling' on political issues that concern people's daily life. In brief, political affairs pollute religion" - Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 232

Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 487., Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 265ff

The use of the term salafi jihadism is debated. Hegghammer is critical of the term, see Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 244 – 267. I use the term to point to the advocating or use of revolutionary violence, in order to reach political goals, heavily influenced by salafi beliefs. The wider term jihadism indicates the advocating or use of revolutionary violence, in order to reach political goals, heavily influenced by Islamic beliefs. I decided to use the term salafi jihadism for several reasons. One is that author of the text I will analyze, uses the term himself, to define his own ideological position, see Naji, Abu Bakr, The Management of Savagery. The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, Harvard: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, 2006, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf, controlled 2017-11-06. 3. Another reason is that the term seems to be heuristically useful. By comparing the authors positions with salafist beliefs, we might be able to enhance our understanding of the text. That said, Hegghammer has a point: we should be careful when we use the term salafi jihadism. We cannot point to any form of jihadism and simply apply the term.

Nilsson, Marco, Foreign Fighters and Radicalization of Local Jihad. Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38.5, pp 343 – 358, 2015, 345ff. I will use Nilsson's analytic framework, that splits the development of jihadism in to three phases, as a way to condense earlier research about the development of jihadism. The framework offered by Nilsson is powerful, combing typologies, processes and critical junctures.
six-day war. The main image of jihadi activity in this period, was that of territorially bound struggles. Jihadi groups targeted regimes in the Muslim world, striving for national Islamic revolutions. Another expression of territorial bound jihad, was defensive jihad. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Muslims gathered from all over the world, to the defend Muslim territory against a non-Muslim invader.\textsuperscript{85} The main victory for the jihadists during this phase was the rise of the taliban regime.\textsuperscript{86}

4.2.2 The second wave of modern jihadism and the rise of global jihad

The talibans rise to power were seen as role model by the jihadists. Yet the jihadists failed to enact similar Islamic revolutions, in other States. Salafi jihadi groups that tried to revolt in Egypt, were crushed by the State. Territoriality bound jihads in Algeria and in other nations lead nowhere. This led to a crisis in the jihadi movement. In the mid 1990:s, a new image of jihad was produced by Al-Qaeda, here called global jihad. The plan was to direct attacks on the far enemy, the USA and its allies. The hope was that this would spur a popular revolt in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{87}

4.2.3 The third wave of modern jihadism, the glocal jihad

The peak of the second wave of modern jihadism, was the terror attack on Twin towers in 2001. The attack did not ignite a popular rebellion in the Muslim world. The USA responded to the attack, by invading Afghanistan. This produced another crisis in the jihadi movement. It was in this environment that the idea of glocal jihad was born. The focus would once again shift to the local

giving it significant explanatory power. However its weakness is a lack of precision. Since it looks at general trends in modern jihadism, we have to acknowledge that all jihadi groups were not equally affected by these trends, see Nilsson, Marco op cit 347. However since this study focuses on Al-Qaeda, a political unit with a trend-setting role (at least during the period of most interest in this study), the framework seems very useful.

\textsuperscript{85} Two ideological figureheads that influenced this phase of modern jihadism was Sayyid Qutb (d 1966) and Abdullah Azzam (d 1989). Jihad (I will here limit my discussion on jihad, to a discussion about the term and the use of force) had traditionally been a State activity. Thus only a State leader could declare a jihad, see Nilsson, Marco, op cit 345. Qutb advocated revolution as means to overthrow any government, that did not implement the laws revealed by God. With this innovation, a jihad could be declared against a government, that did not implement certain policies, see Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 271f., Esposito, John L op cit 257f. Abdullah Azzam use of term the jihad was equally inventive. Against the background of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Azzam argued that it was the duty of every individual Muslim, to defend the lands of Islam against a foreign invasion, see Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 271. Note the difference between Assam’s idea of jihad and the traditional State centered use of term, where jihad was seen as a collective, rather than an individual duty.

\textsuperscript{86} Nilsson, Marco op cit 345f

\textsuperscript{87} Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 53ff. The main ideological figurhead in this development was Osama bin-Laden (d 2011). By calling for a global jihad against America and its allies, the territorial boundaries for jihad that was important for the first modern wave of jihadism, were essentially abolished. bin-Laden still conceptualized jihad as an individual duty, yet it was now a global affair. A wider group of people were also seen as acceptable targets for violence, as the focus was shifted from guerrilla warfare to terrorism, see Nilsson, Marco op cit 346
regimes in the Muslim world. Yet each local struggle against a heretic regime, would now be conceptualized as a step in the global struggle. This would eventually give rise to radicalized local jihads, such as the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Yet it is at the very dawn of this phase, that the text I will analyze was presented.

4.3 Al-Qaeda and its material capabilities

Al-Qaeda was formed as a small, elitist, salafi jihadi movement, with global aspirations. The movement was founded in Afghanistan, after the Soviet Union had begun to retreat from the country. Al-Qaeda possessed two critical material capabilities: a training camp in Afghanistan and Osama bin-Laden's huge fortune.

The US invasion of Afghanistan produced server problems for Al-Qaeda. The organizations training capabilities in Afghanistan diminished significantly. The relatively centralized leadership of Al-Qaeda became less efficient, since the organization had to spread out due to rising security concerns. The security concerns slowed down communications between different cells of Al-Qaeda operators. All of this made it hard for the organization to perform large operations. Al-Qaeda’s ability to perform deeds of international terrorism, were thus severely weakened by the invasion.

4.4 The Management of Savagery

4.4.1 Background

The text The Management of Savagery, was published by the Center of Islamic Studies and Research in 2004. The center is considered an unofficial channel for Al-Qaeda and the text first appeared on a jihadi website. Al-Qaeda’s presence on the web, during the period was, primarily directed towards core activists in the jihadi movement, in closed internet forums. The author uses

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88 Nilsson, Marco op cit 355. Nilsson does not use the term glocal jihad, rather he talks about the merging of the idea of local and global jihad. For analytic clarity I believe that it is useful to use a new term, for this new phase.
89 Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 53ff
90 Meijer, Roel (red) op cit 48
91 Nilsson, Marco op cit 346. Al-Qaeda had other training camps as well, see Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 55. Yet the numbers that Nilsson presents, shows that one in Afghanistan had to have been vital.
92 Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 58ff
93 Nilsson, Marco op cit 346, Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 59ff
95 Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 128ff.
the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji (hereafter Naji). The same pseudonym has also contributed with content, in several other Al-Qaeda channels.96

