Whom it May Concern

– A Case Study of Local Participation in Community-Based Nature Resource Management of the Mangrove Forest on Zanzibar

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Abstract

Local participation, especially in managing systems of socio-natural resources, has been promoted as the answer to the puzzle about sustainable development. Community-Based Nature Resource Management (CBNRM) is an approach that has generally praised as the way to support genuine participation of ‘local people’ and empower them through the process. This paper examines how local participation in conservation projects works in practice. To do this literature around the rise of people-centred conservation models and participation are reviewed. This information is then used to consider a CBNRM case study in Pete, Zanzibar to reveal actions that promote or constrain local participation. The conclusions of this paper suggest that without a secure means of delegated power or the ability to influence meaningful decisions it is unlikely that a community will mobilize itself for the sake of common resources. In Pete, the conditions around the establishment and operation of the CBNRM have not facilitated effective local participation, which has resulted in widespread frustration and uncertainty amongst the community.
Acknowledgements

Asante!


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Acronyms

CPR– Common Pool Resource
CBNRM – Community-Based Nature Resource Management
IMF – International Monetary Found
JECA – Jozani Environnemental Conservation Association
FAO–Food and Agricultural Organization
WB–World Bank
IIED–International Institute for Environment and Development
SWOT–Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
PRA – Participating Rural Appraisal
RUMBA – Resource User Management Agreement
Sida – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN – United Nations
VCC – Village Conservation Committee
ZPRP – Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
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Introduction

Billions of dollars have been put into different kinds of environmental conservation programs and strategic development systems, not least in form of aid to the developing world, but despite scientific support and political good-will many projects are failing.

Encouraged by the message of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, initiatives have been taken by government and donors to experiment with participatory processes, giving local actors responsibilities and decision power in natural resource management. Those experiences have indicated that local democracy can be the basis of efficient and effective environmental decision-making. Communities have, or can at least develop the skill and desire to execute good management of their local natural resources in a way that promotes positive ecological and social effects.¹ However, increasingly clear evidence is pointing towards the lack of connection to the civil society as the reason for failure amongst many of these nature conservation programs.

Study objectives

Study Problem
Community-Based Nature Resource Management (CBNRM) is a global method, which, in rhetoric at least, emphasises the participation of ‘local people’ and their empowerment through the development process. These aspirations of ‘genuinely’ involving local people in CBNRM are widely supported, however, CBNRM has also received criticism for being driven by top down concerns with little regard given to community heterogeneity and related diverse aspirations in practice. By use of a case study approach this project aims to examine CBNRM in practice to ascertain whether the rhetoric matches the reality.

Study objectives
The object of this study is to focus on CBNRM as a vehicle to better understand empirically how local participation in conservation projects works in practice. Particular attention will be placed on understanding forces and actions that promote or constrain local participation, both in the literature reviewed and at a case study site in Pete, Zanzibar.

¹ Ribot, 2002.
Key Questions

- What factors does the literature around CBNRM and participation suggest are important to support local participation in policy interventions such as CBNRM?
- What are the participative goals in the Pete project?
- Who has participated in and shaped the Pete CBNRM project?
- What conditions, strategies and actions have constrained or facilitated local participation in CBNRM at Pete?
- How has the level and quality of participation affected the CBNRM project?

Background:

From conservation to sustainable development

The idea of a human responsibility to promote conservation was born in the industrial metropolis of the world in the 19th century and has developed into a variety of ideologies about humankind’s relationships to the environment. Rather prominent early on in the western world’s crusade for conservation was the mega fauna of Africa, which offered exotica for European and North American hunters. An example of this is the game parks, where Africans were completely denied access to customary land for such activities as hunting since only the white man held the knowledge of hunting responsibly. In this scenario the black man was deemed a poacher, who threatened the hunting and scientific qualities of ‘wild’ Africa.\(^2\)

The exclusion of locals from sensitive or valuable habitats has been consistent during the entire history of conservation of natural values. The side effects of this top-down, centralist approach of strict protection for wildlife management became an uncomfortable fact during the 1980s ecological crisis in Africa. The wild life parks alienated the local inhabitants from their traditional means of livelihood and forced a constantly increasing population to rely on a rapidly decreasing resource base. The emergent conflicts between locals and government authorities eventually compelled greater consideration of local rights such as the World Conservation Strategy, which emphasised the importance of linking reserved areas with income generating demands of local communities.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Ribot, 2002..
\(^3\) IIED, 1994.
Sustainable development is today the most mainstreamed concept linking environmental responsibility with development of the human society.\(^4\) The most commonly cited definition of sustainable development is the one in the UN Brundtland report *Our Common Future* (1987);

> “Sustainable development meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”\(^5\)

Wildlife and nature conservation has been the most deep-seated root of sustainable development and one of the main means of promoting it as a concept\(^6\).

**People are also a resource**

A new chapter in the history book of conservation began in 1992 at the United Nation Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. At this conference it was generally accepted that environmental degradation and biodiversity loss went hand in hand with poverty and that the two of them should be jointly tackled. The link between basic human needs and natural resources became even clearer around the bargaining table at time of the negotiations of United Nations Millennium goals and the bold pledge to halve world poverty by the year of 2015.\(^7\)

The Government of Zanzibar also recognised this connection when they committed themselves to the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP) in January 2002. This plan is a first step in an attempt to reach the Plan of Zanzibar Development Vision 2020, of eradicating absolute poverty in the society. The following excerpt is from the introduction text to ZPRP:

> “In reality, poverty eradication should be synonymous to increasing access to employment opportunities, essential services and income generating activities and providing social safety nets for the most vulnerable. This entitles empowering and creating opportunities for the people, increasing production and household income; improving living conditions through better access to

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\(^5\) United Nations. 1987


\(^7\) W. Adams *et al.* 2000
Empowerment of the people has become a goal as well as a means for Zanzibar’s strategy to reduce poverty. By addressing community-based projects, education and capacity building as three of their five top priorities (health services and agriculture productivity and better use of nature resources are the other two) the Government has formally embarked on the “decentralisation train”.

Driven by different motivations, development interventions, especially throughout the poorer parts of the world, have put an enormous focus on decentralised, participatory models of community management of resources. Almost all developing countries are currently undertaking reforms towards decentralization. Particularly in the context of natural resource management, formal delegation of power to decentralised institutions of various kinds has been extensive. The World Bank, UN and most donors encourage decentralization as a way to achieve efficiency, equity and democracy.

Involving locals in natural resource management is specifically important in the East African coastal region since the inhabitants’ daily life is to a large extent embedded in the use of natural resources. It is reasonable to suppose that people are most likely to recognize negative environmental effects in their local area where there is a heavy reliance on local resources for sustaining livelihoods. However, without the opportunity to influence their own situation, people lack the capacity to deal with the environmental problems affecting them.

