A Phenomenology of Transcendence:

Edith Stein and the Lack of Authentic Otherness in Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*

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Abstract

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.
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Introduction

Edith Stein’s essay “Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” [Martin Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie] was originally written as a second appendix to Finite and Eternal Being [Endliches und ewiges Sein]. Composed during the summer of 1936, the essay consists of a close and detailed reading of four of Martin Heidegger’s published works at that time: Being and Time [Sein und Zeit], Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik], The Essence of Reason [Vom Wesen des Grundes] and What is Metaphysics [Was ist Metaphysik?]. Taking as its point of departure an extended discussion of Being and Time, Stein’s essay coheres principally around what she finds to be an ambiguity in Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein. Although at times highly critical of Heidegger, she stays remarkably faithful to the basic outline of his work while gradually building a meticulous argument that problematizes it from out of its very core.

Since the time of its publication, Being and Time had haunted Stein; it had visibly impacted on her work. She fleetingly mentions this in the foreword to Potency and Act. Studies Toward a Philosophy of Being [Potenz und Akt. Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins] from 1931, referring to herself in the third person:

The way the author poses questions in this work and some of her attempts to solve them may suggest that it is a critical response to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In fact, the personal circumstances of her life in recent years have yet to allow her such an – explicit – concern. She did, however, work through Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] soon after it was published [1927], and the strong impression the book made on her may linger in the present work.

Still, writing in the summer of 1936 what she thought would be the second appendix to Finite

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and Eternal Being, it is the first time that Stein explicitly engages in a criticism of Heidegger. The ambiguity she traces within the description of Dasein derives from Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as transcendence and ecstatic temporality. In §69 of Being and Time, “The Temporality of Being-in-the-World and the problem of the Transcendence of the World”, Heidegger describes Dasein as in itself outside itself. Qua being-toward-death [Sein-zum-Tode] and being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein], Dasein constitutes its own limit in the double sense of its own end and its own outside. He furthermore writes of Dasein as an ecstatic unity of temporality – a unity of its own “outside-itself” in ”the raptures of the future, the having-been, and the present”.

Stein draws several important conclusions from this chapter. She understands Dasein as a moment or a point where actuality and potentiality coincide – not in terms of a moment in time or a point in space, but as pure punctuality. As temporality, she argues, Dasein takes up space. And while Stein does not oppose this idea per se, she contends that the ecstatic and fundamentally finite nature of this spacing point constitutive of Dasein entails two basic issues: the impossibility of being after the end of Dasein and the impossibility of being outside of Dasein. This simultaneous lack of after and outside of hinges on the same problem: Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as transcendence. For Heidegger, Dasein is constantly beyond: simultaneously that which transcends and that which is transcended, but also that towards which this transcendence is directed. This leads to an inability to understand anything other than Dasein as other in itself; it results in a concept of Dasein unable even to imply the mere possibility of an authentic beyond the beyond.

Stein hereby raises several issues: What happens once all otherness is made simply to constitute the other side of the self – death the other side of life and nothingness the

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4 Heidegger’s name occurs only this once in Potency and Act, and no more than three times in the original version of Finite and Eternal Being. Stein does however criticise him in several extensive footnotes in the latter work, e.g. note 33, p. 550; note 36, p. 556; note 35, p. 570; note 51, p. 573.

5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 321.

6 See e.g. Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, p. 66: ”Dasein is not at a point in space, but rather takes up space […] Its temporality makes it possible for it to take up space.” [”Das Dasein ist nicht an einem Ort im Raum, sondern nimmt Raum ein … Seine Zeitlichkeit macht ihm das Raumeinnehmen möglich.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 458.]

7 See Heidegger, Being and Time, §69.

8 Stein never uses the expression ”beyond the beyond” herself. Rather, she speaks of, on the one hand ”God” and on the other hand ”the other”. Since the task of this essay is to examine how she traces out the lack of both divinity and sociality to the same mechanism in Heidegger’s thought, I have chosen this expression in order to encompass both aspects of her critique.
counterpoint to being? What transpires when every possibility of what could be called *authentic otherness* is excluded?

Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as transcendence and ecstatic temporality chiefly revolves around the possibility and/or impossibility of divine being. For her, the ultimate *beyond* of Dasein – what I have chosen to call "beyond the beyond" – would be God. And, indeed, while Stein detects a lack of divinity in *Being and Time*, her discussion also opens up for a critique of Heidegger on the grounds of sociality.\(^9\) If all possibility of authentic otherness is ruled out in advance, then the concepts of being-with [Mitsein] and being-with-others [Mit-dasein] merely comprise two of many modal definitions of a *solus ipse*, thereby leaving, on the one hand, the existence of the other as a mere extension of Dasein (possibly: as its own outside), and, on the other, sociality as a somewhat passive mode of Dasein’s thrown contingency.

For Stein, being-with cannot merely be understood as a passive mode in the sense of a an activity of sharing. Instead, ascribing to Dasein what she chooses to call an *enduring* or *sustaining* quality, she turns being-with into active passivity, thus leaving open the possibility of authentic otherness. So while Stein substantially agrees with Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as a moment or a point where actuality and potentiality coincide, her problem is the transient nature of this point. Even though there might be no being beyond Dasein, and even though there might be no other, she argues that a thorough philosophical understanding of sociality demands at the very least that Dasein is accredited with the enduring and sustaining quality of placing something beyond itself. And while this quality is often dismissed as a question of faith, Stein claims that it is in fact a precondition for existence.

Moreover, in conducting an inquiry into the relationship between Heidegger and Stein with respect to the notion of transcendence, one cannot avoid approaching the question of religion. While Heidegger openly had brushed aside the mere subject of divinity in *Being and Time*, mentioning it only fleetingly, by the early 1930’s Stein had become a firm believer. As a recent convert to Catholicism (baptized in January 1922) she was an earnest reader of St.

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\(^9\) The expression "authentic otherness" is not part of Stein’s own terminology – in the context of this paper, though, it serves the function of what is simultaneously after and outside of Dasein’s "authentic being". At one time Stein uses the similar expression "any being independent of Dasein" (Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy", 90). ["[E]in vom Dasein unabhängiges Sein". Stein, Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie, 494.]

\(^10\) The term sociality will serve two different purposes in the current essay. On the one hand it indicates the purely relational sociality that Stein ascribes to Heidegger. On the other it designates the way in which the personal human kind of being understands and relates to the existence of other human beings.
Thomas Aquinas; the tone of her philosophical work changes accordingly, with an increasing emphasis placed on faith. The core of Stein’s argument in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” – her attempt to develop what theologian James Orr has described as a ”phenomenology of alterity”11 – can be derived from her attempt to critically combine Aquinian theology, Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian existential philosophy.12 Orr even suggests that faith in the writings of Stein ”[…] operates as a lodestar for the philosophical enterprise, illuminating its way and guiding it to destinations it might not otherwise have considered” and that ”[p]hilosophical reasoning structures and strengthens the findings of faith, imbuing them with an intellectual appeal which is suggestive rather than coercive”.13 The task of this essay, however, is not to understand Stein’s philosophical thinking in relation to or as in any way changed by her religious faith. Nonetheless, what I shall try to elucidate is that faith is a constitutive necessity within her philosophical-phenomenological thinking, by arguing that Stein’s writings have a religious horizon but not, in fact, a religious motive.

Stein and Heidegger both studied for Edmund Husserl at the University of Göttingen in the 1910’s. Stein started as Husserl’s teaching assistant at the University of Freiburg in 1916, and was succeeded by Heidegger in 1917. They both took part in compiling Husserl’s Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time from 1905 (although Stein is known to have conducted most of the work).14 Despite all these shared circumstances, the Husserlian heritage marks the two philosophers in noticeably different ways. While already in Potency and Act Stein seeks to develop a theory of intersubjectivity, in this regard staying faithful to, or even preceding

12 In a letter to Heinrich Finke, Stein writes that although her line of thought is often diminished to psychology by her critics, her ambition is that of ”critically comparing scholastic and recent philosophy” (Letter to Finke of 6.1, 1931. Quoted by Hans Rainer Sepp in ”Introduction to Edith Stein”, Potency and Act, xv). She makes an early attempt at this in Husserl’s Festschrift with her contribution ”An Attempt to Contrast Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas”. The original version of the text consists in an imaginary dialogue between Aquinas and her Doktorvater. Both texts can be found in Knowledge and Faith (The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 8), red. Redmond Walter (DC: ICS Publications, 2000).
14 See e.g. Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein, 2. According to Calcagno ”Heidegger took Stein’s edited manuscript of Husserl’s On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time and credited himself with editing it”.

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Husserl,\textsuperscript{15} she partly repudiates Husserl’s transcendental idealism in favour of Thomistic mysticism. And while Heidegger is deeply engaged in the destruction of the philosophy of subjectivity, Stein accuses him of remaining too close to Husserl’s idealism. For instance, she depicts his concept of the \textit{es gibt} as too naïve, a ”naïve realism” lacking the concepts of community and creatorship.\textsuperscript{16} While claiming that Heidegger advocates an idealistic phenomenology that eliminates difference, Stein herself aims to approach phenomenologically the notion of the ideal and the other.

\textbf{Statement of Purpose}

The current essay will show how Stein in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” hits upon a fundamental incompatibility between Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in \textit{Being and Time} and a philosophical understanding of sociality. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as transcendence in terms of ecstatic temporality, Stein locates in his thinking an inattentiveness to authentic otherness, which encompasses the concept of Mitsein, a problem that Heidegger would himself acknowledge only several years later. Even so, Stein does not simply discard the conception of Dasein on the basis of its solipsism and transient nature. Instead, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, she re-defines the human being in such a way that the alleged lack of authentic otherness is diminished. With this in mind, Stein is to be regarded as a precursor not only with regard to the subsequent Heidegger-reception, but also in the context of later phenomenological thought on sociality.

Crucial aspects of Stein’s critique, derived from the core of her own philosophy, are often disavowed as a symptom of her religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, I will argue that her critique of Heidegger’s lack of authentic otherness is an essentially philosophical and phenomenological matter. While her critique does indeed entail certain theological conclusions, alongside a number of implications for both the political and ethical fields (such as in the area of empathy),\textsuperscript{18} I would like to propose that these outcomes are subordinate to the existential-

\textsuperscript{15} Jonna Bornemark, \textit{Kunskapens gräns, gränsens vetande. En fenomenologisk undersökning av transcendentens och kroppslighet} (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, Biblioteket [distributör], 2009), 218.
\textsuperscript{16} Calcagno, \textit{The Philosophy of Edith Stein}, 127 (original quote in Stein, ”Die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie”, \textit{Welt und Person}, 15).
\textsuperscript{17} See e.g. Orr, ”Edith Stein’s Critique of Sociality in the Early Heidegger”, 395f.
\textsuperscript{18} For further discussion, see Orr, ibid., 379.
philosophical approach by which she addresses question of temporality, and which gives rise to her reconceptualisation of Mitsein.

This essay begins with an examination of Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as temporal transcendence, addressing the concepts of *time* and *actuality*. In section two I examine Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as spatial transcendence, addressing the concepts of *space* and *potentiality*. In the end of each section the inquiry will turn towards the matter of sociality – *Being-alongside* and *Mitsein* respectively. In so doing it will pose the following questions: in what way does Stein’s novel understanding of Dasein’s transcending quality give rise to a critique of the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein? How do Heidegger and Stein diverge on this point – on the question of how to apprehend the fact that human beings are a kind of being with? And how does this affect their respective understandings of otherness?