4.4.2 Structure and major themes in the text

The Management of Savagery is divided into five topics, an introduction and a preface. These parts of the text spans 109 pages. In the introduction, Naji presents different Islamic political currents and he affirms his alliances with the salafi jihadi current.97 In the preface an image of the international system is presented, focusing on the super powers vital role for the stability of the system. The current international system when text was written, is presented as a unipolar system, with the USA as the only remaining super power. The author states that the State-system was destabilized by the fall of the Soviet Union, however the USA managed to stabilize the system.98 It is also stated that the regimes in the Muslim world, have been satellite States to the great powers since the cold war. These regimes have suppressed the beliefs of the Muslim societies, and they have plundered the Muslim nations. The Muslim masses has been misled by different diversions, and the armies in the Muslim world, have been bribed by the leaders. Still there are some people that seeks truth and justice.99 Some strategic ideas are also presented, focusing on luring the USA in to a war against Islamic countries, spurring a popular Islamic uprising.100 The preface and introduction are 8 pages long.101

In the first and second topic, Naji presents the concept of the management of savagery. This concept points to the idea, of creating Statelike structures, in regions of domestic anarchy.102 A strategy for the movement is also presented, based on three phases.103 Naji suggest that the jihadists should prioritize a few regions, that contains States with weak States structures.104 In the first phase the jihadist should strike economic targets, such as oil production. The States will answer by concentrating their forces, to protect economic targets and political leaders. Regions of anarchy will rise in the periphery, or in crowded areas in targeted States.105 In these regions the jihadist will

96 Lia, Brynjar op cit 527
97 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 3f
98 Ibid 5ff
99 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 6.
100 Ibid 9f
101 These ideas in the introduction are presented in Appendix 1, and I will call them strategy A.
102 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 11
103 Ibid 15
104 Ibid 15f
105 Ibid 19f. Naji anticipates that the State will not abandon these regions entirely, rather that the jihadists can beat the weak troops left by the State in such regions.

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initiate the next phase; the management of savagery. In a final and quiet distant phase, these regions will expand and link up, forming an Islamic State. This part is 12 pages long.

Topic three deals with particular "principals and policies for implementing the plan." In this topic Naji deals with many issues, in some cases extrapolating on some elements in the strategy, but he also introduces many new themes. These themes include military strategy, education and security. Naji's discussions of these issues have a general character and the author introduces principals, rather than specific instructions. This part of the text spans 39 pages.

In the fourth topic Naji deals with some major problems that the movement will face, such as spies, a lack of administrative personal, and the problem of undisciplined youth. This part is 11 pages long. The final topic in divided in the two parts. The first part is a conclusion of the text that deals with the question: is there any easier way to reach the political goal stated? The rest of topic five is divided into seven articles, added to text. These articles give a shattered impression and it is possible the author added previously written articles. In several of these articles the author has a rather idealistic tone, with a content that lies closer to a militant religious sermon, than any form of power political planning. In these articles the author stresses patience, belief in God's aid and he tries to legitimate the violent practices of the jihadi salafists. This part is 39 pages long.

4.4.3 Style of writing

In most parts of text, the author focuses on logos, rather than pathos or ethos. Concepts are

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106 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 17f
107 Ibid 15. This phase is only briefly mentioned in these topics. Some more details are offered much later in the book, in a chapter called the rules of affiliation, see ibid 50ff
108 The strategic ideas presented in this part of the text, are presented in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. I will call them strategy B and Strategy A Revisited.
109 Ibid 23
110 We can here note that the first subject in the third topic, are more detailed ideas about how to master management. See ibid 23f. This ties in well with the subtitle of the entire book, showing that management is the next critical step for movement.
111 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 28ff
112 Ibid 54 - 62
113 Ibid 52ff
114 Ibid 67
115 Ibid 63ff
116 Ibid 71ff
117 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 81ff
118 Ibid 90ff
119 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 101ff. Passages with legitimation is scattered across the text. A notable passage is a longer text directly discussing the legitimation of, and limits for violence, see ibid 31f.
120 See Bergström, Göran., Borèus, Kristina (red) Textens mening och makt. Metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och
introduced and defined, the author points out anticipated causal mechanism and their dynamic. Legitimizing various ideas forms a large part of the text. The author presents quotes from the holy text of Islam, to legitimize his position. He also tries to expose contradictions in other positions. Pointing to historical practices used during the history of Islam, are also an important way to legitimizing different practices. There are some parts of the text where author does get emotional, and adopts a bellicose revolutionary rhetoric. And there are some parts filled with pathos, where the author deals with the virtues of war and the existential experience of jihad.

4.4.4 Earlier interpretations of the text

Several earlier interpretations of the text, treats the Management of Savagery as an independent variable, that is used to explain the strategy of the Islamic State. Stern & Berger and Gerges, are examples of this type of interpretation. These interpretations has little to say about the structural conditions under which the text was conceived, yet they contain some useful ideas. There are also several focused, intertextual interpretations of the Management of Savagery. The themes of these focused interpretations include: geostrategy, operational doctrine, jihadi training and

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*diskursanalys*, Third Edition, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2017, 91f, regarding the terms logos, ethos and pathos. The focus on logos is connected to an appraisal of learning, and a normative position that action should be based on well-made analysis. Naji writes: "[we should be] abandoning random behavior and adopting intellectual, academic methods", see Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 28

121 Definitions are very important to author, they are necessary for a correct understanding of the world and of divine guidance. Naji writes: "Sharia and predestined laws are connected with the expressions that are found in the Book and the Sunna. If someone corrupts these great expressions, it follows that the sharia laws are understood improperly", see ibid 116. Notice the connection here between quote, and the salafi ideal of purity and of an original, uncorrupted understanding of the holy texts. The ideal here is that there is one, and only one correct way to use important concepts.

122 Some epistemological ideas are important here. Naji writes that "the most important (point) is that it is easier for the people of knowledge and insight to understand (how the process works) as a result of the bounty of God”, see ibid 21. The point is that those with both religious and worldly knowledge, will have a better understanding of different processes, than those who a lack religious knowledge.

123 In an example regarding secrecy Naji writes: "We maintain that secrecy is ordered in war and in situations of battle, as we mentioned in the previous quote, "Secrecy and caution are necessary with the military company 'Take your precautions; then move forward in companies' (Qur'an 4:71).". see ibid 182.