**Site of study: Zanzibar**

Zanzibar is an archipelago in the Indian Ocean of the African East Coast, just south of the equator, outside the mainland of Tanzania. It consists of 16 islands in total, with the main islands being Unguja (1464 sq. km) and Pemba (868 sq. km). The two islands are home for

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8 Ministry of finance and economic affairs, Zanzibar. 2002
9 ZDRP-PTF, 2002
10 Ribot, 2002.
11 Mohammed and Jonstone, 2002
12 Beier and Jakobsson, red 2007.
13 Chachage, 2000
almost the whole population of total 1,070,000 inhabitants\textsuperscript{14}. In 2000, 58.6 percent of the population lived on Unguja and 41.4 percent on Pemba. Pemba has the highest population density average of 270.4 per sq. km compared to Unguja's 256.5.\textsuperscript{15}

The topography of the two islands differs. While Unguja is mainly flat, Pemba has an undulating hilly terrain. Big parts of both islands are coral rag, with poor soil, bush and grass cover. The parts of the islands, which in the past were covered in densely forest, today mainly consist of clove plantations. Historically spices have been one of the dominant export products of Zanzibar.\textsuperscript{16} Raffia fibre production and tourism are the other two main industries.\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout history Zanzibar has had a mix of different rulers, which today can still be seen in the cultural and ethnic diversity of the population. Zanzibar became independent from the British 1964. The same year Zanzibar became an autonomous part of Tanzania, through a union between Zanzibar and the mainland Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{18}

Zanzibar is a country deeply divided by ethno-political differences. The two dominant political parties represent these divisions, where the opposition party represent a minority of the population.

\begin{map}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Zanzibar_and_Pemba_Islands}
\caption{Zanzibar and Pemba Islands (Political) 1977}
\end{map}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] www.wikipedia.org
\item[15] Chachage, 2000
\item[16] Ibid.
\item[17] www.wikipedia.org
\item[18] www.landguiden.se
\end{footnotes}
Support for the two parties is fairly evenly divided amongst the population with the stronghold for the opposition party being in Pemba. Particularly, during elections the tension between the two parties and their supporters often flares into violence and affects the day-to-day business. Despite the lack of democratic tradition in the political system in general, the Government of Zanzibar since the mid 1990s, has supported local participatory approaches in an effort to create more efficient and effective management of domestic forest and fishing resources. To increase the democratic process the Government has initiated an ambitious attempt of decentralization and power-sharing.19

**Pete**

Pete is a small village located in a rural area in the southern region of Unguja, 24 km southeast of Stone Town.

![Map 2](image)

*Map 2. Participatory map of Pete village and nearby surrounding*

The village of Pete is the central point of Pete-Jozani Shehia. Shehia is the smallest administrative union in Zanzibar and its local administration leader the Sheha is appointed by

19 ESAURP publication, 2004
the government. The *Shehia* of Pete-Jozani has 1,435 inhabitants according to the local census undertaken in March 2008. The dependence of nature resources is high. The *Shehia* is covered by seven different kinds of habitat, from terrestrial forest to grassland. Out of the approximately 1,250 ha land, 360 ha is mangroves.

Previous studies have concluded that the ‘social and ecological resilience’ of the mangrove forest of Pete has been reduced heavily because of overexploitation.\(^\text{20}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>514</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (u18)</td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAIN TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1435</strong></td>
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*Table 1: Population in Pete, 2008*

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\(^{20}\) Othman, 2005
Theoretical and analytical insights

CBNRM has been defined as: “a process by which groups or communities organise themselves with varying degrees of outside support so as apply their skills and knowledge to the care of natural resources and environment while satisfying livelihood needs”.21

UN’s remarkable agreement on poverty reduction has shed light on the need for biodiversity conservation strategies and local empowerment. CBNRM has been seen as the answer to those combined issues.22

To a large extent, rural people in the third world have been governed as subjects rather than empowered as citizens. From this perspective, rights, representation and recourse in local matters are required to enfranchise rural people as citizens. An effective decentralization is defined as, “an inclusive local process under local authorities empowered with discretionary decisions over resources that are relevant to local people”23. CBNRM creates a process whereby responsibilities and decision-making powers are delegated by government to local actors usually via the establishment of community-based organisations. Public participation seems to be the primary reason why CBNRM24 has been effective in many cases.

The theoretical discussion has grown in tempo and direction about how and indeed if humankind can collectively care for natural resources. At the end of the 1960s Garrett Hardin presented his theory Tragedy of the Commons, where he declared that property without an owner, or the so-called commons, is doomed to be overexploited by everyone25. Hardin’s view has been challenged by a number of field studies where the metaphor of a tragedy has been replaced by an urgent need of local commitment26. Elinor Ostrom shows how outstanding successful local communities can come together and care for its resources in “Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action”. She argues with Hardin’s critical point of free-riders and the rational-choice creating the prisoners

22 Adams et al. 2004
23 Ribot, 2002.
24 Ibid.
26 F. Saunders et al.
dilemma, saying that a community-driven approach can overcome the narrow thinking of the individual and benefit the community both in singular and plural.

Ostrom asserts that the following institutional design principles refined to suit local conditions will facilitate a successful common pool resource management: clearly defined boundaries of resource and society, congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local condition, collective-choice arrangement, monitoring, graduated sanction, conflict resolution mechanisms, and minimal recognition of rights to organise their own institution without being challenged by external authorities.27 These principles when taken together emphasise the importance of participation in all aspects of environmental governance and have been very influential in CBNRM practice.

But even if political policies encourage involvement from the public and CPR (Common Pool Resource) theory has been adopted as a conceptual framework of the World Bank and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) in pursuit of this goal, it is not certain that ordinary people will commit themselves to this work. And if they do, the influence of local people in institutional arrangements is not an instant guarantee of success.

Andrew Jamison stresses the need of openness for public discussions and participation to overcome the growing barrier between society and nature. He has analysed environmental movements and institutions facilitating good management and cooperation developing five characteristics that resemble the most genuine examples of public participation: 1. Intermediary context and public space – a proper authority for discussion. 2. Communication channels and translation into manageable information. 3. Support by the establishment. 4. Links between valuable contacts and institutional anchoring. 5. Critical intellectuals addressing a broader academic perspective.28

An important, but often vague point in CBNRM and policymaking is the target group. Who is supposed to be participating and empowered by the process? Often a faceless “community” is referred to.29

27 Ostrom, 1990
28 Jamison, 2003
29 Bruns, 2003
The Swedish national encyclopaedia describes a community or society as a unit of people living together in an organised form. In the literature about public participation the community is considered more of an identity than the location of your house. People are expected to develop bonds of commitment to each other, which makes the wholeness of the community bigger than the individual pieces. Therefore it has been argued that the community becomes the link between social goods and own well-being. The strength of community has been given a central position in the discussion of CBNRM and participation. Spokespersons of community-driven development argue, “Communities know their problems and how to solve them better than any outsider can.”

The aim of participatory approaches in wildlife and conservation in general has been to involve people and the community in the process of protection and wise resource use. However the practical meaning of “participation” clearly has become a topic of discussion.

**Levels of participation**

Cernea, quoted by IIED (International institute for Environment and Development) in “Whose Eden?” describes local participation as:

> [...] Empowering people to mobilize their own capabilities, be social actors, rather than passive subjects, manage the resources, make decisions, and control the affect their lives.