**Bibliography and Previous Research**

To date, the first and only English publication of "Martin Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie” is Mette Lebech’s translation, published in 2007, as part of *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* (issue 4). Alongside Stein’s original, this text has been the primary source of my inquiry. Lebech’s translation is occasionally problematic – especially regarding Heideggerian terminology. Whenever it is deemed necessary to return to *Being and Time*, in order to stress an aspect of Heidegger’s original text, I will refer to the Joan Stambaugh’s English translation from 1996. Any terminological incoherencies in quoted passages will be discussed in the footnotes.

In addition to above mentioned primary source I have occasionally chosen to refer to Stein’s *Potency and Act* from 1931 and *Finite and Eternal Being* from 1937. This inquiry is far too brief to make any conclusions as to whether Stein’s philosophical thinking underwent any crucial changes during the period 1931–1937. The two works will accordingly be used for the purposes of clarifying arguments that can be located in the Heidegger essay.

Up until recently, Stein’s contribution to philosophy has remained unjustly underappreciated. In terms of secondary literature, little has been written in English on Stein’s critique of Heidegger – a surprise, owing to her contemporaneous response to *Being and
The general relationship between Heidegger and Stein is briefly treated in John H. Nota’s "Misunderstanding and Insight about Edith Stein’s philosophy" from 1987 and Alasdair MacIntyre’s *Edith Stein. A Philosophical Prologue* from 2006. Only in 2007 a comprehensive discussion of Stein’s Heidegger essay was conducted in a chapter of Antonio Calcagno’s *The Philosophy of Edith Stein*. Calcagno further explores the relationship of Heidegger and Stein in his article "Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Community in her Early Work and in her Later Finite and Eternal Being: Martin Heidegger’s Impact", from 2011.

In her thesis "Edith Stein’s critique of Martin Heidegger. Background, reasons and scope" from 2013 Lidia Ripamonti outlines several important aspects of Stein’s critique of Heidegger that bear upon ontological questions. For the most part, Ripamonti focuses upon Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s understanding of death and dying.

The theologian James Orr has undertaken both the most recent and most comprehensive research on Stein’s critique of Heidegger, e.g. in his essay ”’The Fullness Of Life’. Death, Finitude, and Life-philosophy in Edith Stein’s Critique of the Early Heidegger”, published in 2014. Orr continues this work in two additional articles, specifically focusing on sociality and temporality: "Edith Stein’s Critique of Sociality in the Early Heidegger” from 2013 and ”’Being and timelessness’. Edith Stein’s Critique of Heideggerian Temporality” from 2014. While the former seeks within Stein’s phenomenology of empathy the reason for her critique of sociality in the work of the early Heidegger, the latter provides an account of her critique of temporality. The task of the present essay is to show how these two topics are inextricably entwined.

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19 Cf. Other contemporaneous responses to *Being and Time* such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ review of *Being and Time* in *Deutsche Zeitschrift* 46/4 (1933) or Max Sheler’s ”Zu ’Idealismus-Realismus’ – Aus Teil V: Das emotionale Realitätsproblem; Aus kleineren Manuskripten zu ’Sein und Zeit’ (1927); Rand- und Textbemerkungen in ’Sein und Zeit’ (1927)”, Gesammelte Werke IX, Späte Schriften (Bern/München: Francke-Verlag, 1979).
23 Lidia Ripamonti, ”Edith Stein’s critique of Martin Heidegger. Background, reasons and scope” (PhD diss., University of Angila Ruskin, 2013).
AFTER DASEIN

Edith Stein’s analysis of Dasein in "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy" in comprised of three major parts: the first is of a formal character, the second can be referred to as being discursive or analytic in nature and the last constitutes a problematisation of Heidegger’s thought. Since Stein differs from Heidegger only in certain respects, I have chosen to undertake a thematic rather than linear reading. Taken together, the analysis provided here is divided into four main chapters and structured around twelve operational concepts.

1. Time: Beyond Life and Death

1.1 The Beginning

“It can hardly be doubted that Heidegger wants to understand Dasein as the human kind of being”, Stein writes at the beginning of the second part of her essay “Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” – "What is Dasein?”.25 Her conclusion is preceded by a rigorous chapter, entitled “The Preliminary Analysis of Dasein”, which examines in a thoroughgoing manner Heidegger’s terminological use of Dasein in Being and Time. As a result of this immanent yet ”preliminary” analysis, Stein arrives at the definition of Dasein as a fundamentally *temporal* kind of being, which is thrown into its world and toward its death – what Heidegger recalls as Being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-Sein] and Being-toward-death [Sein-zum-Tode]. She further distinguishes Being-in-the-world and Being-toward-death as both constitutive of and belonging to Dasein, emphasising that she does not exclusively understand Dasein as the human kind of being in terms of the ”human self”, but that she also understands it in a broader ontological sense:

[…] when ”being-in-the-world” is set forth as belonging to Dasein, and ”who” is distinguished not only from the ”world” but also from ”being-in”, then it is expressed that the word *Dasein* is used for different things intimately belonging together to the point where they cannot be without the others, and yet without being identical. Thus we must say: ”Dasein”, for Heidegger, designates

25 Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 69.
sometimes human beings (referred to as "whom" or "self"), sometimes the being of human beings (in this case the expression the "being of Dasein" is often used). This being, in its difference from other modes of being, is called existence. If we think of the formal structure of beings, as shown in our investigations – "something that is" – then "something" expresses the "who" or "self", the "that" is articulated by body and soul, whereas the "being" becomes valid in existence. Sometimes the analysis is concerned with the self, but mostly, however, it is dedicated to being.

Since Dasein is inherently dependent on its mortality, its finitude in the world, Stein assumes that time is the utter horizon or meta-category of Dasein, regardless of whether or not Heidegger speaks, on the one hand, of one kind of human being, i.e. a human "who" or "self", or, on the other, the kind of human being, i.e. the being of human beings.

Apart from apprehending Dasein as a temporal, human kind of being, Stein emphasises also that Heidegger expressly posits an identity between the essence and existence in Dasein. In other words: an identity that is traditionally reserved for God. Stein acknowledges two possible ways of understanding this identity. One way, in line with the philosophia perennis, would be simply to put the human being in the place of god. She immediately dismisses this alternative due to Dasein’s mortality. Yet, as Heidegger defines Dasein neither as a present-at-hand nor as a ready-to-hand – but rather Dasein as the only being capable of understanding the meaning of being – Stein argues that he assigns to Dasein a somewhat

26 Lebech’s translation of ”das Wer” varies between the "whom" and the "who", whereas Stambaugh consistently uses the "who".
27 Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 70. [”Wenn beim In-der-Welt-sein, das als zum Dasein gehörig herausgestellt wird, das Wer nicht nur von der Welt, sondern auch vom In-sein geschieden wird, so kommt darin zum Ausdruck, daß der Name Dasein für Verschiedenes gebraucht wird, was innerlich zusammengehört, wovon eines nicht ohne das andere sein kann, was aber doch nicht dasselbe ist. So dürfen wir sagen: Dasein bezeichnet bei Heidegger bald den Menschen, (es steht dann dafür oft Wer oder Selbst), bald das menschliche Sein (in diesen Fällen drängt sich dafür meist der Ausdruck Sein des Daseins auf). Dieses Sein in seiner Unterschiedenheit von anderen Seinsweisen wird Existenz genannt. Denken wir an den formalen Aufbau des Seienden, wie er sich in unseren Untersuchungen herausgestellt hat — 'Etwas, was ist' — so entspricht dem Etwas das Wer oder Selbst, das Was ist mit Leib und Seele hinausbeförderd, das Sein kommt in der Existenz zur Geltung. Streckenweise beschäftigt sich die Analyse mit dem Selbst, aber vorzugsweise ist sie dem Sein gewidmet.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 464.]
28 Stein, ibid., 68. The fact that Stein doubtlessly dismisses any spatial aspect of the being-in in favour of temporality will be further discussed in chapter 3.
privileged position, thereby making it possible to speak of the human kind of being as a little god.³⁰

Stein touches upon a similar point in her preliminary analysis: she writes that Dasein’s being is constituted by existentiality on the one hand and by facticity on the other:

Existentiality designates the specific characteristic of Dasein, that to its being belongs a relation to itself, that it is "brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in its thrownness"; facticity designates the thrownness which "as a kind of being, belongs to a being which in each case is its possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities, projecting itself upon them".³¹

So while Stein interprets the being of Dasein as the coincidence between essence and existence, she understands Dasein’s being – one’s own being or the who – as a being designated by both existentiality and facticity.

In light of these two premises, Stein will in the third part of her essay – the site for her critical discussion of Dasein – conclude that Dasein, both in its particularity and in its universality, is the point of coincidence between actuality and potentiality. Before, though, gravitating any further towards this topic, it is necessary to touch upon Stein’s views on an aspect of time that Heidegger most deliberately omits, namely, causality.

Towards the end of her essay Stein writes, in opposition to Heidegger, that because the human being is designated as thrown "it is expressly made clear that the human being discovers itself in Dasein, without knowing how it came to be there, that it is not from and through itself and that it also cannot expect information concerning its origin from its own being".³² When Heidegger dismisses the history of philosophy on the basis of it asking the wrong question – and thus changes the main philosophical question from the causal why to

³⁰ Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 69. Cf. Stein’s own definition of Dasein, described by James Orr as "[…] the theological thread connecting finite 'ontic' and eternal 'ontological' being […]" (Orr, "Edith Stein’s Critique of Sociality in Early Heidegger", 393) and her description of the human kind of beings as angels (Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 506).
³¹ Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 60. ['Dabei bezeichnet Existentialität die Eigentümlichkeit des Daseins, daß zu seinem Sein ein Sich-verhalten zu sich selbst gehört, daß es 'vor es selbst gebracht und ihm in seiner Geworfenheit erschlossen wird', Faktizität das Geworfensein als 'die Seinsart eines Seienden, das je seine Möglichkeit selbst ist, so zwar, daß es sich in ihnen und aus ihnen versteht (auf sie sich entwirft).'” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 450.]
³² Ibid., 70.
the temporal how – he transforms the entire perspective on metaphysics. As a result, Stein argues, the whole question surrounding causality becomes superfluous. Enquiries into the "beyond the beyond" or "before the before" no longer have any philosophical relevance, since the solipsistic notion of Dasein is "[…] the ultimate origin beyond which there is nothing further". Throughout her argumentation on this question, Stein mainly focuses on how in Being and Time the very possibility of divinity is foreclosed. Only occasionally does she extend the discussion to encompass mere otherness. All the same, the significant point here is that she does not accept the dismissal of the "why?" or "who?" – the question of causal origin – as something lying beyond the scope of philosophy. Quite the contrary, she finds this mode of questioning to be the most fundamental for human beings – and thus should not be vanquished by philosophical thinking.