124 See ibid 3, for examples.

125 As an example Naji writes: "Thus, the Companions...understood the matter of violence...Friend (Abu Bakr) and Ali b. Abi Talib...burned (people) with fire, even though it is odious, because they knew the effect of rough violence in times of need", see ibid 31. The companions in the text are the companions of the prophet Mohammed. Naji argues, in line with salafi beliefs, that practices of three first generations of Muslim are a blueprint for correct behavior. In these cases he uses this idea, to legitimize the use of violence.

126 For example Naji writes "Behold the blows that are directed toward (America) and its allies in both the East and the West! These blows have continued until this very moment", see ibid 19. The quote is written after a discussion by Naji of American invasion of Afghanistan. The quote seems more like prayer, than any serious analysis of the current situation.

127 See ibid 56ff, for the most prominent part of the book, where jihad is praised as a character developing experience.


129 Porro, Brittany R, *The World From Al-Qaeda’s Perspective: Deciphering its geostrategy, deterrence strategy, and efforts to build the caliphate*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2017
innovations in the jihadi movement. All of these themes, point to the fact that the Management of Savagery is a rich text, that deals with many subjects. Jacksson and Loidolt and in particular Adamskys reading of the text, has been very helpful when I tried to understand the function of the text. Adamsky has contributed with the idea that the strategic and operational litterateur in the jihadi movement, can be seen as an attempt to direct and guide a leaderless and decentralized movement.

The strategy presented in text, has been interpreted in different ways. Stern & Berger states, that Naji proposes that the jihadists should lure the USA, in to several conflicts in the Muslim world. Gerges states that Najis only focus, is on the local regimes in Muslim world. Porros interpretation is that the jihadists should focus on toppling the local regimes in Muslim world, in order to lure the USA in to a war in the middle east.

4.4.5 Placing the text in a structural context

The text were published at a time of crises for Al-Qaeda. The author states in books title, that the most critical stage for the struggle, will be the management savagery. Thus Naji puts the spotlight on a particular strategic element. Yet strategy only forms a part of the textual content, practical principles and political legitimation are also very important themes. As stated, the text was first circulated on an internet forum. The author also states that: "Details are only given for two groups: the group of those who specialize in the arts which the study discusses and the group of the leaders located in the regions of the management of savagery." Finally we have to remember that

133 Jacksson and Loidolt writes: "Naji’s Management of Savagery is much more like a roadmap that he hopes that the group as a whole will implement, one in which heterogeneity and diversity would be viewed as instances of potentially ‘random behavior’ that could put the group at risk”, see Jackson, Brian A., Loidolt, Bryce op cit 305. Adamsky uses the concept of operational art, to capture the way of thinking in the Management of Savagery and other jihadi text. Adamsky writes: "Shared notions of operational behavior and principles of war can significantly elevate the utility of the jihadi force application. It will substitute command and control, which rests on structured bureaucracy with a coherent doctrinal program", Adamsky, Dima op cit 5. Adamskys interpretation makes a lot analytic sense and it seems tell us something important, about the whole purpose of the text.
134 Stern & Berger op cit 24. Stern & Berger also presents three strategic phases I mentioned in chapter 4.4.2 Structure and major themes in the text. However three interpretation of these phases differs from the one I have presented above, see ibid.
135 Gerges op cit 38
136 Porro, Brittany R op cit 19f
137 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 4
communications between the central leadership and local activists, where problematic when the text was published, because of outside pressure.

Given this, it seems reasonable to assume that the text was intended as a handbook for glocal rebellion, driven by local actors, with little direct guidance from any central organization. Strategic guidance places the local rebellion in a global, strategic framework. By introducing principles about how to direct the rebellion, the author also tries to set some standards for local revolutionary activity. The intended readers seem to have been core activists, that could lead or play a key role, in glocal rebellions.

5 Analysis

5.1 Content Analysis

5.1.1 Analytic framework

The content analysis is structured around three themes: the revolutionary balance of power effect, the revolutionary wave effect and the political vulnerability effect. Using a qualitative reading of the text, I have tried to locate all passages in the text, that deals with each theme. The operationalization of the revolutionary balance of power effect, has been achieved by locating all parts of the text that deals with the heighten resource extracting ability of a post-revolutionary State (or Statelike structure). Also by locating any passages dealing with an initial weakness, of a post-revolutionary State. The revolutionary wave effect has been operationalized, by locating all parts that deals with spontaneous diffusion of revolutionary activity. The political vulnerability effect has been operationalized by locating all parts, that deals with some vulnerability of among the

138 Najis vision for the jihad movement, weren't just local groups. A rather mysterious 'high command' is mentioned 22 times in text. In an interesting section Naji states that local groups shouldn't focus to much on big operations, like the attack on the twin towers. Naji notes that such an attack will properly require support from the high command. Instead local groups should focus on small or medium size operations and that this operation does not require any communication with the high command, see Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 17. This points to a division of labor, where the local groups can focus on local rebellion and central functions on big international terrorist attacks.

139 It’s important to note that Al-Qaeda tried to influence other jihadi groups, and take the role of an intellectual vanguard in the wider jihadi movement, see Stern, Jessica., Berger J.M op cit 55. Thus the intended readers were not just Al-Qaeda members.

140 I have chosen to exclude the seven articles in the fifth topic, from the content analysis. The idealistic nature of several of these articles, makes them less relevant for an exploration of the authors power political calculations. And if the articles had been published before the Management of Savagery, in another context, we would have to examine this context, in order to interpret the articles, see 4.4.2 Structure and major themes in the text.

141 With spontaneous I mean: not directly controlled by jihadists them self.
enemy, that does not emanate from a lack of capabilities. As I have noted before, this operationalization is relatively wide. Thus I will conduct a more ridged test of conceptual validity, after a final structuring of the data.¹⁴²

The results are presented by a short summary, of the author treatment of each theme. Each piece of textual content located, will be given a code. This code will be used later in the analysis.

5.1.2 Presentation of the content

5.1.2.1 The revolutionary balance of power effect

There is very little in the text, about the heighten resource extraction ability of a post-revolutionary State. However in one passage, where the author writes about various reforms that jihadists have to implement when they manage a region of savagery, the author writes:

Rp1
"Raising the level of faith and combat efficiency during the training of the youth of the region of savagery and establishing a fighting society at all levels and among all individuals by means of making them aware of its importance"¹⁴³

Rp2
Naji writes that the need of administrative personal will rise sharply, as state power diminishes and savagery spreads. The jihadi movement has to prepare for this development, be training personal and making plans for the administration of large groups of people. If the movement is not prepared, the negative consensuses will be severe.¹⁴⁴

Rp3
In another paragraph, the author continues the discussion about a future lack of administrative personnel. He suggests that the problem could be solved, by an empowering of previously oppressed people, raising them to the rank of civil servants.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² See 5.3.3 Discussing conceptual validity
¹⁴³ Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 18. A similar quote, expressing the same idea, can also be found on page 11.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid 23
¹⁴⁵ Ibid 63
5.1.2.2 The revolutionary wave effect

The revolutionary wave effect is dealt with in four main passages of the text.