Local participation has been interpreted in management processes in many different ways and in most cases this ambitious vision is far from reality. While discussing levels of participation the literature often uses terminology and value judgments expressing high levels of participation as a desirable goal. Participation almost seems to have an intrinsic value, but in those cases where the benefits of participation are motivated, local involvement is said to

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30 Nationalencyklopedin
31 De-shalit, 2000
32 NGO Resource Center, 2006
33 IIED, 1994
34 Ibid. 1994
35 Ibid.
36 Bruns, 2003
create a more committed and equal process likely to result in a more sustainable outcome\textsuperscript{37}. A low level of participation is seen as a result of the governments attempt to manipulate and restrict the locals\textsuperscript{38} or resistance on any level in the hierarchy to transferring appropriate and sufficient power\textsuperscript{39}. Without secure means of transferred decision-rights local authorities find themselves trapped in situations where they become subjects of higher authorities, since they only have been delegated power and can easily lose the insecure privileges given to them\textsuperscript{40}. The main reason for local people to engage themselves as citizens is to influence in topics of high relevance and importance to them.\textsuperscript{41}

The government of Zanzibar, as well as most governments around the globe has incorporated the principals of good governance, such as transparency, accountability, decentralization and participation in their policies. Making the policies more than just lovely words is a significant challenge to continuing the project of development. Decision-making is a complex process involving various institutions and concerns usually encompassing a wide variety of stakeholders and views. Even though it is important to distinguish how different categories of stakeholders are included or excluded it can be useful to summarize an overall level of participation. The following ladder of participation is, of course, a simplified scale leaving out a number of divisions. But still it is an applicable tool to reflect on meaningful and measurable differences, which considers power-sharing in the process.\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{37} Ribot, 2002
\textsuperscript{38} Bruns, 2003
\textsuperscript{39} Ribot, 2002
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., NGO Resource Center, 2006
\textsuperscript{42} Burns, 2003
\end{flushright}
A zero step of participation may be a result of analysis and decisions completely determined by bureaucracy and experts. In such non-participatory government manipulated, little or no

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43 Burns, 2003
information is shared with the public. A first move towards participation is to provide advanced notice of supposedly made decision, which will affect the situation of the target group (1. *Inform*). In a non-participatory government information would only be announced after decisions have been made. In the information step of the scale there is one-way communication from the government to the public. The locals’ role shifts towards consulting power (2. *Consult*) if there is a two-way flow in the communication and they are invited to comment on proposals. Inputs are mostly collected by government agencies through public hearings and open meetings, but written comments can be welcome and interviews with local leaders may be held. Beyond receiving comments and complaints there are several of methods of promoting an interactive discussion providing inputs to the decision-making process (3. *Involve*). Though those methods seek to incorporate participation without the government giving up any of their control of the final decision. This step of involvement runs a major risk of backfiring since it gives the promise of participation having more substantive impact than it actually has.44

In a collaborating level of participatory a main difference is that concerned parties have the right to have representatives on “a seat at the table”. The ability to take part in analyzing information, formulating alternative and ranking preferred solutions opens up for the possibility of a more problem solving effort (4. *Collaborate*). In this approach the decision-making power is still with the agency. However the difference between involvement and collaboration may tend to be marginal, the potential influence being offered and the change required in the agency’s procedures are significantly larger. A critical point with both approaches is the issue of inclusion. What may be done to strengthen the capacity of the participants?45 Who is involved and who is left out? Accountable local institutions with chosen representatives are seen as the key for equity, justice and efficiency strengthening the democratic system. Absence of bodies overseeing the election of representatives risks resulting in a situation with opposite effect. Pluralism without organized representation tends to favours already powerful groups and elite capture.46 Collaboration require clear and strong

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45 Ibid.
46 Ribot, 2002.
mandate for the collaborative group, but in most cases one party on a higher level makes the formal decision in the bureaucratic hierarchy.47

Partnership is the first step into a position where power is fully shared. An important shift towards empowerment has dismissed the ability for the ruling party to unilaterally impose its choice. This does not mean that the situation is fully equal, but gives each side the genuine option to not agree, i.e. both sides have veto (5. partner). In some discussions partnership is presented as the optimal option for a balanced relationship between parties cooperating in a joint effort towards consensus. Potentially benefiting the entire society with better information, creativity, commitment and inclusiveness. However it is also the most time and effort consuming approach, especially if the inherent asymmetry of power, information, and expertise when one part is a governmental agency is enlightened.48

When delegating authority to a local body, such as a committee, the government agrees to accept whatever solution the group chooses. In cases where the government still have the formal ownership total agreement to details of management is not required but delegated to the considerable authority (6. Delegate authority). Representatives of the government can be part of the delegated body if the local authorities have the possibility to outvote him or her. If the representative would have veto power and unanimity is required the institution is categorised as a partnership. If the group can only give recommendations the situation would be one of collaboration rather than delegation. When the government enforces general regulations but part from that have no involvement in specific management decisions the situation can be seen as a self-governance with regulated autonomy (7. Establish Autonomy). Government can offer assistance, for example economic and technical support. To remain in a state of autonomy detailed restrictions or substantial negotiations and specific approvals before decision can be implemented, is not accepted.49

The next level of power transforming involves specific extension advice or customized technical assistance; which supports decisions made by citizens and their organisations without there being legal requirements to comply for such assistance (8. Advise). The

47 Burns, 2003
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
assistance can involve statistic information collected by the government available for public use.\textsuperscript{50}

The last level in this ladder of participation the government has no regulatory or advisory role but still their authority can be needed in providing a legal contextual framework to resolve conflicts (9.\textit{Enable}). The government can also enable organisation by giving them legal status (a longer ladder could include a stage of complete self-government or self-management). Ostrom’s framework and Jamison’s principals (see above) point out that recognition of local management can play a significant role in its ability to use resources sustainably. If policies do not recognize local agreements, treat them as illegal or revoke their legitimacy this is likely to block further development or get in the way of effective and enduring collective action.

\textbf{Methodology}

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) has been chosen as the research methodology. Since the social reality of any community-based system is created by the actors involved in the system\textsuperscript{51} and also since the main focus of this study is to reveal locals’ possibility to participate in the system, it is necessary to approach the study from the locals’ perspective. PRA will be complemented with studies of literature and articles. The literature has been searched through the database at the Nordic African Institute and the National Library database, Libris. The articles have been located with the web tools of Google scholar and Artikelsök. Keyword: public participation, CBNRM in an African context, democracy/decentralisation, Mangrove forest and Zanzibar.

\textbf{Participatory Rural Appraisal}

Participatory rural appraisal is an array of approaches and methods combining reflective participation and research to empower marginalised people and includes local knowledge in the process. The central figure of this approach, Robert Chambers argues that most errors in development issues are caused by domination and misleading by those with formal power. Experience with PRA previously neglected groups of locals in urban and rural areas have

\textsuperscript{50} Burns, 2003
\textsuperscript{51} Saunders \textit{et al.}
shown that the capacity to express and analyse their complex reality in circumstances where top-down expert driven and dominated processes often fail. I am aware that I cannot change my situated position as a researcher, but I can adopt an approach that allows the subjects involved in this research project to have a voice that expresses their view of their situation.