Even though for the most part Heidegger forsakes the question of divine being in Being and Time, he never expressly dismisses the very possibility of a "philosophically 'constructed'" concept of God, remarking instead that it "remains an open question". And while Stein chooses not to disregard this statement outright, she nonetheless faults its accuracy. To support her case she refers to a note in The Essence of Reason:

In the footnotes [of The Essence of Reason] we are […] assured that "the ontological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world tells neither for nor against the possible existence of God" and that Dasein should not be construed to be the "authentic" being as such: "ontological interpretation of being in terms

33 Ibid., 74.
34 Stein points out that Heidegger uses the term "nonsensical" [unsinnig] for that which is not of Dasein since this can be neither meaningful nor meaningless: "[...] meaning is not in-itself, but it is rather an existential determination. Only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless. What is not of Dasein is nonsensical [...]" (Stein, ibid., 60). ["Verstanden ist das Seiende selbst; der Sinn ist nicht an sich, sondern ist eine existentiale Bestimmung. Nur Dasein kann sinnvoll oder sinnlos sein. Nicht Daseinsmäßiges ist unsinnig [...]” Stein, “Martin Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie”, 449.]
35 Cf. e.g. note 13, p. 391 in Being and Time: "We do not need to discuss in detail the fact that the traditional concept of eternity in the significance of the 'standing now' (nunc stans) is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and defined in orientation toward the idea of 'constant' objective presence. If the eternity of God could be philosophically 'constructed', it could be understood only as more primordial and 'infinite' temporality. Whether or not the via negationis et eminentiae could offer a possible way remains an open question." ["Daß der traditionelle Begriff der Ewigkeit in der Bedeutung des 'stehenden Jetzt' (nunc stans) aus dem vulgären Zeitverständnis geschöpft und in der Orientierung an der Idee der 'ständigen' Vorhandenheit umgrenzt ist, bedarf keiner ausführlichen Erörterung. Wenn die Ewigkeit Gottes sich philosophisch 'konstruieren' ließe, dann dürfte sie nur als ursprünglichere und 'unendliche' Zeitlichkeit verstanden werden. Ob hierzu die via negationis et eminentiae einen möglichen Weg bieten könnte, bleibe dahingestellt.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, note 1, 427.]
of the transcendence of Dasein is by no means an ontic derivation of non-Daseinal [beings] from beings qua Dasein.” In regard to the second [criticism], the critics have in fact not left "being-present-at-hand” and "being-ready-to-hand” in the darkness in which Heidegger left it, but rather developed it in a way not foreseen by him. And by a quite faithful and sufficiently far-reaching interpretation of the essential ”self-transcending”, a view of ”Dasein” could have been gained which, at least, left open the possibility of a ”being-towards-God”.³⁶

Despite the fact that Heidegger has a far less ”anti-Christian” approach here than in Being and Time, even using language of Scripture, the incompatibility of his philosophical thought and the existence of God remain as clear as ever, for Stein:

But actually no such interpretation is carried through in Being and Time or in this later treatise. In fact the interpretation which being received in the Kant-book – even more evidently than in Being and Time – leaves no possibility open for any being [Sein] independent of Dasein. When, furthermore, transcendence is interpreted as freedom, by the power of which Dasein projects world and its own possibilities, and in connection with the establishment of the finitude of Dasein (witnessed by the limitation of its really realisable possibilities) the question is raised: "And does the essence of freedom announce itself as finite in this?” This (quite likely rhetorical) question excludes [the possibility] that the being of Dasein pertains to all personal being and it denies it to God: at least to the God of the Christian Faith and also to that of the other monotheistic

³⁶ Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 90. [”Es wird auch in Anmerkungen versichert, daß ’durch die ontologische Interpretation des Daseins als In-der-Welt-sein … weder positiv noch negativ über ein mögliches Sein zu Gott entschieden’ sei und daß das Dasein nicht als das eigentliche Seiende überhaupt hingestellt werden sollte: ’Ontologische Interpretation des Seins in und aus der Transzendenz des Daseins heißt aber doch nicht ontische Ableitung des nichtdaseinsmäßigen Seienden aus dem Seienden qua Dasein.’ Was das Zweite anlangt, so haben in der Tat die Kritiker das Vorhandensein und Zuhandensein nicht in der Dunkelheit gelassen, in der es bei Heidegger blieb, sondern es in einer von ihm nicht beabsichtigten Weise festgelegt. Und bei ganz getreuer und genügend weitgehender Auslegung des wesenhaften Sich-selbst-übersteigens hätte auch eine Sicht des Daseins gewonnen werden können, die ein Sein zu Gott mindestens offen ließ.” Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie”, 494.] Lebech consistently translates ”Sein zu” as ”being-towards” while Stambaugh uses ”being-toward”.

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Ultimately, according to Stein the less anti-Christian approach in *The Essence of Reason* does not change the fact that being beyond Being-in-the-world is fundamentally impossible for Heidegger – if anything, this impossibility becomes *even more evident* when, in his later works, Dasein’s transcendence is defined as freedom. Because in the end, Stein does not develop her critical interpretation on the fact that Heidegger lacks a concept of the divine. Rather, it is by driving towards the very essence of Heidegger’s philosophical thought – his definition of Dasein as finite transcendence – that Stein mounts her critique.

1.2 The End

The matter of death and dying has a prominent position in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, being the area where Stein articulates the most explicit and sustained critique against Heidegger. In chapter two of her essay she dismisses Heidegger’s conception of Dasein and death as a ”fruitless circularity”:

We must first and foremost ask: What is death? Heidegger answers: the end of Dasein. He immediately adds that with this no decision should be favoured as to the possibility of a life after death. The analysis of death remains purely ”of this world”: it looks at death only insofar as it belongs to this world as a possibility of the particular Dasein. What comes after death is a question that can only be asked meaningfully and with justification when the ontological essence of death has been grasped. Much is strange in this discussion. If it is the ultimate meaning of Dasein to be ”being towards death”, then the meaning of Dasein should be clarified by the meaning of death. How is this possible, however, if

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37 Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 90. [”Aber tatsächlich ist die Auslegung weder in *Sein und Zeit* noch in dieser späteren Abhandlung in solcher Weise durchgeführt. Und die Deutung, die das Sein – im Kant-Buch noch offensichtlicher als in *Sein und Zeit* – erfahren hat, läßt keine Möglichkeit für ein vom Dasein unabhängiges Sein offen. Wenn ferner Transzendenz als Freiheit gedeutet wird, kraft deren das Dasein Welt und eigene Möglichkeiten entwirft und im Anschluß an die Feststellung der *Endlichkeit des Daseins* (bezeugt durch die Beschränkheit seiner wirklich zu ergreifenden Möglichkeiten) die Frage aufgeworfen wird: ’Und bekundet sich hierin gar das *endliche* Wesen von Freiheit überhaupt?’ –, so ist mit dieser doch wohl rhetorisch gemeinten Frage wiederum vom Sein des Daseins auf *alles* personale Sein geschlossen und Gott gelehnt: jedenfalls der Gott der christlichen Glaubenslehre und auch der andern monotheistischen Religionen.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 494.]
nothing else can be said of death than that it is the end of Dasein? Is this not a completely fruitless circularity?\(^{38}\)

On the basis of this hermetically sealed circle that Stein calls a "this-wordly analysis of death", the possibility of being beyond Dasein is diminished.\(^{39}\) She develops this conclusion in two steps.

Firstly, she criticises what she finds to be the lack of a definition of death itself. Throughout *Being and Time* death is described only as an existential of Dasein, and the experience of death is described as Being-toward-death. In other words, Dasein is understood in the double sense of death and dying. Stein does not agree on this definition, arguing that death is never just a universal experience – where, for Heidegger, even as an "own", Dasein as a Being-toward-death is always a *universal* own.\(^{40}\) Conversely, for Stein, death is *personal*.\(^{41}\) As a singular but sharable event, she proposes that death deserves to be philosophically treated and defined in itself. (As personal, Stein’s conception of death enables


\(^{39}\) Ibid., 63.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 75.

\(^{41}\) In the section "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" she writes that the meaning of finitude is "[...] to be 'something and not everything'. This meaning of finitude, however, is not only fulfilled in humans but in every being which is not God. Thus finitude as such and transcendence do not simply belong together. Transcendence means the breakthrough from finitude, which a spiritual, and, as such, knowing personal being, is given in and through its understanding of being. Heidegger sometimes speaks of the specific finitude of human beings, but without ever saying what he understands by it. In order to explain it, [he] would have to abolish that which distinguishes the being of human beings from that of nonpersonal spiritual beings and finite pure spirits" (ibid., 86). ["*E*twas und nicht alles sein. Dieser Sinn von Endlichkeit findet seine Erfüllung aber nicht nur im Menschen, sondern in jedem Seienden, das nicht Gott ist. *So gehören Endlichkeit als solche und Transzendenz nicht ohne weiteres zusammen.* Transzendenz bedeutet das Durchbrechen der Endlichkeit, das einem *personalgeistigen* und *als solchem* erkennenden Wesen in und mit seinem Seinsverständnis gegeben ist. Heidegger spricht wohl einigemal von der *spezifischen* Endlichkeit des Menschen, aber ohne jemals zu erörtern, was er darunter verstanden haben will. Um sie zu erklären, mußte das zur Abhebung gebracht werden, was das Sein des Menschen von dem des nicht personal-geistigen Seienden sowie von dem der endlichen reinen Geister unterscheidet." Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 489.]
an understanding and experience of “the death of others”, which according to Heidegger would be impossible. The full extent of this will be further discussed in chapter 3.2).

The second critique extending from Stein’s dismissal of the Heideggerian concept of death as a ”fruitless circularity” is articulated when – once again – she turns to the polysemic meaning of Dasein. Having previously stated that all of Dasein’s existentials not only belong to it but constitute it as a whole, the conclusion is now drawn that none of the existentials can be examined or understood by itself, as a singular circumstance. She thus accentuates the fundamental impossibility for any part of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Being-toward-death to remain after death, once its temporal existence in the world is over. Irrespective of whether there is an afterlife or not, Stein contends, the possibility of death as a transition rather than an end – and the possibility of being beyond the human kind of being – is dismissed by Heidegger, and it is far too easily done.42 In The Philosophy of Edith Stein the Steinian scholar Antonio Calcagno perceptively writes that ”[…] Stein’s problem with Heidegger’s use of the term ’end’ is that he has eternalized Dasein as nothing at the end of temporal existence. […] He has absolutized the moment of death insofar as it colours the whole meaning of life.”43

Stein is in no way incapable of understanding Heidegger’s expressed intention of wanting to destroy ”the traditional concept of eternity in the significance of the ’standing now’”.44 Quite the opposite, she clearly expresses her sympathy and appreciation for his achievements:

Hedwig Conrad Martius says about Heidegger’s approach that it is ”as if a door, so long left unopened that it can hardly be opened anymore, is blown wide open with enormous strength, wise intention and unrelenting stamina, and then immediately closed again, bolted and so thoroughly blocked that any further opening seems impossible”. He has ”with his conception of the human I worked out with inimitable philosophical clarity and energy the key to an ontology

42 She furthermore argues that ”[…] it is possible that the being-in-the-world of human beings ends, without them thereupon ceasing to be in another sense. But this would run against the sense of the previous analysis, which, although underlining other existentials besides being-in-the-world (e.g. understanding), did not regard these as separable” (ibid., 75). ["Es ist möglich, daß das In-der-Weltsein des Menschen endet, ohne daß er damit in einem anderen Sinn aufhörte zu sein. Aber das wäre doch nicht im Sinn der voraufgehenden Analyse, die allerdings neben dem In-der-Weltsein andere Existentialien hervorgehoben hat, z.B. das Verstehen, aber doch nicht als davon abtrennbar." Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 472.]
43 Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein, 122.
44 Heidegger, Being and Time, 416.
which, dispelling all subjectivist, relativist and idealist ghosts could lead him back into a truly cosmological and God-born world. ” He establishes ”being first and foremost in its full and complete rights” even if only in one place: the I. He determines the being of the I by the fact that it ”understands being”. Thus the way is cleared to bring out the understanding of being that belongs to the human being – undisturbed by the ”critical” question of how the knowing I can reach out beyond itself – but also to bring out the being of the world and all created being, which in turn grounds the understanding of divine being. Instead of this, the I is thrown back on itself. Heidegger justifies [how he takes] the analysis of Dasein as [his] point of departure with the fact that one can only ask a being for the meaning of being, if it belongs to its meaning to have an understanding of being. And as ”Dasein” not only has understanding for its own being, but also for other beings, one must start with an analysis of Dasein.45

Yet, she continues:

But does not the opposite follow from this reasoning? Because the human being understands not only its own being but also other beings, it is not referred to its own being as to the only possible way to the meaning of being. […] the possibility always persists of beginning with the being of things or with primary

being. One will not get from this a sufficient explanation of the human being, but only references to it that must be checked. On the other hand, the human being also gives only references to other ways of being, and we must ‘question’ these if we want to understand it. They will of course not answer in the same manner as a human being answers. A thing has no understanding of being and cannot talk about its being. But it is and has a meaning that is expressed in and through outer appearance. And this self-revelation belongs to the meaning of thingly being. Heidegger cannot accept this however, as he recognises no meaning distinct from understanding, but dissolves meaning in understanding [...].