Rw1
In one paragraph Naji states that the media image of the USA, as an unbeatable power has to be destroyed, and that the USA has to be drawn in to a direct war against Islam. By exposing American weakness ”the noble ones among the masses and a few of the noble ones among the armies of apostasy”146, will lose their fear of the USA. Thus they will not fear that the USA will save their local heretic regime, if they try to replace it, and they will not fear an American intervention after a regime shift. An American attack on Islam, will also expose the treachery of the regimes in the Muslim world,147 ”showing [the] heedless people among the masses — and they are the majority. the truth”148 Thus many individuals among the people, will become jihadists. However Naji notes that last effect is only probable.149

Rw2
In another passage, Naji anticipates that a continued resistance in Afghanistan against the USA, will eventually convince that masses that they can resist the USA. The jihadists should try creating a war between the American forces occupying Afghanistan, and the people in the region, drawing people towards the jihadists.150

Rw3
Another image of the revolutionary wave effect, is given in connection to a discussion on media strategy. Naji states that a media strategy will be important.151 The media strategy should give: ”rational and Sharia justification for the operations, especially...[to] the masses.”152 it should also be directed at enemy troops with low income, trying to persuade them to abandon their post. However it is clear that Naji does not trust masses. They are a ”difficult factor”153, ”not generally

146 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 10
147 Ibid 9f
148 Ibid 10
149 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 9. Some similar ideas about the effects of American retreat from Iraq, can be found later in the text, see ibid 62.
150 Ibid 18f. On page 18 Naji also writes that jihadi current will expand in tens of thousands of groups like Al-Qaeda. This clearly a propagandistic statement, and not a serious calculation.
151 Ibid 21. See also ibid 41ff, similar discussion on the importance of the media and media campaigns.
152 Ibid 21
153 Ibid
dependable”, because of the structures among them, created by heretic regimes. Yet through the mercy of God, there is a reserve of manpower in the Umma that will join the jihadists, but only if the jihadist polarizes the Umma.  

Rw4  
In Rw4 the idea of polarization is developed. Naji defines polarization as: ”dragging the masses into the battle such that polarization is created between all of the people. Thus one group of them will go to the side of the people of truth, another group will go to the side of the people of falsehood, and a third group will remain neutral”  

Whether people want it or not, society must be turned in to a violent battle field. Before any zones of anarchy has been created, the primary means to create polarization is a media strategy, aimed at radicalizing young people. As domestic anarchy increases, the people will seek security and ally them self with parties, military organizations or jihadists groups. Polarization will thus increase.  

5.1.2.3 The political vulnerability effect  

The author deals with the political vulnerability effect, in several passages in the text.  

PvI  
In one passage Naji points to the fact, that the superpowers have a massive advantage in military power, yet their internal cohesion is weak. This is because of religious, moral and social corruption in the societies of the superpower. These elements of corruption and internal decay has to be activated. This can be done by an exhaustion of the superpower, particularly by blows directed at the superpowers economy and by the costs of war. These costs will create internal tension inside the superpowers, resolving around material issues. Naji states that this was what mujahidin did towards the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and that the process can be repeated again, if the jihadists can lure the USA in to war against Islam. The American military is weak and feminized. Given the large geographical distance between the Islamic world and USA, the costs of an American intervention in the Muslims world, will be much higher than cost were for the Soviet Union, during the invasion of Afghanistan. The Americans can thus sustain much smaller loses, the what Soviet army could,

154 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 21  
155 Ibid  
156 Ibid 46  
157 Ibid 47. Some of these ideas are repeated on page 68.  
158 Ibid 7ff
before they will back away from a war.\textsuperscript{159}

\textit{Pv2}  
Naji states that the jihadists should focus on striking economic targets. This will force the enemy to concentrate their best troops, to protect the political leadership and key economic targets. The rest of the troops will lack a strong qualified will and the jihadists can easily overcome them.\textsuperscript{160} If the jihadists gets control over a region of savagery, cells should be left in other regions for deterrence. The deterrent could make the enemy inclined to withdraw from other regions, in order to protect the important economic target. If the enemy does this, savagery will spread to other regions. The success of the mujahedeen will also make enemy soldiers uneasy, and inclined to join with the jihadists.\textsuperscript{161}

\textit{Pv3}  
Naji states that the enemies of the jihadists are driven by material goals, concealed behind false religious or cultural motives. In short, the enemies want to survive and live a life of material pleasure. Thus they will only continue a war, if they think that the enemy is weak, and that it is easy to defeat him. If one resist violent, fractions within an enemy coalition will back away from the war.\textsuperscript{162}

5.2 Interpreting the strategy in the Management of Savagery

5.2.1. Two plans or one?

One of the most confusing aspects of the Management of Savagery, is the fact that it seems like the author is presenting two, rather than one strategic framework. As we have already noted, the author presents some strategic thoughts in the preface. The focus in the preface is on the super powers and how the jihadists should deal with them. These thoughts are presented in detail in appendix 1 and I will call this ideas Strategy A. In topic two, the author presents another discussion on strategy. This time, the author focuses on fragile States. I will present these strategic thoughts in detail in Appendix 2, and I will call them Strategy B. Right in the middle of his presentation of strategy B,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{159 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 9f. Some of the arguments in Pv1 are repeated later in text, see ibid 19., 30. See also ibid 44, were the dependency in the West, on oil is discussed.}
\footnote{160 Ibid 19f. These anticipations are repeated on page 44}
\footnote{161 Ibid 20f}
\footnote{162 Ibid 38}
\end{footnotes}
the author has placed a passage where he discusses the US war in Afghanistan. In this passage the
author returns to some of his assumptions in strategy A. I will call this passage Strategy A Revisited
and I will present Strategy A Revisited in Appendix 3. All of this gives a rather strange impression.
Is there one strategy in text or are there two?