In the preface of his book “Whose reality counts?” Robert Chambers encourages people in power situations to experience, listen, learn and share, to be self-critical and willing to change. To realise that there is no permanent reality or final truth, but to always search since there is more meaning to be found in exploring the reality of others and share better ways of learning with them. In this view it has been important for the researcher to critically reflect on its concept, values, behaviour and methods.

There is an inherent difficulty with PRA and participatory discourses as they relate to the concept of a project. By definition, a project has frames and limits. The structural factors shape the project and create a limitation on the participants’ possibility of influence. In the same way a project given by a donor or a government have difficulties to create reliable participation, data-collection undertaken for a C level thesis bound by pragmatic limits and my aspirations. PRA can only be seen as a toolbox of inspiration and not a fully incorporated method since the aim of the research, the theme of questions as well as the final decision-making power in the analysis will be held by the researcher.

**Transect walk and participatory mapping**

To overcome the ”roadside bias”, a transect walk from one side of the village to the other, was undertaken. The primary purpose of the walk was to get an understanding of the surroundings, identify the location of the major problems and opportunities, as well as introducing the researcher to the villagers. The walk was complemented with a participatory map. A group of four locals created a sketch over the village and its surrounding resource (see page 9). Like the transect walk the purpose was mostly to familiarise the locals and the researchers to each others, but the mapping exercise also partially revealed the cooperative patterns and group dynamics in the village.

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52 Chambers, 1997  
53 Ibid.  
54 Cleaver, 1999  
55 McCracken et al, 1988
Problem ranking

Groups of four to five individuals identified problems and opportunities related to the mangrove forest and the conservation management system through discussion. After brainstorming an unlimited number of factors, these were ranked in order of importance.

Semi-structured interviews

Four main themes have been target of discussion during the semi-structured interviews. Every theme has a number of open-ended questions, which were followed up to elicit more information. Before translation the intentions of the themes and questions were carefully explained and discussed with participants. Thorough research planning discussions between the researcher and the field assistant/translator were been crucial for the collection of data using this method (and all other methods). The four themes that were pursued during the fieldwork, that comprise the scope of the themes covered in the interviews, are described below:

Social status and capacity

The objective of this theme was to judge the individual advantage a person feels they have in terms of substantive freedom to develop and enjoy his or her own life in the way he or she finds valuable, as well as covering the self perception of their own status and social function in the society. The rationale behind this theme is that people without the opportunity to influence their own situation will also lack the capacity to deal with the environmental problems affecting them.

The questions about status are quite straightforward. Critique could be raised that the informants might have a difficult time to answer those questions truly and that, to get a better understanding of their connection with and status in the community more indirect questions should been asked. The purpose of the section about social status is not to rank people’s position in the village in relationship to each other, but to be able to get an understanding of the self-confidence and image of the person themselves.

Mangrove forest

The objective of this theme was to clarify the individual’s attitude towards this natural resource in and what kind of needs it fulfils, or have fulfilled in the past for them. That is, an
indication of its cultural and economic importance. This part commenced with a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis, which is an effective and efficient tool to cover multiple aspects of the advantages and disadvantages of their relation to the mangroves by clarifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

CBNRM
This theme focussed on collecting information about the management processes and to give insights into the actor's awareness, access, ability and interest to participate in it. This theme also started with a SWOT analysis. Ostrom’s institutional design principles for enduring institutions have been used as loose guidelines for the questions (see page 12).

Decentralisation and power sharing
The theme lifted the discussion to a more explicit political level concerning the ability of actors to participate in the institutions of Pete village. During this stage of the interviews it was interesting to review the general experience and attitude towards participatory methods and community-based decision making with the view that success of nature resource management is closely linked to the habit and use of power sharing more generally.

Sampling
A number of empirical works, not least done by post-colonial feminists, highlight the way gender, wealth, social class, age and other social differences have divided the so-called “community” boundaries. These works emphasize that conflicted values, more often than shared belief, shape the social life.56 With this in mind it is important to cover a broad variety of people in deep-interviews and group sessions. Not only the obvious - sex, age and social standard in the village but also the actors’ different economic and subsistence activities related to the mangrove forest itself.

Pete shehia have a system of power sharing based on target groups. The same groups have been used in this research to identify stakeholders and categorise the different informants required.

56 Leach et al., 1999.
In total 24 semi-structured single interviews have been made in twelve different categories of livelihood. Five of the informants were members of the Village Conservation Council, in trustee of conservation and therefore got specific questions about this work instead of the CBNRM standard theme. One of the informants represented Pete in the umbrella organisation Jozani Environmental Conservation Association (JECA).

Male: 16
Female: 8

Age
18-25: 5
16-30: 4
31-35: 3
36-40: 4
41-45: 5
70+: 3

The categories in order most to least represented among the informants: farmers, butterfly farmers or butterfly eco tourism employees, teachers, firewood cutters, charcoal makers, soccer players, fishermen, religious leaders, sea weed farmers, bee keepers, midwives and a handicraft cooperative.

Within the constraints of this project I have endeavoured to obtain a representative sample for the population in Pete, though more carefully made sampling approaches could be argued for. My most preferable sampling method would have been informed by a wealth ranking. In this process consultation with key local actors would systematically identify groups and individuals who are deemed to be less powerful (and by reference more powerful) in the village. A wealth ranking also gives a good understanding of what “wealth” and “power” is considered to be in this specific society. However, a wealth ranking is very time-consuming and also demands a complete list of inhabitants in the village. This has been hard to achieve in this case. In strict random sampling, which is the most common conventional sampling method it is also essential to have a complete list of all the members of the population. In this case a snowball sampling method of informant contacts has been used. The ability of the informant to allocate 1-2 hours during daytime also affected the interviews. It is possible that the political sympathies and geographical origin of the fieldwork assistant/translator have also affected my ability to reach some groups of people in the very politically segregated country of Zanzibar.
Except for the regular interviews with locals in Pete a group discussion about compensation and alternative income has been held on a “saving and credit”-meeting. One interview have been made with an organizer of eco-tourist tours to Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park, a previous researcher on mangrove and management in Pete and I have had discussions with the Department of Forestry officers working in the area.

The information presented in the empirical data section was obtained through interviews with Pete villagers. Although I had discussions with officials from the Department of Forestry they indicated that they did not want their views represented in this study. The description of events offered below was developed through triangulation of the version of events from differently situated actors within the village. I have endeavoured as far as possible to give credence to particular events that have been verified from multiple standpoints. Where I reflect on a point, perspective or event I make it clear that these are my thoughts so my musings are not confused with the version of events presented by the actors involved.

Data Presentation: The process from Alpha to Omega, where P stands for Participation.

Historically, harvesting wood from the Pete-Jozani and the Mangrove forest is the oldest and most important income generating resource of Pete village. The dependency on the forest has been inherited from generation to generation and still, after ten years without access to the forest because of nature reserve, the inhabitants see themselves primarily as woodcutters and part-time farmers.