What might at first appear as a plain refusal by Stein to rethink the metaphysical question in terms of temporality and not causality owing to her faith is in fact much more than that. What emerges in “Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” is not simply a thanatological dispute between an atheist and a religious person, or even a conflict between two philosophers. Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as finite transcendence is at one and the same time rooted within and articulated through, as well as stretching beyond Heidegger’s own thinking. At the intersection between Heidegger’s solipsistic definition of Dasein and his conception of Dasein as temporal transcendence, Stein encounters a problem: a lack of understanding of any other kind of being than the own self, i.e. a lack of authentic otherness. So as to be in a better position to thoroughly examine her argument here, it will be necessary to dig deeper into her understanding of the temporality of Dasein.

1.3 The Moment

As was shown in chapter 1.2, Stein’s critique of the circular concept of Dasein and death is in part predicated on her views on Heidegger’s conception of time. She develops this critique further by way of three main themes: i) she finds there to be an “overvaluation of future” that results in ii) a “devaluation of present”, while simultaneously arguing that iii) Heidegger “completely omits consideration of the phenomenon of fulfilment fundamental to all experience”.  

To support her thesis Stein turns her attention towards the moods, principally addressing the mood that Heidegger considers as Existential rather then Existentiell, i.e. anxiety [Angst].

Stein understands anxiety as a mood afflicting itself upon Dasein as a double experience. On the one hand, it is only in anxiety that Dasein diverges from the they-self and is revealed to itself as authentic Being-toward-death. On the other hand, anxiety amounts to the understanding of Being-toward-death as resoluteness; which is to say, Dasein’s understanding of its own being as ”a ‘distinctive mode of openness’, which is identical to original truth”.

Another crucial aspect of Heidegger’s concept of existential anxiety is that it is never directed towards a specific object; one experiences anxiety merely before the openness of one’s own being, and the mood is induced by something completely indefinite. But here Stein disagrees. She concludes that the uncanny state of mind in anxiety entails both anxiety before openness and anxiety about that which slips away: i.e. the fullness [Fülle], fulfilment or completion of Dasein:

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48 Despite the fact that Lebech generally translates the German ”Angst” into ”anguish” in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” and Stambaugh leaves the term untranslated in Being and Time I have chosen to use the translation ”anxiety” which is most commonly used in the international reception of Heidegger.  
49 Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 62. She furthermore adds that ”Dasein is not by this released from its being-in-the-world, but is only now authentically situated and hence capable of authentic being-with and authentic solicitude”. [”Das Dasein wird damit nicht aus dem In-der-Weltsein herausgelöst, sondern erst eigentlich in seine Situation hineingestellt, erst zu eigentlichem Mitsein und eigentlicher Fürsorge fähig.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 455.]  
50 Heidegger himself never speaks of such a fullness or completion in Being and Time. He does however speak of the totality of Dasein. Cf. e.g. §39, p. 171: ”[…] angst provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping the primordial totality of being of Da-sein. Its being reveals itself as care.” [”Die Angst gibt […] den phänomenalen Boden für die explizite Fassung der ursprünglichen Seinsganzeht des Daseins. Dessen Sein enthüllt sich als die Sorge. Die ontologische Ausarbeitung dieses existenzialen Grundphänomens.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 182.] The notion of care will be further discussed in chapter 2.1 of the current essay.
That wherefore one is anguished [anxious] is the possibility not to be, to which anguish [anxiety] testifies: it is the experience of the nothingness of our being. That about which one is anguished [anxious], and likewise that about which human beings are concerned in their own being, is being as a fullness, which one would like to preserve and not leave behind – of which there is no mention in Heidegger's entire analysis of Dasein and through which it would nevertheless first be founded.51

Stein hereby makes a decisive break with Heidegger. Her concept of anxiety does not only purport Abgrundung, as Heidegger proposes, but more essentially a being which is not Dasein’s own – a fuller being, which is the "foundation and goal for its own being".52 As the Steinian scholar and theologian James Orr notes, "fullness subordinates anxiety in terms of existential priority", according to Stein, "because it is what anxiety presupposes".53 Both Heidegger’s and Stein’s understandings of anxiety and the moment constituting itself therewith entail an inversion of temporality – a rupture of vulgar time in favour of authentic time. But Stein does not agree on the fact that the most authentic experience of Dasein is its ecstatic temporality, namely that it exists at the same time in the past, future and the present moment.54 In contradistinction to Heidegger, Stein speaks instead of a superior "life-feeling"55 of the now, one which is closely connected to the experience of fulfilment:

51 Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosopie", 76. ["Das, wovor man sich ängstet, ist das Nicht-sein-können, das eben durch die Angst bezeugt wird: sie ist die Erfahrung der Nichtigkeit unseres Seins. Das, worum man sich ängstet, und zugleich das, worum es dem Menschen in seinem Sein geht, das ist das Sein als eine Fülle, die man bewahren und nicht lassen möchte – das, wovon in Heideggers ganzer Daseinsanalyse nicht die Rede ist und wodurch sie doch erst Grund und Boden gewinnen würde." Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 473.]

52 Ibid., 79.

53 Orr, "'The Fullness of Life’. Death, finitude, and life-philosophy in Edith Stein’s Critique of the Early Heidegger", 573. However, Orr remains critical towards Stein on this point, arguing that she "confuses Dasein’s anxiety at the threat of the nothingness of Being with its anxiety at the threat of the loss of Being" (ibid.). But while Stein does indeed equal "the nothingness of our being" with "the possibility not to be" (Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy", 76) she never equals it with the possibility of loosing one’s own life. She rather understands the possibility not to be as an essential part of human life – in the section on "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" she expressly formulates nothingness as "the pure horizon" of being (op. cit., 88).

54 Cf. e.g. §69, p. 351 in Being and Time where Heidegger writes that "[t]he ecstatic unity of temporality – that is, the unity of the 'outside-itself' in the raptures of the future, the having-been, and the present – is the condition of the possibility that there can be a being that exists as its 'There'". ["Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit, das heißt die Einheit des 'Außer-sich' in den Entrückungen von Zukunft, Gewesen-heit und Gegenwart, ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein 'Da' existiert." Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 350.]
In the pre-theoretical understanding of being which belongs to human beings as such, there is a purely natural and healthy "life-feeling", a certainty of being that is so strong that, when unbroken by anguish [anxiety], one would not believe in death were it not for other testimonies. There are, however, such other testimonies, and they are so convincing that the natural certainty of being is annihilated when confronted with them.56

Stein touches upon this question in a similar way several years earlier, in a discussion of the momentary in Potency and Act. In a brief paragraph called "Being and time", she writes:

We ought not to separate from temporality the being that I am aware of as of my own being. As actual being it involves discrete points: a "now" between a "no longer" and a "not yet". But since its flowing character is split into being and nonbeing, the idea of pure being unveils itself to us, a being which in itself has nothing of nonbeing, in which there is no "no longer", no "not yet," and which is not temporal but eternal. Thus eternal and temporal being, changeless and changeable being, as well as nonbeing, are ideas that the intellect comes upon within itself, for they are not borrowed from elsewhere.57

In other words, the certainty of being or the idea of pure being originating from the analogical relation between being and nonbeing in Dasein is not, according to Stein, perceived only in the moment through cognition, remembrance and expectation, intellect or memory. Rather,

55 James Orr points out Dilthey’s influence on Stein on this matter. He suggests that in her treatise on psychic causality "she adopts from Dilthey her central motifs of 'life-power' (Lebenskraft) and 'life-feelings' (Lebensgefühlen)". He also contends that Stein will later come to use the life-power term to "marry" ontology and theology in Finite and Eternal Being as it comes to denote the power of being itself (Orr, op. cit., 569f).

56 Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy", 76. ["[I]n dem rein natürlichen und gesunden Lebensgefühl, dem vortheoretischen Seinsverständnis, das zum menschlichen Sein als solchem gehört, ist unbeschadet der Angst die Seinssicherheit so stark, daß man den Tod nicht glauben würde, wenn es keine anderen Bezeugungen gäbe. Es gibt aber solche Bezeugungen, und zwar so stark, daß die natürliche Seinssicherheit davor zunichte wird.” Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 474.]

57 Stein, Potency and Act, 10.
she formulates it as a necessity that one sees to the moment’s ontic definition: what is momentary cannot exist by itself.  

Momentary being, at the moment when it is, is something after the manner of being absolute [schlechthin], of full being knowing no changes in tense. Yet because it is but a moment, neither is it at that moment full being; its frailty [Hinfälligkeit] already lies in its momentary being. This momentary being itself is but an analogue of eternal being that at every moment is full being.

This thought is equally present in”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, and reaches the same conclusion: Dasein cannot simply be temporal, not simply given or thrown – it must additionally be understood in terms of sustaining [bewahren]. Ontically as well as intellectually the human kind of being sustains the idea of a fuller being, Stein argues, and this sustaining is manifested as a life-feeling of the now. For Stein, Dasein is dependent on this feeling of life, this experience of presence, which Heidegger vaguely omits in favour of Dasein’s futural character of”being towards”. Because while Heidegger’s term for Dasein’s historicity – its having-been-being – indeed implies a kind of sustaining, Stein argues that Dasein’s futural character constantly transcends it, making any maintenance of the now fundamentally impossible.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 10f.

"That we […], despite our being’s fleeting nature, can take the timeless up into ourselves, maintain something (what Heidegger calls having-been-being is a maintaining), proves that our being is not simply temporal, that it does not exhaust itself in temporality.” Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 79. ["Daß wir aber in unser Sein Zeitloses aufnehmen können, daß wir trotz der Flüchtigkeit unseres Seins etwas bewahren (was Heidegger Gewesend-sein nennt, ist ein Bewahren), das beweist, daß unser Sein nicht schlechthin zeitlich ist, daß es sich nicht in der Zeitlichkeit erschöpft.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 478.] Unlike Lebech I have chosen to translate ”bewahren” as ”sustaining”.