5.2.2 Comparing Strategy A and Strategy A Revisited

Strategy A and Strategy B has different focuses and uses different concepts. However the text that I
call Strategy A Revisited, seems to be of vital interest, since it links Strategy A with Strategy B.
How does the author link the two strategic discussions? We can first notice that the last event that
is mentioned in strategy A, is the terror attack on the twin towers.\textsuperscript{163} In Strategy A Revisited, we
can notice that there is a discussion about the US military presence in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{164} In Strategy A
the author states that the jihadists should drag America in to a war against Islam, and that this would
produce a revolt in the Muslim world, against the local regimes there.\textsuperscript{165} In Strategy A Naji had also
anticipated that the American military of would be weak, unable to bear casualties and that it would
quickly disengage from a conflict in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{166} In Strategy A Revisited, the strategist
discusses a war that US is engaged in, in a Muslim country. Following up on his predictions from
Strategy A, Naji writes in Strategy A Revisited: ”The mere failure of America to achieve all of its
military goals in this country[Afghanistan]... throughout one or two years or more will convince the
masses.....that opposition to America is possible.”\textsuperscript{167} The author also presents a plan about how the
jihadists should use the current situation: ” put (America’s) armies, which occupy the region
[Afghanistan]...in a state of war with the masses in the region. [This] stirs up movements that
increase the jihadi expansion and create legions among the youth who contemplate and plan for
resistance.”\textsuperscript{168} The last quote indicates an anticipation, about an escalating process of radicalization
and violence in Afghanistan, pointing towards a long conflict in the country. And in the first quote
the author is arguing, that the system wide revolt predicted in Strategy A, will come as a result of
the resistance against the USA in Afghanistan. Yet it will come later,\textsuperscript{169} and in the meantime, the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{163 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 9., see Appendix 1 SA9}
\footnote{164 Ibid 19., see Appendix 3 SAR3}
\footnote{165 Ibid 10., see Appendix 1 SA12 and SA13}
\footnote{166 Ibid 9., see Appendix 1 SA8}
\footnote{167 Ibid 18f., see Appendix 3 SAR8}
\footnote{168 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 19., see Appendix 3 SAR9 and SAR10. Notice that the author had anticipated a quick war
against the USA in Strategy A. The quote here points towards a shift in expectations. We have to remember that text
was published in 2004 and that the USA had been in Afghanistan since 2001.}
\footnote{169 There are some reasons to be skeptical about the authors predictions, about an eventual system wide revolt, caused
by the jihadi resistance in Afghanistan. If resistance against the USA in Afghanistan, will surely produce a great
spread of revolutionary activity, why propose a shift of limited resources towards fragile States? The anticipated}
\end{footnotes}
jihadists should focus on new revolutionary projects in fragile nations.  

5.2.3 Contextualizing and interpreting the differences between Strategy A and Strategy B

As was noted in chapter 4, Al-Qaeda has introduced the idea of global jihad. Al-Qaeda's plan was to spur a popular revolt in the Muslim world, by resistance against the USA. This had eventually led to a lot problems for Al-Qaeda. The USA had invaded Afghanistan, they had disposed the taliban regime and this development had led to a subsequent weakening of the material capabilities of Al-Qaeda. And no popular revolt took place in the Muslim world. In the Management of Savagery, an author from Al-Qaeda is trying to introduce a new strategy, trying to convince other jihadists to follow the new ideas from Al-Qaeda. Thus the strategist had strong incentives hid, downplay or smoothed over the fact, that Al-Qaeda's old strategy had not produced the results, that the organization had hoped for. The change in material capabilities made it difficult for the organization to continue to focus on international terrorism. Thus lessons learned and less material capabilities, had given the organization strong incentives to change its strategy.

My interpretation is that we can detect a shift of strategic focus in the Management of Savagery. By an initial presentation in Strategy A, of a plan similar to Al-Qaeda old strategy, an image is given of a continued dedication to the organizations old plans. Yet in strategy B the author is in fact advocating for a shift in the strategic focus, with much less emphasis on resistance against the USA, and more focus on revolutionary activity in fragile nations. Thus I would argue that Naji are in fact presenting two different strategies.

5.2.4 Structuring the data around the two strategies

My interpretation above has stated that there are two strategies in the text. Thus we have structure

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170 This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that Strategy B is focused on revolutionary activity, in selected fragile nations, see Appendix 2 SB 5
171 See 4.2.2 The second wave of modern jihadism and the rise of global jihad
172 See 4.3 Al-Qaeda and its material capabilities
173 I am not arguing that all the underlying assumptions and ideas presented in the text that I call Strategy A, has been abandoned in the text I call Strategy B. Rather there is a subtle shift in text, about how easy it will be to activate the political vulnerability of the USA, and how easy it will be to inspire a revolutionary wave. This shift in anticipations has important consequences for the strategic focus.
the data from the content analysis, around this two strategies, otherwise we will not be able to make sense of it. We can note that Rw1 and Pv1 are part of the textual presentation, of Strategy A.\textsuperscript{174} Rp1, Rw3, Pv2, are part of the textual presentation of Strategy B.\textsuperscript{175} If we investigate Rp 2 and Rp3, we can note that they deal with the managing of regions of savagery, a concept clearly linked to Strategy B.\textsuperscript{176} A close reading of Rw4, shows that it does discuss how polarization should be achieved in the various stages, stated in Strategy B.\textsuperscript{177} Pv3 is so abstract, that it could be linked both to strategy A and B.\textsuperscript{178} It seems to include some basic ideas. that the author has about politics, thus we can link it to both strategies. We can finally note that Rw2 was part Strategy A Revisited, thus we can link it to Strategy B.\textsuperscript{179} Thus we can group the textual passages Rw1 and Pw1 to strategy A and the rest of the textual content to strategy B, except Pv3 that can be connected with both strategies.

5.3 Summarizing the authors images of three effects

5.3.1 Strategy A – Images, causal mechanism and the influence of the different effects

I have now structured the units from the content analysis, into two categories, those linked to Strategy A and those linked to Strategy B. I will now summaries the images given of each effect, inside each strategic context.