The mangrove forest at Pete has in recent times become governmental property and protected from harvest by the law. Illegal cutting has occurred, but the forest remoteness from the village and inconvenience of working in this uncomfortably wet environment compared to the dry and adjacent Jozani forest has until recently left the mangroves relatively undisturbed, although it has always been used to source material for local construction. Locals also use the mangrove forest resources to produce charcoal, firewood, fish, seafood and medicine. Mangrove is also important in supplying a number of ecosystem and environmental services
such as nursery for marine animals, offering protection from storms, flood, erosion seawater intrusion, absorbing pollution as well as providing fresh water.

In the beginning of the 1980s the government of Zanzibar became worried about the effects of the deforestation of the terrestrial forest Pete-Jozani and the natural habitat for the endemic red colobus monkey (*Piliocolobus kirkii*). In 1987 Jozani Forest was declared a protected habitat area as a part of the fifty-square kilometre Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. The Park covered essential parts of the village’s former wood harvest and farming area, which are now no longer available for these uses. There was no consultation with the communities during the planning for the Park. Paradoxically, in their eagerness to protect the monkeys’ native habitat, the government dispossessed the local people of their customary economic base.

The information was given to the villagers during an open community meeting with representatives from the Department of Forestry. During interviews it becomes clear that the locals responded to the restrictions with shock and anger. An animated village discussion followed and the protest eventually made the Department of Forestry agree to allow continued access to these historically used areas that now formed part of the Park, for collection of dried branches and dead logs for firewood. Unfortunately the truce between the Department of Forestry and the villagers did not last long: In order to attract tourists to the National Park red colobus monkeys were collected and translocated from other parts of Zanzibar. Informants explain that this created even more frustration and disapproval among the villagers since the red colobus monkeys are seen as “an indecent crop thief” and “a plague”. The villagers considered the compensation given for damage and loss of property caused by the increase in monkey population inadequate. The compensation was also hardly restricted to the group of direct landowners. Tension between the villagers and the Department of Forestry increased as it became harder for the villagers to support themselves as their economic opportunities dwindled. A couple of months after the meeting with the Department of Forestry illegal cutting incidents in the Park compounded the already fragile relationship between the Department of Forestry and the village. Whether the cutting should be interpreted as a protest or an act of desperation it is not clear, but the Department of Forestry answered with increased security and restricted the collection time and area.
In an attempt to increase the awareness of conservation goals and improve the relationship with the villages around the National Park the Department of Forestry, with help from the NGO, CARE international, initiated the idea of Village Conservation Committees (VCC) in 1995. VCCs were established in several villages around the periphery of the Park – in effect the Park’s buffer zone. The duties of the VCCs were to maintain and fulfil the agreements made with the government in the Resource Use Management Agreement (RUMBA), enforce the security of the protected area, encourage tree planting and support the local people in finding viable alternative income-generating activities. Every village created their own RUMBA and a plan aimed at maintaining sustainable use of the mangrove and terrestrial forest. On initiative from the government the eight villages bordering the National Park also formed an umbrella organisation (JECA) to support their participation in the management national park; a small percent of the area also includes mangrove and sump forest.

The idea of establishing VCCs was conceived in an open meeting between the village and the Department of Forestry. No one really objected to the suggestion since it was a proposal of Government and seen as a “polite order”. People were asked to volunteer for positions, despite the enclosure of their commons in the Park, a number of people with positive attitudes towards ‘environmental issues’ aid. Given that the number of volunteers was not adequate the Sheha undertook the responsibility to identify villagers to fill the remaining places. It was a bit difficult to fill all the 32 places since people were hesitant to get involved in such VCC duties as enforcement and monitoring. The average age in the committee was advanced since it was mostly older people trusted with positions. Younger people were categorised as “clever heads”, boasting about their brilliancy but not committing to any work. Age is still considered an important factor in the level of respect and trust a person is given in the community.

Pete villagers were badly affected by the National Park and organized a campaign in the national media to protest against the government’s action. To solve the situation the VCC suggested to the Government that Pete are to (with responsibility delegated to VCC) be given management responsibility and harvest access to the nearby mangrove forest. In accordance with the politic of the ZPRP, the government agreed to create a community-based management system of the Pete mangrove forest.
After the introduction of the National Park the production of charcoal, which was previously undertaken in the dry land coral rag forest (now part of the Park) shifted illegally to the mangrove forest. Mangrove wood makes high quality charcoal in high demand at premium prices, so unsurprisingly production rose rapidly. Pete had a reputation for producing high quality charcoal and as a consequence had customers coming all the way from Stone town. The business blossomed and the village production expanded at the same speed as the demand, and according to the villagers spoken to this resulted in significant cutting of the mangrove forest. At the same time that the Government agreed to formally establish a local management institution, the Pete coal business reached its climax. Locals recollect in interviews that they remembered that in the year of 2000 the sound of machetes chopping the red stem of mangrove trees could be heard all day long. This massive harvesting rate would in just a few years have significant effects on the structure and quality of the mangrove forest.

Informants in the village explained that in 2002 government decided to increase the level of protection again, however without reclaiming the responsibility of the management from Pete. The boundaries and level of protection were decided in consultation with the VCC. A meeting was held between the Department of Forestry and the Pete villagers to discuss the villagers’ demand for continued access to the mangroves for charcoal production. In the interviews locals describe how several 'strong voices' spoke in favour of a free harvest but the opinions in the village were divided and the situation became a bit tense. Despite the divisions in the village over access conditions the general feeling amongst the villagers spoken to was that their ideas were not taken into consideration by the Department of Forestry. The new restrictions imposed by the Department of Forestry were communicated to Pete villagers via the radio. However, the formal restrictions hardly mattered, since the lack of mature trees suitable for charcoal meant that production on any meaningful scale had already ceased.

The information channel for disseminating Government decisions of this kind is usually the radio. Information about controversial decisions is generally announced this way, as are local efforts of resistance. Decisions of less magnitude are channelled through meetings organized by the VCC or by word spreading from house to house. There is no formalised structure for information sharing and the locals even today are unsure about how to raise opinions and deliver suggestions in local forums.
In the beginning the villagers were quite optimistic about the management system, despite its genesis through the enclosure of the forest resources that they previously used for charcoal production. A key VCC role was to engage Pete villagers in the goals of conservation of the National Park. The VCC task of mobilising villagers in support of conservation villagers was made easier by CARE funded compensation incentive packages. To enable the required roles to be performed Pete villagers attended meetings and were given training by the Department of Forestry. VCC organised tree planting events and inviting groups and school children from all over the island to join in the activity. From this position of relative engagement in the changes that had been imposed on them to establish the National Park, informants made the conclusion that at least two factors were changing the general attitude in Pete. First, the tension so prevalent in the two party political systems in Zanzibar affected relations in Pete. Political opinion as well as place of birth suddenly became a vital reason for compliance or resistance. Secondly, the people of Pete had not realised that the protection of the mangrove was such a long-term program. The villagers express a general opinion of mangrove forest being recovered into a sustainable level for charcoal production in no longer but fives years. But as the years have gone by the only change about the park is the government extending the protection area. Also, the lack of genuine structures for participation and lack of transparent economic management in Pete Board Walk created a situation of distrust and resentment.