"[Dasein] is what it has been, and it is this by something present: future, having been (past), and present are its outside itself or the ecstases of its temporality. The future has primacy” (Stein, op. cit., 64). ["[Dasein ist] was es gewesen ist, und ist bei etwas Gegenwärtigem: Zukunft, Gewesenheit (Vergangenheit), und Gegenwärtigkeit sind sein Außer-sich oder die Ekstasen seiner Zeitlichkeit. Die Zukunft ist das Primäre.” Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existenzphilosophie”, 456.] Concluding the discussion a few pages further on, she states that historicality and being-in-time for Heidegger ”both follow from original temporality; therefore history is also secondary in time” (ibid., 66). ["[F]olgen beide aus der ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit; darum ist sekundär auch die Geschichte in der Zeit.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 459.]
(springing from Dasein’s unfulfilled temporal character) Stein draws the conclusion that history, for Heidegger, is "secondary in time".62

If for Heidegger, future throws momentary Dasein into the uncanny – or, more precise still: Dasein in its authentic and, according to Stein, primordially futural temporality equals being ”in the raptures of the future, the having-been, and the present”63 – the sustaining capacity of Stein’s momentary life-feeling of the now is so strong that, by constantly searching to fulfill itself due to the concern for fulfillment, it expounds the boundaries of the own self. This argument conforms to the quote previously cited from Potency and Act, according to which the now as an eternal point is coterminous with the act.64 In conformity with the Heideggerian moment this point stretches backwards and forwards, breaks vulgar time – but it is never in itself entirely broken because what endures is also the act, the ontic-intellectual idea of the pure act/actuality. Thus, while Dasein’s temporality is in a way ecstatic even for Stein – as an ecstasis in being – it also bears with it an idea, a concern or a feeling, what might be called a phenomenological experience of the static or the infinite, enabling a certain sense of enduring within, yet stretching beyond the boundaries of its own being. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein is that of a fleeting being-toward-death in terms of limited temporality. Stein’s Dasein is also a fleeting being, yet a fleeting being persisting in its fleeting-ness, or as Calcagno notes: "persisting in being” or "being-kept-in-being”. As articulated by Calcagno, Stein ascribes to Dasein an “ontological security”. And if for Heidegger death is a natural inevitability, for Stein it is an unnatural rupture of this ontological security.65

In short, Stein understands Heidegger’s Dasein in its thrownness as a potentially singular, a momentary point coinciding with its future, but that lacks the sustaining and enduring aspects, which she herself reads into it. For Heidegger, she argues, there can be no authentic sustained self and no authentic otherness because there is no subjectivity other than time: no being beyond the life and death of the universally own, temporal, self-transcending being.66

62 Ibid.
63 Heidegger, Being and Time, 351.
64 Stein, Potency and Act, 10f. She furthermore defines an act as "that wherein I come upon myself as be-ing [sei-end]; we are tempted to say: my actual life” (op. cit., 12).
65 Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein, 126.
66 Cf. Stenin’s discussion on this matter in the section ”Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics” (”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 85).
2. Actuality: Beyond Being-toward

In the paragraph quoted earlier from *Potency and Act* it was made apparent that Stein understands Dasein as both actual and singular being – that ”[w]e ought not to separate from temporality the being that I am aware of as of my own being”. But how can the temporal-actual as well as the momentary, both features that in *Being and Time* characterise the human kind of being in its authenticity, be able to preserve a sense of the self without something akin to what Stein calls ”sustenance”? And the other way around: how can Stein’s ”sustenance” of actuality be understood without returning to a mere philosophy of subjectivity? What causes the life-feeling of the now and how, moreover, are we to understand its transcending qualities?

For Heidegger, what unsettles the they-self in anxiety is, in conformity with ecstatic authentic Dasein, being-ahead or care [*Sorge*]. In contrast, for Stein, authenticity is achieved in the concern [*Besorgen*] for fulfilment that is afflicted with anxiety – phenomenologically manifesting itself in and through the life-feeling of the now. It is with this insight that Stein adds to the concept of Dasein a sustaining capacity. In order, though, to instigate a more thorough discussion of Stein’s altered understanding of Dasein as transcending actuality, it is essential to briefly touch upon the reasons for, and the implications arising out of, Stein’s prioritisation of concern over care.

2.1 Care

Stein interprets the concept of ”care” in *Being and Time* as the name for Dasein’s thrownness. She expressly writes that:

> With the term ”care” is designated the entire structure of Dasein (facticity as thrownness, existence as selfanticipation including being towards the end, deterioration). The unity of this whole expresses itself in the self or I: it is not to be understood as ”res”, nor as ”res cogitans”; nor does it speak from the I, but it expresses itself silently in care, and it is ”independent” in authentic being. It belongs to the meaning of care, i.e. to the being of ”a being for which this being is an issue”, that this being understands itself in its being. ”The meaning of Dasein’s being is not something free-floating which is other than and outside of

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itself, but it is the self-understanding Dasein itself.”

In other words, ”care” with its three dimensions of past, future and present (thrown-ness, understanding and fallen-ness) is the name for Dasein’s existential totality just as it also designates the existential meaning of Heidegger’s Dasein. However, the nature of this totality is complex.

Due to the fact that Heidegger equates Dasein’s ”being-ahead” with the care for its own possibilities, Stein argues that something of Dasein’s being always remains outstanding; Dasein’s “care” implies that Dasein is always-already outside-itself – and concomitantly in its actuality is always-already ahead of itself. Stein readily admits that Heidegger thinks not of care as something preserved for the self, the world or even for the living – as Dasein in terms of care is relational one can care in relation to both the other and to the dead. And while this indeed implies a certain kind of sharing in Dasein, Stein raises the question of what this sharing implies if there is nothing to share but Dasein itself. Similarly, she questions the fact that care is a way to be understanding of being without necessarily relating to this understanding of being. Implied in this argumentation is a purported concept of ”being itself”, but one that remains fundamentally dependent on, and could never exist beyond, Dasein.

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69 Ibid., 62.

70 Ibid.

71 ”As the understanding of being is something that belongs to Dasein, there is understanding of being only when Dasein is. From this it follows that being itself, if not beings, is dependent on Dasein. The substance of human beings – understood as caring – is claimed to be their existence” (ibid., 61). [”Da Seinsverständnis etwas zum Dasein Gehöriges ist, gibt es Seinsverständnis nur, wenn es Dasein gibt. Daraus wird gefolgt, daß das Sein selbst, wenn auch nicht das Seiende, vom Dasein abhängig sei. Als Substanz des Menschen aber wird seine Existenz – als Sorge verstanden – in Anspruch genommen.” Stein, Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie, 451.]
2.2 Concern

If, in *Being and Time*, care is simply the same as being, concern can be described as *a way to be* induced by the moods. In anxiety, Dasein concerns itself in its own existence as Being-toward-death and Being-in-the-world. It concerns itself, as Stein writes, in “its own possibility to be as care”.72 Stein moreover defines Heidegger’s concept of concern as something that characterises Dasein:

"Being-in-the-world" is characterized by "concern" (in the many senses of "enduring"73, "achieving", "obtaining", and "being apprehensive"). Knowing is also a kind of concern. One falsifies its original character if one sees it as a relationship between present-at-hands (subject and object). It is a kind of in-being, and admittedly not the fundamental one, but a *modification of the original in-being*.74

While both care and concern are existential prerequisites of Dasein, Stein further understands Heidegger’s concern as a specific mode of Dasein. When Dasein in anxiety concerns itself in its proper existence, time is overthrown and the temporally enclosed they-self breaks open in favour of a more authentic being. In other words, concern is the mode induced by the mood in which Dasein is revealed as authentic care in itself. In the same way Heidegger’s care implied that *being itself* is limited to a structure within Dasein, Stein now argues that the notion of concern purports to a concept of authenticity that could never exist beyond Dasein.

2.3 Being-alongside

72 Ibid., 63. Cf. ibid., 61: “[Dasein’s] being-ahead is named ‘care’ and is the foundation for all concern and solicitude, all wishing and willing, all addiction and urge.” [“[S]ein Vor-weg-sein wird mit dem Namen *Sorge* genannt und ist Grundlage für alles Besorgen und Fürsorgen, alles Wünschen und Wollen, allen Hang und Drang.” Stein, Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie, 451.]
73 Note how Lebech wrongly translates "Erledigen" as "Enduring" here, utterly confusing Stein’s argument. "Erledigen" is commonly translated as "carrying out".
74 Ibid., 58. [”Das In-der-Welt-sein ist gekennzeichnet als *Besorgen* (in den mannigfaltigen Bedeutungen von *erledigen, ausführen, sich verschaffen, befürchten*). Auch das Erkennen ist eine Art des Besorgens. Man verfälscht seinen ursprünglichen Charakter, wenn man es als eine Beziehung zwischen Vorhandenem (*Subjekt und Objekt*) deutet. Es ist eine Weise des In-seins, und zwar nicht die grundlegende, sondern eine *Abwandlung des ursprünglichen In-seins*.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 447.]
The image Stein paints of Heidegger’s Dasein as outstanding care entails not only that Dasein in its actuality is always-already ahead of itself, but also that Dasein in its world is always-already alongside this world.\textsuperscript{75} Not, that is, in a spatial way: there is no entity called Dasein that can be posited alongside other entities – not alongside things, nor alongside a “world”. On the basis of Stein’s interpretation of Dasein as relational, Dasein must rather be understood as pure being-alongside. And as the discussion turns to the question of concern and the authenticity conceived in anxiety, Stein draws closer to the main critique she levels against Heidegger, namely the impossibility of authentic otherness.

For Heidegger, concerned Dasein has as its principal distinguishing feature an existential sharing in an experience of freedom – an experience of abyssal openness that unfolds itself and constitutes the authenticity of what is universally own. Heidegger’s Dasein is ”a being which is concerned in its being about that being” – i.e. the own kind of being.\textsuperscript{76} Even when concerned in its authentic state, Dasein cannot be concerned with another, with another’s Being-toward-death, or even the death of another, Stein argues – only alongside it.\textsuperscript{77} For Heidegger, when Dasein is concerned in anxiety it is care in authentic being.

Stein herself has a somewhat different take on the experience of sharing that occurs in anxiety. She suggests that care induces concern rather than the other way around. Because apart from being concerned in its being in anxiety, Stein proclaims that Dasein must be concerned with – as was shown in chapter 1.3, concerned with the fulfilment of Dasein due to its inherent lack: its mortality. Thus, the breaking open of the temporally enclosed they-self makes room for authentic being beyond the beyond. For while lack might be its reason, this concern with fulfilment causes a life-feeling of the now that entails nothing but overflow: an endurance of life beyond that of being-alongside, because it stretches beyond Dasein. For Stein, when Dasein cares in anxiety it is concerned with authentic being.

\textsuperscript{75} Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 62.
\textsuperscript{76} Heidegger, Being and Time, 179.
\textsuperscript{77} Concern is instead awoken from within Dasein itself through conscience. Heidegger describes conscience as a call that calls Dasein to itself, to its authentic self, back from the previously mentioned they-self [das Man]. And Dasein itself is the caller ”in its anguish [anxiety] concerned with its own possibility to be as care” (Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 63). [”In seiner Angst um sein eigenes Seinkönnen als Sorge ist der Rufer.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 455.]
3. Space: Beyond Body and Soul

In the current essay I have chosen to sub-divide Stein’s critique of the Heideggerian concept of Dasein as transcendence into four main themes – ”time”, ”actuality”, ”space” and ”potentiality”. This is chiefly intended for the purposes of presenting a thematic structure, showing from different sides what, according to Stein, amounts to fundamentally the same problem in Heidegger’s philosophy: the lack of a ”beyond the beyond” as a lack of authentic otherness. And while Stein deviates from Heidegger’s thoughts on space and transcendence much on the same grounds as she does on the issues of time and transcendence, there are some notable differences in nuance between the arguments that will be of value for the concluding discussion on sociality.