The images in strategy A are derived from the textual content: Rw1, Pv1 and Pv3. The revolutionary balance of power effect is not mentioned in connection to Strategy A. The political vulnerability effect is primarily conceptualized as an inherent, material, social tensions inside the polity’s of the super powers. These tensions can be activated through the costs of war. A cultural determined vulnerability inside western military forces, are also incorporated into the calculations. The revolutionary wave effect is related to a dormant opposition, to the governments in the Muslim world. This opposition can be activated through the exposure of the inherent weakness, of the stabilizing super power. Support for the jihadists can also rise by an exposure of the cooperation between the local regimes and the super power.\textsuperscript{180} Both of these effects are extremely important in

\textsuperscript{174} See Appendix 1
\textsuperscript{175} See Appendix 2
\textsuperscript{176} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 23., 63., See 5.1.2.1 The revolutionary balance of power effect
\textsuperscript{177} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 47., See 5.1.2.2 The revolutionary wave effect
\textsuperscript{178} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 38, See 5.1.2.3 The political vulnerability effect
\textsuperscript{179} See Appendix 3
\textsuperscript{180} Some of the underlying calculations regarding the revolutionary wave effects, are not totally clear from the content
Strategy A. By exposing the weakness of the super power, through an activation of the political vulnerability effect, a revolutionary wave will be created. The political vulnerability effect is thus used as a means to activate a goal: a revolutionary wave. In the theoretical expectations, I had anticipated that the author would calculate with socio-economic and political structures. We can note that the culturally determined weakness, anticipated in the western military forces, are not in line with these theoretical expectations.

5.3.2 Strategy B – Images, causal mechanism and the influence of the different effects

The images in Strategy B are derived from: Rp1, Rp2, Rp3, Rw2, Rw3, Rw4, Pv2, and Pv3. There are some traces of the revolutionary balance of power effect in strategy B. By gaining control over some territory, the jihadists can engage in mass militarization. If the movement does not prepare for the administration of the future state, administrative weaknesses are anticipated. The political vulnerability effect, is primarily linked to weak economic and military structures in fragile States. By attacks on economic resources in fragile State, these States will be forced to use their best military forces, to defend vital economic and political targets. Many other areas will be defended by poorly paid and unmotivated soldiers. The jihadists can attack and drive away these unmotivated forces. By continuing to threaten economic targets, they can stop these fragile States from a concentrated military offensive, in to the areas now controlled by the jihadists. The revolutionary wave effect is conceptualized as polarization, in the form of increased tension between different political groups in society. The main mechanism that can activate this radicalization is to create zones of domestic anarchy. Before any spread of domestic anarchy, media campaigns can use to radicalize the youth, leading to increased polarization. Both the political vulnerability effect and the revolutionary wave effect, are important in the Najis calculations. Just like in strategy A, the dismantling of State influence, is seen as the vital link, for the creation of a revolutionary wave effect. Overcoming the problems of administration in anarchic regions, is seen as a vital means to gain support for a post-revolutionary State.

5.3.3 Discussing conceptual validity

Notice in Rw1, that there are two categories of potential revolutionary's: the noble ones among the masses and the headless majority, see 5.1.2.2 The revolutionary wave effect. Earlier in the text the author had written that most people in the Muslim world has been fouled by various diversions, yet that there are some seekers of the truth and justice, see 4.4.2 Structure and major themes in the text. The most reasonable interpretation is that one’s how seeks justice and truth, are the ones that will rebel when the weakness of the USA is exposed. The people that has been fouled by diversions, are the ones that will rebel when the treachery of their local regime is exposed. Foreign domination seems to be the vital underlying factor, that is assumed to create a dormant opposition, towards regimes in the Muslim world.
In order to investigate the conceptual validity of the identified effects, we have to specify the necessary attributes of each effect. I define the necessary attribute of the revolutionary balance of power effect as: the heightened resource extracting ability of a post-revolutionary State. The initial fragility of a post-revolutionary State, is also an attribute of the revolutionary balance of power effect. But since the systemic effects of this attribute, are deemed as less important than the heightened resource extracting ability, I do not consider the initial fragility a necessary attribute. I define the necessary attribute of the revolutionary wave effect as: a diffusion of revolutionary activity between at least two States, creating at least two revolutionary situations. I define the necessary attribute of the political vulnerability effect as: a guns versus butter conflict, activating wide groups within a polity. The conflict has emanate from a military conflict with a non-threatening enemy.

In Strategy A, the political vulnerability effect was located inside the polity of the super powers. It expressed itself as economic tensions, and it could be activated by the cost of wars in the periphery. This matches the necessary attribute of the political vulnerability effect. The revolutionary wave effect was conceptualized as wide spread rebellious activity. The spread would be activated by an exposure of the inherent weakness, of the only super power in the system. This seems to indicate a spread of revolutionary activity, in several nations, that would probably lead to several revolutionary situations. This matches the necessary attribute of the revolutionary wave effect. In strategy B, the political vulnerability effect is conceptualized as fragile economic and military structures, in weak States. This does not match the necessary attribute of the political vulnerability effect. The revolutionary wave effect is conceptualized as a polarization effect, where radicalization and anarchy tears a polity or a region apart. Since this effect tears a polity apart, rather than spread from one polity to another, this effect does not match with the revolutionary wave effect. The textual content regarding the revolutionary power balance effect, seems to match with the necessary attributes of the concept. The heightened resource extracting ability in concurred regions is discussed, and a potential initial fragility, is also mentioned.

Since two of the effects in strategy B, does not match the concepts deducted from the theory, a re-conceptualizations seem appropriate. I believe that we can simply talk about the polarization effect, and an economic and military fragility effect, in connection to strategy B.

5.4 Theoretical considerations
5.4.1 Expected and observed attributes – the revolutionary balance of power effect

The appearance of the necessary attributes of the three effects, were discussed in chapter 5.3.3, yet some other attributes deserve further attention. We can note that author predicts and plans for mass militarization in areas controlled by the jihadists. This matches the theoretical expectations about how a post-revolutionary State, can extract massive amounts of resources for war. Also the strategists are concerned about the potential lack of administrative personnel, for future State building. This also matches the theoretical expectations. Thus there is a good match between the theoretical expectations, and attributes of the revolutionary balance of power effect, indicating relatively refined theoretical expectations.\textsuperscript{181}

The revolutionary balance of power effect, was not as important as expected in the presented strategies. In Strategy A the authors intention was to create a revolutionary wave. The revolutionary balance of power effect, indicates that revolutionary movement can gain significant amounts of power, by controlling territory. Yet a revolutionary wave could be another way to gain relative power. Thus it seems reasonable to assume, that a revolutionary movement could focus on either one of these effects, in a particular strategy. In strategy B the author is clearly interested in getting control of territory, yet his focus is on how to get control over this territory. Details about what happens next, seems to be saved for later.