Pete was the least developed village around Jozani and also the village most active in the demonstration against the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park. According to those interviewed, a businessman heard the debate on the radio and recognized their problem and was willing to respond to Pete’s need to generate alternative income. With the oversight of the Department of Forestry, he funded the establishment of the tourist attraction Pete Board Walk as a way of generating income that could be used to support the development of village infrastructure. The initial idea was that the ‘boardwalk tours’ would be undertaken by Pete villagers and managed through the VCC. However, the Department of Forestry became concerned about whether they had the ability and skills to operate such an eco-tourism attraction. This view was perhaps driven by a concern from the Department of Forestry that a low standard of tourism delivery would reflect on them and flow onto to negative publicity.

57 People born in Pemba are generally associated as being aligned to CUF.
for the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park. As a result the Department of Forestry took it upon themselves to administer and deliver the mangrove boardwalk tours.

The entrance fee to Pete Board Walk is included in the ticket to Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park. The tourists pay a $10 entrance fee and $2 goes to the Pete Board Walk project. The income from Pete Board walk was agreed to be shared among Pete, JECA, Uwemajo and the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park as follows; Pete 50%, JECA 25%, Uwemajo 15% and Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park 10%. In interview the previous chairman of Uwemajo explains that the this nongovernmental organization of local farmers, at the time newly established, felt unfairly treated by the agreement. Uwemajo started a process against JECA declaring their given right for a bigger share motivated by their great economic loss, caused by the enclosure of agricultural land within the National Park. Uwemajo managed to harness the support of the media in their struggle and eventually took JECA to court in an attempt to obtain a greater share of the boardwalk revenue. A new agreement was made and Pete’s share was reduced and Uwemajo’s share was increased. So from 2003, Pete was to get 40%, JECA 20%, Uwemajo 30% and the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park gets 10%. Neither Pete nor Uwemajo however were satisfied with the agreement and the villagers also felt steamrollered by the more powerful organisations in the process. The income from the boardwalk is directed to village infrastructure development, so the villagers feel they are not directly or personally (at a household level) benefiting, and as a result they are critical of the current arrangement. The villagers and farmers expressed the view that they want money in their pockets, not indirect benefit through infrastructure and facilities, such as a school and a mosque.

The income generated and allocated to the Pete Village from the Pete Board Walk is distributed through the Pete Village Development Committee. The amount of money received is related to the tourism season and the committee receives the revenue twice per year. The payment of the high season between July and December 2008 was in the order of 4,5 million Tanzanian shillings\(^{58}\). Doubts were expressed about the Pete Village Development Committee financial management is competency and villagers felt that it did not operate transparently. Different priorities in the village and in various Village Committees have resulted in quarrels between groups. A lot of rumours have been spread about misuse of trust and power within

\(^{58}\) 4.5 million Tanzanian shillings converts to 22,902.7 Swedish Krona
the VCC. Individual members of VCC have been strongly accused of embezzling funds but none of these allegations have been proved. Several villagers described that this kind of friction between villagers and the different committees of Pete was never significant before the introduction of Pete Board Walk and the attendant financial opportunities. Open village meetings with members from the various decision-making bodies have been held in those specific cases, but tensions around the expenditure still exist. This situation, as well as the disappointment with the percentage share of revenue from the boardwalks tours and the compensation for land loss from the government, has from the villagers’ point of view not yet been resolved. There is no specific strategy for how to deal with conflicts between different parties involved in and affected by the events related to the Department of Forestry is intervention at Pete. Conflicts and disagreements are expressed to usually be resolved through discussion between the disputing parties. Shehia have a central position in conflict management, but in the case of Pete conservation project he has “been advised to keep of the discussion” since the situation is too infected.

Told in unequivocal terms, people in Pete are tired of meetings. They do not consider attending meetings as part of a ‘decent’ day’s work. Furthermore, people rarely dare to express opinions at meetings and even if they do only a few selected opinions that arise are considered for further discussion by the VCC and even less information are communicated to government representatives. The VCC and Shehia have formal responsibility for forwarding ideas, complains and opinions from the people to government representatives. Since there is no formal system of communication it is hard for both members and non-members of the VCC to have a clear picture of how much information is actually forwarded in either direction, let alone any action that might result. As a result of perceived lack of action at the Pete village level the government through the Department of Forestry unilaterally changed some agreements and resumed responsibilities. A majority of the respondents spoken to suggested small group discussions or VCC representatives walking house to house to get a personal contact. People feel they need to be motivated and supported in their participation. A number of villagers expressed that they currently feel that they are not welcome to participate in VCC or Department of Forestry activities.

There is a lot of discouragement about initiatives, voluntary work and conservation in Pete. Illegal cutting and destruction of mangrove plantation have created a circle of apathy and
mistrust. A group of people have loudly exclaimed their disappointment with the leadership of VCC and asked them to step aside. Even though this protesting group never got its way it created a general negative atmosphere. The VCC has also had internal conflicts about transparency and power sharing. Many villagers are drawing the conclusion the VCC’s inability to stand as one has reduced the esteem that it once held. The VCC has put their work “on ice” for a while now. Since the end of 2007 the regular monthly village-meetings have been cancelled and the lack of information and action from the VCC has worsened the situation.

The general hope and belief is that this period of total conservation (no harvesting of wood) is just a “temporary measure” aimed to recover the former standard of the mangrove, or at least to a maturity that can support a continuing livelihood based on the forest.

A clear opinion that emerged during field-work in the Pete village was that “everyone”, or at least “everyone else”, cut mangrove regularly or in times of need, even members of VCC. Many fear that nothing will be able to keep people from illegal harvesting of mangrove wood if the economic situation of Pete becomes even more difficult. That is, personal needs exceed the common good. “People are crying while they are destroying” – their actions are driven by concerns of short-term survival. The villagers that I interviewed with conservation responsibilities felt personally threatened by people with economic interests to continuing harvesting wood for charcoal. People are busy pointing the finger at VCC, blaming them for leading the village into this miserable situation. There have been incidents with locals asking representatives of the VCC if they “can come and eat in your house, since you keep me from getting food of my own.”

One of the main issues with the system according to the villagers is lack of capacity and will to monitor and enforce infringements. VCC rarely punish anyone even though the offence might have been blatant. The reason given by villagers for this was that the perpetrators always have a kinship relation with a VCC member. The level of punishment is appropriate to the local conditions, but the locals spoken to criticize the lack of cases where it is utilized. Originally a number of guards from the village were employed to patrol the mangrove’s boundary. But the Department of Forestry was not satisfied with their work and fired everyone but two and in their stead employed their own guards. Since the general opinion in Pete is that the government took their source of economic income and left them with nothing,
the expectations from the villagers on the government to provide viable alternative incomes have been high. When the result instead became even fewer jobs, their disappointment was complete. Of the two remaining guards, one has been found guilty of taking a bribe from illegal woodcutters. He confessed and took the penalty, but surprisingly was able to retain his position as a guard.

The village by-law is a copy of the national mother law and has no specific local variety or adaptation. The sanction for committing an illegal harvest within the boundaries of the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park is 300,000 Tanzanian shillings (or 1,525 SEK) regardless of the type of infringement. Destruction in the mangrove forest has a graduated sanction system of two steps. The infringement incurs a 15,000 Tanzanian shilling fine (or 76 SEK) and confiscation and is monitored by the VCC with support of the Department of Forestry. If the convicted is caught again he or she will be handed over to the police.