Before undertaking a discussion of spatiality, it should be made clear that neither Heidegger nor Stein understand Dasein to be simply posited in or occupying space. What we reckon as space in our everyday life – the spaces through which we move – is merely a spatiality experienced by the in-authentic they-self (as was the case with calculable time). Dasein’s proper spatiality is determined by what Heidegger chooses to call ”de-distancing” [Entfernung] and ”directionality” [Ausrichtung] and it rather designates how Dasein is oriented in the world – how it ”dwells” in the world on an existential level.

3.1 De-distancing

Stein does not discuss in any substantive way Heidegger’s concept of de-distancing, although it is mentioned briefly in her ”Preliminary analysis”. There she states that de-distancing (or ”suppression of the far-away”) means ”the bringing of ready-to-hand into its proper nearness”. The nearness of which she speaks is a proximity to the world when experienced in terms of its equipmental potential. If what is regarded as distance and space in a Cartesian sense is that through which we move and that through which we are separated, Stein implies that Heidegger’s de-distancing denotes the spatial relations in a world in which we take part as beings-in-the world. In this sense there is no distance and nearness other than the varying

78 Ibid., 58f.
79 Ibid., 59.
"reach" of Dasein in its current activity – reach in terms of what Dasein at the moment understands as purposeful. "Nearness” emerges when the world simply functions as Dasein’s extended arm and "de-distancing” arises when in contrast the world does not seem to serve its immediate equipmental purpose, but appears to us as an obstacle. The possibility of de-distancing, i.e. the possibility of a rupture in the experiencing of the world as an equipmental extension of Dasein, is an existential characteristic of Dasein. It designates how Dasein dwells in the world on an existential level, and only on the basis of this existential spatiality can Dasein understand Cartesian space as meaningful.

Stein never expressly discards Heidegger’s concept of de-distancing. Yet, she does not find his description of Dasein’s existential spatiality sufficient: she demands a discussion of the body, which is lacking in Heidegger.80 While she describes Heidegger’s polysemic, modal definition of Dasein as Dasein’s positive definition, she also indexes a negative one: i.e., the negative definition of Dasein originating from Heidegger’s radical attempt at disestablishing the dichotomy of body and soul through rejecting the metaphysico-philosophical search for a causal ground.81 Even though Heidegger’s Dasein might be a kind of being with a body, Stein argues, it simultaneously reaches beyond itself. When he speaks of the being of Dasein, he insinuates a being transcending not only a supposed body, but also the very kind of being it is itself – i.e. the body-soul dichotomy as such. He thus manages to place the discussion of spatiality on a sufficiently abstract level so as to exclude every bodily aspect of the human kind of being except for its mere "being situated” in the world.

However, by recontextualising this argument of Heidegger’s in light of the earlier stated identity of existence and essence that Heidegger holds as pertaining to Dasein, Stein ultimately claims to have located a basic contradiction, one which stretches beyond the discussion of spatiality. In what way can being belong to Dasein, without at the same time this implying a separating out of the essence of the human being (the human kind of being) from

80 “That the human being has a body is not disputed, but nothing further is said about it. In contrast, the way in which the 'soul' is spoken about indicates that this is a word behind which there is no clear meaning. This must not be understood to suggest that what we have here is a materialist outlook. In contrast: it is clearly stated that the 'spirit' (this is admittedly also a word we ought not to use) has priority” (ibid., 69). ["Daß der Mensch einen Leib hat, wird nicht bestritten, es ist nur nicht weiter davon die Rede. Dagegen läßt die Art, wie von der Seele gesprochen wird, kaum eine andere Bedeutung zu, als daß dies ein Wort sei, hinter dem kein klarer Sinn stünde. Das darf nicht etwa dahin mißverstanden werden, als läge hier eine materialistische Auffassung vor. Im Gegenteil: es ist deutlich ausgesprochen, daß dem Geist (das ist freilich ein Wort, das auch nicht gebraucht werden sollte) ein Vorrang eingeräumt wird.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 464.]
81 Ibid.
being or existence as such? Does this not equal only a different, abstracted and disguised version of the body-soul or the existence-essence dichotomy, such that, pure being stands forth as meta-category whereas the human being with all its existentials is regarded as a kind of being? All the same, I have already shown how Stein reaches the conclusion that Dasein cannot be concerned with any authentic being beyond itself, in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the current essay.

3.2 Directionality

Stein concludes that Dasein’s directionality in Being and Time means "having directions in the environment (right, left, up, down, etc.) and its encountering of all things spatial". The directionality described here is thus directionality "in" the environment and not "to" the environment. And while Dasein’s encountering of spatial things is beyond the scope of the current essay, Dasein’s directionality in the environment is of the outmost importance. As being-in-the-world, Dasein is directionality. But whereto is it directed? The only answer given by Heidegger is: towards death.

If the question of time and death was problematised by Stein mainly through a critique of Heidegger’s definition of death as yet another existential of Dasein, then the theme of space and death, is most clearly expressed in her critique of Heidegger’s overemphasis placed on one’s own death – to the detriment of never grasping the death of others. To recall the argument reconstructed in section 1.2 of this study: "If it is the ultimate meaning of Dasein to be 'being towards death', then the meaning of Dasein should be clarified by the meaning of death. How is this possible, however, if nothing else can be said of death than that it is the end of Dasein?" This entails what Stein calls a "fruitless circularity". In contrast, Stein focuses just as much on the death of others as the universal singularity of one’s own death, proclaiming that death is never just an own, universal experience, but also an individuating and differentiating experience. Stein does not find it possible to speak of death, but only of

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82 Ibid., 70.
83 Ibid., 58f. ["daß es Richtungen in der Umwelt hat (rechts, links, oben, unten usw)" Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 448.]
84 Cf. ibid., 77.
85 Ibid., 75. ["Wenn es des Daseins letzter Sinn ist, Sein zum Tode zu sein, so müßte ja durch den Sinn des Todes der Sinn des Daseins erhellt werden. Wie ist das aber möglich, wenn sich vom Tod nichts anderes sagen läßt als daß er das Ende des Daseins sei?" Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 471f.]
86 This despite of Heidegger's explicit objections to the personalism in Being and Time, e.g. §10, p.
deaths. Everyone dies in his own way, approaches death in his own way and experiences other’s deaths in his own way. She furthermore argues that:

We would not believe in the end of our lives and we would not understand anguish [anxiety], yes, in many anguish [anxiety] would not even erupt (without it being disguised as fear for this and that), if we did not constantly experience the fact that others die. […] On this basis, what Heidegger calls ”one dies”, can grow: a knowledge that all human beings one day will be cut out of the world in which we live, and that also such a day will come for us.87

Stein formulates the experience of the dying process of another as a de-anonymization of Heidegger’s universal idea of ”one dies”. This de-anonymization is reached by the awakening of a question: Where did she go? What happens to the dead?88 And she finds this question to

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45f: "[W]hat obstructs or misleads the basic question of the being of Da-sein is the orientation thoroughly colored by the anthropology of Christianity and the ancient world, whose inadequate ontological foundations personalism and the philosophy of life also ignore. […] The sources which are relevant for traditional anthropology – the Greek definition and the theological guideline – indicate that, over and above the attempt to determine the essence of ’human being’ as a being, the question of its being has remained forgotten; rather, this being is understood as something ’self-evident’ in the sense of the objective presence of other created things.” [”Was aber die grundsätzliche Frage nach dem Sein des Daseins verbaut oder mißleitet, ist die durchgängige Orientierung an der antik-christlichen Anthropologie, über deren unzureichende ontologischen Fundamente auch Personalismus und Lebensphilosophie hinwegsehen. […] Die für die traditionelle Anthropologie relevanten Ursprünge, die griechische Definition und der theologische Leitfaden, zeigen an, daß über einer Wesensbestimmung des Seienden ’Mensch ’ die Frage nach dessen Sein vergessen bleibt, dieses Sein vielmehr als ’selbstverständlich ’ im Sinne des Vorhandenseins der übrigen geschaffenen Dinge begriffen wird.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 48f.] Even if Stein does indeed speak of personal being, and even though her philosophy is in a way a ”philosophy of life” inspired by Christian thought, she never regards the being of the human being as ”self-evident” (ibid., 46). She does however push on the importance of understanding Dasein both in its universal and personal being.

87 Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 77. [”Wir würden nicht an das Ende unseres Lebens glauben, ja sie würde bei vielen niemals nackt zum Durchbruch kommen (d.h. ohne Verkleidung als Furcht vor diesem und jenem), wenn wir nicht beständig erfahren würden, daß andere sterben. … Auf dieser Grundlage kann das erwachsen, was Heidegger als Man stirbt bezeichnet: ein Wissen darum, daß alle Menschen eines Tages aus der Welt, in der wir leben, ausscheiden und daß auch für uns einmal dieser Tag kommen wird.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 475]

88 Ibid., 78. She furthermore argues that ”Heidegger must ignore this contemplation of death as it would force him to consider body and soul in their mutual relationship, something which he excluded from the start. Human beings have, since time immemorial, spontaneously met the experience of death with the question of the destiny of the soul” (ibid., 77). [”Von dieser Betrachtung des Todes muß Heidegger absehen, weil sie ihn ja zwingen würde, Leib und Seele und ihr wechselseitiges Verhältnis zu berücksichtigen, was von vornherein ausgeschlossen wurde. Dem unbefangen Menschen hat zu allen Zeiten die Erfahrung des Todes in dieser Form die Frage nach dem Schicksal der Seele
be an implication of the fact that the full meaning of death can never be understood. Once again "where" is not understood in terms of space – the body of the dead might very well remain in front of us – but as a direction towards something else, as either a questioning or a non-understanding.\(^9^9\) Calcagno writes that what strikes us when experiencing another’s death according to Stein is not the lack of what has been, but the fullness of that which is no longer present. He suggests that since we want to keep existing – since death is not natural but frightens us, for Stein – we "point to another dimension of being, namely, a more eternal state that does not admit nothingness, but only plenitude".\(^9^0\) This argument can be recognised from Stein’s conception of the moment and her understanding of anxiety (by which the momentary is subordinated to the eternal moment of pure actuality just as fullness subordinates anxiety).