5.4.2 Expected and observed attributes – the political vulnerability effect

When dealing with the great powers, the political vulnerability effect was conceptualized as a dormant material tensions, inside the polity of the great power. This matches the theoretical expectations. When the strategists attention is shifted towards fragile States, Naji started to look for fragility in the economic and military structures of this States. This was not anticipated. Yet from an analytic perspective, this makes a lot of sense. In a strong polity with developed institutions, the political elite will probably be sensitive to domestic pressure. In a weak polity, with less developed institutions, the political elite might be less sensitive to domestic pressure. Instead they will probably relay more on their military forces, to keep the population calm. Yet many weak polity’s are economically dependent, on a few key economic resources. Since a weak polity has less developed institutions, there is a great risk that the common soldiers in the armies of this less

\textsuperscript{181} See 2.4 Social revolutions as structural readjustment and note 50
developed polity’s, aren't motivated to defend the polity.

5.4.3 Expected and observed attributes – the revolutionary wave effect

In regard to the revolutionary wave effect, the author indicates that there is a dormant opposition towards the governments in the Muslim world. The theoretical assumptions I made about the root cause of revolutionary waves, where that intra-state constraint, could hinder States from an efficient adoption to socio-economic and political macro-trends. This could lead to State-society tensions and depressed State capabilities, and in the end to revolutions. The author does not calculate in this way. The main reasons why, seem to be that he perceives the States in the Muslim world, as dominated by the great powers. State – society tensions are thus seen as a natural, ever present element, given the foreign domination. The perceived foreign domination, is this an intervening variable, that had an unexpected influence on the calculations of the author.

The strategist focuses on how to activate these tensions, by the weakening of local State or superpower influence. The connection between the stabilizing influence of the great power and the revolutionary wave effect was not anticipated. The author states that the international system was destabilized by the fall of Soviet Union, and that the USA managed to stabilize the system after this fall.182 Thus there is a clear connection between the calculations about the revolutionary wave effect, the stabilizing influence of a great power and a perceived unipolar system. The idea seems to be, that if there no great power left to stabilize the system, waves of rebellion will follow. The hope for a quick activation of the political vulnerability of the USA, has faded in Strategy B. Thus the strategist focus shifts, to the removal of the influence of local regimes. If the stabilizing power of a local regime is removed, people will be willing to follow the lead of different rebels. This points towards a low underlying legitimacy and weak State structures, in States dominated by foreign powers.

6 Conclusions

We can now summarize how the neorealist framework used on this study, could contribute to our explanation, of the strategy presented in the Management of Savagery. On a high level of abstraction, the categories used in framework converged with the authors calculations. Political and socio-economic structures were essential in calculations of strategist. Diffusion of revolutionary wave effect is an interfering variable, that the author did not anticipate.
activity and vulnerabilities in enemy State were vital strategic categories. On a lower level of abstraction, we can note that calculations about the strength of a post-revolutionary State or Statelike structure, matched the theoretical expectations. The political vulnerability of stable States, in the form a great powers, also matched the expectations derived from the theories.

There were two intervening, unexpected variables, that produced unexpected calculations. This were fragile States and foreign domination. When the author dealt with fragile States, unexpected vulnerabilities were detected by the strategist, and unexpected plans were conceived. The strategists calculations about the diffusion of revolutionary activity, were highly influenced by the idea of foreign domination. This lead to a fairly simplistic idea about the diffusion of revolutionary activity: expose the weakness of the great powers or of the local regime dominated by foreign powers, and the people will rebel, or be ready to support rebels.

7 Ideas for future research

In this study I have tried to make a contribute to neorealist theory, and the study of revolutionary strategy in general. The results of the study indicate that the presented analytic framework, could help us explain revolutionary strategy. But the study has also indicated that framework needs substantial revision and refinement. The intervening variables detected in the study could be used as indicators, pointing out the direction for future efforts to refine the framework.

From an analytic point of view there is a clear connection between the detected intervening variables. Foreign power can easily gain influence in fragile States. Also fragile State structures, could easily lead to State-society tensions. If State - society relations are tense, a State can seek foreign aid and ally itself with foreign powers, in order to assure its survival. Perceived great power interests, fragile State structures and perceived foreign domination, were intertwined variables in the calculations of the strategist. I had anticipated that intra-State constraints would be a vital variable in the calculations of the strategist. However past intra-State constraints, and the past inability of a State to handle macro-trends, could lead to present foreign domination combined with fragile state structures. Capturing this dynamic and the consequences it has for our theoretical expectations seems to be of great importance. A revision of the analytic framework used in study, incorporating ideas from structural theories about fragile States, could be a way to proceed.

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Appendix 1 - Strategy A, Rw1, Pv1

In this appendix I will present Strategy A. I will present the strategy by condensing it into a number of Statements, and I will give each Statement a code. All of the authors arguments have not been included, I have made a qualitative selection of the most important arguments. The Statements will be presented in the order that author presents them. Note that textual content called Rw1 and Pv1, are integrated into authors presentation of strategy A. For analytic clarity, I have marked the Statements that belongs to Rw1 and Pv1.

SA1: After 1945 the States of world was dominated by the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{183}

SA2: The super powers dominated the other States by their overwhelming military capability.\textsuperscript{184}

SA3: The superpowers do not possess enough military capabilities to totally dominate all other States. Thus they used deceptive media images, to portray himself as omnipotent and benevolent.\textsuperscript{185}

SA4: There are several elements within each superpower, that may harm its internal cohesion. This includes social inequalities and material desires.\textsuperscript{186} (Pv1)

SA5: The elements that can harm the superpowers internal cohesion, has be activated, in order to cause a breakdown of internal cohesion.\textsuperscript{187} (Pv1)

SA6: The best way to activate these elements is to strike at the super powers economy, and create cost by dragging the superpower in to wars.\textsuperscript{188} (Pv1)

SA7: Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there is only superpower left: USA. USA provides stability in the current international system, by its dominance.\textsuperscript{189}

SA8 The military structure of the USA is weak and it will be costly for the USA to project military
capabilities in the periphery, because of the geographic distance. If America received a tenth of the losses sustained by the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan, they will back away from a war.\textsuperscript{190} (Pv1)

SA9 The terror attacks on twin towers, in Nairobi and in Dark al-Salman, started a process of change. They started to show the Muslims, that the media image created by the USA of itself as an omnipotent power, is a false image.\textsuperscript{191}

SA10 The jihadi movement have sustained a loss of manpower, during the struggles of the past 30 years.\textsuperscript{192}