The difference in opinion concerning the VCC in the village is striking. Some villagers say VCC is not serious and are “playing like children”; others think they are doing a hard job well. Having said this, a majority agree that the VCC is struggling to succeed with their work. Both locals and members of VCC expressed the difficulty that the VCC has to become fully respected and legitimate in Pete. People see the VCC members in their day-to-day lives and have difficulty in separating their individual status as community members from the responsibilities and duties attached to the role in the VCC.

Some people think it would be more efficient if the government took the full responsible of the management and sent forestry officers or members of the parliament to discuss directly with the locals, instead of using VCC and JECA as middlemen. Other say, that the government “has already failed with there management of the mangrove forest” and no longer have the political legitimacy to take the responsibility back. According to many disgruntled villagers, opportunities for more consistent and systematic participation and discussion through various forums would create a better management system and more satisfied and engaged inhabitants.
Analysis of Participation: Between theory and practice

The management system of the Pete mangrove forest runs parallel with the usual administrative system of the village. The boundaries between the stakeholders’ responsibilities are not entirely clear and local committees have an on-and-off relationship with each other. Challenging situations have arisen due to family relationships because the same people hold seats around a number of tables.
The dependency of the forest resources for economic survival and identity remains strong in the village even if legal access to the nature resource has been limited. The importance of the Jozani and mangrove forest makes it easy to assume that there is a high interest among local people of involvement in decision-making processes; instead a state of near-apathy or at least passiveness seems to have paralysed the inhabitants. There are several possible reasons for this, starting with the one-way communication from the government in the announcement-stage of the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. Spontaneous protests caused by the information forced the government into a level of consultation. Managing to create this narrow space of participation, the locals negotiated for some compensation and eventually

Figure 2. Administrative system of Pete village and conservation area
accepted the situation. By implanting the colobus monkey and changing restrictions of resource use, the government deviated from the agreement and further increased the uncertainty around the privileges given to the community. This would be the first action, followed by a number of others, to impoverish the process.

Motivated by the clear and very relevant goal of compensation, the village mobilized themselves against the proclaimed enemy - the government and its underling, the Department of Forestry. In general terms the community went from confused but upset, to organized and aggressive. Their demand of fair compensation for the lost land and income resources was responded to and resulted in a governmental initiative (in participation with a third party actor) to increase the structural opportunities for participation. An established local institution created the possibilities for the involvement of locals in the resource management system.

Initiated by the government the organisation of JECA was appointed to represent the locals in the management process. Even though the position at the “table” enabled a level of collaboration, the weak bonds to the inhabitants that are supposed to be represented complicated the situation. The community-based management system of Pete mangrove forest was basically a local initiative and the task of management was for a while delegated to the VCC. Since there is no history of heavy interaction with the mangrove forest in Pete it can be assumed that the lack of knowledge of this specific eco-system made the experts from the Department of Forestry influential. The general belief that it will take five years for the mangrove to gain original standard can be seen as a hint of information given by experts. This exact number of years was announced by the Department of Forestry in the introduction of another mangrove protection project in the village of Kisakasaka, but it had more to do with community aspirations than actual mangrove recovery rates. This lack of mangrove experience in the village, as well as an ineffectively functioning CBNRM created a situation, which resulted in a degraded mangrove forest, thereby prompting the Government to reassert a top-down control. The inhabitants of Pete once again found themselves disconnected from their source of income.

59 Fred Saunders, personal comment, 2008-05-16
Since there were no practical management issues left to deal with, the area of responsibility for the VCC shifted towards patrolling (around the National Park). Numerous incidents where the VCC failed to fulfil their liability and cases with bribed guards weakened the respect for the legal system amongst the community. Importantly the villagers have not elected the members of the VCC, this could be a reason why their local legitimacy is questioned. Contrastingly, the VCC’s representative role is fully recognized by the higher authority. Their relationship with JECA and the Department of Forestry is well established.

Even though the mobilized strength from the initial phase has died down, the issue of compensation and alternative income is still a ‘hot potato’. The villagers do not feel that the government (represented by the Department of Forestry, JECA or VCC) has taken its full responsibility in the situation, considering it “occupied their source of income, leaving them with nothing”. This has also led to the trouble of the Pete Board Walk project and the financial management of the proceeds from this project.

Both VCC and villagers are generally disappointed at the others part in the process. Participatory processes may seem to support involvement, by giving the appearance of participation, but may not actually have any substantial impact. Disappointment, anger and cynicism towards the labour (time) demanded in the name of “participation” are common reactions to these situations and can seen in the case of the Pete CBNRM project.

**Discussion**

Simplified, an effective decentralization or a community-based process could be defined as “an inclusive local process under local authorities empowered with discretionary decisions over resources that are relevant to the local population”\(^{60}\). Continuing to simplify: ‘Public participation’ requires a public who wants to participate. After a first glance at the situation in Pete it is tempting to write off the case as a result of lazy and ignorant people, unwilling to serve the common good. But that would be to simplify far too much.

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\(^{60}\) Ribot, 2002
A deeper investigation makes the situation more complex and reveals circumstances that might explain the people’s lack of interest. The population of Pete could be, as suggested by a number of informants too ‘immature’ to qualify for a CBNRM initiative. Though, advocates for a participatory approach in development deny this as a possibility, claiming all communities’ suitability for responsibilities in management system. Whether this statement is correct or not, a number of factors need to be fulfilled for communities to be able to mobilize themselves.

The key element of community mobilization is to create a network of support, sensitization and increased awareness about the issue, as well as to mobilize resources, such as money, time, information, expertise etc needed to achieve the objectives. A successful community mobilization should have committed and motivated community members. The aim of the issue needs to be relevant in order for the members to put their mind and energy, into it and the result needs to be sustainable, to benefit the community for a longer period than just during the activity.

However, it can be questioned if community mobilization is enough. In participatory approaches of development projects the communities are described with the given security of a nature law, and in the concept of participation simply structured into an organisation. Cleaver writes ironically about the heroic claims of communities’ possession to reach anything if just mobilised. In Pete there is no mechanic, no tailor, no local restaurant or place to buy simpler meals and the ice cream salesman travels the 24 km from Stone Town on his bike. There is rarely any entrepreneurship at all in Pete, even if the aspirations for cash income is huge. Can such a village develop the capacity (both in economic and human capital) to create a functioning management system? It almost seems like they have to be empowered to be able to start a process, which can empower them. Though, the protest campaign after the announcement of Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park shows that the community can unite and cooperate at least in the short term.

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61 Cleaver, 1999
62 NGO Resource Centre
63 Cleaver, 1999
The beginning of the 1990s was an optimistic era in global politic. A catching belief in the future had struck the national delegates by the time of the Earth Summit in Rio 1992. The power and knowledge of the locals were addressed and the riddle of sustainable development was assumed to be solved by the propriety involvement of the concerned public. Just managing to escape a global collapse of world hunger, by creating the green revolution mankind had made itself invincible. Maybe those circumstances made it easy to glorify simple concepts without greater critical analysis. Later experiences have showed us that not even the most brilliant concept of success can be copied and placed upon a new situation without local contextual adaptation.