3.3 Place

The conclusion that arises out of Stein’s discussion of de-distancing and directionality is that she comprehends Dasein in terms of constituting a place, rather than having (as was shown in chapter 3.1) or being (as was shown in chapter 3.2) a point in space. She argues furthermore that this place is inferior to Dasein’s temporality:

Dasein’s \textit{temporality} is not one in which space is coordinated to time. But the \textit{spatiality} of Dasein is temporal. Dasein is not at a point in space, but rather takes up space (and not only that which the body fills. "Because Dasein is ‘spiritual’, and \textit{only because of this}, can it be spatial in a way which remains essentially possible for the extended corporeal thing"). It is directed out in space and uncovers regions wherefrom and whereto it expects something and where things become present. Its temporality makes it possible for it to take up space. In the approaching making present which gives preference to deterioration, the yonder is forgotten and it appears hereafter only as a \textit{thing in space}.\(^9^1\)

\(^{99}\) Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie", 475
\(^{90}\) Ibid., 78.
\(^{91}\) Calcagno, \textit{The Philosophy of Edith Stein}, 123.
In line with Stein’s thought, authentic Dasein as Being-in-the-world can thus be described as a temporal-situational place in the world that is co-structured by space. It differs from the place of the ready-to-hand because of Dasein’s de-distancing and directionality; its place is in no way teleological as that of the ready-to-hand, but nonetheless it is a topos. Clearly it is not possible to fully separate the notions of time and space in either Steinian or Heideggerian thinking: both temporality and spatiality can, on an existential level, be traced back to the concept of Dasein as a moment or a place. Concluding the two discussions on de-distancing and directionality, Dasein could be described as punctuality – being rather than being posited in time, and taking up rather than being posited in space. So far, Stein agrees with Heidegger. But here, once again, they part company.

The schism is created by Stein’s objections to Heidegger’s description of authentic Dasein as a "cleared" being. So what does it mean when in §28 Heidegger describes Dasein as "cleared" [gelichtet] or as a “clearing” [Lichtung]? 92 Stein cites Heidegger’s claim that Dasein in its ecstatic temporality “clears the There primordially”. 93 What is cleared is thus the "there” of the being-there, the "Da” of Da-sein. Along these lines, Stein concludes that it is through Dasein – clearing itself of its "Da” – that "the unity of all existential structures becomes possible. From it being-in-the-world is to be understood, [as well as] the meaning of the world’s being and its transcending”. 94

Furthermore, Stein emphasises that Dasein is never cleared through other beings. 95 Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as "possibility”, "meaning” and "understanding” takes as its departure one single point; it implies an essential openness of Dasein both in terms of that which is open and can be filled and that which is open and can be sealed, as well as the very movement of opening and closing in itself.

Zeitlichkeit macht ihm das Raumeinnehmen möglich. In der nährenden Gegenwärtigung, die das Verfallen bevorzogt, wird das Dort vergessen, und es erscheint zunächst nur ein Ding im Raum.”

92 Heidegger, Being and Time, §69, 125; Sein und Zeit, 233.
93 Ibid., 321; Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy", 65. ["[L]ichtet das Da ursprünglich.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 351.]
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 59.
In combining these two conclusions, Stein asserts that there can be no “other” place towards which the human kind of being is directed – or, that there can be, but then Dasein is in itself both the human kind of being, the directedness, and the other place at once. Once again she shows that being beyond Dasein is impossible in accordance with Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time – spatially as well as temporally, situationally. The Heideggerian moment cannot sustain: it is defined as a rupture, an overthrowing, a clearing – both spacing and gathering, in its doubleness a maintained breathing – but it can neither endure nor sustain.

This is where the critique of Heidegger normally reaches its point of culmination: as a critique of solipsism. That is not, however, the case with Stein. Her own, transformed conception of Dasein is in a way solipsistic too, in that Dasein is in itself both the human kind of being and a directedness of sort; the Steinian human being is a metaphysical kind of being. Yet she stresses additionally the necessity of placing the ”towards which” of our directedness outside of Dasein, without making it into the outside of Dasein, as is the case in Heidegger.

In addition to the endurance of Dasein a propos time, Stein suggests that Dasein is not only a Being-in-the-world as place, but that Dasein in its authentic state takes part in a place that is fuller than itself: a communal place. This communal place is understood as a lived and shared experience (in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities [Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften] she formulates this experience as a Gemeinschaftserlebnis96). Hence, even if there is a tragic aspect to Dasein, the most original or authentic experience is that of partaking in a community fuller than the ”own”. Dasein’s concern with the fullness of community purports to a sense of sustenance; it lingers as an idea of full being dislocated from being-in-the-world as an as if… It constitutes a sustained place that, though continually constructed and lost in the moment, is no less authentic than the universal-particular being revealed in Heidegger’s moment, although authentic in a different way.97

By way of drawing to a close the first three chapters of this study, the disparity between Stein’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of Dasein can be summarised as follows: For Heidegger, Dasein is, at one and the same time, transcending, that which is being transcended and

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96 Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein, xiii. Calcagno refers to this Gemeinschaftserlebnis as “a peculiar form of consciousness”.
97 Cf. James Orr: ”[F]or Stein authentic life is not constituted – as it is in Jaspers and Heidegger – by an absolutisation of finitude, by holding fast to that which restricts and so defines it. […] she construes life as a gift bestowed from beyond the limits of finite existence, and therefore as a condition that breaks the constraints imposed by those limits” (“The Fullness of Life’. Death, finitude, and life-philosophy in Edith Stein’s Critique of the Early Heidegger”, 571).
transcendence itself. He thus develops what can be referred to as a *transcending phenomenology*, evolving around Dasein as the locus. The cost of this, Stein argues, is that he simultaneously transcends phenomenology, placing phenomena within the concept of the depersonalized own being. What was set out to be a destruction of the individual self thus turns into the constitution of an anonymous, universal being or a point that absorbs all – a place extending everywhere and encompassing everything – leaving nothing *outside of* it. If the possibility of being beyond Dasein, i.e. a beyond the beyond, is excluded, the same goes for all otherness. Hence, Stein rather advocates a *phenomenology of transcendence* – clinging to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as beyond, but also pushing at the very phenomenality of its transcendence in terms of lack and fulfilment, thus accentuating the importance of acknowledging the *possibility* of a ‘beyond the beyond’ as a possibility of an authentic otherness – whether this is to be interpreted as a divine being or simply another kind of being-toward-death. It is at this point that our discussion will carry over into the field of sociality.

4. Potentiality: Beyond Being-in-the-world

When Heidegger writes of potentiality in *Being and Time*, Stein understands it in the form of negative possibility. At a certain point in anxiety, when being evades, actuality and potentiality coincide for Heidegger. This point called Dasein – Stein quotes §31 of *Being and Time* – is ”primarily its being-possible”\(^98\); it constitutes a fundamental freedom and openness unveiling itself in an experience of ungrounding. Stein deviates from this definition on the same grounds that she diverges from Heidegger’s definition of Dasein’s actuality as momentary, ecstatic temporality. Her problem is on the one hand the alleged primacy of an *own* potentiality and on the other hand the *groundlessness* of Dasein’s freedom.

In *Potency and Act* Stein ascertains that potency can be active or passive. God’s potency is active and can thus not be described as an act in the creaturely sense. A creaturely act, which starts and stops, demands passive potency as its principle.\(^99\) She draws upon a similar argument in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, when she asks: if Dasein’s existence and essence – or rather, if its actuality and potentiality – coincide, and Dasein’s potentiality according to Heidegger consists of nothing but its own unfulfilled potential (as

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\(^{98}\) Stein, ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 59. [”[Dasein] ist primär Möglichkeit” Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 143.]

being-toward-death), then how are we to understand the fact that Dasein is not just pure act but also that it interacts? In short, how can we understand Dasein as a social kind of being?

Dasein’s innermost authenticity certainly implies a lack and withdrawal, even for Stein. But as was shown in chapter 1.3, she claims that this withdrawal entails a fulfilling and overflowing rather than an abyssal experience. In other words, Stein would argue that Dasein’s potentiality is a kind of potency: not merely possibility but positive possibility. This potency is, for Stein, consonant with Dasein’s sustaining and enduring capacity, making the withdrawal coterminous not with an experiencing of groundlessness but with a constructive ground.

4.1 Being-with

The task of the following sections is to investigate the core of Stein’s argument by turning to that specific kind of authentic otherness, which this essay has set out to investigate, namely the sociality of the human kind of being. This will be accomplished by examining the terms Mitsein and Mit-dasein as they are conceived in relation to potentiality – both the way Stein understands Heidegger’s conception of this relation, and the way she articulates it herself. What difference does it make for the understanding of sociality to regard Dasein as ecstatic ungrounding versus constructive ecstasy?

When in §26 of Being and Time Heidegger introduces the concept of Mitsein Stein understands it ontologically, as an a priori transcendental condition of sociality. She writes that "[i]t belongs to Dasein to be-with other beings who also have the form of Dasein". To be in-the-world at all times means to be a kind of Being-with, according to Heidegger. Regardless of Dasein’s current state, authentic or in-authentic, Dasein is at work in the world as a kind of “own” yet “shared” activity.

For Stein this means that Heidegger’s Dasein is a being-with on a universal level, which must be ”presupposed for learning and understanding (empathy)” and not merely a being-with the other or an other on a particular, or, with her own words, personal level. This

100 Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 59. ["Zum Dasein gehört ein Mitsein von anderen Seienden, die auch die Form des Daseins haben.” Stein, Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie, 448.]
101 Ibid.
102 "[W]e cannot gain from the expression form of existence any information about the meaning and the mutual relationship of the two ’selves’. Because personality is only possible in the they-self" (ibid., 71). ["[Wir können] aus dem Wort Existenzform keinen Aufschluß über den Sinn und das
argument can be recognised from her critique of Heidegger’s concept of being-alongside-the-world. 103 There are, however, two kinds of being "with" in Heidegger’s vocabulary: the pure and simple being-with, Mitsein, and the being-with-Dasein, Mit-dasein.

4.2 Mit-dasein

Heidegger’s addition of “da” in Mit-da-sein marks and separates Mitsein into different da’s, each of which has distinct points of departure. Owing to this interior distinction, the discussion becomes more complex. While Mitsein is defined as a purely existential and relational concept of sociality, Mit-dasein designates authentic Dasein’s existential experience of the other’s being-in-the-world (the other in its “innerworldly being-in-itself”, as Heidegger writes in Being and Time). 104 In contradistinction to Mitsein, being-with-dasein could be described as the authentic sharing of being, which tragically separates the human kind of being into alienated and irreconcilable points, while at the same time, Heidegger proposes, it generates a kind of authentic purely relational sociality. 105

Heidegger’s brief exposition of the social character of Dasein is in no way satisfactory for Stein. She draws attention to the fact that, for Heideger, most of the time Dasein is not its authentic self – it flees and finds shelter in community and inauthentic they-self. Fleeing from the call of conscience, Dasein indulges into communal habits, manners and responsibilities (e.g. "one should” do this and that). And even though Heidegger himself does not speak of the deterioration from authentic self to they-self as a "fall” in hierarchic terms – but rather thinks of the deterioration as an opening/closing that is an inevitable and even crucial fact of Dasein – Stein accentuates the fact that he nonetheless regard the authentic self as Dasein’s greatest achievement. 106 The sociality of authentic self is thus to be regarded as a greater achievement

103 See p. 27f of the current essay.

104 "The world of Da-sein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others. The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is Mitda-sein.” Heidegger, Being and Time, §26, 112. ["Die Welt des Daseins ist Mitwelt. Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen. Das innerweltliche Ansichsein dieser ist Mitdasein.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 118.]

105 Cf. ibid, §26, 113: "The Mitda-sein of others is disclosed only within the world for a Da-sein and thus also for those who are Mitda-sein, because Da-sein in itself is essentially being-with.” ["Dieses Mitdasein der Anderen ist nur innerweltlich für ein Dasein und so auch für die Mitdaseienden erschlossen, weil das Dasein wesenhaft an ihm selbst Mitsein ist.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 120.]