SA11: The jihadi movement should continue to destroy the media image of an omnipotent USA.\textsuperscript{193}

SA12: The jihadi movement should lure the USA in to a direct war against Islam. Such a war will show the noble once among the masses, that they do not have to fear the American support for their local regime, and that they can oppose an American intervention, if they dispose their local regime.\textsuperscript{194} (Rw1)

SA13: The US war against Islam will make the people aware of the treachery of the regimes in the Muslim world. When the people are faced with this treachery, they will finally see the truth and flock to jihadists.\textsuperscript{195} (Rw1)

\textsuperscript{190} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 9
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid 10
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid
Appendix 2: Strategy B, Rp1, Rw3, Pv2,

In this appendix I will present Strategy B. I will present the strategy, by condensing it into a number of Statements and I will give each Statement a code. All of authors arguments have not been included, I have made qualitative selections of the most important arguments. The Statements will generally be presented in order that author presents them, small modifications in the order have been made, for analytic clarity. Note that textual content called Rp1, Rw3 and Pv2 are integrated into authors presentation of strategy B. For analytic clarity, I have marked the Statements that that belongs to Rp1, Rw3, and Pv2.

- SB1: The process of establishing an Islamic State can be broken down into three stages:
  - The power of vexation and exhaustion
  - The administration of savagery
  - The power of establishment – establishing the State \(^{196}\)

SB2: Priority States will move through all of these stages. The remaining States will remain in the power of vexation and exhaustion, then the stage the power of establishment, will come through an outside intervention. \(^{197}\)

SB3: A number of regions should be picked out by jihadis, as priority regions. \(^{198}\)

SB4: Careful investigation in these regions should be made, in order to investigate if the people in these nations ready for a political transformation. After this selection Naji anticipates that about two or three countries, will be chosen as priority States, in each region. \(^{199}\)

SB5: Theoretical consideration when choosing priority States are: regime weakness, difficult geography, sympathetic population, jihadi activity and the distribution of weapons. \(^{200}\)

SB6: The power of vexation and exhaustion, involves exhausting the enemy by small or medium

\(^{196}\) Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 15  
\(^{197}\) Ibid  
\(^{198}\) Ibid  
\(^{199}\) Ibid  
\(^{200}\) Ibid 16
operations, spread of over a large territory and of attracting new recruits.201

SB7: Special focus should be placed upon specific regions, where the jihadists should try to drive out the regime. The groups should at the same time, prepare to take control over these regions.202

SB8: When the regime is dislodged from a region, the phase called the management of savagery begins. The jihadists should provide basic State-like functions, providing security, food and medical treatment. They should also spread faith.203

SB9: The jihadists should militarize society, in the regions they control.204 (Rp1)

[Here follow the passages called Strategy A Revisited]

SB10: The jihadists should focus on economic targets, especially petroleum.205 (Pv2)

SB11: These attacks will force the enemy regimes, to focus on protecting key economic targets, key governmental officials, foreigners and entertainment spots.206 (Pv2)

SB12 Unmotivated military forces will be left in the periphery, or in crowded areas.207 (Pv2)

SB13 The jihadists should attack the weak military forces in the periphery or in crowded areas. In this regions, chaos will spread.208 (Pv2)

SB14: If chaos breaks out in a region, and if a jihadi group moves in to a region to manage the savagery there, cells should be left outside this region as a deterrent.209 (Pv2)

SB15: The deterrent will frighten the enemy leader and it will make the enemy soldiers,

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201 Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 16f
202 Ibid 17
203 Ibid 17f
204 Ibid 18
205 Ibid 19
206 Ibid 19f
207 Ibid 20
208 Ibid
209 Ibid
contemplate the option of joining the mujahidin.\(^{210}\) (Pv2)

SB16: At this point the enemy may consider reconciliation with the jihadists. The enemy may back away from more regions, in order to protect the economy.\(^{211}\) (Pv2)

SB17: The enemy’s retreat will lead to more regions of savagery.\(^{212}\) (Pv2)

SB18: The jihadists will take control over the new regions of savagery, train and prepare for the next step.\(^{213}\)

SB19: In order to accomplish the plan, the jihadists need to develop a media strategy.\(^{214}\) (Rw3)

[Naji does not extrapolate on the any further steps in the plan, in topic two. Thus I will stop my presentation here]

\(^{210}\) Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 20f
\(^{211}\) Ibid 21f
\(^{212}\) Ibid 21
\(^{213}\) Ibid
\(^{214}\) Ibid
Appendix 3 - Strategy A Revisited, Rw2

In this appendix I will present the textual content called Strategy A Revisited. I will present the strategy, by condensing it in to a number of statements and I will give each statement a code. All of authors arguments have not been included, I have made qualitative selections of the most important argument. These statements are presented in the order that the author presents them. Note that the textual content called Rw2, is integrated in to the authors presentation of Strategy A Revisited. For analytic clarity, I have marked what statements belongs to Rw2.

SAR1: Strikes against the USA, culminating with the attack on the twin towers, has led to a decline in the prestige of the USA.\textsuperscript{215}

SAR2: The USA can answer to these attacks by expanding the conflict, or by a limited war.\textsuperscript{216}

SAR3: The USA may have caused the downfall of the Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{217}

SAR4: The USA had already planned to dispose of Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{218} [It seems like author is referring to the idea, that the US had planned to dispose of Taliban regime, before the attacks on the twin towers.]

SAR5: The Taliban regime could have collapsed, even if the Americans had not intervened.\textsuperscript{219}

SAR6: The jihadi current will expand in to tens of thousands of groups, like the one that caused the attack in September.\textsuperscript{220}

SAR7: The USA was lured in to a trap when it invaded Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{221}

SAR8: The failure of the Americans to reach all of their military goals in Afghanistan, will in one or two or more years, convince the masses and some inside enemy army's, that resistance against

\textsuperscript{215} Naji, Abu Bakr op cit 18
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid
the USA is possible.\textsuperscript{222} (Rw2)

SAR9: America should be lured in a war against the masses of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{223} (Rw2)

SAR10: This will create many jihadists in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{224} (Rw2)

SAR11: The USA will be economically drained by the war.\textsuperscript{225}

SAR12: The long distance between America and Afghanistan will strain the USA ability to project power in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{226}

SAR13: Terror attacks should be conducted against the USA, particularly in the Muslims world. This will force the USA to spend more on security, draining its economy.\textsuperscript{227}

[Here Naji continues with the rest of Strategy B]