In this essay lists have been presented with factors and ladders. Those can be useful tool for analysis, but they will not stay unquestioned in their ability to create an optimal structure for the community of Pete. For instance Ostrom supported by Bruns, Jamison and Ribot, express a need of an institution and a desire in the community to organise itself. Cleaver challenges the idea of formalizing community structure into something, which clearly has an idol in the western world’s bureaucratic system. Cleaver points out that social institutions are often difficult to detect and embedded with norms and morals that are not always suitable for local democracy or participation.

All informants (except a 70 + year old widower) declared in interviews that they are more or less fully independent and in no need of the community for their day-to-day life. It is expressed that people ‘mind their own business’ without interfering with their co-villagers. Inhabitants with origin from other parts of the island, Pemba or the mainland found it quit strange how little people from Pete interact with others. Pete seems to be a fragmented village with sub-communities anchored both in and outside of the village. The strong identification with the community assumed in participatory approaches to development does not seem to occur in Pete. Nor is there the supposed coherence between resource, social and administrative boundaries.

64 Elliot, 2004  
65 Cleaver, 1999  
66 Ostrom, 1990; Bruns, 2003; Jamison, 2003; Ribot 2002  
67 Cleaver, 1999  
68 Ibid
Mentioning the feeling of independency from their neighbours it can be questioned whether the individuals could develop a relationship to the community creating the link between common good and own well being as argued by De-Shalit\textsuperscript{69}. Social responsibility and interest of community development is the most significant motivation for participation viewed in the literature. Even though argumentation is built upon the concept of rational-choice, focusing on the reasonability in participation for the individuals own wellbeing, rarely anything is mentioned about the error in economic development and what a enclosed nature resource can mean for the local society.

At least in rhetoric the social norm in Pete is to care for the mangrove forest. Almost 50\% of the informants express an opinion about people illegally cutting being irresponsible individuals, which do not care for others but themselves. But caused by the lack of economic substitute the locals have a hard time addressing participation as a reasonable level of individual compensation. Especially since the goal of the project is unclear.

In theory public participation has two means: It is ether argued as a tool to create efficiency, where public participation is supposed to achieve a better outcome of the project or participation is motivated with arguments of equity and empowerment, where participation is believed to enhance the capacity of individuals to improve their own life-situation. In the case of Pete community-based management there is no clearly articulated participation goal, but I would argue for the first one. The structure of the system, the governmental agency in charge, means of agreements and goals (while expressed) is focusing on resource use and natural capital, rather then social capacity building. It focuses on the importance to maintain the quality of the forest to attract tourists.

Both the park and the protection of the mangrove forest are first and for all conservation initiatives, which, during the process, have been influenced to involve democratic aspects and poverty reduction activities. The creation of a local institution could have established a situation were both factors were working in synergy\textsuperscript{70}, but the implementation in Pete left the result hanging half way through. The Pete CBNRM institution in conjunction with local government would need help with leadership training, strategic planning, enterprise training

\textsuperscript{69} De-Shalit, 2000
\textsuperscript{70} Cleaver, 1999
and development of a well functioning local democratic system to meet the high expectations of ZPRP. As conservation initiative participation could be seen as fairly successful, the illegal harvest has been less in times of committed participation and functioning enterprise training for economic income. However, those periods have not last and disappointments and hardship have made the inhabitants turn to woodcutting again.

In a bottom-up initiated management system a crucial point for the community is to be recognised by relevant authorities and become legalised as a stakeholder in the national/regional management structure. Petes management system instead runs the problem of being recognised by the local people. A community supposed to manage a resource needs public space and a forum that supports discussion. In Pette the space for participation is expressed as narrow and people say there suggestions gets sucked in the branches under the ‘people’s tree’. A system of information sharing needs to be developed and the channels opened for two-way communications. Feed back on proposals would create a stronger feeling of being heard and listened to.

Ribot argues that secure means of transfer is crucial in successful power sharing. Since the VCC in Pette do not have full accountability to others in the village and cannot completely trust the agreements made with the authority they fear losing their position they have adopted suppression techniques on the locals attending open meeting, only resulting in even less commitment to participation.

A number of informants said they would prefer the government to re-take the responsibility of the management system, since it would never be possible for the community to unite and without conflicts monitor it. Other informants said it would never be possible for the government to do so since they already admitted they could not handle it by allowing Pette to participate. In practice I would say that there are little meaningful decisions left to influence, ether for the village or for VCC. To be able to make effective environmental decision-making

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71 Bruns, 2003; Jamison, 2003
72 Three big mango trees in central Pette have become the common meeting point and a natural place for gossip and discussions among friends and neighbours.
73 Glasson et al, 2005
74 Ribot, 2002
75 Berit Ås listed five techniques in 1976, which were used by leaders to oppress people with lower status, especially women: Make invisible, ridicule, withhold information, double bind, heap blame and put to shame.
the local authority should be provided with executive, (decision-making and implementation), legislative (rule-making) and judiciary (dispute-resolution) power. Neither of those powers have been transferred to any larger extend. Even though VCC is patrolling the boundaries of the mangrove forest, they have not been part of the creation of the laws and will have limited interaction with the punishment. I get the impression that the village has been restricted in their possibility to organise their own institution. It seems like the forest is a too valuable resource for the government in forms of tourism to risk it by giving power to the village. The interference in Pete Board Walk is one example of this.

**Conclusion**

A successful CBNRM project requires transfer of power and an accountable, representative local institution. In the case of the Pete community-based management system there is a resistance in the central government to transfer meaningful decisions to local levels. CBNRM by nature are driven by multiple interests, but in Pete locals only get a very narrow space to express their interests. The project has been a top-down structured system where conservation goals have been dominant.

During the process, the government has repeatedly broken agreements and made one-way informative decisions that have significantly influenced the local economy, without giving any compensation. The locals do not feel they benefit from the process and have such lost faith in the system. Inner conflicts caused by weak leadership and lack of information has created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. The VCC was not elected by the villagers and thus its legitimacy in the eyes of some community members is questionable. As a response the VCC have withheld information as it fears losing an already limited power.

In theory, CBNRM has many advantages, but the case of Pete cannot support this position. In the initial state the community mobilized itself to achieve a two-way communication about the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. Their efforts resulted in an involved stage of participation. During the period of relative satisfaction and optimism towards the CBNRM-system the illegal cutting of mangrove forest went down and alternative income-generating activities increased. This gives us a glimpse of how a better functioning CBNRM project could work.
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**Figures, maps and tables**

Figure 1. *An extended ladder of Participation*, Bruns, 2003. “Water Tenure Reform: Developing an Extended Ladder of Participation” p. 14

Figure 2. *Administrative system of Pete village and conservation area*. Linn Rabe, 2008


Map 2. *Participatory map of Pete village and nearby surrounding*, Compiled by Linn Rabe after instructions from inhabitants in Pete Mars, 2008. (see page 19)

Table 1. *Population in Pete*, 2008. Compiled by Hajj Mohammed Hajj after information from Pete Shehia, April 2008
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