106 “What meaning can ’deterioration’ have, if there is to be no reference to a ’fall’? (This is a parallel to ’thrownness’ without a ’throwing’). The reason advanced also is poor: because deteriorated being (it is even called ’nonbeing’) is the closest kind of being to Dasein’s, in which the latter exists for the

Wechselseitige Verhältnisse der beiden Selbst gewinnen. Daß zur Existenz ein Wer oder Selbst gehört, ist wohl einleuchtend.” Stein, “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 466.]
than inauthentic community. So even if Heidegger does in a way recognise genuine sociality, even stressing its importance, on the basis of her critique of Dasein as transcendence Stein argues that all sociality in Being and Time is limited to a structure within authentic Dasein. This immanent structure does not only leave the existence of the other as a mere circumstance due to the passive activity of sharing the world, but makes all authentic otherness fundamentally impossible, according to Stein. Dasein is community just as it is a solus ipse. Only while fleeing into the "they" is the human kind of being part of community for Heidegger – but not even "[w]ithin the boundaries of the 'they-self' and the inauthentic self" does the other come "fully into its own" according to Stein.107 Authentic Dasein is capable of sociality only in terms of a "passive" pure act of being-with, and inauthentic Dasein is capable of sociality only in terms of inauthentic community. Regardless of whether Dasein is conceived in its authentic or inauthentic state, as Mitsein or Mit-dasein, sociality is an a priori ontological condition of Dasein in terms of a pure act. And even though it is true that neither the notion of Mitsein nor Mit-dasein excludes the possibility of otherness per se, coupled with Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as transcendence invariably they do.

4.3 Being Beyond Dasein

Still by this point, the inclination to repudiate Stein’s critique of Heidegger as a simple reversion to the very same history of ontology, which Heidegger had set out to deconstruct might take the upper hand, especially if one is familiar with Stein’s Aquinian inheritance and

most part, deterioration ought not to be interpreted as a fall. When the average everyday human being is characterised as deteriorated, this is only possible in contrast with authentic being, of which we must also have knowledge. And in relation to deteriorated being, authentic being is, qua being, more original." Stein, "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy”, 74. ["Welchen Sinn hat es denn, von Verfall zu sprechen ohne Hinblick auf einen Fall? (Es entspricht genau dem Geworfensein ohne einen Wurf.) Auch die vorausgeschickte Begründung ist wenig beweiskräftig: Weil das verfallene Sein (es wird geradezu Nicht-sein genannt) die nächste Seinsart des Daseins sei, in der es sich zumeist halte, dürfte das Verfallensein nicht als Fall gedeutet werden. Wenn das durchschnittliche, alltägliche menschliche Sein als verfallenes gekennzeichnet ist, so ist das nur möglich in der Abhebung gegenüber einem eigentlichen Sein, von dem wir auch Kenntnis haben müssen. Und im Verhältnis zum verfallenen ist das eigentliche Sein das seinsmäßig ursprünglichere.” Stein, "Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 470.] For further discussion on this topic, see James Orr’s Edith Stein’s Critique of Sociality in Early Heidegger”, 391.

What is necessary to keep in mind, however, is the way that Stein stays faithful to phenomenology throughout her inquiry. The full complexity of Stein’s critique was touched upon in the previous chapter on space. Even if, in one way, she returns to the Thomistic thought of divine hierarchies, in quite another way she dismisses them in favour of a phenomenological philosophy of transcendence. More accurately put: in order to formulate a phenomenological philosophy, including an understanding of otherness, she finds it necessary to return to these hierarchical structures. Not in order to derogate phenomenology, but in order to constructively combine phenomenology with Aquina’s theology. Although never quite completing this process of articulation so as to produce a seamless and uniform system, Stein’s attempt nonetheless deserves proper recognition. Primarily, for the interesting way in which Stein diverges from Heidegger, refusing to simply discard the metaphysical history of ontology, yet clinging to the ecstasy of being. This complex relation with Heidegger, which results in a constructive phenomenology, makes her a precursor to later phenomenological thought.

In this thesis I have chosen to speak of a potential being beyond Dasein in terms of authentic otherness. This decision was taken in order to place the argument on a level abstract enough to show the intimate connection between: i) Stein’s idea of time beyond life and death (i.e. the moment); ii) an actuality beyond being-toward-death (i.e. being-alongside); iii) a space beyond body and soul (i.e. place) and, lastly, a potentiality beyond Being-in-the-world (i.e. being beyond Dasein). The inquiry has not yet made a distinction between the different possible meanings of being beyond Dasein: e.g. the other, the community and the divine. There is, however, one apparent yet important difference at play between conceptions of God or community and the other, between, that is, a divine or communal moment or place and simply another moment or place: the divine and the communal imply the idea of a fuller being. Otherness does not. And recalling Stein’s discussion of the moment, the idea of fullness reinforces the whole argument:

108 In Potency and Act, Stein expressly writes that God’s existence is purely a “formal conclusion” (Potency and Act, 52). Even though the Aquinian concept of the analogy of being between God and creatures runs through her entire work, Stein’s methodical understanding of Aquinas philosophy rests upon, as editor Hans Rainer Sepp notes in the preface “a phenomenological analysis of things and their interconnections as Aquinas conceived them” (Rainer Sepp, “Introduction to Edith Stein”, op. cit., xxvii).

That wherefore one is anguished [anxious] is the possibility not to be, to which anguish [anxiety] testifies: it is the experience of the nothingness of our being. That about which one is anguished [anxious], and likewise that about which human beings are concerned in their own being, is being as a fullness, which one would like to preserve and not leave behind – of which there is no mention in Heidegger’s entire analysis of Dasein and through which it would nevertheless first be founded\textsuperscript{110}

By regarding Dasein as constructive ecstasy rather than ecstatic ungrounding Stein makes room for a fuller being than Dasein’s own. Still, one should be careful not to project an idealism onto Stein who is in fact neither an essentialist nor an existentialist, but a certain kind of realist. She does indeed speak of the fulfilment of Dasein, at the same time as she implies the existence of a fuller being. All the while she is careful not to speak of this fullness as something that is possible to reach in its totality other than in death.\textsuperscript{111} Even her concept of eternity is that of eternal mortality, just as there is no ideal place for Stein without acknowledging ontological hierarchy.

The only way to interpret Stein’s notion of fullness is as a phenomenological experience emerging from within Dasein due to its character of unfulfilled potentiality. What constitutes itself through this experience is not understanding, but rather non-understanding. The result is the experience of authentic otherness in and through the construction of a common ground.\textsuperscript{112}

And while, on the one hand, Stein uses this argument to reinforce the concept of the divine, she also uses it in order to enforce the possibility of understanding authentically other human beings existing beyond the limits of the ”own” being of Dasein. Such understanding can be

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 76. [“Das, worum man sich ängstet, ist das Nicht-sein-können, das eben durch die Angst bezeugt wird: sie ist die Erfahrung der \textit{Nichtigkeit unseres Seins}. Das, worum man sich ängstet, und zugleich das, worum es dem Menschen in seinem Sein geht, das ist das Sein als eine \textit{Fülle, die man bewahren und nicht lassen möchte} – das, \textit{wovon in Heideggers ganzer Daseinsanalyse nicht die Rede ist} und wodurch sie doch erst Grund und Boden gewinnen würde.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 473.]

\textsuperscript{111} ”It must therefore be shown that death can be grasped, and that as a consequence the entirety of Dasein can be grasped along with it” (ibid., 62). [”Es muß also gezeigt werden, daß der \textit{Tod erfassbar} und damit das Dasein \textit{als Ganzes erfassbar} ist.” Stein, ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, 453.]

\textsuperscript{112} For further discussion on Stein’s constructive philosophy of community, see e.g. Mary Catharine Baseheart, ”Infinity in Edith Stein’s Endlies und ewiges Sein”, \textit{Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association} 55 (1981).
reached by engaging in authentic community through action, an action that has as its principle a passive potency, and which thereby demands constant activation.
**Final remarks**

The purpose of this essay has comprised of three separate tasks. The first has been to disclose the crucial disparities that exist between Stein and Heidegger and to offer indications regarding how Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as transcendence is ineluctably intertwined with her critique of his social ontology. The second aim has been to account for how Stein dislocates with Heidegger’s definition of Dasein’s transcendence, and to index the resulting alterations in the understanding of otherness in general, and sociality in particular, that this gives rise to. The third aim has been to show that both Stein’s critique of Heidegger and her development of his philosophical concepts in this area are essentially of a philosophical and phenomenological character rather than being strictly theological.

For the most part, this essay has been devoted to an unravelling of the ways in which Stein distinguishes herself from Heidegger in the existential-philosophical tradition. By systematically and thematically exploring this theme in Stein’s essay “Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” I have managed to derive aspects of Stein’s line of thought that do not only shed new light on the depths of her critique of Being and Time and on the contemporaneous reception of Heidegger, but that also contributes to a further deepening and broadening of the critical reception of Heidegger in our own time.

Stein opposes the way Heidegger transcends phenomenology when he ascribes to Dasein absolute freedom in the abyssal yet self-transcending experience of the authentic own in anxiety. By trying to overcome dichotomies such as body and soul, essence and existence or potentiality and actuality, Heidegger indulges in what Stein calls naïve realism, lacking the concepts of community and creatorship. On the same grounds, Stein criticises his universal yet singularising concept of death. If Dasein can never experience another’s death, then how can we have knowledge of the existence of other kinds of human beings, other beings-towards-death?

Thus, Stein turns towards what could be described as a phenomenology of transcendence. By redefining, at one and the same time, Dasein’s temporal and spatial experience of lack and self-transcendence in anxiety as transcendence towards something fuller than the own being, Stein incorporates into Heideggerian thought the possibility of a being beyond Dasein, both on a general and the particular level. She equates, on the one hand, the possibility of being beyond the human kind of being with divine being, and, on the other hand, being beyond the singular human kind of being with a communal experience, which makes possible an encounter with authentically other human beings.
In the introduction of this essay I suggested that Stein’s Heidegger essay is not, as James Orr would like to suggest, religiously motivated. Yet, it proves to have a religious horizon parallel with the conclusions regarding sociality. The direct relation between divinity and community, which results from Dasein’s concern for fulfilment in Stein’s philosophy, speaks of a social ontology that cannot be separated from her theological conclusions. Authentic otherness in the social field remains as tangible as the existence of God for Stein, as both the knowledge of other kinds of beings and the knowledge of a fuller kind of being is induced by the phenomenological experience of fullness through the experience of lack and finitude in anxiety. Sociality and faith are thus inextricably entwined. Nonetheless, I have shown that neither sociality nor faith ”operates as a lodestar” for Stein’s philosophical enterprise in ”Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy” – while both phenomena are necessary, they are also secondary to Stein’s phenomenological understanding of Dasein’s transcendence.

Why Stein so decisively equates being beyond the human kind of being with either divine being or other human beings is never properly explained. Other spheres of being seem to be excluded or presupposed from the start. Heidegger’s two concepts of being-present-at-hand and being-ready-to-hand are only briefly discussed in Stein’s preliminary analysis of Dasein, and neither vegetative nor animal being is mentioned at all in the essay. Whether, for instance, animal beings are capable of anxiety, and thus of sociality (and faith) remains unquestioned by Stein. Nonetheless, she pushes on the importance of constantly questioning other ways of being without expecting an answer in the same manner as a human being answers. Diverging from Heidegger’s way of dissolving meaning in understanding, Stein formulates her own philosophy pointing not only towards the possibility of being beyond Dasein, but ultimately towards the possibility of meaningful being beyond understanding, sustained by the active engagement in community.
Sources


